Case No.IT-03-69-PT

Before:
Judge Patrick Robinson, Presiding
Judge O-Gon Kwon
Judge Bert Swart

Registrar:
Mr. Hans Holthuis

Decision:
28 July 2004

v.

JOVICA STANISIC

_________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Dermot Groome
Mr. David Re
Ms. Melissa Pack

Counsel for the Accused:
Mr. Gert-Jan Alexander Knoops
Mr. Wayne Jordash

I. BACKGROUND
1. This Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“International Tribunal”) is seized of the confidential and ex parte “Defence Motion for Provisional Release ” filed by the defence of Jovica Stanisi} (“Accused”) on 14 January 2004 (“Motion ”) pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal (“Rules”).¹
   
2. The Office of the Prosecutor (“Prosecution”) filed the “Prosecution’s Response to Stanisic’s Defence Motion for Provisional Release” with a confidential annex on 7 April 2004, opposing the Motion. The Defence subsequently filed the “Reply to Prosecution’s Response to Stanisic’s Defence Motion for Provisional Release” on 14 April 2004.² A hearing, at which the parties made oral submissions, was held on 10-11 May 2004 and 25-26 May 2004.
   
3. The Accused, who worked in the State Security Service (“DB”) of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (“MUP”), is alleged to have been, first, the de facto head of the DB, followed by his formal appointment, from 31 December 1991 to 27 October 1998. Along with his co-accused Franko Simatovic, the Accused is charged under Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Tribunal with five counts: persecutions (as a crime against humanity), murder (as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs of war), deportation (as a crime against humanity) and forcible transfer (inhumane act as a crime against humanity) committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1 August 1991 and 31 December 1995.³
   
4. The Accused was arrested by Belgrade authorities on 13 March 2003. However, on 26 January 2004 the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, at the request of the Accused, issued a statement confirming that the Accused was “not under criminal investigation” before the municipal courts “with respect to any criminal act under the jurisdiction of the said courts.”⁴ While he was detained in Belgrade, the Prosecution indictment against the Accused was confirmed on 1 May 2003.⁵ Thereafter he was transferred to the United Nations Detention Unit (“UNDU”), in The Hague, on 11 June 2003. At his initial appearance on 13 June 2003, the Accused pleaded not guilty to all five counts.
   II. SUBMISSIONS
5. In summary, the Defence submitted, inter alia, the following factors in support of its application for provisional release for the Accused: the past cooperation of the Accused with the International Tribunal; that the Accused should be accorded the rights of an accused who surrendered voluntarily to the International Tribunal; the character of the Accused; the guarantees for the Accused from the governments of the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, and Serbia and Montenegro ; and the medical condition of the Accused.
   
6. In response, the Prosecution submitted that the sheer magnitude of the crimes charged, which carry a possibility of life sentence, is a reason for the Accused not to appear for trial; his past cooperation was mainly self-serving and should be given no weight; government guarantees provide no weight; the Accused should not be treated as though he surrendered voluntarily; and as the Accused held a high position within the Serbian state security apparatus, he had the necessary contacts and the means to locate witnesses and their families, and potentially to utilise a variety of means of intimidation. Finally, the Prosecution argued that, provisional release if granted will be widely publicized within the former Yugoslavia and will have the effect of making potential witnesses and informants more reluctant to assist the Prosecution
   
7. With respect to the medical condition of the Accused, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused suffered from certain illnesses, but that provisional release was not the appropriate response. Rather the appropriate response was to ensure that the Accused, while in custody of the UNDU, received proper and appropriate medical care and any other care he requires.
   III. LAW
8. Rule 65 of the Rules, governing provisional release, provides:

   Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only after giving the host country and the State to which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to be heard and only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person.⁶

9. In determining whether to grant provisional release to an accused, it is for the Trial Chamber to consider the particular circumstances of each case and for an accused to satisfy the Trial Chamber of two matters: (i) that he will appear for trial, and (ii) that, if released, he will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person.⁷
   
10. The Trial Chamber is “not obliged to deal with all possible factors which a Trial Chamber can take into account when deciding whether it is satisfied that, if released, an accused will appear for trial.”⁸ It is sufficient for the Trial Chamber to indicate all the relevant factors that it has taken into account in reaching its decision. In other words, the Trial Chamber must render a reasoned opinion.⁹
    
11. In an application for provisional release the Appeals Chamber held that, in determining whether the Accused, if released, will appear for trial, a Trial Chamber is expected to consider, inter alia, the following factors:

    the fact that the applicants are charged with serious criminal offences; the fact that, if convicted, they are likely to face long prison terms; the circumstances in which they surrendered; the degree of co-operation given by the authorities of the FRY and Serbia; the fact that the government of the FRY and the government of the Republic of Serbia gave guarantees that they would ensure the presence of the accused for trial and guaranteed the observance of conditions set by the Trial Chamber upon their provisional release; the fact that both accused held very senior positions, so far as it is relevant to the weight of governmental guarantees; the fact that the FRY recently passed a Law on Co-operation with the International Tribunal; the fact that the Applicants gave personal guarantees in which they undertook to abide by the conditions set by the Trial Chamber should they be released; the likelihood that, in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the decision, and as far as foreseeable, the circumstances as they may turn out to be at the time when the accused will be expected to return for trial, the relevant authorities will re-arrest the accused should he decline to surrender; and the fact that the accused provisionally accepted to be interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor, thereby showing some degree of co-operation with the Prosecution.¹⁰

12. With respect to government guarantees, the Appeals Chamber held that “the weight to be attributed to guarantees given by a government may depend a great deal upon the personal circumstances of the applicant, notably because of the position which he held prior to his arrest.”¹¹ According to the Appeals Chamber, these circumstances must not only be assessed at the time when the decision on provisional release is being taken, but also, as far as foreseeable, at the time when the case is due for trial and the accused will be expected to return.¹² Further, in so far as the Trial Chamber relies upon the guarantees, “the position of an accused in the hierarchy and the consequence thereof upon the weight of governmental guarantees are indeed significant factors which the Trial Chamber is expected to address as they could have an important bearing upon a State’s willingness and readiness to arrest that person if he refuses to surrender himself; those factors therefore reduce the likelihood of his appearing at trial.”¹³
    
13. In terms of reviewing whether there is any danger posed by an accused, if released, to victims, witnesses or any other person, one of the factors this Trial Chamber previously considered was whether there was any suggestion that an accused had interfered with the administration of justice in any way since the date when an indictment was confirmed against him.¹⁴ However, the Trial Chamber emphasises that it will examine all relevant factors in reviewing this question.
    
14. With respect to applications for provisional release, the burden of proof is upon the Accused to satisfy the Trial Chamber that, if released, he will appear for trial and will not pose any danger to victims, witnesses or other persons. However that burden is discharged not on proof beyond reasonable doubt, but on a lower standard.¹⁵
    IV. DISCUSSION
15. The following paragraphs contain brief discussions of the factors considered relevant by the Trial Chamber.

    A. Whether the Accused, if released, will appear for trial.

    Cooperation of the Accused

16. Prior to the confirmation of the Indictment on 1 May 2003, the Prosecution interviewed the Accused four times in November 2001. According to the investigator who conducted the interviews, the Accused voluntarily agreed to be interviewed and answered most of the questions, but the information regarding the activities of the DB was considerably different from and inconsistent with the information already in the possession of the Prosecution.¹⁶ The investigator further stated that the Accused provided “some material which, had he been willing to further cooperate and give testimony, could have been of evidentiary value to the OTP.”¹⁷ However, since the Prosecution believed that much of the information provided by the Accused was incomplete and in many cases not truthful, it decided not to conduct a further series of interviews to determine whether the Accused could be a witness in other cases.¹⁸
    
17. To counter, the Defence argued that an assessment of inconsistency and the matter of cooperation should be distinguished.¹⁹ In addition, the Defence submitted documents to demonstrate the significance of the information provided to the Prosecution.²⁰ These included explanatory statements from the Accused as to the material he provided to the Prosecution and letters from a former defence counsel.²¹ According to the former defence counsel, during his meetings with the Prosecution, the Prosecution described the documents provided by the Accused as “professional,” and seemed, at that time, to have considered the information provided by the Accused as promising.²²
    
18. Certainly, the more valuable the information provided by the Accused to the Prosecution, the more valuable is his cooperation. However, in the Trial Chamber’s view, if the information lacks value that, by itself, does not disprove cooperation by the Accused. The Trial Chamber takes note of and accords due weight to the voluntariness of the Accused in his interviews at a time when the law on cooperation with the International Tribunal had not yet been passed in Serbia and Montenegro; in the words of the Appeals Chamber, the willingness to be interviewed by the Prosecution shows “some degree of co-operation with the Prosecution.”²³

    Voluntary surrender

19. The Accused was already in the custody of Belgrade authorities prior to the confirmation of the Indictment against him in May 2003. Therefore he was not in a position to surrender voluntarily to the International Tribunal. However in support of its argument that the Accused be accorded all the rights of an accused who surrendered voluntarily, the Defence submitted documents showing the efforts of the Accused to surrender voluntarily.²⁴ These included a letter from former defence counsel to the Belgrade Court, requesting modification of the detention order so that the Accused could surrender voluntarily to the International Tribunal, and a public statement of the Accused through his prior defence counsel of his intention to surrender voluntarily. In addition, the Defence has submitted documents indicating that the National Council for Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found that the Accused should be accorded the rights of a person who voluntarily surrendered to the International Tribunal.²⁵ In Sainovic, the Appeals Chamber took into consideration the fact that the accused in that case had earlier made public statements to the media that they would not voluntarily surrender.²⁶ There is no allegation that the Accused in this case made any such statements.
    
20. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused was already held in detention when the Indictment against him was confirmed on 1 May 2003. On 10 May 2003, the former attorney of the Accused requested the Belgrade court to “modify the detention order and release” the Accused so that the Accused would have the “right and possibility of voluntary surrender.”²⁷ On 11 June 2003, the Accused, who was still detained by the Serbian authorities, was transferred to the International Tribunal. In the circumstances of this case, there is clear evidence of the intent of the Accused to surrender voluntarily.

    Seriousness of the crimes charged

21. The Accused is charged with serious criminal offences, including persecutions as crime against humanity. If convicted, the Accused will likely face a long prison sentence. The Defence submitted numerous documents in an effort to counter the notion that the Accused would likely be convicted on the charges and face a long prison sentence.²⁸ However, a substantive review of whether or not the Accused will be convicted, is a matter for determination at the trial stage. For the purposes of provisional release requests, the Trial Chamber is only concerned with the possibility that the Accused faces a long prison sentence, if convicted.
    
22. The seriousness of the crimes charged is merely one of the factors the Trial Chamber takes into account in evaluating whether the Accused will appear for trial, if released. In this regard, the Trial Chamber observes that the European Court of Human Rights has “repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand.”²⁹

    Government Guarantees

23. The governments of Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, and Republic of Montenegro have given their guarantees with respect to the Accused. In addition, the Trial Chamber heard from a representative of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro and from the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Serbia. During the hearing, the Minister of Justice stated that it would be “perfectly simple” to arrest the Accused should the necessity arise.³⁰
    
24. In response, the Prosecution pointed to the general lack of cooperation, particularly with respect to indictees remaining at large. In this regard, the Prosecution submitted a letter from the President of the International Tribunal to the Security Council, bringing to its attention a report from the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal complaining of “a consistent failure on the part of Serbia and Montenegro to comply with its obligations under Article 29 of the Statute and Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”³¹ The Defence stated that the Trial Chamber should “individualise the enforceability of the guarantees and apply them not generally but to the person of Mr. Stanisic.”³²
    
25. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the reliability of a government guarantee must be determined in relation to the circumstances which arise in the particular case. As stated by the Appeals Chamber, “the issue in each particular case is what would occur if the relevant authority were obliged under its guarantee to arrest the accused person seeking provisional release in that case.”³³ In Mrksic, the Appeals Chamber gave an example of a trial of two accused in which a Trial Chamber could accept a guarantee in relation to one accused, whereas the same or another Trial Chamber could decline to accept the same authority’s guarantee as reliable, in relation to another accused, without there being an inconsistency :

    Accused A may have surrendered voluntarily as soon as he learnt that he had been indicted and may have cooperated with the Office of the Prosecutor in a way which demonstrated his bona fide intention to appear for trial. The reliability of the guarantee provided by the relevant authority is of less importance in such a case, and may more easily be accepted as sufficiently reliable in relation to this particular accused person. On the other hand, Accused B may have been a high level government official at the time he is alleged to have committed the crimes charged, and he may have since then lost political influence but yet possess very valuable information which he could disclose to the Tribunal if minded to cooperate should he be kept in custody. There would be a substantial disincentive for that authority to enforce its guarantee to arrest that particular accused if he did not comply with the conditions of his provisional release. A finding that the guarantee is not sufficiently reliable in the case of Accused B would be completely reasonable, despite the finding that it was reliable in relation to Accused A.³⁴

    The Trial Chamber also notes the dictum of the Appeals Chamber that “the weight to be attributed to guarantees given by a government may depend a great deal upon the personal circumstances of the applicant, notably because of the position which he held prior to his arrest.”³⁵

26. The Accused commenced his service in the DB, a part of the MUP, in 1975. By 1991, the Accused held the position of Deputy Head of the DB and was later appointed the Head or Chief of the DB from 31 December 1991 to 27 October 1998. By virtue of his seniority, the position of the Accused appears to be more analogous to that of Accused B, as described by the Appeals Chamber in Mrksic. However, there is no evidence that the Accused possesses information, which would provide a substantial disincentive for the state authorities to enforce the guarantee given in support of his provisional release. In that respect, the position of the Accused differs from that of Accused B in Mrksic.
    
27. In any event, given that the Accused, who retired in 1998, was arrested by Belgrade authorities on 13 March 2003 and was subsequently transferred to the International Tribunal on 11 June 2003, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused would indeed be re-arrested and transferred to the International Tribunal, should the necessity arise. This is another feature which distinguishes this Accused from the case of Accused B: even if this Accused does possess valuable information, the government has already demonstrated its willingness to arrest and surrender the Accused. In the view of the Trial Chamber, the government guarantees (including the statement given by the Minister of Justice that it would be “perfectly simple ” to arrest the Accused,³⁶) should be accorded due weight.

Character of the Accused

28. There have been numerous submissions from the Defence in support of the character of the Accused, including statements from the former President of the Supreme Court of Serbia,³⁷ former State Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia³⁸ and the Vice President of Montenegro,³⁹ observing that the Accused displayed a respect for the law, and commenting on the positive role of the Accused during the Balkan Crisis.⁴⁰ In particular, the Defence points to the positive role of the Accused with respect to his involvement in the release of three hundred United Nations servicemen held by the forces of Republika Srpska after the NATO campaign in 1995.⁴¹ The Trial Chamber notes the significance that this evidence might have at the sentencing stage, if convicted, but questions its relevance to an application for provisional release.
    
29. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, if released, the Accused will appear for trial.

    B. Whether the Accused, if released, will not pose a danger to victims, witnesses or other persons.

30. The Prosecution argued that the Accused retains influence in the DB and that the Accused has the necessary contacts and means to locate Prosecution witnesses and their families, and could utilise a variety of means of intimidation.⁴² It submitted a statement from a Prosecution investigator that “a large number of potential witnesses,” both in the present case and in the Milosevic case, refused to be interviewed for fear of their safety.⁴³ When the involvement of local authorities and employment of waiver and summons procedures were proposed, many witnesses still refused, stating that the real power lay with the Accused and his co-accused Franko Simatovic. According to the Prosecution investigator, “they made it clear that as long as these men were at liberty they would not feel safe speaking to me.”⁴⁴
    
31. A Prosecution investigator gave evidence that during the course of questioning a suspect who participated in the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the suspect answered questions about paramilitary activities in which he participated in Croatia, but was reluctant to answer questions relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁵ When the investigator asked the suspect why he was not willing to answer questions about Bosnia and Herzegovina, the suspect responded that he was a “member of the Special Unit of the Serbian State Security,” and that he considered the Accused and his co-accused, Franko Simatovic, “to be the most powerful persons in the country and he did not want to annoy them as that could have dangerous consequences for him.”⁴⁶
    
32. With respect to the Accused in particular, the Prosecution investigator referred to a witness who told him that “all former members of the Special Unit(s( who were summoned by the OTP for an interview, were obliged to meet” with the Accused prior to and after the interview.⁴⁷ The witness gave the names of two former Special Unit members who met with the Accused and it appeared to the investigator that the Accused wanted to “screen the interviews.”⁴⁸ There was no indication that the witness himself had met with the Accused.
    
33. In response, the Defence stated that the only “concrete incident” mentioned by the Prosecution investigator was the screening of interviews by the Accused.⁴⁹ The Defence pointed out that the investigator was only able to arrive at this conclusion by comparing the similarities of the statements of the two former Special Unit members, and the dates of the meetings of the two former Special Unit members and the investigator.⁵⁰ However, the investigator did not verify the nature of the meetings with the two former Special Unit members, and based his conclusion that the Accused wanted to screen the interviews solely on the similarities of the statements and dates.⁵¹
    
34. With respect to the statements from the others interviewed by the Prosecution investigator, the Defence questioned whether the statements were credible, given the fact that the Accused did not have de jure power during the time of the interviews because he had already stepped down from office.⁵² The investigator did not further verify the statements of the witnesses and testified that he never received any concrete evidence that the Accused himself tried to influence any witness.⁵³
    
35. In the opinion of the Trial Chamber, the fear of the witnesses, to which the Prosecution investigator referred, reflects more a generalised concern rather than an apprehension linked to any specific acts or conduct of the Accused. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the Accused interfered or would interfere with the administration of justice. Bearing in mind the condition to be imposed on him not to interfere with any victims or witnesses, should he be granted provisional release, and the guarantees from Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, and Republic of Montenegro to arrest the Accused for breach of any conditions of the provisional release, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, the Accused will not pose a danger to any victims or witnesses, if released.

    C. Medical Condition

36. The Defence submits that the medical condition of the Accused is an exceptional circumstance justifying provisional release. At the hearing, the Defence argued that the Accused could not be treated in detention and that if he remained, he would either die or be unable to participate effectively in trial.⁵⁴
    
37. The International Tribunal’s jurisprudence is that for an application for provisional release on medical grounds to succeed, it must be substantiated by a showing by the applicant that he needs treatment which is unavailable while at the UNDU. Thus, the Trial Chamber in Kovacevic noted that the medical reports from a psychiatrist appointed by the Defence and the consulting psychiatrist of the UNDU, together with a report filed by the Commanding Officer of the UNDU, “recommended that the Accused be offered treatment urgently in a mental health facility in a BCS-speaking environment, which may potentially improve the condition of the Accused.”⁵⁵ Against this background, and taking into account that the requirements of Rule 65 were met, the Trial Chamber granted provisional release stressing, inter alia , that in the circumstances of that case, the “purpose of the provisional release of the Accused” was to make available the “specialised medical treatment [the Accused ] needs.”⁵⁶
    
38. The Trial Chamber in Simic also dealt with a request for provisional release on medical grounds that were not of terminal nature.⁵⁷ Although this decision was issued prior to the amendment of Rule 65, deleting the words “only in exceptional circumstances”, the analysis of the Trial Chamber, with respect to provisional release on medical grounds, is clear.⁵⁸ In granting the provisional release request of that accused the Trial Chamber noted in its decision that the medical documents showed that the accused was “hemiplegic and suffering from serious medical problems” and that he required “intensive daily care dispensed by a qualified medical team.”⁵⁹ Subsequently that accused, in compliance with an order from the Trial Chamber, returned to the UNDU for the commencement of the trial proceedings.⁶⁰
    
39. The Trial Chamber heard extensive testimony on behalf of both parties, including four medical experts; many exhibits were tendered. The evidence clearly indicates that the Accused is not in the best of health and is, in fact, quite ill. However, the parties disagree as to the seriousness of the illness.⁶¹ The relevant issue for the Trial Chamber is whether the Accused can be adequately treated while detained at the UNDU.
    
40. In determining that issue, the Trial Chamber has been guided not only by the documents submitted by the parties, which include the medical reports of the Accused from the UNDU and expert reports from the Prosecution and Defence, but also by the testimony of the expert witnesses. In this regard, the Trial Chamber recalls the testimony of the Prosecution expert witness that the Accused could be adequately treated at the UNDU for his medical condition.⁶² A Defence witness, Dr. Tarabar, also stated unequivocally that “treatment can be done with appropriate medical facilities available in The Hague or in Amsterdam better.”⁶³ In addition, with respect to the mental condition of the Accused, a psychiatrist called by the Defence, testified that the condition of the Accused was alleviated with medication.⁶⁴
    
41. On the basis of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused can be adequately treated while in detention at the UNDU.
    V. CONCLUSION
42. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, if released, the Accused will appear for trial and that he will not pose any danger to victims, witnesses or other persons.
    VI. DISPOSITION
43. For these reasons, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules, the MOTION is hereby GRANTED and the Trial Chamber

    (1) ORDERS as follows:

    a) the Accused shall be transported to Schiphol airport in the Netherlands by the Dutch authorities;

    b) at Schiphol airport, the Accused shall be provisionally released into the custody of an official of the government of Serbia and Montenegro to be designated prior to release in accordance with operative paragraph (2)(a) hereof, who shall accompany the Accused for the remainder of his travel to Serbia and Montenegro and to his place of residence;

    c) on his return, the Accused shall be accompanied by the same designated official of the government of Serbia and Montenegro, who shall deliver the Accused to the custody of the Dutch authorities at Schiphol airport at a date and time to be determined by Order of the Trial Chamber, and the Dutch authorities shall then transport the Accused back to the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague;

    d) during the period of his provisional release, the Accused shall abide by the following conditions, and the authorities of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia, including the local police, shall ensure compliance with such conditions:

    (i) to remain within the confines of the municipality of Belgrade;
    (ii) to surrender his passport to the Ministry of Justice;
    (iii)to report each day to the police in Belgrade at a local police station to be designated by the Ministry of Justice;
    (iv) to provide the address at which he will be staying to the Ministry of Justice and the Registrar of the International Tribunal before leaving the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague;
    (v) to consent to having the Ministry of Justice check with the local police about his presence and to the making of occasional, unannounced visits upon the Accused by the Ministry of Justice or by a person designated by the Registrar of the International Tribunal;
    (vi) not to have any contact with the co-accused in the case;
    (vii) not to have any contact whatsoever or in any way interfere with any victim or potential witness or otherwise interfere in any way with the proceedings or the administration of justice;
    (viii) not to discuss his case with anyone, including the media, other than with his counsel ;
    (ix) continue to cooperate with the International Tribunal;
    to comply strictly with any requirements of the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia necessary to enable them to comply with their obligations under this Order and their guarantees;
    (xi) to return to the International Tribunal at such time and on such date as the Trial Chamber may order; and
    (xii) to comply strictly with any further Order of the Trial Chamber varying the terms of or terminating his provisional release; and

    (2) REQUIRES the governments of the Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia to assume responsibility as follows:

    a) by designating an official of the government of Serbia and Montenegro into whose custody the Accused shall be provisionally released and who shall accompany the Accused from Schiphol airport to Serbia and Montenegro and to his place of residence, and notifying, as soon as practicable, the Trial Chamber and the Registrar of the International Tribunal of the name of the designated official;

    b) for the personal security and safety of the Accused while on provisional release ;

    c) for all expenses concerning transport of the Accused from Schiphol airport to Belgrade and back;

    d) for all expenses concerning accommodation and security of the Accused while on provisional release;

    e) at the request of the Trial Chamber or the parties to facilitate all means of cooperation and communication between the parties and to ensure the confidentiality of any such communication;

    f) to submit a written report to the Trial Chamber every two weeks as to the compliance of the Accused with the terms of this Order;

    g) to arrest and detain the Accused immediately if he should breach any of the conditions of this Order; and

    h) to report immediately to the Trial Chamber any breach of the conditions set out above; and

    (3) INSTRUCTS the Registrar of the International Tribunal to consult with the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands as to the practical arrangements for his release and to continue to detain the Accused at the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague until such time as the Trial Chamber and the Registrar have been notified of the name of the designated official of the government of Serbia and Montenegro into whose custody the Accused is to be provisionally released; and

    (4) REQUESTS the authorities of all States through which the Accused will travel;

    a) to hold the Accused in custody for any time that he will spend in transit at the airport;

    b) to arrest and detain the Accused pending his return to the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague, should he attempt to escape.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

__________________
Patrick Robinson
Presiding

Dated this twenty-eighth day of July 2004
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]