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BEFORE: |
CHAIRPERSON:
Mr. Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia)
VICE-CHAIRPERSONS:
Mr. Rafael Rivas Posada (Colombia), Sir Nigel Rodley (United
Kingdom), Mr. Roman Wieruszewski (Poland)
RAPPORTEUR: Mr. Ivan
Shearer (Australia)
MEMBERS:
Mr. Nisuke
Ando (Japan), Mr. Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (India), Mr.
Alfredo Castillero Hoyos (Panama), Ms. Christine Chanet (France),
Mr. Franco Depasquale (Malta), Mr. Maurice Glele Ahanhanzo (Benin),
Mr. Walter Kalin (Switzerland), Mr. Ahmed Tawfik Khalil (Egypt), Mr.
Rajsoomer Lallah (Mauritius), Mr. Martin Scheinin (Finland), Mr.
Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen (Argentina), Ms. Ruth Wedgwood (United
States), Mr. Maxwell Yalden (Canada) |
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PermaLink: |
https://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2004.04.01_Wilson_v_Australia.htm |
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Citation: |
Wilson v.
Australia, Comm. 1239/2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/40, Vol. II, at 571 (HRC
2004) |
Alt. Style
of Cause: |
Wilson
v. Australia |
Publications: |
Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/59/40, Annex X, sect. Y, at 571 (Oct. 1, 2004) |
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1. The author of the
communication, initially dated 20 March 2003, is John Wilson, an Australian
citizen, born in 1942 and resident of Australia. [FN1] He claims to be a
victim of a violation by Australia of articles 1, 2, 9, 14 and 17 of the
Covenant. He is not represented by counsel.
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[FN1] The Optional Protocol entered into force in relation to Australia on
25 December 1991.
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THE FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE AUTHOR
2.1. The author claims that he has been involved in a number of different
legal proceedings in the State of New South Wales which have been conducted
unfairly, and which have denied him the right to a trial by jury. He claims
that this has resulted in him being unlawful imprisoned, unlawfully evicted
from his premises, and defamed. He also claims that he has been the victim
of what he described as the unlawful use of authority by a foreign power.
2.2 The author states that on 5 September 1997 he was arrested and charged
with an offence under s326 of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900, which
criminalizes the making of threats to cause injury or detriment to a witness
in a proceeding, a juror or a judicial officer (the author does not provided
details of the charges against him or the surrounding circumstances). On 26
September 1997 the author appeared in the Local Court, where he insisted on
being tried by jury, to which the presiding Magistrate agreed.
2.3 On 17 November 1997, the author appeared in the New South Wales Supreme
Court in response to a summons issued by the Prothonotary of that Court,
seeking to have the author charged with contempt of court. No details are
provided, and it is unclear how or whether this charge related to those laid
under the Crime Act. The author requested that his trial for contempt of
court be by way of jury trial. The presiding judge refused this request. The
author challenged this decision in the Supreme Court, but this was dismissed
by a single judge of the Court on 13 February 1998, and then by the Court of
Appeal on 26 August 1998. The author's further application to the High Court
of Australia for special leave to appeal against the refusal to grant a jury
trial was dismissed on 16 April 1999.
2.4 The author claims that he was unlawfully imprisoned from 9 November 1999
to 28 February 2000 in the Silverwater Correctional Centre in Sydney, after
being tried and convicted of contempt of Court by the Supreme Court of New
South Wales. No details of the circumstances surrounding his conviction are
provided. He claims that he was denied his request for a trial by jury in
relation to the contempt of court charges against him. On 28 February 2000,
he was released from prison, following a successful appeal to the Court of
Appeal. The author claims that the above circumstances reveal a breach of
article 9(5) of the Covenant.
2.5 The author states that on 28 December 2000, he filed proceedings against
the St. George Bank in relation to allegations that the bank had committed
fraud against him in relation to a housing loan contract, by including terms
as to variable interest rates. The author's claim was also directed against
the State of New South Wales, which, as the author argued, was 'vicariously
liable' for an earlier decision of a judge of the New South Wales Supreme
Court. This decision had upheld an application by the bank to grant it
possession of the author's house, in view of the author's default on loan
repayments. The author claimed that the judge in the earlier matter had
perverted the course of justice by not granting him a trial by jury in
relation to the bank's claims against him. In his claim against the bank and
the State of New South Wales, the author argued that he was entitled to a
trial by jury, but this was rejected by a judge of the Supreme Court of New
South Wales, and the author's subsequent appeals against this procedural
decision in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the High Court were
dismissed on 16 November 2001 and 14 February 2003 respectively.
2.6 The author refers to 23 proceedings in which the relevant court refused
his request for a jury trial, and claims that this reveals a violation by
the State party of articles 2 and 14 of the Covenant.
2.7 The author further alleges that his proceedings against a media company
in June 1997 for defamation, the circumstances of which are not explained,
were unsuccessful, and that the Supreme Court of New South Wales struck out
his claim despite the author's contention that his proceedings should be
heard and determined by a jury. This is said to have amounted to a violation
of article 17 by the State Party.
2.8 The also author also claims that, because the State party's judges and
parliamentarians swear allegiance to Queen Elizabeth the Second, the monarch
of a foreign state, it is in breach of article 1 of the Covenant.
2.9 Finally, the author claims that the failure of the State party's courts
to uphold his claims against the aforementioned bank in relation to his loan
contract constituted a violation of article 26, as he was denied the
protection of the law against what he claims to have been the bank's
fraudulent practices.
THE COMPLAINT
3.1 The author contends that, in the various legal proceedings referred to
in his communication, he was not afforded a trial by jury, and that the
proceedings were not conducted fairly, in violation of articles 9 and 14. He
also claims that the conduct complained of amounted to breaches of articles
1, 2, 17 and 26 of the Covenant.
ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
4.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with the Rule 87 of its Rules of
Procedure, decide whether or not the case is admissible under the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant.
4.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5, paragraph
2(a), of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.
4.3 The Committee reiterates its position that an individual cannot claim
the status of "victim" in respect of alleged violations of the right of all
peoples to self-determination, as enshrined in article 1 of the Covenant.
[FN2] Consequently, this part of the communication is inadmissible under
article 1 of the Optional Protocol.
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[FN2] See, for example, Hom v The Philippines Caser No 1169/2003, Decision
adopted on 8 August 2003.
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4.4 As to the author's claims under articles 2, 9, 14, 17 and 26 of the
Covenant, the Committee considers that they either fall outside the scope of
those provisions or have not been substantiated, for purposes of
admissibility. The Committee observes, in particular, that the Covenant does
not confer the right to trial by jury in either civil or criminal
proceedings, rather the touchstone is that all judicial proceedings, with or
without a jury, comport with the guarantees of fair trial. [FN3]
Consequently, the author's claims are inadmissible under articles 2 and 3 of
the Optional Protocol.
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[FN3] See, for example, Kavanagh v Ireland (No.1) Case No 818/1998, Views
adopted on 4 April 2001.
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5. The Committee therefore decides that the communication is inadmissible.
The decision will be transmitted to the author and, for information, to the
State party.
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[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original
version. Subsequently to be issued in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of
the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.] |
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