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1. The author of the
communication is Lal Seerattan, a Trinidadian citizen currently detained at
the State Prison in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. He claims to be a
victim of violations by Trinidad and Tobago of article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He is represented by
counsel.
The facts as submitted by the author
2.1 The author states that, on 27 December 1982, he was arrested and taken
into custody in connection with the murder, on 26 December 1982, of one
Motie Ramoutar; on 28 December 1982, he was charged with the murder. The
author further states that, on 29 August 1983, after the preliminary hearing
which lasted eight months, the murder charge was reduced to manslaughter by
the Examining Magistrate, and that he was released on bail. On 18 September
1984, he was re-arrested on a murder charge. [FN1] He was tried in the High
Court of Port of Spain between 9 and 11 March 1986, was found guilty as
charged and sentenced to death.
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All persons handling this document are requested to respect and observe its
confidential nature.
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2.2 The prosecution relied mainly on evidence given by the son and the wife
of the deceased. The deceased's son testified that when he and his parents
returned home at about 7 p.m. on 26 December 1982, his father's employee,
one B., was standing in front of the author's house; he was apparently drunk
and shouting threats at the author and his family. When his father sought to
pacify Mr. B., the author's wife came out and told his father that he was
responsible for B.'s misbehaviour. The deceased's son further testified that
he then saw the author running out of the house, holding a harpoon-like
piece of iron, and chasing his father, whose escape was blocked by a fence.
The author stabbed his father several times and then ran away. His evidence
was in essence corroborated by his
2.3 The pathologist testified that the injuries of which the deceased died
could have been inflicted with the weapon that had been described by the
eye-witnesses.
2.4 The author gave sworn testimony and indicated that he was relying on a
cautioned statement which he had given to the police on 27 December 1982. In
that statement the author had said that B. and one J. (who had also been
present at the locus in quo) had thrown stones at his house, that B. had
threatened him, and that he had asked the deceased to take B. home. The
deceased had then tried to pacify B.. When B. and the deceased had started
to fight, he and his family had left and had spent the night at the house of
one S. P.. He further testified that relations between himself and the
deceased and his family had always been cordial.
2.5 The author's wife, who testified on his behalf, gave a different version
of the incident. She stated that B. and the deceased had insulted her, and
that the deceased and his family had thrown stones, after which she and her
husband had left. She denied that her husband had been out in the street
that night, as she had said in her earlier statement to the police. In light
of her evidence, the judge also put the issue to provocation to the jury.
Another witness appeared on the author's behalf, but his testimony was of no
particular significance to the case, as he had only heard the noise outside
and could not say who were the persons involved.
2.6 The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the author's appeal
on 9 March 1987. His petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed on 26 May 1988. On 3 December
1992, a warrant for the execution of the author on 8 December 1992 was
issued. On 7 December 1992, attorneys in Trinidad and Tobago filed a
constitutional motion on behalf of the author, mainly on the ground that
executing the author after such prolonged delay would violate his
constitutional rights. The author was given a stay of execution pending the
outcome of a constitutional motion in another case which concerned the same
issue.
2.7 On 4 January 1994, the author was informed that his death sentence had
been commuted to life imprisonment by order of the President of Trinidad and
Tobago, as a result of the findings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in the case of Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. the Attorney-General of
Jamaica. [FN2]
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Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 1993, judgement delivered on 2 November 1993.
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The complaint
3.1 The author claims that his attorney did not represent him adequately and
that, as a result, his trial was unfair. [FN3] He states that he had wanted
to admit the crime and defend himself by invoking legitimate self-defence on
account of three full years of provocation that preceded the crime in which
the deceased and his family had, among other things, beaten his daughter. He
points out that, by pleading guilty to manslaughter at the preliminary
hearing, he had already admitted the crime but that at the trial his
attorney "took him off the scene" by basing the defence on alibi. He
complains that his attorney never challenged the absence of forensic
evidence before the High Court, that he did not verify what his wife had
previously said to the police, and that he did not raise any objections
against the absence of the photographer (who had taken pictures of the locus
in quo). [FN4] The author further complains that his attorney simply
abandoned the appeal, as he did not argue any grounds of appeal on his
behalf. [FN5] In this context, the author adds that despite this, "he (the
attorney) still had the guts to tell the chief Justice that I am already in
prison and if he (the chief Justice) could give me a five years prison term
because my case was really one of provocation."
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The author was represented by the same attorney at all stages of the
judicial proceedings against him, i.e. preliminary hearing, trial and appeal
to the Court of Appeal.
[FN4] It appears from the Notes of Evidence of the trial that the
photographer had left the country and that the author's attorney made an
application to visit the locus in quo. The prosecution objected because the
author's house had burned down after the incident. The application was then
withdrawn.
[FN5] It appears from the written judgement of the Court of Appeal that the
attorney admitted before the Court of Appeal that, having examined the
evidence in the case as well as the judge's summing-up to the jury, he could
find no ground to argue on his client's behalf. The Court of Appeal agreed
with the attorney, but stated that: "for the record we should deal briefly
with the facts of the case".
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3.2 Counsel, in his reply dated 25 September 1991 to a request for
clarifications from the Committee's Special Rapporteur for New
Communications, submits that there are several factors in the author's case
which give reason to believe that he did not receive a fair trial. With
regard to the absence of scientific evidence at the trial, counsel concedes
that it is open for the defence to comment on the absence of such evidence
in order to undermine the prosecution case, but that the defence would
normally not demand that it be produced. The absence of scientific or other
evidence was however of particular importance in the author's case, since
the prosecution's case rested entirely upon the identification of the author
by the deceased's son and wife in conditions of partial darkness and when
one of those witnesses (namely the wife of the deceased) had poor eyesight
and was not wearing her glasses. Furthermore, given the witnesses' close
relationship to the deceased and the history of bad relations between the
two families, there was ample reason to question the reliability of the
witnesses. Counsel further submits that in these circumstances the judge
ought to have warned the jury to be cautious. Instead, the judge said: "I do
not think [...] that you would have any difficulty in the identification of
the people involved." According to counsel, this amounted to a misdirection
which resulted in an unfair trial. In this context, reference is made to the
petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, which was based on the issue of identification.
3.3 Counsel further points out that crucial witnesses in the case, like B.,
J. and S.P., were not called to court to testify, and that there was a delay
of more than three years between the author's arrest and the trial. He
submits that such a delay is particularly undesirable in cases in which
identification by witnesses is the main issue. The above is said to amount
to violations of article 14 of the Covenant.
The State party's information and observations
4. By submission of 10 September 1993, the State party confirms that the
author has exhausted all domestic remedies in his criminal case.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
5.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
5.2 The Committee notes that the State party does not object to the
admissibility of the communication. Nevertheless, it is the Committee's duty
to ascertain whether all the admissibility criteria laid down in the
Optional Protocol have been met.
5.3 The Committee notes that part of the author's allegations relates to the
evaluation of evidence and to the instructions given by the judge to the
jury. The Committee reiterates that it is in principle for the appellate
courts of States parties to the Covenant, and not for the Committee, to
evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case. Similarly, it is not for
the Committee to review specific instructions to the jury by the judge,
unless it can be ascertained that the instructions to the jury were clearly
arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly
violated his obligation of impartiality. The material before the Committee
does not show that the trial judge's instructions or the conduct of the
trial suffered from such defects. This part of the communication is
therefore inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
5.4 On the basis of the material before the Committee, there is nothing to
support the author's contention that he was not adequately represented
during the trial and on appeal. In particular, the Committee notes that,
during the trial, the author himself chose to rely on the statement he had
given to the police, and in which he himself, on 27 December 1982, raised an
alibi defence. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the author himself
testified in court that "the relationship with the Ramoutar family was a
friendly one", and that as far as he knew there was no friction between his
and the deceased's family. In the circumstances, the author cannot blame the
attorney for not having based the defence on provocation. In this respect,
therefore, the author has no claim within the meaning of article 2 of the
Optional protocol.
5.5 The Committee further considers that counsel failed to substantiate, for
purposes of admissibility, that the author's trial was unfair because
crucial witnesses in the case were not called to testify in court. This part
of the communication is therefore also inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
5.6 The Committee notes that the author was initially arrested on 27
December 1982, released on bail on 29 August 1983, re-arrested on 18
September 1984 and convicted on 11 March 1986. Given the particular
circumstances related to the pursuit of judicial proceedings against Mr.
Seerattan, the Committee considers that an issue might arise under article
14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant; this should be considered on the
merits.
6. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) that the communication is admissible in as much as it appears to raise
issues under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant.
(b) that, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional
Protocol, the State party shall be requested to submit to the Committee,
within six months of the date of transmittal to it of this decision, written
explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the measures, if any,
that may have been taken by it;
(c) that any explanations or statements received from the State party shall
be communicated by the Secretary-General under rule 93, paragraph 3, of the
rules of procedure to the author and to his counsel, with the request that
any comments which they may wish to make should reach the Human Rights
Committee, in care of the Centre for Human Rights, United Nations Office in
Geneva, within six weeks of the date of the transmittal;
(d) that this decision shall be communicated to the State party, to the
author and to his counsel. |
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