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1. The author of the
communication, dated 28 March 2001, is Manuela Sanlés Sanlés, a Spanish
national, who claims violations by Spain of article 2, paragraph 1, and
articles 7, 9, 14, 17, 18 and 26 of the Covenant in respect of Ramón
Sampedro Cameán, who declared her his legal heir. The author is represented
by counsel. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant entered into force for
Spain on 25 January 1985.
THE FACTS AS SUBMITTED BY THE AUTHOR
2.1 On 23 August 1968, Ramón Sampedro Cameán, aged 25 at the time, had an
accident which resulted in the fracture of a cervical vertebra and
irreversible tetraplegia. On 12 July 1995, he initiated an act of
non-contentious jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance in Noia, La
Coruña, pleading his right to die with dignity. Specifically, he requested
that his doctor should, without having criminal proceedings brought against
him, be authorized to supply him with the substances necessary to end his
life. On 9 October 1995, the court dismissed his request, on the ground that
it was punishable under article 143 of the Spanish Criminal Code as the
offence of aiding and abetting suicide, carrying a penalty of 2 to 10 years'
imprisonment.
2.2 Ramón Sampedro lodged an appeal with the Provincial High Court in La
Coruña, which rejected it on 19 November 1996, confirming the decision of
the court of first instance.
2.3 On 16 December 1996, Ramón Sampedro lodged an application for amparo
(constitutional protection) with the Constitutional Court, pleading a
violation of his dignity and his rights to the free development of his
personality, to life, to physical and psychological integrity, and to a fair
trial. The appeal was accepted for consideration on 27 January 1997, and the
20-day period for Mr. Sampedro to formulate his final arguments commenced on
10 March 1997.
2.4 In the early hours of 12 January 1998, Ramón Sampedro committed suicide,
with the help of persons unknown. Criminal proceedings were instituted
against the person or persons who may have aided and abetted his death. The
case was dismissed, however, since no person could be identified as
responsible.
2.5 The author of the communication was named as Ramón Sampedro's heir in
his will. On 4 May 1998, she sent a letter to the Constitutional Court,
claiming the right to continue the proceedings brought by the alleged
victim, and reworded the pleadings of the application for amparo. The new
contention was that the Provincial High Court should have acknowledged Mr.
Sampedro's right to have his own doctor supply to him the medication
necessary to help him to die with dignity.
2.6 On 11 November 1998, the Constitutional Court decided to dismiss the
case, and to refuse the author the right to pursue the proceedings. Among
its arguments the Court stated that, although the right of heirs to continue
the proceedings of their deceased relatives in cases of civil protection of
the right to honour, personal and family privacy and image was acknowledged
in the Spanish legal system, in the case of Mr. Sampedro there were no
specific or sufficient legal conditions which justified the author's
continuing the proceedings. The Court also stated that the matter could not
be identified with the rights cited by her, in view of the eminently
personal nature, inextricably linked to the person concerned, of the claimed
right to die with dignity. It further considered that the voluntary act in
question concerned the victim alone and that the appellant's claim had
lapsed from the moment of his death. It went on to point out that this
conclusion was reinforced by the nature of the remedy of amparo, which was
established to remedy specific and effective violations of fundamental
rights.
2.7 On 20 April 1999, the author applied to the European Court of Human
Rights pleading violation of the right to a life of dignity and a dignified
death in respect of Ramón Sampedro, the right to non-interference by the
State in the exercise of his freedom, and his right to equal treatment. The
European Court pronounced the application inadmissible ratione personae, on
the ground that the heir of Ramón Sampedro was not entitled to continue his
complaints. With reference to the alleged excessive duration of the
proceedings, the European Court stated that, even if the author could be
considered a victim, in the circumstances the duration of proceedings had
not been so great as to lead to the conclusion of a clear violation of the
Convention; it accordingly declared the complaint manifestly ill-founded.
THE COMPLAINT
3.1 The author argues that in, considering the intervention of a doctor to
help Mr. Ramón Sampedro to die as an offence, the State party was in breach
of the latter's right to privacy without arbitrary interference, as provided
for in article 17 of the Covenant. The author contends that, as the alleged
victim stated in his book, he requested euthanasia for himself alone and not
for other persons, and that accordingly the interference of the State in his
decision was unjustified.
3.2 The author contends that the State's "criminal interference" in Ramón
Sampedro's decision constituted a violation of his right not to be subjected
to inhuman or degrading treatment, as provided for in article 7 of the
Covenant; the tetraplegia from which he suffered had considerable
repercussions on his daily life as he was never able to get up. He required
the assistance of other persons in order to eat, dress himself and attend to
all his needs, including the most intimate; and the lack of mobility to
which circumstances condemned him entailed accumulated and unbearable
suffering for him. The author contends that, although in this case the
suffering was not caused directly by the voluntary intervention of a State
agent, the conduct of the State organs was not neutral, since a criminal
provision prevented Mr. Sampedro from ending his life with the assistance
that was essential in order to enable him to achieve his purpose. The author
stresses that the situation created by the State party's legislation
constituted ill-treatment for Ramón Sampedro and caused him to lead a
degrading life.
3.3 The author asserts that there has been a violation of article 6 of the
Covenant, arguing that life as protected by the Covenant refers not only to
biological life, under any circumstances, but to a life of dignity, in
contrast to the humiliating situation Mr. Sampedro suffered for over 29
years. She maintains that the right to life does not mean the obligation to
bear torment indefinitely, and that the pain suffered by Ramón Sampedro was
incompatible with the notion of human dignity.
3.4 The author maintains that article 18, paragraph 1, of the Covenant has
been violated, and asserts that Ramón Sampedro's decision was based on
freedom of thought and conscience and the right to manifest his personal
beliefs through practices or deeds. She claims that Mr. Sampedro was reduced
to "enslavement to a morality he did not share, imposed by the power of the
State, and forced to exist in a state of constant suffering".
3.5 The author maintains that article 9 of the Covenant has been violated in
that the liberty of the individual may only be restricted if the law
establishes such restrictions and only when they constitute necessary means
of protecting public security, order, health or morals or the rights or
fundamental freedoms of others. She asserts that State interference in Mr.
Sampedro's decision cannot be equated with any of these hypotheses, and
furthermore, the right to freedom must be envisaged as the right to do
anything that does not impair the rights of others; the alleged victim
requested euthanasia only for himself and not for others, for which reason
the interference of the State in his decision was unjustified.
3.6 The author maintains that the right to equal protection of the law as
set out in article 2, paragraph 1, and in article 26 of the Covenant has
been violated. In her opinion, it is paradoxical that the State should
respect the decision of a person committing suicide but not that of disabled
persons. She argues that any self-sufficient person who is mobile and
experiences extreme suffering is able to commit suicide and will not be
prosecuted if he does not succeed, unlike a person whose range of action is
severely restricted, as in the case of Ramón Sampedro, who was reduced to
complete immobility and could not be assisted, on pain of criminal
prosecution. In the author's opinion, this constitutes discrimination
vis-à-vis the law. She considers that the State, as the embodiment of the
community, has the obligation to be understanding and to act humanely with a
sick person who does not wish to live, and must not punish any person who
assists him in carrying out his determination to die; otherwise, it incurs
the risk of an unjust difference of treatment with regard to a person who is
capable of action and wishes to die.
3.7 The author states that article 14 of the Covenant was violated because
the Constitutional Court refused to acknowledge her legitimacy in the
proceedings regarding Mr. Sampedro. She claims compensation from the State
for the violations of the Covenant perpetrated against Mr. Sampedro when he
was alive.
THE STATE PARTY'S OBSERVATIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND THE MERITS
4.1 The State party, in its written submission dated 2 January 2002,
maintains that the communication is inadmissible under article 5, paragraph
2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, on the ground that the communication
submitted to the Committee on this occasion concerns exactly the same matter
as was submitted by the same person to the European Court of Human Rights.
It adds that the inadmissibility decision by the European Court in this
matter was not a mere formality, but was reached after a genuine examination
of the merits, since the Court examined the nature of the right claimed by
Mr. Sampedro when he was alive, i.e. the right to assisted suicide without
criminal repercussions.
4.2 According to the State party, the author of the communication wishes the
Committee to review the decision on the merits previously adopted by another
international body, and to find, contrary to the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, that "the right to die with dignity" or "assisted
suicide without criminal repercussions" requested by Mr. Sampedro before his
voluntary death is not an eminently personal or non-transferable right. It
adds that the Spanish Constitutional Court was unable to take a decision on
the matter because of the voluntary death of Mr. Sampedro, which caused the
abatement of the amparo proceedings.
4.3 The State party recalls that Ramón Sampedro's heir has expressly
asserted that he "died with dignity", that no one has been or is currently
being prosecuted or charged for assisting him to commit suicide, and that
the criminal proceedings initiated have been dismissed. In the State party's
view, the author's complaint is pointless since it is neither legally nor
scientifically possible to recognize a dead person's right to die.
4.4 In its observations dated 13 April 2002, the State party maintains that
the author is exercising an actio popularis by claiming that the so-called
right "to die with dignity" should be pronounced in respect not of herself
but of a deceased person. It adds that the author's claims distort the
rights recognized in the Covenant. It affirms that, according to the
judgement of the European Court in the Pretty v. United Kingdom case, [FN1]
the right to life could not, without a distortion of language, be
interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely, a right
to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a
public authority.
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[FN1] Judgement 2346/02 of 29 April 2002.
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THE AUTHOR'S COMMENTS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND THE MERITS
5.1 In her written statement dated 11 July 2002, the author maintains that
the European Court did not examine the merits of the case but, on the
contrary, emphasized that the prime complaint concerning the State's
interference in Ramón Sampedro's decision to die in peace was not examined,
since it considered that his heir and sister-in-law was exercising an actio
popularis. For that reason, it refused her the right to pursue the action,
considering the complaint incompatible ratione personae.
5.2 The author is of the opinion that the European Court only examined the
merits of the case in respect of the complaint concerning the undue length
of the proceedings; with regard to her other arguments, she observes that,
according to the Committee's jurisprudence, [FN2] a matter declared
inadmissible by the European Court on grounds of form is not a matter
"examined" within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional
Protocol. She adds that the European Court further did not examine the
complaint concerning the right to freedom.
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[FN2] She quotes communications Nos. 808/1998, Georg Rogl v. Germany, and
716/1996, Dietmar Pauger v. Germany.
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5.3 The author asserts that she is not exercising an actio popularis since
she is the successor of the victim who died without reparation or response
as to the merits of his case. She adds that she was denied the right to
continue the case initiated by Ramón Sampedro during his lifetime by an
arbitrary decision of the Constitutional Court.
5.4 The author maintains that article 9, paragraph 7, of the Civil Procedure
Act permits, without exceptions, the continuation of proceedings on the
death of the complainant if the heir comes to court with a new power of
attorney, as happened in her case. Under article 661 of the Civil Code, "the
heirs succeed the deceased solely as a result of his death in respect of all
his rights and obligations".
5.5 Article 4 of Organization Act No. 1/1982 clearly states: "The exercise
of actions for the civil protection of the honour, privacy or image of the
deceased is incumbent on the person who has been designated by him for that
purpose in his will". In the case of Mr. Sampedro, a violation of the right
of privacy, in relation to his private life, has been argued.
5.6 The author asserts that the Constitutional Court is applying unequal
jurisprudence as regards the authorization of the continuation mortis causa
of her status as complainant, since while she as heir of Ramón Sampedro was
denied continuity, in judgement No. 116/2001 of 21 May 2001 the same chamber
of the Court granted procedural continuity to the heir of a complainant who
died during proceedings concerning an appeal against a measure providing for
suspension of union militancy. The chamber handed down the decision in this
regard despite the "eminently personal" nature of the case.
5.7 The author points out that the Committee has accepted the continuation
of the proceedings by the heir of a complainant who died in the course of
the proceedings, even during the phase prior to the consideration of the
complaint by the Committee itself. [FN3] With reference to the decision in
the Pretty v. United Kingdom case, referred to by the State party, the
author points out that what Sampedro was asking for was not a positive
measure on the part of the State, but that it should abstain from action and
allow matters to take their course, in other words, not interfere in his
decision to die.
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[FN3] Communications Nos. 164/1984, Croess v. Netherlands, and 774/1997,
Brok v. Czech Republic. Also cited is the jurisprudence of the Committee
against Torture in case No. 14/1994, M'Barek Ben v. Tunisia.
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5.8 The author contends that Ramón Sampedro died without acknowledgement of
the fact that his claim to die with dignity was backed by a human right. In
her view, these constitute sufficient grounds to permit his heir to continue
the case. She adds that she was not granted any compensation for the
suffering she had to bear.
5.9 The author makes reference to a judgement by the Constitutional Court of
Colombia in 1997, concerning euthanasia, which stated that article 326 of
the Colombian Criminal Code, which refers to compassionate homicide, did not
criminally implicate the doctor who assisted terminally-ill persons to die
if the free will of the passive subject of the act was exercised. That Court
linked the prohibition of the punishment of assisted suicide to the
fundamental right to a life of dignity and to protection of the independence
of the individual. [FN4] The author asserts that the law makes progress
through the search for a just and peaceful order, and that to assist someone
suffering from an incurable and painful illness to die is a normal reaction
of solidarity and compassion innate in human beings.
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[FN4] Judgement of 20 May 1997. Action for constitutional review brought by
José Eurípides Parra Parra.
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5.10 She asserts that the State party indirectly obliged Ramón Sampedro to
experience the suffering entailed by immobility. A constitutional State
should not be permitted to impose that burden on a disabled person, and
subordinate his existence to the convictions of others. In her opinion, the
interference of the State in Ramón Sampedro's right to die is incompatible
with the Covenant, which in its preamble states that all the rights
recognized in it derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.
5.11 As regards the alleged violation of the right not to be subjected to
arbitrary interference provided for in article 17, the author asserts that,
even in the Pretty case, the European Court acknowledged that the State's
"criminal law prohibition" concerning the decision to die of a disabled
person experiencing incurable suffering constituted interference in that
person's privacy. Although the European Court had added that such
interference is justified "for the protection of the rights of others", this
argument is in her view meaningless since no harm is done to anyone and even
the family tries to assist the person taking the decision to die.
5.12 In written submissions dated 22 January and 20 March 2003, the author
maintains that, contrary to the assertions of the State party, Mr. Sampedro
was not able to die as he wished and that his death was neither peaceful,
gentle nor painless. Rather, it was distressing since he had had to resort
to potassium cyanide.
ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
6.2 Although the State party appears to assert that the communication is
inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol because the author is
not a � victim � in the meaning of that provision, the Committee notes that
the author seeks to act on behalf of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán, who
according to the author was a victim of a violation of the Covenant in that
the authorities of the State party refused to allow his assisted suicide by
granting protection from prosecution, to the doctor who would assist him in
committing suicide. The Committee considers that the claims presented on
behalf of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán, had become moot prior to the submission
of the communication, by the decision of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán to
commit, on 12 January 1998, suicide with the assistance of others, and the
decision of the authorities not to pursue proceeding against those involved.
Consequently, the Committee considers that at the time of submission on 28
March 2001, Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán could not be considered a victim of an
alleged violation of his rights under the Covenant in the meaning of article
1 of the Optional Protocol. Consequently, his claims are inadmissible under
this provision.
6.3 As to the author's claim that her rights under article 14 of the
Covenant were violated by the denial of her right to continue the procedures
initiated by Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán before the Constitutional Court, the
Committee considers that the author not having been a party to the original
amparo proceedings before the Constitutional Court, has not sufficiently
substantiated for the purposes of admissibility the existing of a violation
of article 14, paragraph 1 of the Covenant. Consequently, this part of the
communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.4 In the light of the conclusions reached above, the Committee need not
address the State party's arguments related to article 5, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Optional Protocol and the possible application of the State party's
reservation to that provision.
7. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 1 and 2 of the
Optional Protocol;
(b) That this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the
author of the communication.
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[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the Spanish text being the original
version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as
part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.] |
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