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[p23] The Court,
composed as above,
delivers the following judgment:
[1] By an Application instituting proceedings, filed with the Registry of
the Court on July 12th, 1931, in accordance with Article 40 of the Statute
and Article 35 of the Rules of Court, the Royal Danish Government, relying
on the optional clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, brought
before the Permanent Court of International Justice a suit against the Royal
Norwegian Government on the ground that the latter Government had, on July
10th, 1931, published a proclamation declaring that it had proceeded to
occupy certain territories in Eastern Greenland, which, in the contention of
the Danish Government, were subject to the sovereignty of the Crown of
Denmark. The Application, after thus indicating the subject of the dispute,
proceeds, subject to the subsequent presentation of any cases, counter-cases
and any other documents or evidence, to formulate the claim by asking the
Court for judgment to the effect that "the promulgation of the
above-mentioned declaration of occupation and any steps taken in this
respect by the Norwegian Government constitute a violation of the existing
legal situation and are accordingly unlawful and invalid".
[7] Further, the Danish Government, in the Application, reserves the right,
in the first place, to apply to the Court, should circumstances require it,
for the indication of interim measures for the protection of its rights and,
in the second place, to ask the Court to decide as to the nature of the
reparation due to the Danish Government in consequence of the Norwegian
Government's act of which it complains.
[8] On July 13th, 1931, notice of the Application was given to the Norwegian
Government; on July 14th, the communications [p24] provided for in Article
40 of the Statute and Article 36 of the Rules of Court were despatched and
were sent to all States entitled to appear before the Court, including the
United States of America.
[9] As the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the
Parties, the Danish and Norwegian Governments availed themselves of their
right, under Article 31 of the Statute, each to appoint a judge ad hoc.
[10] By an Order made on August 6th, 1931, the Court fixed the times for the
presentation of the Case, Counter-Case, Reply and Rejoinder in the suit, in
accordance with a proposal made jointly by the Parties' Agents on August
4th, 1931. By an Order made on June 18th, 1932, at the request of the Danish
Government, the time-limit originally fixed for the presentation of the
Reply was extended, and the Norwegian Government was given the right to ask
for a corresponding extension of the time-limit fixed for the Rejoinder; the
latter Government availed itself of this right, and accordingly the
time-limit last mentioned expired on October 14th, 1932. The various
documents of the written proceedings having been duly filed within the
time-limits as finally fixed, the suit thus became ready for hearing on
October 14th, 1932.
[11] In the Danish Case, the Danish Government, in conformity with Article
40 of the Rules of Court, asks, as stated in the Application, for judgment
to the effect that
"the promulgation of the declaration of occupation above mentioned and any
steps taken in this connection by the Norwegian Government constitute a
violation of the existing legal situation and are accordingly unlawful and
invalid".
[12] Under the same Article of the Rules of Court, the Norwegian Government,
in its Counter-Case, asks for judgment to the effect that
"Denmark has no sovereignty over Eirik Raudes Land;
Norway has acquired the sovereignty over Eirik Raudes Land; The Danish
Government should bear the costs incurred by the Norwegian Government in
this case".
[7] The Danish Government, in its Reply, repeats the sub-missions made in
its Case, but also prays the Court to reject the submission made in the
Norwegian Counter-Case and to adjudge
"that the Norwegian. Government shall bear the costs incurred by the Danish
Government in this case". [p25]
[8] The Norwegian Government repeats in its Rejoinder the submissions made
in its Counter-Case.
[9] In the course of a series of public sittings held between November 21st,
1932, and February 7th, 1933, the Court heard the statements, replies,
rejoinders and observations presented by:
MM. B�g, as Advocate, Gustav Rasmussen, as Deputy-Advocate, M. Steglich-Petersen,
Agent, and by M. Charles de Visscher, as Advocate and Counsel, on behalf of
Denmark,
and MM. Per Rygh and Arne Sunde, Agents and Counsel, and by M. Gilbert Gidel,
as Counsel and Advocate, on behalf of Norway.
[10] At the conclusion of the respective statements, the Parties Agents
presented the submissions of the Governments represented by them as follows
:
M. de Scavenius, on behalf of the Danish Government:
"May it please the Court,
To reject as unfounded the three submissions in the Norwegian Counter-Case
of March 12th and 15th, 1932;
To give judgment to the effect that the declaration of occupation
promulgated by the Norwegian Government on July 10th, 1931, and any steps
taken in this connection by that Government, constitute a violation of the
existing legal situation and are, accordingly, unlawful and invalid;
To decide that the Norwegian Government shall bear the costs incurred by the
Danish Government in this case."
[11] M. Bull, on behalf of the Norwegian Government:
"May it please the Court,
To reject the submissions presented by the Danish Government;
To adjudge and declare that Denmark has no sovereignty over Eirik Raudes
Land;
That Norway has acquired the sovereignty over Eirik Raudes Land;
That the Danish Government shall bear the costs incurred by the Norwegian
Government in this case."
[12] A large number of documents, including memorials or opinions on special
points, and maps were filed on behalf of each of the Parties, either as
annexes to the documents of the written proceedings or in the course of the
hearings.
[13] The Agent and Counsel for the Norwegian Government, in the course of
his oral rejoinder, adduced certain new documents, whereupon the Agent for
the Danish Government, invoking Articles 48 and 52 of the Statute, prayed
the Court to refuse to accept "the fresh facts adduced in the rejoinder".
The point having thus been raised, and having regard also to certain
reservations made on behalf of Norway respecting fresh documents used in the
Danish oral reply, the Court [p26] reserved the right to refuse the fresh
documents produced on either side in the oral reply and rejoinder and to
give the Danish Agent an opportunity of presenting observations on the fresh
documents produced in the rejoinder. M. Steglich-Petersen was in fact
permitted to comment on the documents in question and thereupon withdrew his
Government's objection to this admission. Accordingly, the Court declares
that, in so far as the terms of Article 52 of the Statute are applicable to
the evidence produced by one of the Parties to the case, the consent of the
other Party, which is required under that Article, may be regarded as having
been obtained.
[14] The submission of the case being in all respects regular, these are the
circumstances in which the Court is now called upon to give judgment.
***
[15] According to the royal Norwegian proclamation of July 10th, 1931, which
gave rise to the present dispute, the "country" the "taking possession" of
which "is officially confirmed" and which is "placed under Norwegian
sovereignty" is "situated between Carlsberg Fjord on the South and Bessel
Fjord on the North, in Eastern Greenland", and extends from latitude 71� 30'
to 75� 40' N.
[16] By "Eastern Greenland" is meant the eastern coast of Greenland.
[17] It must have been intended that on the eastern side the sea and on the
western side the "Inland Ice" should constitute the limits of the area
occupied under the proclamation of July 10th, though the proclamation itself
is silent on the subject. Indeed, Counsel for the Danish Government was
disposed to criticize the validity of the proclamation because of the
absence of any western limit of the occupation. This is a point, however,
which in view of the conclusions reached by the Court need not be pursued.
[18] Greenland, which extends from latitude 59� 46' to 83� 39' N. and from
longitude 73� to 10� 33' W., and the southernmost point of which is in about
longitude 630 W. of Greenwich, has a total area of about 2,200,000 square
kilometres; five sixths of this area are covered by the "Inland Ice", so
that only a narrow strip of varying width along the coasts is free of
permanent ice. It should be added that only in the last years of the XIXth
century was it definitely established that Greenland is not connected by
land with the other parts of the continent of America, i.e. that Greenland
is an island. [p27]
[19] The climate and character of Greenland are those of an Arctic country.
The "Inland Ice" is difficult to traverse, and parts of the coast -
particularly of the East coast - are for months together difficult of access
owing to the influence of the Polar current and the stormy winds on the
icebergs and the floe ice and owing to the frequent spells of bad weather.
[20] According to the information supplied to the Court by the Parties, it
was about the year 900 A. D. that Greenland was discovered. The country was
colonized about a century later. The best known of the colonists was Eric
the Red, who was an inhabitant of Iceland of Norwegian origin ; it was at
that time that two settlements called Eystribygd and Vestribygd were founded
towards the southern end of the western coast. These settlements appear to
have existed as an independent State for some time, but became tributary to
the kingdom of Norway in the XIIIth century. These settlements had
disappeared before 1500.
[21] Information as to these early Nordic settlements and as to the extent
to which the settlers dominated the remainder of the country is very scanty.
It seems clear that the settlers made hunting journeys far to the North on
the western coast, and records exist of at least one expedition to places on
the East coast. The historian, or saga writer, Sturla Thordarson tells
(about 1261) how the men of Greenland undertook to pay tribute, and how, for
every man murdered, a fine should be payable to the King whether the dead
man was a Norwegian or a Greenlander and whether killed in the settlements
or in the districts to which people went for the summer even as far North as
under the Pole Star.
[22] In 1380, the kingdoms of Norway and Denmark were united under the same
Crown; the character of this union, which lasted until 1814, changed to some
extent in the course of time, more particularly as a result of the
centralization at Copenhagen of the administration of the various countries
which were under the sovereignty of the Dano-Norwegian Crown. This evolution
seems to have obliterated to some extent the separation which had existed
between them from a constitutional standpoint. On the other hand, there is
nothing to show that during this period Greenland, in so far as it
constituted a dependency of the Crown, should not be regarded as a Norwegian
possession.
[23] The disappearance of the Nordic colonies did not put an end to the
King's pretensions to the sovereignty over Greenland.
[24] The Norwegian Counter-Case describes the succeeding period as an era of
unsuccessful efforts on the part of the Catholic Church, of the Kings of
Norway and Denmark and of their subjects, to renew relations with the
Norwegian colonies of [p28] Western Greenland. The passports delivered by
the King to the leader of two such expeditions - Godske Lindenow, a Danish
subject - at the beginning of the XVIIth century indicate the voyage as "ad
terram nostram Grunlandiam". Some Eskimos brought back from Greenland in
1605 are described by the King as "Our subjects". In 1635, in a letter
addressed to the King of France, Christian IV describes Greenland as "a
divis nostris antecessoribus Regibus Norvegice ad Nos devoluta". In 1636,
the King gives a concession to the Burgomaster and certain citizens of
Copenhagen for a monopoly of the navigation and trading in Greenland and
gives directions as to their dealing with "Notre pauvre peuple, Nos sujets
et habitants dudit pays [FN1]". In 1666, Frederick III is said to have added
a bear to the arms of the Danish Monarchy as the emblem of Greenland.
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[FN1] Translation supplied by the Danish Government
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[25] Similarly, foreign countries appear to have acquiesced in the claims of
the King of Denmark. Both the States-General of the United Provinces in 1631
and the King of France in 1636 intimated that they did not dispute the
claims; and, by the Treaty of Lund of September 27th, 1679 (7th Secret
Article), Sweden recognized the ancient rights and claims of the King of
Denmark over Greenland and the adjacent seas and coasts.
[26] It is alleged on behalf of Norway that at this time the word
"Greenland" was used to denote all the countries bordering on the seas to
the North, including Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla, as well as what is now
called Greenland. It appears that at this date there were in Spitzbergen no
native inhabitants, so that when mention is made of Eskimos brought back
from Greenland, as happened in 1605, it must be the Greenland in the
narrower sense that is referred to.
[27] Though at this time no colonies or settlements existed in Greenland,
contact with it was not entirely lost, because the waters surrounding it,
especially on the East coast, were regularly visited by whalers, and the
maps of the period show that the existence and the general configuration of
Greenland, including the East coast, were by no means unknown.
[28] At the beginning of the XVIIIth century, closer relations were once
more established between Greenland and the countries whence the former
European settlements on its coasts had originated. In 1721, the pastor Hans
Egede, of Bergen in Norway, formed a "Greenland Company", went to Greenland
as a missionary and founded a new colony there, which was soon followed by
other settlements. In 1723, this Company was granted a concession placing at
its disposal for twenty-five years "the whole country of Greenland" - the
King simply reserving his "sovereignty, absolutum dominium and hereditary
[p29] rights". The Company was, however, dissolved and, after an interval
during which the State itself took over the conduct of Greenland affairs by
means of a "Greenland Department" attached to the Royal Chancellory, a fresh
concession was granted in 1734 to a certain Jacob Severin. In 1740, just
before the renewal of this concession - which comprised a prohibition,
applicable both to the King's subjects and to foreigners, of trading and
navigation in Greenland contrary to the terms of the concession - the King
formed a "Greenland Commission" to which he entrusted matters arising out of
the concession. Furthermore, on the occasion of the renewal of the
concession, the King issued an Ordinance on April 9th, 1740, prohibiting any
person, whether a subject or a foreigner, from doing business in breach of
Severin's concession in the colonies already established in Greenland or to
be established thereafter, provided that the situation and limits of the
colonies (which were in general to extend to fifteen miles on either side of
each colony) were first published. The Ordinance also prohibited all persons
from robbing the Greenlanders or committing any acts of violence against
them in any place in Greenland, whether by land or sea.
[29] Severin's concession finally expired in 1750. In the following year, a
concession was granted to the already existing "General Trading Company" of
Copenhagen. The exclusive privileges to be enjoyed by the Company were
enforced by an Ordinance of March 26th, 1751, enacting penalties against
persons acting in breach of the concession in terms very similar to those of
the Ordinance of 1740. Another Ordinance of April 22nd, 1758, confirmed the
previous one, but extended its scope by including, in addition to the
"Colonies and factories already established or subsequently to be
established", "other ports and localities in general without differentiation
or exception".
[30] In 1774, the State itself once more took over the Greenland trade,
which it administered by means of an autonomous "Board", and the King, on
March 18th, 1776, issued an Ordinance, which is still in force and which
repeats the provisions of the previous instruments in very similar terms.
The concessions previously granted to private persons were bestowed upon a
privileged Trading Administration. Since then the Greenland trade has been a
monopoly of the State of Denmark. In 1781, "Regulations" were made dividing
"the country" into a northern and a southern district; the "inspectors" set
over these districts were not only entrusted with the supervision of the
monopoly's trade, but were also given powers of general administration.
[31] During this period, settlements were established described as colonies,
factories or stations, along the West coast between [p30] latitude 60� 42'
and 72� 47' N. ; according to the Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, the
"Colonies and factories" then existing extended from latitude 60� to 73� N.
Attempts to reach the East coast and effect a landing there were made from
the West coast of the island, but led to no results.
[32] In the contention of Norway, the above-mentioned instruments, when they
speak of Greenland in general, mean the colonized part of the West coast
referred to above; Denmark, on the contrary, maintains that the expressions
in question relate to Greenland in the geographical sense of the word, i.e.
to the whole island of Greenland.
[33] The Napoleonic era profoundly affected the international status of the
Scandinavian countries, and also that of Greenland. After Sweden had ceded
Finland to Russia (1809), the policy of the Allies against France made it
possible for Sweden to obtain the cession of the kingdom of Norway which
until then had been united to Denmark, who had supported France. By a series
of conventions concluded in 1812 and 1813, Russia, Great Britain and Prussia
supported Sweden's aspirations. After the Franco-Danish alliance had been
renewed on July 10th, 1813, and war had broken out between Denmark, on the
one hand, and Sweden and her allies, on the other, the battle of Leipzig
(October 1813) led to the triumph of the Allied cause and the Swedish army
compelled Denmark to sign the Peace Treaty of Kiel, dated January 14th,
1814, the fourth Article of which provided for the cession to Sweden of the
kingdom of Norway, excluding however Greenland, the F�roe Isles and Iceland.
[34] The two relevant paragraphs of Article 4 of the Treaty of Kiel run as
follows [FN1]:
"Article IV. - His Majesty the King of Denmark, for himself and his
successors, renounces for ever and irrevocably all his rights and claims on
the kingdom of Norway, together with possession of the Bishopricks and
Dioceses of Christians and, Bergenhuus, Aggerhuus, and Drontheim, besides
Nordland and Finmark, as far as the frontiers of the Russian empire.
These bishopricks, dioceses, and provinces, constituting the kingdom of
Norway, with their inhabitants, towns, harbours, fortresses, villages, and
islands, along the whole coast of that kingdom, together with their
dependencies (Greenland, the Ferroe Isles, and Iceland, excepted) ; as well
as all privileges, rights, and emoluments there belonging, shall belong in
full and sovereign property to the King of Sweden, and make one with his
united kingdom." [p31]
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[FN1] Translation as printed in the "Annual Register" for 1814.
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[35] At the end of 1814, the necessary steps were taken with a view to the
complete liquidation of all matters arising out of the Union between Denmark
and Norway. After protracted negotiations, this liquidation was effected by
a Convention signed at Stockholm on September 1st, 1819, between Denmark of
the one part and the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway of the other part.
It will be necessary, in the later part of the present judgment, to revert
to the events of 1814 to 1819, as they are of special importance in regard
to the dispute concerning Greenland.
[36] In the course of the XIXth century and the early years of the XXth, the
coasts of Greenland were entirely explored. For the purposes of the present
case, it is only necessary to note two dates: first, in 1822 the Scottish
whaler Scoresby made the first landing by a European in the territory
covered by the Norwegian declaration of occupation; secondly, about 1900,
thanks to the voyages of the American Peary, the insular character of
Greenland was established. It is admitted by Norway that from the time of
Scoresby's landing the East coast forms part of the known portion of
Greenland.
[37] Several Danish expeditions explored portions of the non-colonized part
of Greenland during the XIXth century; first in 1829-1830, the Graah
expedition explored the East coast south of Angmagssalik. Approximately the
same part of the East coast was again explored in 1883-1885 by the Holm
expedition which led, after some years, to the colonization, in 1894, of
Angmagssalik. The Ryder expedition in 1891-1892 explored Scoresby Sound and
the coast to the north of this fjord, i.e. a part of the coast occupied by
Norway in 1931. In 1898-1900, the Amdrup expedition explored the very
inaccessible coast between Angmagssalik and a point near the southern limit
of the territory occupied in 1931. In 1906-1908, the "Danmark Expedition"
explored the whole of the equally difficult East coast north of a point near
the northern end of the territory occupied in 1931 and north-wards to the
point reached by Peary when he explored the coast from the western side. In
1926-1927, the Lauge Koch expedition explored the coast between Scoresby
Sound and Danmarkshavn comprising the whole of the territory occupied in
1931. It results from this short summary that the whole East coast has been
explored by Danish expeditions. There were, in addition, many non-Danish
expeditions.
[38] In 1863, the Danish Government granted to Mr. J. W. Tayler, an
Englishman, an exclusive concession for thirty years to enable him to
establish on the East coast of [p32] Greenland "stations for the purpose of
trading with the natives, hunting, fishing, or working any metalliferous or
other mineral-bearing mines there discovered, or engaging in any other
business which he may consider to his advantage"; any station of this kind
which might thus be established ."to the north or south of the 65th degree
of latitude North" was to be placed "under the sovereignty of the Danish
Crown". All the papers with regard to the granting of the Tayler concession
have been submitted to the Court at the request of the Norwegian Agent.
[39] The Tayler concession led to no practical result.; The concessionnaire
was not able to establish any stations on the East coast.
[40] Between 1854 and 1886, applications were made to the Danish Government
for the grant of several other concessions for the erection of
telegraph-lines in or across Greenland, or for the grant of mining
concessions. Some of these were granted, some were refused. They all use the
term "Greenland" without qualification, and one at least provides for a
survey for a telegraph-line across Greenland from the eastern to the western
coast. These concessions also led to no practical result.
[41] In 1894, at Angmagssalik, in latitude 65� 36' N., the first Danish
settlement on the East coast was established. In accordance with the
provisions of the Ordinance of 1776, mention of which has already been made,
the foundation of this "mission and trading station" was "made public" by a
Decree of October 10th, 1894, notice of which was given to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Norway by a note from the Danish Minister at
Stockholm; notice of the Decree was also given to the governments of some
other States. The papers in connection with the establishment of this
settlement have also been laid before the Court and are of some importance,
as will subsequently appear.
[42] As regards the limits of the colonized territory on the West coast of
Greenland, these were already in 1814 held to extend from latitude 60� to
latitude 73� N. These limits, which had already been established by the
Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, were confirmed by a Proclamation ("Notice to
Mariners") of May 8th, 1884. On March 8th, 1905, however, a fresh
Proclamation was published to the effect that "the Danish colonies on the
West coast of Greenland .... extend from latitude 60� to latitude 74� 30'
N.". Notice of the Proclamation was given on November 29th, 1905, to the
Norwegian Minister [p33] for Foreign Affairs by the Danish Minister at
Christiania [FN1]; it was observed, in the Danish note, that this involved
an extension by a degree and a half of the limit fixed in the "Proclamation
of 1884".
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[FN1] The name of the capital of Norway was altered to Oslo on January 1st,
1925. It is so described in the judgment in connection with events
subsequent to that date.
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[43] In 1909, a private Danish society established a mission station on the
Northwest coast of Greenland, at Cape York, in latitude 76� 32' N. ; in the
following year, a trading and research station known as "Thule" was founded
in the same locality by Danish explorers. Apparently, no notice of the
foundation of these stations was given to the Powers. Finally, in 1925,
another Danish trading and mission station was established on the East coast
at Scoresby Sound, in about latitude 70� 30' N. No special notice was given
of the establishment of this station.
[44] In 1905, a Decree was issued by the Danish Minister of the Interior,
fixing the limits of the territorial waters round Greenland. The limits
within which the fishing was stated to be reserved for Danish subjects were
to be drawn at a distance of three marine miles along the whole coast of
Greenland.
[45] In 1908, a law was promulgated by Denmark relating to the
administration of Greenland. The colonies on the West coast were divided
into two districts, a northern and a southern.
[46] In 1921, a Decree was issued, running as follows [FN2]:
"In pursuance of His Majesty's authority dated the 6th instant, and with
reference to the Royal Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, know all men that
Danish Trading, Mission and Hunting Stations have been established on the
East and West coasts of Greenland, with the result that the whole of that
country is henceforth linked up with Danish colonies and stations under the
authority of the Danish Administration of Greenland.
Done at the Ministry of the Interior, May 10th, 1921."
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[FN2] Translation from the French text supplied by the Danish Government.
The translation supplied by the Norwegian Government reads as follows:
"In terms of His Majesty's authority dated the 6th instant, and with
reference to the Royal Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, know all men that
Danish Trading, Mission and Hunting stations have been established on the
East and West coasts of Greenland, so that the whole of that country is
henceforth linked up with Danish colonies and stations and with the Danish
Administration of Greenland.
Done at the Ministry of the Interior, May 10th, 1921."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[p34]
[47] This Decree was notified to the Powers during June and July. It was
followed on June 16th, 1921, by a Proclamation (Notice to Mariners)
concerning navigation in the seas around Greenland, to the effect that the
closing of the island to Danish and foreign ships extended to "the whole of
the coasts and islands pertaining to Greenland".
[48] Reference to these Decrees must again be made later.
[49] Throughout this period and up to the present time, the practice of the
Danish Government in concluding bilateral commercial conventions or when
participating in multilateral conventions relating to economic questions -
such as those concluded since 1921 under the auspices of the League of
Nations - has been to secure the insertion of a stipulation excepting
Greenland from the operation of the convention. Only in one case - that of
the conventions concluded with Japan on February 12th, 1912 - is the
exception or the reservation otherwise than in favour of "Greenland" or the
"territory of Greenland" without qualification; in the conventions with
Japan, the exception is in favour of "the Danish colonies in Greenland".
[50] With particular regard to the territory covered by the Norwegian
declaration of occupation of July 10th, 1931, certain circumstances invoked
by the Parties concerning the exploitation of the country are to be noted.
[51] In 1919, the "Eastern Greenland Company" was founded at Copenhagen;
this was a limited company with extensive . resources at its disposal, and
its aim was to conduct hunting operations in the zone between Scoresby Sound
and Germaniahavn (latitude 70� 30' to 77� N.). The resources of this
company, which built a number of houses and hunting cabins in the district
in order that its hunters might winter there, were exhausted by 1924 and its
operations ceased. The Danish Government, which had taken over the company's
stations, conceded the use of them to a new hunting company founded in 1929,
the Nanok Company, which carried on the operations of the former company.
The Nanok Company's principal station is equipped with wireless.
[52] As regards Norwegian activities, in addition to visits to the East
coast paid periodically during the summer from 1889 onwards, expeditions
wintered in the territory in question in 1908 and 1909, and again in 1922
and in 1926 and the ensuing years. The expedition of 1922 established a
provisional wireless station at Mygg-Bukta (Mackenzie Bay), but the Danish
Government made a protest immediately against its erection. Owing to the
loss of a ship, this station ceased [p35] working in the following year. It
began to function again in 1926, and since then this Mygg-Bukta station has
been working regularly. Since 1929 both hunting operations and the wireless
service have been carried on by a Norwegian company, the Arktis
n�ringsdrift. The various Norwegian expeditions also have built a large
number of houses and cabins in the disputed territory.
[53] During the XIXth century, while the Danish Government made a practice
of excluding "Greenland", without qualification, from the commercial
conventions it concluded and in other ways acted upon the assumption that
Danish sovereignty extended to the whole of Greenland, opinions were
occasionally expressed by private persons in Denmark interested in Greenland
to the effect that the absence of effective occupation of the uncolonized
parts exposed the territory to the risk of permanent occupation by some
foreign State. Thus, in 1823, after the landing of Scoresby on the East
coast, a M. Wormskj�ld - who was a naturalist and an expert in Greenland
affairs - was consulted by the Danish Minister of State and addressed to him
a letter indicating the weakness of the Danish position and the contentions
which a foreign Power might adduce in favour of a right to occupy the
eastern coast. It was, perhaps, as a result of this communication from M.
Wormskj�ld that in 1829 the expedition mentioned above under a naval officer
named Graah was sent to visit the East coast; but no policy of colonization
was then initiated.
[54] Interest in Greenland, however, was gradually increasing in Denmark,
and in 1878 the Danish Government set up a Commission for the study of the
natural and ethnographic phenomena of Greenland. This Commission has
published a large number of volumes containing reports on many questions
connected with Greenland, including the results of the scientific and
exploring and cartographic expeditions to the country.
[55] At the beginning of the present century, opinion again began to be
manifested in favour of the more effective occupation of the uncolonized
areas in Greenland, in order that the risk of foreign settlement might be
obviated.
[56] During the Great War of 1914 to 1918, Denmark by treaty ceded to the
United States of America her West Indian Islands - the Danish Antilles -
and, during the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, broached to
the American Secretary of State - [p36] at first in conversation and
subsequently, on December 27th, 1915, by a written communication - the
question of the extension of Danish activities throughout all Greenland. As
the result, the United States signed on August 4th, 1916, the same day as
the treaty for the cession of the Antilles, a declaration to the effect that
the United States would not object to the Danish Government extending their
political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.
[57] On July 12th, 1919, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs instructed
the Danish Minister at Christiania that a Committee had just been
constituted at the Peace Conference "for the purpose of considering the
claims that may be put forward by different countries to Spitzbergen", and
that the Danish Government would be prepared to renew before this Committee
the unofficial assurance already given (on April 2nd, 1919) to the Norwegian
Government, according to which Denmark, having no special interests at stake
in Spitzbergen, would raise no objection to Norway's claims upon that
archipelago. In making this statement to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the Danish Minister was to point out "that the Danish Government
had been anxious for some years past to obtain the recognition by all the
interested Powers of Denmark's sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, and
that she intended to place that question before the above-mentioned
Committee" ; and, further, that the Danish Government felt confident that
the extension of its political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland "would not encounter any difficulties on the part of the Norwegian
Government".
[58] On July 14th, 1919, the Danish Minister saw M. Ihlen, the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who merely replied on this occasion "that the
question would be considered". The Norwegian Minister recorded his
conversation with the Danish representative in a minute, the accuracy of
which has not been disputed by the Danish Government. On July 22nd
following, M. Ihlen made a statement to the Danish Minister to the effect
"that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the
settlement of this question" (i.e. the question raised on July 14th by the
Danish Government). These are the words recorded in the minute by M. Ihlen
himself. According to the report made by the Danish Minister to his own
Government, M. Ihlen's words were that "the plans of the Royal [Danish]
Government respecting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland ....
would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway". It is this [p37]
statement by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs which is described
in this judgment as the "Ihlen declaration".
[59] In 1920, the Danish Government approached the Governments in London,
Paris, Rome and Tokyo with a view to obtaining assurances from these
Governments on the subject of the recognition of Denmark's sovereignty over
the whole of Greenland. Each of those Governments replied in terms which
satisfied the Danish Government - which thereupon, in 1921, approached the
Swedish and Norwegian Governments as the only other Governments interested.
The communication to the Swedish Government was dated January 13th, and that
to the Norwegian Government January 18th.
[60] The Swedish Government made no difficulty. The Norwegian Government was
not prepared to adopt the same attitude unless it received an undertaking
from the Danish Government that the liberty of hunting and fishing on the
East coast (outside the limits of the colony of Angmagssalik), which
Norwegians had hitherto enjoyed, should not be interfered with. This
undertaking the Danish Government was unwilling to give, as it alleges that
it would have involved a reversal of the policy which Denmark had hitherto
followed of endeavouring to shield the Eskimo people of Greenland on grounds
of health from uncontrolled contact with white races; such a policy could
not be maintained unless control could be exercised over those having access
to the territory.
[61] The terms of the correspondence in which the Danish Government sought
and received assurances from the interested Powers as to Denmark's position
in Greenland, are so important that they will be discussed in detail later.
[62] As regards the discussion with the Norwegian Government: as soon as it
became clear that the Norwegian Government was unwilling to give the desired
assurances, the Danish Government, in May 1921, instructed its Minister at
Christiania that no further application was to be made and said that it
would rest content with the verbal undertaking given by M. Ihlen in 1919.
The Decree of May 10th, 1921, referred to above, was then issued. The reason
given for acting somewhat hastily was that May 12th was the 200th
anniversary of the day when Hans Egede sailed from Bergen to found his
colonies in Greenland and the occasion was to be marked by suitable
solemnities.
[63] During the latter half of the year 1921 and during the two succeeding
years, diplomatic correspondence continued [p38]." between the Danish and
Norwegian Governments. This correspondence need not be described in detail.
The general effect of it is to show the points on which the two Governments
were at issue.
[64] On the Danish side there was evinced willingness to make every effort
to satisfy the desire of the Norwegian Government that Norwegians should be
able to continue to fish and hunt on the East coast of Greenland but a
determination not to give way on the claim to sovereignty. On the Norwegian
side it was gradually made clear that, in the opinion of the Norwegian
Government, the uncolonized part of the East coast of Greenland was a terra
nullius, and that Denmark's political aspirations could only be met if it
involved no sacrifice of Norwegian economic interests. This disagreement,
however, on the point of principle as to the status of the territory did not
exclude a mutual desire to find a practical solution of the fishing and
hunting questions.
[65] On July 13th, 1923, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed
the Danish Minister at Christiania that, on the 7th of that month, the
Storting had passed a resolution calling on the Norwegian Government "to
invite the Danish Government to enter into negotiations on the question of
Greenland, the said negotiations to be conducted on a free basis between
representatives specially appointed for that purpose by the two countries".
The Danish Government accepted the invitation (note of July 30th, 1923); the
two Governments agreed that the negotiations would have the effect of
suspending the exchange of views through diplomatic channels, but that, in
case they proved unsuccessful, the legal situation would remain unaffected.
[66] Negotiations began in September 1923. In their early stages, they
covered the Greenland question generally, but as they progressed, points on
which no agreement could be reached were eliminated. On January 28th, 1924,
the negotiations resulted in the approval of a draft agreement, which the
delegations recommended for adoption by their respective Governments. On
July 9th, 1924, the latter signed a Convention applicable to the whole
eastern coast of Greenland, excepting the district of Angmagssalik (and, in
a certain eventuality, that of Scoresby Sound); the Convention was to come
into force as from July 10th, 1924, for a first period of twenty years.
[67] Under Article 2, ships were to have free access to the East coast, and
their crews and persons on board were given the right to land, to winter in
the territory and [p39] to hunt and fish. Under Article 5, the erection of
meteorological, telegraphic and telephonic stations was authorized.
[68] Simultaneously with the Convention, notes were signed by each
Government to the effect that it signed the Convention in order to avoid
disputes and to strengthen friendly relations between the two Powers, and
that it reserved its opinion on questions concerning Greenland not dealt
with in the Convention, so that by the Convention nothing was prejudged,
abandoned or lost.
[69] It is apparent from the documents filed with the Court, in particular
from the Protocol signed at the twelfth and last meeting of the delegations
held at Christiania on January 28th, 1924, that the chief points that these
notes had in view were: the Danish contention that Denmark possessed full
and entire sovereignty over the whole of Greenland and that Norway had
recognized that sovereignty, and the Norwegian contention that all the parts
of Greenland which had not been occupied in such a manner as to bring them
effectively under the administration of the Danish Government were in the
condition of terra nullius, and that if they ceased to be terrce nullius
they must pass under Norwegian sovereignty.
[70] On July 8th, 1924, the Danish Directorate of the Greenland Colonies
issued a Decree dated July 5th, adverting to the Proclamation of June 16th,
1921, referred to above, and announcing that the Danish Government would
permit Danish vessels and persons on board of them to navigate "until
further notice" to the territory (which was subsequently specified in detail
by the Convention of July 9th), subject to conditions which were identical
with those laid down later in the Convention; the Decree added that the
permission granted would be applicable also to nationals, vessels and
companies of Iceland and of foreign nations with which the Danish Government
should conclude an agreement. This act occasioned reservations on the part
of the Norwegian Government.
[71] On April 1st, 1925, the Danish Government promulgated a law "on fishing
and hunting in Greenland waters", etc.; this was followed, on April r8th, by
a law "concerning the administration of Greenland". The former law - which
served as the basis for a Proclamation ("Notice to Mariners") dated May
22nd, 1925, by the Greenland Directorate "on navigation in the seas around
Greenland" - reserved this hunting and fishing in Greenland waters
exclusively for Danish subjects (including Eskimos) settled in Greenland,
and for persons obtaining special licences, subject to the terms of the
above-mentioned Decree of July 5th, 1924 (which contains in substance the
provisions of the Convention of the 9th of that [p40] month). The second law
divided Greenland, from an administrative point of view, into three
provinces, and laid down that "all commercial activities in Greenland are
reserved to the Danish State under the direction of the Ministry of the
Interior". On August 8th, 1925, Norway made "categorical reservations"
against the latter law, "in so far as it applies to regions where the
sovereignty of Denmark has not hitherto been demonstrated".
[72] During the year 1925, the British and French Governments requested the
Danish Government to grant most-favoured-nation treatment i.e. the treatment
accorded to Norwegian subjects by the Convention of July 9th, 1924 to their
respective subjects in Eastern Greenland. Denmark granted these requests,
and the arrangements concluded on the subject took the form of two exchanges
of notes (notes of April 23rd and June 4th, 1925, and of October 12th and
19th, 1925). When Norway learned of these exchanges of notes, she drew the
attention of Great Britain and France, on September 25th and November 2nd,
1925, to the fact that "she had not recognized Danish sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland"; the Norwegian Government caused the Danish Government
to be informed of this step. Similar communications were also made by the
Norwegian Government to all the other Powers whom it regarded as being
interested.
[73] Subsequently, the question of Danish sovereignty over the eastern coast
of Greenland appears not to have been raised for nearly five years. But, in
the summer of 1930, the Norwegian Government conferred police powers on
certain Norwegian nationals "for the inspection of the Norwegian hunting
stations in Eastern Greenland". Denmark became uneasy at this action, and
intimated to the Norwegian Government, at first verbally, and afterwards -
on December 26th, 1930 - in writing, that she could not countenance the
granting of regular police powers to Norwegian nationals in territories
situated in Greenland, seeing that these territories were, in the Danish
view, subject to Danish sovereignty. On January 6th, 1931, the Norwegian
Government replied that, in accordance with the standpoint which it had
reserved in its note of July 9th, 1924, Eastern Greenland constituted a
terra nullius, and that, consequently, it was "fully entitled" to invest
Norwegian nationals in this territory with police powers in respect of
Norwegian nationals and other persons domiciled in Norway.
[74] The year 1930 also witnessed the inauguration by Denmark of a "three
years plan" for scientific research in "the central part of Eastern
Greenland, i.e. the district between Scoresby [p41] Sound and Danmarkshavn".
In a note dated February 20th, 1931, from the Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen to the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian
Government pointed out that "this important enterprise, whose object was not
purely scientific but also had a practical aim of colonization, would be
operating in the portion of Eastern Greenland which has been frequented for
many years past by Norwegian hunters .... and where there are Norwegian
interests of particular importance". The note further "strongly urged the
Danish Government, in the interests of both countries, to do everything in
its power to ensure that the Danish 'three years' plan .... should not be
carried out in such a way as to conflict with the provisions of the
Convention concerning Eastern Greenland, or with the legitimate interests of
the Norwegian hunters in that country".
[75] It is in these events of 1930, and in the reactions which they
provoked, that the immediate origin of the present dispute is to be sought.
[76] On March 11th, 1931, the Danish Government replied to the Norwegian
observations on the "three years plan", and on March 14th it informed the
Norwegian Government, linking the question of police powers to that of the
"three years" expedition, "that it thought it necessary, in accordance with
the point of view expressed by the Danish Government in its note of July
9th, 1924, in connection with this expedition to provide for police
supervision, with powers extending to all persons in the territory in
question in Eastern Greenland". A prolonged diplomatic discussion ensued,
during which it seemed as if the Governments were inclining towards an
agreement to refrain from raising during the life of the Convention of 1924
questions concerning the differences on matters of principle which had not
been settled by that Convention, in order to ensure a peaceful development
of the situation in Eastern Greenland. On June 30th, the Norwegian
Government requested the Danish Minister at Oslo to confirm that the Danish
Government was agreed that, during the life of the Convention, no police
authority, whether Norwegian or Danish, should be established in Eastern
Greenland, and that no other act of sovereignty should be accomplished
therein by Norway or by Denmark.
[77] The Danish reply, which was given on July 3rd, was in the negative. The
Danish Government held that the proposed arrangement would go beyond the
limits of the Convention of 1924, and would moreover constitute a
recognition of the contention upheld by Norway in 1924 (the terra nullius
theory) and would be inconsistent with the fundamental standpoint maintained
at that time by Denmark (theory of Danish [p42] sovereignty over the whole
of Greenland). In these circumstances, the Danish Government preferred to
seek a solution for the existing differences in conciliation or in judicial
settlement by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Norwegian
Government consented to submit the question to the Court by a Special
Agreement; it suggested, however, on July 7th, that the Court should be
asked "to adjudicate on the basis of the situation, in fact and in law, as
existing on July 1st, 1931", and that in case the Court should find that
"Denmark had not acquired sovereignty over Greenland or over part thereof",
the Danish Government would not oppose "the acquisition by Norway of
sovereignty over the regions in question".
[78] The Danish Government replied to this suggestion by a note of July
10th, which contains the following passage:
"The Danish Government does not intend, in the course of the examination of
the case, to take any surprise action, or any step calculated to modify the
existing situation at law, provided always that Norway refrains from any
step which would necessitate action on the part of Denmark. The Danish
Government naturally presumes that the Norwegian Government, for its part,
likewise intends to refrain from any such action. The Danish Government is,
however, of opinion that the judgment should be given on the basis of the
general situation, as it has evolved during a long period of time, and is
unable to believe that action taken by either side, in the present
preparatory stage of the case, or during its examination, could in any way
influence the judgment. It regards the Norwegian Government's declaration,
that the situation existing on July 1st should form the basis of the
decision, as evidence that the said Government concurs that no action taken
during the examination of the case could possess decisive importance. For
the rest, the Danish Government holds that it must be left to the Court to
decide what considerations of law or of fact must be taken into account for
a decision of the case [FN1]."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Translation by the Registry from the French translation filed by the
Danish Government
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[79] The Danish Government further proposed in the same note that the
Special Agreement should be drawn up "by direct negotiations between
representatives appointed for that purpose".
[80] In the meanwhile, on June 28th, 1931, certain Norwegian hunters had
hoisted the flag of Norway in Mackenzie Bay in Eastern Greenland, and
announced that they had occupied the territory lying between Carlsberg
Fjord, to the South, and Bessel Fjord, to the North, in the name of the King
of Norway. In reply to a Danish enquiry, occasioned by this [p43] news, the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, on July 1st, that more
detailed information would be obtained from the persons who had carried out
the occupation; that the Government would then decide on its future
attitude; but that the occupation in question was "an entirely private act,
which will not influence our policy". In its note of July 3rd, referred to
above, the Danish Government observed that it had taken due note of this
part of the Norwegian Minister's statement.
[81] The Danish note of July 10th, already mentioned, had been preceded on
July 5th and 6th by an exchange of views between the Danish Minister at Oslo
and the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs in reference to a Danish
suggestion that, during the negotiations for the proposed Special Agreement,
Denmark would not take any surprise action capable of modifying the existing
situation at law, or resort to any tactical measures. It is argued, on
behalf of Denmark, that this offer was manifestly made subject to
reciprocity, and that an agreement was reached in that sense. On behalf of
Norway, the opposite contention is maintained.
[82] Finally, on July 10th, 1931, in a note verbale addressed by the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Danish Minister at Oslo, the
Norwegian Government stated that, "having regard to the legal position of
Norway in the proceedings before the Court", it "had felt obliged to
proceed, in virtue of a Royal Resolution of the same date, to the occupation
of the territories in Eastern Greenland situated between latitude 71� 30'
and 75� 40' N." The Royal Resolution in question was worded as follows:
"1. The occupation of the country in Eastern Greenland between Carlsberg
Fjord on the south and Bessel Fjord on the north, carried out on June 27th,
1931, is officially confirmed, so far as concerns the territory extending
from latitude 71� 30' to latitude 75� 40' N., and the said territory is
placed under Norwegian sovereignty.
2. Messrs. Hallvard Devoid and Herman Andresen are invested with police
powers in the aforesaid territory, viz., M. Devoid in respect of the
district south of Clavering Fjord and M. Andresen in respect of the district
to the north of the said fjord [FN1]."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Translation by the Registry from the French translation filed by the
Norwegian Government
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[83] The territory covered by this Resolution was denominated by Norway
"Eirik Raudes Land".
[84] The contents of the Resolution were notified to the Powers whom Norway
regarded as being interested. [p44]
[85] On the following day - July 11th, 1931 - the Danish Government informed
the Norwegian Government that it had "submitted the question" on the same
day "to the Permanent Court of International Justice". The Danish
Application instituting proceedings was filed with the Registry, as already
stated, on July 12th, 1931.
***
[86] The Danish submission in the written pleading, that the Norwegian
occupation of July 10th, 1931, is invalid, is founded upon the contention
that the area occupied was at the time of the occupation subject to Danish
sovereignty; that the area is part of Greenland, and at the time of the
occupation Danish sovereignty existed over all Greenland; consequently it
could not be occupied by another Power.
[87] In support of this contention, the Danish Government advances two
propositions. The first is that the sovereignty which Denmark now enjoys
over Greenland has existed for a long time, has been continuously and
peacefully exercised and, until the present dispute, has not been contested
by any Power. This proposition Denmark sets out to establish as a fact. The
second proposition is that Norway has by treaty or otherwise herself
recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a whole and therefore cannot
now dispute it.
[88] The Norwegian submissions are that Denmark possessed no sovereignty
over the area which Norway occupied on July 10th, 1931, and that at the time
of the occupation the area was terra nullius. Her contention is that the
area lay outside the limits of the Danish colonies in Greenland and that
Danish sovereignty extended no further than the limits of these colonies.
[89] Other contentions were also developed in the course of the proceedings.
[90] On the Danish side it was maintained that the promise which in 1919 the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of his
Government, gave to the diplomatic representative of the Danish Government
at Christiania debarred Norway from proceeding to any occupation of
territory in Greenland, even if she had not by other acts recognized an
existing Danish sovereignty there.
[91] In this connection Denmark has adduced certain other undertakings by
Norway, e.g. the international undertakings entered into by that country for
the pacific settlement of her disputes with other countries in general, and
with Denmark in particular. [p45] On the Norwegian side it was maintained
that the attitude which Denmark adopted between 1915 and 1921, when she
addressed herself to various Powers in order to obtain a recognition of her
position in Greenland, was inconsistent with a claim to be already in
possession of the sovereignty-over all Greenland, and that in the
circumstances she is now estopped from alleging a long established
sovereignty over the whole country.
[92] The two principal propositions advanced by the Danish Government will
each be considered in turn.
I
[93] The first Danish argument is that the Norwegian occupation of part of
the East coast of Greenland is invalid because Denmark has claimed and
exercised sovereign rights over Greenland as a whole for a long time and has
obtained thereby a valid title to sovereignty. The date at which such Danish
sovereignty must have existed in order to render the Norwegian occupation
invalid is the date at which the occupation took place, viz., July 10th,
1931.
[94] The Danish claim is not founded upon any particular act of occupation
but alleges - to use the phrase employed in the Palmas Island decision of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, April 4th, 1928 - a title "founded on
the peaceful and continuous display of State authority over the island". It
is based upon the view that Denmark now enjoys all the rights which the King
of Denmark and Norway enjoyed over Greenland up till 1814. Both the
existence and the extent of these rights must therefore be considered, as
well as the Danish claim to sovereignty since that date.
[95] It must be borne in mind, however, that as the critical date is July
10th, 1931, it is not necessary that sovereignty over Greenland should have
existed throughout the period during which the Danish Government maintains
that it was in being. Even if the material submitted to the Court might be
thought insufficient to establish the existence of that sovereignty during
the earlier periods, this would not exclude a finding that it is sufficient
to establish a valid title in the period immediately preceding the
occupation.
[96] Before proceeding to consider in detail the evidence submitted to the
Court, it may be well to state that a claim to sovereignty based not upon
some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely upon
continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be
shown [p46] to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some
actual exercise or display of such authority.
[97] Another circumstance which must be taken into account by any tribunal
which has to adjudicate upon a claim to sovereignty over a particular
territory, is the extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by some
other Power. In most of the cases involving claims to territorial
sovereignty which have come before an international tribunal, there have
been two competing claims to the sovereignty, and the tribunal has had to
decide which of the two is the stronger. One of the peculiar features of the
present case is that up to 1931 there was no claim by any Power other than
Denmark to the sovereignty over Greenland. Indeed, up till 1921, no Power
disputed the Danish claim to sovereignty.
[98] It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to
territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal
has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of
sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a
superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims to
sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries.
[99] In the period when the early Nordic colonies founded by Eric the Red in
the Xth century in Greenland were in existence, the modern notions as to
territorial sovereignty had not come into being. It is unlikely that either
the chiefs or the settlers in these colonies drew any sharp distinction
between territory which was and territory which was not subject to them. On
the other hand, the undertaking (1261) recorded by Sturla Thordarson that
fines should be paid to the King of Norway by the men of Greenland in
respect of murders whether the dead man was a Norwegian or a Greenlander and
whether killed in the settlement or even as far to the North as under the
Pole Star, shows that the King of Norway's jurisdiction was not restricted
to the confines of the two settlements of Eystribygd and Vestribygd. So far
as it is possible to apply modern terminology to the rights and pretensions
of the kings of Norway in Greenland in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries, the
Court holds that at that date these rights amounted to sovereignty and that
they were not limited to the two settlements.
[100] It has been argued on behalf of Norway that after the disappearance of
the two Nordic settlements, Norwegian sovereignty was lost and Greenland
became a terra nullius. [p47] Conquest and voluntary abandonment are the
grounds on which this view is put forward.
[101] The word "conquest" is not an appropriate phrase, even if it is
assumed that it was fighting with the Eskimos which led to the downfall of
the settlements. Conquest only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty
when there is war between two States and by reason of the defeat of one of
them sovereignty over territory passes from the loser to the victorious
State. The principle does not apply in a case where a settlement has been
established in a distant country and its inhabitants are massacred by the
aboriginal population. Nor is the fact of "conquest" established. It is
known now that the settlements must have disappeared at an early date, but
at the time there seems to have been a belief that despite the loss of
contact and the loss of knowledge of the whereabouts of the settlements one
or both of them would again be discovered and found to contain the
descendants of the early settlers.
[102] As regards voluntary abandonment, there is nothing to show any
definite renunciation on the part of the kings of Norway or Denmark.
[103] During the first two centuries or so after the settlements perished,
there seems to have been no intercourse with Greenland, and knowledge of it
diminished; but the tradition of the King's rights lived on, and in the
early part of the XVIIth century a revival of interest in Greenland on the
part both of the King and of his people took place.
[104] That period was an era of adventure and exploration. The example set
by the navigators of foreign countries was inspiring, and a desire arose in
Norway and Denmark to recover the territory which had been subject to the
sovereignty of the King's ancestors in the past. The expeditions sent out in
1605 and 1606 under Lindenow to "Our Country of Greenland", the efforts to
assure respect on the part of foreign Powers for the King's rights there and
the claim to exclude foreigners from the Greenland trade all show that the
King considered that in his dealings with Greenland he was dealing with a
country with respect to which he had a special position superior to that of
any other Power. This special position can only have been derived from the
sovereign rights which accrued to the King of Norway from the submission
made to him by the early Nordic settlers and which descended to the
Danish-Norwegian kings. It must have covered the territory which is known as
Greenland today, because the country was inhabited. The expedition in 1605
brought back some of the inhabitants, whereas Spitzbergen was admittedly
uninhabited. Lastly, as there were at this date no colonies or [p48]
settlements in Greenland, the King's claims cannot have been limited to any
particular places in the country.
[105] That the King's claims amounted merely to pretensions is clear, for he
had no permanent contact with the country, he was exercising no authority
there. The claims, however, were not disputed. No other Power was putting
forward any claim to territorial sovereignty in Greenland, and in the
absence of any competing claim the King's pretensions to be the sovereign of
Greenland subsisted.
[106] After the founding of Hans Egede's colonies in 1721, there is in part
at least of Greenland a manifestation and exercise of sovereign rights.
Consequently, both the elements necessary to establish a valid title to
sovereignty - the intention and the exercise - were present, but the
question arises as to how far the operation of these elements extended.
[107] The King's pretensions to sovereignty which existed at the time of the
foundation of the colonies are sufficient to demonstrate the intention, and,
as said above, these were not limited to any particular part of the country.
[108] Was the exercise of sovereign rights such as to confer a valid title
to sovereignty over the whole country? The founding of the colonies was
accompanied by the grant of a monopoly of the trade, and before long
legislation was found to be necessary to protect and enforce the monopoly.
In the earlier Ordinances of 1740-1751, issued at the time when Jacob
Severin was the grantee of the monopoly, the prohibition of trading was
restricted to the colonies, but those Ordinances also contained a
prohibition of injurious treatment of the Greenlanders, and this was not
limited to the colonies but operated in Greenland as a whole. Furthermore,
the prohibition of trading was to apply not only in the existing colonies
but in any future colonies which might be established. Legislation is one of
the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign power, and it is clear
that the operation of these enactments was not restricted to the limits of
the colonies. It therefore follows that the sovereign right in virtue of
which the enactments were issued cannot have been restricted to the limits
of the colonies.
[109] The Ordinance of 1758 and that of 1776 (which is still in force) also
operated beyond the limits of the colonies: under these Ordinances, the
prohibition on trading is no longer restricted to the colonies but is to
apply "in all places whatever". This extension in the area of the monopoly
is reflected in the terms of the commercial treaties of the period. The
[p49] treaties before 1758 (those of 1742 between Denmark and France, of
1748 between Denmark and the Two Sicilies and of 1756 between Denmark and
the Republic of Genoa) make an exception for the trade "with His Majesty's
colonies in Greenland". The notes exchanged with Russia in 1782 relate to
"Greenland" in general.
[110] Norway has argued that in the legislative and administrative acts of
the XYIIIth century on which Denmark relies as proof of the exercise of her
sovereignty, the word "Greenland" is not used in the geographical sense, but
means only the colonies or the colonized area on the West coast.
[111] This is a point as to which the burden of proof lies on Norway. The
geographical meaning of the word "Greenland", i.e. the name which is
habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded
as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the Parties
that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it lies
on that Party to establish its contention. In the opinion of the Court,
Norway has not succeeded in establishing her contention. It is not
sufficient for her to show that in many of these legislative and
administrative acts action was only to be taken in the colonies. Most of
them dealt with things which only happened in the colonies and not in the
rest of the country. The fact that most of these acts were concerned with
what happened in the colonies and that the colonies were all situated on the
West coast is not by itself sufficient ground for holding that the authority
in virtue of which the act was taken - whether legislative or administrative
- was also restricted to the colonized area. Unless it was so restricted, it
affords no ground for interpreting the word "Greenland" in this restricted
sense.
[112] The terms of some of these documents give no support to the Norwegian
view. As shown above, the Ordinances of 1740, 1751, 1758 and 1776 purport to
operate in Greenland generally. If the terms of these Ordinances are
examined closely, they do not bear out the view that "Greenland" means only
the colonized area. In the Ordinance of 1758, for instance, the word
"Greenland" is used three times. First, the Ordinance recites the concession
held by the Company "de naviguer et commercer seule dans les colonies par
Nous etablies dans Notre pays de lllGroe'nland...." ; then it recites that
the King has learned with great displeasure that certain foreigners repair
annually to Greenland ".... о�, par un commerce illicite auquel Us se
livrent tant dans les ports qu'en dehors, Us .... exercent toutes sortes de
violences contre [p50] les habitants....", and then the King, "comme
souverain seigneur h�r�ditaire du lllGroenland et des �les en
d�pendant....", proceeds to re-enact and to extend the prohibitions
contained in the previous Ordinances [FN1].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] The texts in question have been officially submitted to the Court in a
French translation only
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[113] There is nothing to show that the word "Greenland" is not used all
through the Ordinance in the same sense. The Ordinance is issued by the King
as Hereditary Sovereign of Greenland. It has been shown above that the
rights and pretensions which the King derived from his ancestors as kings of
Norway were not limited to any particular part of Greenland, because no
colonies existed at the time, but extended to the whole country. Again, the
colonies are described as colonies established in Greenland, so that the
colonies and Greenland cannot have coincided. Lastly, the trading
prohibition which the Ordinance enacts is no longer, as in 1740 and 1751,
limited to the colonies, but extends to every place on land or sea within
four miles of the coast, and is now grouped with the prohibition against
violence to the Greenlanders which in the previous Ordinances operated
throughout Greenland and was not limited to the colonies. An examination of
this Ordinance alone is enough to disprove the contention that the word
"Greenland" in these legislative and administrative acts of the XVIIIth
century means only the colonized area.
[114] It has also been argued on behalf of Norway that "Greenland" as used
in documents of this period cannot have been intended to include the East
coast because at the time the East coast was unknown. An examination however
of the maps of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries shows that the general
features and configuration of the East coast of Greenland were known to the
cartographers. Even if no evidence of any landings on the coast have been
produced, the ships which hunted whales in the waters to the East of
Greenland sighted the land at intervals and gave names to the prominent
features which were observed. Indeed, "Greenland" as a geographical term was
even more used in connection with the East coast than with the West coast,
as the term "Straat Davis" was often used to describe the West coast, or
colonized area, of Greenland.
[115] The conclusion to which the Court is led is that, bearing in mind the
absence of any claim to sovereignty by another Power, and the Arctic and
inaccessible character of the uncolonized [p51] parts of the country, the
King of Denmark and Norway displayed during the period from the founding of
the colonies by Hans Egede in 1721 up to 1814 his authority to an extent
sufficient to give his country a valid claim to sovereignty, and that his
rights over Greenland were not limited to the colonized area.
[116] Up to the date of the Treaty of Kiel of 1814, the rights which the
King possessed over Greenland were enjoyed by him as King of Norway. It was
as a Norwegian possession that Greenland was dealt with in Article 4 of that
Treaty, whereby the King ceded to the King of Sweden the Kingdom of Norway,
"la Gro�nlande .... поп comprise....". The result of the Treaty was that
what had been a Norwegian possession remained with the King of Denmark and
became for the future a Danish possession. Except in this respect, the
Treaty of Kiel did not affect or extend the King's rights over Greenland.
[117] In order to establish the Danish contention that Denmark has exercised
in fact sovereignty over all Greenland for a long time, Counsel for Denmark
have laid stress on the long series of conventions - mostly commercial in
character - which have been concluded by Denmark and in which, with the
concurrence of the other contracting Party, a stipulation has been inserted
to the effect that the convention shall not apply to Greenland. In the case
of multilateral treaties, the stipulation usually takes the form of a Danish
reserve at the time of signature. In date, these conventions cover the
period from 1782 onwards. As pointed out in the earlier part of the
judgment, the exclusion of Greenland is, with one exception, made without
qualification. In that case alone it is "the Danish colonies in Greenland"
to which the treaty is not to apply. In many of these cases, the wording is
quite specific; for instance, Article 6 of the Treaty of 1826 with the
United States of America : "The present Convention shall not apply to the
Northern possessions of His Majesty the King of Denmark, that is to say
Iceland, the F�r� Islands and Greenland...."
[118] The importance of these treaties is that they show a willingness on
the part of the States with which Denmark has contracted to admit her right
to exclude Greenland. To some of these treaties, Norway has herself been a
Party, and these must be dealt with later because they are relied on by
Denmark as constituting binding admissions by Norway that Greenland is
subject to Danish sovereignty. For the purpose of the present argument, the
importance of these conventions, with whatever States they have been
concluded, is due to the [p52] support which they lend to the Danish
argument that Denmark possesses sovereignty over Greenland as a whole.
[119] It has been contended on behalf of Norway that no importance should be
attached to these conventions because, when they were concluded, the Parties
had no such question in mind as whether Danish sovereignty was limited or
not to the colonies, and whether in consequence "Greenland" meant more than
the colonized area. Both as to these conventions, and also as to the Treaty
of Kiel, Counsel for Norway adhere to the contention that the word
"Greenland" is used in the sense of the area comprised within the colonies.
[120] It is true that when they conclude a commercial convention, States are
not dealing with such questions as the extent of their respective
territories, but the usual object of a commercial convention is to give to
each of the Parties facilities for trade and navigation in the territories
of the other; consequently, the area within which such facilities are, or
are not, accorded is a point of some importance. It is a question on which
disputes may arise if there is any uncertainty. If the Parties were agreed
that the treaty was not to. apply in a particular area and the area is only
designated by name, the natural conclusion is that no difference existed
between them as to the extent of the area which that name covered. The Court
is therefore once more led back to the question as to what the contracting
Parties meant when they excluded "Greenland". The natural meaning of the
term is its geographical meaning as shown in the maps. If it is argued on
behalf of Norway that these treaties use the term "Greenland" in some
special sense, it is for her to establish it, and it is not decisive in this
respect that the northern part of Greenland was still unknown. She has not
succeeded in showing that in these treaties the word "Greenland" means only
the colonized area.
[121] To the extent that these treaties constitute evidence of recognition
of her sovereignty over Greenland in general, Denmark is entitled to rely
upon them.
[122] These treaties may also be regarded as demonstrating sufficiently
Denmark's will and intention to exercise sovereignty over Greenland. There
remains the question whether during this period, i.e. 1814 to 1915, she
exercised authority in the uncolonized area sufficiently to give her a valid
claim to sovereignty therein. In their arguments, Counsel for Denmark have
relied chiefly on the concession granted in 1863 to Tayler of exclusive
rights on the East coast for trading, hunting, [p53] mining, etc. The result
of all the documents connected with the grant of the concession is to show
that, on the one side, it was granted upon the footing that the King of
Denmark was in a position to grant a valid monopoly on the East coast and
that his sovereign rights entitled him to do so, and, on the other, that the
concessionnaires in England regarded the grant of a monopoly as essential to
the success of their projects and had no doubt as to the validity of the
rights conferred.
[123] Among the documents connected with the grant of this concession which
have been submitted to the Court is the report submitted to the King for his
approval by the Minister of the Interior, and it is interesting to note that
it states as a matter free from all doubt that Danish sovereignty exists
over the East coast of Greenland:
"En tout cas, les r�sultats auxquels cette tentative pourrait conduire
pr�senteraient un int�r�t scientifique assez important, et, pourvu que Ton
prenne les garanties n�cessaires tant en ce qui concerne la souverainet� de
Votre Majest� sur cette partie du Gro�nland - que personne ne conteste - et
pour la protection des Gro�nlandais qui у habitent et qui, par suite,
doivent �tre consid�r�s comme les sujets de Votre Majest�, l'octroi d'une
autorisation de ce genre � ceux qui poss�dent les qualit�s et l'�nergie
n�cessaires pour tenter la r�alisation d'une pareille entreprise pourra
certainement �tre accord� sans aucune hesitation [FN1]."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] French translation supplied by the Danish Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[124] Counsel for Norway have pointed to Article 2 in the concession, which
provides that the establishments created by the concessionnaires were to be
placed under the sovereignty of the Crown of Denmark and to be subject to
Danish law - and have argued that the grant of a concession in these terms
is itself evidence that the Danish Government realized that Danish
sovereignty did not extend to this part of Greenland. The explanation
however is simple. Tayler was an Englishman. The Danish Government were
aware that people in Denmark, such as M. Wormskjold, had been afraid that
foreign Powers would attempt to make settlements on the East coast, and
Article 2 was intended to make sure that the settlements established by
Tayler should not be made the basis of a claim of occupation and sovereignty
by the King of England.
[125] The concessions granted for the erection of telegraph lines and the
legislation fixing the limits of territorial waters in [p54] 1905 are also
manifestations of the exercise of sovereign authority.
[126] In view of the above facts, when taken in conjunction with the
legislation she had enacted applicable to Greenland generally, the numerous
treaties in which Denmark, with the concurrence of the other contracting
Party, provided for the non-application of the treaty to Greenland in
general, and the absence of all claim to sovereignty over Greenland by any
other Power, Denmark must be regarded as having displayed during this period
of 1814 to 1915 her authority over the uncolonized part of the country to a
degree sufficient to confer a valid title to the sovereignty.
[127] The applications which the Danish Government addressed to foreign
governments between 1915 and 1921, seeking the recognition of Denmark's
position in Greenland, have played so large a part in the arguments
addressed to the Court that it is necessary to deal with them in some
detail. The point at issue between the Parties is whether Denmark was
seeking a recognition of an existing sovereignty extending over all
Greenland, as has been urged by her Counsel, or, as maintained by Counsel on
behalf of Norway, whether she was trying to persuade the Powers to agree to
an extension of her sovereignty to territory which did not as yet belong to
her:
[128] The terms used in the correspondence between the Danish Government and
the foreign governments concerned relating to these applications are not
always clear; sometimes a particular phrase or expression seems to afford a
strong argument in favour of the view held by one Party in the dispute and
another phrase or expression, emanating from the same side and perhaps even
in the same note, may be consistent only with the opposite view.
[129] The Court has come to the conclusion that in judging the effect of
these notes too much importance must not be attached to particular
expressions here and there. The correspondence must be judged as a whole.
One reason for this is that in some cases the notes were written by
individual Danish diplomatic representatives, and, though no doubt they were
based on the instructions these Ministers received, some variation must be
expected and allowed for in the terms they used.
[130] There can be no doubt that an expression such as "extension of
sovereignty", which figures in two or three of the most important documents
on the Danish side, if taken by [p55] itself, is very difficult to reconcile
with the view now upheld by the Danish Government, that what that Government
was seeking in these applications was recognition of existing sovereignty
and not consent to the acquisition of new sovereignty. Nevertheless, the
conclusion which the Court has reached is that the view upheld by the Danish
Government in the present case is right and that the object which that
Government was endeavouring to secure was an assurance from each of the
foreign governments concerned that it accepted the Danish point of view that
all Greenland was already subject to Danish sovereignty and was therefore
content to see an extension of Denmark's activities to the uncolonized parts
of Greenland.
[131] Before analysing the important documents in this correspondence, it is
well to repeat what has been said above as to the existence in Denmark of
opinions held by well-qualified persons, such as M. Wormskj�ld, that owing
to the absence of any effective occupation on the eastern coast of
Greenland, some foreign Power might attempt to establish a settlement and
might thereby acquire the sovereignty over the territory for itself.
[132] While this was the opinion which had been expressed by private
persons, the Government had, whenever it was necessary for it to express an
opinion, enunciated the view that there was no doubt as to the existence of
the Danish sovereignty over the East coast of Greenland.
[133] A sentence has already been quoted from the report to the King in
1863, asking for approval of the Tayler concession. Similarly, in the report
submitted to the King in connection with the founding of the colony of
Angmagssalik in 1894, the Minister of the Interior says:
"Bien que, jusqu'� pr�sent, il n'ait �t� �tabli des colonies danoises que
sur la c�te occidentale du Gro�nland, la souverainet� de l'Etat danois n'est
pas restreinte � cette partie du pays, et le Gouvernement danois a, lorsque
l'occasion s'en est pr�sent�e, exerc� et affirm� sa souverainet� sur la c�te
orientale du pays [FN1]."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] French translation supplied by the Danish Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[134] Given this divergence of view between the Government opinion on the
one side, and the opinion of private persons on the other, it is quite
natural that at a time such as that of the Great War and the Peace
Conference which followed it, when many territorial changes were taking
place, the Danish Government should think the moment favourable for
endeavouring to [p56] secure general recognition of its sovereignty over all
Greenland. If it took action for this purpose, however, it is most unlikely
that on the eve of doing so it would completely change the point of view
which it had previously enunciated and proceed upon the footing that it had
no right to sovereignty over the uncolonized area and that it had now to
acquire sovereignty there for the first time. The Danish Government stood to
gain nothing by making any such change of opinion and would seriously
prejudice its position if it failed to secure the acknowledgements it
desired from foreign States.
[135] The first country to be approached was the United States of America,
and the moment chosen was that of the negotiation of the treaty for the
cession of the Danish Antilles. It seems probable that the negotiations
about Greenland were in part conducted verbally, but the memorandum
addressed to the United States Government on December 27th, 1915, by the
Danish Minister at Washington is not helpful to the Danish case. It is by no
means clear, and it uses the phrase "extension of the care and suzerainty of
Denmark to the whole of Greenland [FN1]". On the other hand, if what the
Parties had in mind was consent by the United States Government to Denmark's
acquiring sovereignty over parts of Greenland which had hitherto been terr�
nullius, it seems incredible that any competent draughtsman would use so
complicated a phrase as that proposed by the United States Government for
insertion in the Antilles Treaty: ".... The United States will not object to
the claim of Denmark to take such measures of control and protection in
Greenland as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance
these interests" (i.e. the political and economic interests of Denmark in
Greenland).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] English text supplied by the Danish Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[136] The phrase used in the American declaration as ultimately signed was
that the United States Government ".... will not object to the Danish
Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland", a phrase which is not inconsistent with either thesis. On the
other hand, when submitting the Antilles Treaty, together with the above
declaration as to Greenland, for the royal ratification, the Danish Minister
for Foreign Affairs treats the declaration as involving American consent to
an extension of sovereignty. [p57]
[137] The next government to be approached was the Norwegian. That
Government had already manifested a desire to acquire Spitzbergen, and in
April 1919 the Danish Government had given the Norwegian Government to
understand that, as there were no Danish interests in Spitzbergen which ran
counter to those of Norway, Denmark would not oppose the Norwegian
aspirations.
[138] Early in July 1919, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs learned
from the Danish Minister in Paris that the Spitzbergen question was to come
before a Committee of the Peace Conference.
[139] Instructions were thereupon issued, on July 12th, 1919, to the Danish
Minister at Christiania to make to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs a communication to the effect that a Committee had just been
constituted at the Peace Conference "for the purpose of considering the
claims that may be put forward by different countries to Spitzbergen", and
that the Danish Government would be prepared to renew before this Committee
the unofficial assurance already given to the Norwegian Government,
according to which Denmark, having no special interests at stake in
Spitzbergen, would raise no objection to Norway's claims upon that
archipelago. In making this statement to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the Danish Minister was to point out "that the Danish Government
had been anxious for some years past to obtain the recognition by all the
interested Powers of Denmark's sovereignty over the whole of Greenland and
that it intended to place that question before the above-mentioned
Committee"; that the Government of the U.S.A. had made a declaration that
that Government would not oppose the extension of Danish political and
economic interests over all Greenland; and further that the Danish
Government counted on the Norwegian Government not making any difficulties
with regard to such an extension.
[140] When, on July 14th, 1919, the Danish Minister saw the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Ihlen, the latter merely replied "that the
question would be considered". The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs
recorded his conversation with the Danish representative in a minute, the
accuracy of which has not been disputed by the Danish Government. On July
22nd following, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after informing his
colleagues of the Norwegian Cabinet, made a statement to the Danish Minister
to the effect "that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties
[p58] in the settlement of this question" (i.e. the question raised on July
14th by the Danish Government). These are the words recorded in the minute
by M. Ihlen himself. According to the report made by the Danish Minister to
his own Government, M. Ihlen's words were that "the plans of the Royal
[Danish] Government respecting Danish sovereignty over the whole of
Greenland .... would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway".
[141] The Danish Government were not able to bring the question before the
Peace Conference in 1919. The matter was therefore taken up with the
governments individually, instructions being sent to the Danish Ministers in
London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo on March 2nd, 1920, to address communications
to the Governments to which they were accredited. These instructions
described at length the work which Denmark had accomplished in Greenland and
mentioned the colonies she had founded. Then follows an admission that no
formal "prise de possession" had been taken of all Greenland and a statement
is made that it is desirable that Denmark should extend its "sollicitude par
sa souverainet� sur le Gro�nland tout entier". The text of the American
declaration is set out and the instructions go on to say that, having got
the American declaration, Denmark proposes also to obtain recognition by
other Powers of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland, and the Minister
concerned is therefore to ask for official recognition of Danish sovereignty
over all Greenland. It is suggested that the form in which such recognition
might be given would be a declaration corresponding to that made by the
United States Government. It will be seen that, in these instructions, the
Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs treats recognition of Danish sovereignty
over all Greenland and a statement that there is no objection to the Danish
Government extending its political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland as meaning the same thing.
[142] Each of the Ministers concerned thereupon addressed himself to the
Government to which he was accredited, following in his own way the tenour
of the instructions he had received.
[143] In reply, the French Government sent a note to the effect that it
would make no objection to the Danish Government extending its sovereignty
to all Greenland, as contemplated in the American declaration.
[144] The Italian Government says that they will have no difficulty in
recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland. [p59]
[145] The Japanese Government says that they have no objection to the Danish
Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland.
[146] The British Government (after some preliminary correspondence with a
view to securing a right of preemption over the country), recognizes Danish
sovereignty over Greenland.
[147] These notes all appear to have been written upon the assumption that
they were complying with what the Danish Government had asked for, despite
the diversity of their contents.
[148] The British note, it is true, was written in slightly more favourable
circumstances, because the Foreign Office had had the advantage of a further
communication from the Danish Government in which the Danish view had been
explained more clearly. The British Government had at first tried to secure
a right of preemption over Greenland as a condition of its recognition of
Danish sovereignty. This the Danish Government refused in a note on July
20th, 1920, in which it makes its point of view clear. The note says that
the Danish occupation of Greenland dated back to 1721, since when Greenland
had been treated uninterruptedly as a Danish colony, and that the Danish
"suzerainty" had never been questioned by any other foreign Power. The note
went on to say that the request which had been made by the Danish Government
must therefore be regarded as dictated by a desire to obtain "formal
recognition of an existing status sanctioned by prescriptive right".
[149] Thus it will be seen that as soon as one of the Powers to whom
application had been made indicates a desire to obtain some return for the
grant of what had been asked, the Danish Government replies with a note
setting out the legal basis of its claim to sovereignty in Greenland on
lines similar to those which it has followed in the present case. With the
legal position thus made clear, the British Government gave the desired
recognition to Danish sovereignty and only asked that, in view of the
proximity of Greenland to Canada, the British Government should be consulted
if the Danish Government ever contemplated the alienation of the territory.
[150] Early in 1921 the Danish Government approached the Swedish and
Norwegian Governments with similar requests for recognition of Danish
sovereignty.
[151] The note addressed to the Swedish Government on January 13th, 1921,
follows the lines of those addressed to the four [p60] Powers in 1920, but
adds that those Powers have recognized Danish sovereignty over all
Greenland.
[152] The memorandum addressed to the Norwegian Government by the Danish
Legation at Christiania on January 18th, 1921, was conceived on somewhat
different lines. It repeats the Danish desire to obtain recognition by the
Powers concerned of Danish sovereignty over the whole of that country, and
the fact that it had not been possible to bring the question before the
Peace Conference in Paris. The communication then refers to the declaration
made by the United States Government, the successful applications to the
four Powers and the Danish decision to address corresponding requests to the
Norwegian and Swedish Governments. Mention is made of Spitzbergen and of how
Denmark had said, in 1919, that she would not oppose the Norwegian claims
there and that she reckoned on an extension of Danish sovereignty in
Greenland not meeting with difficulties on the part of Norway. Reference is
then made to the Ihlen declaration, and it is said that as this had only
been verbal Denmark would now like to have a written confirmation of it. The
memorandum concludes by asking for a written statement that the Norwegian
Government recognized Danish sovereignty over all Greenland.
[153] This memorandum has been analysed in some detail because it is the
document chiefly relied on by the Norwegian Counsel in maintaining that what
Denmark sought to obtain was an extension of her sovereignty to the
non-colonized part of Greenland in the sense that it implied that no such
sovereignty existed at the moment. It is true that, as stated in the
memorandum itself, the word "extension" is used, but it is used in
connection with the attitude which Denmark had adopted in 1919. If however
the communication made in 1919 to the Norwegian Government is examined, it
will be found to be more consistent with the view that the Danish desire was
to obtain the recognition of an existing sovereignty. As said above, too
much importance must not be attached to some of these individual phrases and
expressions when taken apart from their context. Words such as
"reconnaissance expresse de la souverainet� du Gro�nland dans son entier"
are more applicable to an existing sovereignty than to describe an agreement
to an extension. Nor must it be forgotten that the date of this
communication was six months later than the note of July 20th, 1920, to the
Foreign Office in London, which sets out the Danish position with reasonable
precision. [p61]
[154] Nevertheless, it would seem that the Norwegian Government must have
understood the Danish communication as implying an extension of sovereignty
in the proper sense of the term, and it was just this "extension", i.e.
agreement to something which did not yet exist, to which Norway was
unwilling to agree except on terms which would safeguard the opportunities
for hunting and fishing which Norwegians then enjoyed in Eastern Greenland.
The Norwegian Government therefore felt unable to give the recognition which
was asked for.
[155] After a certain time, during which the communication of January 18th
remained unanswered officially, but during which some unofficial
communications passed, a note from the Norwegian Government, dated November
2nd, 1921, dealing with the Decrees of May 10th and June 16th of that year,
stated that the Norwegian Government had not recognized, and could not
recognize, an extension of Danish sovereignty which would involve a
corresponding extension of the monopoly and result in the suppression of the
hunting and fishing activities of the Norwegians in the parts of Greenland
in question.
[156] Confronted with an attitude which did not satisfy it, the Danish
Government expounded - as it had done to the British Government in July 1920
- its view of the situation in law, and in its note of December 19th, 1921,
affirms that Danish sovereignty has no need of any renewed recognition by
the Norwegian Government and asserts that this sovereignty has for a long
time found expression in a series of international documents and legislative
enactments, of which the contents have been brought to the knowledge of the
countries concerned and to which no objection has ever been made.
[157] The Danish Government thus enunciates once more the view expressed in
1863 and in 1894, and in the note to the Foreign Office in July 1920, that
it already possessed sovereignty over all Greenland. If that was the view
which the Danish Government held before, during and at the close of these
applications to the Powers, its action in approaching them in the way it did
must certainly have been intended to ensure that those Powers should accept
the point of view maintained by the Danish Government, namely, that
sovereignty already existed over all Greenland, and not to persuade them to
agree that a part of Greenland not previously under Danish sovereignty
should now be brought thereunder. Their object was to ensure that those
Powers would not attempt themselves to take possession of any [p62]
non-colonized part of Greenland. The method of achieving this object was to
get the Powers to recognize an existing state of fact.
[158] In these circumstances, there can be no ground for holding that, by
the attitude which the Danish Government adopted, it admitted that it
possessed no sovereignty over the uncolonized part of Greenland, nor for
holding that it is estopped from claiming, as it claims in the present case,
that Denmark possesses an old established sovereignty over all Greenland.
*
[159] The period subsequent to the date when the Danish Government issued
the Decree of May 10th, 1921, referred to above, witnessed a considerable
increase in the activity of the Danish Government on the eastern coast of
Greenland.
[160] That Decree was followed by the Decree of June 16th of the same year
concerning navigation in the seas round Greenland and declaring that the
whole of the coasts and islands were closed to Danish and to foreign ships.
Though the stringency of this measure was relaxed when the Convention of
1924 was concluded, the exclusion of all shipping remains the rule except in
so far as access is authorized by treaty or decree or special authorization.
[161] In 1925, legislation was enacted regulating the hunting and fishing,
and in the same year Greenland was divided into provinces by a law which
declared that all commercial activity was reserved to the Danish State.
[162] This legislation with regard to hunting and fishing, and the law
dividing the country into provinces, are noteworthy, as are also the
admission of French and British nationals to most-favoured-nation treatment
in Eastern Greenland, under notes exchanged between Denmark and the British
and French Governments in 1925.
[163] These were all cases in which the Danish Government was exercising
governmental functions in connection with the territory now under dispute.
[164] The character of these Danish acts is not altered by the protests or
reserves which, from time to time, were made by the Norwegian Government.
[165] These acts, coupled with the activities of the Danish hunting
expeditions which were supported by the Danish Government, the increase in
the number of scientific expeditions [p63] engaged in mapping and exploring
the country with the authorization and encouragement of the Government, even
though the expeditions may have been organized by non-official institutions,
the occasions on which the Godthaab, a vessel belonging to the State and
placed at one time under the command of a naval officer, was sent to the
East coast on inspection duty, the issue of permits by the Danish
authorities, under regulations issued in 1930, to persons visiting the
eastern coast of Greenland, show to a sufficient extent - even when
separated from the history of the preceding periods - the two elements
necessary to establish a valid title to sovereignty, namely : the intention
and will to exercise such sovereignty and the manifestation of State
activity.
[166] The conclusion of the 1924 Convention with Norway, to which reference
must again be made later, though signed by that State on the footing that
she maintained her point of view as to the territorial status of Eastern
Greenland (terra nullius) and that the conclusion of the Convention did not
prejudice her point of view, does not exclude the right of Denmark to
maintain her point of view that she was entitled to and was in fact enjoying
sovereignty over all Greenland, nor does it exclude her right to show that
the elements which go to establish a valid claim to sovereignty were both
present.
[167] Except for the verbal change that the phrase "territoire de Gro�nland"
is more often employed than " Gro�nland", the commercial arrangements
concluded by Denmark during this period continue to provide that, on the
Danish side, the agreement is not to apply to Greenland, showing thereby
that the States with which Denmark was concluding these agreements were not
disposed to dispute her claim to be sovereign over the area which the
agreement denominates as Greenland. As also is the case with regard to the
previous periods, it lies on Norway to show that the word "Greenland" in
these agreements is used in some special sense which does not include the
uncolonized part of the East coast, and in the opinion of the Court Norway
has not shown that this is so.
[168] Even if the period from 1921 to July 10th, 1931, is taken by itself
and without reference to the preceding periods, the conclusion reached by
the Court is that during this time Denmark regarded herself as possessing
sovereignty over all Greenland and displayed and exercised her sovereign
rights to an extent sufficient to constitute a valid title to sovereignty.
When considered in conjunction with the facts of the [p64] preceding
periods, the case in favour of Denmark is confirmed and strengthened.
[169] It follows from the above that the Court is satisfied that Denmark has
succeeded in establishing her contention that at the critical date, namely,
July 10th, 1931, she possessed a valid title to the sovereignty over all
Greenland.
[170] This finding constitutes by itself sufficient reason for holding that
the occupation of July 10th, 1931, and any steps taken in this connection by
the Norwegian Government, were illegal and invalid.
II.
[171] The Court will now consider the second Danish proposition that Norway
had given certain undertakings which recognized Danish sovereignty over all
Greenland. These undertakings have been fully discussed by the two Parties,
and in three cases the Court considers that undertakings were given.
*
[172] 1. In the first place, the Court holds that, at the time of the
termination of the Union between Denmark and Norway (1814 to 1819), Norway
undertook not to dispute Danish sovereignty over Greenland.
[173] In the early part of this judgment, it has been recalled that when the
King of Denmark was obliged to renounce, in favour of the King of Sweden,
his kingdom of Norway, Article 4 of the Treaty of Kiel of January 14th,
1814, excepted from that renunciation Greenland, the Faroes and Iceland.
[174] In order to effect the settlement - which was mainly of a financial
character - rendered necessary by the separation of Norway from Denmark,
Norwegian commissioners were appointed at the end of 1814 to confer with
Danish commissioners. The solution of the questions to which the separation
of the two countries gave rise was not easy. When, as early as 1816, Denmark
began to fear that the conferences held at Copenhagen between the Danish and
Norwegian commissioners would prove fruitless, the Danish Cabinet approached
the Allied Powers. This step led to a Conference between these Powers which
held its first meetings in London in July and August 1818. On the basis of a
report of this Conference, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle decided, on
November 13th, 1818, to make representations to the King of Sweden and
Norway in order to ensure that the terms of the Treaty of Kiel were [p65]
complied with so far as regards the portion of the debt of the
Danish-Norwegian monarchy for which Norway was to be responsible.
[175] It was then that the King of Sweden and Norway reverted to the
question of the former Norwegian possessions of which Greenland was one.
[176] The Norwegian commissioner at Copenhagen - M. Hoist - was instructed
on January 7th, 1819, formally to claim the restitution of the Faroes,
Iceland and Greenland "as being possessions which had formerly belonged to
the Kingdom of Norway". The instructions given to M. Hoist referred to the
fact that the "extraordinary Storting of 1814 had, in a most humble address,
petitioned His Majesty to take the necessary steps to secure the restitution
to the Kingdom of Norway of the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland,
pos-sessions which for centuries were an integral part of that kingdom".
This claim was presented to the Conference at Copenhagen on February 5th,
1819, and met with a point blank refusal on the Danish side. On learning of
this refusal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Norway, on
February 23rd, 1819, authorized the Norwegian commissioner at Copenhagen to
withdraw the claim. M. Hoist did so in a declaration which he made on March
27th, 1819, and the original French text of which should be given here:
"II est notoire que le Prince Chr�tien Fr�d�ric [FN1] a provoqu� de la part
de la Repr�sentation Nationale de la Norv�ge assembl�e � Eidsvold, une
protestation formelle contre le. Trait� de Kiel, qui assurait au Roi [FN2]
la Souverainet� sur la Norv�ge. Une constitution des plus lib�rales �tant
intervenue, la Repr�sentation Rationale ayant, par une �lection libre et
spontan�e, offert au Roi la Couronne de Norv�ge sous la condition expresse
d'accepter la nouvelle constitution; et le Roi у ayant donn� Son
assentiment, et �tant par l� devenu Roi constitutionnel, au lieu de
Souverain absolu, comme II devait l'�tre conform�ment au Trait� de Kiel, il
en est r�sult� pour S. M. l'obligation d'avoir �gard aux adresses que Lui
pr�sente le Stor-Thing dans les formes prescrites par la Loi. Or, le
Stor-Thing s'�tant adress� au Roi mon Auguste Souverain - l'effet d'engager
S. M. � faire les d�marches n�cessaires pour que les �les de Faeroe,
l'Islande et la Groenlande fussent restitu�es par le Dannemarc pour �tre
r�unies au Royaume de Norv�ge: le Roi n'a pu Se dispenser de satisfaire, sur
ce point, aux v�ux exprim�s par l'assembl�e nationale. En remplissant ce
devoir selon la teneur litt�rale de l'adresse du Stor-Thing, l'intention n'a
jamais �t� de lier cette question � celle de la liquidation en g�n�ral, ni
d'entraver en aucune mani�re la marche r�guli�re d'une n�gociation que S. M.
d�sire sinc�rement de voir termin�e � la satisfaction commune des [p66] deux
parties int�ress�es. Lorsqu'il est question de la s�paration politique de
deux Etats, dont les int�r�ts se sont trouv�s amalgam�s par une union de
plusieurs si�cles, il serait impossible d'�viter des sacrifices de part et
d'autre, et le Roi Se borne ,en cette occasion d'�noncer Sa conviction
certaine que, dans le cours de cette liquidation et lorsqu'il s'agira de
balancer les ressources respectives des deux Etats, on pourra facilement
tomber d'accord sur les moyens de compenser la perte qu'a faite en cette
occasion la Norv�ge de ses colonies dans la mer du Nord."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] The Governor of Norway.
[FN2] The King of Sweden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[177] The last sentence of this declaration brings out not only the
financial element in the claim for the restitution of the possessions in
question but also, and above all, the fact that the claim was definitely
withdrawn.
[178] Moreover, in March 1819, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden
and Norway communicated to the British Minister at Stockholm a request for
the mediation of the Prince Regent of Great Britain in the matter in regard
to which the Cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen were still at variance,
and said that the King of Sweden and Norway abandoned on behalf of Norway
all claim to the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland.
[179] In a note dated May 28th, 1819, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Sweden and Norway once more wrote to the British Minister at Stockholm that
the King of Sweden and Norway agreed to "renounce in favour of the Crown of
Denmark .... the claims of this country [Norway] in respect of Iceland,
Greenland and the Faroe Islands".
[180] This renunciation found expression in the conclusions reached by a
conference at Stockholm. With the British Minister in that capital acting as
mediator, the conference prepared for signature by the King of Denmark and
by the King of Sweden and Norway, in his capacity as King of Norway, the
Convention of September 1st, 1819, which finally settled the difficulties.
[181] Article 9 of this Convention [FN1] states that "everything in
connection with the Treaty of Kiel in general and with its [p67] sixth
article [FN1] [the financial article] in particular" is completely settled.
There can be no doubt that the words "everything in connection with the
Treaty of Kiel in general" cover also Article 4 of the Treaty which mentions
Greenland and that they are incompatible with the Norwegian argument to the
effect that the Convention of September 1st, 1819, only relates to the
financial settlement between Denmark and Norway. In this connection, it may
be observed that it is true that the first draft convention drawn up by the
Danish Commissioners at Copenhagen on July 16th, 1819, including Article VI
of that draft, which corresponds to Article 9 of the Convention of September
1st, 1819, only related to financial matters. Article VI of this draft ran
as follows: "Everything in connection with the execution of Article 6 [the
financial article] of the Treaty of Kiel being regarded as settled by the
above points...." Article VI of the Danish draft was however amended on
August 23rd, 1819, when a new draft was submitted to the Stockholm
Conference by the Danish plenipotentiary and the British mediator. This
second draft extended the scope of Article VI of the original Danish draft
of July 16th, 1819, so that it now said that not only Article 6 of the
Treaty of Kiel was to be regarded as completely settled, but "Everything in
connection with the Treaty of Kiel in general and with its sixth article in
particular". This change, which was maintained in Article 9 of the
Convention, finally disposes not only of [p68] the financial questions dealt
with in Article 6 of the Treaty of Kiel but of all questions mentioned in
the Treaty, and therefore also of the territorial questions in Article 4,
which leaves Greenland to Denmark. As has already been explained,
"Greenland" in Article 4 of the Treaty of Kiel means the whole of Greenland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] This Article runs as follows :
"Article neuf. - Tout ce qui concerne le Trait� de Kiel en g�n�ral, et
nomm�ment Son Sixi�me Article, �tant ainsi envisag� comme enti�re-ment
r�gl�, Sa Majest� le Roi de Su�de et de Norv�ge, et Sa Majest� le Roi de
Dannemarc d�clarent qu'aucun payment ult�rieur, hormis ce qui est stipul�
actuellement, ne sera soit � titre dudit Trait�, soit pour cause de
l'ancienne Union entre la Norv�ge et le Dannemarc, exig� de part et d'autre;
ni par le Gouvernement Norv�gien du Gouverne-ment Danois ou des Sujets
Danois; ni par le Gouvernement Danois du Gouvernement Norv�gien ou des
Sujets Norv�giens; de m�me qu'au-cune pr�tention, qui, � ce titre, ou pour
cette cause, a pu �tre avanc�e jusqu'� pr�sent des deux c�t�s, ne sera
d�sormais prise en consid�ra- . tion ou mise en discussion, qu'en tant
qu'elle s'accorde avec les termes, et les principes de cette Convention, qui
annulle de fait et de droit toute redevance ult�rieure de part et d'autre."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Translation as printed in the "Annual Register" for 1814:
"Article VI. As the whole debt of the Danish Monarchy is contracted, as well
upon Norway as the other parts of the kingdom, so his Majesty the King of
Sweden binds himself, as Sovereign of Norway, to be responsible for a part
of that debt, proportioned to the population and revenue of Norway.
By public debt is to be understood that which has been contracted by the
Danish Government, both at home and abroad. The latter consists of Royal and
State obligations, bankbills, and paper money formerly issued under Royal
authority, and now circulating in both kingdoms.
An exact account of this debt, such as it was on the 1st of January 1814,
shall be taken by Commissioners appointed to that effect by both Crowns, and
shall be calculated upon a just division of the population and revenues of
the kingdoms of Norway and Denmark. These Commissioners shall meet at
Copenhagen, within one month after the exchange of the ratification of this
treaty, and shall bring this affair to a conclusion as speedily as possible,
and at least before the expiration of the present year; with this
understanding, however, that the King of Sweden, as Sovereign of Norway,
shall be responsible for no other portion of the debt contracted by Denmark,
than that for which Norway was liable before its separation."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[182] The Court holds that, in consequence of the various undertakings
resulting from the separation of Norway and Denmark and culminating in
Article 9 of the Convention of September 1st, 1819, Norway has recognized
Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland and consequently cannot
proceed to the occupation of any part thereof.
*
[183] 2. A second series of undertakings by Norway, recognizing Danish
sovereignty over Greenland, is afforded by various bilateral agreements
concluded by Norway with Denmark, and by various multilateral agreements to
which both Denmark and Norway were contracting Parties, in which Greenland
has been described as a Danish colony or as forming part of Denmark or in
which Denmark has been allowed to exclude Greenland from the operation of
the agreement.
[184] The first of these agreements is the Commercial Treaty concluded
between Denmark and the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway on November
2nd, 1826, a Treaty for which provision was made in Article 23 of the Treaty
of Kiel. Article 5 of that Treaty reads as follows: "The respective colonies
of the two High Contracting Parties, including in the case of Denmark,
Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Isles, shall be specially excepted from
the provisions of the four preceding articles, which shall only be
applicable to the Kingdom of Denmark, the Duchies of Slesvig, Holstein and
Lauenbourg of the one part, and to the Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, of the
other part."
[185] Among more modern agreements may be quoted, as examples, the
stipulations in the Universal Postal Conventions of 1920, 1924 and 1929,
which say that : "The following shall be considered as belonging to the
Universal Postal Union: .... (c) the Faroe Isles and Greenland, as being
part of Denmark."
[186] It has already been said that when the Treaty of 1826 speaks of
"Greenland", this can only denote Greenland in the sense, for example, of
Article 4 of the Treaty of Kiel, i.e. the whole of Greenland. The same
applies to the Danish-Norwegian Agreements, referred to above, which
followed the Treaty of 1826. In accepting these bilateral and multilateral
agreements as binding upon herself, Norway reaffirmed [p69] that she
recognized the whole of Greenland as Danish; and thereby she has debarred
herself from contesting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, and,
in consequence, from proceeding to occupy any part of it.
*
[187] 3. In addition to the engagements dealt with above, the Ihlen
declaration, viz. the reply given by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, to the Danish Minister on July 22nd, 1919, must also be
considered.
[188] This declaration by M. Ihlen has been relied on by Counsel for Denmark
as a recognition of an existing Danish sovereignty in Greenland. The Court
is unable to accept this point of view. A careful examination of the words
used and of the circumstances in which they were used, as well as of the
subsequent developments, shows that M. Ihlen cannot have meant to be giving
then and there a definitive recognition of Danish sovereignty over
Greenland, and shows also that he cannot have been understood by the Danish
Government at the time as having done so. In the text of M. Ihlen's minute,
submitted by the Norwegian Government, which has not been disputed by the
Danish Government, the phrase used by M. Ihlen is couched in the future
tense: "ne fera pas de difficult�s" ; he had been informed that it was at
the Peace Conference that the Danish Government intended to bring up the
question: and two years later - when assurances had been received from the
Principal Allied Powers - the Danish Government made a further application
to the Norwegian Government to obtain the recognition which they desired of
Danish sovereignty over all Greenland.
[189] Nevertheless, the point which must now be considered is whether the
Ihlen declaration - even if not constituting a definitive recognition of
Danish sovereignty - did not constitute an engagement obliging Norway to
refrain from occupying any part of Greenland.
[190] The Danish request and M. Ihlen's reply were recorded by him in a
minute, worded as follows [FN1]:
"I. The Danish Minister informed me today that his Government has heard from
Paris that the question of Spitzbergen will be examined by a Commission of
four members (American, British, French, Italian). If the Danish Government
is questioned by this Commission, it is prepared to reply that Denmark has
no interests in Spitzbergen, and that it has no reason to oppose the [p70]
wishes of Norway in regard to the settlement of this question.
Furthermore, the Danish Minister made the following statement:
The Danish Government has for some years past been anxious to obtain the
recognition of all the interested Powers of Denmark's sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland, and it proposes to place this question before the
above-mentioned Committee at the same time. During the negotiations with the
U.S.A. over the cession of the Danish West Indies, the Danish Government
raised this question in so far as concerns recognition by the Government of
the U.S.A., and it succeeded in inducing the latter to agree that,
concurrently with the conclusion of a convention regarding the cession of
the said islands, it would make a declaration to the effect that the
Government of the U.S.A. would not object to the Danish Government extending
their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.
The Danish Government is confident (he added) that the Nor�wegian Government
will not make any difficulties in the settlement of this question.
I replied that the question would be examined.
14/7 - 19 Ih."
"II. To-day I informed the Danish Minister that the Norwegian Government
would not make any difficulties in the settlement of this question.
22/7 - 19 Ih."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Translation from a French text supplied by Norway.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[191] The incident has, therefore, reference, first to the attitude to be
observed by Denmark before the Committee of the Peace Conference at Paris in
regard to Spitzbergen, this attitude being that Denmark would not "oppose
the wishes of Norway in regard to the settlement of this question"; as is
known, these wishes related to the sovereignty over Spitzbergen. Secondly,
the request showed that "the Danish Government was confident that the
Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty" in the settlement of the
Greenland question; the aims that Denmark had in view in regard to the
last-named island were to secure the "recognition by all the Powers
concerned of Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland", and that there
should be no opposition "to the Danish Government extending their political
and economic interests to the whole of Greenland". It is clear from the
relevant Danish documents which preceded the Danish Minister's demarche at
Christiania on July 14th, 1919, that the Danish attitude in the Spitzbergen
question and the Norwegian attitude in the Greenland question were regarded
in Denmark as interdependent, and this interdependence appears to be
reflected also in M. Ihlen's minute of the interview. Even if this
interdependence-which, in view of the affirmative reply of the Norwegian
Government, in whose name the Minister for Foreign Affairs was speaking,
would have created a bilateral engagement - is not held to have been
established, it can hardly [p71] be denied that what Denmark was asking of
Norway ("not to make any difficulties in the settlement of the [Greenland]
question") was equivalent to what she was indicating her readiness to
concede in the Spitzbergen question (to refrain from opposing "the wishes of
Norway in regard to the settlement of this question"). What Denmark desired
to obtain from Norway was that the latter should do nothing to obstruct the
Danish plans in regard to Greenland. The declaration which the Minister for
Foreign Affairs gave on July 22nd, 1919, on behalf of the Norwegian
Government, was definitely affirmative : "I told the Danish Minister today
that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in the
settlement of this question."
[192] The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature
given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in
response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power,
in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the
country to which the Minister belongs.
[193] Norway has objected that the Danish Government's intention to extend
the monopoly r�gime to the whole of Greenland was not mentioned in the
Danish request of July 14th, 1919, as is alleged to have been done at a
later date in the communications addressed to the interested Powers in 1920
and 1921; and it is argued that if the Norwegian Government had been warned
of this intention, the declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs would
have been in the negative; and that, in consequence, the declaration, though
unconditional and definitive in form, cannot be relied on against Norway.
[194] The Court cannot admit this objection. It seems difficult to believe
that Norway could not have foreseen the extension of the monopoly, in view
of the fact that the United States of America, which had received in 1915 a
request similar to that made to Norway on July 14th, 1919, had understood
perfectly well that the Danish plans in regard to the uncolonized parts of
Greenland involved an extension of the monopoly r�gime - although this was
not mentioned in the Danish request at Washington - and had for that very
reason at first demanded the maintenance of the "open door". It is all the
more difficult for the Court to accept the Norwegian argument on this point
because the monopoly, in Greenland, is an institution which traces its
origin to the Dano-Norwegian administration in the XVIIIth century. It is
also noteworthy that Norway has adduced a document of an official character,
dated November 3rd, 1916 (viz., the letter from the Danish Minister of the
Interior (Directorate of Greenland Colonies) to the Parliamentary Committee
for the Danish West Indies), from which it appears that the Danish
administration was at that time [p72] contemplating the application of the
r�gime of exclusion to the whole area of Greenland. The word "exclusion" is
more correct in this context than "monopoly", but this in no way affects the
argument.
[195] From the foregoing, it results that the Court is unable to regard the
Ihlen declaration of July 22nd, 1919, otherwise than as unconditional and
definitive.
[196] The standpoint adopted by Norway led her in 1921 to refuse a written
confirmation of the Ihlen declaration, when such confirmation was requested
by Denmark in the note from her Minister at Christiania on January 18th,
1921.
[197] Thus, after the issue by Denmark of the Decree of May 10th, 1921,
which introduced the r�gime of exclusion for the whole of Greenland, M.
R�stad, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the Danish Minister at
Christiania, unofficially, on July 20th, 1921, that "the Norwegian
Government has not recognized and cannot consent to recognize an extension
of Danish sovereignty over Greenland which would involve a corresponding
extension of the Danish monopoly, since the result would be the extinction
of the economic activities, and particularly the hunting and fishing
operations hitherto pursued without hindrance by Norwegians in the parts of
Greenland and in the Greenland waters in question"; this was confirmed in
the official Norwegian note of November 2nd, 1921, which has been referred
to earlier in this judgment. The r�gime of exclusion, which - according to
the Norwegian Government's argument - could not have been foreseen by it,
was sufficient to justify - according to such argument - the change in its
attitude.
[198] It follows from what has already been said that the Court is unable to
adopt this reasoning.
[199] The Court readily understands that Norway should feel concern for the
interests of the Norwegian hunters and fishermen on the East coast of
Greenland ; but it cannot forget, in this connection, that as early as
December 1921, Denmark announced her willingness to do everything in her
power to make arrangements to safeguard Norwegian subjects against any loss
they might incur as a result of the Decree of May 10th, 1921 (letter from
the Danish Minister at Christiania dated December 19th, 1921, to the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs). The Convention of July 9th, 1924,
was a confirmation of Denmark's friendly disposition in respect of these
Norwegian hunting and fishing interests.
[200] What the Court cannot regard as being in accordance with the
undertaking of July 22nd, 1919, is the endeavour to replace an unconditional
and definitive undertaking by one which was subject to reservations : and
what it is even more difficult for the Court to admit is that,
notwithstanding the undertaking of July 22nd, 1919, by which she promised to
refrain [p73] from making difficulties in the settlement of the Greenland
question, Norway should have stipulated that "Eastern Greenland must be
Norwegian". This pretension was already apparent at the end of a letter of
January 12th, 1923, from the Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen to the Danish
Minister for Foreign Affairs; and it was enunciated very definitely on
September 28th, 1923, in the minutes of the sixth meeting of the Conference
which drew up the Convention of July 9th, 1924, and again in the Protocol
signed on January 28th, 1924, referred to above.
[201] The Court is unable to read into the words of the Ihlen declaration
"in the settlement of this question" (i.e. the Greenland question) a
condition which would render the promise to refrain from making any
difficulties inoperative should a settlement not be reached. The promise was
unconditional and definitive. It was so understood by the Norwegian Minister
for Foreign Affairs when he told the Danish Minister at Christiania - on
November 7th, 1919, that "it was a pleasure to Norway to recognize Danish
sovereignty over Greenland" (dispatch from the Danish Minister at
Christiania to the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs of November 8th,
1919). It was also in the same sense that the Danish Minister at Christiania
had understood the Ihlen declaration, when he informed the Danish Minister
for Foreign Affairs on July 22nd, 1919, that M. Ihlen had told him "that the
plans of the Royal Government in regard to the sovereignty of Denmark over
the whole of Greenland would not encounter any difficulties on the part of
Norway".
[202] It follows that, as a result of the undertaking involved in the Ihlen
declaration of July 22nd, 1919, Norway is under an obligation to refrain
from contesting Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a whole, and a fortiori
to refrain from occupying a part of Greenland.
*
[203] Denmark has maintained that the Convention of July 9th, 1924, already
referred to above, excludes any right on the part of Norway to occupy a part
of Greenland.
[204] In this connection it should be noted that when Norway initiated
negotiations in 1923, on the question of Greenland, the negotiations were
intended to cover the whole problem of Greenland, and primarily the legal
status of the eastern coast. But when it was found impossible to reconcile
the Danish theory of sovereignty and the Norwegian theory of a terra
nullius, it became necessary to confine the negotiations to an arrangement
on certain matters which it was possible to regulate, while leaving the
legal status of the uncolonized [p74] part of the island undefined. The
matters in question were the right of sojourn, of taking possession of land
for user, the right of hunting and fishing and of establishing telegraph
stations and other installations in Eastern Greenland. These were interests
which Norway was, as is known, much concerned to uphold. In order to make it
quite clear that the Convention only covered a limited part of the whole
question of Greenland, the Parties exchanged identic notes, on the same day
as the signature of the Convention, declaring that each reserved its
fundamental standpoint on questions concerning Greenland not dealt with in
the Convention, so that nothing was prejudged, nothing abandoned or lost
thereby. The question of the sovereignty and that of the terra nullius - to
mention that point alone - were thus left entirely outside the Convention of
July 9th, 1924, and the Court finds that neither Denmark nor Norway can
derive support from the Convention for their fundamental standpoints on the
legal status of the territory covered by the Convention: viz., Danish
sovereignty, or terra nullius, respectively. And, in truth, Norway has never
argued that she was entitled to derive any such argument from the
Convention.
[205] Finally, Denmark has maintained that, under certain provisions of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, of the General Act of conciliation,
judicial settlement and arbitration of 1928 and of conventions between
Denmark and Norway for the pacific settlement of disputes, Norway is
likewise bound to abstain from occupying any part of Greenland; it is also
maintained that the same result ensues from two agreements said to have been
arrived at by the two Parties at the beginning of July 1931, in the course
of the exchange of views which preceded the occupation of July 10th, and of
which an account has been given in the early part of this judgment.
[206] In view of the conclusion reached by the Court, there is no need for
these questions to be considered.
*
[207] Each Party has prayed the Court to order the other Party to pay the
costs in the present case. The Court, however, holds that there is no need
in the present case to deviate from the general rule laid down in Article 64
of the Statute, namely, that each Party will bear its own costs. [p75]
[208] FOR THESE REASONS,
The Court,
by twelve votes to two,
(1) decides that the declaration of occupation promulgated by the Norwegian
Government on July 10th, 1931, and any steps taken in this respect by that
Government, constitute a violation of the existing legal situation and are
accordingly unlawful and invalid;
(2) rejects the opposing submissions of the Norwegian Government;
(3) declares that there is no need to deviate from the general rule laid
down in Article 64 of the Statute that each Party will bear its own costs.
[209] Done in French and English, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of April, one thousand nine
hundred and thirty-three, in three copies, one of which shall be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others delivered to the Agents of the
Government of His Majesty the King of Denmark and of the Government of His
Majesty the King of Norway respectively.
(Signed) M. Adatci,
President.
(Signed) �. Hammarskj�ld,
Registrar.
[210] M. Anzilotti, Judge, and M. Vogt, Judge ad hoc, declare that they are
unable to concur in the judgment given by the Court and, availing themselves
of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the
judgment the dissenting opinions which follow.
[211] MM. Sch�cking and Wang, Judges, whilst concurring in the judgment,
have appended thereto the observations which follow.
(Initialled) M. A.
(Initialled) A. H. [p76]
Dissenting Opinion of M. Anzilotti.
[Translation.]
[212] Being unable wholly to concur in the present judgment, and having
regard to the importance of the case and of the principles of law involved,
I feel it my duty to avail myself of my right under the Court's Statute and
to indicate as briefly as possible my standpoint in regard to this dispute.
[213] 1.- In the first place, I dissent with regard to the manner in which
the question referred to the Court has been approached.
[214] The dispute is one between Denmark and Norway regarding the
sovereignty over a territory in Eastern Greenland. Denmark's position in
Greenland formed the subject of a request addressed by the Danish Government
to the Norwegian Government in July 1919, and of a declaration on the part
of the latter Government accepted by the Danish Government. Accordingly, in
my view, the first thing to be done was to decide whether this constituted a
valid agreement between the two Governments; if so, the rule to be applied
for the solution of the dispute should first and foremost have been sought
in this agreement.
[215] I am quite aware that this was not the line taken by the Parties, one
of whom desired to take advantage of the present proceedings in order to
attempt to establish his sovereignty over all Greenland, and, accordingly,
had every interest in presenting the request addressed to the Norwegian
Government, and other similar overtures, in the light of a preconceived
theory, whilst it was to the other's interest to show that the declaration
made on his behalf in 1919 was devoid of any importance. That, however,
should not have prevented the Court from rectifying the position in
accordance with the principles of law and the rules of its own Statute.
[216] I speak only of the Danish request in 1919 and of the declaration made
in response thereto because, in my view, that is the only agreement between
the two countries - assuming, of course, that there was an agreement - which
concerns the question submitted to the Court. As regards the Convention of
July 9th, 1924, concerning Eastern Greenland, I hold, with the judgment,
that the notes exchanged the same day between the Danish and Norwegian
Governments render it impossible to adduce any argument from that Convention
in support of the contentions of either Party. [p77]
[217] 2. - The important point in the present proceedings is, of course, the
request made to the Norwegian Government by the Danish Government and the
former's declaration.
[218] The request addressed to the Norwegian Government was, however, only
one of several similar overtures on the part of the Danish Government
addressed, from the end of 1915 onwards, to a number of States with a view
to defining and securing its position in Greenland. It is scarcely possible
rightly to appreciate the request with which we are concerned unless we
consider it in conjunction with the whole series of overtures of which it
formed part, more especially since, as we shall presently see, the request
addressed to the Norwegian Government, as a result of which the declaration
was made, reproduced the terms of a declaration obtained by the Danish
Government from another State.
[219] This is the point of view from which I shall briefly consider the
overtures in question, in regard to which I am definitely at variance with
the Court. In order to avoid repetition, I shall leave aside for the moment
the request addressed to the Norwegian Government : I shall devote special
attention to that, after I have defined the meaning and effect of the
overtures made by the Danish Government to other States.
[220] 3. - The best way of appreciating these overtures is, in my view, to
allow the documents relating to them to speak for themselves. Though the
attitude adopted by the Danish Government is, in a sense, the most important
factor, the answer given by the foreign governments must also be noted,
either because it shows how the Danish request was understood, or because
the Danish Government, in accepting these answers without observations or
reservations, showed that it accepted the interpretation placed by the other
Government upon its request.
[221] It seems that the Danish Government raised the question of its
sovereignty over all Greenland for the first time in connection with the
negotiations regarding the cession of the Danish West Indies to the United
States of America. We do not know how the Danish Government first approached
the American Government: a proposal was made by the latter Government (see
Danish Government's Case) which was solely concerned with securing the
principle of the open door and was not accepted by the Danish Government.
[222] But in the memorandum handed to the Secretary of State on December
27th, 1915, the Danish Minister in Washington, after stating that "it was
desirable that the Danish Government should extend its care by the
suzerainty of the State to include the whole of Greenland", added that he
had been [p78] "instructed" by his Government "to say that the Danish
Government would very much desire to receive the binding promise of the
American Government that no objection would be raised to the said extension
of the care and suzerainty of Denmark to the whole of Greenland" (Annexes to
Norwegian Government's Counter-Case, No. 38).
[223] The American Government's declaration of August 4th, 1916, is to the
effect that "the Government of the United States of America will not object
to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interest to
the whole of Greenland" (Annexes to the Danish Government's Reply, No. 170).
The terms of this declaration deviate from those of the request; but it is
certain that the declaration was construed by the Danish Government as a
promise not to object to the extension of Danish sovereignty. This emerges
from several documents; but the report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
to the King, dated August 1st, 1916 - reproduced under №.165 of the Annexes
to the Danish Government's Reply - appears to me to be absolutely decisive
in this respect. In his report, the Foreign Minister says:
"Finally, it appears to me most important that the United States of America
have offered to make, simultaneously with the signature of a convention, an
official declaration to the effect that the Government of the United States
of America will not object to the Danish Government extending their
sovereignty to include the whole of Greenland...."
[224] This is especially worthy of note because, in all the overtures
successively undertaken by it, the Danish Government expressly referred to
the request made to the United States of America; the American declaration
was submitted to the other governments as a model for the declaration asked
of them.
[225] The overtures to the other Powers - as I have said, I am leaving aside
for the moment the request addressed to the Norwegian Government - were only
made later and when it was no longer possible for the question to be brought
before the Peace Conference. On March 2nd, 1920, the Danish Minister for
Foreign Affairs sent to the Danish Ministers in London, Paris, Tokyo and
Rome, instructions which were to serve as a basis for overtures to the
respective governments.
[226] In these instructions (Annexes to the Danish Government's Reply, No.
170), after outlining Danish activities in Greenland since 1721, and after
observing that several parts of that country had been effectively occupied
on behalf of Denmark, but [p79] that "formal possession of Greenland as a
whole had not been taken", the Minister for Foreign Affairs goes on to say
that, "having regard to Danish sentiment in this matter and in the interest
of the Eskimos, it would be desirable that the Danish Government should be
enabled to extend its care, by means of its sovereignty, over the whole of
Greenland".
[227] The instructions next describe the request made to the United States
of America and reproduce the terms of the declaration made by the American
Government. They conclude by requesting the Danish representative "to
endeavour to obtain .... the Government's .... official recognition of
Danish sovereignty over all Greenland", and they add that "the best way of
obtaining such recognition from .... would, in the Foreign Minister's
opinion, be for the .... Government to make a declaration corresponding to
that made by the American Government". The import attached to that
declaration by the Danish Government has already been seen.
[228] In the note transmitted on March 16th, 1920, to the British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs (Annexes to the Danish Government's Reply, No.
171), we read: "I have accordingly been instructed to submit to His
Britannic Majesty's Government a request for the official recognition of His
Danish Majesty's sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. In view of my
Government's opinion, such recognition might be given in the same way as the
Government of the United States of America recognized in 1916...."
[229] To this note was attached a memorandum which, pursuant to the
instructions received, gave an account of the historical relations between
Denmark and Greenland and set out the other considerations militating in
favour of the request. The memorandum concluded with the following
paragraph:
"Danish explorers have visited practically the whole of uninhabited
Greenland and made maps of the country , but no formal occupation of the
whole of Greenland has actually taken place. In view of Danish sentiments in
this matter as well as the interest of the Esquimau population, it would be
desirable if the Danish Government could extend its activity by proclaiming
its sovereignty over the entire territory of Greenland."
[230] The notes to the Italian Government, on March 17th, 1920 (Annexes to
the Danish Government's Reply, №. 173), to the French Government, on March
20th, 1920 (ib., №. 174), to the Japanese Government, on May 12th, 1920
(ib., №. 175), and to the Swedish Government, on January 13th, 1921 (ib., №.
177), together with the documents annexed to them, though containing some
differences in wording, all reproduce the same essential ideas, that is to
say that, ever since the beginning [p80] of the XVIIIth century, Denmark has
been founding colonies in Greenland, but that formal possession has not been
taken of the whole of Greenland in the name of the Crown of Denmark ; that
it is desirable that Denmark should be enabled to extend her sovereignty
and, thereby, her care to the whole of Greenland; finally, that the
recognition of Danish sovereignty might take the form of a declaration
similar to that made by the United States of America, the terms of which are
given in each case.
[231] On two occasions, however, the Danish Government deviated from this
standpoint and contended that the recognition sought was in respect of a
situation already existing and long since established: this it did, first,
in the note which the Danish Minister in London, on the basis of the
instructions received by him from the Foreign Minister (Annexes to the
Danish Government's Reply, №. 176), addressed to the British Government on
July 20th, 1920 (Danish Government's Case), and secondly, in the note
addressed by the Danish Minister at Christiania to the Norwegian Government
on December 19th, 1921 (Annexes to Danish Government's Case, №. 91). It is
therefore necessary to see in what circumstances this attitude was adopted.
[232] The note of July 20th, 1920, to the British Government is a reply to
that Government's note of May 19th (Danish Government's Case): in the latter
note, the Foreign Office stated that they were prepared officially to
recognize Danish sovereignty over Greenland, provided that Denmark gave the
British Empire a right of preemption in the event of the sale of the island.
It was to avoid this condition, which had met with determined opposition
from the United States of America, that the Danish Government adopted the
attitude expressed in the note in question.
[233] As regards the note of December 19th, 1921, that document was in reply
to the note of November 2nd, in which the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs informed the Danish Government that the Norwegian Government had not
recognized, and could not consent to recognize, an extension of Danish
sovereignty over Greenland, involving a corresponding extension of the
Monopoly, and the resulting extinction of the fishing and hunting operations
hitherto conducted by Norwegians in the parts of Greenland in question and
in the adjacent waters.
[234] It should be observed that the Danish Government affirmed the
preexistence of its sovereignty over all Greenland when it was necessary to
do this in order to refute claims which it was unable or unwilling to admit;
apart from such cases, it confined itself to asking for a recognition of an
extension of its [p81] sovereignty. It is therefore difficult to consider
the two notes of July 20th, 1920, and December 19th, 1921, as representing
the standpoint adopted by the Danish Government in approaching foreign
governments in regard to its position in Greenland ; to do so would indeed
set these two documents in manifest contradiction with the direct, definite,
and concordant statements which appear in all the other documents.
[235] The only conclusion which I find it possible to derive from the two
notes in question is that, at that moment, the Danish Government was
perfectly aware of the possibility of adopting either attitude: viz. that of
affirming an already existing sovereignty, and requesting its recognition,
or that of urging reasons in support of an extension of its sovereignty, and
requesting the recognition of this extension. It elected to adopt the latter
attitude and only resorted to the former in the course of a discussion and
to avoid conditions or limitations which it felt unable to accept.
[236] The majority of the replies from the interested States show that it
was, in truth, in that sense that the governments understood the request
made to them by the Danish Government, and that what they agreed to
recognize was the extension of Danish sovereignty over the whole of
Greenland.
[237] Thus, the French reply, dated March 31st, 1920, says that "the
Government of the Republic will not object to the Danish Government
extending its sovereignty over the whole of Greenland in the manner
indicated in the American note of August 4th, 1916" (Danish Case).
[238] The Japanese reply, dated June 24th, 1920, is worded as follows: "I
have the further honour to declare herewith on behalf of the Imperial
Government that they have no objection to the Danish Government extending
their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland." (ib.)
[239] The Italian Government's reply, dated June 29th, 1920, states that
"the Royal Government will have no difficulty in recognizing the sovereignty
of Denmark over Greenland" (ib.). In my opinion, it is beyond all doubt that
what is contemplated here is a future recognition, i.e. a recognition which
will not be refused whenever Danish sovereignty has been extended to the
whole of Greenland.
[240] The British and Swedish replies alone - the former, no doubt, as a
result of the Danish note of July 20th, 1920 - appear to contemplate a
recognition independent of any future events : the British reply, dated
September 6th, 1920, states that "His Majesty's Government recognize His
Danish Majesty's [p82] sovereignty over Greenland" (Danish Case) ; and the
Swedish reply, dated January 28th, 1921, declares that ".... His Majesty's
Government, as from this date, has recognized the sovereignty of Denmark
over the whole of Greenland" (ib.). But there is nothing in these replies to
indicate that these Governments believed that they were confirming an
already existing sovereignty. The fact that the British Government felt
justified in appending to its recognition a reservation in regard to its
right to be consulted in case the Danish Government should contemplate
alienating this territory, appears rather to point to an opposite
conclusion.
[241] I am therefore of opinion that, if one reads the documents as they
stand, giving the words the sense which they naturally bear in the context,
one is inevitably led to the conclusion that the Danish Government was
making a distinction between the colonized districts of Greenland and the
other parts of the country, and that what it was requesting from the States
whom it approached was, not the recognition of an already existing
sovereignty, but the recognition of the right to extend its sovereignty to
the whole of Greenland.
[242] 4. - Such, in my opinion, is the conclusion which emerges from the
text of the documents.
[243] It remains to be seen whether this conclusion is inexplicable or
inconsistent, having regard to the position of Denmark in Greenland at the
moment when the overtures were made. It is in this connection that the
historical question of Danish sovereignty in Greenland arises in the present
suit; a literal interpretation fails where it would lead to absurd or
inconsistent results.
[244] Two facts in particular merit attention.
[245] First, the existence of an ancient claim to sovereignty over the
country known as Greenland, a claim unconnected either with the extent of
the colonization of the country, or even with a more or less accurate
geographical demarcation thereof.
[246] It is agreed that the origin of this claim resides in the authority
which the ancient kings of Norway had acquired over the political
organization which inhabitants of Iceland, of Norwegian origin, had founded
at the end of the Xth century in South-West Greenland and which, at first
independent, did homage to the King of Norway in 1261 and became tributary
to the Kingdom of Norway. This species of suzerainty fitted in with the
notion of an exclusive dominion of the kings of Norway over the seas and
lands of the North and afforded the basis for a claim which was neither
limited to the territory occupied by the tributary State nor subject to the
condition that that State should continue to exist. [p83]
[247] It was, no doubt, as a consequence of this claim that, some two
centuries after the political organization in Greenland had been destroyed
by the Eskimos, and practically all communication with Greenland had ceased,
the kings of the Danish-Norwegian Union announced the intention of
re-establishing the old relations with "the Country of Greenland belonging
to Our Kingdom of Norway"; or described themselves as "hereditary sovereigns
of Greenland"; or spoke of "Our Country of Greenland", etc.
[248] Again, this historic claim manifests itself in legislation or in
treaties relating to1 Greenland as a whole. The animus possidendi, of which
so much has been said in these proceedings, is, at bottom, nothing else than
the old claim on the basis of which, first the kings of Denmark and Norway
and later the kings of Denmark, did not hesitate to act as sovereigns of
Greenland when opportunity offered itself.
[249] The other fact deserving of attention is the disproportion between the
claim to sovereignty over all Greenland and the effective exercise of that
sovereignty.
[250] I am prepared to admit that the Danish Government has proved that, on
some occasions, laws have been promulgated which, according to their meaning
and tenour, were not limited to the colonized parts of Greenland; I also
concede that frequently the Danish-Norwegian Union or Denmark have acted, in
relation to foreign States, as though their sovereignty covered all parts of
Greenland alike.
[251] But that is all that can be conceded to the Danish stand-point. It is
undeniable and it has not been denied - and that in my view is the essential
point - that in this respect there was a profound difference between the
colonized regions of Greenland and the remainder thereof; for, whereas in
the colonies there was a regular administration and a judicial organization,
in the remainder of Greenland there were perhaps laws in force but no
authority to enforce them: in fact - and this is a circumstance as
exceptional as it is significant - no officials had even been appointed
competent to decide disputes or to apply and ensure respect for the law.
[252] For a long time, the disproportion to which I have referred was not of
much importance. This was the case not merely because the requirements of
international law were then smaller, but also, and above all, because the
title to sovereignty existed independently of its exercise: the
Danish-Norwegian or Danish kings did not claim to be sovereigns of Greenland
because they exercised authority over that country ; they exercised
authority over it because they claimed to be the hereditary sovereigns of
the country. From this point of view, and having regard to the natural
conditions [p84] prevailing in Greenland, I unhesitatingly admit that
Danish-Norwegian or Danish sovereignty was manifested in a manner satisfying
to requirements of international law, in the sense that sovereignty over all
Greenland was neither compromised nor lost. It is however obvious that this
position is only tenable if one postulates the existence of a title to
sovereignty antecedent to the so-called second colonization and if the
validity of that title is established.
[253] The situation however evolved in an entirely contrary direction.
[254] Historic claims to dominion over whole regions - claims which had,
formerly, played an important part in the allocation of territorial
sovereignty: - lost weight and were gradually abandoned even by the States
which had relied upon them. International law established an ever closer
connection between the existence of sovereignty and the effective exercise
thereof, and States successfully disputed any claim not accompanied by such
exercise.
[255] Furthermore, the natural conditions prevailing in Greenland and their
importance changed appreciably as a result of technical improvements in
navigation which opened up to human activities a part of that country,
especially the East coast, which previously, although known, had been
practically inaccessible.
[256] Accordingly, the question of Danish sovereignty over Greenland
presented itself in a new light.
[257] For, if the notion of a historical sovereignty arising from the old
Norwegian claims be discarded, Denmark's title to sovereignty over Greenland
must necessarily be sought in a taking of possession effected since 1721.
But in that case it is a question of the occupation of a terra nullius. To
say that the title resides in possession and not in occupation is a verbal
quibble, for possession of a territory which formerly belonged neither to
the State possessing it nor to any other State is nothing else than
occupation considered at a moment subsequent to the original act of
occupying.
[258] In short, either the so-called second colonization is the
manifestation of a preexisting sovereignty and the title to this sovereignty
must be established and shown to be valid; or else Greenland, in 1721, was a
terra nullius and we have before us an occupation which must be appraised in
accordance with the rules governing occupation.
[259] The historical development of Denmark's position in Greenland in the
XIXth century was bound to give rise to this problem. Accordingly, it is
easy to understand the anxiety which became evident with respect to parts of
Greenland which [p85] had not yet been effectively occupied. The attention
of the Danish Government was repeatedly drawn from different sides to the
possibility of disputes and to the danger of uncolonized territories in
Greenland being occupied by other States. Of course these were private
opinions, though in some cases they emanated from particularly competent
sources ; it is not to be expected that the Government itself should cast
doubt upon its sovereignty before having decided what it ought to do. It
should however be noted that the Government itself was not altogether free
from anxiety on the point. I find a striking proof of this in Article 2 of
the concession granted to Mr. J. W. Tayler on June 7th, 1863, in which it is
expressly stipulated that any settlement - colony, post, mine, or similar
establishment - which the concessionnaire might create north or south of
latitude 65�, is to come under the sovereignty of the Danish Crown and to be
subject to the Danish laws; it is difficult to understand that in granting a
concession to a foreigner in a territory which it regards as indisputably
subject to its sovereignty, a State should concern itself with the
possibility of the concessionaire taking possession of the territory in the
name of his own sovereign.
[260] Again, the fact that the Danish Government had doubts as to the
soundness of its claim to sovereignty over certain parts of Greenland is
proved by the very overtures which it made. A proceeding of this kind is
explicable only when the government which resorts to it thinks it necessary
to safeguard a doubtful or unsettled position. Accordingly it is a
proceeding which, so far as I am aware, has not been often resorted to. A
single precedent has been cited: the recognition of Swiss neutrality by
Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. But it has been forgotten that the
purpose of that Article was not to recognize Switzerland's neutrality which
no one disputed, but something quite different: the intention was on the one
hand to secure approval of the abrogation of certain provisions affecting
Swiss neutrality, and on the other hand to place on record that the
guarantees stipulated in favour of Switzerland in 1815 constituted
"international obligations for the maintenance of peace", in order to make
it possible for that country to enter the League of Nations.
[261] Denmark's historical position in Greenland had thus been reconsidered
in the light of the principles of international law now in force and of the
new situation existing in fact, and there was a demand for action which
would eliminate any danger by means of the taking of effective possession of
the territories not yet occupied.
[262] Accordingly, when, in 1915, the Danish Government considered that the
time had come to settle the question, it definitely took up the attitude
suggested to it by the present [p86] state of international law. Historical
claims were abandoned; all the documents point to the year 1721 as the
commencement of Danish dominion in Greenland. A definite distinction is made
between the parts of Greenland of which effective possession has been taken
- in regard to which no question arises - and the other parts of which
possession has not been formally taken but over which it would nevertheless
be just and desirable that Denmark should be enabled to extend her
sovereignty. And it was in order to obtain recognition of this extension
that the Danish Government approached the governments of the States which it
regarded as specially interested.
[263] Everything fits and forms a coherent whole in the overtures made by
the Danish Government; and the conclusion which emerges from the text of the
documents, far from being inexplicable or inconsistent with the historical
development of Denmark's position in Greenland, is the clear and natural
outcome thereof.
[264] 5. - Of all the overtures made by the Danish Government, the only one
which directly concerns us and with which I intend to deal hereafter is that
made in July 1919 to the Norwegian Government.
[265] First and foremost, this overture differs from the others by reason of
the circumstances in which it was made. The request to the United States of
America was made in connection with the cession of the Danish West Indies,
and its aim was to obtain a declaration which would accompany the signature
of the Convention. The overtures to the other Powers were made when it was
impossible for the Greenland question to be settled by the Peace Conference;
their object was to secure declarations which would take the place of a
settlement by the Conference and would close the question as between Denmark
and the State approached.
[266] On the other hand, it was precisely with a view to submitting this
question to the Peace Conference, and having it settled by the Committee
which was dealing with Spitzbergen, that the Danish Government approached
the Norwegian Government .
[267] In a letter dated at Copenhagen July 12th, 1919 (see Annexes to the
Danish Case, No. 84), the Minister for Foreign Affairs instructed the Danish
Minister at Christiania to inform the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs
that the question of Spitzbergen was shortly to be examined by a Committee
of the Peace Conference, composed of one American, one British, one French
and one Italian delegate, and that there was every reason to believe that
the Danish Government would in the near future receive an invitation to
bring its point of view on [p87] this question to the notice of the
Committee. "The Danish Government" - says the letter - "will be prepared to
renew before this Committee the unofficial assurance already given to the
Norwegian Government regarding the attitude of Denmark in the question of
Spitzbergen, namely, that Denmark, having no special interests at stake in
Spitzbergen, would raise no objection to the claims of Norway."
[268] Then come two paragraphs in which the object of the request to be made
to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs is set forth in the following
terms:
"Nevertheless, I would ask you in the course of the conversation to bring
out clearly that the Danish Government has, for a certain number of years,
been anxious to obtain the recognition by all the interested Powers of
Denmark's sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, and that it intends to
place that question before the above-mentioned Committee. In the course of
the negotiations with the United States of America concerning the cession of
the Danish West Indies, the Danish Government has already raised the
question of such a recognition by the United States, and had succeeded in
obtaining from the latter, simultaneously with the conclusion of the
Convention for the cession of the islands in question, a declaration to the
effect that the United States of America would not object to the Danish
Government extending its political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland.
I would ask you to explain to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs
that the Danish Government is confident that it will meet with no
difficulties on the part of the Norwegian Government with regard to such an
extension."
[269] Two days later, the Danish Minister at Christiania had the
conversation, which he had been instructed to seek, with the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Ihlen. The subject of this conversation was
recorded by M. Ihlen in a minute, a French translation of which is given
under No. 205 of the Annexes to the Norwegian Government's Rejoinder:
neither the accuracy of the minute, nor that of the translation, has been
challenged.
[270] The minute was to the following effect:
"The Danish Minister today informed me that his Government had heard from
Paris that the Spitzbergen question would be dealt with by a Committee of
four members (American, British, French, and Italian). Should this Committee
question the Danish Government, the latter would be prepared to answer that
Denmark had no interests in Spitzbergen and that Denmark had no reason to
oppose Norway's wishes in regard to the settlement of the question.
Further, the Danish Minister informed me of the following:
The Danish Government has for several years been concerned with the question
of obtaining recognition of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland from all
the Powers concerned, and they intend [p88] simultaneously to submit this
question to the Committee. In the course of the negotiations with the United
States of America concerning the cession of the Danish West Indies, the
Danish Government raised this question in so far as concerned recognition by
the United States Government, and it obtained from the latter,
simultaneously with the conclusion of the Convention regarding the cession
of the islands referred to, a declaration to the effect that the United
States would not raise any objection to the extension by the Danish
Government of its political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland.
The Danish Government confidently expected that the Norwegian Government
would make no difficulty in connection with the settlement of this matter. I
replied that the question would be considered."
[271] The reply was given on July 22nd, eight days later; it is recorded as
follows in a further minute by M. Ihlen:
"I today informed the Danish Minister that the Norwegian Government would
make no difficulty in connection with the settlement of this matter."
[272] The Danish Minister informed his Government of the reply in a
despatch, of the same date, in which he stated that M. Ihlen, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, had informed him on that day that "the plans of the Royal
Government concerning Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland -
mentioned in your despatch of 12th instant - will meet with no difficulty on
the part of Norway" (Annexes to the Danish Case, №. 85).
[273] The above are the principal documents relating to the Danish
Government's request to the Norwegian Government, and to the latter's reply.
[274] In this connection two questions arise:
(a) Did the two Governments agree upon anything ? and upon what?
(b) If so, was the agreement valid ?
[275] 6. - There appears no doubt that, in the opinion of the Danish
Government, there was a connection between the attitude which that
Government was prepared to adopt in the Spitzbergen question, and that which
it was asking the Norwegian Government to adopt in the Greenland question.
[276] I do not, however, think one can go so far as to say - as is now
contended by the Danish Government - that there was a regular reciprocal do
ut des contract, in which the declaration that the last-named Government was
prepared to make-and which it actually made before the Committee of the
Peace Conference - was to constitute the counter-part of the undertaking
which it was asking Norway to give. [p89]
[277] That was it is true, the idea suggested by the Danish Minister at
Paris, in his note of July 11th, 1919 (Danish Case). But the instructions
which the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs sent on July 12th to the
Danish Minister at Christiania (see above), and which resulted in his
conversation with the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, appear to have
been conceived and drawn up in rather a different spirit. The reason
probably lies in the fact - which was recalled in the instructions - that
the Danish Government had already given the Norwegian Government an
unofficial assurance that, as Denmark had no interests contrary to those of
Norway in the Spitzbergen question, she would raise no objection to the
latter's demands. There is nothing in these instructions that suggests the
idea of asking the Norwegian Government for a counter-concession; the
declaration concerning Spitzbergen, which the Danish Government was
proposing to "repeat" before the Committee, is indicated rather as an
opportunity for making an equivalent request to the Norwegian Government.
The words "nevertheless, I would ask you, in the course of the conversation,
to bring out...." convey just that idea.
[278] Everything points to the conclusion that it was in that sense that the
Danish Minister at Christiania interpreted his instructions. The minute
drawn up by M. Ihlen certainly does not convey the idea of an alleged do ut
des contract; on the other hand, if one compares this minute with the Danish
instructions of July 12th, the two documents are seen to be in complete
accord with one another. I have little doubt that the word "further" which,
in M. Ihlen's minute, separates the part of the conversation concerning
Spitzbergen from the part concerning Greenland, represents exactly what took
place; for what the Danish Minister had been instructed to do was "to bring
out, in the course of the conversation", the aspirations which his
Government entertained with regard to Greenland.
[279] I therefore hold that no do ut des contract was proposed by the Danish
Government. But even were it otherwise, there is nothing to show that M.
Ihlen realized that the statement which the Norwegian Government was being
asked to give was to be the counter-part of the declaration which the Danish
Government was promising to make in regard to Spitzbergen. The request made
to the Norwegian Government is therefore, in this respect, on the same plane
as those addressed to the other Powers.
[280] This request was that the Norwegian Government should not make any
difficulties in the settlement of the Greenland question - which the Danish
Government was proposing to submit, together with that of Spitzbergen, to
the Committee of the [p90] Peace Conference. The settlement contemplated by
the Danish Government was clearly not just any settlement: it was a
settlement on the lines indicated in the Danish Minister's communication,
namely, that no opposition would be made "to the Danish Government extending
its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland".
[281] It follows that when the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs
informed the Danish Minister, on July 22nd, that "the Norwegian Government
would make no difficulty in the settlement of this matter", that signified
that the Norwegian Government would not object to the Danish Government
extending its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland. It
has already been shown (see No. 3 above) that, in the eyes of the Danish
Government, "the extension of political and economic interests" signified,
at any rate in the first place, "the extension of sovereignty". There is no
reason to doubt that this was also the sense in which the Norwegian Minister
for Foreign Affairs understood the Danish request. That view is, indeed,
confirmed by the subsequent documents, which show that the Norwegian
objections were not aimed at the extension of Danish sovereignty, but at an
extension of sovereignty involving a corresponding extension of the
monopoly; the extension of sovereignty was, therefore, common ground: I
would refer in particular to the private letter from M. R�stad, Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania,
dated July 20th, 1921 (Annexes to the Norwegian Government's Rejoinder, №.
209), and to the Norwegian note of November 2nd of the same year (Annexes to
the Danish Government's Case, №. 89).
[282] The question whether the so-called Ihlen declaration was merely a
provisional indication (Norwegian contention) or a definitive undertaking
(Danish contention) has been debated at length. In my view there has been a
good deal of exaggeration on both sides.
[283] There is no doubt that the declaration was requested, and granted,
with a future settlement in view. The Norwegian Government could, therefore,
well be under the impression that the possibility of upholding its
interests, and ensuring adequate safeguards for them, still remained open to
it. It would be going beyond the intention of the Parties - or, at any rate,
of one of them - if the agreement resulting from the Ihlen declaration were
to be regarded as a complete and final settlement of the Greenland question
between Denmark and Norway. In this respect, the Norwegian declaration
differs unmistakeably from those which the Danish Government obtained from
other Powers, and which are complete in themselves. [p91]
[284] There was nevertheless, one point on which agreement had been reached
between the Parties, and which may definitively be regarded as common ground
for the future settlement. That point was not the recognition of an
already-existing Danish sovereignty: that contention of the Danish
Government is refuted by all the documents. The point on which the Danish
Government's request and the Norwegian Government's reply are in accord is
that the latter Government shall not make any difficulties in a settlement
of the question which would enable the Danish Government to extend its
political and economic interests, that is to say, its sovereignty, to the
whole of Greenland. In regard to this point, the Norwegian declaration is of
the same nature as those of the other Powers. Norway doubtless retained the
possibility of upholding her interests, provided always that . she refrained
from opposing the extension of Danish sovereignty to the whole of Greenland.
[285] 7. - The outcome of all this is therefore an agreement, concluded
between the Danish Minister at Christiania, on behalf of the Danish
Government, and the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the
Norwegian Government, by means of purely verbal declarations.
[286] The validity of this agreement has been questioned, having regard, in
the first place, to its verbal form, and to the competence of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs.
[287] As regards the form, it should be noted, to begin with, that as both
Parties are agreed as to the existence and tenor of these declarations, the
question of proof does not arise. Moreover, there does not seem to be any
rule of international law requiring that agreements of this kind must
necessarily be in writing, in order to be valid.
[288] The question of the competence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is
closely connected with the contents of the agreement in question; and these
have already been determined.
[289] No arbitral or judicial decision relating to the international
competence of a Minister for Foreign Affairs has been brought to the
knowledge of the Court; nor has this question been exhaustively treated by
legal authorities. In my opinion, it must be recognized that the constant
and general practice of States has been to invest the Minister for Foreign
Affairs-the direct agent of the chief of the State - with authority to make
statements on current affairs to foreign diplomatic representatives, and in
particular to inform them as to the attitude which the government, in whose
name he speaks, will adopt in a given question. Declarations of this kind
are binding upon the State.
[290] As regards the question whether Norwegian constitutional law
authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make the [p92] declaration,
that is a point which, in my opinion, does not concern the Danish
Government: it was M. Ihlen's duty to refrain from giving his reply until he
had obtained any assent that might be requisite under the Norwegian laws.
[291] A question of a totally different kind is whether the declaration of
the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs was. vitiated, owing to a mistake
on a material point, i.e. because it was made in ignorance of the fact that
the extension of Danish sovereignty would involve a corresponding extension
of the monopoly and of the r�gime of exclusion.
[292] It is manifest that the r�gime of exclusion, by rendering hunting and
fishing operations impossible in the territorial waters and on the coasts of
Greenland, might be gravely detrimental to Norwegian interests. The
documents submitted to the Court clearly show that the difficulties raised
by the Norwegian Government in 1921 - when the Danish Government requested
it to repeat in writing the verbal declaration it had given in 1919 - were
not aimed at the extension of sovereignty itself, but at the regime of
exclusion which would result from the extension of sovereignty.
[293] It should also be noted that this point - which was expressly
mentioned in the communications made to the other Powers - was not referred
to in the verbal communication made by the Danish Minister at Christiania to
the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The allusion to economic
interests, in conjunction with political interests, could not be considered
as a sufficient indication of something so specific as the r�gime of
exclusion.
[294] My own opinion is that there was no mistake at all, and that the
Danish Government's silence on the so-called monopoly question, and the
absence of any observation or reservation in regard to it in M. Ihlen's
reply, are easily accounted for by the character of this overture, which was
made with a future settlement in view. But even accepting, for a moment, the
supposition that M. Ihlen was mistaken as to the results which might ensue
from an extension of Danish sovereignty, it must be admitted that this
mistake was not such as to entail the nullity of the agreement. If a mistake
is pleaded it must be of an excusable character; and one can scarcely
believe that a government could be ignorant of the legitimate consequences
following upon an extension of sovereignty; I would add that, of all the
governments in the world, that of Norway was the least likely to be ignorant
of the Danish methods of administration in Greenland, or of the part played
therein by the monopoly system and the r�gime of exclusion.
[295] The foregoing is merely by way of supposition, because, as I have
said, I am strongly inclined to think that there [p93] was no mistake, and
that the silence observed on this point, both by the Danish and Norwegian
Governments, is attributable to the very nature of the declarations made by
the two Parties. In regard to the other Powers, the situation of the Danish
Government was different, as it was asking them for declarations which would
definitively settle the question. On the other hand, it is easy to
understand that the Norwegian Government should have thought it unnecessary
to dwell particularly on this point, since the whole question was going to
be brought up and examined on a later occasion.
[296] This leads me to the last question which arises in connection with the
binding character of the agreement of 1919; viz. whether the breaking off of
the negotiations by the Danish Government in 1921 entitled the Norwegian
Government to consider itself released from its undertaking.
[297] The agreement was concluded with a view to the settlement of the
Greenland question by the Peace Conference. This method of dealing with the
question, which was suggested by the Danish Government for reasons of
expediency, does not, however, appear to have been an essential condition of
the Norwegian Government's assent to the Danish request. The Norwegian
Government has never contended that the declaration made on its behalf to
the Danish Government had lost its value because that Government did not
submit the question to the Peace Conference but, instead of doing so, made
overtures to individual Powers.
[298] On the other hand, it was essential that there should be a settlement.
Norway had only given her assent to the Danish Government's desire to extend
its sovereignty to the whole of Greenland with a view to a future settlement
of the question, when she would have an opportunity of urging her interests
and demanding that they should be equitably safeguarded. I am, accordingly,
of opinion that, if the Danish Government had really claimed to abide by the
agreement of 1919 and to consider it as a final and complete settlement of
the question, and if it had refused to negotiate or to take the Norwegian
demands into consideration, it would have been acting in a sense contrary to
the agreement itself and the Norwegian Government would have been entitled
to declare itself released from its engagement.
[299] This was not, however, what occurred. The impression which, I think,
emerges from a perusal of the diplomatic correspondence between the two
Governments, from 1921 onwards, is rather that the Danish Government was
prepared - saving its right of sovereignty - to do its utmost to safeguard
the Norwegian hunting and fishing interests on the eastern coast of
Greenland. It is true that it was the Danish Government [p94] that broke off
the negotiations - perhaps somewhat abruptly - in 1921; but it is equally
true that these negotiations were resumed, and it is admitted that the
Convention of 1924 went a long way to meet the wishes of the Norwegian
Government.
[300] In these circumstances, I consider that the agreement, which was
validly concluded in 1919, has retained its force.
[301] 8.- It is consequently on the basis of that agreement which, as
between the Parties, has precedence over general law, that the dispute ought
to have been decided.
[302] The results which flow from this agreement may be summarized as
follows:
(a) As Denmark admitted to Norway in 1919 that there ere parts of Greenland
which were not yet subject to her sovereignty, she could not now adduce a
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, existing prior to that date. As the
territory affected by the Norwegian declaration of occupation of July 10th,
1931, is indubitably one of the parts of Greenland which - according to the
Danish Government's position in 1919 - were not subject to Danish
sovereignty, that territory must be considered as a terra nullius, unless
Denmark could be shown to have extended her sovereignty to it by acts
subsequent to 1919, and in conformity with international law; but no such
fact has been adduced by the Danish Government.
(b) As Norway had undertaken not to oppose the extension of Danish
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, she was, before everything else,
bound not to occupy any part of this region herself, thereby making it
impossible for Danish sovereignty to be extended to it.
[303] All that now remains is to apply the consequences of the agreement of
1919 to the submissions of the two Parties.
[304] The Danish Government asks the Court to give judgment to the effect
"that the promulgation by the Norwegian Government of the declaration of
occupation of July 10th, 1931, and any steps taken in this respect by the
Norwegian Government, constitute a violation of the existing legal situation
and are consequently unlawful and invalid".
[305] As the Norwegian occupation was effected in violation of an
undertaking validly assumed, it constitutes a violation of the existing
legal situation, and it is therefore unlawful: within those limits the Court
should, therefore, have acceded to the Danish Government's submission.
[306] On the other hand, regarding the question from the stand-point that I
have taken, and apart from certain other questions [p95] which I do not
propose to examine, the Court could not have declared the occupation
invalid, if the term "invalid" signifies "null and void". A legal act is
only non-existent if it lacks certain elements which are essential to its
existence. Such would be the occupation of territory belonging to another
State, because the status of a terra nullius is an essential factor to
enable the occupation to serve as a means of acquiring territorial
sovereignty. But this does not hold good in the case of the occupation of a
terra nullius by a sovereign State in conformity with international law,
merely because the occupying State had undertaken not to occupy it.
Accordingly, it would have been for the Norwegian Government to revoke the
occupation unlawfully carried out, without prejudice to the Danish
Government's right to apply to the Court, as reparation for the unlawful
act, to place this obligation on record (Judgment №. 13, p. 47).
[307] The Norwegian Government, in its turn, has submitted the following
counter-claim:
"that Denmark does not possess sovereignty over Eirik Raudes Land;
that Norway has acquired sovereignty over Eirik Raudes Land".
[308] In my view, it follows from the whole of the written and oral
proceedings that the first paragraph is designed to supply the ground for
the second and that, accordingly, there is only one claim the aim of which
is to obtain a declaration from the Court that the occupation effected by
the Norwegian Government is lawful and valid. This claim should, in my view,
be rejected, for an unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at
law.
(Signed) D. Anzilotti. [p96]
Observations by M. Sch�cking and M. Wang
[Translation.]
[309] While fully concurring in the Court's conclusions, we nevertheless
find it necessary to make some reservations regarding some of the reasons
which are given in support of them. The Court has definitely adopted the
view that there was a historic Danish sovereignty, extending over the whole
of Greenland, and exercised, in particular, as early as the XVIIIth century.
We are prepared to admit that there were indeed claims to that effect, which
had been put forward by Denmark in earlier centuries, and had not been
seriously disputed by other States. But the exact significance of the
documents which should demonstrate the exercise of this sovereignty remains
somewhat uncertain; moreover, the documents in question are legislative
acts, the effective application of which, elsewhere than on the western
coast - though it would have been an indispensable requirement under the
international law even of that period - has not been sufficiently
established. Even if all the circumstances, taken together, conferred a
presumptive title upon Denmark, the history of the diplomatic overtures
undertaken by Denmark between 1915 and 1921 in order to obtain recognition
of her sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, proves, in our opinion,
that, at that time, Denmark herself did not maintain towards the other
interested Powers the theory of an already existing Danish sovereignty over
the whole country. Regarding this point, having in view more especially the
report of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the King of Denmark on
August 1st, 1916, we are compelled to place a different construction upon
the Danish overtures to the Powers, namely, that Denmark was desirous of
extending her sovereignty to the whole of Greenland, with the assent of the
States chiefly interested.
[310] This view does not however prevent us from considering that, owing to
some of the other reasons which are set forth in the judgment, the Norwegian
occupation is unlawful and invalid.
(Signed) Walther Sch�cking.
( � ) Wang Chung-Hui. [p97]
Dissenting Opinion by M. Vogt.
[Translation]
[311] According to the Saga, Gunnbj�rn Ulvsson, who left Norway for Iceland,
about the year 900, was driven westwards by a storm. He saw a large country
and some islands to the West and subsequently succeeded in reaching Iceland.
Later, two inhabitants of Iceland set out to search for the islands seen by
Gunnbj�rn and, according to the Saga, they reached Greenland and passed the
winter there.
[312] Eirik Raude (Eric the Red) is, however, generally regarded as the
discoverer of Greenland; he was born in Norway about 950 and left for
Iceland about 970. About 980 he went to Greenland. He reached the habitable
region on the South-West, spent three winters there and visited the West
coast from Cape Farvel to a point far to the North. He it was who named the
country "Greenland".
[313] In 984, Eirik Raude began the colonization of the South-West coast.
The inhabitants of Iceland who accompanied him were of recent Norwegian
origin, the colonization of Iceland by Norwegians having begun in 870. It is
not easy to fix the precise date from which it may be said that Iceland
became a distinct State. During the ensuing period, immigration to Greenland
continued from Iceland and Norway.
[314] As regards communications between Greenland and other countries, these
were directed partly towards Iceland, but mainly towards Norway, whence came
the goods which the settlers needed.
[315] In 1261, the Greenlanders submitted themselves of their own free will
to the King of Norway, who promised to maintain regular navigation to the
colonies in Greenland.
[316] This regular navigation, which was essential to the Greenlanders,
ceased in 1410 and thus isolated, the settlers succumbed in the course of
the XVth century to the rigours of the climate and the attacks of native
Eskimos from the North who destroyed the colonies.
[317] In the following centuries, some expeditions set out for Greenland,
but no regular communications were established and no colonization
undertaken.
[318] Only at the beginning of the XVIIIth century were regular
communications with Greenland reestablished, after the Norwegian Pastor Hans
Egede had succeeded in forming the Greenland Company of Bergen. In 1723, the
King of Norway and Denmark, in the concession granted to this company, [p98]
expressed his intention of reestablishing the old commercial intercourse
between Norway and "the country of Greenland belonging to Our Kingdom of
Norway". Hans Egede left for Greenland in 1721 and, in the same year,
founded the first colony there. This marked the beginning of the second
Norwegian colonization of Greenland, which gradually extended in the course
of the XVIIIth century. The colonies thus established remained Norwegian
possessions until 1814, when the King of Denmark and Norway, by the Treaty
of Kiel, ceded the kingdom of Norway to the King of Sweden - "Greenland, the
Ferroe Isles and Iceland excepted".
[319] The Treaty of Kiel was concluded on January 14th, 1814, and
ratifications were exchanged on February 9th, 1814. In an open letter, dated
January 18th, 1814, King Frederick VI released his Norwegian subjects from
their oath of allegiance. Norway maintained that her union with Denmark was
dissolved by this letter. The Norwegian nation did not recognize the Treaty
of Kiel as binding upon them; they held that it was not within the power of
a king to cede a nation, against its will, to another king. Accordingly, the
Norwegian nation assumed for itself full sovereignty. A union between Norway
and Sweden was concluded on November 4th, 1814. On the 10th of the same
month, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote as follows in
instructions addressed to Swedish diplomatic representatives abroad: "We owe
the union of Norway to Sweden not to the provisions of the Treaty of Kiel
but to the trust of the Norwegian nation."
*
[320] The main question in the case before the Court is that of Danish
sovereignty over the disputed territory, and this question has generally
been presented in the course of the proceedings as the question of Danish
sovereignty over Greenland as a whole.
[321] In approaching this question, we must in the first place consider the
legal consequences of the overtures made by the Danish Government to various
Powers between 1915 and 1921.
[322] The standpoint of the Danish Government in the question of Danish
sovereignty was defined in a report made on August 1st, 1916, to His Majesty
the King of Denmark by his Minister for Foreign Affairs. This report
contains the following: "Finally, it appears to me most important that the
United States of America have offered to make, simultaneously with the
signature of a convention [concerning the Danish West Indies], an official
declaration to the effect that the Government of the United States of
America would not object to the Danish Government extending their
sovereignty to include the whole of [p99] Greenland; such a step would
afford valuable support to the future development and maintenance of Danish
interests in the possession in question...."
[323] In the documents submitted, we find the expressions used by Denmark in
her representations to foreign governments with a view to securing the
extension of Danish sovereignty to all Greenland. These expressions vary.
The instructions of March 2nd, 1920, given by the Danish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, contain the following: "It is desirable that the Danish
Government should extend its care, by means of its sovereignty, to the whole
of Greenland." By this expression the Danish Government indicated what may
be called the substantial motive of its overtures. The ostensible reason is
stated as follows: "Having got this declaration [that of the United States
of America], it [the Danish Government] proposes also to obtain recognition
by other Powers of Danish sovereignty over Greenland", and again: "I request
you therefore to endeavour to obtain from the Italian [British, etc.]
Government official recognition of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland."
In the same instructions, the Danish Government informed its Ministers
abroad that "effective possession" has been taken "in the name of Denmark"
of a certain district in Greenland which had been "outside the districts
hitherto under the Danish administration", and again "that formal possession
of Greenland as a whole has not been taken". An instruction of July 12th,
1919, issued by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Danish
Minister at Oslo contains the following sentence: "I will, on the other
hand, ask you [FN1] to bring out in the course of the conversation that the
Danish Government has for some years past been anxious to obtain the
recognition by all the interested Powers of Denmark's sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland and that it intends to place that question before the
above-mentioned Committee" (at Paris).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] The Danish text reads as follows : " De bedes imidlertid under
samtalen fremh�ve��
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[324] All these expressions convey the same idea, namely, that Denmark had
not hitherto possessed sovereignty over all Greenland. The parts of
Greenland which have not been brought under the Danish Greenland
Administration and of which possession has not been effectively or even
formally taken, cannot be regarded as under Danish sovereignty. For this
reason the notes despatched by the Danish Ministers, who had received these
instructions, all contain expressions such as "extend her sovereignty to all
Greenland"; "extend her care, by means of her sovereignty, to all
Greenland"; or, "extension of Danish [p100] sovereignty to the whole of
Greenland". There is no trace of the despatch of any rebuke or correction to
the Danish Ministers abroad who, in carrying out their instructions, used
the expressions "extend", or "extension of", "Danish sovereignty". In point
of fact, these Ministers merely gave accurate expression to the idea
embodied in the instructions themselves. The last note is that of January,
1921, to the Norwegian Government. In this we read: "The Danish Government
also reckoned on an extension of Danish sovereignty to all Greenland not
meeting with difficulties on the part of Norway." This reference to the
request made verbally in 1919 makes no qualification as regards the
expression "extension of sovereignty".
[325] Already in December 1915, the Danish Minister in Washington, in a note
to the United States Secretary of State, had spoken of "the extension of the
care and suzerainty of Denmark to the whole of Greenland", and the Danish
Minister in Paris, in his note to the French Government in 1920, used the
words: "extend her sovereignty to all Greenland".
[326] If the Danish Government had believed that such expressions were not
correct, it would no doubt have taken every care to warn its Ministers
abroad to avoid making use of the words which have been quoted above.
[327] The replies of the governments whom Denmark had approached also show,
for the most part, that these governments considered that what was desired
was a future extension of Danish sovereignty. I would also refer in this
connection to the history of the Danish-American negotiations concerning the
sale of the Antilles, as related by Charles Callan Tansill in a recent work:
The Purchase of the Danish West Indies.
[328] It is true that on various occasions, in the XIXth century, the Danish
Government had expressed its conviction, in Denmark, that the sovereignty
over the whole of Greenland belonged to Denmark.
[329] On the other hand, during the same century, there had been no small
number of official acts and declarations which revealed an opposite
conviction. Thus, the expedition of Graah (1829-1830), which acted "under
instructions from the King", and the expeditions of Holm (1883-1885) and
Ryder (1891-1892) organized by the Danish State, were all commanded by
officers of the Royal Danish Navy; and all three of them took possession of
lands on the East coast in the name [p101] of the King. These formal acts of
occupation did not produce any legal effects; but they are clear evidence
that the Danish Government was not convinced that it possessed sovereignty
over the whole of Greenland. This attitude was also expressed by the Danish
Minister of Marine at a meeting of the Folketing, in the session of
1880-1881, in a speech which he made on the exploration of the East coast of
Greenland. On that occasion the Minister said : "It is in every way natural
that a part of the coast lying so near to the colonies belonging to the
Danish Crown should be explored at the initiative of Denmark...."
[330] The Holm expedition had been organized by the Commission for the
Exploration of Greenland. This Commission wrote to the Ministry of Marine
concerning the explorations which it behoved Denmark to undertake "in regard
to territories, which are in part subject to the Danish State, and in part
adjacent to the territories that are subject". The Government followed the
advice of the Commission. There is nothing to show that it did not accept
the argument mentioned above.
[331] In a report submitted to the King of Denmark by the Minister of the
Interior, in connection with the Tayler concession, granted in 1863, the
Minister points out that no one disputed Danish sovereignty on the East
coast of Greenland. In the same report it is also emphasized that Mr. Tayler
"undertakes to take possession in Your Majesty's name of any new part of the
coast which may be reached by the expedition....". The actual concession
stipulates that "any station .... shall come under the sovereignty of the
Danish Crown....".
[332] Such contradictions cannot be regarded as evidence of a definite
attitude, or of a firm conviction.
[333] At the beginning of the present century, we have to note the law of
May 27th, 1908, which lays down, inter alia:
".... Southern Greenland comprises the country situated between Cape
Farewell and the Nordre-Str�m-Fiord, including the latter; Northern
Greenland includes the remainder of the Danish territory on the western
coast...."
[334] In a note to the British Government, dated July 20th, 1920, the Danish
Government maintains that Danish sovereignty over all Greenland was acquired
"by prescriptive right". This note was occasioned by the fear lest a dispute
might arise on the question of preemption between two of the Great Powers
whom Denmark had approached. In a despatch dated December 21st, 1921, the
Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen had reported, as a result of overtures made
by him to the Danish Government, that the last-named Government "has
refused, out of deference for America, to [p102] accept the demand of Great
Britain for a right of preemption, in case Denmark should desire, in the
future, to alienate Greenland. The British Government then contented itself
with reserving its right to be informed in case Denmark should ever
contemplate thus alienating Greenland. And if I have rightly understood,
Denmark must be regarded as having accepted that reservation." The argument
put forward in the note of July 20th, 1920, by Denmark, finding herself in a
difficult diplomatic position, to the effect that she possessed an ancient
sovereignty, acquired by prescriptive right, cannot be allowed very much
weight.
[335] The most eminent Danish jurists of recent times have maintained that
the Danish possessions in Greenland were limited, and they have spoken of an
effective occupation, or taking into possession, in such a way as to be
valid in international law, as being a necessary basis for Danish
sovereignty.
[336] The declarations of 1915 to 1921 were declarations freely made, so to
speak, to the community of nations. In thus officially declaring to a
certain number of Powers that it did not yet possess sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland, the Danish Government debarred itself from claiming to
possess an ancient sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. To concede the
right of a government to put forward claims to an ancient sovereignty, only
a few years after that very government has solemnly proclaimed that it did
not possess that sovereignty, would be to open the door to instability in
international affairs.
*
[337] It is next necessary to consider whether Denmark acquired sovereignty
over the territory in dispute, subsequently to 1921.
[338] It is clear that Denmark had the animus possidendi during that period;
but did she have the corpus possessionis? The region in question is one
where the citizens of another nation have engaged in fairly regular
activities, certainly since, and probably long before, 1889 - "a favourite
resort of the Norwegian hunters" - without Denmark having attempted to
exercise sovereignty over those foreigners. And these activities continued,
even after the proclamation of June 16th, 1921, under which the whole of the
coasts and adjoining islands of Greenland were closed to ships of foreign
nationality. It is a territory, the sovereignty over which is disputed, a
territory which was visited in 1930 by a Danish official expedition under
the command of a Danish naval officer, without any action whatever being
taken by him in regard to the serious [p103] accusations brought by a Danish
company against the Norwegian hunters in the district. He did not even
interrogate the accused persons. It is a territory, forming part of the
areas which M. Christensen, the former Danish Prime Minister, in a speech in
defence of the Convention of 1924, referred to in the following words:
"As we have no warships in Greenland waters, nor any police-force capable of
expelling them [i.e. the Norwegian hunters], we have no means of
intervening."
[339] That statement still held good in July 1931.
[340] It has been argued on behalf of the Danish Government that the
administrators of Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound, whose jurisdiction has
not been delimited by any geographical boundaries, have been since 1894 (?),
and are still, the local representatives of the Danish State in Eastern
Greenland. This assertion has been contested on behalf of Norway: it has
been pointed out that the officials in those two stations are in no way
entitled to exercise official authority, and that in fact they never have
attempted to exercise any kind of authority, outside the very limited
districts entrusted to their administration.
[341] The Danish Government has not produced any document conferring the
alleged authority, outside the two stations in question, upon the
above-mentioned officials. Two facts should be noted: (1) the officials
mentioned by the Danish Government are employes of the Monopoly, pastors,
and telegraphists; (2) Denmark undertook, in the Protocol signed on January
28th, 1924, at the closure of the negotiations for the Convention of July
9th, 1924, to trace the boundaries of the two above-mentioned colonies
according to the customary rules (cf. the Ordinance of March 26th, 1751).
The said Protocol, in making an express reference to the Ordinance of March
26th, 1751, indicates that the boundaries of the stations are situated,
speaking generally, at a distance of fifteen miles on either hand.
Considering these circumstances and the geographical situation, it is
difficult to understand what governmental authority the employ�s of the
Monopoly, the pastors and telegraphists of Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound
can possibly possess in Eirik Raudes Land.
[342] My conclusion is that Denmark has not proved the corpus possessionis
in respect of the territory in question, nor has she proved an "inchoate
title". [p104]
*
[343] I am led by the circumstances to examine the question of the extent of
Danish sovereignty over Greenland from another point of view.
[344] What is the origin of that sovereignty?
[345] Until 1814, Greenland was a Norwegian dependency; it is therefore
necessary to determine what was that Greenland which Denmark retained for
herself at the dissolution of the union between the two kingdoms.
[346] The instructions sent to some of the Danish Ministers abroad by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Copenhagen, on March 2nd, 1920, begin with
the words: "Danish enterprise in Greenland had its origin in 1721." In
pursuance of those instructions, these Ministers presented memoranda to the
different governments, in such terms as: "Danish enterprise in Greenland was
initiated in 1721"; "l'uvre danoise аи Gronland a �t� initi�e depuis d�j�
1721"; "l'activit� civilisatrice des Danois dans le Groenland a commenc� en
1721"; "the beginning of Denmark's penetration into Greenland took place in
the year 1721". Especially clear is the following declaration: "The taking
into possession of Greenland by Denmark dates from a period as far distant
as 1721." The latter passage is quoted from the instructions issued by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 7th, 1920, and the information was
transmitted to the British Government in the following form: "The occupation
of Greenland by Denmark took place as far back as 1721." This decisive
statement is contained in the instructions, and in a diplomatic note,
written with the express object of emphasizing the fact that Danish
sovereignty went back to an ancient date. A letter, dated April 29th, 1921,
from the Danish Minister at Oslo to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, contains the words: "The Danish Government being about to celebrate
the 200th anniversary of the attachment of Greenland to Denmark...."
[347] When these documents speak of Denmark, this must really be understood
to mean Norway, or - if it is preferred - the King of the two United
Kingdoms, in his capacity as King of Norway. In any case, for the present
purpose, it suffices to note that the sovereignty which Denmark invokes only
goes back - according to the solemn declarations made by the Danish
Government to foreign Powers - as far as the year 1721. During the
proceedings, the Danish Government has used expressions such as: "the Danish
Government is entitled to adduce an uninterrupted occupation of two hundred
years", and "the Danish State has exercised sovereignty over all Greenland
for two hundred years". These expressions are not [p105] without importance,
although the Danish Government has, in other passages, sought to base its
sovereignty on a more ancient historical foundation.
[348] Christian IV was the most remarkable of the kings of Denmark and
Norway and took more interest than any of them in the countries in the
northern seas. In his "Fiscal Letter" of April 1st, 1606, he writes as
follows: "Greenland, which is a member [of Norway], which belongs by right
to the Crown of Norway and which in the days of some of Our beloved
ancestors, Kings of Denmark and Norway, by abandonment or other unfortunate
circumstances, was separated and cut off, with the rights and profits
attaching thereto, from the Crown of Norway." It was, however, the avowed
intention of the King to restore this country to the Norwegian Crown.
[349] When, in 1616, the Dutch captains took possession of the western coast
between the 60th and 66th degree of north latitude on behalf of the
States-General, Christian IV maintained a passive attitude. His successor,
Frederick III, granted a concession in 1652, "seeing that the aforesaid
country of Greenland was a dependency of our Kingdom of Norway". In a
despatch dated January 13th, 1844, the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
wrote : "After 'old Greenland' [in other words, the East coast], which had
been discovered by Norwegians and Icelanders at the end of the Xth century,
had been entirely abandoned at the beginning of the XVth century, all
relations with that country ceased, until King Christian IV decided to send
ships to endeavour to rediscover the eastern coast...."
[350] The somewhat vague claims of the Danish-Norwegian kings found
expression in terms such as "hereditary sovereign of Greenland" and "Our
country of Greenland", etc. Thus, in the charter granted to the Greenland
Company of Bergen on February 5th, 1723, the King declared his intention of
reestablishing the ancient commercial relations between Norway and "the
country of Greenland belonging to our Kingdom of Norway....". But no very
great importance can be attached to claims of such a nature.
[351] Even admitting that an ancient sovereignty is not forfeited by
dereliction, unless the animus is abandoned as well as the corpus
possessionis, it must be conceded that the sovereignty could not be still in
being some centuries after the extermination of the ancient colonists and
the cessation of communications.
[352] The second colonization of Greenland, under the direction of the
Pastor Hans Egede, was a Norwegian enterprise. In his numerous petitions
Hans Egede recalled the fact that Greenland had been a dependency of the
Kingdom of Norway. The Bergen Company, which sent Egede to Greenland,
declared [p106] its object to be that "this country which has been so long
deserted and has been left in the hands of savages may, in course of time
.... be restored to Your Majesty....". In connection with the petitions of
the Bergen Company, the Principal Secretary of the Danish Chancellory
stated, in an opinion presented about the end of 1722, that ".... the
country [that is Greenland] has for a great number of years been res
derelicta....".
[353] It accordingly follows that the sovereignty which Denmark now
possesses in Greenland is based upon the Norwegian colonization at the
beginning of the XVIIIth century.
*
[354] From a purely historical standpoint, it was sought to base the claim
for sovereignty on the fact that Greenland had, in ancient times, been a
country belonging to Norway. But, according to the custom then prevalent in
matters of colonization, the sovereignty was in reality restricted, after
the second colonization, to certain areas surrounding the factories or
stations successively established. The same system was also employed by the
Monarch of the two kingdoms in dealing with possessions in the Indies and
Africa. In regard to possessions in those parts of the world, the King also
granted charters for colonies which might hereafter be established.
[355] The system which it was sought to apply in Greenland consisted, from
1721 onwards, in successively extending the colonized territory, with a
consequent extension of the territory under governmental administration,
thus again, in turn, extending the sovereignty of Denmark. This system has
been described on various occasions by the Danish Government. I will content
myself with two examples.
[356] The Danish Ministry of the Interior (Directorate of Greenland
Colonies) in a letter, dated November 3rd, 1916, to the Parliamentary
Commission for the Danish West Indies, refers to the establishment of the
Angmagssalik station in 1894 and explains how, by a Proclamation dated March
8th, 1905, it had been "announced that the Danish establishments
henceforward extended as far as latitude 740 30' N.; that is to say that the
sovereignty of Denmark and the regime of exclusion have accordingly been
extended over a fresh zone, one degree and a half of latitude in width". The
Ministry's letter continues in the following terms: "These two regions,
which have been incorporated at a relatively recent date, are universally
recognized as being subject to Danish sovereignty; in any case, no objection
has ever been raised in any quarter against this view; and it would perhaps
be possible to maintain that Danish sovereignty could always continue [p107]
to be extended to all places where there are Danish establishments, that is
to say - since a trading and mission station has now been founded by private
initiative at Cape York - to every inhabited part of Greenland."
[357] In the instructions issued on March 2nd, 1920, by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs at Copenhagen to a number of Danish Ministers in foreign
countries, the following passage occurs:
"As has been mentioned above, Denmark established colonies in Greenland as
early as the beginning of the XVIIIth century. Later on, when it was found
that Eskimos were also living outside the districts hitherto subject to the
Danish administration, namely, at Cape York, Denmark extended her missionary
enterprise and commercial activities to those regions and, by reason of that
fact, these territories of Greenland have also been effectively taken into
possession on behalf of Denmark."
[358] A study of the Ordinances, etc., of the XVIIIth century relating to
Greenland, confirms the accuracy of the description, thus given by the
Danish Government, of the system of colonization and administration.
[359] Denmark has endeavoured, during the proceedings, to draw a distinction
between the sovereignty itself, and the exercise of sovereignty by the
Danish administration. But, if Denmark believed that she possessed a
sovereignty, valid in international law, over the whole of Greenland, she
ought to have prohibited trading with Greenland to all other nations; she
ought to have taken steps to combat the foreign trade which she said was
prohibited. But the history of the colonization shows that Denmark did not
believe herself entitled to proceed in this way.
[360] The Department of Police and Trade had stated in a proposal to the
King, dated February 28th, 1721 : ".... for we humbly submit that it would
be imprudent to enact such a prohibition before Your Majesty's subjects have
really taken the country into possession....".
[361] In regard to a concession for trading with Greenland, the Principal
Secretary of the Royal Danish Chancellory wrote on February 20th, 1740:
"....the last article should, moreover, be drawn in such a way as to show
that His Majesty authorizes Severin alone to trade with the Greenland
colonies, whether already established or hereafter to be established, and
that neither His Majesty's subjects nor foreigners may engage in trade
within a given distance from the said colonies, seeing that it is evidently
impossible to prohibit foreigners or others from trading in the Davis Strait
so long as they do not approach nearer to the colonies than may be declared
permissible for them". The concession was modified and restricted in
conformity with this proposal. [p108]
[362] The documents filed with the Court show that the Danish Government did
not know any legal method of preventing trade with foreigners other than the
establishment of a chain of colonies.
[363] The Ordinance of April 9th, 1740, provides that if any person venture
"to trade in the colonies already established or hereafter to be
established, in Our Country of Greenland" as also within the boundaries
fixed for them, "and similarly if any person venture, in any part of
Greenland whatsoever, by sea or by land, to despoil the Greenlanders or to
do them violence the offenders" shall be "punished by seizure and
confiscation". This Ordinance, which provides for the protection of the
Eskimos, even outside the boundaries of the colonies, has been relied on as
proof of the existence of a corpus possessions. As a fact, however, this
Ordinance is based upon a memorial of Severin, in which the latter proposes
measures to prevent the Greenlanders from being despoiled or molested,
offenders being liable "according to the nature of the offence [to be] duly
punished as pirates".
[364] The punishment of acts of piracy by the crews of ships did not require
the existence of sovereignty in the places where such acts had been
perpetrated. And piracy might take place either by sea or by land.
(Pradier-Fod�r�: "It matters little whether the act of brigandage is
perpetrated on the high seas or on the coasts, in order to determine its
character [FN1].")
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] This subject has been fully dealt with by Paul Stiel in his book Der
Tatbestand der Piraterie, etc. (Leipzig, 1905). Reference may also be made
to the report to the Council of the League of Nations, C. 196. M. 70. 1927.
V., page 204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[365] It is interesting to cite the following paragraph in the proposal
submitted to the King on April 1st, 1740 : "In Severin's project it is
stated that no person may, under pain of confiscation of his ship and its
cargo, do any wrong or prejudice to the Greenlanders; but as the word wrong
is of a rather general character, and might be construed in too wide a
sense, the Commissioners have contented themselves with proclaiming that if
anyone should despoil the Greenlanders or use any flagrant violence against
them, his vessel shall be seized for confiscation." Here again it is clearly
a question of piracy.
[366] The Danish Government has adduced an instruction drawn up in 1737, in
the following terms:
"He must warn all foreign merchants and all whalers, to refrain, .... from
depriving the Greenlanders at any point .... either of blubber or fish....,
this being contrary not only to our Absolutum Dominium, but also to the law
of Nations; and, furthermore, Dutch subjects who act in this way are
violating the attached Ordinance made in 1720 by the States-General." [p109]
[367] In acting in the manner described in the colonies, the Dutch were
doubtless infringing "our Absolntum Dominium". But the fact that the
instructions make reference to the law of nations and also to a Dutch
Ordinance seems to prove that the Copenhagen Government was not founding
itself on the idea of a Danish sovereignty extending to the whole of
Greenland.
[368] In 1753, the General Greenland Trading Company wrote: "Although the
place [on the coast of Greenland] where these vessels are said to have been
abandoned (so far as is known to us) is not subject to Your Majesty's
sovereign dominium...." The King ordered that no steps should be taken to
seize the ships in question.
[369] The Ordinance of April 22nd, 1758, has been adduced by the Danish
Government as evidence that, since that date, foreigners were prohibited
from trading anywhere in Greenland. But if this Ordinance is compared with
that of 1751, the text of which it was desired to modify, it is seen that no
substantial modification was intended; and a memorial of the Trading
Company, dated March 30th, 1759, describes the Ordinance of 1758 as
"concerning the prohibition of trading in Davis Strait", in other words, on
the colonized western coast.
[370] The Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, maintains the principle that the
establishment of stations must be effective, and must be published, as in
the past. The first article speaks of the Trading Monopoly and of navigation
"in the colonies and factories established, or hereafter to be established,
in Greenland and the islands appertaining thereto, in Davis Strait and Disco
Bay, as also in other ports and places in that region...." The article
declares that the colonies and factories "extend at present between lat. 60
and 73 N.", and it prohibits trade and navigation "in the aforesaid
country".
[371] In 1921, the Danish Government informed a certain number of foreign
governments that the Ordinance of 1776 prohibited access to the Greenland
coast "both as regards colonies and factories already established and those
which may hereafter be created". This interpretation of the Ordinance in the
sense that the prohibition of access only applied to the colonies has been
maintained by the Danish Government during the present proceedings. But in
that case the conclusion follows that "the aforesaid country" in that
Ordinance only signified the colonized western coast; and a study of the
Ordinance of 1776 gives the impression that it is based on the notion of a
sovereignty only extending to the colonized territory. [p110]
[372] The Rescript of April 17th, 1782, refers in the introduction to "two
royal inspectors designated for Greenland....". It begins with the following
words: "As it has been humbly pointed out in your letter of March 6th last
to our Danish Chancellory that there is no judicial authority in Our country
of Greenland....". And further on: "We have graciously deigned to appoint
two covenanted officials in this country as inspectors of trade and
fisheries, one for the Northern colonies and one for the Southern colonies";
and again further: "the aforesaid two inspectors, each one in respect of the
part of the country entrusted to him...."
[373] A report of November 1787 from the Royal Greenland Trade mentions that
His Majesty has been pleased "to divide the country into two inspectorates".
A report of the Royal Greenland Trade Commission of 1790 speaks of "two
inspectors who are to be regarded as the only public authorities in the
country", and in the same year another report of the said Commission
mentions that the two inspectors have to "watch over the territorial rights
of Your Majesty".
[374] Lastly, by a Royal Resolution of March 23rd, 1803, the King appointed
MM. Motzfeldt and Myhlemphort "Inspectors of Colonies and Whaling, the
former in Northern Greenland and the latter in Southern Greenland".
[375] The administration of these two inspectors, who were the only
representatives of the State in Greenland, continued to be definitely
limited to the colonized districts, the boundaries of which were fixed.
[376] The system of gradual extension of sovereignty by means of the
extension of colonization and administration was consistently followed, and,
in 1921, it again found expression in the Decree of May 10th which lays down
"that the whole country is henceforward attached to the Danish colonies and
stations and to the Danish administration of Greenland [FN1]" (".... que
tout le pays est d�sormais rattach� aux colonies et stations danoises et �
I'administration danoise du Gro�nland)".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] The (French) translation given above was filed by the Norwegian
Government. The translation submitted by the Danish Government was as
fol�lows : ".... l'ensemble du pays est d�sormais rattach� aux colonies et
stations danoises sous l'autorit� de l'administration danoise du Groenland"
(".... the whole of the country is henceforth attached to the Danish
colonies and stations under the authority of the Danish administration of
Greenland"). In view of these two different translations, it seems advisable
to give the original Danish text: ".... at hele Landet herefter er inddraget
under de danske Kolonier og Stationer og den danske Styrelse af Gr�nland".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[377] What happened in 1921, it is contended on behalf of Denmark, was
merely that "the whole country was attached to the special organization, the
office at Copenhagen which deals [p111] effect by several of the contracting
Parties to such treaties with Greenland affairs, in other words: it was
merely a question of domestic administration". Nevertheless, the Decree of
May 10th, 1921, was notified to foreign Powers. Even accepting the
construction now placed on this text by Denmark, it seems difficult to admit
that a State can have had effective possession of vast territories - even in
the Arctic regions - which were subject neither to the central
administration nor to the local administration instituted for the colony, of
which these vast territories are alleged to form part; territories of this
kind, elsewhere, are expressly subject to the different organs of the
competent administration, sometimes to several authorities (civil, military,
judicial); even if there are parts of the territory which have never been
visited by the authorities, there exists however a competent authority for
these territories who can act, if circumstances require it.
[378] It follows from the foregoing that the Greenland which up to 1814 was
a possession of Norway, and which in 1814 became a Danish possession - that
is to say the Greenland referred to in the Treaty of Kiel and during the
Norwegian-Danish negotiations concerning the financial settlement - was not
the whole of Greenland in the geographical sense of the present day. It
could only be, and it was only, the Greenland over which the Monarch of the
two united kingdoms had exercised - and over which he consequently possessed
- effective sovereignty, in other words, the colonized districts subject to
the administration of the Sovereign. That being so, it is unnecessary to
dwell further on the scope of the Treaty of Kiel and of the subsequent
financial settlement.
*
[379] In regard to the numerous treaties in which the Danish Government
inserted an exception in regard to Greenland, the following considerations
call for attention:
[380] If these treaties can be adduced as evidence that the respective
contracting States recognized Danish sovereignty over the whole of
Greenland, in virtue of the exception thus inserted by Denmark, how can one
account for the fact that the Danish Government itself, in the years
1915-1921, approached a certain number of these very same States with an
express request for their recognition ? And how can one account for the fact
that these States did not then reply that they had already granted this
recognition by the conclusion of one or other of these treaties ? The true
explanation is, perhaps, that at the same time when the treaties of
commerce, etc., were concluded, none of these foreign Powers was
thinking-owing to the nature of the case-of the area which might be covered
by the term "Greenland". Statements to that [p112] effect by several of the
contracting Parties to such treaties concluded with Denmark were indeed
produced to the Court.
*
[381] As regards the conversations which took place on July 14th and 22nd,
1919, between M. Krag, the Danish Minister at Oslo, and M. Ihlen, the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, there is in existence a record,
accepted by both Parties, in the form of notes bearing the initials of M.
Ihlen.
[382] The notes are in the following terms, according to the Norwegian
Government's translation:
"I. Le ministre de Danemark m'a communiqu� aujourd'hui que son Gouvernement
a �t� avis� de Paris que la question du Spitzberg sera examin�e, par une
commission de quatre membres (am�ricain, britannique, fran�ais et italien).
Au cas o� le Gouvernement danois serait interrog� par cette commission, il
est pr�t a r�pondre que le Danemark n'a pas d'int�r�ts au Spitzberg et qu'il
n'a aucune raison de s'opposer aux d�sirs de la Norv�ge touchant le
r�glement de cette question.
En outre, le ministre de Danemark a communiqu� ce qui suit:
Le Gouvernement danois s'est pendant plusieurs ann�es occup� de la question
d'obtenir la reconnaissance, par toutes les Puissances int�ress�es, de la
souverainet� du Danemark sur l'ensemble du Greenland, et il se propose de
soumettre cette question, simultan�ment, � ladite commission. Au cours des
n�gotiations avec les Etats-Unis d'Am�rique concernant la cession des
Antilles danoises, le Gouvernement danois a soulev� cette question en ce qui
concernait la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, et il a
obtenu que celui-ci, concurremment avec la conclusion de la convention
relative � la cession desdites �les, donn�t une d�claration dans laquelle il
est dit que les Etats-Unis ne s'opposeraient pas � ce que le Gouvernement
danois �tend�t � l'ensemble du Groenland ses int�r�ts politiques et
�conomiques.
Le Gouvernement danois compte (a-t-il dit) que le Gouvernement norv�gien ne
fera pas de difficult�s au r�glement de cette affaire. J'ai r�pondu que la
question sera examin�e.
14/7 � 19 Ih."
"II. J'ai dit aujourd'hui au ministre de Danemark que le Gouvernement
norv�gien ne ferait pas de difficult�s au r�glement de cette affaire.
22/7 � 19 Ih. [FN1]" [p113]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Translation from the French text supplied by Norway:
"I. The Danish Minister today informed me that his Government had heard from
Paris that the Spitzbergen question would be dealt with by a Committee of
four members (American, British, French and Italian). Should this Committee
question the Danish Government, the latter would be prepared to answer that
Denmark had no interests in Spitzbergen and that Denmark had no reason to
oppose Norway's wishes in regard to the settlement of the question.
"Further, the Danish Minister informed me of the following:
"The Danish Government has for several years been concerned with the
question of obtaining recognition of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland
[113] from all the Powers concerned, and they intend simultaneously to
submit this question to the Committee. In the course of the negotiations
with the United States of America concerning the cession of the Danish West
Indies, the Danish Government raised this question in so far as concerned
recognition by the United States Government, and it obtained from the
latter, simultaneously with the conclusion of the convention regarding the
cession of the islands referred to, a declaration to the effect that the
United States would not raise any objection to the extension by the Danish
Government of its political and economic interests to the whole of
Greenland.
"The Danish Government confidently expected (he said) that the Norwegian
Government would make no difficulty in connection with the settlement of
this matter. I replied that the question would be considered.
14/7 - 19 Ih."
"II. I to-day informed the Danish Minister that the Norwegian Govern-ment
would make no difficulty in the settlement of this matter.
22/7 - 19 Ih."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[383] The translation filed by the Danish Government does not differ
ubstantially, or in any essential particular, from the above. In place of
the words "аи r�glement de cette affaire" ("in the settlement of this
matter"), the Danish translation has: "аи sujet du r�glement de cette
affaire" ("in connection with the settlement of this matter"). It should be
noted that the word " simultan�ment" (� ladite commission)
("simultaneously..... to the Committee) does not appear in the instructions
sent to M. Krag.
[384] On July 22nd, the Danish Minister reported to his Minister for Foreign
Affairs in the following terms:
"I have the honour to report that M. Ihlen, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, informed me today that the plans of the Royal Government respecting
Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland - mentioned in your despatch
of the 12th instant - would meet with no difficulties on the part of
Norway."
[385] To appreciate the nature and scope of these conversations, it is
necessary to consider the following facts which emerge from the. evidence
produced:
[386] The Danish Government's overtures to the various other Powers, during
the years 1915 to 1921, were in writing, whereas it approached the Norwegian
Government in 1919 orally.
[387] In the negotiations with the United States of America in 1916, Denmark
expressly reserved her right to the continuance of the monopoly. There is no
proof that this was mentioned to M. Ihlen.
[388] In the overtures in writing to the other Powers, the monopoly system
is expressly described; in the brief request addressed verbally to Norway in
1919, the extension of this [p114] system was not mentioned. M. Krag spoke
of the Danish Government's anxiety to obtain recognition by all interested
Powers "of Denmark's sovereignty" over all Greenland; he described how "this
question" had been raised with the United States and he gave the American
reply to the effect that the United States would not oppose the extension of
Danish political and economic interests over all Greenland. M. Ihlen could
not, from these general expressions, and without any explanation or special
knowledge, draw the inference that this meant the extension of the monopoly.
[389] On Denmark's side, it has been maintained, in the course of the
proceedings, that the overtures to certain Powers between 1915 and 1921 were
designed to obtain recognition of sovereignty and also of future measures
for the welfare of the Eskimos, i.e. the monopoly system; so far as can be
observed, nothing was said regarding the extension of the monopoly in the
conversation with M. Ihlen; on the contrary, M. Ihlen's minutes and the
instructions given to M. Krag and the latter's despatch to his Government
after M. Ihlen's answer, all alike only refer to the question of
sovereignty.
[390] The important Greenland Society of Copenhagen, in a letter to the
Danish Government on November 2nd, 1916, had said with regard to the coastal
area between Germanialand and Cape Dalton (an area which includes Eirik
Raudes Land) that "it is a favourite resort of Norwegian hunters who almost
every year engage in hunting there both at sea and on land"; and the Society
emphasized that "the State of Denmark must exercise sufficient foresight to
secure these regions as soon as possible".
[391] The brief minutes kept by M. Ihlen are the only record made in the
Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Danish demarche of 1919 and of
M. Ihlen's reply.
[392] During the Dano-Norwegian negotiations for the settlement of this
matter, the Danish Government closed the coasts of Greenland which had
hitherto been open, a measure directed particularly against Norwegians; by
this measure the Danish Government broke off the negotiations.
[393] Thus, in 1919, the Danish Government was fully aware of the Norwegian
interests in Eastern Greenland. At the same time, the aim of the demarches
undertaken by it was an extension of the monopoly the consequences of which
were bound to be most serious for Norwegian interests.
[394] The Danish Minister in Paris, on July nth, 1919, had suggested to his
Government that Denmark's attitude in the [p115] Spitzbergen question should
be based on that of the Norwegian Government in regard to Denmark's request
for recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland. Nothing was said to M.
Ihlen regarding any such linking together of the two questions, nor did the
instructions to M. Krag contain anything on the point. In these instructions
we read : "I will, on the other hand, ask you to bring out in the course of
the conversation", etc. If what was desired was an arrangement on the
principle of do ut des in regard to the questions of sovereignty, it should
have been expressly stated. The Danish Minister at Oslo begins, on the
contrary, by stating unreservedly that the Danish Government, should it be
questioned on the point, would be "willing to reply that Denmark has no
interests in Spitzbergen and has no reason for opposing Norway's aspirations
regarding the settlement of this question".
[395] Moreover, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs had already stated
unreservedly on April 1st, 1919, to the Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen,
that Denmark had no interest conflicting with those of Norway in
Spitzbergen; in view of this unofficial statement, it would have been
difficult for M. Ihlen to conceive, in July of the same year, that there was
any question of an agreement of some sort on the principle of do ut des. It
has in no way been proved that M. Ihlen knew - as has been alleged - that
Denmark, when intending to adopt an attitude favourable to Norway in the
Spitzbergen question at the Peace Conference, was relying upon his
declaration. M. Ihlen expressly denied it in a statement made by him on July
4th, 1923, protesting against certain assertions made in Denmark. In this
statement, M. Ihlen expresses himself as follows:
"On one of the last days of March, 1919, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs telegraphed to the Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen asking him to
explain to the Danish Foreign Minister the reasons militating in favour of
the attachment of Spitzbergen to Norway, and to express the hope that
Denmark would take a favourable view of the matter. In conformity with these
telegraphic instructions, the Norwegian Minister had a conversation with M.
Scavenius, Foreign Minister, on the subject of Spitzbergen, on April 1st,
1919. In a despatch of April 2nd regarding this conversation, the Norwegian
Minister reported that M. Scavenius had at once declared that the Danish
Government would be altogether favourable to the union of Spitzbergen with
Norway. Denmark herself had no interest in that region conflicting with
those of Norway, and the Danish Government fully recognized the weight of
the geographical and economic arguments in favour of uniting these islands
with Norway, and considered this as the most practical settlement. Not a
word was said about Greenland in this conversation. [p116]
The d�marche made to me by the Danish Minister at Oslo and alluded to by M.
Scavenius did not take place until some months later, on July 14th, 1919.
During this conversation, the questions of Spitzbergen and Greenland were
both discussed, but I can say with certainty that Monsieur Krag, the Danish
Minister, did not on this occasion place any conditions upon the Danish
Government's favourable attitude in the question of Spitzbergen. There is
therefore no justification for speaking of the conclusion of a contract."
[396] In view of the undeniable fact that Denmark had no interest in
Spitzbergen, I should not have considered it equitable to attribute to the
Danish Government an intention of proposing, in July 1919, any such bargain
on the do ut des principle. In point of fact, the Spitzbergen Treaty
guaranteed all rights to every Power, including Denmark, whereas Norway, by
recognizing Danish sovereignty, would have run the risk of sacrificing all
her rights in Greenland.
[397] It is very probable that M. Ihlen was, generally speaking, well
disposed owing to the Spitzbergen question, and doubtless he favourably
regarded Denmark's desire to approach the Committee of four members at
Paris. M. Ihlen also gave evidence of his favourable attitude at a visit
paid to him by the new Danish Minister at Oslo in November of the same year;
in the course of this visit, M. Ihlen - according to a report of the Danish
Minister - said that "it was a pleasure for Norway to recognize Denmark's
sovereignty over Greenland". This was an official courtesy visit and too
much importance must not be attached to the way in which the remark quoted
is worded in the report; but in any case it proves M. Ihlen's attitude.
[398] It has not been proved that the Krag-Ihlen conversations linked
together the Greenland and Spitzbergen questions in a manner possessing any
real legal significance ; and the facts above mentioned militate against the
theory that M. Ihlen must have realized the existence of a close connection
of this kind. During the year 1921, the Danish Government mentioned to the
Norwegian Government the benevolent attitude shown by Denmark in the
Spitzbergen question. But only in a note at the beginning of 1923, was the
theory that the two questions were interdependent - as maintained before the
Court - put forward to Norway. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that this
interdependence was not referred to in the Protocol of Closure of the
Dano-Norwegian negotiations of January 28th, 1924, in which the Danish
delegation expressly referred to the Ihlen declaration as binding upon
Norway. [p117]
[399] The correspondence with the Danish Minister in Paris was known to the
Danish Government and the Danish Minister at Oslo, but unknown to M. Ihlen.
The Danish authorities, having this correspondence in mind, gradually
conceived an idea of the import of the brief conversations with M. Ihlen,
differing from the idea which M. Ihlen himself could have had, as he was
unaware of the suggestions put forward regarding the interdependence of the
two questions of sovereignty.
[400] It appears from the information supplied during the proceedings that
the conversation of July 14th, 1919, was the first notice that the Norwegian
Government had of Denmark's aspirations. Thus, M. Ihlen was unprepared for
the question; he mentioned the matter verbally and unofficially to his
colleagues, but no decision was taken by the Government. It also appears
from the information produced that M. Ihlen made no enquiries into the
question of Norwegian interests in Eastern Greenland; he was not thinking of
them when he gave his verbal answer on July 22nd, 1919.
[401] Norwegian hunters and fishermen had for a considerable period engaged
in their pursuits in Eastern Greenland, unquestioned and unhindered by
Denmark. Accordingly, it is to be supposed that the Norwegian authorities
had no knowledge of any grievance on the part of these Norwegian nationals.
Moreover, the Danish Government for its part had never taken exception to
these Norwegian activities and, in these circumstances, it is easy to
understand that these activities should not at once have occurred to the
minds of members of the Norwegian Government ; this also explains how it was
that the fundamental interests of Norwegians, the questions of law here in
issue, the possible extension of the monopoly and of the r�gime of exclusion
to a region where no Eskimos existed, had not at this time been examined by
the Norwegian Government. Norway had had no administrative connection with
Greenland for more than a century; and the traditions of this connection
were no longer familiar to the Norwegian administration in 1919.
[402] M. Ihlen gave his verbal answer a week after he had been approached,
whereas the declaration of the United States of America on August 4th, 1916,
was made after lengthy negotiations. The United States were directly
interested in Davis Strait, and there can be no doubt that there had been
intercourse between Americans and the Eskimos living along the West coast of
Greenland.
[403] It is true that the Norwegian Government, in the course of the
proceedings, produced a document dating from 1916 from which it appears that
the Danish administration was then contemplating the application of the
r�gime of exclusion [p118] to the whole of Greenland. Nevertheless, the
dispute between the two Parties began some years after M. Ihlen's
declaration, and it seems very unlikely that, prior to M. Ihlen's reply,
there was any knowledge in Norway of documents relating to the
administration of Greenland and still less likely that such documents had
been studied.
[404] If the Danish Government had approached Norway in writing as she did
the other Powers, the documents would have been submitted to the competent
authorities in Norway and the matter would in all probability have taken a
different turn.
[405] It might be said that M. Ihlen was guilty of negligence on this
occasion; but this criticism applies more strongly to the Danish Government
in the same connection. When it is remembered that the action of the Danish
Government was, at all events in part, the outcome of Norwegian activity in
Eastern Greenland and that the attention of the Danish Government had been
specially drawn, shortly before, to these Norwegian interests, and again
when it is remembered that the question concerned aspirations and plans
conceived by Denmark, it is reasonable to say that there was more serious
negligence on the part of the Danish Government than on that of the
Norwegian Government, which was unprepared for the Danish d�marche and did
not regard its reply as a definitive settlement of the matter.
[406] It appears that the object of the conversations of July 14th and 22nd,
1919, between M. Ihlen and M. Krag was, so far as Denmark was concerned, to
obtain a final and binding promise; but, in that case, the form of the
Danish d�marche leaves much to be desired. The outcome was a verbal answer
given by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, without any discussion
between the two Governments upon the substance of the question and without
the question having been examined in Norway. The responsibility for this
fatal omission rests first and foremost upon Denmark.
[407] M. Ihlen, it is true, when making his declaration of July 22nd, was
speaking on behalf of the Norwegian Government and promised that Norway
would raise no difficulty in the future settlement of this matter. Such a
promise made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs is, in principle, valid and
binding. But in the present case there are special circumstances. M. Ihlen,
when making his declaration, was labouring under a fundamental and excusable
misapprehension. I would refer to M. Raestad's letter of July 20th, 1921, to
the Danish Minister at Oslo : ".... I have now received a communication from
Ihlen, whence it appears - as I thought - that, in his conversation with M.
Krag, he did not give it to be understood that Norway would agree to the new
territory [p119] being placed under the Danish Monopoly." This
misapprehension on the part of M. Ihlen was, in the first place, due to the
fact that the Danish request had been made verbally and was not accompanied
by the information given to the other Powers regarding the extension of the
monopoly and regime of exclusion, which was, as subsequently explained by
Denmark, the real object of the demarche. This object was explained in a
note addressed on December 19th, 1921, by the Danish Minister at Oslo to the
Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In that note it is explained that
the words used in the American reply and quoted by M. Krag to M. Ihlen:
".... to the Danish Government extending their political and economic
interests to the whole of Greenland", contemplated precisely the extension
to the whole of Greenland of the special regulations in question, i.e. the
regulations of the monopoly and r�gime of exclusion.
[408] A promise given under such conditions has not the same value as a
promise which is not tainted by an error or defect.
[409] M. Ihlen's declaration clearly related to a future settlement of the
matter between the two Governments. Obviously, the Danish Government, which
was well aware of the Norwegian interests on the East coast of Greenland,
realized that the future settlement must necessarily cover these interests;
it would be contrary to common sense to contend that the Norwegian interests
could be put on one side during the settlement in regard to which the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs had promised not to place
difficulties in the way of the Danish aspirations. The undertaking thus
given was, in the nature of things, based on the idea of reciprocity. The
two Parties were bound, after the Ihlen-Krag conversations, mutually to
refrain from making difficulties when the time came to effect a settlement
between them.
[410] Norway was honouring M. Ihlen's promise when Denmark suddenly broke
off the negotiations for a mutual settlement.
[411] On May 6th, 1921, the Danish Government obtained a royal decision by
virtue of which it attached all Greenland to the Danish colonies and
factories and to the Danish administration of Greenland. Even at this date,
when the Danish Government had thus decided to break off all negotiations,
the Norwegian Government still preserved its conciliatory attitude. On May
7th, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was entirely ignorant
of the Danish decision of May 6th, suggested to the Danish Minister at Oslo
the following arrangement: the Norwegian Government was to make a
declaration corresponding approximately to that of the American Government
and would, at the same time, in a separate note, point out that [p120] this
declaration was made subject to the reservation that Norway did not abandon
the rights above mentioned (namely, the fishing and hunting rights of
Norwegians). He added that the Norwegian Government would doubtless
favourably consider any method which would lead to a settlement such as has
been indicated above ; he did not attach so much importance to the question
of form.
[412] On May 10th, the Danish Government formally broke off the negotiations
in progress with the Norwegian Government by means of the following note
sent by the Danish Minister at Oslo:
"With regard to the Greenland question, I have received from the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs a telegram, the terms of which I venture to transmit to
you:
'The Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not desire any further d�marche to be
made with a view to obtaining from the Norwegian Government a written
declaration, but desires to rest content with the promise already made
verbally on behalf of Norway.'"
[413] The reason for this unexpected action was that the Norwegian
Government, which was fully within its rights, wished to settle the matter
of Norwegian economic interests at the same time as the question of
sovereignty.
[414] By a letter of July 2nd, the Danish Minister at Oslo informed the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the whole of Greenland was
closed.
[415] By this rupture of the Dano-Norwegian negotiations, Denmark abolished
the arrangement made with M. Ihlen, and the promise of the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs thereby ceased to be binding. Denmark's failure
to fulfil the implicit obligation resulting for her from the Krag-Ihlen
agreement, gave the other Party the right to declare himself released from
his undertaking.
[416] This was what happened.
[417] Eighteen days after the notification of the closing of the whole of
Greenland, M. R�stad, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to
the Danish Minister in the following terms:
"You will no doubt have to reckon with the fact that the present Norwegian
Government, like its predecessor, in agreement with the opinion of other
responsible circles, is unable to accept an extension of Danish sovereignty
over Greenland involving a corresponding extension of the monopoly, to the
detriment of Norwegian interests."
[418] The Danish Government has argued before the Court that, by this
letter, Norway was not contesting the sovereignty of Denmark over the whole
of Greenland. The accuracy of this allegation cannot be admitted. The Danish
Government, in its overtures to foreign Powers, had linked the question of
[p121] sovereignty and that of the monopoly so closely together that it is
impossible to treat them as separate in this connection. The Danish
Government had spoken of an extension of sovereignty, while - according to
its own statement - it had in mind, from beginning to end, the extension of
the monopoly system. In a memorandum, dated January 18th, 1921, from the
Danish Legation at Oslo to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a
description is given of the overtures made to the Great Powers; it contains
the following passage: "The Ministry accordingly sent instructions, at the
beginning of last March, to its Ministers in London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo,
to endeavour to obtain official recognition by the Governments in question
of Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland urging, in support of the
request, the actual position of Denmark in relation to Greenland; the best
method of according this recognition would, in the opinion of the Danish
Government, be for the said Governments to make declarations corresponding
to that already given by the United States." But during the present
proceedings, the Danish Government has laid considerable stress on the fact
that the American reply contained a definite and specific reference to the
system of monopoly, which Denmark was proposing to continue and to develop.
In the instructions sent to the Danish Ministers abroad, this inseparable
interconnection, this unity in dualism, was brought out by the words: "it is
desirable that the Danish Government should extend its care [for the
Eskimos, by means of the monopoly] by means of its sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland."
[419] The first overture, which was made verbally to the Norwegian
Government in July 1919, only touched on the question of the recognition of
sovereignty; and the second overture, which was made in writing on January
18th, 1921, was also concerned with the question of sovereignty, "an
extension of Danish sovereignty to the whole of Greenland". But, as has been
already said, a later Danish note of December 19th, 1921, revealed that what
was actually aimed at was the extension of the monopoly system as well.
[420] M. Ihlen gave his reply without realizing this inseparable
inter-connection, and indeed without being able to suspect its existence.
However, when this connection became clear to M. R�stad, the latter stated
that Norway could not accept such a request for recognition by Denmark. The
request sought indeed to obtain everything: sovereignty plus monopoly,
monopoly plus sovereignty, "[an extension of its] care by means of its
sovereignty", That was indeed the object which the Danish request had
throughout had in view, and it was this request that Norway refused to
accede to. M. R�stad's [p122] no was a rejection of the request for
recognition of Danish sovereignty, in the form in which it appeared when all
its aspects had been fully revealed. M. R�stad's letter of July 20th, 1921,
contains, for that reason, a refusal to recognize this sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland, the recognition of which Denmark had endeavoured by her
overtures to obtain.
[421] In this connection, some importance attaches to the fact that in both
the overtures made to the Norwegian Government in 1919 and 1921 - and not
least in the latter of these overtures�the Danish Government had shown that
it did not regard itself as possessing sovereignty over the whole of
Greenland. The conviction thus implanted in the mind of the Norwegian
Government led to certain consequences.
[422] When one considers in succession the incomplete form of the request
made to M. Ihlen, the light which was subsequently thrown on the plan for
the extension of the monopoly and the regime of exclusion, the not very
conciliatory attitude of the Danish Government, when the Norwegian
Government desired to have a settlement of Norwegian economic interests in
conjunction with the recognition of Danish sovereignty, and lastly, the
Danish decision to close Eastern Greenland on the ground, as was alleged,
that Norway had recognized the extension of Danish sovereignty, one is
driven to the conclusion that it would be contrary to all justice that,
after the rupture of the negotiations by Denmark in 1921, Norway should
still be regarded as bound by M. Ihlen's promise, and obliged to refrain
from making difficulties in a future settlement between the two countries.
[423] It is necessary here to mention another fact which is of some
importance in this connection. By a declaration made to the Danish
Government on September 6th, 1920, the British Government had reserved its
right to be consulted, in case Denmark should contemplate selling Greenland.
This British reservation, which was not rejected by the Danish Government,
was not communicated to the Norwegian Government, to whom it presented,
without doubt, considerable importance.
[424] Keeping in view the realities of the case, I am thus led to the
conclusion that the Krag-Ihlen arrangement had lost its binding force in
1921.
[425] Since that time, the Norwegian Government has unceasingly maintained
that Denmark only possesses sovereignty over a part of Greenland, and that
Norway has not recognized a Danish sovereignty extending to the whole
country.
[426] Nevertheless, in a note dated July 13th, 1923, the Norwegian
Government declared that it was prepared to enter into [p123] fresh
negotiations on "an entirely free basis". The Norwegian conception was given
very definite expression in the Protocol of Closure of the Danish-Norwegian
negotiations, dated January 28th, 1924. The Norwegian delegation declared
therein that all parts of Greenland, which were not effectively under Danish
administration, were terra nullius.
[427] Accordingly, the Norwegian Government has consistently maintained,
ever since the breaking off of the negotiations by the Danish Government in
1921, that it is not bound by the Krag-Ihlen arrangement.
[428] The reasons which I have set forth above lead me to accept the
submissions presented by the Norwegian Government in regard to sovereignty,
and for these reasons consequently prevent me, to my regret, from signing
the judgment which the Court has delivered. I am, however, in agreement with
the conclusion of the judgment which deals with the costs of the
proceedings.
(Signed) Benjamin Vogt.
Annex.
Documents Submitted to the Court.
I. - Documents Filed in the Course of the Written Proceedings.
A. - On behalf of the Danish Government:
(a) Pamphlet by M. Knud Rasmussen, entitled: "Greenland, its exploration and
development by Denmark", Copenhagen, 1931.
(b) Danish Commercial Review, No. 32, June 1931.
(c) Eight maps and diagrams (Greenland; Eastern Greenland; scientific work
in Greenland). (These maps, etc., were also filed during the oral
proceedings, assembled together in an atlas.)
(d) Annexes to the Danish Government's Case. One volume.
A. Letter of the Royal Danish Geographical Society (Oct. 16th, 1931).
B. Statements by foreign experts concerning the Danish Greenland
Administration.
C. The cartography and scientific exploration of Greenland.
D. List of voyages of exploration and scientific expeditions undertaken on
the East coast of Greenland.
E. Extracts from legislation promulgated by Denmark with regard to
Greenland.
1. Ordinance of April 9th, 1740, concerning navigation to Greenland.
2. Ordinance of April 10th, 1744 (idem).
3. Ordinance of March 26th, 1751 (idem).
4. Ordinance of April 22nd, 1758 (idem).
5. Ordinance of March 18th, 1776, renewing the proclamation and prohibition
in respect of any unlawful trading in Greenland and its dependencies.
6. The Eastern Greenland (Tayler) concession of June 7th, 1863.
7. Decree of October 10th, 1894, concerning the mission and tradingstation
founded on the East coast of Greenland.
8. Article I of the proclamation of March 8th, 1905, concerningnavigation in
Davis Strait.
9. Decree of May 10th, 1921, regarding the establishment of trading, mission
and hunting stations in Greenland.
10. Article I of the proclamation of June 16th, 1921, concerningnavigation
in the seas surrounding Greenland.
11. Decree of the Department for the Colonies in Greenland of July 5th,
1924, concerning access to Eastern Greenland.
12. Law of April 1st, 1925, concerning hunting and fishing in Greenland
waters.
13. Extract from the law of April 18th, 1925, concerning the administration
of Greenland.
14. Proclamation of May 22nd, 1925, concerning navigation in the seas
surrounding Greenland.
F. Extracts from conventions and treaties concluded by Denmark in the XIXth
and XXth centuries concerning Greenland.
15. Treaty of commerce between Denmark and Prussia (June 17th, 1818).
16. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Great Britain
(June 16th, 1824).
17. Convention of friendship, commerce and navigation between Denmark and
the United States of America (Apr. 26th, 1826). [p125]
18. Treaty of commerce between Denmark and Norway and Sweden (Nov. 2nd,
1826).
19. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Austria (Feb.
12th, 1834).
20. Declaration between Denmark and the Free City of Bremen (Nov. 5th,
1835).
21. Declaration between Denmark and the Free City of Liibeck (Oct. 14th,
1840).
22. Declaration between Denmark and Oldenburg (March 31st, 1841).
23. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Belgium (June
13th, 1841).
24. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and France (Feb.
9th, 1842).
25. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Sardinia (Aug.
14th, 1843).
26. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Hanover (Apr.
13th, 1844).
27. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and
Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Nov. 25th, 1845).
28. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and the Two Sicilies
(Jan. 13th, 1846).
29. Convention of commerce between Denmark and Prussia (May 26th, 1846).
30. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Greece (Oct. 31st,
1846).
31. Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between Denmark and the
Dominican Republic (July 26th, 1852).
32. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Belgium (Aug.
17th, 1863).
33 a, b, с Exchange of notes between Denmark and Belgium concerning the
coasting trade (Aug. 12th, 24th and 31st, 1867).
34. Declaration concerning the coasting trade between Denmark and
Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Sept. 7th and 14th, 1867).
35. Declaration concerning the coasting trade between Denmark and the North
German Confederation (Feb. I7th-23rd, 1868).
36. Postal Convention between Denmark and the North German Confederation
(Apr. 7th and 9th, 1868).
37. Postal Convention between Denmark and Russia (June 25th -July 7th,
1872).
38. Treaty of friendship, commerce and establishment between Denmark and
Switzerland (Feb. 10th, 1875).
39. Detailed regulations for the execution of the Universal Postal
Convention (Paris, June 1st, 1878).
40. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and
Austria-Hungary (March 14th, 1887).
41. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Russia (March 2nd,
1895).
42. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Belgium (June
18th, 1895).
43. Convention of friendship and consular relations between Denmark and
Paraguay (July 18th, 1903).
44. Universal Postal Convention (Rome, May 26th, 1906).
45. Regulations for the execution of the Convention signed at Rome on May
26th, 1906.
46. Exchange of letters between the Danish and Norwegian Postal Departments
(May 27th and July 29th, 1908).
47. Declaration concerning commerce between Denmark and Serbia (Nov.
17th-30th, 1909).
48. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Roumania (Apr.
11th, 1910). [p126]
49. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Mexico (May
3rd, 1910).
50 a. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Japan (Feb.
12th, 1912).
50 b. Customs Convention between Denmark and Japan (Feb. 12th, 1912).
51. Universal Postal Convention (Madrid, Nov. 30th, 1920).
52. Extradition Convention between Denmark and Finland (Feb. 12th, 1923).
53. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Lithuania concerning commercial
and maritime relations (July 18th, 1923).
54. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Finland (Aug. 3rd,
1923).
55. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Estonia concerning commercial and
maritime relations (Sept. 7th, 1923).
56. Exchange of notes concerning commercial and maritime relations between
Czechoslovakia and Denmark (Jan. 31st, 1924).
57. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Poland (March
22nd, 1924).
58. Universal Postal Convention (Stockholm, Aug. 28th, 1924).
59. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Latvia (Nov. 3rd,
1924).
60. Convention for the suppression of the contraband traffic in alcoholic
liquors between Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland and the Free City of Danzig, Sweden and the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics (Helsingfors, Aug. 19th, 1925).
61. Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between Denmark and Siam
(Sept. 1st, 1925).
62. Exchange of notes of April 26th-30th, 1926, between the Danish Legation
at Berne and the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
63. International Convention for the abolition of import and export
prohibitions and restrictions, signed by Denmark on November 8th, 1927.
64. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Spain (Jan.
2nd, 1928).
65. Treaty of commerce between Denmark and Austria (Apr. 6th, 1928).
66. International Agreement relating to the exportation of hides and skins
(Geneva, July nth, 1928).
67. International Agreement relating to the exportation of bones (Geneva,
July 11th, 1928).
68. Convention of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Greece (Aug.
22nd, 1928).
69. International Convention concerning economic statistics, signed by
Denmark on December 14th, 1928.
70. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Spain (Jan. 8th-3ist, 1929),
concerning treatment of Danish (and Greenland) merchandise upon entry into
the Spanish possessions in the Gulf of Guinea and vice-versa.
71. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Columbia (June
21st, 1929).
72. Universal Postal Convention (London, June 28th, 1929).
73. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Czechoslovakia con�cerning
treatment of Greenland merchandise in Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovak
merchandise in Greenland (Aug. 26th, 1929).
74. Exchange of notes between Denmark and France (Feb. 28th, 1930),
concerning commercial contractual relations. [p127]
75. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Egypt, concerning a provisional
Commercial Agreement (May 7th, 1930).
76. Extradition Convention between Denmark and Estonia (May 13th,1930).
77. Treaty of establishment, commerce and navigation between Denmark and
Turkey (May 31st, 1930).
78. Treaty of commerce and navigation between Denmark and Lithuania (June
21st, 1930).
79. Treaty of commerce between Denmark and Bolivia (June 30th,1930)
80. Exchange of notes between Denmark and Roumania (Aug. 28th, 1930),
concerning commercial and maritime relations.
81. Extradition Convention between Denmark and Latvia (Aug. 28th, 1930).
G. Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence between the Danish and
Norwegian Governments concerning certain questions relating to Greenland.
82. Note of October 22nd, 1894, from M. Hegermann-Lindencrone, Danish
Minister at Stockholm, to Count de Lewenhaupt, Ministerfor For. Aff. of
Sweden and Norway.
83. Note of November 29th, 1905, from M. Henrik Grevenkop-Castenschiold,
Danish Minister at Christiania, to M. L0vland, Norwegian Minister for For.
Aff.
84. Letter of July 12th, 1919, from M. Erik Scavenius, Ministerfor For.
Aff., to M. O. Krag, Danish Minister at Christiania.
85. Report sent on July 22nd, 1919, by M. O. Krag, Danish Minister at
Christiania, to M. Erik Scavenius, Minister for For. Aff.
86. Memorandum of January 18th, 1921, from the Danish Legation at
Christiania to the Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
87. Private letter sent on April 29th, 1921, by M. Kruse, Danish Minister at
Christiania, to M. Michelet, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
88. Note of July 2nd, 1921, from M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania,
to M. Raestad, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
89. Note of November 2nd, 1921, from M. Raestad, Norwegian Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania.
90. a. Note of November 23rd, 1921, from the same to the same. 90 a. Letter
of November 9th, 1921, from the Aalsund Association of Masters of the
Merchant Service to the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
90 b. Letter of November 23rd, 1921, from the Norwegian Ministry for For.
Afi. to the Aalsund Association of Masters of the Merchant Service.
91. Note of December 19th, 1921, from M. Kruse, Danish Ministerat
Christiania, to M. Raestad, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
92. Note of December 19th, 1921, from the same to the same.
93. Verbal note of May 23rd, 1922, from the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen
to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
94. Verbal note of June 29th, 1922, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen.
95. Note of September 20th, 1922, from M. Esmarch, Secretary-General of the
Ministry for For. Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Ministerat Christiania.
96. Note of September 23rd, 1922, from the same to the same.
97. Note of October 2nd, 1922, from M. Kruse, Danish Minister at
Christiania, to M. Mowinckel, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff. [p128]
98. Note of October 16th, 1922, from M. Mowinckel, NorwegianMinister for
For. Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania.
99. Note of November 14th, 1922, from M. de Haxthausen, Secretaryof
Legation, Danish Charge d'affaires at Christiania, to M. Mowinckel,
Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
100. Note of December 22nd, 1922, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to M. Cold, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
101. Note of January 12th, 1923, from the same to the same.
102. Note of February 5th, 1923, from M. Cold, Danish Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen.
103. Note of February 17th, 1923, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to M. Cold, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
104. Note of March 17th, 1923, from M. Cold, Danish Minister for For. Aff.,
to M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen.
105. Note of July 13th, 1923, from M. Michelet, Norwegian Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania.
106. Note of July 30th, 1923, from M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania,
to M. Michelet, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
107. Note of August 23rd, 1923, from M. Michelet, Norwegian Minister for
For. Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Christiania.
108. Extract from the minutes of the negotiations between the Danish and
Norwegian delegations concerning Greenland.
109. Convention between Denmark and Norway concerning Eastern Greenland,
signed on July 9th, 1924.
110. Note of July 9th, 1924, from M. Ditleff, Norwegian Charge d'affaires at
Copenhagen, to Count Moltke, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
111. Note of July 9th, 1924, from Count Moltke, Danish Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Ditleff, Norwegian Charg� d'affaires at Copenhagen.
112. Note of September 22nd, 1924, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to Count Moltke, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
113. Note of September 25th, 1924, from Count Moltke, Danish Minister for
For. Aff., to M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at Copen�hagen.
114. Verbal note of August 8th, 1925, from the Norwegian Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
115. Verbal note of August 20th, 1925, from the Danish Ministry for For.
Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen.
116. Verbal note of September 13th, 1930, from the Norwegian Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
117. Verbal note of December 19th, 1930, from the Danish Ministry for For.
Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen.
118. Memorandum of December 20th, 1930, from M. Oldenburg, Danish Minister
at Oslo, to M. Mowinckel, Norwegian Prime Minister and Minister for For.
Aff.
119. Memorandum of January 6th, 1931, from M. Mowinckel, Norwegian Prime
Minister and Minister for For. Aff., to M. Oldenburg, Danish Minister at
Oslo.
120. Note of February 20th, 1931, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to M. P. Munch, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
121. Note of March 11th, 1931, from M. P. Munch, Danish Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen.
122. Verbal note of March 14th, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to
the Norwegian Department for For. Aff. [p129]
123.Verbal note of March 30th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
123. Note of March 31st, 1931, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to M. P. Munch, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
124. Note of June 13th, 1931, from M. P. Munch, Danish Minister for For.
Aff., to M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen.
125. Verbal note of June 13th, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to the
Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
126. Verbal note of June 20th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
127. Verbal note of June 23rd, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to the
Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
128. Note of June 24th, 1931, from M. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen, to M. P. Munch, Danish Minister for For. Aff.
129. Verbal note of June 30th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
130. Verbal note of July 3rd, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to the
Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
131. Verbal note of July 7th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
132. Verbal note of July 10th, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to the
Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
133. Verbal note of July 10th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
134. Verbal note of July nth, 1931, from the Danish Legation at Oslo to the
Norwegian Department for For. Aff.
135. Verbal note of July 13th, 1931, from the Norwegian Department for For.
Aff. to the Danish Legation at Oslo.
(e) Annexes to the Danish Government's Reply (three vol.).
Volume I.
H. Geographical and demographical questions.
137. The Arctic character of Greenland.
138. The living conditions of the native population.
139. Observations by M. Knud Rasmussen concerning the living conditions of
the inhabitants of the South-East coast.
I. Questions relating to scientific exploration.
140. Remarks on Chapter III of the Norwegian Counter-Case concerning
Norwegian scientific work.
141. Brief summary of the scientific exploration of Greenland during the
last fifty years.
142. Scientific research carried out on the East coast of Greenland between
Scoresby Sound and Danmarks Havn.
K. Observations of M. Knud Rasmussen on various points in the Norwegian
Counter-Case. (№. 143.)
L. Questions concerning hunting operations.
144. Hunting operations of Danes in Eastern Greenland.
145. The Danish hunting lodges in North-East Greenland.
146. Norwegian interests in Eastern Greenland.
147. Norwegian hunting lodges in Eastern Greenland.
148. Hunting and fishing rights in the North-West Territories of Canada.
M. Declarations concerning Danish sovereignty.
149. Observations on Annex 4 to the Norwegian Counter-Case. [p130]
150. Quotations from geographical works and encyclopaedias showing that
Eastern Greenland is regarded as subject in its entirety to the sovereignty
of the King of Denmark.
N. Documents concerning the Tayler concession (1863).
151. Report of November 29th, 1860, concerning the application for a
concession from the mineralogist I. W. Tayler, submitted to the Ministry of
the Interior by the Board of the Royal Greenland Trade Monopoly.
152. Letter of April 23rd, 1862, from M. H. A. Rink, Inspector of Southern
Greenland, to the Ministry of the Interior.
153. Letter of May 24th, 1862, from the Ministry of the Inter or to Mr. I.
W. Tayler.
154. Prospectus of the Greenland Company, Limited, London.
155. Extract from the Morning Post of London (Nov. 25th, 1862).
156. Letter of May 5th, 1863, from Messrs. Antony Gibbs & Sons, of London,
to Mr. I. W. Tayler.
157. Letter of May 13th, 1863, from Mr. I. W. Tayler to the Ministry of the
Interior.
158. Proposal approved by His Majesty on June 7th, 1863, concerning the
granting of authorization to the mineralogist I. W. Tayler to establish
trading stations on the East coast of Greenland.
159. Letter of February 29th, 1864, from M. M. G. Melchior to the Ministry
of the Interior.
160. Letter of May 5th, 1865, from M. Melchior to the Ministry of the
Interior.
161. Other concessions granted or refused by the Danish Government during
the XIXth century to undertakings in Greenland, in particular Eastern
Greenland.
O. Other provisions.
162. Proposal approved by His Majesty on September 25th, 1894, concerning
the establishment of the mission and trading station of Angmagssalik on the
East coast.
163. Proclamation of March 8th, 1905, concerning navigation in Davis Strait.
164. General circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior on April 19th,
1916, concerning the steps to be taken to protect historical remains in
Greenland.
165. Extract from a report made to His Majesty on August 1st, 1916, upon the
treaty between Denmark and the United States of North America concerning the
cession of the Danish West Indies.
166. Report approved by His Majesty on May 6th, 1921, upon the trading,
mission and hunting stations established on the East and West coasts of
Greenland.
167. Proclamation of June 16th, 1921, concerning navigation in the seas
surrounding Greenland.
168. General regulations for voyages to and in Greenland, issued by the
Ministry of Navigation and Fisheries on August 7th, 1930.
P. Diplomatic documents.
169. Declarations exchanged on June 13th, 1856, between the Danish
Government and the Swedish-Norwegian Government.
Correspondence concerning the declarations made by foreign Powers
recognizing Danish sovereignty over all Greenland:
170. Instructions of March 2nd, 1920, given by M. Erik Scavenius, Danish
Minister for For. Aff., to the Danish Minister at Rome. [p131]
171. Note of March 16th, 1920, from M. Grevenkop-Castenschiold, Danish
Minister at London, to the Right Honourable Earl Curzon of Kedleston, His
Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for For. Aff.
172. Memorandum annexed to the preceding note.
173. Note of March 17th, 1920, from M. A. Oldenburg, Danish Minister at
Rome, to H.E. Senator Scialoja, Italian Minister for For. Aff.
174. Note of March 20th, 1920, from M. H. A. Bernhoft, Danish Minister at
Paris, to H.E. M. A. Millerand, Prime Minister andMinister for For. Aff. of
France.
175. Note of May 12th, 1920, from Count P. Ahlefeldt-Laurvig, Danish
Minister at Tokyo, to H.E. Viscount Y. Uchida, JapaneseMinister for For.
Aff.
176. Instructions of July 7th, 1920, given by M. Harald de Scavenius, Danish
Minister for For. Aff., to M. Grevenkop-Castenschiold, Danish Minister at
London.
177. Note of January 13th, 1921, from M. Herluf Zahle, Danish Minister at
Stockholm, to H.E. Count Wrangel, Swedish Minister for For. Aff.
Correspondence concerning the communication to other Powers of the Decree of
May 10th, 1921:
178. Note of June aoth, 1921, from M. Herluf Zahle, Danish Minister at
Stockholm, to the Swedish Minister for For. Aff.
179. Verbal note of June 27th, 1921, from the Danish Legation at Paris to
the French Ministry for For. Aff.
180. Note of June 21st, 1921, from M. Grevenkop-Castenschiold, Danish
Minister at London, to the Foreign Office.
181. Verbal note of June 23rd, 1921, from the Danish Legation at Rome to the
Italian Ministry for For. Aff.
182. Note of August 26th, 1921, addressed in the name of Denmark by the
Swedish Minister at Tokyo to the Japanese Ministry for For. Aff.
183. Note of July 9th, 1921, from M. С Brun, Danish Minister at Washington,
to the United States Department of State.
184. Verbal note of June 21st, 1921, from the Danish Legation at Berlin to
the Auswalllrtiges Amt.
185. Verbal note of June 25th, 1921, from the Auswlllartiges Amt to the
Danish Legation at Berlin.
186. Note of July 1st, 1921, from M. O. Krag, Danish Minister at Brussels,
to H.E. M. Jean Jaspar, Belgian Minister for For. Aff.
187. Note of July 13th, 1921, from H.E. M. Jean Jaspar, Belgian Minister for
For. Aff., to M. O. Krag, Danish Minister at Brussels.
188. Note of July 1st, 1921, from M. O. Krag, Danish Minister at The Hague,
to H.E. the Netherlands Minister for For. Aff.
Applications for permission to enter Eastern and Northern Greenland,
submitted by foreign governments, after the promulgation of the Decree of
May 10th, 1921, and granted by the Danish Government:
(a) 1925. Canadian Police: permission to place provisions at Etah
(North-West of Greenland):
189. Note of December 9th, 1924, from Earl Granville, His Britannic
Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen, to Count C. Moltke, Danish Minister for
For. Aff.
190. Note of April 2nd, 1925, from the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to Earl
Granville, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen. [p132]
191. Note of April 2nd, 1925, from Count Reventlow, Secretary-General of the
Danish Ministry for For. Aff., to Earl Granville, His Britannic Majesty's
Minister at Copenhagen.
(b) 1925. M. H. R. E. Krlllger, a German national: permission to visit Cape
York (North-West of Greenland):
192. Verbal note of May 25th, 1925, from the German Legation at Copenhagen
to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
193. Verbal note of July 6th, 1925, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the German Legation at Copenhagen.
(c) 1926. Commander Byrd, an American citizen : permission to land with an
aeroplane at Cape Morris M. Jesup (the northern point of Greenland):
194. Note of March 24th, 1926, from M. John Dyneley Prince, United States
Minister at Copenhagen, to the Danish Minister for For. Aff.
195. Note of March 31st, 1926, from the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to M.
John Dyneley Prince, United States Minister at Copenhagen.
(d) 1926. American Museum of National History : the Northern Greenland
expedition:
196. Note of March 24th, 1926, from M. John Dyneley Prince, United States
Minister at Copenhagen, to Count C. Moltke, DanishMinister for For. Aff.
197. Verbal note of April 6th, 1926, with annex, from the United States
Legation at Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
198. Memorandum annexed to preceding note.
199. Note of April 27th, 1926, from the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to Mr.
Oliver B. Harriman, United States Charge d'affaires at Copenhagen.
(e) 1928. Miss Louise A. Boyd, an American citizen: permission to land and
to hunt to the North of the district of Scoresby Sound (in the territory
covered by the Norwegian Government's declaration of occupation of 1931):
200. Verbal note of March 1st, 1928, from the United States Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
201. Telegram of March 12th, 1928, from M. Brun, Danish Minister at
Washington, to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
202. Verbal note of March 14th, 1928, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the United States Legation at Copenhagen.
(f) 1931. Miss Louise A. Boyd, an American citizen: permission to land and
to hunt to the North of the district of Scoresby Sound (in the territory
covered by the Norwegian Government's declaration of occupation of 1931):
203. Verbal note of April 22nd, 1931, from the United States Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
204. Verbal note of May 4th, 1931, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff. to
the United States Legation at Copenhagen. [p133]
205. Verbal note of May 30th, 1931, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the United States Legation at Copenhagen.
(g) 1930. Captain Bartlett, an American citizen : permission to undertake
archaeological research to the North of the district of Scoresby Sound (in
the territory covered by the Norwegian Government's declaration of
occupation of 1931):
206. Verbal note of February 27th, 1930, from the United States Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
207. Verbal note of April 9th, 1930, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the United States Legation at Copenhagen.
(h) 1930. M. C. Dumbrava, a Roumanian subject: permission to undertake
scientific research at certain points in Eastern Greenland situated outside
the trading stations:
208. Verbal note of March 14th, 1930, from the Royal Roumanian Legation to
the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
209. Verbal note of April 26th, 1930, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the Royal Roumanian Legation at Stockholm.
(i) 1930. German Polar Expedition, organized on the initiative of Professor
Wegener: permission to establish a station in Western Greenland, one on the
Indlandsis and one in Eastern Greenland,, at the upper end of the fjord of
Scoresby Sound, about 150 km. from the headquarters of the district of that
name:
210. Verbal note of December 15th, 1928, from the German Legation at
Copenhagen to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
211. Extracts from the draft mentioned in the verbal note of December 15th,
1928, from the German Legation at Copenhagen.
212. Verbal note of February 12th, 1929, from the Danish Ministry for For.
Aff. to the German Legation at Copenhagen.
Q. Special questions.
213. Confirmation of existing sovereignty by the ceremony of hoisting a
flag, by a taking of possession, etc.
214. Large desert or sparsely inhabited territories difficult of access,
under the sovereignty of a particular State.
Volume II.
R. 215. The legal status of Eastern Greenland. Opinion of M. Karl Strupp,
ordinary Professor of public law at the University of Frank�furt a/M.
Volume III.
A. Denmark's work of colonization in Greenland.
B. List of ships having navigated regularly between Copenhagen and Greenland
on account of the Trade Monopoly of the Danish State (1781-1930).
(f) Atlas and description of the chief Danish stations in Eastern Greenland.
(g) An illustrated volume entitled: "A Hundred Pictures from Greenland."
[p134]
B. - On behalf of the Norwegian Government :
(a) Annexes to the Norwegian Government's Counter-Case. One volume.
I 1. Greenland, a geographical outline by M. Werenskiold, Professor at the
University of Oslo.
II 2. Description of the Norwegian hunting stations in Eirik Raudes Land,
prepared by the Norwegian Service for the exploration of the Arctic regions.
[Annex attached under special cover.]
III. 3. Danish economic activity in Eastern Greenland, by the trapper John
Gi�ver.
IV. 4. Declarations to the effect that Denmark only possesses sovereignty
over the colonized parts of Greenland.
V. Documents concerning the union between Norway and Denmark.
5. Act of Union, concluded at Bergen on August 29th, 1450.
6. Act of Renewal of the Union, done at Trondheim, November 7th, 1532.
7. The Norwegian Code of Laws, promulgated on December 4th, 1604 (Book I,
Chap. 10).
8. Acts of sovereignty concerning the Kingdom of Norway and its dependencies
(1661 and 1662).
9. The Royal Law, promulgated on November 14th, 1665.
VI. Documents relating to the second colonization of Western Greenland,
before 1814.
10. Extract from the proposal by the Revenue Board (Department) on May 26th,
1721, together with the Royal Resolution of June 2nd, 1721.
11. Extract from a memorandum by the Royal Chancellory (1738).
12. Letter from the Principal Secretary of the Royal Chancellory, dated
February 20th, 1740.
13. Extract from the definitive draft of the concession granted to Jacob
Severin on March 4th, 1740.
14. Humble Petition addressed to the King, in March 1758, by the General
Trading Company.
VII. Documents relating to the Treaty of Kiel of January 14th, 1814.
15. Despatch, dated January 16th, 1814, from Baron Wetterstedt to Count
Engestrom, Swedish Miniater for For. Aff.
16. Letter, dated January 17th, 1814, from M. Rosenkrantz, Danish Minister
for For. Aff., to Count Schimmelmarm, Danish Deputy-Minister for For. Aff.
17. I. Letter, dated February 5th, 1814, from Count Engestrom, Swedish
Minister for For. Aff., to Baron Wetterstedt, Chancellor of the Court.
II. Extract from a Bill of Complaints by the Royal Council of Norway against
King Christian 1st (1482).
18. Letter, dated February 6th, 1814, from Count Engestrom, Swedish Minister
for For. Aff., to H.R.H. Charles-John, Prince Royal of Sweden.
19. I. Treaty of Kiel of January 14th, 1814, and separate article, with
ratification, by King Frederick VI, signed on February 7th, 1814.
II. First separate and secret article of the above Treaty, with ratification
by King Frederick VI, signed on February 7th, 1814. [p135]
III. Second separate and secret article of the Treaty of Kiel, with
ratification by King Frederick VI, signed on February 7th, 1814.
VIII. Extracts from diplomatic correspondence, etc., on questions concerning
Greenland.
20. Despatch, dated April 2nd, 1919, from the Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen to the Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
21. Note by M. von Tangen, Director in the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
(May 10th, 1921).
22. Letter, dated May 10th, 1921, from the Danish .Minister at Oslo to the
Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
23. Letter, dated January 22nd, 1923, from the Danish Minister at Oslo to
the Norwegian Minister for F'or. Aff.
24. Extract from the minutes of the negotiations at Copenhagen in 1923,
concerning Eastern Greenland.
25. Written proposal submitted by the Danish delegation during the
negotiations at Copenhagen in 1923.
26. Despatch, dated December 1st, 1923, from the Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen to the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
27. Letter, dated July 12th, 1924, from the Danish Minister at Oslo to the
Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
28. Note, dated September 25th, 1925, from the Norwegian Minister at London
to the British Minister for For. Aff.
29. Despatch, dated October 3rd, 1925, from the Norwegian Ministry for For.
Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen.
30. Despatch, dated October 5th, 1925, from the Norwegian Minister at
Copenhagen to the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
31. Note, dated November 2nd, 1925, from the Norwegian Minister at Paris to
the French Minister for F'or. Aff.
32. Despatch, dated November 12th, 1925, from the Norwegian Ministry for
F'or. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Copenhagen.
33. Telegram, dated July nth, 1931, from the Norwegian Ministry for F'or.
Aff. to M. Devoid, at Mygg-Bukta.
34. Telegram, dated July 11th, 1931, from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice
to M. Devoid.
35. Telegram, dated July 11th, 1931, from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice
to M. Devoid.
36. Telegram, dated July 13th, 1931, from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice
to M. Devoid.
IX. Various documents.
37. Danish Notice to Mariners navigating in Davis Strait, dated May 8th,
1884.
38. Memorandum, dated December 27th, 1915, from the Danish Minister at
Washington to the Secretary of State of the United States of America.
39. Danish memorandum, dated April 22nd, 1916, to the Minister of the United
States of America at Copenhagen.
40. I. Letter, dated November 3rd, 1916, from the Danish Ministry of the
Interior (Directorate of Greenland Colonies) to the Parliamentary Commission
of the Danish West Indies.
II. Letter, dated November 2nd, 1916, from the Greenland Society to the
Danish Ministry of the Interior.
III. Extract from a letter, dated August 9th, 1913, from M. Knud Rasmussen
to the Danish Ministry of the Interior.
41. Extract from the instructions given on January 28th, 1919, to the Danish
Minister at Paris.
42. Danish Decree of May 10th, 1921, concerning the establishment of
trading, mission and hunting stations in Greenland (I : Danish text ; II :
French transl.). [p136]
43. Norwegian law of May 1st, 1925, implementing certain provisions of the
Convention of July 9th, 1924, concerning Eastern Greenland.
X. Extracts from recent works of international law.
44. Extracts from authors referred to in Chapter VII of Part II.
45. Extracts from authors referred to in Chapter V of Part II.
46. Article by M. Redslob: The Greenland Dispute before the Hague Court
(Journal des Nations, issue of September 13th, 1931).
XI. 47. Atlas, containing 27 maps. [Annex in separate cover.]
(b) An illustrated volume entitled: "Description of the Norwegian Hunting
Stations in Eirik Raudes Land."
(c) Annexes to the Norwegian Government's Rejoinder. One volume.
XII. Annexes to Chapter I of Part I.
48. The union between Norway and Denmark (1380-1814).
49. I. Partition of the Kingdom of Norway between Denmark and Sweden on
January 14th, 1814. Additional data.
II. Letter, dated January 7th, 1814, from Niels Rosenkrantz, Minister for
For. Aff. of Norway and Denmark, to Baron Wetterstedt, Swedish
Plenipotentiary at Kiel.
III. Instructions given on January 7th, 1814, by Niels Rosenkrantz, Minister
for For. Aff. of Denmark and Norway, to Edmund Bourke, Danish
Plenipotentiary at Kiel.
IV. Supplement to the instructions given by Niels Rosenkrantz to Edmund
Bourke.
V. Questions addressed to Niels Rosenkrantz by Edmund Bourke, on January
8th, 18Г4, concerning his instructions.
VI. Letter, dated January nth, 1814, by Edmund Bourke, Danish
Plenipotentiary at Kiel, to Baron Wetterstedt, Plenipotentiary of Sweden.
VII. Proclamation by the King of Denmark concerning the cession of Norway to
Sweden (Middelfart, Jan. 18th, 1814).
VIII. Open letter from the King of Denmark concerning the cession of Norway
to Sweden (Middelfart, Jan. 18th, 1814s).
XIII. Annexes to Chapters II, III and IV of Part I.
50. Danish declarations concerning the lllstgrlllnlandsk FangstKompagni
Nanok A/S (Nanok Compagny Ltd. for Huntingin East Greenland), constituted in
June 1929.
51. I. The Nanok Company and the Danish Government tend to make the
Norwegian trappers responsible for the poor results of the Company's
hunting.
II. Danish campaign against the Norwegian hunters. Hunting methods of Danes
and Greenlanders.
52. Scientific work carried out by different nations in Eirik Raudes Land.
53. Short observations on the Annex to the Reply entitled L'llluvre
colonisatrice du Danemark аи Grolllnland.
XIV. Annexes to Chapter VI of Part I, etc.
54. I. Extracts from declarations made in the Danish Rigsdag.
II. Other Danish declarations.
III. Danish geographical, statistical and other works.
IV. Non-Danish works.
55. I. Observations on Annexes 149 and 150 to the Danish Reply.
II. Article in the Berlingske Tidende of May 27th, 1889.
56. Statements in the Rigsdag concerning the Danish Decree of May 10th,
1921. [p137]
XV. Various documents.
57. Comparison between Greenland (in particular Eirik Ramies Land) and the
Antarctic regions.
58. Administration of certain Arctic regions.
59. The Arctic regions : climatological designation.
60. Information on the conformation and situation of "Greenland",derived
from maps subsequent to the year 1600.
61 A. History of the exploration of the East coast of Greenland. 61
B. Observations by W. Werenskiold on Annex 138 to the Danish Reply.
62. Economic resources of Western Greenland.
63. Norwegian and Danish trappers and their hunting grounds in Eirik Raudes
Land from the occupation till the summerof 1932.
64. Extracts from the Convention concluded between Norway and Denmark on
January 15th, 1926, for the pacific settlement of disputes.
65. British and French laws of the XVIIIth century affecting territories
which may hereafter be colonized or placed under the sovereignty of the
State.
66. Some legal opinions on the scope of Article 10 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
XVI. Administrative, legislative and diplomatic documents.
67. Extract from the diplomatic instructions of King Christian IV (Apr. 5th,
1624).
68. Extract from the diplomatic instructions of King Christian IV (July
28th, 1631).
69. Extracts from the instructions drawn up on September 7th, 1691, by the
Burgomaster and Council of Hamburg.
70. Extracts from the Concession granted on September 28th, 1697, to the
West Indies and Guinea Company.
71. Extracts from the Concession granted on October 29th, 1698, to the East
Indies Company.
72. Extracts from the petition, dated June 4th, 1720, from the Greenland
Company of Bergen to the King.
73. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Board of Police
and Trade (Feb. 28th, 1721).
74. Extract from the Norwegian Revenue Department's Register of extracts for
the year 1721 (Nos. 7 and 8).
75. Opinion submitted about the end of the year 1722 by the Principal
Secretary of the Danish Chancellory.
76. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Board of Police
and Trade (Jan. 11th, 1723).
77. � 5 of the Concession granted to the Greenland Company of Bergen on
February 5th, 1723.
78. Points 1 and 2 of the Instructions drawn up for the "Governor", Major С.
Е. Paars, on May 7th, 1728.
79. Extract from a draft by F. Holmsted and G. Klouman, merchants of
Copenhagen (Nov. 22nd, 1731).
80. Extract from a draft by Jacob Severin, merchant (Nov. 26th,
1731).
81. Extracts from the Concession granted to the Asiatic Company on April
12th, 1732.
82. Extracts from the Concession granted to the West Indies and Guinea
Company on February 5th, 1734.
83. Extracts from the Concession granted to Jacob Severin, merchant, on
March 15th, 1734, for "navigation to Greenland".
84. Extract from the petition submitted to the King on November 11th, 1735,
by Jacob Severin, merchant. [p138]
85. Rescript of January 27th, 1736.
86. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Board of Police
and Trade (Jan. 16th, 1737).
87. Extracts from the petition submitted to the King on January 21st, 1737.
by Jacob Severin, merchant.
88. Extract from the Royal Resolution of March 4th, 1737.
89. Extracts from the letter addressed to the Danish Board of Trade on March
6th, 1737, by Count Holstein, Principal Secretary of the Danish Chancellory.
90. Point 1 of the Instructions issued by the King to the Officer commanding
the frigate Blaa Heyre (March 15th, 1737).
91. Despatch, dated April 13th, 1737, from M. von Schulin, Secretary of the
German Chancellory at Copenhagen, to M. Griis, Norwegian-Danish Envoy at The
Hague.
92. Note delivered on February 10th, 1738, to the Norwegian-Danish.
Government, by the Dutch Minister at Copenhagen.
93. Points 2 and 3 of the Rescript of February 21st, 1738, to Jacob Severin,
merchant.
94. Note delivered on February 22nd, 1738, by the Dutch Minister at
Copenhagen to the Norwegian-Danish Government.
95. Draft letters patent presented on October 7th, 1738, by Jacob Severin,
merchant, concerning traffic with Greenland.
96. Extract from the Rescript of November 21st, 1738, concerning a Dutch
vessel seized in Disco Bay.
97. Extracts from a proposal made by the Advisory Committee on Greenland to
the King (Jan. 8th, 1739).
98. Rescript of February 27th, 1739, to the Advisory Committee on Greenland.
99. Extracts from the proposal of the Advisory Committee on Greenland, to
the King (Dec. 24th, 1739).
100. Extract from the Rescript of January 8th, 1740.
101. Extract from the note sent in January 1740 to the States-General by the
Norwegian-Danish Envoy at The Hague.
102. Extract from the memorial dated February 24th, 1740, from Jacob
Severin, merchant, to the Advisory Committee on Greenland.
103. Letter, dated February 25th, 1740, from the Advisory Committee on.
Greenland to the Principal Secretary of the Danish Chancellory.
104. Extracts from the Concession granted to Jacob Severin, merchant, on
March 4th, 1740.
105. Extract from the proposal of the Board of the Chancellory to the King
(Apr. 1st, 1740).
106. Extract from the petition dated January 30th, 1741, submitted to the
King by Jacob Severin, merchant.
107. Rescript of April 1st, 1741.
108. "Extract from the Register of Resolutions of the States-General of the
United Provinces of the Netherlands. Dated Wednesday, December 6th, 1741."
109. Extract from the Rescript of January 12th, 1742.
110. Memorial, dated March 2nd, 1744, from Jacob Severin, mer�chant, to the
Principal Secretary of the Danish Chancellory.
111. Extract from the proposal of the Advisory Committee on Greenland to the
King (March 25th, 1744).
112. Letter, dated March 8th, 1749, from Count Holstein, Principal Secretary
of the Danish Chancellory, to the General Trading Company.
113. Letter, dated March 27th, 1749, from the General Trading Company to
Count Holstein.
114. Extract from the General Trading Company's petition to the King, dated
November 5th, 1749. [p139]
115. Extract from the petition dated November 27th, 1749, from Jacob
Severin, merchant, to the King.
116. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company- General meeting of December 10th, 1749 : proposals by the
Board.
117. Extract from the General Trading Company's petition to the King, dated
December 13th, 1749.
118. Extract from the Rescript of December 19th, 1749.
119. Letter, dated December 30th, 1749, from the General Trading Company to
Jacob Severin, merchant.
120. Extract from the General Trading Company's petition to the King, dated
March 16th, 1750.
121. Rescript of March 20th, 1750, addressed to Jacob Severin, merchant.
122. Letter, dated March 24th, 1750, from Count Holstein, Principal
Secretary of the Danish Chancellory, to the Deputies and Assistants of the
Board of the Finance Department.
123. General Trading Company's petition to the King, dated May 30th, 1750.
124. General Trading Company's petition to the King, dated October 28th,
1750.
125. General Trading Company's memorial, dated November 17th, 1750, to the
Missions Council.
126. Extract from the General Trading Company's memorial, dated February
9th, 1751, to the Revenue Board.
127. Extract from the General Trading Company's letter, dated February 12th,
1751, to Hans Egede.
128. Extract from the General Trading Company's memorial, dated February
15th, 1751, to the Missions Council.
129. Petition, dated March 11th, 1751, from the General Trading Company to
the King.
130. Extract from the General Trading Company's instructions to Niels
Christian Geelmuyden, dated April 17th, 1751.
131. Extract from the General Trading Company's instructions, dated April
17th, 1751, to Chief Clerk Jonas Lilienskiold, of Svanenhielm.
132. Extract from the General Trading Company's instructions to Bendt
Jacobsen Lund, merchant, of Christianshaab Colonydated April 17th, 1751.
133. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. General meeting of March 22nd, 1752: proposals by the
Board.
134. Extract from the General Trading Company's instructions to Niels
Christian Geelmuyden, dated April 8th, 1752.
135. Extract from the General Trading Company's instructions, dated April
21st, 1752, to Poul Moltzau, merchant, of Godthaab.
136. Extract from the opinion given to the Danish Chancellory on January
19th, 1753, by the General Trading Company.
137. Extract from the Rescript of February 2nd, 1753, to the Chairman and
Directors of the General Trading Company.
138. Extract from the Minute-Book of the Board of the General Trading
Company. General meeting of February 25th, 1754.
139. Memorial, dated April 20th, 1754, from the General Trading Company to
the Board of the Department.
140. Extract from the Register of copies of "customs-free consignments",
Sub-Head B, of the Revenue Department Civil Status Office, at Copenhagen.
141. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. General meeting of April 22nd, 1754 : proposals by the
Board. [p140]
142. Rescript of March nth, 1755.
143. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. General meeting of December 6th, 1755: proposals by the
Board.
144. Extract from the letter, dated January 8th, 1756, from the General
Trading Company to the Principal Secretary of the German Chancellory, at
Copenhagen.
145. Extract from the Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between
Denmark and the Republic of Genoa (Paris, March 13th, 1756).
146. Extract from the petition addressed to the King on August 12th, 1756,
by the General Trading Company.
147. Rescript of October 18th, 1756.
148. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. General meeting of March 29th, 1757: proposals by the
Board.
149. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Revenue
Department (August 13th, 1757).
150. Extract from the petition addressed to the King, in September 1757 by
the General Trading Company.
151. Memorial transmitted on December 8th, 1757, by the General Trading
Company to the Principal Secretary of the German Chancellory, at Copenhagen.
152. Proposal submitted to the King by the Council of the Chancellory (April
14th, 1758).
153. Extract from the despatch sent on February 17th, 1759, by the
Norwego-Danish Envoy at The Hague to the Principal Secretary of the German
Chancellory, at Copenhagen.
154. Extract from the memorial addressed on March 30th, 1759, by the General
Trading Company to the Principal Secretaryof the German Chancellory, at
Copenhagen.
155. Extract from the letter sent on May 22nd, 1760, by the General Trading
Company to Anders Olsen, merchant in the colony of Sukkertoppen.
156. Proposal submitted to the King by the Revenue Department (June 5th,
1761).
157. Rescript of June 8th, 1761.
158. Extract from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. General meeting of March 30th, 1763.
159. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Revenue
Department (June 3rd, 1763).
160. Extracts from the Minute-Book of the general meetings of the General
Trading Company. Proposals by the Board.
161. Despatch sent on March 31st, 1770, by the German Chancellory, at
Copenhagen, to M. do la Potterie, Charge d'affaires for Norway and Denmark
at The Hague.
162. Extracts from the charter granted on July 23rd, 1772, to the Asiatic
Company.
163. Memorial addressed by the General Trading Company on December 7th,
1773, to the Department of Customs.
164. Draft proclamation attached to the memorial of December 7th, 1773, in
the French translation made by the General TradingCompany.
165. Memorial addressed by the Royal Board of Trade and Fisheries in
Greenland to the Chief Taxation Office, on January 22nd, 1776.
166. Extract from the letter sent on February 5th, 1776, by the Chief
Taxation Office to the Revenue Department. [p141]
167. Letter sent on April 1st, 1776, by the Chief Taxation Office to the
Board of Trade and Fisheries in Greenland.
168. Letter sent on August 21st, 1776, by the Chief Taxation Office to M.
Bang, Legal Adviser and Counsel to the Department.
169. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Department of
Customs (Sept. 18th, 1776).
170. "Extract from the Register of the Resolutions of the States-General of
the United Provinces of the Netherlands, for Wednesday, September 25th,
1776."
171. Extract from the despatch sent by Count Suffolk to the British Minister
at Copenhagen on November 12th, 1776.
172. Memorial sent on March 22nd, 1777, by the Danish Chancellory to the
Board of Trade and Fisheries in Greenland, and note sent to the Missions
Council concerning the Moravian Brothers in Greenland.
173. Despatch sent on April 12th, 1777, by Count Bernstorff, Minister for
For. Aff. of Norway and Denmark, to M. Juel, Minister for Norway and Denmark
at The Hague.
174. Extract from the instructions drawn up on August 28th, 1779, by the
General Trade Board for Johan Friederich Schwabe and Bendt Olrick.
175. Letter addressed on August 28th, 1779, by the Greenland Trade Board to
"all merchants and writers of the King's colonies, factories and
establishments in Davis Strait".
176. Extracts from the regulations of July 2nd, 1781, concerning the Royal
Trade in Greenland, Iceland, Finnmark and the Faroe Islands.
177. Rescript of April 17th, 1782.
178. Extract from the instructions of April 19th, 1782.
179. Royal letters patent of May 13th, 1782.
180. Extracts from the regulations of July 27th, 1782.
181. Extract from the report transmitted on November 13th, 1787, by the
Royal Greenland Trade Board, etc., to the Danish Chancellory.
182. Extract from the letter addressed on November 28th, 1787, by the Royal
Greenland Trade Board, etc., to the Department for For. Aff. at Copenhagen.
183. Extract from the proposal submitted to the King by the Council of
Finance (Jan. 8th, 1788).
184. Extract from the report made on May 18th, 1790, by the Royal Commission
for the Greenland Trade.
185. Extract from the report submitted to the King on June 22nd, 1790, by
the Royal Commission for the Greenland Trade.
186. Rescript of July 9th, 1790.
187. Letters patent of June 3rd, 1791, concerning the administration of
successions in Greenland.
188. Letters patent of February 10th, 1792, determining the method and
time-limit for succession notices in Greenland.
189. Extract from the memorial of the Royal Commission for the Greenland.
Trade (March 20th, 1794).
190. Royal Resolution of April. 16th, 1794.
191. Extract from the Royal Resolution of March 23rd, 1803.
192. Extracts from the letter sent on April 21st, 1823, to Count
Schimmelmann, Danish Minister of State, by M. Wormskjold, Danish naturalist
and expert on Greenland questions.
193. Note sent on February 10th, 1840, by the Danish Minister for For. Aff.
to the Belgian Charg� d'affaires at Copenhagen. [p142]
194. Letter sent on June 7th, 1842, by the Danish Chancellory to the Prefect
and Bishop of Zeeland.
195. Despatch sent on November 24th, 1843, by the Danish Minister at London
to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
196. Despatch sent on January 13th, 1844, by the Ministry for For. Aff. to
the Danish Minister at London.
197. Extract from the letter sent on November 15th, 1845, by the Danish
Revenue Department to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
198. Letter sent on December 30th, 1845, by the Danish Revenue Department to
the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
199. Despatch sent on March 14th, 1846, by the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
to the Danish Minister at London.
200. Despatch sent on January 30th, 1847, by the Danish Ministry for For.
Aff. to the Danish Minister at London.
201. Despatch sent on February 9th, 1847, by the Danish Minister at London
to the Danish Ministry for For. Aff.
202. Annex to the letter sent on March nth, 1847, by the British Secretary
of State for For. Aff. to the Danish Minister at London.
203. Letter sent on July 4th, 1860, by I. W. Tayler to the Danish Minister
of Finance.
204. Letter sent on March 29th, 1862, by I. W. Tayler to the Danish Ministry
of the Interior.
205. Notes made by M. Ihlen, Norwegian Minister for For. Aff., of his
conversations on July 14th and 22nd, 1919, with M. Krag, Danish Minister at
Oslo.
206. Verbal note transmitted on October 30th, 1919, by the Danish Legation
at London to the British Foreign Office.
207. Memorandum transmitted on December 3rd, 1919, by the Danish Minister at
London to the British Foreign Office.
208. Note sent on December nth, 1919, by Lord Curzon, British Secretary of
State for For. Aff., to M. de Grevenkop Castenskiold, Danish Minister at
London.
209. Extract from a private letter sent on July 20th, 1921, by M. Rlllstad,
Norwegian Minister for For. Aff., to M. Kruse, Danish Minister at Oslo.
210. Proposal of the Danish Government concerning the ratification of the
Treaty of Spitzbergen.
211. Minute of the deposit of Denmark's ratification of the Treaty regarding
Spitzbergen (Paris, Feb. 9th, 1920).
212. Royal Norwegian Resolution (Dec. 19th, 1930).
213. I. Verbal note sent on March 16th, 1932, by the Norwegian Ministry for
For. Aff. to the Czechoslovak Legation at Oslo.
II. Verbal note sent on April 4th, 1932, by the Czechoslovak Legation at
Oslo to the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
III. Verbal note sent on September 6th, 1932, by the Norwegian Legation at
Madrid to the Spanish Ministry of State.
IV. Verbal note sent on September 10th, 1932, by the Spanish Ministry of
State to the Norwegian Legation at Madrid.
V. Verbal note sent on September 14th, 1932, by the Finnish Ministry for
For. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Helsingfors.
VI. Verbal note sent on September 20th, 1932, by the Belgian Ministry for
For. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Brussels.
VII. Verbal note sent on September 21st, 1932, by the Austrian Ministry for
For. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Vienna. [p143]
VIII. Verbal note sent on September 29th, 1932, by the For. Aff. Division of
the Swiss Federal Political Department to the Norwegian Legation at Berne.
XVII. Various documents.
214. Articles 28 and 30, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Lawof Norway.
215. Extract from the L�rebog i den norske Statsforfatningsret (Treatise on
Norwegian constitutional law), by Bredo Morgenstierne.
216. Extract from proposal №. XLVI, for the year 1910, laid before the
Storting.
217. Extract from : "Documents respecting Captain L. C. F. L�tken's stay in
Berlin in 1902 and 1903, and the missions of the same officer to Berlin in
1906 and 1907 when he was Director in the Ministry ; together with the
minutes of the discussions on this subject held by the Commission appointed
to study the future organization of the Army and Navy."
218. Extract from a report of the enlarged Commission for the Constitution
and Foreign Affairs (proposal №. LXVI, for the year 1923, to the Storting).
219. Statements made in the Danish Folketing by M. Munch, Danish Minister
for For. Aff.
220. Letter sent on August 19th, 1932, by Mr. Rudmose Brown, Professor at
the University of Sheffield, to M. Adolf Hoel, Professor at the University
of Oslo.
221. Letter sent on September 15th, 1932, by M. E. Wolgast, Professor at the
University of Rostock, to the Norwegian Ministry for For. Aff.
222. Letter sent on September 18th, 1932, by M. R. Redslob, Professor at the
University of Strasburg, to M. Colban, Norwegian Minister at Paris.
223. Article published by M. Herman Gummerus in the Finnish Review Valvoja
Aika.
224. [See letter (d) below.]
225. Texts and memorials relating to Greenland and the Eskimos. [See letter
(e) below.]
226. [See letter (f) below.]
Appendix.
227 Despatch dated May 24th, 1857, from the Danish Minister For. Aff. to the
Danish Charge d'affaires at Philadelphia.
228. Despatch, dated May 25th, 1857, from the Danish Minister for For. Aff.
to the Danish Charge d'affaires at London.
229. Letter, dated August 6th, 1857, from the Danish Ministry for For. Aft.
to the Ministry for the Interior.
(d) A volume entitled: "Liquidation of the Norwegian share of the Common
Public Debt of the formerly united Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark
(1814-1821)." (№. 224.)
(e) A pamphlet entitled: "Documents and memoranda relating to Greenland and
the Eskimos." (№. 225.)
(f) Atlas containing thirteen maps. (№. 226.)
II. - Documents Filed During the Oral Proceedings :
A. - On behalf of the Danish Government.
(а) Map of Eastern Greenland, scale 1 : 1,000,000.
(b) Five maps entitled:
(1) Wovdie Gletscрer und Umgebungen.
(2) Moschusochs-Fjords (Innere Teile des -).
(3) Cavering Insel (�stlicher Teil der - ). [p144]
(4) Eirik Raudes Land from Snftasund to Youngsund.
(5) East Greenland between 700 - 770
(c) Map of the "Department of State (Map Series №. 1, Publication №. 275)" -
"The new world and the European colonial system in 1823 � The new world and
the European colonial system in 1931."
(d) An atlas entitled : "Maps annexed to the Danish Government's Case." (See
above, c.)
(e) Memorial by Gudmund Hatt, Professor of Geography at the University of
Copenhagen.
(f) Instructions given by King Frederic IV to Governor С. Е. Paars, etc.
(May 7th, 1728).
(g) Instructions given by King Christian VI to Jacob Severin (Feb. 21st,
1738).
(h) Letter addressed to the King by Jacob Severin (Jan. 21st, 1737).
(i) Letter from M. Wormskjold to Count Schimmelmann (April 21st, 1823).
(j) Letter addressed to the King by Flans Egede (June 4th, 1720).
(k) Extract from the minutes of the general meetings of the General Trading
Company (Nov. 26th, 1772).
(l) Letter from the Danish Legation at Washington to the Secretary of State
of the United States of America (March 22nd, 1921).
(m) Extracts from the itinerary arranged by the Ministry of Marine at
Copenhagen for the Godthaab (the 1930 cruise).
(n) Extract from the Godthaab's register of judicial acts (1930), with
annex.
(o) Note from the Dutch Government to the Norwegian Government (July 24th,
1931)
(p) Report by M. Knud Rasmussen on the murder of an Eskimo (Jan. 6th,1921).
(q) Note from the Danish Minister at Paris to the French Prime Minister (May
6th, 1920).
(r) Proposal regarding the ratification by Denmark of the Treaty of
Spitzbergen, submitted to the King by the Danish Minister for For. Aff. and
approved on December 5th, 1923.
B. - On behalf of the Norwegian Government.
(a) A map entitled "Eirik Raudes Land", scale 1 : 1,000,000, of the
Norwegian Service for the exploration of the Arctic regions.
(b) Extracts, with a French translation, from the work entitled: Descriptio
statuum cultiorum in tabulis, by J. P. Anchersen (Copenhagen and Leipzig,
Otto Christoffer Wenzell, 1741).
(c) Statements by various authors and politicians (1729-1931) to the effect
that the part of Greenland colonized in the XVIIIth century belonged to the
Kingdom of Norway.
(d) Note addressed on September 26th, 1932, by the Turkish Minister for For.
Aff. to the Norwegian Minister at Ankara.
(e) Note verbale addressed on October 4th, 1932, by the Polish Ministry for
For. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Warsaw.
(f) Telegram sent on October 4th, 1932, by the Roumanian Minister for For.
Aff. to the Norwegian Minister at Sofia.
(g) Note verbale addressed on November 24th, 1932, by the Estonian Minister
for For. Aff. to the Norwegian Legation at Helsingfors.
(h) Letter addressed on November 29th, 1932, by the Yugoslav Minister for
For. Aff. to the Norwegian Minister for For. Aff.
(i) (1) Telegram of January 19th, 1933, from M. Hoel to M. Peter S. Brandal.
(2) Telegram of January 20th, 1933, from M. Peter S. Brandal and M. V.
Landmark to M. Hoel. [p145]
(3) Telegram of January 20th, 1933, from M. Hallvard Devold to M. Hoel.
(4) Extract from the instructions given on June 27th, 1930, by the Norwegian
Ministry of Justice and Police to M. Adolf Hoel.
(5) Communiqu� to the Norwegian Press concerning the police powers granted
to M. Hoel.
(6) Cutting from the Danish paper Politiken (June 13th, 1930).
(7) Cutting from the Danish paper Socialdemokraten (Feb. 9th, 1930).
(8) Cutting from the Danish paper Kristeligt Dagblad (Apr. 4th, 1930).
(9) Cutting from the Danish paper Nationaltidende (May 10th, 1930).
(10) Extract from a wireless talk by Vilhelm Bjerknes: "Weather
forecasting", Oslo, 1933.
(11) Extract from the report of Commandant Baug� printed in the Revue, des
travaux de l'Office des p�ches maritimes, Paris, Volume II.
(12) Extract from an article by Knud Rasmussen in Atlanlen (Vol. IV,
1915-1917, p. 34).
(13) Extract from the Yearbook of the Greenland Society for 1914, pages 5 to
21.
(14) Extract from Reports and Decrees relating to the administration of
Greenland, №. 1, 1932.
(15) Extract from the Treaty of commerce of August 23rd, 1742, between
Norway and Denmark and France.
(16) Extract from the Treaty of commerce of April 6th/16th, 1748, between
Norway and Denmark and the Two Sicilies.
(17) Extract from the declaration made on October 8th/19th, 1782, by the
plenipotentiaries of the Empress of Russia in connection with the Treaty of
commerce between Norway and Denmark and Russia (Oct. 8th/19th 1782).
(18) Extract from the "Most Humble Proposal of the Royal Department of
Finance" of March 15th, 1803.
(19) Memorandum of the Department for the administration of the Fund ad usus
publicos to the Department for the Royal Trade with Greenland, Iceland,
Finmark and the Faroes (Dec. 29th, 1785).
(20) Circular letter of the Royal Ministry for For. Aff. to the King's
Ministers at Saint-Petersburg, London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid and Vienna
(Nov. 11th, 1786).
III. - The Court Has Had Before it the Complete Text of the following
Documents :
(a) Arbitral award made in the Clipperton Island case (1929).
(b) English and French versions of the arbitral award made in the Palmas
Island (Miangas) case (1928).
(c) Translation into French (prepared by the Registry) of the first part of
a paomphlet published in 1923 by A. Rlllstad and entitled Grlllnland og
Spitsbergen.
(d) Volume entitled : "Aktstykke frlll uppgjerda millom Noreg og Danmark
etter 1814" (Oslo, 1925), cited in Annex 224 of the Norwegian Government.
(e) Volume entitled : "Diplomatiske Aktstykker vedkommende Norges: Opgj�r
med Danmark" - 1814-1819 (Christiania, 1890) (cited in Annex 224 of the
Norwegian Government).
IV. - Texts, in the Original Language, of Certain Documents Enumerated
Above, Filed at the Court's Request :
A. - Documents transmitted by the Agent for the Danish Government:
(1) Original text, in Danish, of certain documents of later date than March
18th, 1776. [p146]
(2) Photographic reproduction of a despatch dated September 4th, 1818, from
Baron de Humbold, Prussian Minister at London, to the King of Prussia,
together with:
a photographic reproduction of a draft note to Baron de Stierneld, Minister
of Sweden and Norway at London;
a photographic reproduction of a draft report of the pleni-potentiaries of
the Four Powers to their respective Courts.
(3) Photographic reproduction of Protocol №.3 of London (Apr. 24th, 1819),
with annexes. (Cf. B, 2-7, hereafter.)
(4) Extract from Lord Strangford's note to Lord Castlereagh (March 12th,
1819). (English text.)
(5) Five telegrams exchanged at the end of 1915 between the Danish Legation
at Washington and the Danish Minister for For. Aff. (Danish text.)
(6) Memorandum handed by the Danish Minister at Washington to the United
States Secretary of State (Dec. 27th, 1915) (English text.)
(7) Idem (Apr. 22nd, 1916). (English text.)
(8) Instructions from the Danish Ministry for For. Aff. to the Danish
Minister at Paris (Jan. 28th, 1919). (Danish text.)
(9) Instructions from the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to the Danish
Ministers at Paris (with annex), London, Rome and Tokyo (March 2nd, 1919).
(Danish text.)
(10) Extract from the original French text of the memorandum transmitted by
the Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen to the Danish Government on May 9th,
1919.
(11) Instructions given by the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to the Danish
Minister at Stockholm (Jan. 8th, 1921). (Danish text.)
(12) Note from the Danish Minister at Stockholm to the Swedish Minister for
For. Aff. (Jan. 13th, 1921). (Danish text.)
(13) Reply from the Swedish Minister for For. Aff. to the Danish Minister at
Stockholm (Jan. 28th, 1921). (Swedish text.)
(14) Confidential collection (Aktstykker vedrlllrende Grlllnland og de med
den Norske Regering indtil 1. September 1923 flllrte
Forhandlinger-Copenhagen, 1923) of documents made by the Danish Ministry for
For. Aff. in view of the Danish-Norwegian negotiations of 1923-1924 (this
Collection contains, inter alia, the original Danish text of the relevant
legislative instruments of 1740, 1751, 1758, 1776, and of the instructions
given by the Danish Minister for For. Aff. to the Danish Minister at
Christiania on July 12th, 1919, as also the original Danish or Norwegian
text of a part of the diplomatic correspondence between Denmark and Norway
from 1921 to 1923).
(15) Protocol of the twelfth and last meeting held at Christiania on January
28th, 1924 (Convention of July 9th, 1924).
(16) Original text in Danish or Norwegian of a part of the diplomatic
correspondence between Denmark and Norway in 1930 and 1931.
(17) Work entitled Grlllnlands historiske Mindesmlllrker, Copenhagen, 1838,
Volume II (which reproduces, on pp. 776 and 779, an extract in Icelandic or
Danish of the Haakonarsaga by Sturla Thordarson).
(18) Protocol of the exchange of ratifications of February 9th, 1814 (Treaty
of Kiel). [p147]
B. - Documents transmitted by the Agent for the N ovwegian Government:
(1) M. Ihlen's minute of July 14th and 22nd, 1919. (Norwegian text.)
(2) Note sent by Lord Strangford to Count Engestrom (Jan. 5th, 1819).
(3) Four notes sent by Count Engestrom to the Ministers of the Allied
Courts at Stockholm (Jan. 7th, 1819).
(4) Report from the Norwegian Government (Nov. 20th, 1818).
(5) Declaration by the "Swedish-Norwegian" Commissioner (Jan. 16th,
1819).
(6) Declaration by the Danish Commissioners (Feb. 5th, 1819).
(7) Declaration by the "Swedish" Commissioner (March 27th, 1819).
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