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Full Name: ADAM R. DAMIRI
Place of Birth: Jakarta
Age/ Date of Birth: 54 years/ 20th of November 1949
Sex: Male
Nationality: Indonesian
Address: Komplek MABES TNI, Jati Karya,
(Bekasi)
Religion: Islam
Occupation: Member of TNI-AD
(The Indonesian Army)
Rank/NRP (Soldier's Registration
Number: Major General of the TNI-AD
NRP 25109
Post: Asops Kasum TNI/ Former
PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA
(Military Territorial Commander)
Education: AKABRI Darat (the Indonesian Armed
Forces Academy- the Army)
The Defendant has never been detained;
The Defendant was defended by the Team of Attorneys: HOTMA SITOMPUL, SH, and
associates, on the 10th of July 2002, and the Team of Ad vocation for TNI
Officers and the Team of Ad vocation for POLRI (the Indonesian Police)
Officers; Col. TNI. CHK. AD. SETIAWAN, SH., MBA., and associates, on the 8th
of July, 2002;
The Human-Rights Ad. Hoc Court:
After reading the dossiers related to the case;
After reading the Decision of the Head of the Central Jakarta Human-Rights
Court , No. 09/PID.HAM/AD. HOC/2002/PH.JKT.PST, dated on the 2nd of July
2002, on the appointment of the Panel of Judges to preside and rule over the
case;
After reading the Decision of the Head of the Panel of Judges No. 09/PID.HAM/AD.HOC/2002/PH.JKT.PST,
dated the 4th of July 2002, on the settlement of court hearing sessions;
After listening to the reading of the Indictment (Surat Dakwaan) by the Ad.
Hoc Public Prosecutor, Case Registration Number: 09/HAM/TIM-TIM/07/2002,
dated the 1st of July 2002;
After listening to the reading of the Objections (Surat Keberatan) by the
Attorneys of the Defendant, on the 17th of July 2003;
After listening to the reading of the Replies (Surat Tanggapan) of the Ad.
Hoc Public Prosecutor, dated on the 24th of July 2003;
After reading the Intermediate Decision (Putusan Sela) No. 09/PID.HAM/
AD.HOC/2002/PH.JKT.PST, of the Panel of Judges in the court hearing on the
31st of July 2002, in the order as follows:
1. Declaring the Objections of the Team of Attorneys of the Defendant could
not be accepted.
2. Declaring the Indictment of the Public Prosecutors of the Ad. Hoc Court
read on the 10th of July 2002, has met the requirements and therefore has
been accepted as the source of the examination of the case;
3. Declaring the Human-Rights Ad. Hoc Court to continue the examination of
the case of the Defendant, ADAM R. DAMIRI;
After hearing:
The Criminal Indictment of the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, read on the 5th of
June 2003 with the order of Indictment as follows:
C H A R G E S
The Panel of Judges of the Human-Rights Ad. Hoc Court at the Central Jakarta
Human-Rights Court presided and ruled over the case, to decide:
1. Declaring the Defendant ADAM R. DAMIRI has not been proven guilty of
committing Grave Human Rights violations as stated in the First and Second
Indictments (Vrijspraak);
2. Declaring the evidence in the form of sharp weapons and homemade firearms
to be destroyed;
3. Letters in the form of photo-copies and video-cassettes to be presented
as evidence for other cases (reserved at the Secretariat of Human Rights
Task Force of RI Attorney General Office);
4. Impose the financial charge of the court to the state;
Considering, after hearing the Plea of the Defendant read before the court
pleading the panel of Judges to decide the charges indicted on the Defendant
have not been legally and convincingly proven, therefore to free the
Defendant of all charges, and after hearing the Plea of the Team of
Attorneys of the Defendant, thoroughly explained in the Defense (Pleidoi)
read on the 1st of July 2003 which mainly stated that the Panel of Judges to
decide:
1. Declaring the Defendant has NOT been legally and convincingly proven
guilty based on the law, of committing criminal acts of Grave Human Rights
Violations as charged in the Indictment of the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutors;
2. Declaring, therefore FREE the Defendant of all charges indicted by the Ad.
Hoc Public Prosecutor;
3. Restoring the honor, rights and dignity of the Defendant to the rightful
status prior to the case;
4. Imposing the financial charges of the court to the state;
Considering, in accordance with the Indictment of the Ad Hoc Public
Prosecutor dated on the 1st of July 2002, Case Registration Number: 09/HAM/TIM-TIM/07/2002,
the Defendant has been charged with indictments as follows:
FIRST:
That the Defendant ADAM R. DAMIRI as the Military Territorial Commander (PANGDAM)
IX/ UDAYANA assigned since the15th of June 1998 until the 27th of November
1999, during the unconfirmed days and dates between April 1999 and September
1999, at the Military Territorial Command Headquarters (KODAM) IX/ UDAYANA
in Denpasar, Bali, or at least, in a place within the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Indonesia, in which the Human-Rights Ad. Hoc Court at the
Central Jakarta District Court has been authorized to preside and rule over
the case of the Defendant, based on the article 2, of the Presidential
Decree {KEPPES (sic!)}No. 96 of the year 2001 dated the 1st of August 2001
on the Change/Amendment of the RI Presidential Decree No. 53 of the year
2001 on the establishment of the Human Rights Ad. Hoc Court at the Central
Jakarta District Court. That the Defendant as the Military Commander or the
one who effectively acted as the Military Commander, knew, or based on the
condition of the time, should have known; that the troops under his
effective command and control, had been committing or just committed grave
Human Rights violations, in the form of murders, as part of the spreading
and systematic attacks directly aimed at civilians, as the result of the
lack of adequate control, while the Defendant did no adequate and necessary
actions within his power to prevent or to stop the crime, nor hand over the
perpetrators to the authorized officials for examinations, investigations
and prosecutions of the crimes committed by the Defendant in ways as follows:
I. That the Defendant as the PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA, who had duty and authority,
among others:
a. As the Commander in Chief:
- Maintain and improve disciplines, regulation and order, of all the
soldiers under his commands.
- Maintain and improve the technical skills of the soldiers.
- Improve the welfare of the soldiers and their families.
b. As the Commander in Chief of Operations:
- Organize security operations within his area of jurisdiction.
- Organize and carry out duties in the Garrison (Garnisun).
- Lead and coordinate MUSPIDA (the Local Community Leaders) under his
jurisdiction.
- Control the management of territorial establishment.
That as the PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA, the Defendant ADAM R. DAMIRI, supervised
several Military Post Command (KOREM), including; KOREM 164 Wira Dharma,
East Timor.
While KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, East Timor, supervised 13 Military District
Command (KODIM), including:
- KODIM Liquisa;
- KODIM Dili;
- KODIM Covalima
II. On the 6th of April 1999, in Liquisa, the Pro-Integration's Merah Putih
(Red and White) Group led by Manuel Sausa and Jose Affat, carrying sharp
weapons and firearms, joined in by about 100 (one hundred) members of TNI
soldiers, made the attacks against civilian refugees sheltering at Liquisa
Church and the residence of Pastor (Father) Rafael Dos Santos. Among the TNI
members who joined in the attacks include:
1. JOSE MATHEUS
2. TOME DIEGO
3. ABILIO ALVES
4. CARLOS (DANRAMIL/Military District Commander of Maubara)
5. ANTONIO GOMES
6. ISAK DOS SANTOS
7. GEORGE VIEGAS
8. MAURISIO
9. JEFERINO
10. ZACARIAS
11. MANUEL MARTINS
12. JACOB
The result of the attacks was that more or less than 22 (twenty two)
civilians died, including:
1. JACINTO DA COSTA
2. AGUSTINHO
3. JOAMICO
4. ABRAO DAS SANTOS
5. AGUSTO MOUZINHO
6. AMEKO DAS SANTOS
7. NARSIZO
8. HERMINO DAS SANTOS
9. FERNANDO DAS SANTOS
10. LAURINDO DAS PEREIRA
11. MERIKI DAS SANTOS
12. MANUEL LISBRA
13. VICTOR DA COSTA
14. ALBERTO OLIVEIRA
15. AMANDIO CESAR DAS SANTOS
16. CESAR DAS SANTOS
17. JHONY MAU SAKO
18. LAURINDA DAS SANTOS
19. AGUSTINO DAS SANTOS
20. SANTIAGO
21. The Grave of an anonymous Victim of Liquisa incident, at Maubara
cemetery.
22. The Grave of an anonymous Victim of Liquisa incident, at Maubara
cemetery.
III. On Saturday, the 17th of April 1999, AITARAK and the Pro-Integration
Group organized a big rally in front of the East Timor Governor Office,
attended by East Timor Governor Abilio Jose Osiorio Soares, Dominggus Soares,
Mathius Mai, Jose Da Silva, Tavares as the Commander of PPI, and Eurico
Guterres as the representative of PPI and the second speaker, who, through
live-broadcast on Dili radio, delivered, among others, "commandoes," such as
follows:
- All CNRT leaders should be exterminated/ killed
- Pro-Independence people should be killed
- Kill Manuel Viegas Carascalao
- Carascalao family should be killed
After the rally ended, they made spreading and systematic attacks, first, on
the residence of Leandro Isaac, after doing abuses and burning properties at
the house of Leandro Isaac, they continued by attacking the house of Manuel
Viegas Carascalao on Jl. Antonio De Carvalho No. 13, Dili, in which Manuel
Viegas Carascalao sheltered refugees from around Dili, including from
Maubara, Liquisa, Turiscal, Alas, and Ainaro, who reached more or less than
136 (one hundred and thirty six) people, the attacks were commited by
Aitarak, the Pro-Integration Militia, and members of TNI troops using
automatic guns, as well as sharp weapons of various kinds. The assailants
include:
1. JOSE MATHEUS
2. THEOFILO DA SILVA
3. ANTONIO BESKAU
4. ANTONIO GOMES
5. MIGUEL
6. DUARTE
7. CARLOS AMARAL
8. BALITZAR
The result of the attacks was that several victims died, including:
1. MARIO MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO (MANELITO)
2. RAUL DAS SANTOS CANCELA
3. ALFONSO RIBERIO
4. RAFAEL DA SILVA
5. ALBERTO DAS SANTOS
6. JOAO DOS SANTOS
7. ANTONIO DOS SOARES
8. AGUSTINO B. X. LAY
9. CRISTANTO DAS SANTOS
10. EDUARDO DE JESUS
11. JUANIRO PEREIRA
12. CESAR DOS SANTOS
IV. - After the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot on the 4th
of September1999, which confirmed the loss of the Pro-Integration party, the
resentment of the Pro-Integration party led to the tortures and murders of
the Pro-Independence people.
- The refugees kept coming to shelter at POLDA (the Provincial Police
Headquarters) in Dili, Dili harbor compound, and other places considered
safe by the refugees.
- The coming refugees could not be differentiated as those from the
Pro-Integration or those from the Pro-Independence, as in the chaotic
situation, the masses crowding the harbor struggled to find their way to
immediately leave East Timor. Moreover, the occurring sound of repeated
gunshots created panic among the refugees crowding the harbor.
- The incident made some refugees run towards Diocese Dili located right in
front of Dili harbor.
On Sunday, the 5th of September 1999, Diocese Dili (the office of Bishop
Bello) was attacked by the masses of the Pro-Integration, started with the
physical clashes when the Pro-Integration Group checked on every youth of
the Pro-Independence trying to leave East Timor by ships through Dili harbor.
The clashes quickly spread along the Kelapa (Coconut) Beach (outside Dili
Harbor) towards the gathering place of the Pro-Independence youth sheltering
at Diocese Dili. The Pro-Integration youth, along with members of TNI troops
coming from various places throughout Dili, made the attacks against the
Pro-Independence youth resulting in the unconfirmed number of victims, an
estimated 20 people died in the incident including a person named NUNU.
5. That on Monday, the 6th September 1999, members of the Pro-Integration
people crowded around Ave Maria Catholic Church, in Suai, joined in by
members of TNI troops, including:
1. Colonel HERMAN SEDIONO (Covalima Regent)
2. Major AHMAD SAMSUDIN (Chief of Staff of KODIM Covalima/ KASDIM)
3. Captain SUGITO (Sub-district Military Commander/DANRAMIL)
4. Second Sergeant AMERICO SERANG, a member of KODIM Covalima
5. Second Sergeant ALARIO PEREIRA, a member of KODIM Covalima
6. Chief Private ALFREDO AMARAL, a member of KODIM Covalima
Made the attacks against the Pro-Independence Group sheltering inside the
Ave Maria Church, Suai, causing more or less than 27 people died, including
3 (three) priests who were;
1. Pastor TARSISIUS DEWANTO
2. Pastor HILARIUS MADEIRA
3. Pastor FRANSISCO SOARES
(According to the reports on the grave excavation and autopsies made by the
Forensic Department of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia/FK.UI
No. TT.3002/SK:II/XI/1999)
6. That the acts of attack resulting in the deaths of several civilians
became part of the spreading and systematic attacks aimed directly at East
Timor civilians, and therefore they were considered as Grave Human Rights
violations.
7. That the Defendant as PANGDAM IX /UDAYANA knew or, based on the situation
at the time, should have known, that some of the TNI members on duty in East
Timor had committed Grave Human Rights violations, but did not try to
prevent or stop the act of attacks or hand over the perpetrators to the
authorized officials for examinations, investigations, and indictments.
The actions of the Defendant have violated the Regulation Article 42
paragraph (1) a and b jis, Article 7 b, Article 9 a, Article 37 Law No. 26
of the year 2000 on Human Rights Court.
SECOND:
That Defendant ADAM R. DAMIRI as the Military Territorial Commander IX/
UDAYANA, who had been assigned since the15th of June 1998 until the 27th
November 1999, in the times and places as mentioned in the FIRST Indictment,
the Defendant who knew, or based on the condition at the time, should have
known, that the troops under his command and control had been committing or
just committed Grave Human Rights violations in East Timor area, which were
considered as crimes against humanity in the form of abuse of a certain
group of people or an organization established on similarities of political
understandings, race, ethnic, culture, religion, sex, or other basis, which
have been universally acknowledged as the acts that violated the
International Law as the result of the lack of adequate control over the
case, while the Defendant did not make adequate and necessary actions within
his power to prevent or stop the crimes, or hand over the perpetrators to
the authorized officials to do the examinations, investigations and
indictments, in which actions, the Defendant had committed in ways as
follows:
1. That the Defendant as the PANGDAM IX/UDAYANA, who had the military power
in East Timor province, had duty and authority, among others:
a. As the Commander in Chief:
1. Maintain and improve discipline, regulation and order, of all the
soldiers under his commands
2. Maintain and improve technical skills of the soldiers
3. Improve the welfare of the soldiers and their families
b. As the Commander in Chief of Operations:
1. Organize security operations in his area of jurisdiction
2. Organize and carry out duties of the Garrison
3. Lead and coordinate MUSPIDA under his jurisdiction
4. Control the management of the territorial establishment
As the PANGDAM IX/UDAYANA, Defendant ADAM R. DAMIRI, supervised several
KOREM, including KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, East Timor.
While KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, East Timor supervised 13 KODIM, including:
5. KODIM Liquisa;
6. KODIM Dili;
7. KODIM Suai;
2. On the 6th of April 1999, in Liquisa, the Pro-Integration Group's Besi
Merah Putih led by Manuel Sausa and Jose Affat, carrying sharp weapons and
firearms, joined in by about 100 (one hundred) members of TNI army, attacked
civilian refugees sheltering in Liquisa Church and the residence of Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos. Among the TNI members who joined in the attacks, include:
1. JOSE MATHEUS
2. TOME DIEGO
3. ABILIO ALVES
4. CARLOS (DANRAMIL of Maubara)
5. ANTONIO GOMES
6. ISAK DOS SANTOS
7. GEORGE VIEGAS
8. MAURISIO
9. JEFERINO
10. ZACARIAS
11. MANUEL MARTINS
12. JACOB
As the result of the attacks, there were injured victims from the tortures,
and on the part of the Pro-Independence, there were as many as 21 (twenty-one)
people wounded, including:
1. FRANSISCO DAS SANTOS
2. JOAO PARERA
3. JOAMICO
4. JOSE RAMOS
5. JOSE NUMES SERRAO
6. LUCAS SOARES
7. MATEUS PANLERO
8. LUCAS DAS SANTOS
9. RICARDO RODRIQUES PEREIRA
10. LAKUMAO
11. JANUARY
12. JOAO DAS SANTOS
13. JOAO KUDA
14. ARMANDO
15. ANTONIO
16. LUIS
17. EMILIO
18. SEBASTIAN
19. RAMERIO
20. MATIUS ALVES COREIRA
21. FELIS
3. On Saturday, the 17th of April 1999, Aitarak and the Pro-Integration
Group organized a big rally in front of the East Timor Governor's Office,
attended by East Timor Governor Abilio Jose Osiorio Soares, Dominggus Soares,
Mathius Mai, Jose Da Silva, Tavares as the Commander of PPI, and Eurico
Guterres as a representative of PPI and the second speaker in the event, who,
through live-broadcast in Dili radio, delivered, among others, "commandoes"
as follows:
1. All CNRT leaders should be exterminated/ killed
2. Pro-Independence people should be killed
3. Kill Manuel Viegas Carascalao
4. Carascalao family should be killed
After the rally ended, they made spreading and systematic attacks, first, at
the residence of Leandro Isaac, and after doing tortures and burning
properties at the residence of Leandro Isaac, they continued to attack the
residence of Manuel Viegas Carascalao on Jl. Antonio De Carvalho No. 13,
Dili, in which Manuel Viegas Carascalao sheltered refugees from around Dili,
including from Maubara, Liquisa, Turiscal , Alas and Ainaro, who reached
more or less than 136 (one hundred and thirty six) people, the attacks
committed by AITARAK, the Pro-Integration troop, joined in by members of TNI
army, using automatic shotguns also sharp weapons of various kinds. Among
those who joined in the attacks, include:
1. JOSE MATHEUS
2. THEOFILO DA SILVA
3. ANTONIO BESKAU
4. ANTONIO GOMES
5. MIGUEL
6. DUARTE
7. CARLOS AMARAL
8. BALTIZAR
As the result of the attacks, there were wounded victims, the tortures by
the Pro-Integration party victimized, among others:
1. VICTOR DOS SANTOS (APIN)
2. ALFREDO SANCHES
3. FLORINDO DE JESUS
4. BETINDO MBOQUEQUE
5. JOAO JUNIOR
6. NIKI
4. - After the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot on the 4th
of September 1999, which resulted in the loss of the Pro-Integration party,
the resentment of the Pro-Integration party led to tortures and murders of
the Pro-Independence people.
- The refugees kept coming to shelter at POLDA Headquarters' compound in
Dili, Dili Harbor compound, and other places considered safe by the refugees.
- The coming refugees could not be differentiated as those from the
Pro-Integration or those from the Pro-Independence, as in the chaotic
situation, the masses crowding the harbor struggled to find their way to
immediately leave East Timor. Moreover, the occurring gunshots had increased
panic among the refugees crowding the harbor.
- That incident made several refugees run towards Diocese Dili located right
in front of the Harbor.
On Sunday, the 5th of September 1999, Diocese Dili (the office of Bishop
BELLO) was under attacks by masses of the Pro-Integration, started with the
physical clashes when the Pro-Integration Group conducted checks on every
youth of the Pro-Independence trying to leave East Timor by ships through
Dili harbor. The clashes quickly spread toward the street alongside Kelapa
Beach (outside Dili harbor), leading to the gathering place of the youth
from the Pro-Independence party sheltering in Diocese Dili. The youth of the
Pro-Integration, joined in by members of TNI troops from throughout Dili led
(sic) to a number of wounded victims, including:
1. LILI, who was about 10 years old
2. NELIO MASQUITA
3. DACOSTA REGO
4. NONATO SOARES
5. JOAO BERNANDINO SOARES
5. On Monday, the 6th of September 1999, there were attacks and burning of
properties at Diocese Dili and the residence of Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes
Bello, SDB, committed by the Pro-Integration Group, joined in by members of
TNI troops, during which time, there were a large number of civilian
refugees sheltering at Diocese Dili and the residence of Bishop Carlos
Felipe Ximenes Bello, SDB.
6. The acts of attacks that led to the killings of civilians were parts of
the spreading and systematic attacks aimed directly at the East Timor
civilians and were considered as Grave Human Rights violations.
7. The Defendant as the PANGDAM IX/UDAYANA knew, or based on the situation
at the time, should have known that some members of TNI on duty in East
Timor had committed Grave Human Rights violations, but did not try to
prevent or stop the attacks, or hand over the perpetrators to the authorized
officials to do the examinations, investigations, and indictments.
The Defendant has violated the regulation Article 42 paragraph (1) a and b
jis, Article 7 b, Article 9 h, Article 40 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000
on Human Rights Court.
Considering, in the effort to prove the indictments, the Ad. Hoc Public
Prosecutor had presented and had shown before the court, the evidence, which
were sharp weapons and homemade firearms, also letters in the form of
photo-copies, and a video-cassette, and visum et repertum (autopsy) reports;
Considering, besides that, the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor had also presented
30 witnesses, including a de charge witnesses, also 6 expert witnesses to
appear in court, whose names were proposed by the Attorneys of the Defendant,
as well as by the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutors, they are namely:
Witness 1 MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO
Witness 2 Lieut. Gen. (Ret.) KIKI SYAHNAKRI
Witness 3 Maj. Gen. ZAKI ANWAR MAKARIM
Witness 4 Lieut. Col. TNI. LILIK KOESHADIYANTO
Witness 5 Col. TNI. M. NOER MUIS
Witness 6 Brig. Gen. TNI. TONO SURATMAN
Witness 7 Gen. TNI. (Ret.) WIRANTO
Witness 8 Lieut. Col. In. ASEP KUSWANI
Witness 9 LEONITO MARTINS
Witness 10 Lieut. Col. In. SOEDJARWO
Witness 11 Col. In. (Ret.) Drs. HERMAN SEDYONO
Witness 12 Maj. In. SUGITO
Witness 13 AKBP. Drs. ADIOS SALOVA
Witness 14 a de Charge BRIPKA Police MAKARAU
Witness 15 a de Charge Maj. In. SALMON MALAVE
Witness 16 a de Charge Police Capt. JOHN REA
Witness 17 a de Charge YAYAT SUDRADJAT
Witness 18 Capt. In. DJOKO WALUYO
Witness 19 RAFAEL DOS SANTOS (his testimony was presented through a
teleconference on 23rd of January 2003)
Witness 20 Asst. to the 1st Lieut. (Peltu) CARLOS AMARAL
Witness 21 Sgt. Maj. TNI. RAYMUNDO DOS SANTOS
Witness 22 Maj. In. HARTONO, former Section Chief (Kasi) of Operations,
KODIM Dili.
Witness 23 Brig. Gen. TNI. WIDYA BAGYA
Witness 24 I KETUT MURTIKA, SH.
Witness 25 Brig. Gen. Drs. G. M. TIMBUL SILAEN
Witness 26 Mgr. CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES BELLO SDB
Witness 27 ABILIO JOSE OSARIO SOARES BAP
Witness 28 AKBP Police Drs. HULMAN GULTOM
Witness 29 Air Force Maj. Gen. (MARSDYA) TNI. (Ret.) TAMTAMA ADI
Witness 30 Lieut. Col. Drs. GATOT SUBIYAKTORO
The Expert Witnesses are as follows:
Witness 1 Dr. A.S.S. TAMBUNAN, SH.
Witness 2 Prof. Dr. MULADI, SH.
Witness 3 Dr. DODI HARYADI
Witness 4 Brig. Gen. TNI. (Ret.) PLT. SIHOMBING, SH. LLM.
Witness 5 Prof. H. A. S. NATABAYA, SH.
Witness 6 SAJIDIMAN SURJOHADIPRODJO
Considering, besides the testimony of the witnesses, the testimony of the
Defendant had been heard before the court.
Considering, the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor had presented witnesses who made
their testimony under oath based on their respective religion, mainly stated
as follows:
Witness 1 MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO
- That the witness was assigned as a member of the East Timor's Provincial
Legislative Council (DPRD TK. I) since 1980 until 1992, from GOLKAR Faction.
- That the incident on the 17th of April 1999, at the witness' residence
happened when at that time, there were 136 refugees coming from several
areas, among others, from Samin, Ainaro and Maubara.
- That they took refuge because they were attacked, some were threatened to
be killed, so they ran away to Dili, as they felt they were safer in Dili;
- That the witness' observation was that they were attacked by Militia,
there were several groups of Militia, but the witness did not know exactly
which groups committed the attacks;
- That at the time, the witness had gone to pick up his wife at the airport,
the witness received a phone call from his son Manelito from home, the
witness received the information through his hand phone that they were
already inside the house;
- That through the radio in his car, the witness heard the ongoing rally in
front of the East Governor Office, in which the witness heard the threats
made by Eurico Guterres, who said: "Kill anyone who refuse Integration. Kill
them all, including the Carascalao family";
- That the voice in the radio was the voice of Eurico Guterres, because the
witness had often listened to Eurico Guterres talking, the witness has
recognized his voice for a long time;
- That upon hearing that the witness' house was under attack, before going
home, the witness went to the residence of DANREM (Military Post Commander)
Tono Suratman, because he was the highest-ranked officer of the Military
authority in the area, in the witness' opinion, DANREM had the obligation to
defend everyone, but DANREM Tono Suratman refused while laughing and mocking,
and at that time, the DANREM was accompanied by Basilio Araujo, the witness
said if he could not give the protection, the witness asked for a weapon to
defend himself;
- After the witness was rejected by DANREM Tono Suratman, the witness
decided to go home to observe the situation, on the way to the witness'
house, near the Traffic Office, the witness saw an Officer stood by the
sidewalk, and 2 (two) Police Trucks, the witness then asked for help to the
officer and the police, but they said nothing nor made comments;
- That when the witness continued his trip to the witness' house, and passed
by the Bishop's residence, the children gathering at the Bishop's residence
invited the witness into the Bishop's house and the witness was told not to
go into his house because the people in the witness' house were all killed
by the Militia;
- That about 3 or 4 days the witness took shelter at POLDA, and when the
witness went home, the witness saw all were destroyed, there were no more
properties that could be secured, all the valuables were all looted;
- That the witness saw there were blood marks on the walls, also outside the
house in the front yard and there were bullet holes on the walls;
- That the distance between the witness' house and the Governor's Office
where the big rally took place, was about 500 meters;
- That based on the testimony of the people who were attacked, there were
assailants who were not East Timor people, they looked like the Military,
there were the Military in the Militia;
- That the dead casualties were more than 10 people, the witness did not
know where they were buried, they were usually thrown into the sea or buried
in mass burials;
- That the refugees had stayed in the witness' house for over a month, the
witness often met people on the streets who seemed to have no food nor
shelters, so the witness said that rather than living on the street, it was
better to stay at the witness' house for he had a rather large backyard;
- That to accommodate the refugees, the people and also Indonesians in Dili
had come distributing food, but they never said from whom;
- That during the incident the witness left his house at around 11 o'clock
in the morning, besides the refugees who stayed in the house, there were the
witness' son, aunt, grandchild, friends, Javanese, his son's school friends;
international and Indonesian journalists, and the attacks led to the death
of his son Manelito Carascalao;
- That in the witness' house, there were so many blood marks; in the study,
in the dining room, in the bed rooms, in the living room, on the walls, on
the floors, all over the place;
- That the condition of his son; his body had so many holes, his throat was
severely cut almost completely, there were bullet wounds, trace of machete
wounds in the legs, cuts and bruises all over his face, his body was handed
over by the police to the witness, 4 days after the attack;
- That there were 136 refugees taking shelter at the witness' house, and
after the attack, there were only around 60 people who survived;
- That the Militia was established by KOPASSUS (the Army Special Force), the
witness did not know who were the people, who gave money to the Militia, in
the witness' opinion, they could be KOPASSUS or the government;
- That Carlos Pereira was the witness' nephew who joined the Militia, and as
the uncle, the witness never got in touch with him again;
- That the witness mentioned that the Militia was supported by the Military,
because without such support from the Military, the Militia would not be
capable of doing anything, that the Militia was established, in the witness'
opinion, to force or put pressures on people to accept Integration, but
failed because they used violence;
- That there were Militia from CNRT or FALINTIL, but it was more likely that
they were from FALINTIL, as the Militia members were former FALINTIL;
- That the Militia's ideology was enforcing Integration, the witness was
ready to settle it through peaceful referendum, when KOPASSUS had not made
the moves of violence, people were ready to accept Integration, as if
normally observed, livelihood in Indonesia was not difficult;
- That the Militia's activities were financed by KOPASSUS or officials who
worked together with them such as the Governor, the Mayor, the Regent and so
on. After United Nation's troops entered East Timor, there had been proves
that Rp 1,988,000,000,- was withdrawn and signed by Dili Mayor's wife for
social activities, while there were no such activities anymore;
- That many people of the Pro-Integration never approved of the use of
violence, they proposed that referendum be conducted in peaceful ways, at
the time, they were almost successful, but when KOPASSUS started their works,
they failed, then many of them retreated;
- What caused the witness to change from a Pro-Integration to that of
Pro-Referendum, were the witness' experience since 1975, the witness joined
the Pro-Integration movement because so many FRETILIN people were killed,
and the witness was against such murders. In Bacau, the witness saw a member
of the Military killed a woman just for her earrings, then when the witness
and one of his friends stated their objections, his friend was sent to
Kupang, and was detained;
- That during the big rally in front of the governor's office, there were no
people of Pro-Independence who attended, in the witness opinion, if there
were people of the Pro-Independence, they would have been killed;
- That the witness heard in the radio that Eurico Guterres delivered his
speech at the East Timor Governor office's front yard, telling people to
kill anyone who refused Integration, Mario Carascalao and Manuel Carascalao
should all be killed;
- That before the witness joined TNI to fight for Integration, the witness
was a Pro-Independence, but changed because there were Pro-Independence
people who used violence like KOPASSUS who did the unreasonable killings the
witness could not be approve of. That the witness saw that after KOPASSUS
came into East Timor, they conducted the same violence, the witness could
not accept that his relatives and son were brutally murdered;
- That the witness did not know the members of TNI, namely; Theovillo Da
Silva, Antonio Bescau, Antonio Gomes, Miquel, Duaerte, Carlos Amaral,
Baltisar;
- That the witness said that Tono Suratman was a murderer, the witness
considered Tono Suratman a murderer, but did not mean that he had killed
people, Tono Suratman allowed people to do the killings;
- That the witness had been invited to East Timor POLDA to meet the
Defendant in relation to the attacks on the witness' house;
Witness 2 Lieut. Gen. TNI Ret. KIKI SYAHNAKRI
- That the witness had become the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority in East Timor since the 9th through the 27th of September 1999;
- That the witness as the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority and
the Defendant/ PANGDAM UDAYANA had coordinative relationship because at the
time, PANGDAM UDAYANA established a Command Post (Posko) in Kupang for a
close coordination over the refugee matters;
- That the basis of the establishment of the Military Emergency, was a
Presidential Decree (KEPPRES) on the 6th of September 1999, and the witness
was appointed as the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority based on
the Law No. 23 of the year 1959, in East Timor, during the time when the
local government could not function, during mass disturbances, or during
events that threaten the country's sovereignty, in which the state of the
Military Emergency should be implemented;
- That the incident on the 6th of April 1999, when a riot occurred in
Liquisa, the official statement of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma said the number of
victims was 5 (five), then Bishop Bello said the number of victims was 25,
due to this different information, TNI Commander sent a team to East Timor
to reconfirm the correct number of casualties, and Inspector Gen. TNI.
MARSDA (Lieutenant General in the Air Force) Tamtama Adi was appointed chief
of the team sent to East Timor;
- That it is true that East Timor had been the spotlight of the world, so
every incident, especially when there had been dead casualties, would be
widely concerned and become the spotlight of the world;
- That after becoming the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, the
witness' duty was to stop the violence there, then develop conducive
condition to continue the process of People's Consultation/ Ballot, the
witness should design, in accordance with the operational concept, the
demarcation line on the highway between Dili and East Same to separate the
Pro-Independence and the Pro-Integration Group, but this concept of solution
had never been completed because on the 14th of September 1999, United
Nations (UN) had already issued the UN Security Council's Resolution No.
1264, which authorized the Multinational Forces to be assigned in East Timor;
- That to reduce the level of violence, the witness made 3 (three) concepts
of approach; the first was the persuasive approach, the witness called both
parties, the witness contacted FALINTIL sheltering at Dare, the uphill side
of Dilli which was in the control of the Pro-Integration, the witness also
provided rice for the Pro-Independence, the second was that the witness made
preventive efforts by proposing the advancement of the liquidation of KOREM
164 Wira Dharma to ABRI Commander, because the KOREM had 2 (two) Battalions
of local/native soldiers, and the third was making repressive measures;
- That the witness divided East Timor into 3 (three) sectors, which were
East Sector, West Sector, and Dili as the Special Sector, then sub-sectors
were established so that every Company (Kompi) Commander had to be
responsible for a relatively small area;
- The result of the witness' observation as the Commander of the Military
Emergency Authority after the witness made the sky observation over the
towns, was that the badly burnt were Dili, then Manatuto, parts of Maliana
and Suai, while the rest of the towns were still intact;
- That the Defendant asked for back-up personnel for East Timor, then MABES
TNI-AD (the Army Headquarters) sent 2 (two) brigades, but the witness forgot
when the date of the sent off the troops was, but it was in August 1999, the
2 (two) brigades consisted of 6 (six) battalions while each battalion
consisted of around 650 personnel;
- That the Multinational Forces' troops arrived on the 20th of September
1999, led by Gen. Peter Kosgrov, the Multinational Forces were to aid TNI;
- That after the transfer of Commands by KOOPS NUSRA, in this case, was
PANGDAM UDAYANA, effectively started on the 5th of September 1999, and up to
the time when the witness came to East Timor, there had been a drop of
escalation, and the property burnings were far declining;
- That the Battalion of East Timor native soldiers, the liquidation of 2 (two)
Battalions of soldiers, was fairly large, they wanted to fight against the
existence of the Multinational Force troops, if they had not been liquidated,
and they were there at the time of the arrival of the Multinational Force
troops, conflicts would have occurred;
- That the involvement of the East Timor natives in the framework of winning
the Pro-Integration was true, but their involvement in the violence in
Liquisa after which the witness stayed for 2 (two) days to clarify the
victims, was not confirmed, the witness could not find their involvement;
- That the Military Emergency Command was established on the 7th of
September 1999, and on the 8th of September 1999, the witness arrived in
East Timor and in the evening of the 9th of September 1999, the witness took
over the authority from PANGKOOPS NUSRA (Commander of the Military
Operations of NUSA TENGGARA), the witness made the operational concept by
drawing the demarcation line, but on the 14th of September 1999, the UN
Security Council's Resolution was already issued, assigning the
Multinational Force troops to enter East Timor;
- That the witness on the 9th and the 10th of September 1999, made sky
observations over the burnt/ devastated East Timor;
Witness 3 Major General TNI. ZAKI ANWAR MAKARIM
- That the term Militia was known after the UN came into East Timor, before
that, the term Militia was known during the 1975 era, to explain those who
were the supporters (partisan) and no longer exist, they fought for
Integration, and dissolved in the community into civil servants, soldiers,
officers, and so on;
- That in 1975, Portugal left 27 thousands firearms which were distributed
to political parties in a rally in Dili town, and it happened before
Portugal left East Timor;
- That after the Tri-partite Agreement was signed, the civil servants,
doctors and teachers were gone, all of them had made the exodus, the
institution still in function in East Timor was UNAMET, but the Governor was
still there, the Regents were there, the sub-district Chiefs were still
there, but all of them were almost completely functionless as the conflicts
had already heated up;
- That the Tri-partite Agreement or New York Agreement was signed on the 5th
of May 1999, but the UN Advance Team had already made the entry since April
1999, followed by the arrival of UN troops reaching around 5,000 personnel,
in East Timor;
- That the witness had met Bishop Bello, to discuss inputs over the best
solutions that could be made, then the witness invited the leader of PMI (Indonesian
Red Cross) Tony Pavler, and had discussions with them, there were 3 (three)
important events/incidents in April 1999, and before that, in March 1999,
there was a massacre of the Pro-Integration in Ermera area;
- That on the 21st of April 1999, the Peace settlements was in the process,
and total Reconciliation should be implemented, then PANGDAM and DANREM made
the preparations and summoned the conflicting parties;
- That since the announcement of Option II, the situation in East Timor had
heated up, and Indonesia only had 3 (three) months to make the preparation
for the People's Consultation/ Ballot, therefore the PANGDAM/ the Defendant
advised that it was necessary to immediately achieve total reconciliation,
and asked the TNI Commander to be involved in the matter;
- That PANGDAM had the duty to maintain the overall security, to report
issues that needed further handling so that the Central could take immediate
actions to keep the whole territorial region. During the time of before the
People's Consultation/Ballot, as well as during the People's Consultation/
Ballot, the function had changed, PANGDAM/ the Defendant had the function of
preparing a certain area to succeed the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
embracing all people's potentials including those from the two conflicting
parties to ensure that the People's Consultation/ Ballot could be held on
time.
- That on the number of casualties, Bishop Bello reported there were between
20 and 25 victims, Bishop Bello said at least 15 people died and the other
10 severely injured, while the official report received by TNI stated 5 (five)
deaths, according to Bishop Bello, the victims were those from the
Pro-Independence, while the TNI confirmed the victims were from both parties;
- That since President B.J. Habibie announced the Option II, the political
condition had heated up, there were burning of properties, the witness
observed that the underdog (sic) was seen in April, in March through April,
the Pro-Integration people were driven out of Liquisa Regency, and from Batu
Blater area, there were 800 families who escaped to NTT (East NUSA TENGGARA);
- That resulting from the witness' investigation, the troops in Liquisa
isolated the kampongs to prevent conflicts as a small conflict could quickly
spread out onto the other kampongs throughout Liquisa, they took guard in
the kampongs, made roadblocks, and the police tried to mediate the two
conflicting parties to initiate negotiations;
- That in the witness' opinion, the People's Consultation did not fail, on
the other hand, it was successful, according to a representative of UN who
met the witness, the People's Consultation in East Timor was one of the best
People Consultation/ Ballot ever held in the world, because 98,7 % of the
people participated by giving their votes, while the implementation was safe,
on time, and the result was announced;
- That Indonesia had proposed to UNAMET as the representative of UN, not to
set up its Command Post (Pos Komando) in the Base Area of the
Pro-Independence, and set it up in the neutral area instead, so that both
parties could file reports to UNAMET, but UNAMET set its Command Post in the
Pro-Independence Base, and it was guarded by the Pro-Independence, so none
of the Pro-Integrations would dare to enter;
- That the second suggestion was that UNAMET should not recruited its local
staff only from the Pro-Independence Group, those from the Pro-Integration
should also be accepted, it is the fact that the 4,000 recruited local staff
were students and those from the clandestine network, it had become the
embryos of the growing resentments;
- That the peace agreement on the 21st of April 1999, was attended by Bishop
Bello, Bishop Basilio Narsimento, representatives of KOMNAS HAM (National
Commission for Human Rights), such as; Joko Sugianto, Kusparmono Irsan, and
Marbun, PANGDAM UDAYANA/ the Defendant, Gen. TNI. Wiranto, DANREM Tono
Suratman, Manuel Carasscalao, Leandro Ishak (sic), Joao Tavares, and the
witnesses in the peace agreement were Gen. TNI. Wiranto and Bishop Bello;
- That the peace agreement on the 21st of April 1999, was approved by Xanana
Gusmao, as basically Xanana Gusmao had already given his approval by signing
the peace agreement documents, and with the signature of Xanana Gusmao, the
Pro-Independence Group were sure to attend the peace meeting;
- What was meant by kantongisasi ("pocketing/sacking") was that an armed
force group should be isolated in a certain area, PANGDAM/ the Defendant's
idea at the time was that every armed force group was put into a pocket/sack,
then it was socialized through KOMNAS HAM and UNTAET, and the witness had
seen himself that the kantongisasi concept of PANGDAM managed to pile up
some 1,000 weapons, though the Pro-Independence refused to hand in their
weapons;
- That the witness did not know the 12 members of TNI, who, in the
indictment, were accused of committing the attacks at the residence of
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos;
- That the witness saw that in the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, the
bullet holes stuck in the window frame were fired from inside the house, the
witness tried to prove whether they ever seized the guns, and in accordance
with the reports, whether they were fired from inside, it was the fact that
the ditches came from the bullets of organic guns, 7,62 caliber, from G.3
guns, NATO standard, while TNI guns at the time, were M. 16s with FNC;
- That PAM SWAKARSA were just ordinary people's organization, if in America
there were the 'neighbor watch', in Jakarta they were called Siskamling,
while in East Timor, due to the forced exodus to flee their homelands, in
the kampongs they established the organization similar to Siskamling called
PAM SWAKARSA;
- Because they were not familiar with agriculture, the Governor or the local
government provided rice aids for their food;
- That WANRA was the official organization under TNI territorial supervision,
so the KOTER (Territorial Commands) supervised WANRA, and throughout
Indonesia there were 400 thousands WANRA, every KODIM had WANRA, they
received special allowance from DEPHAN (the Ministry of Defense);
- That the Defendant/PANGDAM was informed that some people were crowding the
residence of Manuel Carascalao, the witness remembered DANDIM (Military
District Commander) had offered the security protection for the residence,
but it was turned down, then the police offered the protection, but it was
also turned down;
- The efforts of the security authorities were adequate, but as Manuel
Carascalao refused to trust the security officials, all the efforts were
turned down;
- That the Defendant's duties as PANGKOOPS (Operational Commander) during
the time before the People's Consultation/ Ballot, could not be carried out
as the Defendant/ PANGDAM had to embrace both parties, there should be no
Intelligence Operations, Territorial Operations, or Combat Operations, there
were only security operations to ensure the People's Consultation/ Ballot
could be carried out on time, but when the situation had heated up, the
KOOPS (Operational Commands) were continued again;
- That for the witness' testimony, the Defendant stated no objections, only
added that MABES TNI considerations not to appoint PANGDAM UDAYANA as the
Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, was because PANGDAM UDAYANA
had a wide range of responsibilities that covered four provinces, West Nusa
Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Bali and East Timor, so it was necessary to
appoint the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority who had the full
power and authority to use the law instruments applied in Military Emergency
situations, which were not accessible in the law instruments of civilian
authority, whereas PANGKOOPS was posted as PANGDAM in the transfer of KODAL
(Control of Command) from the police;
Witness 4 Lieut. Col. LILIK KOESHADIYANTO
- That the witness was assigned at KODIM Suai, on the 29th of August 1999,
as acting Commander of the KODIM, based on the instruction of PANGDAM XVI (sic)
UDAYANA, and at the time the Mass for Peace was held at Ave Maria Church,
attended by Bishop Bello and UNAMET representatives, MUSPIDA and
representatives of Anti-Integration as well as Pro-Integration groups;
- That in the Mass for Peace, the two conflicting parties agreed on the
implementation of the People's Consultation/ Ballot and would accept
whatever result of it, whether it would be won by the Pro-Integration group,
or it would have be won by the Anti-Integration group;
- That the worth noting events that happened during his post as the acting
DANDIM of Suai included the Mass for Peace held at Ave Maria Church on the
29th of August, 1999, then on the 30th of August in which the People's
Consultation/ Ballot was held, and on the 3rd of September 1999, whereas the
peace settlement was made at the Regent's residence between the
Pro-Integration and the Anti-Integration groups, on the 4th of September
1999, was the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot, on the 5th
of September 1999, was the evacuation of UNAMET personnel, during which as
many as 3,130 personnel were flown in helicopters to Dili. Then on the 6th
of September 1999, a clash occurred between the Anti-Integration and the
Pro-Integration Group at Ave Maria Church, and on the 8th of September 1999,
he was called back to Dili;
- That the incident at Ave Maria Church was reported by the witness to
DANREM, then the witness coordinated with KAPOLRES (District Police
Commander) to further investigate the incident at Ave Maria Church, then the
witness secured around 800 people, the Anti-Integration people at MAKODIM (Military
District Headquarters) who were threatened by the Pro-Integration Group;
- That the witness saw masses rushed out of the church, ran in all direction
trying to safe themselves while screaming, some were wounded, who were then
rescued, the witness did not know whether they were the Pro-Integration or
the Anti-Integration groups, then the witness prevented and hampered other
masses trying to force their way into the church;
- That the situation when the witness arrived was not conducive, the
non-native residents who were not East Timorese had all gone out of East
Timor, while most of the civil servants were also gone to take refuge, the
remaining authorities were the Kovalima regent, DANDIM, and KAPOLRES, and on
the 4th of September 1999, residents of Kovalima regency from the uphill
villages went to downtown Suai, around 50,000 people who were frustrated,
angry and hungry went to meet DANDIM, KAPOLRES, and the regent asking aids
of transportation to leave for (sic) East Timor area;
- That in the witness' opinion, the refugees taking shelter at the church
were from both sides, the Pro-Integration as well as the Anti-Integration,
the people accommodated in the church were protected by the Pastor;
- That UNAMET had given aids, and provided food for 2,000 refugees in the
church; the incoming aids were in the form of rice, medical supplies, milk
and other necessities, that the water condition was bad, the water in the
area was scarce, and it was all sucked up into the church;
- This condition led to resentment among Suai residents who suffered due to
the scarce water and food, while in the church, the water and food were
abundant. This condition was likely to cause frictions among the conflicting
groups, then the witness advised the regent to mediate a peace agreement,
and that was done by the regent by organizing the Mass for Peace;
- That the strength of KODIM included around 300 personnel, divided into 6 (six)
KORAMIL (Sub-district Military Command), the members under the witness'
supervision were about 30 personnel, while the others secure the vital
installations such as PLN (the state-owned electricity company), TELKOM (the
state-owned telecommunication company), the airport, gas stations, DOLOG (the
state Logistics Depot), and so on;
- That the People Consultation / Ballot on the 30th of August 1999, was
planned to start at 09.00 in the morning, however, it already began at 06.00
in the morning, and the witness received reports that at around 03.00 and
04.00 o'clock, the physically handicapped people, and the blinds were
gathered to make their votes in the People Consultation/ Ballot at 06.00
o'clock that morning, and they were guided, one by one, to vote for the
Anti-Autonomy;
- That the Police could provide security protection during the voting of the
People Consultation/ Ballot, only from a radius of between 50 and 100 meters,
while TNI were present some 500 meters away;
- That many people reported on the cheatings during the voting of the People
Consultation/ Ballot to the Police and KPS (Committee for Peace and
Stability);
- That the witness himself had complained to UNAMET that the voting of the
People Consultation/ Ballot was not fair, not democratic, not honest, and
full of fraud, the witness had handed over the facts on the frauds to UNAMET,
but UNAMET contradicted him, and stated that the People Consultation/ Ballot
was done in democratic ways;
- That one example of the undemocratic performance was that the Ballot Boxes
(Kotak Suara) were not opened at the TPS (Polling Places), but they were
piled up, and brought to Dili on helicopters without escort;
- That the witness saw that the masses outside the church compound reached
around 5,000 (five thousands), and those who took refuge inside the church
were around 2,000 people;
- That Ave Maria Church was not a place listed by MUSPIDA to accommodate
refugees, as the church is a holy and sacred place, and not all people could
enter the place;
- That the incident concerning the riot at Ave Maria Church, Suai, was
reported by the witness to DANREM, and DANREM had made reports to the
Defendant, then the Defendant issued instructions to prevent further
spreading of the riot, and make thorough investigation over the incident;
- That the witness had asked for additional personnel, but as the back up
personnel were still on the way, the request had yet to be accommodated;
- That the victims resulting from the clash, at the time, reached 27 people;
Witness 5 Brigadier General TNI. M. NOER MUIS
- That the witness had been assigned as DANREM 164 Wira Dharma since the
13th of August 1999, until the 7th of September 1999, during the time of the
Military Emergency, the witness was still in the post of DANREM, in which
the witness supervised 13 KODIM;
- That the worth noting events happened during his assignment as DANREM in
East Timor were that during the campaign, a clash occurred between the
Pro-Independence and the Pro-Autonomy on the 27th of August 1999;
- That the Campaign Stage ended at the time of the voting of the People
Consultation/ Ballot on the 30th of August 1999, in reports from all
regencies and communities, they mentioned the violations and cheatings by
UNAMET during the People Consultation/ Ballot, which was planned to be
announced on the 7th of September 1999, but then advanced on to the 4th of
September 1999, then on the 5th of September 1999, the control of commands
was transferred from POLRI (the Indonesian Police) to TNI, on the 6th of
September 1999, a turmoil erupted at Ave Maria Church, and on the 7th of
September 1999, the Military Emergency was implemented;
- That in the clashes at Diocese Dili, the witness did not know for sure how
many victims there were, but the witness reported directly to PANGDAM IX
UDAYANA, through the radio about the incident;
- That resulting from the clashes at Ave Maria Church, Suai on the 6th of
September 1999, there were 27 victims, after receiving reports from DANDIM
Suai, the witness reported it to PANGDAM IX UDAYANA/ the Defendant;
- That the Defendant, as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, made instructions to secure the
area, investigate the incident, prevent further riots;
- That the witness had received an STR (Confidential Telegrams) No. 549,
3-8-1999, with the content of instructions to stand by the troops under the
witness' control as DANREM, not all troops were equipped with organic
weapons, only certain troops were;
- The witness gave instructions to his subordinates through the radio, the
written ones were sent through STR dated the 6th of September 1999, and the
witness' instructions started to take effect along with witness (sic), as
the witness saw and knew that;
- That in the transfer of KODAL Command, there were back up troops
consisting of 1 (one) SSK (Company-Level-Squad) with 100 personnel arrived
on a Hercules plane, and additional troops which arrived one after the other
through the sea, consisted of more or less than 2 (two) of the
Brigade-Level-Units;
- That the Commander in Chief of the operations at the time was the
Defendant himself as the Commander IX UDAYANA;
- That the number of refugees at the time reached around 300,000 people,
they fled to NTT, Kupang, Bali, Flores, and some to Jakarta;
- That according to reports from KODIM, there were no involvement of the
members of POLRI and TNI in the turmoil at the residence of Bishop Bello,
according to the reports, the members of TNI were the ones who secure Bishop
Bello;
- That the turmoil that erupted on the 6th of September 1999, at Bishop
Bello's house, according to reports, was because the Pro-Integration people
had found Ballot Boxes in Bishop Bello's house and also piled up Ballot
forms (kertas suara) there, regulation stated that Ballot Boxes and the vote
counting were determined by UNAMET, not at the Diocese, this caused the
losing people angry, and then the turmoil erupted;
- That the incident at Ave Maria Church, Suai, in DANDIM reports, happened
because in the Ave Maria Church, Suai, there were so many Pro-Independence
masses taking refuge, when the Pro-Integration people were passing in front
of the church, there were shots coming from inside the church, then the
clashes erupted;
- That the native/local members of POLRI, as well as TNI, were allowed to
participate in the People Consultation/ Ballot, as based on the regulation
resulting from the Tri-partite meeting in New York, the native people who
were 17 years old or over, were allowed to participate in the People
Consultation/ Ballot's voting;
- That the mass departure of refugees happened after the announcement of the
People Consultation/ Ballot on the 4th of September 1999, then TNI personnel
prepared ships and helicopters to transport the refugees;
- That the soldiers under the witness supervision as DANREM at KOREM
included 2 Organic Battalions consisted of around 7,000 up to 7,500
personnel, while Territorial Battalion had around 4,500 people;
- That the witness was responsible to the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA,
the PANGDAM was responsible to the control commander of TNI troops, in this
case, was TNI Commander;
- That in the reports from DANDIM of Dili, after the riot at the residence
of Bishop Bello, the Pro-Integration found stored Ballot Boxes kept in ....
(translator: unfinished paragraph, page 29 of the text);
- That the reason that led to the attacks at Bishop Bello's house, according
to DANDIM report, was because Bishop Bello, since the beginning, was never
neutral, as a religious shepherd he was partial, and took sides of the
Pro-Independence, the churches accommodated only the Pro-Independence.
Bishop Bello often complained about the Pro-Integration, but never
complained about the Pro-Independence, after the announcement of the People
Consultation/ Ballot, Bishop Bello became the most wanted man, and after the
incident, they found Ballot Boxes at Bishop Bello's house;
- That the incident at Bishop Bello's house resulted in dead victims, and
wounded ones due to tortures, then the witness sent troops and the witness
ordered immediate investigation with the coordination of POLRI;
- That after the Tri-partite Agreement on the 5th of May 1999, it was
settled that the security matters were in the hands of POLRI, the People
Consultation/ Ballot would be held by UNAMET without taking sides, and would
be carried out in democratic manners;
- That stages in the People Consultation/ Ballot were;
- Registration Stage;
- Campaign Stage;
- Quiet Day Stage;
- Voting Stage;
- People Consultation/ Ballot Stage;
- That when the People Consultation/ Ballot's announcement was advanced from
the earlier planned on the 7th of September 1999, to the 4th of September
1999, the witness strongly opposed it, then the witness reported it to the
Defendant, while according to the UN delegation, possible disturbances would
occur if the announcement had been made on the 7th of September, then
PANGKOOPS/ the Defendant coordinated with Ian Martin and made reports to his
superiors;
- That based on the agreement, both parties/groups practiced an arm truce,
but the group which implemented it was only the Pro-Integration who stored
away their weapons, including the TNI organic weapons, Portugal guns,
homemade firearms, and sharp weapons, but the Pro-Independence refused to
put away their weapons;
- That WANRA were armed, but after completing their guard duty at their
posts, the weapons were handed over to KODIM, and after the Registration
Stage of the People Consultation/ Ballot, WANRA were sent home to their
kampongs to make their votes;
- That there was a connection between WANRA, KAMRA, PAM SWAKARSA, and the
Pro-Integration, as the members of the organizations were the people who
were residents, so they were socially related;
- That there were burning of properties in the towns, alleys and residential
areas, and in several areas, there were the burning of houses and
motorcycles, the burning of properties also happened in the last day of the
Campaign Stage on the 27th of August 1999, and after the announcement of the
People Consultation/ Ballot, the Pro-Independence joined in by burning down
the vital installations, but INTERFET troops just kept quiet;
- That on the 7th of September 1999, there were the mass departure of
refugees to NTT, and within the 3rd week, on the 21st of September 1999,
East Timor was officially handed over to UN;
Witness 6 Brigadier General TNI. TONO SURATMAN
- That the witness had been assigned in East Timor as many as 6 (six) times,
in 1978, 1983, 1989, 1995, 1998, and the last time when he was the Commander
of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma since the 10th of June until the 13th of April
1999, supervising 13 KODIM;
- That the witness duty as DANREM were first, improving the discipline of
TNI troops in East Timor, second, improving the skills of the soldiers, and
third, improving the welfare of the soldiers assigned in East Timor;
- That the witness gave instructions on the security measures as requested
by POLDA, over the arrival of foreign visitors and delegates who made the
visits to East Timor;
- That during the time of his assignment in East Timor, there were two
incidents concerning clashes between Pro-Integration and the
Pro-Independence masses, at the residences of Pastor Rafael and Manuel
Carascalao;
- That the witness had been to the crime scenes, at the residence of Manuel
Carascalao right after the riot, the witness did not see bullet ditches/holes
inside the house and the casualties were between 10 and 12 people, the
victims mostly suffered dagger cuts and stabs, and all were sent to the
hospital;
- That the witness had observed the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos,
and in accordance with KODIM reports, the victims were 5 (five) people;
- That PAM SWAKARSA was not under the command of TNI, while TRIBUANA Task
Force was a unit assigned under the witness' control;
- That the witness did not know whether or not PAM SWAKARSA had firearms,
but the witness heard that the firearms that were left by Portugal numbered
around 27,000, these could be in the hands of both groups, so if they were
armed, they were not from TNI;
- As DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, the witness was responsible to Defendant Maj.
Gen. TNI. Adam R. Damiri, as PANGDAM UDAYANA at the time;
- That every development of situation in progress in the witness' area, was
reported in words and in writing to the Defendant;
- That as DANREM, the task-forces in BKO Operations (Troops Reinforcements
sent in from outside the Territorial Commands), under the witness control,
were, among others: Unity Task Force, Territorial Task Force, and TRIBUANA
Task Force, who were responsible to DANREM through DANDIM;
- That PAM SWAKARSA was established as a form of the people's spontaneous
response due to intimidations by CNRT assisted by FRETILIN who were armed,
so they insisted on securing their areas and kampongs, which were far from
the security authority which were the police or TNI;
- That WANRA was supervised by TNI in accordance with the Law No. 20 of the
year 1982 on Defense and Security, a WANRA received a monthly salary of Rp.
150,000,- and 18 kg of rice. WANRA members were averagely between 35 and 45
years old, they were assigned at KODIM, and were given limited trainings,
such as trainings in salutation service, guarding and securing areas
surrounding KORAMIL, they did not have firearms, but could be authorized to
use firearms by KODIM, and WANRA had the status of civilians, recruited from
the native residents of East Timor, they were responsible to DANDIM or
KORAMIL, in accordance with their assignments;
- That BESI MERAH PUTIH (Red and White Iron), AITARAK and LAKSAUR were
united in the Pro-Integration Group, they made and established the
organization for the call to defend the Red and White, not only the
Pro-Integration that established such groups, the Pro-Independence also
established their own groups;
- That on the incident at the residence of Manuel Carascalao, the witness
received reports from KODIM Commander saying that on 17th of April 1999,
there was a big rally in front of the East Timor Governor Office, after the
big rally, the Pro-Integration people organized a parade, at the time they
passed in front of Manuel Carascalao's house, the clashes erupted at Manuel
Carascalao's house;
- That resulting from the incident, 12 (twelve) people died, and the wounded
were between 20 and 30 people, all were handled by the police;
- That in the incident at the houses of Rafael Dos Santos and Manuel
Carascalao, as they were in progress, were reported by the witness to the
Defendant as PANGDAM UDAYANA, and the Defendant gave instructions which were
to assist the police;
- That the big rally on the 17th of April 1999, was a big rally of the
Pro-Integration Group originated from 13 regencies, who were present in the
front of East Timor Governor's office to determine their loyalty to the
Unity of the Country of the Republic of Indonesia;
- That as far as the witness remember, after the big rally, the term
Commander always turned up, and the mentioned Commander in East Timor was
not meant as a leader of a squad with complete automatic and organic
weaponry, but it was a term of East Timor people to describe Joao Tavares as
the Commander of PPI;
- That based on the Tri-partite agreement on the 5th of May 1999, the
security maintenance were in the hands of the police, while TNI went back
into the Barracks, which could be called as kantongisasi (the pocketing/sacking),
in which TNI had no rights to carry out activities, while the police were
assisted by the International Police;
- That Manuel Carascalao had come to the witness' house, he came, not for
assistance, but for weapons, because his house was under the attacks of the
Pro-Integration;
- That the witness took parts in the efforts to have meetings on peace
settlements for 3 (three) times, the first was in October 1998 in Dare, at
the residence of the Pastor, which was attended by the Bishop and the
provincial MUSPIDA leaders, and the second was on the 21st of April 1999,
which was attended by the two conflicting parties, and the third was in
Jakarta, on the 18th of June 1999, in which the two groups attended with
efforts to reach peace settlements;
- That after the announcement of Option I and Option II, the situation which
formerly relatively conducive or securely controlled, changed drastically,
there were the acts of terror and intimidation by the Pro-Independence;
Witness 7 General (Retired) TNI. A.D. WIRANTO
- That the witness had several times been assigned in East Timor, in
security operations in East Timor, also as a staff officer who assisted the
operational activities there, the witness had been assigned in East Timor
when he was still ranked a Captain, as well as when he was already a General;
- That as the ABRI (Indonesian Armed Force) Commander at the time, the
witness always received reports from Defendant Adam R. Damiri, as PANGDAM
UDAYANA, on East Timor situation;
- The witness had seen the Special Report No. R. 184/lapsus/IV/1999, but the
witness did not remember whether or not he had read it, the reports the
witness received, were of various types, such as Intelligence Reports,
Logistic Reports, Operational Reports, Special Reports, Daily Reports,
Weekly Reports, and all directly went into the existing Staff System in
MABES TNI Headquarters;
- That based on the Special Report No. 184/lapsus/IV/1999, the witness
immediately sent a team of investigation led by the Inspector General of
MABES TNI to East Timor, and for the back-up, there was no special
coordination between the security officials and the Pro-Integration party,
during which time, it was not yet outlined in the Tri-partite Agreement, and
it was still based on the situational security operations in East Timor
against FRETILIN, which was considered as the insurgent group in East Timor;
- That in April 1999, the witness received reports from the Team of
Investigation of MABES ABRI, just arrived from Liquisa, that the repeated
shootings involving the two conflicting groups did not involve the security
officials;
- That the security officials then carried out security measures by doing
the clean-up (membersihkan), clean-up was meant as securing the place of the
shootings, and finding the wounded to be evacuated;
- That the reports received by the witness from the team of investigation of
MABES ABRI on Liquisa case, said that the incident in Liquisa happened on
the 4th - the 5th of April 1999, when the Anti-Integration groups besieged
and attacked the Pro-Integration people, and destroyed the house of Antonio
Lopez De Cruz, on the 5th - the 6th of April, the Pro-Integration Group from
Maumere, that made their revenge by attacking the Anti-Integration, was
termed as the shooting contacts;
- That at the time, the Anti-Integration and the Pro-Integration had
conferred at the Parish House, but had failed to reach agreements, instead,
it turned into distorted fights causing 5 people died and 20 others injured;
- That the witness considered that a sensitive matter, because it had caused
victims, and to clarify matters, the witness immediately sent a team led by
TNI Inspector General, and emphasized that PANGDAM Maj. Gen Adam R. Damiri
and KAPOLDA (the Police Chief) of East Timor, to thoroughly investigate the
background and perpetrators in the incident, then in April, the witness went
to East Timor to settle the matters;
- That the witness as MENHANKAM (the Minister of Defense and Security)/
PANGAB (ABRI Commander), at the time, the post of MENHANKAM, in its official
relation with POLRI, was to assist the President in the guidance (pembinaan)
of the ABRI force on behalf of the country's Defense and Security, the
witness was responsible to the President;
- That in matters concerning the guidance of ABRI force, its trainings,
equipments, and finance, the witness was assisted by KASAD (the Army Chief
of Staff), KASAL (the Navy Chief of Staff), and KASAU (the Air Force Chief
of Staff), while the operational matters of the force were handled by
PANGDAM, who was the Commander in Chief;
- That PANGDAM, besides carrying out the operations, was also authorized,
through KASAD, to carry out the guidance and usage of the Army Squads within
their jurisdictions or Strategic Compartments;
- That the witness, as ABRI Commander at the time, received reports from
PANGDAM, such as Reports on Logistics, Intelligence, Daily Operations, and
so on. The reports could be handled on behalf of PANGDAM, by his assistances
or his Staff;
- That East Timor conditions between April 1999 and September 1999, the
Liquisa incident on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of April 1999, and the incident at
the residence of Manuel Carascalao on the 17th of April 1999, were reported
by the Defendant/PANGDAM to the witness as the ABRI Commander/PANGAB, and
the reports were brought into the Staff Meetings at MABES Headquarters level;
- That the content of the reports on the clashes between the Pro-Integration
and the Anti-Integration groups, were meant that they attacked each other,
the Pro-Integration Group from Maubara revenged by attacking Liquisa,
finally the peace meeting was arranged at the Parish House, which failed to
reach agreements, then somebody unintentionally fired his gun, and that led
to repeated attacks on each other that cause victims;
- As it was a sensitive matter, the witness brought it into the Staff
Meeting, and his decision to send the team of investigation to PANGDAM and
KAPOLDA to thoroughly investigate the incident, and take actions against
those who were guilty, were reported by the witness to President B. J.
Habibie;
- That in PANGDAM/ the Defendant's reports to the witness/ PANGAB, there was
no mentioning on the involvement of ABRI, it had been only concluded that
security officials were present at the area, and there were accusations that
the security officials were involved in the shooting contacts;
- That the security officials did not take sides of the Pro-Integration, but
they made the decision based on the government's policy that East Timor was
a legitimate part of the Republic of Indonesia, so anyone who did not
approve of the Integration would be against the government's policy;
- That both parties, the Anti-Integration and the Pro-Integration were armed,
FRETILIN group had two forces, which were political and military forces,
both were led by Xanana, they were equipped with armory left by Portuguese
and the weapons seized from TNI, and they also got the armory from illegal
flights, that cruised around the area every night, while the Pro-Integration
made homemade firearms to defend themselves;
- That during the incidents in Liquisa and at the house of Manuel Carascalao,
the control of the security authority was in the hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA
who was PANGDAM/ the Defendant, as that time was before the People
Consultation/ Ballot;
- That the incident at Diocese Dili on the 5th of September 1999, was
reported by PANGDAM/ the Defendant to the witness, and the witness himself
made the rechecks through the telephone to PANGDAM/ the Defendant, as well
as KAPOLDA;
- The content of the reports included that the clashes between the two
parties, were then spread to the Parish House and the Diocese. The mass
clashes had involved some 400 masses of the Pro-Autonomy and the Pro-Anti (sic)
Integration, sheltering at Bishop Bello's residence;
- That there were many Ballot Boxes stored up at Bishop Bello's house, then
the attacks just happened, that led to the mass clashes involving both
parties;
- That TNI and POLRI troops were mobilized to stop the turmoil, then
evacuated the people to the safe places at MAKOREM and MAPOLDA Headquarters,
Bishop Bello was secured at MAPOLDA in Dili, and then was flown to Baucau on
a POLRI helicopter;
- That the masses committed the attacks because they were disappointed to
the Bishop as he was not neutral, he even took parts in the activities
concerning the Pro and Contra-Integration matters;
- That the incident at Ave Maria Church, Suai on the 6th of September 1999,
was also reported to the witness, the mass clashes occurred around the
church area, the witness had emphasized that firm actions should be taken
against the perpetrators and preventive measures were made to avoid the
spreading onto other areas;
- That concerning the incident at Diocese Dili on the 6th of September 1999,
the security control was in the hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA or the Commander of
Nusa Tenggara Commands and Operations, who was PANGDAM UDAYANA/ the
Defendant;
- That what was meant by the clean up were, among others, after the incident
at the residence of Manuel Carascalao, as there were several connotations of
meaning, in the point of view of a security official who saw, witnessed and
tried to break up the mass fights involving both parties, a clean-up would
likely to discover dead victims;
- That the number of native East Timor who became members of TNI was fairly
large, especially in the Battalion 744, which was established in East Timor
and mostly accommodated East Timor youth;
- That there were no special instructions nor overall Policy of the
government or of the witness as PANGAB at the time, to make a total
destruction of East Timor, or to disturb the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
because if those were the government's policy or the witness' decision,
there would have been no People's Consultation ever happened in East Timor,
and it would have been turned back into the area of civil war;
- That when the decision on the Options was announced by RI (the Republic of
Indonesia) President, the witness believed that considerations over the
International Politics and National concerns were more important rather than
those over the conditions in the field;
- The witness was an assistant of the President, the decision was surely in
the hands of the President, the witness had advised the President, and
larger considerations would be always more dominant rather than smaller
risks in making the decisions;
- That the witness had described several possibilities to the president at
the time the decision on the Options was made, among others, it would be
difficult for the generally uneducated people (masyarakat terbelakang) to
have an understanding on such an abstract concept;
- That at the time, there had been considerations on such risks, then the
witness made a contingency plan to face the worst situation possible,
whoever would have won, the Pro-Independence or the Pro-Integration;
- That there were back-up troops sent to East Timor from places throughout
Indonesia, and were gathered in East Timor reaching over 6 (six) Battalions,
or approximately 6,000 personnel, and up to the time of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, there were 7 Battalions maintained there;
- That the native East Timor people recruited in 1978 were assigned into
Battalions 744 and 745;
- That the intelligence reports had revealed the overall view, and also
field evaluation that the People's Consultation/ Ballot would be probably
won by the Pro-Integration, and plans had been made, whichever of the two
groups would have won, overseeing the possibilities;
- That the witness had instructed that TNI and POLRI should be neutral,
should not take sides, and should take firm actions in accordance with the
law, against whoever violated the law, no exceptions, whether they were from
the Pro-Integration or from the Pro-Independence, the instructions were
written and recorded on video, and the video had been handed over to KPP HAM
(Commission of Inquiry of Human Rights Violations);
- That after the Tri-partite Agreement, the Indonesian Authority had to be
responsible on security matters throughout the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
it was a very difficult task, because after 23 years being in war with
FRETILIN, all of a sudden, just in a brief moment, they had to be placed as
the party with respected rights in the People's Consultation/ Ballot, to be
socialized with, in peace, and to be treated as brothers;
- That after that, the government issued the Presidential Decree No. 43 to
appoint MENKOPOLKAM (Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security) as the
Coordinator, therefore it was the form of making the security as
comprehensive and integrated activities;
- That there had been a letter from Australian Prime Minister JOHN HOWARD to
the RI Government, requesting that there should be time for the East Timor
people to ruin (merusakan, sic) the Special Autonomy;
- The Defendant was not appointed as the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority, not because of his incapability, but because the Defendant, as
PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, should maintain security in his area. Therefore it was
considered better to appoint another high-ranked officer who could keep up
with the development of operations in East Timor, a professional officer who
had the ability to control the emergency situations;
- That on the transfer of KODAL Command, as at the time, the evaluation of
MABES TNI/DEPHANKAM said that the KODAL Command, which was in the hands of
POLRI was no longer effective, the handling of commands and control by POLRI
could no longer provide the safe, orderly and controlled environment in the
area. The incidents in 4 (four) regencies could have spread out onto the
other 9 (nine) regencies;
- That the frauds committed by UNAMET had been reported in stages from the
bottom up to the decision makers in the national level, the reports were
received in writing as well as in words, they had even been discussed in the
international level;
- That the Foreign Minister and the President had interfered to get
clarification on the frauds committed by UNAMET and its elements;
- That in response to the matter, UN assigned 3 (three) Rapporteurs to
thoroughly examine the facts of the reports, and then make comprehensive
report on that;
- That the frauds were confirmed by UN, but such frauds were not dominant
nor significant to change the winning figures, and the vote counting was
done transparently and open to public, so there was no need to hold it up as
the process of the People's Consultation/ Ballot was already completed;
- That the witness had instructed to take firm actions against violators who
were members of TNI in East Timor, then the witness sent the Assistant of
the MABES TNI Intelligence to East Timor to reconfirm whether or not there
were TNI soldiers involved, and the witness heard that PANGDAM/ the
Defendant had punished the officers who allegedly involved in the seizure of
a journalist's camera;
- That the transfer of KODAL Command was started on the 5th of September
1999, and during the time the witness had finished his inspection in Dili,
he met Bishop Bello and Ian Martin, and the witness decided that the
transfer of KODAL Command should be done immediately, then when he arrived
in Jakarta, the witness reported to the President and the President approved
his decision, then the transfer of KODAL Command effectively started on the
5th of September 1999, at 19.30;
- That the transfer of KODAL or the transfer of Command Control was
authorized to coordinate various activities within the area, carried out by
various institutions;
- That the responsibility of the commands were regulated in the Military as
One Step Down and One Step Up", a Commander, one step down, should be
responsible over the instructions/orders he gave to his subordinates, but
should not be responsible over the acts he did not order/instruct;
Witness 8 Lieutenant Colonel TNI ASEP KUSWANI
- That the witness was a DANDIM (KODIM Commander) of Liquisa since 1997
until September 1998, and the main duty of DANDIM was doing the territorial
maintenance and assisting DANREM 164 Wira Dharma;
- That the number of members of KODIM Liquisa was 40 personnel, 10 of the
members of KODIM Liquisa were natives, and KODIM Liquisa supervised 3
KORAMIL, which were KORAMIL Liquisa, KORAMIL Batublete and KORAMIL Maubara;
- In the incident at the residence of Rafael Dos Santos, that on the 6th of
April 1999 between 06.00 and 08.00 a.m., there were not yet signs of
crowding masses, just between 08.00 and 09.00 a.m., a squad of police had
been present to secure the area;
- That at 10 o'clock in the morning, after the police were there, masses
began to crowd the area, then the witness reported to DANREM, the number of
masses had increased again at between 11.00 and 12.00 noon, then WADANREM (Deputy
DANREM) arrived in Liquisa, and the witness reported the situation to him;
- That around 12.00 noon, at the KODIM Headquarters, gunshots were heard,
roughly coming from the direction of the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos
Santos, then the witness ordered Joko Waluyo to rescue the pastor, then
brought him to KODIM, along with 10 other people and a nun;
- That the incident at the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos caused 5
people died, and more or less than 20 people wounded;
- Those who were present at KODIM, on the 6th of April 1999, as the incident
was happening at Pastor Rafael Dos Santos's house, were the witness himself,
the Regent, KAPOLRES, WADANREM, and Lieut. Col. TNI. Yayat Sudrajat;
- That none of the KODIM members were armed, as the weapons were still
locked up in the storeroom. The weapons in the possession of KODIM were SS1
and SS2 guns and 10 pistols;
- That the witness did not know for sure whether the refugees sheltering at
the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos were of the Pro-Independence or
the Pro-Integration Groups, all the witness knew was that they were masses;
- That the witness received reports that on the 5th of April 1999, CNRT
group burnt down Pukelara kampong;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, during the incident, when the witness was
still at KODIM Headquarters, the witness heard the screams: "Attack! Attack!"
The ones who committed the burning were said to be hiding in Pastor Rafael
Dos Santos's house, and the officers initiated a talk with the pastor over
the handing over of those who were hiding inside, to be legally processed
further;
- That the distance between KODIM Headquarters and the scene of the crime at
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos's house was between 50 to 60 meters, as from the
front-stairs at MAKODIM, the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos could be
clearly seen;
- That there were efforts to make peace to calm down the situation, such as
promoting a disarmament, but those who handed over their weapons were only
the Pro-Integration Group, the Pro-Independence Group refused to hand over
their weapons;
- That the Defendant as PANGDAM UDAYANA, during the time, had made a visit
to KODIM Liquisa, and the Defendant had made a visit to Dili to supervise
the DANDIM officers;
- That the steps taken by MUSPIDA to prevent the clashes from spreading out
were by making anticipations by working with the police, and as those were
criminal procedures, it was up to the police to determine their own measures;
- That the refugees sheltering in the church compound and the residence of
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos reached around 1,300;
Witness 9 LEONITO MARTINS
- That the witness was posted as Liquisa Regent since 18th of June 1994
until the 4th of September 1999;
- That the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot on the 4th of
September 1999, was advanced from the earlier planned on the 7th of
September 1999;
- That right after the result of the People's Consultation was announced,
the witness went straight to Atambua, the winning people went hiding in the
woods, the losing people from Liquisa and Maubara regencies tried to get out
of the regencies. The witness tried to arrange boats to transport the
refugees from Liquisa regency, and around 40,000 people could be transported
out;
- That on the 6th of September 1999, clashes erupted at the residence of
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, it was not in the church located at the same
compound, around 50 meters away from the Pastor's house;
- That the clashes occurred between the Pro-Independence and the
Pro-Integration Groups, the witness, at the time, was at KODIM office, the
witness looked out through the window, and saw that the clashes erupted at
the Liquisa Church compound, in front of the house of Pastor Rafael Dos
Santos;
- As the witness went home to the witness' house, there were people taking
refuge at KODIM, the witness saw soldiers escorted 2 (two) pastors, who were
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos and his assistance, along with 3 (three) other
young men;
- That in the afternoon the witness got information that the clashes caused
5 (five) people died and 20 others injured;
- That the witness saw the dead victims with wounds all over their bodies,
including the severe cuts on the cheeks and noses;
- The 5 (five) dead victims, the witness saw each of them with his own eyes,
when he was inside a car. That the incident concerning the clashes had been
reported by the witness to East Timor Governor through the regional
government's Public Relation Office on the 6th of April 1999;
- That TNI and PAM SWAKARSA were not related, PAM SWAKARSA only maintained
the security in villages in East Timor, as the villages in East Timor were
not orderly organized, and they maintained the security in their own areas
from lootings and burnings;
- That PAM SWAKARSA were not trained by the Military and the witness never
saw TNI joined in the shootings against the Pro-independence;
- That there were quite many PAM SWAKARSA in Liquisa, as they were members
of former political parties, so that in a meeting, the governor supervised
them to continue PAM SWAKARSA to maintain security in the area, as in the
village levels, the violence had increased, while what were meant by the
former political parties were, among others: APODETI, UDT, KOTA TARABALISTA,
and so on;
- That around 09.00 in the morning, Eurico Guterres came from Dili to meet
the witness at the witness' house;
- That at around 10.00 that morning the witness arrived at KODIM Liquisa to
meet DANDIM to discuss and talk about events happening at the witness' house,
then WADANREM arrived at KODIM office to inform them about Jacinto, the
police's most wanted man, who was apparently hiding at the Pastor's house;
- That in the meeting with MUSPIDA of Liquisa Regency at KODIM office, it
was agreed to send over a police named John Rea to negotiate with the Pastor,
but as John Rea just got out of the front stairs of the KODIM office,
gunshots were heard, so John Rea canceled the visit to the Pastor's house;
- That the incident in Liquisa Church compound was related to the prior
incidents happened on the 3rd of April 1999, when there were threats by the
Anti-Integration groups at Dato village, which managed to reach settlement,
then on the 4th of April 1999, clashes erupted again, but could be settled
again by MUSPIDA, then on the 5th of April 1999, the occurring clashes
worsened, there were attacks on Pukalara kampong, in which there were
burning of properties, and a woman named Faulina was slashed by the
Anti-Integration Group, another person who was a civil servant from the
Public Works Office named Annanias was held at the house of the Village
Chief;
- That when the team of investigation from MABES TNI came to Liquisa, they
did not question the witness, but directly questioned the religious figures;
- That the witness looked out of the window of KODIM office toward the scene
of the crime, at the time when the police were trying to break up the fights,
but the witness did not see soldiers, and the witness saw 3 soldiers
escorted Pastor Rafael Dos Santos to enter KODIM through the back entrance
of KODIM office;
- That when the witness was at KODIM office, the witness heard shots coming
from downstairs area, and somebody ran out while screaming "Sia teteo to
lara!" which meant They fired from inside, the witness heard the words from
someone in the masses who ran out;
- That people said that those who were sheltered at Pastor Rafael Dos
Santos's house carried sharp weapons, bows and arrows, and spears;
- That BMP (BARISAN MERAH PUTIH (sic)) was the organization of people who
wanted to defend the Red and White, and they existed in kampongs in East
Timor, they wanted the Red and White flag to keep flying in East Timor;
- That on the 7th of April 1999, the witness and MUSPIDA came to the TKP (the
crime scene), at the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, but the witness did
not come inside, only watched through the broken glassed windows, then the
witness said to the representatives of MUSPIDA to immediately make the
repairs so that the pastor could stay there again for the sake of the
religious community;
- That Jacinto was a man who was trusted by CNRT in Liquisa, in the local
government's structure, he was a village chief, and in the party, he was the
leader;
- That the witness did not see or hear that the one who led the attacks at
the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos was DANRAMIL Maubara;
- That the People's Consultation/ Ballot was held on the 30th of August
1999, and was planned to start at 7.00 in the morning, however, it already
started at 5.00 o'clock in the morning, then there was a village woman
saying her card was already punched, then there was an Australian journalist
who brought and punched voting cards;
Witness 10 Lieutenant Colonel TNI SUDJARWO
- That the witness was a Commander of KODIM 1627 Dili since the 6th of
August 1999, until the 17th of September 1999, for 29 days;
- That when the witness started his assignment as the KODIM Commander, the
witness said to KODIM members who were mostly East Timor natives, to hope
for the best result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot as expected by the
government and UN, and accepted the result as it was;
- That the announcement of the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot
on the 4th of September 1999, the witness said to the members, should be
accepted as it was, as the result was approved by UN;
- That the witness made approaches to the two parties, and it was true that
the Pro-Integration masses had a close relationship with the authority, then
when the witness met the Secretary General of CNRT, Jose Paloso, the witness
said to him to avoid attacking each other, and promote mutual respects;
- That since the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot and
before the People's Consultation/ Ballot, fights often occurred between the
two groups;
- That at 14.30 p.m. WIB (Western Indonesia Time) on the 5th of September
1999, riot erupted at Diocese Dili, the witness received reports on the
incident from BABINSA (Law Enforcement Officials posted in villages, and
affiliated with the Civilian Administration), then the witness reported it
to DANREM, and DANREM gave the instructions to handle the matter by
coordinating with POLRI, hampering the masses trying to force their way into
Diocese Dili to prevent it from spreading out, and helping the police in the
fieldwork;
- That Diocese Dili was the entrance of all the refugees from West Timor as
well as from other areas, the witness immediately departed for the TKP and
instructed Sergeant Arnold Raja to bring 15 members to the TKP to assist the
police officers;
- That the incident at Diocese Dili caused 3 people wounded, one of the
victims was Monato Soares, a former member of the Army, who worked there;
- That the victims suffered severe cuts and the witness saw broken glasses
and the garage burnt down;
- Before the court, the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor presented the evidence
which were the weapons, the witness said that the firearms were not from
KODIM or KORAMIL, the witness explained that those firearms were seized by
TNI from FRETILIN, KODIM only had firearms typed SP 1, SP 2, M 16, and FN 46
pistols, and the witness also recognized the bullets as those with 5.8
caliber;
- During the People's Consultation/ Ballot, there were increasing tensions
among people due to the frauds committed by UNAMET personnel;
- That the People's Consultation/ Ballot was held on the 30th of August
1999, and was announced on the 4th of September 1999 at between 8 and 9 in
the morning, the winner was the Pro-Independence Group, while the loser felt
disappointed;
- That TRIBUANA Task Force was assigned in BKO operations under KODIM 16277
Dili, their tasks were to gather information from the surrounding area, to
assist the execution of the People's Consultation/ Ballot to ensure it would
be held successfully and safely, also to assist in carrying out tasks on
territorial supervision at KODIM;
- That the witness, after coordinating with the police, had established
places for refugee shelters, which were the offices of the Military and
Police institutions, the governor's office, the harbor, and KORAMIL posts;
- That the organic troop of KODIM Dili consisted of 380 personnel, including
99 civil servants, divided into 4 KORAMIL, the witness supervised 10 men
from TRIBUANA Task Force troop, and from Battalion 521, there were around
600 personnel already assigned in 67 posts;
- That during the turmoil in Dili and at the residence of Bishop Bello,
Battalion 744 were posted in Ubis and made no move anywhere;
- That Bishop Bello requested assistance in transporting refugees, not to
the witness, but to the superior officials;
- That during the incident, Bishop Bello went out of the house escorted by
two civilians, then they were greeted by Captain TNI Hartono and the
Assistant to the 1st Lieutenant (PELTU) Ade Suherman, then they were
escorted into a police car and then under DANREM instruction, were brought
straight to MAPOLDA Headquarters;
- That the witness' KASDIM (the KODIM Chief of Staff), who was assigned at
KODIM for over 10 years, could make distinctions between those who were the
Pro-Independence members, and the others, who were the Pro-Integration ones;
- That among the shelters for refugees were KODIM office, Dili port, and the
governor's office, as there were refugees everywhere;
- That AITARAK group established in Dili, the witness did not know whether
AITARAK group or the other groups were involved in the riots;
- That the witness did not know what caused the turmoil, but after the
incident, the witness anticipated those happened because of the
disappointment over the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot, the
witness hampered the masses coming from Liquisa, the witness had predicted
there would be attacks at places whereas the witness applied security
precautions, however, the attacks occurred in places he unpredicted;
- That on the 4th and 5th of September 1999, General Wiranto came to Dili,
the witness was instructed by DANREM to secure the airport and the place
where General Wiranto conducted briefings;
- That KODIM jobs after the People's Consultation/ Ballot would be providing
the security evaluation for foreigners and Indonesians, securing vital
installations such as PLN, TELKOM, the airport, the sea port and DOLOG
storage houses;
- That the security maintenance conducted by TNI were for the physical
facilities, but police jobs were carried out by POLRI, with TNI backing up
the police work;
- That in the incident on the 5th of September 1999, the witness was at
KOREM Headquarters, the witness reported to DANREM and was not authorized to
file reports to the Defendant;
- That around 90% of the members of KODIM Dili were East Timor natives;
- That the witness never heard any member of KODIM or KOREM did the attacks
at the residence of Bishop Bello;
- That the witness had secured state-owned money worth approximately Rp 43
billions, and additional properties;
Witness 11 Colonel TNI (Ret.) HERMAN SEDYONO
- That the witness was Covalima Regent since 1988 until 1994;
- That before the People's Consultation/ Ballot was held, the situation was
safe, but around May 1999, the government announced the grant of the 2 (two)
Options to East Timor people;
- That after Options were announced, UNAMET personnel came to Covalima, Suai,
while the Pro-Independence group was already existed in Covalima Regency,
the Pro-Integration Group were just established in July 1999;
- That the witness knew the leader of the Pro-Integration was Olivio Moro,
while the Anti-Integration was led by Manuel Cordoza;
- That in the witness' efforts to socialize the People's Consultation/
Ballot, the witness and the whole authority officials, called on people to
participate in the voting of the People's Consultation/ Ballot, and the
village chiefs to register their residents;
- That the witness as PANGDAM called on TNI to be neutral, and took no sides
on either one of the groups;
- That on the 6th of September 1999, there were attacks of the
Pro-Integration Group against the Pro-Independence Group, at Ave Maria
Church compound;
- That the residents taking refuge at Ave Maria Church reached around 2,000
people, the witness had seen them, and had helped by providing food and
other necessities for them;
- That other refugee shelters were SMPN II public school, SD Mata Air
elementary school, and the Public Works Office building;
- That at the time, the witness made coordination with POLRES, to place a
guarding post outside the church, and the witness made requests to the
pastor to allow POLRES members to stay on guard, but he refused;
- That in a provincial MUSPIDA meeting, a call had been made, that during
the People's Consultation/ Ballot, many people who lived in uphill villages
would go downtown for the voting, during which time, the witness offered to
accommodate them at SMPN I public school; when they arrived, the witness
would pick them up along with the Pastor, but finally they preferred to
shelter at the churchyard;
- That to anticipate the situation during the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
the witness always coordinated with church leaders, the witness organized
meetings on peace settlements, collective masses were held to prevent
unwanted problems;
- That the witness organized the collective masses, during which, the
security officials were called on to hand in their weapons, but those
collected were only from the Pro-Integration Group, the Pro-Independence
Group never handed in their weapons, peace efforts were also done through
traditional approach, besides that, the witness established KPS (Commission
for Peace and Stability);
- That in the incident on the 6th of September 1999, at Ave Maria Church,
between 12.00 and 13.00 in the afternoon, the witness arrived in Suai from
Atambua at 4 o'clock at dawn, with the rented vehicles to transport refugees;
- That the witness went to the TKP (the crime scene) with DANDIM, and
KAPOLRES, but the witness could not get into TKP, from where he stood, the
witness saw TNI officers from KODIM, the witness stayed there until 5
o'clock in the afternoon;
- That around 7 o'clock in the evening, the witness got reports that there
were victims, and a few days later, the witness knew that Pastor Hilario,
Pastor Fransisco, and Pastor Dewanto died;
- That Olivio Moro was present at the scene, but the witness did not know
what he was doing there, the witness only saw that he repeatedly shouted;
- That the corpses were brought to the border area in Atambua region, some
30 kilometer distance from Suai;
- That in May 1994, in Dili, a briefing was organized by the Defendant as
PANGDAM to direct the witness, and besides the Defendant, the ones who spoke
in the briefing were East Timor Governor and a staff official from DEPLU (the
Foreign Ministry);
- That the Governor's briefing included that the existing PAM SWAKARSA
should be activated, and there would be compensations for their families,
PAM SWAKARSA was activated to maintain security in their own areas;
- That during the People's Consultation/ Ballot, there were people's
protests coming almost everyday, complaining the frauds, for example, the
election that was planned to start at 08.00 a.m., but was already started at
06.00 a.m., and the police officers could not get near the polling places,
the police were only allowed to stand guard at around 50 meters away, the
people also protested to the fact that the local staff of the election were
mostly the Pro-Independence members;
- That the witness saw a nun was rescued into the house of a KODIM member,
the one who secured her was KASDIM, who managed to secure between 700 and
800 people;
- That in the crime scene the witness never met Captain TNI Sugito, DANRAMIL
of Suai;
- That the situation of Suai after the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, was that many people in the kampongs cried, while the
people at the church screamed, and many people rushed to the refugee command
posts to demand transportation to leave the area;
- That MUSPIDA had set up refugee centers for emergency to be established as
refugee shelters;
- That for the witness' testimony, the Defendant had responded and explained
that there was no Regent to Commander Command Line, the existing one was
Regent to Governor Line;
Witness 12 Major Infantry SUGITO
- That the witness had been assigned to East Timor in 1976, 1979, 1993 and
the last one was his assignment as DANRAMIL of Suai, Covalima Regency, since
the 16th of June 1992 until the 20th of September 1999;
- That when the turmoil erupted in Suai, the witness was not present, as he
was in search for borrowed vehicles in Atambua to evacuate refugees;
- That the witness saw, at the KORAMIL office, there were around 1,000
refugees, and when the witness arrived at KORAMIL, the on-duty officer
reported to the witness that there were repeated shootings at Ave Maria
Church around 10 o'clock that morning;
- That the witness had members to accompany him to TKP, there, the witness
saw corpses lying all over the place, then the witness along with 4 other
men there, loaded the corpses onto a Panther van, then the witness went back
to KORAMIL;
- That the witness counted the corpses up to 27, mostly had severe cuts,
among the corpses were those of the 3 priests'; who were Pastor Hilario,
Pastor Fransisco, and the witness forgot the name of the last one;
- That as far as the witness knew, the three pastors had severe machete cut
wounds, in the hands, there were rather deep cuts, then there were those on
the stomachs, and necks;
- That the 27 corpses were buried in mass burials in Alas village, within
the Indonesia border, the village was chosen, because if they chose the East
Timor area, they would be attacked by unidentified assailants;
- That the 27 corpses were buried piled up into 3 (three) graves;
- That around the 4th of September 1999, there was a briefing held by DANDIM,
then after the briefing, the witness make anticipations to prevent further
riots;
- That the refugees were sheltered inside the fenced churchyard, and besides
that, there was a security post guarded by 10 personnel from BRIMOB (the
Mobile Brigades), as anticipations in securing the gate for the people's
entrance and exit;
- That the witness had heard about a group called BESI MERAH PUTIH (Red and
White Iron), but who led or supervised them, the witness did not know;
- That the refugee shelters were at the offices of KODIM, POLRES, KORAMIL,
and schools nearby KODIM, and some took refuge inside the church at their
own initiatives, as the church was a protective shelter for them;
- That the refugees at Suai church reached around 5,000 people, and the
refugees were already there since before the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
the reason they took refuge in the church, the witness personally did not
know, as the refugees did not come from Suai district, but from other areas
within Suai Regency;
Witness 13 AKBP (Adjutant to the Chief Police Commissioner) ADIOS SALOVA
- That during the incident in April 1999 in Liquisa, the witness was posted
as KAPOLRES of Liquisa;
- That the conflict at Liquisa Church happened at around 12.00 to 12.30 p.m.
WITA (Central Indonesia Time);
- That the result of the meeting held at KODIM, was that the requirements
proposed by the Pastor had been accepted, then John Rea was assigned to
inform the Pastor that all the requirements proposed by the pastor were
approved, and then John Rea would pick up Jacinto, but just as John Rea was
ready to go, gunshots were heard;
- That in the reports received by the witness, the refugees sheltering at
the Pastor's residence reached around 2,000 up to 3,000 people;
- That the witness assigned 60 members to isolate of the refugees reaching
thousands in number, and due to the lack of personnel, the witness asked for
back-up personnel to KODIM;
- That the meeting between MUSPIDA and WADANREM at KODIM was dismissed after
the shots were heard, the witness departed for TKP;
- That after the shots were heard, the masses were provoked, finally they
rushed into the church compound, then the witness and TNI members joined in
to chase them away;
- That when the witness was present at the TKP to organize and supervise his
men, the witness saw that the ones who made the attacks used daggers and
machetes;
- That the turmoil caused 5 (five) people dead and around 25 others wounded;
- That Second Sergeant (SERDA) Sofyan was shot during the attacks at the
Pastor's house, SERDA Sofyan was a member of KOPASSUS (the Army Special
Force). The witness only requested back-up from KODIM;
- That MARSDYA (Lieut. Gen. of the Air Force) TNI Tamtama Adi, who was the
Inspector General of MABES ABRI, made a visit to Liquisa to investigate
Liquisa incident, the witness reported the incident at the Liquisa Church
compound to the Inspector General of ABRI;
- That the admittance of KAMRA (Community Security Guards) was carried out
by KOREM then was handed over to POLRI, and KAMRA under the witness'
coordination reached 60 personnel;
- BMP was an organization of people who wanted to defend Integration, its
leader in Liquisa was ARNOLD SOUSA;
- That the witness, at the time, saw Pastor Rafael and his staff when they
were at KODIM office, the members of KODIM were the ones who rescued Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos;
- That the witness had organized 'weapon sweepings', which were difficult to
be applied to the Pro-Independence, as they ran away into the woods and
joined FALINTIL, so the weapon sweepings were mostly applied to the
Pro-Integration;
- That what was meant by back-up was requesting additional force/personnel
to East Timor POLDA, because the lack of force situation required additional
back-up force;
- That inside the Pastor's house and in the backyard near the storeroom,
they found machetes;
- That due to the crowding masses inside and outside the Liquisa Church
compound, the witness had predicted of the coming clashes, therefore the
witness requested KODIM to back them up;
- That the witness met Eurico Guterres at about 8 o'clock in the morning of
the 6th of April 1999, when the witness was on the way to POLRES, the
witness told Eurico Guterres don't mess up around here, just leave it to me;
Witness 14 BRIPKA Police MAKARAW (a de charge Witness)
- That the witness was assigned at the INTELPAM (Intelligence officer) of
East Timor POLDA, in the incident in April 1999, the witness was present at
the Governor's office observing the ongoing big rally of East Timor people,
which was the Rally of PAM SWAKARSA of East Timor;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, the incident was first occurred at
Diocese Dili, when a group of masses came into Diocese Dili, then fights
erupted between the masses inside the Diocese Dili and those crowding
outside;
- That in the Diocese Dili's surrounding area, there were the army troops
securing MAHKOTA TIMUR (Eastern Crown) Hotel, as there were many UN Police
and UNAMET personnel sheltering there;
- That the witness saw the masses arrived at Bishop Belo's house, then the
witness reported to the command post saying that the masses had rushed into
Bishop Belo's house, then about five minutes later, the soldiers arrived in
2 BRIMOB cars and 1 (one) ABRI Hino car, then around 20 minutes later, POLRI
members arrived, then they blocked the entrance to the residence of Bishop
Belo's, as the crowding masses could not be hampered;
- That as the witness was the first one to arrive at Bishop Belo's house,
the witness rescued Bishop Belo, and the fence of Bishop Belo's house
collapsed when the masses' pushed their way in;
- That there were Guarding Posts established in the area surrounding Bishop
Belo's house, the witness knew that they were permanent guarding posts, that
were already set up, not only for the People's Consultation/ Ballot events;
- That the refugee centers established by the security Authority include the
offices of the Governor, KOREM, KODIM, and POLRES, the seaport, and the
airport;
- That the incident at Bishop Belo's house caused a sick child died;
- That the witness saw at the TKP in Diocese Dili, there were Ballot Boxes
scattering all over the place, the witness saw and carried them away himself.
There were some Ballot Boxes inside Bishop Belo's house but not too many in
amount;
- That the witness heard from the direction of Bishop Belo's house, the
screams and cries for help from women and children, even from some men, they
were civilians;
- That on the 17th of April 1999, the witness saw the participants of the
Big Rally carrying homemade firearms and painted red-and-white sticks, and
the big rally was televised through the state TV, TVRI;
- That after the rally, there was information that members of PAM SWAKARSA
would organize a parade around Dili town, then the witness was instructed to
stand guard on the considered unsafe positions. The big rally was attended
by thousands of people;
- That the refugees taking shelters in the harbor reached hundreds of
thousands;
Witness 15 Major TNI. SALMON MALAVE (a de charge Witness)
- That the witness was assigned as the Chief of Staff of KODIM 1627 Dili to
assist carrying out duties at KODIM and its internal affairs;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, when the witness and DANDIM were in
DANDIM's office, an intelligence officer from KODIM reported that at Diocese
Dili, clashes erupted among groups of people;
- That the witness was assigned to secure the established refugee centers,
the security maintenance at Diocese Dili and the residence of Bishop Belo
were not accommodated because the places were not included in the listed
refugee centers. The listed refugee shelters were the offices of the
Governor, KODIM, KORAMIL, POLRES, POLDA, and the harbor;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, clashes occurred at Diocese Dili and on
the 6th of September 1999, at 10.30 a.m., clashes occurred at the residence
of Bishop Belo, in the middle of a mass ceremony, during which, no security
officials were present to guard the mass ceremony;
- That the house of Bishop Belo was not accommodated with security
precautions as in accordance with the agreements concerning the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, the first ones should be protected were UNAMET
personnel, then the refugees, and the vital objects in Dili, so the Bishop's
residence was not in the priority list;
- That anticipating the incident at Diocese Dili from spreading toward the
residence of Bishop Belo, in front of Bishop Belo's house, 2 (two) trucks of
soldiers were assigned, but the reports from PASIOP (Officers in Charge of
the Operation?) said that Bishop Belo requested the troop to be withdrawn
because at 7 o'clock the next morning, a mass would be held, so the troop
should be withdrawn;
- That KODIM Dili got BKO operation from KOSTRAD (the Army Strategic Reserve
Command) with the force consisted of 680 personnel divided into 3 (three)
KORAMIL with 67 posts, and under the witness' KODIM, 97 % of its members
were East Timor natives;
- That the result of the witness' monitoring, none of the TNI members
involved in the attacks, and the witness never heard that TNI supplied
weapons to AITARAK;
- That reports from PENERBAD posts stated that clashes occurred at Bishop
Belo's house, then 1 (one) KIJANG KOMANDO van was sent to hamper them, then
DANDIM requested back-ups from KOREM, and KOREM sent 2 SSP troops to the TKP
and then the riot inevitably dispersed;
- That the guns owned by KODIM, among others, were SP 1, M 16 and pistols,
actually the SP 1 had 39 bullets, the M 16 had 18 bullets, and there were 31
pistols;
- That the witness carried the corpse of the son of Manuel Carascalao, onto
the funeral van, and the witness saw that the back of the corpse was wet
with blood from machete cut wounds, not bullet wounds;
- That the Sector Commanders in East Timor were divided into several sectors,
which were East Sector, Central Sector and West Sector;
Witness 16 Adjutant to the Police Commissioner JOHN REA (a de charge Witness)
- That on the 5th of April 1999, the witness made the investigation and knew
there were abuses committed by Dato Village Chief Jacinto and his men, and
the witness was informed that Jacinto was sheltered in the house of Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, after the morning call, KAPOLRES Liquisa
received a phone call from a nun requesting security precautions at the
Liquisa Parish House area, then POLRES Liquisa sent one platoon of POLRI
members;
- That the witness heard there were masses crowding around the Liquisa
Church compound, and a few hours later, the number of crowding masses had
increased, then POLRES Liquisa requested assistance to East Timor POLDA to
aid them with one platoon of BRIMOB to back up POLRES, then a platoon of
BRIMOB was sent led by IPDA (Second Police Inspector?) Frans Salamali;
- That the witness heard from KAPOLRES that KASAT SABHARA (the Chief of
SABHARA Squad) had negotiations with the pastor, requesting the pastor to
hand over Jacinto, but the pastor refused to do it;
- That due to the unsuccessful effort, KAPOLRES instructed the witness to
once again negotiate with the pastor asking him to hand over Jacinto and his
men;
- That accompanied by IPDA (Police) Frans Salamali, the witness met the
pastor, the witness requested the pastor to hand over Jacinto who committed
crimes against his own people, to be legally processed, and the pastor said
he would be concerned if Jacinto should be handed over, the witness assured
that Jacinto would be legally processed, after that the pastor offered to
hand in the evidence, which was a kelewang (a single-edged sword), and asked
to just let the man and the others stay, the witness said that the evidence
and the men were needed for the legal process;
- That the ones who fired the tear gas were the members of BRIMOB, who were,
in the security procedures, equipped with tear gas;
- That the witness received instructions from KAPOLRES to go back to Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos's house to inform him that his requests would be
accommodated, but before the witness had a chance to inform him, the
gunshots were heard;
- That the witness received the corpses loaded onto a vehicle from KAPOLRES
and DANDIM of Liquisa who stood next to the vehicle;
- That the witness brought the 5 (five) corpses loaded onto a truck to
Liquisa Hospital for autopsy;
- That the pastor made three requirements, first, Jacinto, the Chief of Dato
Village, would be handed over, but he should be received by MUSPIDA, in this
case, was the regent, second, the masses crowding the pastor's residence
should be removed from the area, and third, Jacinto would be legally
processed, not at POLRES Liquisa, but at East Timor POLDA, but one of the
requests proposed by the pastor, was rejected by the regent;
- That the witness heard that Pastor Rafael Dos Santos was rescued by
members of KODIM;
- That the investigation of the TKP, discovered organic guns, the witness
found sharp weapons, homemade and organic firearms in the house of Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos;
- That the witness knew in the next day, that the 5 (five) corpses were
buried by the district chief, in Maubara district;
- That for the 4 (four) suspects of the violence case in Liquisa, their
investigation process were carried out at East Timor POLDA and they were
detained at East Timor POLDA;
Witness 17 Colonel TNI AD (Army) YAYAT SUDRADJAT
- That the witness had been assigned in East Timor in between the years of
1982 and 1999, and in April 1999, the witness was assigned in Dili as the
Commander of TRIBUANA VIII Task Force with 116 member troop, the witness'
assignment as the Commander of TRIBUANA VIII Task Force was from February to
September 1999, and that was under the instruction of TNI Commander;
- That the 115 (sic.) members of the witness' troop were assigned in KODIM
throughout East Timor, started from the most Eastern side, which was Los
Palos, then Bako, Manatuto and Samai, in all the 13 regencies, only 3 (three)
regencies did not assign members of his troop, which were Ambena, Suai and
Ailiu;
- That the witness' duty as the Commander of TRIBUANA VIII Task Force was to
assist DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, in monitoring the situation in East Timor
area to promote conducive condition in the efforts to initiate
reconciliation and peace between the Pro-Independence and the
Pro-Integration during the People's Consultation/ Ballot, so there were no
assignments like the prior ones such as combat operations, the task he was
responsible to, was to complete the People's Consultation/ Ballot in
accordance with the government policy at the time;
- That before the witness' departure for East Timor, the President of the
Republic of Indonesia B.J. Habibie, at that time, presented the Options for
East Timor area, which were Special Autonomy Option, or East Timor
separation from Indonesia;
- That the witness duty was to make efforts so that the two conflicting
parties could be united to participate in the process of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, and its execution would be free from conflicts;
- That the witness knew the incidents which happened in East Timor, in April,
the incident in Liquisa victimized 5 (five) people, and the incident in Dili,
during the April 1999 incident in Liquisa, the witness was assigned by
DANREM to prevent the worse situation in Liquisa, and only in May 1999, the
witness sent members of the troop to Liquisa, then there were members of the
witness' troop in BKO operation under DANDIM of Dili;
- That the Defendant Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri was not the witness'
direct supervisor, but the witness was under his direct instructions in the
organizational line;
- That in East Timor, the conflict was between the Pro-Integration and the
Pro-Independence, the Pro-Independence still had the armed force called
FRETILIN, and they intimidated people from the Pro-Integration, and that
happened on and on, the aim was to find solutions, so the two conflicting
parties could be united to succeed the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- That in the operational duties, the witness was responsible to DANREM 164
Wira Dharma;
- That during the incident in Liquisa, the witness did, not only the
monitoring, the witness was present at the scene as it was happening, and
clearly saw that none of the TNI solders or members of POLRI joined in the
attacks;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, to Liquisa, the witness brought 3 (three)
members of TRIBUANA Task Force, and they had weapons, and one of the witness'
troop members named Sergeant Sofyan was shot in the leg; when he was at the
back of KODIM office;
- That in the middle of a meeting attended by the witness, representatives
of KODIM, KAPOLRES, and Liquisa regent, gunshots were heard from the
direction of Pastor Rafael's house, then the witness ran out, and on the
street, the witness saw people attacking each other with machetes, then the
witness helped the victims, which make his clothes stained with blood, and
the witness also helped carrying a young child who had been carried by the
mother who was severely wounded from machete cuts, the child fell and broke
an arm, then the witness secured the child to a safer place;
- The riot at Diocese Dili, the witness saw after it happened, he met
Domininggus Sakera, then the witness accompanied Domininggus Sakera to pick
up important documents in Diocese Dili, that time, the Diocese was already
in a mess, and at the right side where the parking lot was, a car was
burning, then the witness drove Domininggus Sakera to the house of Gunawan
in Komoro;
- That when the witness entered Diocese Dili, the witness saw it was still
on fire, but he did not see blood stains, and the witness saw the police and
KODIM officers sealed up the place to secure the area surrounding Diocese
Dili;
- That as the attacks on the residence of Bishop Belo were in progress on
the 6th of September 1999, the witness was present at KOREM housing compound,
approximately 2 kilometers away, then the witness went to the scene;
- That the information on the incident at Pastor Rafael's house was taken
from reports from John Rea, DANDIM and KAPOLRES, and from talks with
WADANREM, it started with the crowding of masses who were the
Pro-Independence Group taking refuge at Pastor Rafael's house, one of whom
was Jacinto, then the Pro-Integration masses demanded Jacinto to stand trial
for the crimes he had committed;
- That the witness acknowledged from John Rea reports, that the negotiation
requesting the handing over of Jacinto was not yet succeeded, Jacinto was
not handed over by Pastor Rafael, who then required that the handing over of
Jacinto would be done as long as he was brought to East Timor POLDA;
- That it was decided at the time that the requests of Pastor Rafael would
be accommodated, which meant that if Jacinto was handed over, he would be
legally processed at East Timor POLDA, the witness offered himself to
initiate the negotiation with Pastor Rafael, urging him to hand over Jacinto,
so the situation would calm down and the people could all go home;
- That the witness had heard about BMP, AITARAK and PAM SWAKARSA, which were
established by people, while PAM SWAKARSA was established to secure the
local areas, and was approved by PEMDA (the local authority);
Witness 18 Captain TNI. JOKO WALUYO (a de charge Witness)
- That the witness had been assigned at KODIM Liquisa since 1994 until 1999;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, turmoil and mass clashes erupted at the
house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, the witness heard shouts demanding the
handing over of Jacinto;
- That DANDIM ordered KODIM members to stay put as there were crowding
masses, so that they should stand by, in case POLRI needed them, they would
have been ready;
- That the witness assisted the police to secure the pastor and other people
in the Parish House compound, as the police had been at a loss on what to do,
the witness brought 8 (eight) of his men to pick up the pastor and brought
him to KODIM;
- That besides Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, those who went along with them were
Pastor Joseph and Sister Flora;
- That according to the information, the victims of the clashes at the house
of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos were 5 (five) people died, while between 22 and
25 people wounded, the dead victims, the witness heard, were buried in
Maubara;
Witness 19 RAFAEL DOS SANTOS
- That on the 5th of April 1999, the Militia made a move to Liquisa, then
the leader of the Pro-Independence and the people from several kampongs who
were Pro-Independence made an ambush against the Militia, but as they met
the Militia, other Militias were seen with the police and TNI;
- That during the day the Pro-Independence people were shot at, it caused 2
(two) of them died, and a few others wounded in the shootings;
- That incident caused the people, including men, women, children, old and
young to run toward the church and the Parish House compound, the Militia
started their moves from KODIM Liquisa, then entered the house, the Militia
shot dead Hermin who was running towards Maubara field;
- That on the 5th of April 1999 in the morning, members of KORAMIL and
Militia gathered in the front yard of KODIM Liquisa, in the center of town
area, then on the 6th of April 1999 morning, Militia surrounded the church
compound;
- That 2 (two) officers, DANYON (Battalion Commander) Lopez and Fransiscus
came to the church, then Eurico Guterres also arrived there at 10 o'clock
that morning then entered the Parish House to have a dialog to look for
solutions, but it did not work out;
- That around 12 o'clock noon, there arrived 5 (five) more officers, one of
them was John Rea, from the POLRES Liquisa, to have a dialog, but the
witness did not what resulted from the dialog;
- That around 13.00 in the afternoon, the shootings started around the
church compound, then some of the people in the Parish House, the pastor's
residence and outside were repeatedly assaulted with sharp weapons, by the
Militia, because the people inside the pastor's house refused to go out,
then tear gas was shot into the pastor's house;
- That the people inside the pastor's house ran outside, the men were
attacked with sharp weapons by the Militia, but they let the women go;
- That because he could not stand the tear gas, then the witness also rushed
out of the house, and when the witness was at the door, a militia man tried
to shoot the witness, but the gun was stuck, because it was stuck the man
threw away his gun, then picked up a machete and initiated an attack toward
the witness, but the witness was rescued by an officer from KODIM Liquisa;
- That the witness saw and heard about 1 (one) hour of shootings at Liquisa
Church compound committed by KODIM and the police;
- That in the afternoon, 2 (two) people were shot dead, one of them was the
Head of Liquisa Animal Husbandry;
- That one of the persons who do the shootings was a member of KORAMIL
Maubara named Antonio;
- That the witness saw with his own eyes that those who made the attacks on
the church compound and the Parish House was BMP Militia, KODIM soldiers,
the police and BRIMOB, the witness could make distinctions between militia,
soldiers and the police, as for over 10 years the witness had lived in the
parish, had socialized with the police, soldiers and people who were his
religious community;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, the witness saw with his own eyes that
there were attacks, happened at around 13.00, at the Parish House compound
and those who made the attacks were BMP Militia, along with soldiers from
KODIM Liquisa and the police;
- That the one under attacks was the witness' house, and the witness himself
saw through the glassed window in the house, that people outside made the
attacks at the Parish House;
- That the witness saw people who were outside were repeatedly slashed with
machetes by the militia;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, around 10.00 that morning, Eurico Guterres
arrived at the Parish to mediate the dialog with the parish pastors, so that
the masses crowding the Parish House could be urged to leave for home, but
the efforts did not work out;
- That at the time the shootings started, Eurico tried to push his way
inside the Parish House as many people in the house refused to come out,
from outside the house people shouted telling people to go out of the house,
then from the glassed window, the witness saw with his own eyes that the
tear gas was shot into the house;
- Because he could not breathe, then the witness ran outside, and rescued by
4 young men, and brought to KODIM at around 17.00 in the afternoon;
- Just as the witness made his departure to KODIM, in the yard of the Parish
House, the witness saw 2 (two) corpses were just laid there;
- Around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, arrived at KODIM, DANDIM Lieut. Col.
Asep Kuswani, Lieut. Col. Salova, and Maj. Irwan, then Lieut. Col. Asep
Kuswani said that it was already safe, then in the pastor's house they found
5 (five) unidentified corpses;
- That when the witness came back to the Parish House, the witness saw the
pastor's house was already completely destroyed, nothing left, the witness'
bedroom was destroyed, and blood stained all over the place, in the house,
on the corridors, in the bath room, blood also stained all over the floor;
- That the shooting started outside the pastor's house, at the time, there
were no shots fired from inside the pastor's house;
- That the police shot the tear gas into the house through the windows, the
police who shot the tear gas were those who were outside the pastor's house;
- That the witness unmistakably saw Tomi Diego, a member of KODIM Liquisa
fired shots, he was an East Timor native from Liquisa Regency;
- That the driver of Eurico Guterres was a member of the KOPASUS army
special force, the witness took a good look at the driver when he was
parking his car on the roadside, the witness could make the distinction
between East Timorese, Javanese and people from outside East Timor, and the
driver was not East Timorese;
- That those who died, the witness heard, were around 20 victims, some were
civil servants, others were private company workers;
- That the number of people taking refuge at the church compound reached
around 2,000 (two thousands), they came from Liquisa and Maubara;
- That the refugees who sheltered inside the church were previously checked
by the witness, those who carried machetes, daggers, or bows and arrows were
sent home;
- That besides Tomi Diego, other soldiers who joined in the attacks were
Roymundo, Jacob, and Isak Dos Santos, the witness' own nephew, who wore
sarong and a head band, and carried an M 16 gun wrapped in a cloth;
Witness 20 PELTU (the Assistant to the First Lieutenant) CARLOS AMARAL
- That the witness was assigned as DANRAMIL Maubara since 1997 until 1999;
- That during the incident at Liquisa Church, the witness was not there, but
he was on leave to Central Java started from the 28th of March until the
15th of April 1999, (the witness showed the on-leave permit document to the
panel);
- That when the witness came back from his leave, SERKA (Chief Sergeant)
Suparno reported on the Liquisa incident, it was reported that there were 5
dead victims who were brought to Maubara, and were buried at the Public
Cemetery in Maubara, the funerals were attended by representatives of
KORAMIL, District and MAPOLSEK offices;
Witness 21 RAYMUNDO DOS SANTOS SARMENTO (a de charge)
- That the witness was assigned to KODIM Liquisa, and when the Liquisa riot
broke out, the witness still worked there, the witness' main duties were
managing internal affairs, such as the correspondence;
- That on the 4th of April 1999, the witness was present at KODIM Liquisa
receiving reports from KORAMIL over fights that occurred among the youth
over the gambling in a cock-fight, on the 5th of April 1999, the witness
received reports from DANRAMIL that turmoil and fires broke out, and on the
6th of April 1999, at around 6 o'clock in the morning, the witness was at
KODIM, and at around 7 o'clock he did the morning call, then around 8
o'clock that morning, masses began to crowd;
- That the witness heard gunshots from the downtown area, in the direction
of the residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, and then the witness was
summoned by Lieutenant TNI. Joko, along with several of his friends to go
for the rescue of the pastor because the pastor was one of the area
respected figures, and Lieutenant Joko told them that the rescue was ordered
by the Commander;
- That the riot took place inside as well as outside the pastor's house, as
there were officers who tried to break up the fights, the witness came only
to rescue the pastor;
- That the witness escorted the pastor to KODIM, and when the witness
arrived at KODIM, the pastor was directly greeted by DANDIM;
- That the turmoil victimized 5 (five) people died, and about 20 others
wounded;
- That the witness heard when the tear gas was thrown/shot by the police, it
was done to disperse the masses;
- That when the witness was escorting the pastor toward the exit, a man came
aiming his gun at the pastor, then Lieutenant Joko shouted don't shoot! If
you shoot him, I'll shoot you now, he shouted to the man who aimed his gun
at the pastor;
- That according to reports, those who did the shootings, destroying, also
kidnapping on the 5th of April 1999, were the men led by Jacinto, the Dato
Village Chief, the one who was kidnapped, was Ananias, the kid of a civil
servant assigned at KODIM;
- That as far as the witness knew, no members of KODIM made the attacks, and
no Militia ever gathered at MAKODIM;
- That the background that led to the riot, was that the masses crowding
outside the pastor's house demanded Jacinto, the Dato village Chief, to be
handed over, then the clashes broke out with the people inside the church;
- That in accordance with the leaders' instruction, TNI should stand neutral
and took no sides;
Witness 22 Major TNI. Infantry HARTONO
- That on the 5th of September 1999, during the mass clashes at Diocese Dili,
the witness, along with several other KODIM members, and 2 platoons from
YONIF (Infantry Battalion) 321/ Brawijaya assisted the police officers to
prevent and end the mass riot at Diocese Dili;
- That the next day on the 6th of September 1999, the witness, along with
the 2 (two) platoons of YONIF 521 (sic) / Brawijaya troop, made security
precautions surrounding the house of Bishop Belo;
- That during the mass clashes at the house of Bishop Belo, the witness
assisted the POLRI or BRIMOB officers to stand guard, secure and rescue
people hiding in the house of Bishop Belo;
- That the witness never saw either TNI or POLRI members who were involved
in the attacks on the house of Bishop Belo;
Witness 23 Brigadier General TNI. WIDHYA BAGJA
- That the witness had been assigned as KASETUM of MABES TNI;
- That the witness had handed over letters to the Attorney General Office (then
the witness presented the photo-copies of the letters to the panel);
- That there were 2 kinds of letters, the incoming letters that had no
original copies, only the photo-copies, and the outgoing letters that had
the original copies, and there were the original copies of the letters from
MABES TNI;
- The copies that were sent were exactly the same as those kept at MABES TNI,
but the witness did not open the letters, and besides those letters, the
witness never sent other letters to the Attorney General Office;
- That the letters reserved at KASETUM MABES TNI were those signed by KODAM,
and the original letters were still reserved at KODAM, the witness never
received original letters;
Witness 24 I KETUT MURTIKA, SH.
- That on the 10th of August 2000, the witness confiscated as many as 16
letters from MABES TNI, and the one who handed over the letters was a SETUM
official at MABES TNI, Widhya Bagya;
- That the letters were handed over in the form of photo-copies, and
according to the SETUM official, the original letters were reserved at KODAM
UDAYANA, the witness never saw the originals, the letters, besides presented
as evidence in the case, were also presented as evidence in other cases;
- That on the other evidence letters/documents, a team was authorized to
make the confiscation;
- That the letters were handed over by the witness to the supervisors to be
stamped by JAMPIDUM as the letters of evidence in the court, and the
official who issued the confiscation permits was the Junior Attorney General
(Jaksa Agung Muda);
- That the confiscation was authorized to a team, and when the confiscation
was in progress, KASETUM MABES TNI Widhya Bagya was accompanied by 2 (two)
officials, Major TNI. Kurniasih and Tobing, after that the official record
was made;
- That for the testimony of the witness the Defendant declared no knowledge
of the letters;
Witness 25 Brigadier General Police Drs. TIMBUL SILAEN (the testimony was
read)
- That on the whole, POLRI acknowledged the terms BMP, AITARAK, MAHIDI and
others as the organizations established by the Pro-Integration youth, as far
as the witness observed, the organizations had no weaponry, but the inputs
from the foreign journalist and reports from the subordinate officials, said
that they were sporadically seen carrying homemade firearms, as well as
organic guns;
- That to follow up the reports, or information, the witness instructed
KAPOLRES to conduct "sweepings," the result was that some of the homemade
firearms were confiscated by POLRES officers;
- That the case on the attacks at the house of Manuel Carascalao as it was
happening, the witness was on a flight from Jakarta to Dili, he arrived in
Dili at 13.00 WIB., in the airport, the witness received reports from
WAKAPOLDA, and KAPOLRES Dili, that there were attacks at the residence of
Manuel Carascalao, from the airport the witness went straight to TKP;
- That at the house of Bishop Belo, the witness met Bishop Belo, Manuel
Carascalao, and Leandro Isak, they asked for protection at POLDA, then
escorted by BRIMOB, the two Pro-Independence figures along with about 100
other refugees were secured at East Timor POLDA;
- That on the legal actions against the perpetrators, POLRI had conducted
TKP processing, made visum (official record) reports, and arrested the
perpetrators;
- That the attacks on UNAMET office in Bobonaro started with the fights
between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence that took place in
front of UNAMET office, the Pro-Independence members ran towards UNAMET
office, that made the Pro-Integration group throw things at UNAMET office,
which broke the glass windows of the UNAMET office;
- That KAMRA was under the supervision of POLRI, in accordance with the Law
that regulated it, KAMRA only managed, guarded, and made first precautions
at the crime scene, if they became the members of organizations such as
AITARAK, BMP or others, they did it outside the scope of KAMRA organization;
- That KAMRA were recruited by KOREM, from the first registration, up to the
trainings were done by KOREM, their number reached around 1,000;
- That the witness received reports on the case over the attacks at Liquisa
church, then the witness instructed WAKAPOLDA and several other KADIT
officers to back up KAPOLRES Liquisa with the assistance of a BRIMOB Company
from East Timor POLDA;
- That the reports the witness received stated that the crowding masses, and
the occurring gunshots at the church compound made the preventive measures
difficult;
- The measures taken after the incident were localizing the incident with
TKP processing, then after the 5 corpses were discovered, requesting the
visum reports to the hospital, securing the refugees, and making the arrests;
- That the attacks on Diocese Dili on the 5th of August 1999, at 14.30 WITA,
started with the clashes occurring among the masses crowding the harbor,
seeing the huge number of the Pro-Autonomy masses, the Pro-Independence
party ran away towards Diocese Dili for protection, then the Pro-Autonomy
masses pushed their way into Diocese Dili and committed the burning and
destroying;
- That BRIMOB officers tried to hamper the approaching waves of masses by
firing the warning shots, after the fire dispersed, the police made the
entrance to the TKP, there were no victims, but rumors outside claimed that
the victims were loaded onto trucks;
- That the attacks at the house of Bishop Belo on the 6th of September 1999,
quickly spread out as the shootings continued, the Pro-Autonomy masses tried
to burn down the Diocese, but they were chased away by BRIMOB, who put out
the flame;
- That Bishop Belo was rescued by Major Carlo, and on the request of Bishop
Belo, he boarded on a helicopter in a flight to Baucau, and for the rescue,
Bishop Belo called the witness on the phone to express his gratitude;
- That in line with the plans in CABUT II and HANOIN LOROSAE II operations,
the tasks of East Timor POLDA would be providing the security precautions in
the evacuations of WNI (Indonesian citizens) and WNA (foreigners) out of
East Timor after the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- That the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot was that the number
of the votes for Option I reached 94,388 or approximately 21.5 %, while
those who chose Option II were 344,58 (sic!) votes or 78.5 %;
- That East Timor POLDA was particularly different with other POLDA, as East
Timor was formerly the area for 'operations', or the disturbed areas which
continually had TATOLI IV Operations;
- That in the TATOLI operations, KAPOLRES was posted as WADAN (the Deputy
Commander) of the Sub-sector under KODIM, this condition continued for a
long time up to the time of the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, during a visit of MENHANKAM (Minister
of Defense and Security)/ PANGAB (ABRI Commander) and other officials to
Dili, PANGKOOPS reported the situation to the minister, so since the 4th of
September 1999, midnight, WITA, the transfer of KODAL Commands had been in
the hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA, the control was already in the hands of
PANGKOOPS NUSRA, Major General TNI. Adam R. Damiri, after that, the transfer
was made from PANGKOOPS NUSRA to the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority on the 7th of September 1999;
Witness 26 Magistrate CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES BELO (the witness testimony was
read in court)
- That the witness became the Apostolic Administrator of Diocese Dili since
the 13th of May 1983, and pentasbisan (the official ceremony) as the Bishop
was made on the 19th of June 1988;
- That on the 3rd of September 1999, the witness went home from Baucau on a
UNAMET helicopter arriving at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the witness
saw between 60 and 70 refugees gathering at the compound, and on 4th of
September the number had increased to 90, on the 4th of September 1999, the
People's Consultation/ Ballot was announced, and through the evening, the
number of refugees kept on rising, and by the 5th of September 1999, there
were already 4,000 people;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, a meeting was held at the Commander's
residence in Farol, attended by Gen. TNI. (Ret.) Faisal Tanjung, Gen.
Wiranto, KAPOLRI, and Lopez Da Cruz, Salvador Soares, while from FPDK, there
were Joao Tavares, Basilio Araujo, and Mario Sanchez, and from CNRT, MAUHUDU
attended, while representatives of the church were the witness himself and
Manuel Abrantas;
- The Minister of Political and Security Affairs, General TNI. (Ret.) Faisal
Tanjung, said that the referendum had been completed and the Indonesian
government fully accepted the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
though acknowledged the occurring frauds, the Indonesian government still
accepted it;
- That Gen. TNI. Faisal Tanjung also said that if there were problems
concerning groups of people who refused to accept the result of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, it would be up to the East Timor people to seek
solution;
- That General Wiranto said even though there had been a thousand of frauds,
and the number votes for the Pro-Independence that reached 78 % was too high,
the Indonesian government would have accepted it, and urged the church to
make reconciliation and dialogs between the Pro-Independence and the
Pro-Integration Group;
- That in the meeting, the witness asked 2 questions to General Wiranto, the
first was that ABRI Community had sophisticated, highly-skilled intelligence,
could they discover who did the night shootings in Dili? The second was that
the witness requested TNI Commander Gen. WIRANTO to clean up the routes of
Dili - Batu Gade, and Dili - Lauten from Militia groups and checking posts
they established along the road, the two questions were not answered by
General TNI. Wiranto, those words were just cynical criticism, they had been
aware that there would be chaos when the church was urged to have
reconciliation;
- That Joao Tavares refused to have reconciliation with FRETILIN, as
FRETILIN were liars and murderers;
- That the witness went home at around 3 o'clock, then there was a phone
call from General VICAR telling that CAMAR ECCLISIASTICA was surrounded by
Militia, but the witness stayed home, and in the evening there were already
5,000 refugees;
- That on the 5th of September 1999, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon,
shots had been fired all through the evening, then on the 6th of September
1999, when the witness woke up at 5.00 in the morning, the witness saw in
front of the house, there were 2 (two) trucks of KOSTRAD (the Army Strategic
Reserve Command) soldiers, who said they were there to protect the refugees,
then at around 6.00 that morning, the witness went out to ask for permission
so that the refugees could go to the beach to urinate, but 15 minutes later
the 2 (two) trucks just disappeared;
- That after breakfast the witness made a phone call to KAPOLDA Timbul
Silaen, requesting trucks to transport the refugees from Dili to Baucau,
KAPOLDA told the witness to directly call DANREM to be provided with trucks
and protection, but DANREM said they had no vehicles available;
- That when a Lieutenant Colonel from KOSTRAD came to ask how he was doing,
the witness asked him to provide the protection to avoid Militia attacks,
then the witness heard from the children at the witness' house that when the
Lieutenant Colonel went out and arrived at the end of the road, he shouted
at the Militia waiting there, attack now; attack now otherwise I'd kill you;
- That around 4.30 p.m. they rode motorbikes around the house and threw
stones onto the roof while repeatedly shouting;
- That as the shootings started, they began to throw Molotov bombs onto the
veranda in front of the main entrance, after that there were shots fired at
the witness from the four corners of the compound, the east, west, south and
north, the witness saw glass windows were crashed, the refugees started to
scream, women and children cried, the Militia shouted: "Sae, sae, sae!,"
which in TETUN language meant "Out, out, out!," there were, at the time,
around 5,000 refugees;
- That the witness shouted to everybody to sit down in the garden, then the
witness met several youth representatives of the Militia and asked them to
put out the fire that started to spread up from the windows, they answered:
"We have our leaders, so we can't do anything," at that time, the police
arrived in a truck, and started to make actions to control the situation,
and sent the foreigners away toward a football field in front of the witness'
house;
- That KAPOLDA then sent a jeep to carry the witness to POLDA, the witness
left the refugees, and after that the witness could not recollect what
happened;
- That in the talk between the witness and KAPOLDA at POLDA, KAPOLDA Timbul
Silaen said to the witness: "Bishop, we had to take these actions, because
when Timor people were in trouble, they always ran to the church, the
pastors, or the nuns, and to prevent that, we have to do this;"
- The KAPOLDA at the time just kept giving instructions, not seriously. The
children told him that the police themselves threw kerosene onto the flame;
- That KAPOLDA provided a helicopter and brought the witness to Baucau, and
according to the witness' children, KOPASSUS were already there separating
men and the women, and searched for activists;
- That the refugees seeking shelters in the witness' house came from various
'corners' (of the area), they said that the armed Military riding on trucks
came to their houses, told them to get out leaving all of their belongings,
then the Militia set their houses on fire;
Witness 27 ABILIO JOSE OSORIO SOARES (the testimony was read in court)
- That the witness was the former governor of East Timor before and after
the People's Consultation/ Ballot, the Governor's duty was to carry out the
governance, to develop the society, and have good coordination with related
institutions, and usually, all the central government institutions in the
provincial level assisted the governor in carrying out the tasks;
- That East Timor problems became complicated after the intervention of the
International world, and on top of that was the engineering behind the Nobel
Prize Award, given to Ramos Horta on the 12th of November 1992;
- That the witness had refused the implementation of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, instead he wanted reconciliation efforts, if necessary,
be held in Australia by inviting East Timor prominent figures residing in
East Timor, as well as outside East Timor, including Xanana Gusmao;
- That at the time, the witness instructed all regents to establish PAM
SWAKARSA with the aim to prevent physical conflicts between people's groups
throughout the regencies;
- That at the time nearing the People's Consultation/ Ballot, PEMDA (the
Local Government) established 2 organizations:
1. FPDK (Forum for the Unity of Democracy and Justice)
2. BRTT (East Timor People Guard)
to organize all East Timor people down to the village level, and 75 % of
East Timor people joined in the organizations.
- That during the People's Consultation/ Ballot, there were frauds committed
by UNAMET officials, the witnesses from outside the TPS (Polling Places)
were not allowed to observe in the voting, an example of UNAMET frauds was
that the witness' parents were told to punch the cards to vote for the
Pro-Independence;
- That in Suai Regency, in an UNAMET car imported from Portugal, driven by
an UNAMET personnel, during the election, they found ballot cards already
punched on the Pro-Independence column, so the witness saw the process of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot was flawed and full of frauds;
- That FPDK and BRTT protested to UNAMET, and UNAMET had admitted the fraud,
but all of a sudden the announcement of the result of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot was advanced onto the 4th of September 1999, instead of
the earlier planned on the 7th of September 1999;
- That the advancement of the announcement of the People's Consultation/
Ballot from the 7th of September 1999, to the 4th of September 1999, led the
people who were defeated into committing crimes such as the burning and
destroying of properties, and the killing of people suspected as those of
UNAMET team;
- That at the time, there was an opinion that ABRI had told people to take
refuge, that happened not because ABRI told them to, but because they wanted
to, and the burning of properties were committed by the people on their own
houses and vehicles;
- That if there was members of ABRI who were involved, they were the East
Timor natives who were frustrated over the disappointing treatment of the
international world;
- That at the time, the witness knew on the murders and burning of
properties when he received the information through the phone call from Jose
Ximenes, the Head of the DLLAJR (Traffic and Land Transportation Agency)
office, and the witness immediately informed the Defendant on the incidents;
- That in carrying out the governance in the province, there should always
be coordination with related institutions especially MUSPIDA elements, and
occurring problems would be discussed in the scope of MUSPIDA forums;
- That PAM SWAKARSA was officially established by PEMDA TK. II (Regency
Level Government) based on a Governor's Decree, and PAM SWAKARSA
organizations on the regency level were given new names by the PEMDA TK. II,
such as AITARAK, BMP, MAHIDI, ABLAI or MAHADOMI;
- That PAM SWAKARSA assisted PEMDA TK. II in maintaining security and order
in the community, besides the existing security authority;
- That the institution providing the supervision were the respective regent
with the financial support from APBD (the local government budget plan);
- That the witness knew on the murders happened at the house of Manuel
Carascalao, located next to his family home, while the murders in Liquisa
were informed to the witness through reports from Liquisa regent, and the
murder of Journalist Sander Robert Thones, the witness acknowledged through
people's information;
- That before the People's Consultation/ Ballot, the witness had already
known the possibility of the occurring clashes, and the witness had asked
the security authority to make anticipation;
- That considering the possibilities, the witness instructed the
establishment of PAM SWAKARSA due to the possible security disturbances in
many areas, for the security maintenance during the People's Consultation/
Ballot, and for providing prepared personnel for security precautions at TPS,
which were useless efforts;
Witness 28 AKBP Pol. (Assistant to the Chief Police Commissioner) Drs.
HULMAN GULTOM (the testimony was read in court)
- That as KAPOLRES of Dili, the witness had duty to enforce the Law, to
protect people, and to serve people in the POLRES Dili jurisdiction, and as
KAPOLRES of Dili, the witness was responsible to East Timor KAPOLDA;
- That at POLRES Dili, there were assigned KAMRA recruited from East Timor
KOREM, reaching 120 personnel, with the majority of them were East Timor
natives;
- That on the 17th of April 1999, there was an official ceremony of the
establishment of AITARAK, the ceremony was successfully held, and ended at
around 11.00 WITA (Central Indonesia Time), and as the participants started
to go back to their respective places, riots erupted in several places,
among others, at the residence of Manuel Carascalao;
- That at the time, one platoon of BRIMOB arrived at the TKP when the riot
was in progress, the riot could be immediately handled, but still caused
victims, in which 13 people died, while 41 others were rescued at MAPOLRES
Dili;
- That on the 17th of April 1999, riots occurred in 3 different locations so
that the security forces were limited;
- That on the 4th of September 1999, the result of the People's Consultation/
Ballot was announced and it was won by the Pro-Independence Group, since the
announcement, the Pro-Integration Group became disappointed and committed
the crimes that scared people and made them seek shelters at Dili harbor;
- That as far as the witness knew, the attacks at Diocese Dili happened on
the 4th of September 1999, started with the activities of the
Pro-Integration that scared people, many of the people ran to Dili harbor
for protection and refuge, and some others seek the protection at Diocese
Dili;
- That after they knew that the Pro-Integration masses had attacked Diocese
Dili, POLRES Dili could only send the 7-men force led by 2 KAPUSKODAL and
KASATSERSE officers with the 5 members, the 7 POLRI personnel could not
handle nor chased away the attacking masses reaching around 300 people;
- That the incident of the siege of Diocese Dili happened so fast, as when
the back up forces arrived, Diocese Dili was already in flame, while the
available firefighter trucks were not in use;
- That on the 6th of September 1999, right on midnight WITA, the Military
Emergency Authority started to take effect, KAPUSKODAL was informed that the
residence of Bishop Belo was under attacks, and at the time he arrived at
the residence of Bishop Belo, POLRI troop led by Lieut. Col. J. J. Sitompul
were already there to rescue Bishop Belo and the refugees sheltering at the
residence of Bishop Belo, then brought them to East Timor POLDA;
- That in the TATOLI IV Operations, KAPOLRES was the WADAN (Deputy Commander)
of Dili Sub-sector, while the Sub-sector Commander was DANDIM of Dili, and
in the TATOLI IV Operations, POLRI, in the structural existence, was
assigned to handle criminal cases so that the processing would not violate
the Law, and the witness reported to KAPOLDA, while DANDIM to DANREM;
- That the incident was caused by the contradictory interests between the
Pro-Integration and the Anti-Integration;
- That the peak of the disappointment of the Integration groups was at the
time of the announcement of the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
when the Pro-Integration Group suffered a total defeat;
Witness 29 MARSDYA (Lieutenant General of the Air Force) TNI. (Ret.) TAMTAMA
ADI
- That on the 15th of April 1999, the witness, as the TNI Inspector General,
was appointed by MABES TNI as the head of the team to clarify and
investigate the alleged involvement of TNI in the incident at Liquisa Church;
- That the information or news on the case had been confusing, there was
information that in the incident at Liquisa Church located not far from
KODIM, TNI joined in the attacks on the refugees sheltering at Liquisa
Church;
- That the witness went to TKP in Liquisa on the 17th of April 1999, before
investigating the TKP, the witness was escorted to (observe) the locations
were the houses were burnt down in the incidents on 5th of April 1999;
- That after conducting the checks at the TKP, it was clear that the TKP was
not the church, but the Parish House some 50 meters away, and none of the
perpetrators were TNI, however, the officers were the ones who initiate
peace and took parts in the negotiations;
- That TNI joined in the attempts to break-up the fights, also to rescue
Sister Flora, the pastor, and several young people;
- That there was a member of TNI, Lieutenant Sofyan, who got shot and then
brought to the hospital, and the clashes caused 5 people died and 20 others
wounded from machete cuts;
- That to obtain adequate data and information, the witness met the Regent,
Sister Flora, DANDIM, and POLRES Liquisa officers, and people said the one
who burnt properties was Jacinto;
- That according to the information the witness received, on the 6th of
April 1999, there were efforts to make negotiations so that Jacinto, who had
been hiding in the church compound, would turn himself in;
- That the witness had interviews with Sister Flora who also treated and
took care of the victims, and according to Sister Flora, the victims were 5
people died and 20 others wounded from machete cuts;
- That the witness, after getting the clarification, concluded 3 points,
they were:
1. The crime scene was not the church, but the Diocese;
2. The number of dead victims was 5, and the number of the wounded from
machete cuts was 20;
3. The members of POLRI did not involve in the attacks, however, they were
involved in the efforts to bring peace and security;
- That in the methods of investigation, the team consisted of 4 members
conducted interviews and went to the crime scene;
- That MABES TNI got information, on members of TNI who allegedly joined in
the attacks, from reports from NGOs, newspapers or other media coverage, and
intelligence institutions, while the reports from Bishop Belo, the witness
never read them;
- That the witness and the investigation team did not interview Pastor
Rafael, but the witness and his team interviewed John Rea, and according to
John Rea, he tried to negotiate for reconciliation but did not succeed;
- That Pastor Rafael had a pistol and aimed it at people, and he also
mobilized the masses;
- That the witness knew Pastor Rafael had a pistol from DANDIM of Liquisa,
Asep Kuswani;
- That the report made by the investigation team was considered as a Special
Attention Report and it was not final;
- That the report on the investigation and clarification was sent by the
witness to TNI Commander (MABES TNI), and the witness knew that TNI
Commander followed it up as recommended by the team;
- That the witness was informed by sister Flora and the regent, that there
were no involvement of TNI;
- That the Attention Report made by the investigation team was considered as
report with special characteristics and sent to MABES TNI as unsealed
letters;
- That the interviews were done verbally and had no official record;
- That on the 17th of April 1999, there were clashes at the house of Manuel
Viegas Carascalao in Dili, but the witness was not assigned to investigate
the incident in Dili, the witness received reports from DANREM of Dili over
the incident at the house of Manuel Viegas Carascalao;
Witness 30 AKBP Police (Assistant to the Chief Police Commissioner) GATOT
SUBIYAKTORO (the testimony was read in court)
- That the witness was the KAPOLRES of Covalima, East Timor from 1998 to
1999;
- That in the attacks at Suai Church compound, earlier in the day, the
witness made some checks on problems concerning the refugees sheltering at
the SMP II school building, the Public Works office, and POLRES barracks,
the witness went to the regent's house to discuss occurring problems in
handling the refugees, then came the Pro-Integration Group to meet the
regent, and as far as the witness knew, the regent told them to avoid making
unnecessary actions;
- That all of a sudden, gunshots were heard, and they were informed that at
the church, clashes occurred, and that there were burning of properties,
then the regent went straight to the location;
- That when the witness saw the crowding masses, and some of them from the
autonomy groups pushed their way into the church while shouting words the
witness did not understand;
- That the witness called for the members present at the POLRES to get to
the location, and after the riot at the church had dispersed, out of the
church, came around 250 people, mostly women, the witness then instructed to
escort and secure the refugees to the shelters at MAKODIM, as well as at
POLRES;
- That in the next day, on the 6th of September 1999, around 8.30 a.m. WITA,
the witness' members reexamined the TKP, and reported that at the TKP, there
were blood marks, and at the remains of the fire, they found no corpses;
- That the information said the victims had been brought away on a truck by
the Pro-Integration people, and the witness did not know where they brought
them;
- That on the 7th of September 1999, started on midnight WITA, the Military
Emergency was applied in East Timor;
- That the witness had been informed by DANDIM that KAPOLRES was the
Sub-sector's WADAN (Deputy Commander) in TATOLI IV Operations, but when the
operations started or ended, the witness did not know;
Considering the testimony presented in court from the expert witnesses,
proposed by the Team of Attorneys of the Defendant, as well as from those
proposed by the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, mainly explained as follows:
Witness 1 Dr. ARIFIN S. S. TAMBUNAN, SH. (Expert Witness)
- That "Command" was a Military term indicating the authority to have
control on squad-troops, and have control to mobilize and plan the moves/actions
of the subordinate officers, and also supervise the moves/actions of the
subordinate officers;
- There were 2 (two) kinds of Commands, Control Command, and Supervisory
Command. The authority over the control include giving orders and
instructions to the subordinate officers;
- That in the case of neglecting the members allegedly violating the law,
the Commander should be responsible for it;
- That in the TNI Doctrine, the Commander should be responsible over what
his subordinate officers did, and what his subordinate officers did not do;
- That the Commander should be responsible as he was the controller and
supervisor, and the Commander should be the center of the squads;
- That the command structure in ABRI/ TNI, starts top down from the TNI
Commander, then Strategic Reserve Commands under him, the Chief of Staff of
the Forces included the Operational Command, Strategic Reserve Commands,
Tactical Commands, and Personnel Commands;
- That KODAM Commander was included in the Tactical Commands;
- That what was meant by "effective control" was that the Commander/officer
could give orders or instructions to the concerned officers, and if there
were troops that were assigned to assist him, he would also have effective
control over them;
- That every incident that took place anywhere would be the responsibility
of the state, because the state was responsible over the security and public
order anywhere within Indonesian territory, including in East Timor;
- That terms of Human Rights violations were first recognized after the
implementation of the Law no 26 of the year 2000, in which the Commander
would be declared responsible if he knew his subordinate officers committed
the violations, and he made no actions to prevent them or take no actions
within his power against the subordinate officers;
- That in normal situation, PANGDAM was responsible to the TNI Commander,
and in the supervisory matters, he was responsible to KASAD (the Army Chief
of Staff);
- That according to the witness, all soldiers in one territorial command
should be responsible to PANGDAM, and in the Military Law, verbal
instructions were the same as the written ones;
- That when DANDIM and DANREM could not handle the situation, then PANGDAM
should take over;
- That the role of TNI in the defense and security was to uphold and keep
the country's sovereignty;
- That in the situation in which the country was in the civil law and order,
the responsibility of the country's security and public order would be in
the hands of POLRI, and when POLRI were incapable of handling it, then TNI
had the obligation to assist;
- That in the case of the Military Emergency in KODAM territory, PANGDAM
would be the commander of the Military Emergency Authority;
Witness 2 Prof. Dr. MULADI, SH (Expert Witness)
- That the witness had been to East Timor with a group of officials sometime
in between August and September 1999, before the People's Consultation/
Ballot, at the time, the witness observed the internal tensions between the
Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence;
- That at the time, the witness stayed in the airport, the ones who came to
Dili were only PANGAB, General Wiranto, and his officers, at the time the
witness was the Minister of Judicial Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia;
- That the most noted event concerning East Timor was international pressure
to bring to trial, the Human Rights violators in Indonesia;
- That frankly, the Human Rights violators were not only from the RI party,
but also those from the East Timor party from the Pro-Independence, because
in a conflict, the two opposing parties must have committed Human Rights
violations, whether the indictments were of serious/grave Human Rights
violations or of just ordinary crimes, they could be further tried, but the
two parties interacted each other in the matter, including President Xanana
Gusmao;
- That Indonesia had established Human Rights Court, not because of the
International pressure, Indonesia established the Human Rights Court as a
sovereign country, which had dignity to bring to trial its people, based on
its own Law;
- That the responsibility of a Command would be the responsibility of a
military commander against crimes committed by his troops, individually or
collectively, under the effective control of the Commander, there were 2 (two)
kinds of Command Responsibilities, the first was Direct Command
Responsibility in the form of commissioned actions or active actions, such
as terminate the soldiers or commit murders, the second was in the form of
omission crimes, or in Indonesian language was termed as crimes of
negligence (pembiaran), in which the commander who knew of the possible
crimes made no preventive measures to stop the crimes, and if there were
already committed crimes, made no effort to take the violators for further
investigation and legal indictment;
- That there were judgments of the International Crime Tribunal over Command
Responsibility cases such as Tokyo, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda cases, and there
were doctrines or principles on the enforcement set forth by prominent
figures, or the law experts, or based on the International Common Law (Hukum
Kebiasaan Internasional), and General Principles of Law, moreover, there
were the International Law Principles accepted by most civilized nations;
- That there were measures for the standards of commands:
1. The measure termed as the 'Power to Interfere' in which a commander had
the authority to prevent a possible crime;
2. The measure termed as the 'Power to put to an End' over a crime in
progress;
3. The measure termed as the 'Power to Refresh' by applying penalty in
accordance with the formulation of the Article 26. Then there were the
Subordinate-Supervisor relation, and the Commander-Force relation under his
affirmative command, so there were the same quality relationships in the
supervisory and the military terms;
4. The measure termed as 'Material Ability' which means every commander
could use his power whenever he wants, then the right of the effective
control is in a line of command called Circular Command, so even if he is
not a Top Commander, he is in the position to influence decision making, the
commander has the authority to give orders/instructions obligatory to his
subordinates, he has the affirmative duty, he has the legal, as well as
moral obligations to supervise and control his subordinate officers;
- That the elements of the Effective Control, for example, revealed in court
hearings of a case in Tokyo, Japan, in which in a troop, there was a
commander who was on trial for mass-rape crimes in Nanjing, but the
commander, who was a logistics officer, could not be held responsible, he
was free of charges because he did not have the effective power to influence
the Commander, then the man moved to the Philippines to become a staff
member of General Yamashita, in the post of an operational officer, it
turned out the violence in the Philippines involved Japanese soldiers,
therefore this man was held responsible because he was in the position of a
policy maker, he was then an officer with effective and tactical powers;
- That the witness heard about the frauds committed by UNAMET as KOMNAS HAM
had representatives there, the election staff were recruited from the
Pro-Independence people, and the vote counting were not done in Indonesia,
but they were done abroad;
- That Indonesia filed serious complaints on the matters, then 3 (three)
prominent judges from England, Scandinavia and Netherlands were assigned to
look over the matters, they concluded that there were possible frauds but
the numbers were insignificant, the frauds were systematically executed;
Witness 3 Dr. DODI HARYADI (Expert Witness)
- That the witness' attention was the turbulence of the social behavior
during the People's Consultation/ Ballot in East Timor, the witness tried to
make analysis on the back ground of such social behavior;
- That the witness made the observations by keeping himself well informed on
the case through mass-media;
- That the brutal actions as the characteristics of mass physiology, were
caused by the collective emotional loads that needed expulsions, or release,
against obstructions, so the obstructions became the objects of emotional
discharges of the masses;
- That the witness made a study on the characteristics of the East Timor
population, historically, it was described that East Timor people were
divided into sub-ethnics, which had been long socialized as having conflicts
among the sub-ethnics, or the non-homogeneous society groups;
- That if the mass characteristics were situational or spontaneous, the
change of behavior, which was previously controlled, could instantly change
into the mass behavior that were difficult to anticipate and unpredictable;
- That when a certain number of individuals gathered and were in the
collective emotion, that would be a predisposition to the possible mass
behavior, there were External Condition that stimulate the emotion which was
the trigger factor of collective behavior termed as the mass-behavior;
- That the back ground of the ethnical cultures of East Timor people, this
condition alone, was already a predisposition of occurring conflicts, then
the situational conditions during the mass behavior were considered as
problematic, so the efforts to overcome the occurring mass-behavior in that
mode, would be very difficult;
Witness 4 Brigadier General Retired TNI. AD. (Army) P.L.T. SIHOMBING (Expert
Witness)
- That what was meant by the Command Responsibility would be the
responsibility of a Commander based on Criminal, as well as Civil laws over
crimes committed by his subordinate officers, and the Command Responsibility,
in Indonesia, had been a new issue;
- That the Indonesian Law and Regulations were mostly the legacy on the
former Dutch colonial government, designed to meet the interests of the
colonial authority, so that the omission or the command responsibility
offenses were not adequately accommodated in the Military KUHP (the Military
Criminal Code) and in KUHP (the Criminal Code);
- The result of that was the commanders were seldom touched by Law, as all
soldiers or commanders should be equal in Law;
- That the command responsibility should comply with the principles of the
Military Doctrines, which exercised the Unity of Command through the Chain
of Command;
- That the chain of command started from the top ranked, down to the lowest
ranked positions, was nationally subjective, they were practiced, based on
the command system of each country;
- That the background of the practice of the command responsibility, from
the state point of view, was because the commander had been authorized with
certain obligations which were not accomplished, so he made mistakes he
should be responsible for, as due to his "wrong full act", the crimes
committed by his troop members took place, so the responsibility should come
from that;
- That the command responsibility of the command line could be stretched
from the bottom up by complying with the elements as follows:
1. There should be provided evidence of grave Human Rights violations
committed by his troop members, if there were none, there would be no
command responsibility;
2. There should be the subordinate relation between the commander and the
actors of the crimes, and the subordinate relation could be applied to the
commander, not only to the one who held the command, so it could be applied
to the direct commander, or indirect ones, that would be the point of
decision, those who could be held responsible were every commander within
the chain of command, from the lowest ranked, up to the highest one;
3. The commander did not act upon or failed to act upon the power authorized
to him to stop (the crimes), or turn in the violators to the authority;
- That when the KODIM Commander did not take any actions, then he should be
held responsible, then it could be investigated further up, that when the
DANREM did not take adequate actions, he could be held responsible too, this
could be done further up onto the top of the chain;
- That what was meant by the subordinate relation was the subordinate
relation between the commander and the actors of the crimes, and the
relationship should not be direct, it could be indirect ones, but it could
not be stretched out to the sides, it could only stretched upwards;
- That the chain of command applied in TNI circle was regulated in the Law
No. 20 of the year 1982, Presidential Decree No. 60 of the year 1983,
Commander's Decree No. 8,9 and 10 of the year 1992, and in the Buku Petunjuk
Lapangan Tingkatan Satuan-satuan (Guideline Book for Field Level Squads
(?)), such as the Guideline Book of Ground Combat Operations, the Guideline
Book of Merged Operations, and the Guideline Book of MABES TNI, but it was
principally based on the Article 37 Paragraph 1, and the Paragraph 3 of the
Law No. 20 of the year 1982;
- That the prime supervisory command had the duty to supervise TNI squads
and elements, while the prime operational commands were the elements of
executors of the military operations in Indonesia. But the prime supervisory
command, at one time, could become the prime operational command, for
example, KODAM, once, had become the prime supervisory command supervising
squads at the time, and was responsible to the chief of staff, when it
became the prime operational command, it was responsible to the Commander;
- That as the prime supervisory command PANGDAM had the duty to supervise
the TNI elements or his line of officers to be ready for any task, and as
the prime operational command, PANGDAM carried out instructions of the upper
commands;
- That command squads were the principles applied universally in the
Military, the national military should be obedient in carrying out the tasks
in one command to avoid duplications, and to create the unity of efforts to
carry out the main duty or other state obligations;
- That the acts of control were carried out after given orders or the
execution of instructions from the upper commands, this control mode was one
facilities of KODAL Commands in the military existence, the effective
control could be confirmed whether or not the command was reported, that was
the confirmation, for example, DANDIM received reports from DANRAMIL, so
DANDIM was the effective controller, it could be observed through
operational instructions, as there was the KODAL Command, so as long as the
reports were made, the effective control was applied;
- That to claim the command responsibility, in practice, there should not be
necessarily evidence from the court's decision, but the public opinion
claiming the troop member's involvement in the crimes of grave Human Right
violations, would be enough, it could be claimed without trial;
- That certain articles of the Humanitarian Law were in the competent
Military Commander Convention which applied the law to the subordinate
officers, and this was the omission offense applied in the Humanitarian Law,
while in the command responsibility, a commander would be in the right
position to be the law enforcement officer as he was authorized to do that,
however, the power was not adequately used on time, which led to the grave
Human Rights violations committed by his subordinate officers;
- That for the civilians, the Humanitarian Law-based terminology were
applied in various ways, while Combatants were the members of the armed
forces or groups who spontaneously applied resistance against attacks from
the opposing party;
- That whether or not Militia were Combatants, were depended on the
prerequisites, whether or not the militia had a commander who was
responsible over the actions of his men, or, whether or not the militia
conducted military operations in accordance with the International Law;
- That Wanra as long as they were included in power structure they were
included as Combatants, but if they were not included in the structure they
were not Combatants;
- If Wanra committed crimes, if Wanra were included in the KODIM structure,
the one who took responsible was the KODIM Commander;
- That in the element of the commander's knowledge of the grave Human Rights
violations after the occurrence or those in progress, the commander should
not be necessarily informed just through official reports of his subordinate
officers, a newspaper coverage claiming the occurring violations, for
instance, would be enough to be used as the evidence;
- That when there were newspapers reports on repeated pattern of the "wrong
full acts", the commander should take immediate actions, the commander
should instruct the competent elements to investigate and take legal actions;
- That in the 'superior order', in this position, the commander should still
be held responsible, as in the execution of operations, the commander had to
be responsible over 2 (two) things, first, he must ensure his subordinate
officers could safely carry out their task, and second, the main duty should
be accomplished, so there should have been guidelines on what the troop
members could and could not do, though unfortunately, they had never been
regulated;
- That concerning all the cases that took place in TNI circle, there was a
telegram from ABRI Commander No. 10 of the year 1995, requiring every
commander to hand over the legal cases taking place in their squad circles,
to the investigators for follow ups;
- That the commander who had the control over the execution of an operation,
should know everything that happened in the operation, so if there were
violations he did not aware of, that means his control was not effective;
- That in the practice of Article 42, of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000,
the first element was that there were the involvement of the troop members
in the crimes, the second was there was the subordinate relation with the
actors of the crimes while such subordinate relation should not be
necessarily a direct one;
Witness 5 Prof. AHMAD SARIFUDIN NATABAYA, SH. (Expert Witness)
- That the witness took part in the preparation of the Law No. 26 of the
year 2000, as the government found it necessary to have or apply the Law to
seek settlements on East Timor cases;
- That the commander's responsibility according to Article 42 of the Law No.
26 of the year 2000 were the same as those in Article 28 ICC, so the command
responsibility in the International Law practice were the same as those
practiced in Indonesia;
- That a command was a legal authority or power given to the commander to
give orders/ instructions to the soldiers under his command, or the person
who hold the command responsibility;
- That the meaning of the Effective Command Control was, it could be
executed effectively and 'de jure' had the power to give instructions to the
sub organic level, there should be the Chain of Command, so the one who was
responsible was the commander who was given the power to give direct orders;
- That in accordance with the Law, the person who could be held responsible
for the command responsibility was the one who held the effective command;
- That each country had its own rule on the command responsibility as stated
in the indictments on the Defendant, in the command responsibility regulated
in the Article 42 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, it was clear that
every country had its own rules on who should be effectively responsible, as
in the military there was the Chain of Command in which the first one who
should be responsible was the one who had 'de jure' and 'de facto' power to
give direct orders to the subordinate officers;
- That based on the Den Haag Convention, a Commander should be responsible
even over the actions of his subordinate officers;
Witness 6 Lieutenant General Retired TNI. AD (Army) SAYIDIMAN SURYO
HADIPROJO (Expert Witness)
- That the witness explained that in 1945, General Yamashita was held
responsible over what the Japanese soldiers did in the Philippines at the
end of the war, at the time, General Yamashita was the Commander of the
Japanese Army in the Philippines, but the witness observed that it was the
changes arranged by the English and American troops over the charges on
General Yamashita, who was the offensive leader of Japan in the Malaysia
peninsula, General Yamashita was blamed because the Japanese soldiers in the
Philippines treated the allied troops' war prisoners inhumanly, which was
considered as a violation of the Geneva Convention on the prisoners of war;
- That the Military Emergency was decided by the Head of State and the
Government, as when the TNI Commander was present, he would hold the command,
so in the conflicts such as these, it could happen that the police were
under the command of the military;
- That a military commander should be a Military Officer who was authorized
to hold the Military Command, the one who would effectively carry out the
military control, which means that the person could effectively have control
on the subordinate officers;
- That as an example, one infantry battalion had a Battalion Commander who
supervised 4 up to 5 companies, the Battalion Commander had the effective
control over the Company Commanders, that is why every execution of tasks
should be assigned with official instruction, verbally, as well as in
writing, from the Platoon Commander to the DANKI (Company Commanders), and
this would be the effective control;
- That in the military world, there were rules to ban the demolition of
civilians, the demolition of civilians would be against the military law, a
serious violation of the principles of war;
- That Combatants were meant for all members of the military, wearing
uniforms, carrying or not carrying weapons, and civilians could be
considered as Combatants, for example, guerilla troops;
- That members of WANRA were in the TNI guerillas, like many of the
territorial members during the subsequent fights for the Independence, WANRA
became Combatants, but when they did not take part, they would be the
Non-combatants, they were ordinary people or civilians;
Considering the testimony of the Defendant, Major General TNI. AD. (Army)
Adam R. Damiri, which had been presented in court, mainly explained as
follows:
- That the Defendant was assigned as PANGDAM UDAYANA since the 14th of June
1998 until the 27th of November 1999, or practically for 16 month;
- That the Defendant's duty as PANGDAM UDAYANA covered 2 (two) fields, they
were;
1. As the KOTAMA (Commander in Chief), his supervisory duty was to maintain
and improve the orderliness and discipline of the troops under his command,
then maintain and improve the welfare of the soldiers and their families;
2. As the Commander in Chief of Operations, his duty were to organize
operations within his jurisdiction and responsibilities, and then carry out
the tasks of the Garrison, supervise the elements of TNI in his region, lead
and coordinate the elements of MUSPIDA in his region, organize and carry out
territorial operations, or territorial supervisions;
- That in accordance with the Chain of Command, the responsibility of the
PANGDAM 'one step up' would be to the TNI Commander, while 'one step down,'
he had the power of the effective command control on the KOREM Commander,
who had control over the commander under him, the DANDIM;
- That as far as the witness knew, there were 2 (two) Options, the first
Option was made in the end of 1998, which granted the rights of extended
autonomy to the people of East Timor, while the second Option was released
on the 27th of January 1999, stating that in case the people's choice was
not the first Option, East Timor would be separated (from Indonesia) in
reconciliation;
- That the instructions of TNI Commander to the Defendant were related to
the implementations of the first and the second Options, in which the
Defendant should provide conducive situation for the People's Consultation/
Ballot to be held safely, orderly, and successfully;
- That with the historical background of East Timor under Portugal's
colonialism, among people often occurred clashes or prolonged conflicts that
victimized people, therefore the measures taken by the Defendant would be
making efforts to promote peace among the East Timor people;
- That on the 18th of April 1999, the Defendant along with KAPOLDA tried to
call on prominent figures of the two opposing parties to initiate peace
settlements, then on the 20th of April 1999, the TNI Commander came to East
Timor to follow up the peace plan;
- That at the residence of the Commander, the two conflicting parties agreed
to have peace settlements, then a concept of peace treaty was made ready for
the signing, Xanana was the first who was asked to sign it, then the treaty
was sent to the correctional institution he was in, in Jakarta, after it was
signed by Xanana, the treaty was then sent back to Dili, East Timor, Those
who attended the meeting were General Wiranto, Bishop Belo, and
representatives of both groups, the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence;
- That the Defendant, then, socialized the result of the meeting to all
people of East Timor, and the Defendant also took follow-up precautions by
gathering up the weapons, as agreed in the treaty, but the weapons were only
turned in by the Pro-Integration, while the Pro-Independence refused to turn
in their weapons;
- That on the 6th of April 1999, the Defendant received verbal reports from
DANREM Tono Suratman over the mass riot erupted at the residence of Pastor
Rafael Dos Santos, between the Pro-Independence and the Pro-Integration
groups;
- That on the 17th of April 1999, the Defendant received reports from DANREM
Tono Suratman over the mass riot erupted at the house of Manuel Carascalao;
- That the Defendant also received reports from DANREM Col. TNI. Noer Muis,
over the mass riot at Diocese Dili on the 5th of September 1999, and at the
residence of Bishop Belo on the 6th of September 1999;
- That the incident at Ave Maria Church on the 6th of September 1999, was
also reported to the Defendant, the report said the mass riot occurred
between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence at Suai Church, causing
a number of people died or injured;
- That the incident on the 6th of April 1999 which was reported to victimize
27 people and several others wounded, the incident at the house of Manuel
Carascalao that victimized 12 people died, and the incident on the 6th of
September 1999, were all reported to the Defendant;
- That the Defendant received reports that there were no TNI members who
were involved;
- That after the government issued the decision of applying the Military
Emergency, on the 7th of September 1999, PANGDAM/ the Defendant handed over
all things related to the duty and responsibility over security measures in
East Timor region, to the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, Maj.
Gen. Kiki Sahnakrie;
- That after the transfer, the Defendant as the Commander, had no more
authority to maintain security or organize operations within East Timor
region;
- That the Defendant never read the Special Report No. 184/Kep.Sus/IV/1999,
signed by Brig. Gen. TNI. Mahidin Simbolon, the KASDAM of UDAYANA, the
content of which, the Defendant was just informed of in the court;
- That it had become the regular procedure that every incident reported to
the Commander through DANREM, the instructions from PANGDAM would be taking
precautions to overcome the situation, prevent it from spreading out, avoid
causing victims, secure the refugees, arrest and further question the
perpetrators in accordance with the law, those were the instructions of
PANGDAM which were the PROTAP (the regular procedure) of PANGDAM, and after
that, control should be applied to the subordinate officers who received the
instructions;
- That after the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot on the
4th of September 1999, which was earlier planned for the 7th of September
1999, the huge mass unrest occurred as the result of the disappointment of
East Timor people. Overseeing the developing situation, and the possibility
of difficulties in handling the growing problems, the DANREM, KAPOLDA and
UNAMET arranged a joined agreement to make efforts to prevent the spreading
out of the riot by a transfer of KODAL command, after that the Defendant
reported the meeting to the TNI Commander, and on the 5th of September 1999,
at 19.30 the transfer of KODAL started to take effect;
- That based on the transfer of KODAL command, the Defendant made
instructions to his line of officers in Dili area to make preventive and
other necessary precautions, the Defendant issued the instructions in
written record;
- That the structure of KODAM IX UDAYANA, started with PANGDAM and KASDAM as
the top echelon leaders, assisted by the Assistants to the Staff leader
consisted of the intelligence, operational, personnel, logistics, and
territorial staff, then the executive body of KODAM, with the executive
elements in the hands of KOREM Commanders of NTT, NTB, Bali and East Timor;
- That the worth noting events were always reported by the Defendant to the
TNI Commander, then the incident on the 6th of September 1999, at the Ave
Maria Church, Suai were verbally reported by the Defendant to the TNI
Commander, and as the Defendant recalled, the written reports were made by
his staff to be sent to TNI Commander;
- That the reports received by the Defendant stated that the victims of the
incidents at the Ave Maria Church, Suai, reached 29 people, including the
three pastors;
- That the weapons in the possession of TNI for Infantry Battalion 744 and
Battalion 745, TNI standards, were M-16 A-1, some used SS-1, then the
artillery of Mortar-5 for the platoon level, Mortar-6 for the company level,
and Mortar-8 for the battalions, pistols were authorized to leading officers
and higher level ones, while the weapons for territorial squads were type
SP-1 guns, the machine guns were organic guns, and some others used the M-16
A-1;
- That before the grant of Options, they faced the armed separatists, so
every member of the TNI carried guns, but after the Options, the existing
squads could no longer carry out operations, and should stand by in their
military institutions, the infantry were not allowed to carry guns, while
the members of KOREM and KODIM had to put their weapons in storage;
- That the leader of FALINTIL and CNRT was Xanana Gusmao, while the leader
of PAM SWAKARSA and the Pro-Integration was Joao Tavares;
- The instruction of TNI Commander to the Defendant was that the Defendant
should socialize Option I and Option II to all people of East Timor, and
about the Tri-partite Agreement, the Defendant worked together with the
Governor and KAPOLDA of East Timor to socialize the information on the
Tri-partite Agreement and the People's Consultation/ Ballot to all the
people of East Timor;
- The perpetrators of the repeated riots were not shot on sight as the shot
on sight operation had its own procedure, they could not just do it, as it
would not solve the problem, on the contrary, such actions would lead to
bigger problems, if a riot could be dispersed by only warning shots, why
using shot on sight procedure? Except in emergency conditions in which the
threatening riot could not be dispersed;
- That the squad troops in BKO Operations under KOREM Wira Dharma consisted
of 5 BTT Battalions: 1(one) Battalion accommodated between 700 and 750
personnel spread out into 13 regencies, except 1 (one) Battalion directly
assigned to Dili to anticipate the possible attacks by FALINTIL from the
southern parts of Dili town;
- That the Defendant was not appointed as the Commander of the Military
Emergency Authority because in MABES TNI Headquarters, when the Military
Emergency status was applied to a certain area, the first one to be the
Commander of the Military Emergency Authority would be the Commander of the
military area or PANGDAM, but subsequent officers in line could also be
appointed for the position, depending on the situation. The TNI Commander
did not appoint the Defendant as the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority because KODAM UDAYANA already supervised 4 (four) provinces, with
each of them having individual characteristics, and the growing situation in
a certain area should be anticipated without neglecting the other 3 (three)
provinces which needed the same attention, while the responsibility for the
other 3 (three) provinces could not be transferred to officers other than
PANGDAM;
- That the consideration of the TNI Commander to appoint Maj. Gen. TNI Kiki
Syahnakri (sic), was because he had the adequate experience in East Timor,
as Maj. Gen. TNI. Kiki Syahnakri was raised in Battalion 744, had become
KASREM (the Chief of Staff of KOREM) and DANREM there, he had better
experience than the Defendant, who domiciled in Bali at the time, while the
Defendant should also accommodate the refugees leaving for NTB area;
- That to decide an area to be in the Military Emergency area needed certain
requirements, the Government applied the Military Emergency with criteria
such as the increase of escalation of the situation that needed to be
handled with stronger legal instruments, then the local Government was no
longer in function, even during a huge natural disaster, the Government
could apply the Military Emergency;
- That the occurring burning of properties happened due to the
disappointment of the people, the burning occurred sporadically, while the
efforts to overcome the fires lacked adequate equipments, as up to the time
of the Military Emergency there were still some of the burning of properties
left. On the 4th of September 1999 the burning of properties spread out to
other areas, not of because there were new fires, but because they had no
equipments to put out the fires;
- That TNI and POLRI did not know who did the burning of properties while
reports to the Defendant said most of the fires occurred because people
burned their own houses or properties of others;
- That during the transfer of KODAL Command to the hands of Maj. Gen TNI
Kiki Syahnakri, the number of victims of the riots between July and
September 1999 reached 65 people died and 13 others injured;
- That the visit of the Inspector General TNI from MABES TNI to East Timor,
the Defendant did not know, but in an letter, the Defendant made a visit to
Dili dated on the 18th of April 1999, to check on the Liquisa incident and
the one at the house of Manuel Carascalao, whereas at the time, he met the
team led by the Inspector General TNI;
- That the perpetrators were arrested, as during the civil authority
government, the case was handled by the police, in the Liquisa incident, the
authority arrested 10 (ten) people, 6 (six) were handled by POLDA, 4 (four)
were handled by POLRES, whereas the follow up procedure, the Defendant did
not know, because they were already in the police process;
- That the locations for refugee shelters were already settled on, the first
were the airport and the seaport, the second were the government and
military institutions, all to facilitate the supervision, and no listed
shelters at churches or convents, as churches and the parish houses were
sacred places;
- That after the incidents, right then, the Defendant knew that there were
refugees sheltering in churches and parish houses, because churches could
not be used as refugee shelters;
- That WANRA, in accordance with the Law No. 20 of the year 1982, were the
people who were trained to assist TNI in the security maintenance of an area,
but not included in the organic TNI, while BABINSA were in the organic TNI;
- That the meaning of 'command' and 'effective control' were that the
command and the effective control were the power and responsibility given to
military commands in accordance with the levels of commands, in the effort
to control the troops under the commands. That related to the effective
command control on the PANGDAM level, he had the effective control only on
DANREM, and DANREM had it on DANDIM, but PANGDAM had no effective control on
KODIM members or on DANDIM, as in accordance with the Chain of Command;
- That the form of the concrete effective command control would be
instructions, orders or whatever directions made within the power of the
leader who was in the direct line with the persons one level under him, in
the case was the DANREM, and PANGDAM also had the power to monitor DANREM,
and PANGDAM also had the power to control and supervise them;
- That in an operation, in line with the Chain of Command, the command and
the effective control, the instructions were given only to the DANREM, not
directly to the troops in charge on the field;
- That in accordance with the Military Criminal Code, there were the rules
regulating the members of the military who committed crimes, ANKUM stated
that a case should be handled by the military police to further investigate
the members who committed violations, then the case was handed over to the
Military Prosecutor (Oditur Militer), who was also their supervisor, who
then, as the PEPERA handed over the case to the Military Tribunal, based on
the investigation;
- That based on the Tri-partite Agreement on the 5th of May 1999, it was
determined that the responsibility of the security maintenance were in the
hands of the RI Government, and the institution in charge was the police,
then the People's Consultation/ Ballot was to be organized by UNAMET and
several institutions under it, so in each of the stages of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, UNAMET was in function and was authorized to make
evaluation to further determine whether it deserved continuance;
- That in the preliminary schedule, the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot was to be made on the 7th of September 1999, and on the
7th of September 1999, all preparation would have been completed, and to
anticipate that, MABES TNI had assigned 2 Brigades of TNI troops, but with
the advancement of the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot
onto the 4th of September 1999, the 2 Brigades could not be assigned on time,
as the brigades departed on ships which needed between 10 to 14 days to
complete the trip;
- That the 2 (two) brigades consisted of more or less than 6 (six)
Battalions with each of the battalions accommodated about 700 personnel, so
there would be 4,200 personnel with the additional two brigades already in
the Brigade Headquarters, each of which, accommodated 100 personnel;
- That the announcement of the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot
led to the disappointment of the people, as from the result of the
monitoring, there were people's plan to express their complaints through a
huge demo, then the prominent figures who planned the demo were summoned to
POLDA to be given directions to express their concern and aspirations to the
UNAMET office, in the evening, the Defendant met Ian Martin, and told him
that the next day, several of the people's prominent figures who felt
disappointed over the result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot, would
come to visit, and that he should receive them well and consider what they
had to say;
- That seeing the chaotic situation after the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, KAPOLDA, DANREM, and UNAMET evaluated that the police
and the authority could no longer overcome the riots, moreover the refugees
sheltering in the listed centers reached hundreds of thousands in numbers,
therefore, by a joined agreement, the transfer of KODAL Command took place,
and fortunately the TNI Commander came to Dili on the 5th of September 1999.
Then the Defendant reported on the plan of the transfer of KODAL Command to
the TNI Commander, and after receiving the reports on the situation in the
field, the TNI Commander decided the transfer of KODAL Command on the 5th of
September 1999, at 19.30 WITA, when the Defendant took over the control on
KODAL, and on the 6th of September 1999, on midnight, the status was changed
into Military Emergency;
- That the organizational structure in the operations where KAPOLRES was the
WADAN of the Sub-sector under DANDIM was during the TATOLI Operations, while
during the Option II, the TATOLI Operations were no longer existed;
- As a professional soldier, the Defendant obeyed and comply with the policy
of the leaders, one of which, the decision to appoint Maj. Gen. TNI Kiki
Syahnakri as the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, was well
accepted and the Defendant never felt a failure, the TNI Commander had his
own considerations for that;
- That since he dedicated himself in the TNI circle, the Defendant had
received 7 (seven) awards from the government, and only 1 (one) the
Defendant was most proud of, the SATYA SEROJA Award;
- That in line with the Government and TNI Commander's Instructions
overseeing the Options and the People's Consultation/ Ballot, there was the
statement on which they would stay neutral and took no sides of either group,
and granted the political rights to all people of East Timor to determine
their own future through the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- That the meaning of an 'interference', was the involvement of 'outsiders'
apart from their authorized function and tasks, for example, the UNAMET
personnel, who were authorized to organize the People's Consultation/ Ballot
with the neutral stance and open, honest approach, but the fact was that
they often intimidated people, and their interference were clearly seen in
the Kantongisasi of FRETILIN groups in which a number of foreigners were
found, then in the shootings against TNI before the Tri-partite Agreement,
during which, in the FRETILIN squads, they found Australian soldiers who
carried, MT-5 guns, also they were found operating illegal flights often
seen cruise along the coast of the southern East Timor;
- That UNAMET came into East Timor province between 2 and 3 months before
the Tri-partite Agreement were signed on the 5th of May 1999;
- That to fill the gap after the authority applied the Military Emergency
starting to take effect since the 7th of September 1999, on the strike of
midnight WITA, while the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority had
not yet arrived, the Defendant tried to make a call on all people of East
Timor broadcasted through the state Radio, RRI, and this was reported to the
Commander of the Military Emergency Authority to avoid being insolence;
Considering besides the testimonies of the witnesses made under oath, the
testimonies of a de charge witnesses, and the testimonies of the expert
witnesses, also the testimonies of other witnesses were presented and read
in court, there were the material evidence that were presented in court,
they were:
1. 1 (one) bundle of the Visum et Repertum dossiers from No. 001/tt.3002/SK
II/XI/1999, up to the Visum et Repertum dossiers No. 026/TT.3002/SK II/XI/1999,
that had been legalized in accordance with the originals.
2. 1 (one) bundled book of dossiers of evidence in the form of photo-copies
consisted of letters, which include:
2.1. The Call of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA on the 7th of September 1999.
2.2. - TR No: STR No. 551/1999 on the transfer of KODAL Command.
- TR No: STR No. 553/1999 on the transfer of KODAL Command.
2.3. The plan of CABUT 2 Operation (Revised)
2.4. The plan on the Actions facing the contingency past the People's
Consultation/ Ballot in East Timor, Option I - failed.
2.5. Written Instructions of MENHANKAM/ PANGAB No. Sprit-1798/PIX/1999 dated
the 7th of September on the Military Emergency Authority Command.
2.6. The reports on the development of situation from PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA to
the TNI Commander and KASAD (The Army Chief of Staff) from the 5th to 11th
of April 1999, from the 12th to 18th of April 1999, from the 23rd to 29th of
August 1999, and from the 30th of August up to the 6th of September 1999.
2.7. The worth noting events after the registration, and campaign stages of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot in the period of 28th of August up to the
4th of September 1999.
2.8. The Guidelines on the Human Rights implementation, in the East Timor
operation area.
2.9. The Instructions of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA, No. Sprint-1000/VII/1998 dated
the 30th of July 1998 on the Speech on Human Rights, and the reports on the
presentation of the Speech on Human Rights in the DAM (Military Territorial
Region) IX/ UDAYANA circle.
2.10. Telegram No. STR-614/1999 dated the 17th of June 1999, on measures to
ensure the security in East Timor.
2.11. Telegram from KASAD No. STR-172/1999 dated the 5th of May 1999 on the
instructions for the preparation of the plan on security.
2.12. STR of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA No. 223/ 1999 dated the 30th of March 1999,
on the chronology of the shootings at Maliobo Kampong, Maliana district on
the 19th of March 1999, at 18.15 p.m. committed by GPK group, with victims
include 4 people died and 4 other people injured.
2.13. Observations (Not Visum et Repertum) of LETDA (Second Lieut.) Ckm.
Maksum Pandelima on Sander Thones.
2.14. Reports on the overall situation in East Timor.
2.15. Directives No. 2/P/IX/1999, on the PDM (Military Emergency Authority)
Commands in East Timor.
2.16. LAPSAR PANG Retired PDM, to MENHANKAM/ TNI Commander and the President.
2.17. Book on the Law No. 23 Prp of the year 1959, on the Emergency and the
explanations.
2.18. Pocket Book on the requirements of the procedure of the usage of the
Military Emergency Power in East Timor.
2.19. Pocket Book on the Authority and Restrictions on Emergency/ Military
Emergency.
2.20. TNI Commander's Directives:
- No. 02/P/IX/1999, dated the 6th of September 1999, on the Military
Emergency Authority Command in the area of East Timor.
2.21. Decisions:
- Skep/991/P/1998 dated the 30th of December 1998 on the Resignation and the
Appointment of positions in ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) circle on behalf
of Maj. Gen. TNI. I Gede Nyoman Arsana, and 99 other officers.
- Skep/821/P/IX/1999, dated 20th of September 1999, on the regulation over
the usage of Power of the Military Emergency Authority in the East Timor
area.
2.22. Instructions:
- Sprint/757/IV/1999 dated 15th of April 1999, on the Business Trip to East
Timor, on behalf of MARSDYA TNI Tamtama Adi, and three other officers.
- Sprint 889/V/1999 dated 20th of May 1999 on the Special Tasks in assisting
the works of the Independent Commission, on behalf of Maj. Gen. TNI Zacky
Anwar Makarim and two other officers.
- Sprint 1096/VI/1999 dated 4th of June 1999 on Instruction on behalf of Maj.
Gen. TNI Zacky Anwar Makarim and two other members of the TP40KTT.
- Sprint/1660/VIII/1999 dated 13th of August 1999, as the Security Advisor
P3TT in Dili, East Timor, on behalf of Maj. Gen. TNI Zacky Anwar Makarim,
and two other officers.
- Sprint/179/P/IX/1999 dated 7th of September 1999 on the Military Emergency
Authority in East Timor area.
2.23. Telegrams and Telegraphed Letters
- TR/614/1999 dated 17th of June 1999, on the Security Assurance in East
Timor.
- STR/675/1999, dated the 6th of July 1999, on the Decision of the people of
East Timor.
- STR/551/1999, dated 5th of September 1999, on the Anticipation of the
development of the situation in East Timor.
2.24. Situation Reports:
- STR/560/1999 dated 22nd of September 1999, on the Reports of the
situations, Week IV, dated 14th until 20th of September 1999.
- STR/17/2000 dated 20th of January 2000, on Indications of worsening
security situation in East Timor.
- R/33/X/1999, dated the 11th of October 1999, on the Reports of the
development of situation in East Timor on 11th of October 1999.
2.25. Others (Special Reports)
- R/184/Lapsus/IV/1999, dated 7th of April 1999, on the Reports on fights
between the Pro-Integration and the Anti-Integration masses in Liquisa
Regency.
- R/02/X/1999, the Special Report dated 11th of October 1999, on the
chronology of the shooting contacts of INTERFET against TNI and POLRI troops.
3. 1 (one) bundle of dossiers of evidence in the form of photo-copied
documents, consisted of letters as follows:
3.1. Book of the Law No. 23, Prp, of the year 1959, on the Emergency
Situation, including the explanations.
3.2. Copy of KEPPRES (Presidential Decree) Number: 43 of the year 1999.
3.3. Copy of INPRES (Presidential Instruction) Number: 5 of the year 1999.
3.4. KEPMENKO Number: KEP-13/MENKO/POLKAM/6/1999.
3.5. Plan of HANOIN LOROSAI Operation I - 1999.
3.6. Plan of HANOIN LOROSAI Operation II - 1999.
3.7. Plan of CABUT 2 Operation (Revised)
3.8. Plan on actions to confront the Contingency post the Decision of the
people of East Timor Option I - failed, dated 30th of August 1999.
3.9. Guidelines on the implementation of Human Rights, in the East Timor
operation area, dated 1st of August 1998.
3.10. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostility and efforts to promote peace
in East Timor, dated the 21st of April 1999.
3.11. Statement of Stance of Diocese Dili and Diocese Baucau Bishops, dated
the 21st of April 1999.
3.12. List of participants of the meeting of the Small Team on the grant of
the special status with extended autonomy for East Timor, dated the 23rd of
October 1998.
3.13. Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number: 960/PO/X/98/04,
dated the 27th of October 1998 on the establishment of the Small Team to
discuss the autonomy for East Timor, and prepare the government's basic
positioning.
3.14. Memo of the ASMENKO I/ POLDAGRI to MENKOPOLKAM Number: M.53/Tim
P4-OKTT/7/1999, dated 3rd of July 1999, on the overall view in case Option I
failed.
3.15. STR of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA No. 223/1999, dated 30th of March 1999 on
the chronology of the shootings at Mariabo Kampong, Maliana district, on the
19th of March1999, at 18.15 committed by GPK, victims include 4 people died
and 4 others injured.
3.16. Instruction of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA Number: Sprint/841/VII/1999, dated
21st of July 1999 on the distribution throughout the line squads, and the
transport of ammunition/ grenades and the attachments.
3.17. Instruction of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA Number: Sprint/894/VII/1999, dated
30th of July 1999, the transfer of DANREM 164/ WIRA DHARMA, Tono Suratman to
his new post/squad, as PAMEN DENMA MABESAD.
3.18. Instruction of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA Number: Sprint/1000/VII/1998, dated
30th of July 1998, on the lecture on Human Rights and the reports on the
presentation of the lecture on Human Rights at the Military Region IX/
UDAYANA circle.
3.19. Telegraphed Letter of KASAD No. STR-172/1999, dated the 5th of May
1999, on the instruction for the preparation of the security arrangement.
3.20. Daily Instructions of KOREM Commander 164/ Wira Dharma, in the effort
to set up security stability in East Timor, dated 21st of April 1999.
3.21. Directives/ Guidelines/ Instructions of KOREM 164/ Wira Dharma, dated
the 27th of May 1999.
3.22. Telegraphed Letter Number: 159/1999, dated the 3rd of July 1999, of
DANREM 164/ Wira Dharma for DANDIM 1627 up to 1639.
3.23. TR No. STR No. 551/1999, on the transfer of KODAL, also TR No. STR No.
553/1999, on the transfer of KODAL
3.24. Report on the development of situation of PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA to TNI
Commander and KASAD.
- STR/253/1999, dated the 5th until the 11th of April 1999.
- STR/279/1999, dated the 12th until 18th of April 1999.
- STR/550/1999, dated 23rd until 29th of August, 1999.
3.25. Telegraphed Letter No: STR-614/1999, dated 17th of June 1999, on the
measures to provide security in East Timor
3.26. Pointers taken from the Decisions of MENHANKAM/ TNI Commander Number:
Skep/728/P/VIII/1999, dated the 12th of August 1999, on the resignation and
appointment of position in TNI circle, with the attachments.
3.27. Report on the retirement (purna tugas) of the Commander of the
Military Emergency Authority, dated the 28th of September 1999.
3.28. Worth noting events within the post registration and campaign period
of the People's Consultation/ Ballot of between the 28th of August up to the
4th of September 1999.
3.29. Pocket book of Regulations on the usage of Power of the Military
Emergency Authority, in East Timor area
3.30. Pocket Book on the Authority and Restrictions in the Emergency/
Military Emergency conditions
3.31. Hand Grenades, made in Korea, brand: Hand Grenade Frag Delay K/5 Comp.
B Lot. E. C. 82 H.6001 - 001. EC. 85 M.605 - 03
3.32. Ammunition 8,9 mm Caliber
3.33. Ammunition 9 mm Caliber
3.34. Ammunition 6,4 mm Caliber
3.35. Ammunition 7,9 mm Caliber
3.36. Ammunition 7,8 mm Caliber
3.37. Ammunition 8,3 mm Caliber
3.38. Ammunition 6,0 mm Caliber
3.39. Ammunition 6,6 mm Caliber
3.40. Ammunition 7,62 mm Caliber
3.41. Ammunition 9,1 mm Caliber
3.42. Magazine Shotgun type SS-1 PINDAD
3.43. GETME 63 Magazine
3.44. GETAU Shotgun/ G3 No. FMP 172322
3.45. MOUSER Shotgun Free Number Los Nomor: (sic)
3.46. SKS Shotgun No. OH.2289
3.47. Homemade Firearm
3.48. Homemade Pistol
3.49. Crime Scene Photographs Case File Number: 7 DHQ 99
3.50. Crime Scene Photographs Case File Number 30 DHQ 99
Considering that the court had been presented with parts of the firearms and
ammunitions listed in the court record (Berita Acara Persidangan), and the
Panel of Judges had instructed the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor to play the
video-cassette evidence presented by the victim witness Manuel Carascalao in
the court hearing on the 20th of August 2001, and the video-cassette had
been replayed in the court hearing on the 25th of February 2003, with main
scenes as follows:
1. Showed Eurico Guterres is making a speech and cheered by the masses with
yells and gunshots.
2. Showed sometime later in the evening, when Eurico Guterres is making
another speech and greeted by the cheering masses.
3. Showed Witness Basilio Araujo
4. Showed the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer
5. Showed Eurico Guterres is making his speech for the third time
6. Showed Prabowo handed over a banner to a TNI soldier.
7. Showed for the fourth time, Eurico Guterres is making a speech, then is
continuing by having the first and the second interviews:
- Eurico Guterres is standing nearby TNI troops and then he is getting onto
a red plate-numbered KIJANG van.
- Eurico Guterres in the middle of the third interview and saying he will
register for the People's Consultation/ Ballot, and if the People's
Consultation/ Ballot turns out to be poorly organized, then he will organize
a boycott.
8. Showed AITARAK troop in black uniforms are running in all directions on
the street.
9. Showed an interview with a person who saw the murder of a journalist.
10. Showed an interview with Dos Santos with the background of the crowding
masses and a few foreigners.
There are explanations on PANGDAM UDAYANA Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri, and
some people's opinion on the People's Consultation/ Ballot.
11. Showed Eurico Guterres in the fourth interview.
12. Showed Eurico Guterres is being interviewed for the fifth time, and
saying he and his troop is ready, and also showed an interview with PPI
Commander Joao Tavares.
13. Showed Eurico Guterres is being interviewed for the sixth time.
14. Showed an interview with Guilhermo Dos Santos.
15. Showed an interview with Joao Tavares, the Commander of PPI.
16. Showed corpses of victims in the house of Manuel Carascalao.
17. Showed KAPOLDA of East Timor, Timbul Silaen is walking.
18. Showed Eurico Guterres is making a speech.
19. Showed the traditional elderly people of East Timor, in a ritual of
retaining blood from a slashed pig.
20. Showed Dos Santos is making a speech.
21. Showed a music and dance party, and people are dancing, one of them is
Guilhermo Dos Santos.
22. Showed a cock-fight game in the middle of the crowded audience of masses.
23. Showed the Ambassador at-large, Lopez Da Cruz.
24. Showed the East Timor Governor, Abilio Soares inside a building, with an
Indonesian song is playing in the background.
25. Showed Eurico Guterres is signing a letter.
26. Showed an interview with the Ambassador-at-large, Lopez Da Cruz.
27. Showed an interview with the East Timor Governor, Abilio Osario Soares,
and so on.
The Conclusion of the Panel of Judges was that the video-cassette mostly
contained interviews, while according to Witness Manuel Carascalao, the
video-cassette he presented was records of the Big Rally on the 17th of
April 1999, in the front yard of the East Timor Governor's office, and of
the attacks on the residence of Manuel Carascalao.
Considering that based on the testimonies of the witnesses who made their
testimonies under oath, related to the testimony of the Defendant, and the
evidence as mentioned before, therefore the facts were concluded as follows:
- It is the fact that the clashes and conflicts that occurred between April
and September 1999 in Dili, East Timor, were related to the announcement of
RI President on the grant of 2 (two) Options to the people of East Timor on
the 27th of January 1999;
- It is the fact that after the long history of occurring violence in East
Timor, President B.J. Habibie wished for the whole, comprehensive
settlements for the people of East Timor, who had been long involved in
conflicts, therefore the RI President, B.J. Habibie, announced the grant of
2 (two) Options for the people of East Timor, which include:
1. Option I: The grant of a special autonomy to the people of East Timor, if
the people chose the Option I, therefore East Timor would be a part of RI
territory;
2. Option II: The choice to reject the special autonomy option, if this
option was chosen by the people of East Timor, therefore East Timor would
not be a part of RI territory;
- It is the fact that the offer of the comprehensive settlements over the
problems regarding East Timor through the grant of the two options, was
responded by the UN, by the enactment of the Republic of Indonesia -
Portugal Agreement on East Timor, under UN's support, which was signed on
the 5th of May 1999,
- It is the fact that from that point on, the implementation of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot in East Timor was started with the Agreement initiated
by UN, between RI and Portugal governments, signed on the 5th of May 1999 in
New York, the 'New York Agreement' signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the UN,
was known as the Tri-partite Agreement;
- It is the fact that the Tri-partite Agreement on the security maintenance
of Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN Secretary General, were consisted as:
1. A safe atmosphere with no violence or other forms of intimidation would
be a prerequisite for the implementation of an open and fair People's
Consultation/ Ballot in East Timor. The responsibility to ensure such
environment, and to maintain the overall law and order, were at the top of
the Indonesia's security priorities. Neutral stance of TNI and the police
were very important in this case.
2. KPS (the Commission for Peace and Stability), established in Dili on the
21st of April 1999, should be immediately in function. KPS worked together
with the UN to regulate the mass conducts before and after the consultation,
which should be well observed by all parties, to ensure the arm truce, also
to take necessary measures to reach the arm truce settlements;
3. Before the registration started, the Secretary General would determine,
based on an objective evaluation, that there was provided adequate security
situation for the process of an open and peaceful People's Consultation/
Ballot;
4. Only the police, who would be responsible for the maintenance of law and
order, and the Secretary General, after receiving the adequate mandate,
would assign a certain number of civilian police officials to do the work,
who, during the People's Consultation/ Ballot, would provide the supervision
over the guarding of Ballot Cards to the Polling Places;
- It is the fact that there were 2 (two) questions in the Ballot forms of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot, which were asked to the people of East
Timor, they were:
1. Do you accept the special autonomy for East Timor within the United
Country of the Republic of Indonesia?
2. Do you refuse the special autonomy for East Timor, which result with the
separation of East Timor from Indonesia?
- It is the fact that the people of East Timor who had the rights to give
their votes were those who were 17 (seventeen) years old or older, they were:
a. Those who were born in East Timor
b. Those who were not born in East Timor, but at least one of the parents
were born in East Timor.
c. The person whose husband or wife were in the two categories mentioned
above
- It is the fact that the stages of the process of the People's Consultation/
Ballot were regulated as follows:
Operational Plan/ Performance 10th of May - 15th of June
Public Information Program/
Voters' Education 10th of May - 5th of August
Preparation of Registration 13th of June - 17th of July
The announcement of the List
of Voters, and the submission of
Objections and Complaints 18th of July - 23rd of July
Political Campaign 20th of July - 5th of August
Quiet Period 6th - 7th of August
The election 30th of August
The announcement of the Result of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot
- It is the fact that in the process of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
Indonesia and Portugal had the rights to send their representatives to
observe stages of the People's Consultation, in, as well as outside East
Timor;
- It is the fact that the International Observers would observe the process
of the People's Consultation/ Ballot, based on the regulations, established
by UN, in relation to their presence;
- It is the fact that the Indonesian Authority would ensure the provision of
the safe atmosphere for the process of an open and fair People's
Consultation/ Ballot, and be responsible of the security of the process, and
the safety of the UN personnel;
- It is the fact that a number of UN officials would be assigned to ensure
the security and safety of the UN personnel and properties. A number of the
International civilian police would be present in East Timor to provide
assistance for the Indonesian police during the stages of activities of the
People's Consultation/ Ballot, and to supervise the guarding of Ballot Cards
and Boxes to and from the Polling Places;
- It is the fact that TNI Commander's instruction to respond to the
Tri-partite Agreement of the 5th of May 1999, the Indonesian Government, in
this case was the RI police, was authorized the responsibility over the
control and the law enforcement during the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- It is the fact that based on the Tri-partite Agreement, TNI were not
allowed to make any activity, then TNI would withdraw some of the troops
from East Timor, send them back into their posts, TNI had to stand by at
their own Military installations, were not allowed to go out of the barracks,
and were not allowed to carry their weapons;
- It is the fact that after the announcement of the grant of the 2 (two)
Options by the RI President, B.J. Habibie, there were pressures,
intimidations and abuses on the Pro-Integration people;
- It is the fact that on the 5th and 6th of April 1999, there were attacks
of the Pro-Integration Group against the Pro-Independence Group sheltering
at the Liquisa Church. The attacks caused 20 people died, and many others
injured;
- It is the fact that the attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against the
Pro-Independence Group sheltering in Liquisa Church, were related to the
clashes between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence Group on the
3rd and 4th of April 1999, during which, the Pro-Independence group burnt
down the houses of the Pro-Integration people;
- It is the fact that, though there were TNI troops and the Stayling police
standing by near the Liquisa church compound, but when the attacks came,
they did nothing;
- That it is the fact that on the 5th of April 1999, morning, members of
KORAMIL and Militia gathered round in front of KODIM Liquisa in the center
of town area, then on the 6th of April 1999, in the early morning, Militia
besieged the church;
- That it is the fact that on the 6th of April 1999, at around 10 in the
morning, came Eurico Guterres to the Parish House to mediate a dialog with
the pastors of the Parish, in the effort to urge the masses crowding the
compound to disperse and leave for home, but they failed to reach
settlements;
- It is the fact that on the 6th of April 1999, around 13.00 of the
afternoon, the shootings started around Liquisa Church, then people in the
Parish compound went into the pastor's house, and people outside the
pastor's house were repeatedly slashed with sharp weapons by the militia;
- It is true that the witness, Pastor Rafael Dos Santos saw and heard the
ongoing shootings for about an hour at Liquisa Church compound, committed by
KODIM and the police, there were 2 (two) victims died after getting shot at,
one of them was the Head of Liquisa Animal Husbandry, and the one who shot
him was a member of KORAMIL of Maubara;
- It is the fact that Witness Pastor Rafael Dos Santos saw with his own eyes
the attacks that happened at around 13.00 of the afternoon, in the Parish
House compound, committed by BESI MERAH PUTIH (Red and White Iron) Militia,
KODIM of Liquisa, and the police;
- It is the fact that the witness, Pastor Rafael Dos Santos had lived for
over 10 years in Liquisa, that he could distinct police officers from the
soldiers, those the witness recognized were a soldier from KODIM, Chief
Sergeant Dos Santos, and the Second Sergeant (Police) Florindo;
- It is the fact that the witness, Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, saw with his
own eyes through the jalousie- lassed windows, that people outside the
witness' house rushed to attack into the Parish House, the witness saw with
his own eyes through the jalousie glass that the tear gas were shot into the
house, then the witness breathed painfully, then the witness ran out of the
house;
- It is the fact that before the witness was out, when he reached the door,
a militia man tried to shoot him, but his gun did not explode, because it
did not explode, the militia man grabbed a machete and initiated to attack
the witness with the weapon, but the witness was rescued by an officer from
KODIM;
- It is the fact that the witness clearly saw Tome Diego, a member of KODIM
of Liquisa who was an East Timor native, made the attacks, and beside Tome
Diego, other soldiers who joined in the attacks were Jacob and Ishak Dos
Santos, the witness' own nephew;
- It is the fact that when the witness, Pastor Rafael Dos Santos went back
to the Parish House, the witness saw the Parish House was already in ruins,
blood marks were everywhere inside the house, on the floor, across the
corridors, and also in the bathroom;
- It is the fact that the Liquisa regent, Leonito Martins, through the
windows of the KODIM office, saw the clashes at Liquisa Church, in front of
the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, and after the incident, the witness
saw the dead victims, whose bodies were full of severe cuts, on the cheeks,
on the noses, the witness saw one by one, the dead victims were carried into
car;
- It is the fact that Jacinto, a prominent figure from CNRT, who was the
most wanted man by the Pro-Integration group and the police, hid in the
residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos;
- It is the fact that the distance between KODIM Headquarters and the
residence of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos was between 50 and 60 meters, so the
witness could clearly see the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos;
- It is the fact that before the clashes at Ave Maria Church erupted,
MUSPIDA of Liquisa organized a meeting at MAKODIM, which was attended by
East Timor WADANREM (Deputy DANREM), Col. TNI Mujiono;
� It is the fact that the refugees sheltering in Liquisa Church compound and
the house of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, reached between 2,000 and 3,000
people;
- It is the fact that overseeing the crowding masses inside and outside the
Liquisa Church compound, Witness Adios Salova as the KAPOLRES of Liquisa
could expect the possibilities of clashes, so he requested back-up from
KODIM;
- It is the fact that on the 17th of April 1999, a big rally was held at the
front yard of the governor's office, attended by over 6,000 people, with
participants coming from regencies throughout East Timor, the government
officials who attended the rally were the East Timor Governor and other East
Timor authority officials;
- It is the fact that the Inspector of the rally was PPI Commander Joao
Tavares, who also made the opening speech, in which he called on people to
win the integration process and still be a part of the united country of the
Republic of Indonesia;
- It is the fact that besides the PPI Commander, Joao Tavares, Eurico
Guterres also made the speech in front of the attending masses reaching
thousands in number;
- It is the fact that after the big rally in front of the governor's office,
in the parade of motor vehicles of the Pro-Integration masses, during which,
they passed in front of the residence of Manuel Carascalao, clashes erupted
between the Pro-Integration group and those sheltering at the residence of
Manuel Carascalao, which led to the attacks of the Pro-Integration group
against the Pro-Independence group, causing 17 people died and many others
wounded. One of the twelve (sic!) dead victims was Manelito Carascalao, who
was the son of Manuel Carascalao;
- It is the fact that participants of the big rally on the 17th of April
1999, carried guns, homemade firearms, and sharp weapons in the attacks at
the residence of Manuel Carascalao;
- It is the fact that on April 1999, escalation of violence had increased
throughout East Timor, and this became the concern of the RI government and
East Timor's prominent figures, also became the serious interest of the UN;
- It is the fact that on the 21st of April 1999, there was a meeting between
the two conflicting parties at the residence of Bishop Belo, attended by the
representatives of the conflicting parties and government officials,
including: CNRT and FALINTIL, which were represented by Xanana Gusmao and
Leandro Issac, the provincial government, which were represented by Abilio
Ososrio Soares as the governor, and Armindo Soares Mariano as the chief of
the Provincial Legislative Council of East Timor, while TNI and POLRI were
represented by Col. Infantry Tono Suratman (DANREM), and Police Col. Timbul
Silaen, with observers General TNI. Wiranto (MENHANKAM/PANGAB), Bishop Belo,
Bishop Basilio Dasimento, and the governor Abilio Soares;
- It is the fact that resulting from that meeting, an agreement on peace was
signed by the two conflicting parties, and the enactment of the settlements
included the 'sweeping' operations against weapons to promote the
disarmament of the two conflicting parties;
- It is the fact that KPS (Commission for Peace and Stability) was
established in Dili on the 21st of April 1999;
- It is the fact that up to the 17th and 18th of June 1999, the organization
of KPS was unstable, because Xanan Gusmao of the Pro-Independence party
never attended;
- It is the fact that due to the increasing escalation of violence in East
Timor, the East Timor Governor, Abilio Ososrio Soares requested all regents
to activate and intensified the organization of PAM SWAKARSA, he also
required all members of PAM SWAKARSA to be given money compensation to
support their welfare affordable to the respective regency governments;
- It is the fact that the reorganized members of the people's groups were
aimed at improving the security of their respective areas, but after the
situations had heated up later, the members of the Pro-Independence in PAM
SWAKARSA, left the organization because PAM SWAKARSA made greater efforts
for the ideology of the Pro-Integration;
- It is the fact that PAM SWAKARSA, after all, was a constituent of the
government which fought for the Pro-Integration, in line with the
government's policy;
- It is the fact that KAMRA was under the responsibility of the police,
WANRA was under the responsibility of KODIM, and PAM SWAKARSA was under the
responsibility of the government, all were prepared to provide security in
their own areas;
- It is the fact that the Pro-Integration troops were later known as PAM
SWAKARSA consisted of, among others, AITARAK, BMP, and BRTT;
- It is the fact that on the 5th of September 1999, at 19.30 WITA (Central
Indonesia Time), KODAL (Command Control) was transferred from POLRI to TNI.
The transfer of KODAL was made due to the chaotic situations everywhere,
especially in Dili town, the concentration center of refugee masses, the
situation developed into destructive manner, and the governance was already
ineffective;
- It is the fact that the transfer of KODAL was made because the situation
was already very chaotic, options were given for the people of East Timor
who wanted to take refuge and leave East Timor;
- It is the fact that TNI had duty and responsibility as follows:
1) To secure all personnel of UNAMET reaching about 2000 who stayed in East
Timor;
2) To take immediate actions to prevent clashes on a larger scale;
3) To secure hundreds of vital objects/ installations throughout East Timor;
- It is the fact that on the 30th of August 1999, the people of East Timor
held the People's Consultation/ Ballot, which result was announced by UNAMET
on the 4th of September 1999 with the composition of achievement as follows;
- The votes refused the Autonomy Option, which meant a separation from RI
territory, reached 78,5% (334,580);
- The votes for the Special Autonomy Option reached 21% (94,338);
- The invalid votes reached 1,6% (7,985);
- It is the fact that on the 4th of September 1999, RI President, B.J.
Habibie, officially announced that RI Government could accept the result of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot which was announced by UNAMET (UN);
- It is the fact about the execution of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
started from the registration, election, piling up of Ballot boxes, up to
the Vote Counting were organized by UNAMET, while KPS only observed whether
or not there were Human Rights violations;
- It is the fact that right after the result of the People's Consultation/
Ballot was announced, thousands of the Pro-Integration people seek refuge,
many cried in despair, while after the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, violence quickly spread out throughout East Timor,
resulting in the total destructions of residential houses, office buildings,
and shop lootings which tremendously terrorized people;
- It is the fact that a day after the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot on the 5th of September 1999, clashes erupted, then TNI
Commander, his staff, and several other related officials, were directly
escorted to East Timor to mediate the meeting between the prominent figures
of the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence, urging them to accept the
result of the People's Consultation/ Ballot which was announced the day
before, and socialized it to all the supporters of the two parties to make
them thoroughly understand that the result of the People's Consultation/
Ballot was the choice of the people of East Timor, for the better future of
East Timor;
- It is the fact that on the 6th of September 1999, some attacks committed
by the Pro-Integration masses were made against the Pro-Integration group
sheltering in a church compound in Suai, causing 27 people died, with 17 of
them were males, and 10 others were females including a child;
- It is the fact that the Pro-Independence sheltering at Suai Church reached
thousands of people, who were after the attacks of the Pro-Integration group,
relocated to the office compounds of the regent, KODIM, and POLRES, and some
other safer places;
- It is the fact that on the 6th of September 1999, the Pro-Integration
group made the attacks against the residence of Bishop Belo, where the
Pro-Independence group took refuge and were sheltered. The attacks happened
because Bishop Belo was considered not neutral, and was a Pro-Independence.
The attacks of the Pro-Integration caused a child died, and the back side of
Bishop Belo house burnt down;
- It is the fact that overseeing the worsening and threatening situation,
with the growing number of falling victims, with strong criticism kept
coming from the International Community and the UN, then President B.J.
Habibie applied the Military Emergency status started on the 7th of
September 1999, to provide the powerful law enforcement authority to control
the situation, and to handle possible clashes in larger scale, then Maj. Gen.
Kiki Syahnakri was appointed as the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority to handle the situation;
- It is the fact that the change from KODAL to the Military Emergency status,
then the handling of conflicts in East Timor were taken over by the Military
Emergency Authority. With the Military Emergency status, all the military
instruments could be in function, based on the law and regulation. Another
consideration for the implementation of the Military Emergency was that the
situation was already chaotic, and that the local government was no longer
in function;
- It is the fact that UNAMET committed various frauds, such as: in the
recruitment of its local staff, the appointment of witnesses for the
election purposes in the TPS (Polling Places), also in the Vote Counting
sessions with only witnesses from the Pro-Independence, while those from the
Pro-Integration were rejected or were never involved during the election of
the People's Consultation/ Ballot, as well as, during the Vote Counting,
besides that, during the Campaign, UNAMET supported the Second Option;
- It is the fact that there were two conflicting parties in East Timor, they
were:
- The Pro-Integration Group:
- FPDK (Forum for the Unity of Democracy and Justice)
- BRTT (East Timor People Guards)
- MAHIDI (Dead of Alive for Indonesia), in Ainaro
- LAKSAUR MERAH PUTIH in Suai
- BMP (Red and White Iron) in Liquisa
- SAKUNAR in Ambeno
- AHI in Ailiu
- AITARAK in Dili
- JATI MERAH PUTIH in Los Palos
- DARA INTEGRASI in Ermera
- DADARUS MERAH PUTIH in Bobonaro
- OAN KLIBUR BA DAMAI
- LIQUISA BESI MERAH PUTIH (Red and White Iron of Liquisa)
- SAKA ERMERA DARAH MERAH PUTIH
- GUNTUR KAILAH in Ermera
- HAHALINTAR (sic) JUNIOR in Ablai Bobonaro
- TIM PANCASILA in Atsabe Ermera
- MAHADOMI in Manatuto
- ABLAI in Same
- NAGA MERAH (Red Dragon) in Ermera
- And the Pro-Independence Group:
CNRT consisted of CLANDESTIN, VITUN, FORSAREPTIL, FALINTIL, and FRETILIN;
- It is the fact that the attacks of the Pro-Integration Group on the
Pro-Independence, victimized mostly civilian women and children;
- It is the fact that the UN had approved the entry of INTERFET troops into
East Timor;
- It is the fact that the attacks on Ave Maria Church caused 3 (three)
pastors died, they were Pastor FRANSISCO, Pastor HILARIO, and Pastor DEWANTO;
- It is the fact that besides the Ave Maria Church compound, other refugee
centers included SMP II Public School, SD Mata Air School and Public Works
Office Building;
- It is the fact that the weapons in the possession of KODIM Liquisa were
more or less than 72 of SS-1 and SS-2 guns, and 10 pistols, while the
firearms in the possession of KODIM Dili, among others, were SP-1, SP-2,
M-16 and FN-46 pistols;
- It is the fact that for East Timor region, TRIBUANA VIII Task Force was
assigned to assist DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, to monitor the situation in East
Timor, to promote conducive situation in the enactment of the peace
reconciliation between the Pro-Independence and the Pro-Integration during
the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
- It is the fact that TRIBUANA VIII Task Force, in its operations, was
responsible to the Commander of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma;
- It is the fact that in the incident in Liquisa on the 6th of April 1999,
the Commander of TRIBUANA VIII Task Force, Lieut. Col. TNI Yayat Sudradjat,
was present at the crime scene;
� It is the fact that East Timor Governor Abilio Osario Soares instructed
all regents to reactivate PAM SWAKARSA to secure their respective areas;
� It is the fact that during the attacks of the Pro-Integration against
refugees from the Pro-Independence Group sheltering at the residence of
Manuel Carascalao, on the 17th of April 1999, DANREM Wira Dharma at the time,
was Col. TNI Tono Suratman;
- It is the fact that when Col. TNI Noer Muis was posted as DANREM 164 Wira
Dharma, there were several worth noting attacks of the Pro-Integration Group
against the Pro-Independence Group, such as:
1. The Attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against refugees from the
Pro-Independence Group at Diocese Dili on the 5th of September 1999, at the
time, the DANDIM was Lieut. Col. TNI Sujarwo, the KAPOLRES was Police Lieut.
Col. Hulman Gultom, and the regent was Dominggos Soares;
2. The attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against refugees of the
Pro-Independence in the residence of Bishop Belo in Dili on the 6th of
September 1999, around 10.30 in the morning;
3. The attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against refugees from the
Pro-Independence Group at Ave Maria Church, Suai on the 6th of September
1999, causing 27 people died, at the time, the DANDIM was Lieut. Col. TNI
Lilik Koeshadiyanto;
- It is the fact that the masses taking refuge at Ave Maria Church of Suai
were around 5,000 people, while those outside the church compound were
around 5,000 people, and the refugees sheltering at Ave Maria Church were
already there before the People's Consultation/ Ballot was held;
- It is the fact that the incident at Ave Maria Church, Suai, was reported
by the acting DANDIM officer, Lieut. Col. Lilik Koeshadiyanto, to DANREM 164
Wira Dharma Noer Muis, and DANREM had reported the incident to the Defendant,
Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri, then the Defendant had instructed to make
prevention of spreading clashes into other regencies;
- It is the fact that the a de Charge witness, Police BRIPKA MAKARAW, the
INTEL PAM officer of East Timor POLDA heard screams and cries coming from
the house of Bishop BELLO, cries for help coming from mothers, children, and
even men, who were civilians;
- It is the fact that KODIM of Dili received assistance of BKO troop from
KOSTRAD with the strength consisted of 683 personnel;
- It is the fact that DANREM 164 Wira Dharma at the time, whether he was Col.
TNI Tono Suratman, or Col. TNI Noer Muis, according to the hierarchy of the
Command Line, were responsible to the Defendant, Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R.
Damiri, as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA;
- That in the TATOLI IV Operations, the KAPOLRES was the WADAN (Deputy
Commander) of the Sub-sector, while the Commander of the Sub-sector was
DANDIM of Dili;
- It is the fact that in East Timor, there were several Task Forces in BKO
Operations assigned under DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, such as: Health Task Force,
Territorial Task Force, and TRIBUANA Task Force, they were responsible to
DANREM, through DANDIM;
- It is the fact that WANRA was under TNI supervision in line with the Law
No. 20 of the year 1982, each of them received a monthly salary of Rp.
150,000,- and 18 kg of rice. They were assigned at KODIM, after receiving
limited trainings on salutation, escorting, and security measures, and they
were responsible to the respective DANDIM or DANRAMIL in accordance with
their assignment areas;
- It is the fact that DANREM Col. TNI Tono Suratman received report from
DANDIM of Dili, on the incident on the 17th of April 1999, after the big
rally of the Pro-Integration in front of the East Timor Governor's office,
after the rally ended, the Pro-Integration people organized a parade around
town, and when they passed by the house of Manuel Carascalao, they clashed
with the refugees sheltering at the house of Manuel Carascalao;
- It is the fact that DANREM 164 Wira Dharma Col. TNI Tono Suratman, on the
occurring clashes at the houses of Pastor Rafael Dos Santos and Manuel
Carascalao, directly reported to the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, and
the Defendant gave instructions as efforts to assist the police;
- It is the fact that Joao Tavares was the Commander of PPI, and the Deputy
Commander of PPI was Eurico Guterres;
- It is the fact that the victim-witness, Manuel Carascalao had come to the
house of DANREM 164 Wira Dharma Col. TNI Tono Suratman to ask for help and
protection against the attacks at his house, but DANREM refused, then the
victim-witness requested weapons to defend himself, this request was also
rejected, and the meeting at DANREM house was witnessed by Basilio Araujo;
- It is the fact that DANREM 164 Wira Dharma Col. TNI Noer Muis, after
receiving report from DANDIM of Suai, had further reported the incident at
Ave Maria Church, Suai, on the 6th of September 1999 to the Defendant, Maj.
Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, with confirmed victims
reached 27 people;
- It is the fact that Witness Col. TNI Noer Muis, The DANREM 164 Wira Dharma,
had received STR No. 543.3.8.1999, which consist of instructions to stand by
the troop under the witness' control;
- It is the fact that the witness, Col. TNI Noer Muis gave orders to his
subordinates through the radio, or STR (Radio-Telegraphed Letters) on the
6th of September 1999, and the witness' orders had been executed by his
subordinate officers, because the witness saw and knew that;
- It is the fact that with the transfer of KODAL, there were additional
troop consisted of 1 (one) SSK (approximately 100 personnel) transported
with a Hercules plane, and other additional troops came one after the other,
consisted of 2 (two) squads of troop on the Brigade level;
- It is the fact that the Commander of Operations at the time was the
Defendant himself as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA;
- It is the fact that the number of refugees, at the time, was around
300,000, they left for NTT, Kupang, Bali, Flores, and even for Jakarta;
- It is the fact that the East Timor natives, POLRI as well as TNI, could
join the People's Consultation/ Ballot, as in line with the result of the
Tri-partite Agreement signed in New York, the East Timor natives who were 17
years old or older could join the People's Consultation;
- It is the fact that the soldiers under the control of DANREM 164 Wira
Dharma, Col. TNI Tono Suratman, at the KOREM, were 2 (two) Organic
Battalions with between 7,000 or 7500 personnel, while the Territorial
Battalion consisted of 4,500 personnel;
- It is the fact that the cause of the attacks at the house of Bishop Belo,
according to the report of DANDIM of Dilli, was because right from the
beginning, Bishop Belo never stood neutral, Bishop Belo as a religious
shepherd took the side of the Pro-Independence, yet often filed complaints
about the Pro-Integration, after the announcement of the People's
Consultation/ Ballot, the Pro-Integration group were in search for Bishop
Belo, and after the incident at the house of Bishop Belo, they found Ballot
Boxes;
- It is the fact that after the clashes at the house of Bishop Belo, there
were died and wounded victims of abuse;
- It is the fact that the Tri-partite Agreement on the 5th of May 1999,
settled on the security responsibility to be in the hands of POLRI, and the
People's Consultation/ Ballot to be organized by UNAMET without taking sides
and in democratic manners;
� It is the fact that based on the prior agreement between the two parties,
the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups, there were settlements
on disarmament, but those who handed in their weapons and put them in
storage were only the Pro-Integration, while the Pro-Independence refused to
pile up their weapons;
- It is the fact that WANRA were armed, but after completing their post
guard, their weapons were handed over to KODIM;
- It is the fact that the burning of properties had spread out through East
Timor, starting from the down town area to the alleys of residential areas,
in several areas houses and motor vehicles were burnt down, the burning of
properties happened in the last day of the campaign period on the 27th of
August 1999, and after the announcement of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
the Pro-Independence group took parts in the burning down of vital
installations, while the INTERFET troops made no actions against them;
- It is the fact that on the 7th of September 1999, there was an exodus of
people, leaving for NTT, and in the 3rd (third) week, on the 21st of
September 1999, East Timor was completely handed over to the UN;
- It is the fact that on the 17th of April 1999, Witness Manuel Viegas
Carascalao listened to a radio program in the witness' car, on Eurico
Guterres, in a speech in front of the big rally, said: "Kill people who
refuse Integration. Kill them all, including the Carascalao family!" The
witness recognized the voice as the voice of Eurico Guterres, because the
witness often heard Eurico Guterres talking;
- It is the fact that after being sheltered at POLDA in 3 or 4 days, the
witness went home and saw all were destroyed, his valuables were all robbed,
the witness also saw blood marks on the walls, outside, in the front yard,
and there were bullet holes on the walls;
- It is the fact that the attacks at the witness' house, caused over 17
victims died, and the witness' son Manelito Carascalao was one of them, with
many severe wounds on his corpse, his neck was almost completely slashed in
two, his body had bullet holes, there were marks of sharp weapon slashes on
the forehead, and cuts on his face;
- It is the fact that the ABRI Commander, at that time was Gen. TNI Wiranto,
always received reports from the Defendant, Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri, as
the PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, on the situations in East Timor;
- It is the fact that Gen. TNI Wiranto had seen the Special Report No.
R.184/Lap.Sus/IV/1999, but did not recall whether or not he had read it;
� It is the fact that the ABRI Commander, Gen. TNI Wiranto, received various
types of reports, such as: Intelligence Reports, Logistics Reports,
Operations Reports, Special Reports, Daily Reports, Weekly Reports, and all
of them directly filed into the Staff System at MABES TNI Headquarters;
- It is the fact that as the follow up of the Special Report No. R.184/Lap.Sus/IV/1999,
the ABRI Commander, Gen TNI Wiranto, immediately sent a team of
investigation led by the Inspector General of MABES TNI, MARSDYA TNI-AU (Air
Force Lieutenant General) TamtamaAdi, to thoroughly investigate the
incidents at the church and the Parish House in Liquisa, and the ABRI
Commander emphasized that the Defendant/ PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, Maj. Gen. TNI
Adam R. Damiri, and the East Timor KAPOLDA, Police Col. Timbul Silaen, to
thoroughly investigate the background that led to the incidents and find the
perpetrators;
- It is the fact that for problems regarding the supervision, trainings,
equipments and finance of the forces, the ABRI Commander was assisted by the
Army Chief of Staff, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Navy Chief of
Staff, while the forces' operations were carried out by the Commanders of
KODAM and the Commanders in Chief;
- It is the fact that the KODAM Commander, besides carrying out the
operational tasks, was also delegated the authority, through the Army Chief
of Staff, to carry out the supervisory tasks, so the KODAM Commander had the
duty on the supervision of the army squads in his area or in his strategic
compartments;
- It is the fact that the ABRI Commander, Gen. TNI Wiranto requested reports
from the Defendant, Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri, as the Commander of KODAM
IX/ UDAYANA, among others, on Logistics, Intelligence, Operations, Daily
Activities, and so on, the reports of which, were filed by the deputies or
staff officials on behalf of the PANGDAM;
- It is the fact that the Defendant, Maj. Gen. Adam R. Damiri / PANGDAM IX
UDAYANA, reported the activities from April through September 1999 to the
ABRI Commander, the Defendant reported to the ABRI Commander the Liquisa
incidents on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of April 1999, and the incident on the
17th of April 1999, at the house of Manuel Carascalao, after that, the
Defendant's reports were discussed in the meetings of officers in MABES
level, in which according to the ABRI Commander, they dealt with sensitive
issues, MABES TNI then sent a team of investigation to PANGDAM/ the
Defendant and the East Timor KAPOLDA, then the ABRI Commander reported the
matter to the RI President, B.J. Habibie;
- It is the fact that in his reports to the ABRI Commander, the Defendant/
PANGDAM IX UDAYANA did not mention the involvement of ABRI, it was only
concluded that the security authority were present in the scene, and there
were allegations that the security officers were involved in the shooting
contacts;
- It is the fact that when the incidents occurred in April 1999, in Liquisa
and at the house of Manuel Carascalao, the control of the security authority
was in the hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA, who was the Defendant, Maj. Gen TNI
Adam R. Damiri;
- It is the fact that the Defendant, Maj. Gen. TNI Adam R. Damiri reported
to the ABRI Commander on the incident at Diocese Dili on the 5th of
September 1999, and the ABRI Commander had made a recheck through phone
calls to the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, as well as to the KAPOLDA;
- It is the fact that the incident at Ave Maria Church, Suai, on the 6th of
August 1999, was also reported to the ABRI Commander, and during the
incident at Diocese Dili on the 5th of September 1999, the security control
was in the hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA, who was PANGDAM IX UDAYANA Maj. Gen.
TNI Adam R. Damiri / the Defendant;
- It is the fact that on the 4th and 5th of September 1999, the ABRI
Commander, Gen. TNI Wiranto came to Dili, and at Komoro Airport in Dili
conducted a briefing;
- It is the fact that there were additional troops sent to East Timor,
assigned from areas throughout Indonesia, and those assigned in East Timor
included 6 (six) Battalions, consisted of around 6,000 personnel, and up to
the People's Consultation/ Ballot, there were assigned 7 (seven) Battalions;
- It is the fact that the East Timor native soldiers were recruited in 1978
and assigned in Battalions 744 and 745, and 90% of the members of KODIM of
Dili were East Timor natives;
- It is the fact that the ABRI Commander had instructed TNI and POLRI to
stand neutral, take no sides whatsoever, and take firm actions in line with
the law, against whoever violated the law, regardless whichever sides they
came from, the Pro-Integration or the Pro-Independence;
- It is the fact that the consideration of the ABRI Commander in the
appointment and assignment of the Commander of the Military Emergency
Authority, Maj. Gen. TNI Kiki Syahnakri, was because he was a top-ranked
officer who could update the development of operations in East Timor, a
professional officer who had the ability to control the situations in
emergency;
- It is the fact that there was a transfer of the Control of Command (KODAL)
in the East Timor area, because at the time, according to MABES TNI/ the
Ministry of Defense and Security, KODAL Command was no longer effective in
the hands of POLRI, and the ways of handling the commands and control from
POLRI could no longer bring the East Timor region into the safe, secured and
controlled conditions, so that the incidents in the 4 (four) regencies would
not spread out to the other nine regencies;
- It is the fact that the ABRI Commander, Gen. TNI Wiranto, during the time
of the transfer of KODAL from the police to the Defendant, Maj. Gen. TNI
Adam R. Damiri, instructed officials to immediately overcome the riots, to
prevent them from spreading out to other areas, to take stern actions
against the provokers who were involved in the provocation against the
masses, and to punish the perpetrators from whichever parties they came from,
and whenever necessary, to shoot them on sight;
- It is the fact that the takeover of the control of command was a power to
coordinate various activities in a certain area, carried out by various
institutions;
- It is the fact that the frauds committed by UNAMET, were reported
according to the regulated stages from the bottom up to the decision makers
on the national level, the reports were received in writing, as well as in
verbal procedure, they were even discussed in the international level;
- It is the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the RI President
had interfered to get clarification on the frauds committed by UNAMET and
its elements, and as the response, the UN sent 3 (three) rapporteurs to
reexamine the facts of the reports and then made a comprehensive report on
it;
- It is the fact that the UN knew of the frauds, but the frauds were not
dominant nor significant to disqualify the winner, and the vote counting was
done openly and publicly, so that the delay of the announcement was no
longer necessary;
- It is the fact that the First Lieut. Sugito had taken his men to the TKP (crime
scene) at Ave Maria Church, Suai, the witness saw corpses were scattered
around the place, then the witness and 4 (four) other people carried the 27
corpses by wrapping them in canvas and loaded them onto a Panther van;
- It is the fact that the corpses at Ave Maria Church, Suai, mostly had
slashes of sharp weapons, and among the corpses were those of Pastor Hilario,
Pastor Fransisco, and Pastor Dewanto, the three pastors had wounds from
sharp weapons including the severe cuts on the hands, stomachs and necks;
- It is the fact that the 27 corpses were buried in piles in 3 (three)
burial holes, in Alas village in the Indonesia-East Timor border, the
village was chosen because if they made the burials within the East Timor
area, they were afraid that during the funeral, they had to confront attacks
by unidentified assailants;
- It is the fact that on the 15th of April 1999, MARSDYA TNI Tamtama Adi,
the Inspector General TNI, had made the investigation and clarification on
the alleged involvement of TNI in the incidents in Liquisa;
- It is the fact that the method of the investigation used by the 4 (four)
member team, were by making observation notes, and went to the TKP to make
verbal interviews without official records;
- It is the fact that MARSDYA TNI Tamtama Adi and his team did not interview
Pastor Rafael Dos Santos, but the team of investigation interviewed John Rea,
who, according to the information, tried to mediate a peace settlement, but
failed to do so;
- It is the fact that the report of the team of investigation was considered
as the Special Attention Report and was not yet completed, and it was
considered as report with 'very special' characteristics, and the document
was sent without seals, and it was sent directly to MABES TNI Headquarters;
- It is the fact that the Military Emergency Command was established on the
7th of September 1999, then Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri was appointed and
assigned as the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority for East Timor
region;
- It is the fact that the basic principles of the establishment of the
Military Emergency was the Presidential Decree that was issued on the 6th of
September 1999, based on the Law No. 23 of the year 1959, in which in East
Timor at the time, the local government was no longer in function, the
eruption of mass riots, and the situations that threatened the sovereignty
of the country led to the establishment of the Military Emergency;
- It is the fact that the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, Maj.
Gen. TNI Kiki Syahnakri had duty to stop the violence, to create conducive
conditions to continue the process of the People's Consultation/ Ballot,
also to propose to the ABRI Commander, the advancement of the liquidation of
KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, as KOREM 164 Wira Dharma had 2 (two) Battalions of
East Timor native soldiers consisted of quite large force, for they wanted
to fight against the arrival of the multinational troops, so the liquidation
was advanced to avoid conflicts at the time of the arrival of the
multinational troops in Dili;
- It is the fact that the troops arrived in Dili on the 20th of September
1999, led by General Peter Kosgrov, the troops were there to assist TNI;
- It is the fact that the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, Maj.
Gen. TNI Kiki Syahnakri, had made sky observations over the towns, and it
was seen that the badly burnt towns included Dili, Manatuto, and parts of
Maliana and Suai;
- It is the fact that when Maj. Gen. TNI Kiki Syahnakri was appointed as the
Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, Dili town was still under the
control of the Pro-Integration, while FALINTIL had controlled Dare, the
uphill area of Dili town;
- That based on the PRO-JUSTISIA Letter No. T.T. 3002/SK.II/XI/1999, on the
excavation of the unidentified mass burials, issued by the Department of
Forensic, the Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia, there were facts
as follows:
1. That based on the request of visum (autopsy) reports from the Public
Prosecutor Office of East Nusa Tenggara in the Letter No. R. 417/Q.3/D.P.1/II/1999,
dated the 22nd of November 1999, the team of Forensic Doctors from the
Department of Forensic, the Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia/
RSUPN Dr. CIPTO MANGUNKUSUMO Hospital, Jakarta, consisted of Dr. SAMPURNO,
SH. Spf., Dr. HERKUTANTO, SH. Spf., and Dr. AGUS WIJAYANTO, on the 25th of
November 1999, had excavated corpses from the unidentified mass burials
allegedly victims of Human Rights violations, in the South Alas village,
Kobalima district, Belu Regency, NTT, and had examined 3 corpses on the site,
while the examination of the other 23 corpses were carried out on the 26th
of November 1999, at RSU Atambua Hospital;
2. There were 3 (three) mass burials:
2.1. One burial was around 2 times 3 square meters, contained 12 corpses
2.2. One burial was around 2 times 3 square meters, contained 3 corpses
2.3. One burial was around 2,5 times 2,5 square meters, contained 11 corpses
3. That based on the Visum et Repertum (autopsy report) No. 001/TT.3002/SK.II/XI/1999,
the conclusion of the forensic examination, was that the corpse was
identified as that of Romo (Father) Tarcisius Dewanto, on the corpse they
found fractures at the third and fifth bones at the back of the neck caused
by a high-speed gunshot, a fracture on the first rib at the left side, which
matched the hole in the clothing, also caused by a gunshot, beside that,
they found fractures on the ribs caused by blows of blunt objects;
4. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 002/TT.3002/SK.II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was identified as
that of Romo Hilario Madeira, on the corpse they found a fracture on the
left upper arm, which matched the characteristics of those caused by
high-speed gunshots. Besides that, they found fractures on the left shoulder
bone, on the right ribs up to the seventh rib on the back side, and on the
first left rib on the front side, also caused by a high-speed gunshot, the
shot-wound ditches, based on the location, had caused fatal damages to the
organs inside the left chest cavity, which were the lung and the large
artery.
The cause of the fatality was the gunshot on the left chest, led to the
damage of the internal organs, including the lung and the large artery, that
caused the bleeding;
5. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 003/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination, the corpse was identified as that of
Romo Fransisco Soares, on the corpse they found a fracture on the third bone
on the neck, with the straight line fracture due to cut of a sharp weapon,
the entire cut on the neck bone led to the entire cut of the spinal cord
that caused the fatal damage to the brain. Besides that, they also found
fractures on the left ribs at the back, caused by the blow of a blunt object,
which also caused severe damage to the lung tissue in the chest.
The cause of the fatality was the strike of a sharp weapon in the neck area,
which led to the complete cut of the spinal cord that caused a fatal damage
to the brain;
6. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 004/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination, was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, over 30 years old, on the corpse they found a fracture on the
sixth right rib, which matched the tear on the jacket, caused by a strike of
sharp object. Based on the location, the strike penetrated through the chest,
damaging the lung tissue and caused the severe bleeding on the right side of
the chest cavity, and it was fatal;
The cause of the fatality was the strike of a sharp object on the right side
of the chest area, that went through the chest and caused the bleeding.
7. That based on the Visum et Repertum No.005/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was identified as
that of an adult female, between 35 and 44 years old, on the corpse they
found a fracture on the sixth rib on the right side which matched the tear
on the jacket, caused by the strike of a sharp object. Based on its location,
the strike went through the chest and caused severe damage to the lung
tissue and the bleeding on the right side of the chest cavity, besides that,
they found a wound on the right thigh, caused by a strike of a sharp object.
The cause of the fatality was the strike on the right side of the chest that
penetrated into the chest, which led the bleeding.
8. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 006/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
male, around 20 years old or younger, the corpse was already decomposed. The
cause of the fatality could not be confirmed.
9. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 007/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
female, around 20 years old or younger, the tissue was already decomposed.
The cause of the fatality could not be confirmed, but the strike by a sharp
object on the right side of the back could be considered as the cause.
10. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 008/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
female, around 25 years old, on the corpse they found a tear in the neck
area, and the complete cut of the sixth bone of the neck, caused by the
strike of a sharp object, the complete cut of the neck bone led to the
complete cut of the spinal cord, and the fatal damage to the brain;
The cause of the fatality was the strike of a sharp object onto the neck
area that caused severe damage to the spinal cord and the brain;
11. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 009/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
5-year-old child, on the corpse they found slits on the front and the back
sides of the clothing and T-shirt, caused by strikes of sharp objects.
The cause of the fatality could not be confirmed, but the strikes of sharp
objects on the chest and stomach areas could be considered as the cause of
the fatality of the child;
12. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 010/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
young woman, around 21 years old, on the corpse they found that parts of the
vertebrae on the chest area, which were the eighth, ninth, and tenth bones,
were crushed in pieces, caused by a high-speed gunshot, the damage of the
vertebrae caused damage to the spinal cord and the internal organs,
including the aorta, which was fatal.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot that crushed the spinal
cord and caused severe damage to the aorta that led to the bleeding;
13. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 011/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, age 30 years old or older, they found that the third, fourth,
fifth bones of the vertebrae were crushed into pieces, caused by a
high-speed gunshot.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot on the neck that crushed
the spinal cord and the brain.
14. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 012/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult, less than 22 years old, on the corpse they found a bone fracture on
the right side, an injury caused by a high-speed gunshot.
The cause of the fatality was a high-powered gunshot on the upper side of
the right leg, causing the severe damage to the right leg that led to the
bleeding.
15. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 013/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
young adult male, on the corpse they found a bone fracture on the upper side
of the left arm, and based on the characteristics, it was caused by a
high-powered gunshot, and the fracture on the left rib, based on the
seriousness of the condition, it was also caused by a gunshot.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot that hit the left side of
the chest and caused damage to the organs inside the left chest cavity,
which were the lung and heart.
16. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 014/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult female, on the corpse they found fractures on the right shoulder bone,
the right collarbone, and the first through the fifth right ribs, which
collectively could be concluded as the injuries caused by a high-speed
gunshot. The damage on the bones led to the damage of the internal organs in
the right side of the chest, including the lung that led to the bleeding.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot on the left chest
damaging the internal organs, including the lung.
17. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 015/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination, was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, on the corpse they found severe fractures on the skull, on top
of the skull, as well as on the upper jaw area. The damage were caused by a
high-speed gunshot, besides that, they found a tear on the right of the
backside of the clothing and T-shirts, caused by a strike of a sharp object.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot that crushed the top of
the skull.
18. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 016/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination, was that the corpse was that of a
young female, less than 25 years old, on the corpse they found a smooth
slash on the left side of the chest, caused by a strike of a sharp object,
and a round tear on the armpit area, caused by a gunshot or a blow of a
blunt object.
The cause of the fatality could not be confirmed, but the strike of a sharp
object and, or the gunshot as mentioned before, could be considered as the
cause of her death.
19. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 017/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
young adult male, less than 25 years old, on the corpse they found a smooth
slash on the left arm and waist areas of the clothing, caused by a strike of
a sharp object.
The cause of the fatality could not be confirmed, but the strike of sharp
objects could be considered as the cause of the fatality.
20. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 018/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
male, age between 30 and 40 years old, on the corpse they found severe
fractures of the bones of the face, including on the cheeks, and the upper
and lower jaws, that based on the complexity of the condition, matched those
caused by a high-speed gunshot. On the corpse, they also found that the
sixth bone of the vertebrae was entirely cut due to the strike of a sharp
object, which led to the completely cut of the spinal cord.
The cause of the fatality was a high-speed gunshot into the head that
crushed the bones in the head, while the strike in the neck entirely cut the
vertebrae on the neck area.
21. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 019/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was and adult
male, age over 25 years old, the cause of fatality could not be confirmed,
but the strike of sharp objects could be considered as the cause of his
death.
22. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 020/TT.3002/SK II/ XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, on the corpse they found severe injuries in the soft tissues, as
well as bone fractures, the cause of fatality could not be confirmed.
23. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 021/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, on the corpse they found a hole on the back of the skull, caused
by a gunshot, and a fracture on the left rib caused by a strike of a sharp
object. The gunshot in the head had crushed the brain, while the wound on
the left side of the chest caused by a strike of a sharp object that had
torn the left lung that led to the bleeding. The cause of fatality to this
man was a gunshot that hit the head.
24. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 022/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
young adult male, on the corpse they found fractures on the upper and lower
jaws that based on the complexity of the condition, was caused by the severe
strike of a blunt object, or a high-speed gunshot, while the burn injuries
seemed to happen after his death.
The cause of the fatality was the severe strike of a blunt object or a
high-speed gunshot.
25. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 023/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, between 35 and 40 years old, on the corpse they found marks of
fractures on the skull, as they found a piece of the bone from the left
temple which did not match the Sutura. The injury of the skull could be
caused by the strike of a blunt object or a gunshot, while the burn injury
seemed to happen after his death.
The cause of the fatality was the severe strike of a blunt object, or a
gunshot on the head.
26. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 024/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of an
adult male, not more than 25 years old, on the corpse they found bone
fractures on the head, including the nose up to the upper jaw, also the
cheek bones, caused by a high-speed gunshot. The severe damage on the bones
of the head had caused the severe bleeding that led to breathing trouble,
which was fatal. The cause of fatality was a gunshot in the head.
27. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 025/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, the
conclusion of the forensic examination was that the corpse was that of a
female, on the corpse they found fractures on the right ribs, which matched
the tear on the clothing, caused by a gunshot. The cause of the fatality was
a gunshot.
28. That based on the Visum et Repertum No. 026/TT.3002/SK II/XI/ 1999, was
that the corpse was that of an adolescent male, the cause of fatality was
not confirmed.
29. The condition of the corpses were already decomposed, it was concluded
that the victims died around 2 up to 3 months before the examinations, the
cause of the fatality of the victims were varied, from gunshots, to the
strikes by sharp or blunt objects, the degrees of certainty of the causes of
fatality were also varied, some of them could not be confirmed the causes of
their deaths. How the victims died were determined by the causes of fatality,
the treatment on the corpses, and how they were buried. Mostly the fatality
causes of the victims were violence, they did not have proper post-mortality
treatments, and they were buried in mass burials. Those points indicated
that the corpses were victims of mass murders.
Considering that before the Panel of Judges further consider and discuss the
case of Grave Human Rights violations, it is necessary to point out some
principles of the International Law and the Humanitarian Law; besides that,
as this case concerns the grave Human Rights violations, it is necessary to
point out some general principles in the International Law concerning the
crimes against humanity that have universal characteristics, which are as
follows:
- That no one should be above the Law, that our responsibility would be
ensuring its law enforcement and no one can escape the law for crimes he
committed in the past or in the future.
- Crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide are Hostis Humanis
Generis (Enemies of Mankind), which are international crimes that should not
escape prosecution and punishment.
- Crimes against humanity have become parts of the general law principles
that have been acknowledged by most community of nations, those who have
committed crimes (commission) or omission could be retroactively prosecuted.
Considering that in the explanation of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, on
the Human Rights Court, it is declared that grave Human Rights violations
are "Extra Ordinary Crimes", while the explanation of Article 7 of the Law
says that genocide crimes and crimes against humanity in this regulation are
in line with the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (Article
6 and Article 7), the law makers and the Government have adopted the rules
of the International Law into the National Law, therefore the exercise of
the principles, customs, and court practices of the International Law on the
actors of the Grave Human Rights violations, could be applied into the grave
Human Rights violation courts in our country, such as this case, and they
would be justified as long as they are related to the case of Grave Human
Rights violations in East Timor.
Considering besides applying the principles as mentioned above, the panel
consider it necessary to point out and discuss several issues concerning the
validation of the Criminal Code, which consisted of the validation system in
evaluating each of the evidence, which would be the basic guidance in
hearing the case, as in the Article 10 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000 on
the Human Rights Court, among others, it is regulated that, if not regulated
otherwise in this law, the criminal code procedure on the cases of Grave
Human Rights violations, would be based on KUHAP (the Criminal Code
Procedure), therefore the Law No. 8 of the year 1981 (KUHAP/ the Criminal
Code Procedure), would be used as the basic code procedure of the grave
Human Rights violations, including its validation system.
Besides that, Article 183 of the KUHAP Criminal Code Procedures regulates
that to determine whether or not a defendant is guilty, and to be able to
sentence the person, therefore:
- The fault should be proven with, at least, two valid evidence, and
- With the verification of, at least, two valid evidence, the judge would
have no doubt that the crime had been committed and that the Defendant
should be responsible for that.
Considering that Article 184, Paragraph (1) of KUHAP Criminal Code Procedure
declares limited valid evidence according to the Law, which are:
a. Witness' Testimony
b. Expert's Testimony
c. Letters
d. Indications/ Clues
e. The Defendant's Testimony
Considering Article 183 in relation to Article 184 Paragraph (1) of KUHAP
Criminal Code Procedure, therefore a Defendant could be punished with
criminal penalty, if his fault had been proven with at least, two out of
five valid evidence as mentioned above. Therefore, the minimum validation
which would be considered adequate to prove the crime committed by a
Defendant, would be at least, two valid evidence;
Considering therefore the Panel of Judges should first explain each of the
valid evidence, and how the judges' stance over the evidence, which would be
the guidelines in ruling the case;
1. Witness' Testimony
That the witness' testimony would be considered as a valid evidence when the
testimony of the witness was presented in court, over a crime he heard, he
saw with his own eyes, and he experienced himself, by mentioning the reason
of the knowledge, and the testimony was given under oath based on respected
religion of each witness as regulated in Article 185, Paragraph (1) jo
Article 1 point 27 jo Article 160, Paragraph (3) of KUHAP Criminal Code
Procedure.
While the testimony of the witness which was not given under oath, though in
accordance with the testimony of others, could not be considered as the
valid evidence, but if the testimony is in accordance with the testimony of
the witness who has given the testimony under oath, it could be used as the
additional evidence for other valid evidence;
That the Law also regulates, when the witness, after giving the testimony in
the investigation process, passed away, or for valid interference could not
be present in court, or could not be summoned because his address or
residence has been too far-away, or for other reasons which concern the
national interests, therefore the given testimony would be read in court,
and if the testimony had been given under oath, therefore the testimony
would have the same value as the witness' testimony presented in court {Article
162, Paragraph (1) and (2) of KUHAP}.
That on how the judges would justify the facts of the witness' testimony,
the Criminal Code Procedure regulates guidelines as follows:
a. The concurrence of the testimony of one witness with that of the others;
b. The concurrence of the witness' testimony with other evidence;
c. The feasible reason used by the witness to explain about a certain issue;
d. The lifestyle and morality of the witness, also all things that could
generally influence whether or not the witness' testimony is trustworthy;
That the testimony of several witnesses, each of which stands for itself,
over an incident or condition, could be used as evidence, if they are
related to each other in one way or the other, therefore could confirm an
incident or a certain condition (Article 185, Paragraph 4).
While the opinion or presumption obtained from merely reasoning was not the
witness' testimony in Article 185 Paragraph (5) KUHAP, as well as the
testimony obtained from other persons or testimonium de auditu was not
included as the witness' testimony (Explanation of Article 185, Paragraph
(1)).
The Law does not explicitly mention the valuation of the witness' testimony,
read in court, which has not been given under oath;
From the starting point of the regulation Article 161, Paragraph (2), in
relation with the Article 185, Paragraph (7),
Considering that based on the above explanation, therefore the Judge could,
for certain reasons, accept or reject the testimony of a witness, though it
should be acknowledged that the Judge could not simply arbitrarily accept or
reject the testimony of the witness, on the other hand, the Judge should
really thoroughly consider the testimony of the witnesses based on reasons
in accordance with the law;
2. Experts' Testimony
That the testimony of an expert is a testimony given by a person who has
particular knowledge on a certain issue that is essential in clarifying a
criminal case, for the interest of the investigation stated in court (Article
1 point 28 jo Article 186 of KUHAP).
That the testimony of the expert is equal to the testimony of a witness
mentioned before, that is it has no value of fixed and definite validation,
therefore the testimony of an expert has a free value of validation or vrij
bewrijkracht;
3. Letters of Evidence
That according to Article 187 of KUHAP, a letter could be valued as a valid
evidence according to the Law, when
- The Letter has been stated under oath of office
- The letter has been confirmed with a statement under oath
Then Article 187 of KUHAP has comprehensively specified the forms of letters
which are valued as the evidence, they are:
a. The Official Record and other letters in the official format made by the
authorized Public Official or made in his presence, with required contents
as follows:
Contains the explanation of an incident or condition which was heard, seen
or experienced by the respected official, with the clear and firm reasons
over his explanation;
b. The letter was made in the regulated format, or the letter was made by
the authorized official over the issue which management he is responsible
for, and would be used for the confirmation/ validation of a certain issue
or condition;
c. The testimony of an expert which contains the argument based on his
expertise over a certain issue or condition which has been officially
requested from him;
d. Other letters could be in effect if they are related to the content of
other evidence.
That the letters as mentioned in the pointers a, b, c, are the official
letters made by the authorized officials, or as regulated, or the letters of
an expert with the particular knowledge on a certain issue or condition,
made with the statement under oath, or confirmed with the statement under
oath, while the letters in the format as regulated in the pointer d, are the
letters with regular format;
That the value of the validation/verification of the letters of evidence is
equal to that of the witness' testimony, or that of the expert's testimony,
they all have free value of validation, the Judge is free to value the
validation of evidence, as the principle of the process of the criminal case
investigation is to seek the Real Truth (Kebenaran Sejati/ Materiel Waarheid)
and not the Formal Truth (Formeel Waarheid)
4. Clue/ Indication Evidence
That a Clue/ Indication is the act, incident or condition, which because of
its concurrence with one another, or with the criminal act itself,
indicating the occurrence of a crime, and the actor/s of the crime, and the
clue could be obtained from:
a. Witness' testimony
b. Letters
c. Defendant's testimony
(Article 188, Paragraph 1 and 2 of KUHAP Criminal Code Procedure)
That if the Judge wants to use the clue evidence as the basic valuation in
verifying the Defendant's fault, the Law really demands the consciousness
and responsibility of the concerned Judge.
Article 188, Paragraph (3) declares the valuation on the verification of a
clue in every single condition, should be wisely considered by the Judge,
after he had comprehensively carried out the investigation with thorough
accuracy and care, based on his conscience.
Considering that the rule could be comprehended that as much as he is
capable of, the Judge would not use the Clue Evidence in the proving the
Defendant's fault, except in the very significant and pressing situation,
whereas the Judge had already thoroughly examined and made the best use of
other valid evidence, but as they were not adequate enough, the Judge could
turn to the Clue Evidence. The value of the verification of the Clue
evidence is equal to that of the witness' testimony, the expert's testimony,
the letters of evidence, which all have the free valuation of verification,
therefore the Judge would be free to value and use it as the evidence, and
the Clue evidence could not stand on itself in proving the fault of the
Defendant.
5. Defendant's Testimony
That the Defendant's Testimony is the statements of the Defendant presented
in court on the actions he did or he knew or he experienced, and the
Defendant's testimony could be used only for himself.
(Article 189 Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (3)
That the Defendant's testimony that were given outside the court could be
used to assist in finding the evidence in court, as long as the testimony is
supported by valid evidence on the charges on the Defendant, and the
Defendant's testimony alone would not be enough to prove the Defendant is
guilty of committing the crime as indicted on him, it has to be supported by
other valid evidence.
(Article 189 Paragraph (2) and Paragraph (4) of KUHAP)
Considering that the value of the verification of the Defendant's testimony
is equal to that of the other evidence as mentioned above, that it has the
free value, because the Judges would not have to value of the validation on
the evidence of the Defendant's testimony. The Judge could accept or reject
it to be used as evidence for certain reasons. Besides that, the Defendant's
testimony alone would not be enough to prove the Defendant guilty of
committing the crime as charged to him, it has to be supported by other
evidence.
Considering that based on the whole explanation above, after the Panel of
Judges heard the testimony of the witnesses presented in court, the
testimony of those read in court, as well as the testimony of the Defendant
presented in court, also by thoroughly observing the evidence presented in
court, the Panel of Judges find it necessary to first value the testimony of
the witnesses;
Considering the valid evidence in the form of letters, one of the letters
that needs to be reconsidered by the Panel of Judges, is the Special Report
Letter No. R-184/LAKSUS/IV/1999, signed by the Brig. Gen. TNI Mahidin
Simbolon, the Panel considered this 1 (one) letter is related to the other
valid evidence;
Considering the evidence in the form of Clues/Indications, the Panel of
Judges would use the Clues/Indications from the courts of other cases of
Grave Human Rights violations in East Timor which have been ruled at the
same time with that of the Defendant, because the Panel of Judges regard the
cases of Grave Human Rights violations in East Timor should be considered as
one case, but as there are as many as 18 Defendants, therefore the case is
divided into separated cases (splitsing);
Considering the Defendant has been examined in court and has given his
testimony;
Considering before the Panel consider the evidence proposed by the Ad Hoc
Public Prosecutor, the Panel of Judges would first consider the charges of
the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor and the Plea Notes of the Team of Attorneys of
the Defendant;
Considering the charges of the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, the Panel of Judges
disagrees with the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, because the Prosecutors are not
accurate, inconsistent and do not follow the rules of indictments, which are:
- The Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor do not consider the testimony of the expert
witness, AKBP Drs. Gatot Subiyaktoro;
- The Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor indicted the Defendant free of charges, but
still included the matters that implicate and commutate the Defendant, that
is unusual in the free-of-charge indictment;
- In the last part of the indictment, the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor declares
that the indictment would not influence the TNI Community, especially the
Defendant, Maj. Gen Adam R. Damiri: "The court was not a form of revenge and
was not carried out for the benefit of, or under the pressures of certain
parties, ...." That is a very unusual statement to be declared in a
free-of-charge indictment;
- The difference in opinion would be reconsidered by the Panel of Judges in
the considerations related to the matter;
Considering the Plea Notes of the Attorneys of the Defendant, the Panel of
Judges disagreed, though the Panel understands that what stated in the Plea
Notes were the facts that only commutate the Defendant;
Considering that the difference of opinion would not be discussed one at a
time in this section but all of them would be presented in the consideration
related to the matter;
Considering the whole explanation above, after the Panel of Judges heard the
testimony of the witnesses, those presented in court, as well as those read
in court, also the testimony of the Defendant presented in court, and
thoroughly observed the evidence presented in court, the Indictment Letters,
as well as the Plea Notes, the Panel of Judges consider it necessary to
first value the testimony of the witnesses:
a. Witness' Testimony
a. 1. On the Quality of the Witnesses
Considering that out of the 30 witnesses presented in court, the 12 of them,
they are LILIK KOESHADIANTO, Brig. Gen. NOER MUIS, Brig. Gen. TNI TONO
SURATMAN, ASEP KUSWANI, LEONITO MARTINS, SUJARWO, Drs. HERMAN SEDYONO, Maj.
Infantry SUGITO, AKBP Drs. ADIOS SALOVA, YAYAT SUDRAJAT, AKBP Drs. HULMAN
GULTOM, AKBP Drs. GATOT SUBIYAKTORO, and the witnesses whose testimony were
read in court, they are Drs. G.M. TIMBUL SILAEN, ABILIO JOSE OSARIO SOARES,
have been all the Defendants in the courts of Grave Human Rights violation
cases too;
Considering that the 12 other witnesses, they are Lieut. Gen TNI (Ret) KIKI
SYAHNAKRI, Maj. Gen. TNI ZAKI ANWAR MAKARIM, Gen. TNI (Ret) WIRANTO, BRIPKA
Police MAKARAU, Maj. Infantry SALMON MALAVE, Capt. Police JOHN REA, Capt.
Infantry JOKO WALUYO, First Lieut. CARLOS AMARAL, Sgt. Maj. RAIMUNDO DOS
SANTOS, Maj. Infantry HARTONO, Brig. Gen TNI WIDYA BAGYA, and MARSDA (Ret)
TAMTAMA ADI, are the witnesses from the military community from the Army TNI
as well as the Air Force TNI;
Considering that the quality of the witnesses are the former supervisors of
the Defendant, the colleagues of the Defendant, or the subordinate officers
of the Defendant, therefore the Panel of Judges consider the testimony of
the witnesses cover up the fault of the Defendant, or at least, they have
given testimony that commutate each other.
Considering that only the 3 victim witnesses, who could only gave the
authentic testimony, they are the witnesses, MARIO VIEGAS CARASCALAO and
Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS who were examined through teleconferences, and the
witness, Bishop BELO, whose testimony was read in this court;
a. 2. On the Testimony of the Witness, Bishop BELO
Considering the Attorneys of the Defendant that argued the testimony of
Bishop BELO as testimonium de auditu (The Plea Notes, page 444), the Panel
of Judges disagreed to that because in page 490, the testimony of Bishop
BELO was acknowledged, though it was stated as the testimony of his own (unus
testis nullus testis).
Considering that the Attorneys of the Defendant are inconsistent with their
arguments, therefore the Panel of Judges considered the testimony of Bishop
BELO should be used;
Considering that Bishop BELO experienced, or in the sense of requesting
himself the protection to avoid the attacks of Militia, and he heard himself
the words: "Attack now! Attack now!" shouted by an officer in military garb
who had rather light skin color like a Manado native;
Considering that Bishop BELO experienced himself, as he asked General
WIRANTO. First, that in the ABRI Community, they should have a sophisticated
intelligence network to be able to find who did the shootings during the
evenings that worsened the situation. "I ask who did the shootings in Dili
town that made people could not sleep. Second, I ask the ABRI Commander to
clean up the routes from Batu Gede and Dili to Lautem, from Militia groups
and their checking posts they established along the road." But the two
questions were not answered by WIRANTO, he said only the "wet words" or the
term for being cynical.
Considering that Bishop BELO saw with his own eyes, from the helicopter that
brought him from Baucau, that his home was on fire;
a. 3. On the Testimony of the Witness, Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS
Considering that Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS is the victim witness who
experienced himself when he was threatened to be killed, and experienced
himself, when his residence was under attacks by the Militia, joined with
the Police and TNI, though it was first denied by the Attorneys of the
Defendant, but they admitted that members of KODIM, RAYMUNDO, ISAC DOS
SANTOS and TOME DIEGO, were among those who attacked the residence of Pastor
RAFAEL (see page 420 of the Plea Notes);
Considering that the assailants were likely to be the members of KODIM, whom
he knew very well, as they were all the local natives, even one of them or
ISAC DOS SANTOS, was his own nephew, so the testimony of the witness is
trustworthy;
Considering that Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS experienced himself being in the
middle of the tear gas smoke that was directly shot into the jalousie
glassed window, and he experienced himself the glass of the jalousie windows
of his house were shattered caused by the shots directly aimed at his house;
Considering that Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS sincerely admitted that he was
rescued by an officer of KODIM from the threats to be killed by a member of
the Militia;
Considering the fact that his testimony, though presented through a
teleconference, was given without pressures or directions, as it was
witnessed by the representative of the Supreme Court, as well as the
representative of the Attorneys of the Defendant, in Timor Loro Sae,
therefore the Panel of Judges accept the truth of his testimony;
Considering the testimony of the witness, Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, though
according to the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor in the indictment, it was stated
as the testimony of his own (page 101 of the Indictment Letter), it was
agreed by the Attorneys of the Defendant according to the Plea Notes (page
422), but the Panel of Judges disagreed, and their consideration would be
presented later.
a. 4. On the Testimony of the Witness, MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO
Considering that the testimony of the witness, MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, was
accepted by the Panel of Judges as the valid testimony as the witness was a
victim witness who experienced himself his house being destroyed, he saw
with his own eyes and heard that his house was under attacks, and that his
son named MANELITO was killed very tragically, with his corpse full of
severe wounds caused by slashes of sharp weapons, which almost completely
separated the head from the body, and also wounds from gunshots;
Considering the witness saw with his own eyes, that blood marks were
everywhere, in the front yard as well as inside the house, including in the
dining room, in the study room, even in the bed rooms, also marks of
gunshots on the walls, the household properties were totally destroyed, the
glass windows and doors were shattered, also the condition of the entire
house was in a real mess, the Panel of Judges disagreed with the Attorneys
of the Defendant who said that the testimony of the witness was only a
misinformation (see the Plea Notes page 227);
Considering that the testimony of the Witness was his own experience,
therefore the Panel of Judges declared the testimony as the valid evidence;
b. On the Testimony of the Expert
Considering that the testimony of expert witnesses, in the opinion of the
Panel of Judges have been quite objective, though the Judges were not
required to use them, the Panel would consider only the important parts, but
if they are not replied in this section, it is not necessarily meant that
the Judges had accepted or rejected it, but they could be replied later in
other sections related to the matter;
b. 1. On the Testimony of Prof. Dr. MULADI, SH., on the Systematic Element:
Considering that in accordance with the testimony of an expert that the
systematic element should be proven by the existence of the government
policy on an 'ethnic cleansing', according to the Panel of Judges, could
never be proven, as there were no governments would officially rule or apply
policies such as that;
Considering that in the International Ad Hoc Crime Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
in the case of JEAN PAUL AKAYESU, the systematic element was described as
the systematic and patterned actions based on the policies involving public,
as well as private resources. The systematic element should not be formally
formulated as the government policy, but should only be referred to the
existence of a planning;
Considering that in the TIHOMIR BLASKIC case in the International Ad Hoc
Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the systematic elements
referred to four elements, they are:
- Political intentions or ideology in the plan to destroy, abuse or weaken a
group of people or community;
- The spreading crimes or instructions of repeated and sustained inhuman
actions that were related one another against civilians;
- The planning on the use of public, as well as private resources, such as
the military or other resources;
- The involvement of the top-level officials, in political, as well as
private authorities in the setting up of the plan;
Considering that in Indonesia, it could never be proven that there would
never be a government policy to make attacks, commit murders or violence
against the residents of the former East Timor Province, even though there
were lives, properties and dignity that should be sacrificed by the
civilians in East Timor, due to the repeated, massive, same patterned crimes,
those could not be blamed only on the Pro-Integration Group, in this case,
the Militia in the PPI organization, also those could not be described as
the scheme of PPI group, but they could be explained as the scheme of the
system, as described by an expert, Dr. DANIEL SPARINGGA, which could be
proven only by the existence of victims of the clashes happened repeatedly
and in the same pattern, such as regulated in the customs of the
International Law;
Considering that ABRI, especially the Army TNI policy in East Timor is the
prime element in the system, in the operational control, the supervisory, as
well as the security systems, those which could be described in history, as
well as those in reality, it should be undeniable that ABRI, especially the
Army TNI, was part of the system, so it could not be said that they should
not be responsible;
b. 2. Reply on the Testimony of the Expert, Dr. DODI HARYADI
Considering the testimony of the expert witness that said the cultural
background of the ethnic communities in East Timor, had been socialized as
having conflicts among sub-ethnics or non-homogeneous groups of people, were
considered as the pre-conditions for the mass-behavior categorized as
threatening behaviors;
Considering that the Panel have the opinion that the threatening
pre-conditions should not remain persistent for a long time, therefore the
East Timor authority should have made immediate and adequate preventions to
end the threatening situation or sustainable conflicts.
c. On Letters
Considering that the valid evidence in the form of the Letters of evidence
proposed by the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, one of which, was the evidence of
the Special Report Letter Number: R-184/LAPSUS/IV/1999, dated on the 7th of
April 1999, signed by the Brig. Gen. MAHIDIN SIMBOLON;
Considering the testimony of the witness, General WIRANTO, who said that the
witness could only count on the official reports, such as the Letter Number:
R-184/LAPSUS/ IV/ 1999, which is an official letter, with the official
letterhead and seal of PANGDAM UDAYANA;
Considering that as the evidence, the report is valid, the report letter had
been replied by the TNI Commander, and as the follow up, MABES TNI sent a
team of investigation to Liquisa, led by Inspector General of MABES TNI,
MARSDA (the Air Force Lieutenant General) TAMTAMA ADI. The fact shows that
the letter is valid, though the Attorneys of the Defendant and the Defendant
objected to the use of the letter as evidence;
Considering the report of the team of investigation presented in court, also
the testimony of the witness MARSDA TAMTAMA ADI before the court, who only
interviewed 4 (four) persons, the Regent of Liquisa, Sister FLORA, DANDIM of
Liquisa, and KAPOLRES of Liquisa, the Panel considered that the Special
Attention Report did not meet the requirements of an investigation as the
only 4 (four) respondents would not meet the requirements of an
investigation of such incidents that covered a vast area and caused so many
victims, moreover, the interviews were not documented into official records,
therefore the Panel regarded the investigation not valid, and would not take
it into consideration;
Considering that the Panel disagreed with the Attorneys of the Defendant who
said that the letter should not be used as a valid evidence as there was no
original letter, but based on the testimony of the witnesses, Brig. Gen.
WIDYA BAGYA and I KETUT MURTIKA, or the witnesses who handed over and
received the document as it should be, also after reading the official
record of the handing over of the document declaring the letter was in
accordance with the rule concerning original dossier, therefore the
objection of the Attorneys of the Defendant could be put-aside;
Considering that the problem of the letters of evidence concerns the
particular evidence of the Special Report No. R-184/LAPSUS/IV/1999, dated
the 7th of April 1999, signed by Brig. Gen TNI MAHIDIN SIMBOLON, the KASDAM
(Chief of Staff) of KODAM IX/ UDAYANA, which include words: "The members of
POLRES and BRIMOB squads, also the members of TRIBUANA Task Force,
immediately back up the Pro-Integration Group ...," which in the opinion of
the Panel, as it is already publicly acknowledged that 'to back up' means 'to
assist' or at least, described the one-sidedness of the officers to the
Pro-Integration Group;
Considering that based on the above explanation, the Panel of Judges
considered the Letter could be used as the valid evidence;
d. On the Clues/Indications
Considering the Clues as evidence, are the valid evidence as regulated in
Article 184, Paragraph (1), the Panel would carefully take them into
consideration;
Considering that it was an undoubted fact (feiten notoir, prima facie), that
the presence of TNI, especially the Army TNI, since 1975, had influenced the
decision over the policy of Integration of East Timor to Indonesia, as the
27th Province;
Considering it was an undoubted fact that ABRI, especially the Army TNI, at
the time, played important roles in mentally and physically developed East
Timor, including the establishment of the native East Timor to become loyal,
dedicated, and quite skillful soldiers, among others, in establishing and
training WANRA, which in 1999, WANRA members joined in the PPI organization;
Considering it would be understandable that the sacrifices of ABRI,
especially the Army TNI in the 23 years time, had become meaningless when RI
Government announced the grant of Independence Option for the people of East
Timor, furthermore, they had to accept the reality that the 27th Province
had to be separated from the 'mother country' Indonesia, so it was
understandable if the disappointment was directed to the Pro-Independence
Group, who would easily control and use what they had built;
Considering that at the beginning of the assignment of Maj. Gen TNI KIKI
SYAHNAKRI as the Commander of the Military Emergency Authority, as declared
in his testimony before the court, he said that the first priority in his
work program would be liquidating the Battalions 744 and 745 whose members
were the local natives, because of the concern of their possible attacks at
the UN peace-keeping troops to arrive in Timor Loro Sae;
Considering overseeing the matters, there were clear indications why those
who became the Defendants of the Grave Human Rights violation cases were
mostly from the Army TNI;
Considering therefore the Panel of Judges would use the clues/ indications
taken from the courts of other cases of Grave Human Rights violations in
East Timor, which had been presided and ruled over simultaneously with that
of the Defendant, as the Panel considered the cases of Grave Human Rights
violations in East Timor should be in fact, tried as one case, but as there
were as many as 18 Defendants, therefore the case was separated into several
cases (splitsing);
Considering that the separation was also acknowledged by the Attorneys of
the Defendant, it was proven by the proposals of free-from-all-charge
judgments for DANDIM of Liquisa, Lieut. Col. ASEP KUSWANI, and DANREM 164/
Wira Dharma, Brig. Gen. TONO SURATMAN (see page 487 of the Plea Notes), also
for DANDIM of Dili, Lieut. Col. Infantry ENDAR PRIYATNO, and the criminal
procedures against Lieut. Col. SOEDJARWO, the DANDIM of Dili, and against
Brig. Gen. NOER MUIS, the DANREM 164/WD, in the pages 487, 489, 491, of the
Plea Notes;
Considering that particularly in the case of DANDIM of Dili, Lieut. Col.
Infantry ENDAR PRIYATNO, the Panel of judges presided and ruled over the
case, have proven that the members of KORAMIL of Maubara attacked the
residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO only because the members of KORAMIL of
Liquisa were not under the direct command of DANDIM of Dili, therefore
DANDIM of Dili was indicted free from all charges;
Considering also in the case of Lieut. Col. Infantry SOEDJARWO, it was
proven that the security protection that should be provided at the residence
of Bishop BELO had been withdrawn, so the attacks could be easily enforced;
Considering the failure to act from Brig. Gen NOER MUIS as the DANREM 164/WD,
in the prevention and anticipation of the occurrence of riots/ clashes;
Considering the case of EURICO GUTERRES who testified in court such as
testified by the Defendant, that he clearly confirmed the closeness of PPI
with the military, which made stronger indications of the involvement of the
military, especially the Army TNI, in every mass riot/ clash, and the
occurrence of the omission (pembiaran) crimes as in fact, the riots/ clashes
had been acknowledged by the military or the Army TNI;
Considering every clash and riot was performed in repeated, similar pattern
or ways, also the attacks always aimed at refugee centers for the
Pro-Independence people, which had no security or the security had been
withdrawn;
Considering there were always similar signs before the occurrence of a riot/
clashes, there would be a huge number of crowding masses, mostly carried
homemade firearms, wood sticks, and other weaponry, such as happened at
MAKODIM of Liquisa, before the riot/ clashes at the residence of Pastor
RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, such pattern occurred in the Big Rally, before the
attacks on the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, the incident just erupted
without preventive measures from the police officials, as well as from TNI,
though many of the TNI, POLRI, and the intelligence officers attended the
big rally, this was supported by the testimony of a witness, the INTELPAM
officer from the East Timor POLDA;
Considering the contents of the speeches delivered by EURICO GUTERRES and
JOAO TAVARES in front of thousands of the masses of the Pro-Integration
Group, which provoked the 'wipe out' of CARASCALAO family, the attending
authority officials should have known and predicted the coming situation, at
least they knew that at the residence of MANUEL CARASCALAO there were
refugees of the Pro-Independence Group;
Considering that the Panel of Judges take into consideration the existence
of the refugees, it would be unreasonable for the Pro-Independence refugees
to shelter in the listed centers at MAKODIM, MAPOLDA, or the residences/
offices of KORAMIL, the governor, while DANDIM, KAPOLDA, the regent,
DANRAMIL, and all their subordinate officers were clearly took the side of
the Pro-Integration Group;
Considering that overseeing the above indications, it could be concluded
that there were proofs of the involvement of the members of TNI and POLRI in
the occurrence of riots/ clashes as charged by the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor;
Considering that based on the valid evidence, the Panel of Judges disagreed
with the Public Prosecutor, who declared there had been only one evidence (unus
testis, nullus testis), as besides the testimony of the witnesses and the
letters, there had been strong indications of the involvement of ABRI,
especially the Army TNI members, therefore the argumentation of the Public
Prosecutors should be put aside;
Considering that the argumentation unus testis nullus testis could be put
aside in the cases on Grave Human Rights violations, such as practiced in
the International Ad Hoc Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
the case of DUSCO TADIC.
Considering the setting aside of the above argument is possible when the
court had to face difficulties in presenting witnesses, whose testimony had
to be supported by other clues/ indications;
Considering that the Public Prosecutor has indicted the Defendant of the
crime posed by the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, as follows:
FIRST: Article 42 Paragraph (1) a and b jis Article 7 b, Article 9 a,
Article 37 Law No. 26 of the year 2000, on Human Rights Court;
SECOND: Article 42 Paragraph (1) a and b jis Aricle 7 b, Article 9 h,
Article 40 Law No. 26 of the year 2000, on Human Rights Court;
Considering the starting point of the Panel of Judges is the Indictment
Letter of the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor, Case Registration No. 09/HAM/TIM-TIM/07/2002,
on behalf of the Defendant, ADAM R. DAMIRI, dated on the 1st of July 2002.
Considering the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor had indicted the Defendant of
committing crimes against humanity during times and places as follows:
1. Liquisa Regency, on the 6th of April 1999;
2. Dili Regency, and Dili administrative town, on the 17th of April 1999,
and 5th and 6th of September 1999;
3. Covalima Regency, on the 5th and 6th of September 1999;
Considering as the Indictment on the Defendant was listed in cumulative
method, the Panel would consider the two indictments;
Considering the Panel should first consider the first indictment, with
considerations as follows:
Considering that Article 42 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000 Paragraph (1)
a and b reads as follows:
1) A Military Commander or a person who could effectively act as a Military
Commander could be held responsible of a crime in the jurisdiction of the
Human Rights Court, committed by troops under his effective control of
commands, or under his effective power and control, and the crime has been
the result of the lack of adequate control over the troops, he should be
a. A Military Commander or a person who knows or base on the condition at
the time, should have known, that the troops are committing or just
committed Grave Human Rights violation and
b. A Military Commander or a person who did not take necessary measures in
his power to prevent or stop the crime or to hand over the perpetrators for
further investigation and prosecution.
Considering that according to the Panel, the elements of the First
Indictment should be as follows:
1. A military Commander or a person who could effectively act as a Military
Commander;
2. The Effective Control;
3. Are committing or just committed Grave Human Rights violation in the form
of murder;
4. No adequate control over the troops;
5. Knows or based on the condition of that time, should have known;
Considering that the elements would be explained one by one by the Panel as
follows:
Ad. 1. On "a Military Commander or a person who could effectively act as a
Military Commander"
Considering that a Military Commander is a member of the Armed Force who has
duty and authority to give instructions to one or more of the Armed force
units, or has the power to give direct orders to his subordinate officers or
to the commanders of the subordinate units.
Considering that a Commander, according to the Command Doctrine is the power
based on the Law, to give instructions or to direct the squads and soldiers
under the command.
Considering that a Command Unit should be applied through the Chain of
Command which is the Hierarchy of the Command Line, from the top ranked
commander down to the lowest one, and the instruction starts from the top
Commander and it is interpreted by the down-line force in stages down to the
level of executors;
Considering that though the execution should be carried out in the regulated
stages according to the ranking order of the squad, but the responsibility
over the execution of the task should be in the hands of one person, who is
the holder of the top command, except when there is a divergence committed
by those in the lowest level of command.
Considering that the command structure consists of the supervisory command
and the operational command, each of which, has its own command structure;
Considering that based on the Article 37 Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (3) of
the Law No. 20 of the year 1982, on the Defense and Security of the Nation,
the highest ranked of Commanders, who should be responsible on the defense
management would be the President, assisted by the TNI Commander, while the
usage command or the operational command would be in the hands of the TNI
Commander;
Considering the Commander is the Military Commander who could effectively
control the operations and troops, and the operations carried out by the
Military District Command (KODAM), as the Operation Command (KOOPS) started
from the instruction of the (TNI) Commander so that PANGKOOPS should
directly report to the Commander;
Considering, that the power of the Commander should cover:
- The execution of commands and controls on KOOPS, including on the squads
which should be established besides KOOPS;
- The officer who has the control and supervision over the execution of the
task of KOOPS, and other squads involved;
- The Highest Ranked Officer who hands over the Case;
- The Highest Ranked Supervisor who has the authority to give Penalty;
Considering that PANGKOOPS is a Military Commander who could effectively
hold the control of operations over the troops, it means that PANGKOOPS
receives instructions from the Commander and controls the entire TNI squads
under KOOPS.
Considering the power of PANGKOOPS would cover:
- The Executor of Commands and the Control of Operations over squads under
the Command of KOOPS
- The control executor and the supervision on the execution of the task
operation over the squads and soldiers under his command;
- The Highest Ranked Officer who hands over the Case in the operation area;
- The Highest Ranked Officer who has the authority to give Penalty, in the
operation area;
Considering that the Panel of Judges agreed with the Ad Hoc Public
Prosecutor who declared that based on the result of the court examination,
it has been proven that (pages 166-167):
- The Defendant was the Commander of the Military District Command (PANGDAM)
IX/ UDAYANA, who was assigned since 15th of June 1998 until 27th of November
1999;
- As the PANGDAM IX/ UDAYANA, the Defendant had duty and authority as the
Chief of the Supervisory Command, as well as the Chief of the Operational
Command;
- KODAM IX/ UDAYANA supervised several Military Sub-district Command (KOREM)
including KOREM 164 Wira Dharma of East Timor, which supervised 13 KODIM,
including:
- KODIM 1638/ Liquisa;
- KODIM 1627/ Dili;
- KODIM Suai (Covalima)
- The Defendant had the authority to give instructions or make directives to
the TNI squads in the jurisdiction of KODAM IX/ UDAYANA, including those in
KOREM jurisdiction, such as KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, East Timor, and he had
the right to get reports;
Considering the Panel of Judges also had the same opinion with the Attorneys
of the Defendant, who declared an active Military Commander should be the
one who has been appointed as a military officer, holds a rank, receives
salary from the state, and should be appointed as the leader in the military
community, who has the authority based on the Law, to lead, move, control,
and supervise the squads consisted of personnel and materials of the
military squad (page 402 of the Plea Notes).
Considering that based on the above considerations, the Panel of Judges
reject the argument of the Team of Attorneys of the Defendant who declared
that the Defendant had no authority of the effective control of command on
members of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma and members of KODIM squad, as well as
KORAMIL in the jurisdiction of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, therefore the
Defendant was not an effective Military Commander (page 403 of the Plea
Notes).
Considering that based on the above consideration, therefore the Panel of
Judges consider the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA was an effective
Commander who had to be responsible over the crime under the jurisdiction of
the Human Rights Court, committed by the troops under his effective command
and control, or in his effective power and control as the result of the lack
of adequate control over the troops;
Ad. 2. The Effective Control
Considering that the troops under his effective command and control were the
troops down-line the Commander, de jure as well as de facto, they were in
the down-line chain of command whereas the Commander could give instructions,
while the word "effective" was meant to cover the required de jure and de
facto;
Considering that the Team of Attorneys in the Plea Notes refers to the
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, 1949 (Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of the 12th of August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victim of International Armed Conflict/ Protocol I) as the
doctrine and standard of the responsibility of a command (Articles 86 and
87), in which the Team of Attorneys uses the term "direct subordinates" and
uses the term "... under the direct command and control" in the translation
of the term "... under their command and other persons under their control
..." (pages 397-398), the Panel of Judges consider the translation not
accurate, because in the original text, the two Articles have not contained
the word "direct", and the addition of the word "direct" would mislead the
meaning of the Article;
Considering that based on the consideration that what is meant by the troops
under his effective command and control would not be the troops which were
his direct subordinates;
Considering that the control is the action after the issuance of an
instruction or the execution of an instruction from the up-line command, in
which the control is the facility of KODAL in the military circle, the
effective control could be proven by observing whether or not the command
ranks received the required reports. In other words, the control could be
observed in the operation instructions, as there had been the KODAL, and as
long as they received the required reports, then that should be the practice
of an effective control. Example: DANRAMIL reported to DANDIM, DANDIM
reported to DANREM, DANREM to PANGDAM, and PANGDAM to the TNI Commander;
Considering that DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, Col. TNI TONO SURATMAN, in the
incident at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, he directly reported
to the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, after that the Defendant gave the
instructions which were to assist the Police;
Considering that based on the testimony of DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, Col. TNI
NOER MUIS, after receiving reports from DANDIM of Suai over the attacks at
Ave Maria Church, Suai on the 6th of September 1999, he reported to the
Defendant, the PANGDAM IX UDAYANA. It was also reported that the number of
dead victims reached 27. The TNI Commander requested reports from the
Defendant on the incidents in East Timor. Then the Defendant reported the
incidents in April and September 1999, to the TNI Commander, which were
followed up by the departure of the special Team of Investigation to Liquisa.
Then the Defendant also reported to TNI Commander the incidents of the 5th
September at Diocese Dili, and that on the 6th of September at Ave Maria
Church, Suai;
Considering that during the incidents, the security control were in the
hands of PANGKOOPS NUSRA, therefore the Defendant was the effective
Commander for receiving reports from his subordinates, and reporting up to
his supervisor;
Ad. 3. Are committing or just committed Grave Human Rights violations in the
form of murders.
Considering what was meant by Grave Human Rights violation as indicted by
the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor was the crime against humanity in the form of
spreading or systematic attacks, which he knew, were aimed at the civilians,
and in the form of murders.
Considering the elements of crime against humanity would be the existence of
"attacks", and "spreading" or "systematic."
Considering what is meant by "attacks" should not be necessarily military
attacks, which means that the attacks should not be necessarily use the
military force, or the use of the military guns, but they could be a
mobilization of non-military force, or operations that have been carried out
on civilians that led to murders.
Considering what is meant by "spreading" refers to the massive actions,
repeatedly performed, in a large scale which covers the area, as well as
that which covers the number of victims, and they were performed
collectively (AKAYESU case)
Considering that in East Timor, there had been crimes against humanity in
the form of murders and meet the spreading element as covered in the court
that:
- On the 5th and 6th of April 1999, there were attacks of the
Pro-Integration Group against civilians of the Pro-Independence sheltering
in Liquisa Church and in the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS which was
about 50 meter away from KODIM Headquarters, that caused 20 victims of the
Pro-Independence died, while TNI and POLRI who were present at the scene
were standing by but made no preventive measures.
- On the 17th of April 1999, there were attacks of the Pro-Integration group
against civilian refugees from the Pro-Independence Group sheltering at the
residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, caused 17 people died, including the
son of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO. The attacks were made after the Big Rally
of the Pro-Integration Group in front of the East Timor Governor's office,
acknowledged by TNI and POLRI officials. Even DANREM received reports
directly from the victim witness on the attacks.
- On the 6th of September 1999, there were:
- Attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against the Pro-Independence refugees
sheltering at Ave Maria Church Suai, causing as many as 27 victims died, as
reported in the result of the excavation of the mass burials and the visum
et repertum (autopsy) reports, issued by the Forensic Department of the
Faculty of Medicine of the University of Indonesia (UI);
- Attacks of the Pro-Integration Group against refugees of the
Pro-Independence sheltering at the residence of Bishop BELO, causing a young
child died.
Considering that the systematic element in the crime against humanity would
be the orderly, patterned actions, based on the policy involving public, as
well as private resources, and it should not necessarily be formally
formulated, but it could refer to the existence of a plan (AKAYESU case).
Besides that, it should contain three other elements, they are: the
political purpose contained in the plan to destroy or weaken a group of
people or community; the crime should be in a large scale and they were
performed repeatedly, and involved the authority (BLASKIC case);
Considering that in the crime against humanity in East Timor, such as those
in the three different places above, have similar characteristics, though
they were not formally formulated, they are:
- Always preceded by the crowding mass consisted of organizations of the
Pro-Integration Group which have clear organizational structures, and
acknowledged by the government officials, TNI and POLRI;
- The existence of the political purpose which was winning the
Pro-Integration Group by weakening the Pro-Independence Group;
- The victims of the attacks were always civilian residents of the
Pro-Independence sheltering at the centers out of the refugee centers
authorized by the government;
- The locus of the incidents were in a large scale, and they were done
repeatedly in Dili, Liquisa and Suai;
- It is very clear that The Army TNI was discriminative, or at least,
clearly took the stance on the side of the Pro-Integration Group;
Considering that based on the above facts, the Panel of Judges consider the
elements of the crime against humanity have been fulfilled;
Considering that the actors of the crimes against humanity were the troops
that should be under his effective command and control, therefore the Panel
of Judges would consider the element: "Troops under his effective command
and control" as follows:
Considering that it has been proven that the actors of the crime against
humanity in the incidents were the Pro-Integration, it has been also proven
that there had been involvements of TNI members:
- In the incident of the attacks at Liquisa Church on the 5th and 6th of
April 1999, that caused 20 people died and many others injured, it has been
proven that:
- There were members of TNI who were standing by with members of POLRI at
the crime scene, but just did nothing;
- That the witness RAFAEL DOS SANTOS saw and recognized the members of TNI
who joined in the attacks, they were a member of KODIM of Liquisa, Chief
Sergeant TNI RAYMUNDO DOS SANTOS, and a member of KORAMIL of Maubara and
other TNI members, including TOME DIEGO, JACUB, and the Second Sergeant of
POLRI, FLORINDO, according to RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, they made the attacks with
BESI MERAH PUTIH (Red and White Iron) Militia;
- That the assailants departed from the front yard of KODIM Liquisa;
- The tear gas were shot straight into the house where the refugees
sheltered;
- In the incident of the attacks at the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO on
the 17th of April 1999, DANREM 164 Wira Dharma, Col. TONO SURATMAN, knew of
the attacks as he was directly reported by the witness, but he just did
nothing;
- In the incident of the attacks on Diocese Dili on the 5th of September
1999, it has been proven that the security authority, especially TNI, failed
to make the preventive actions and corrective measures, such as happened in
the incident of the attacks on Ave Maria Church, Suai, as well as in the
attacks at the residence of Bishop BELO on the 6th of September 1999.
Considering that according to the Panel of Judges, the Defendant, as the
PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, should be the person who made firm actions against the
perpetrators of the attacks at Liquisa Church, the residence of MANUEL
CARASCALAO, the Church of Suai, and Diocese Dili, and the incident at the
house of Bishop BELO, with the pattern of repeated, systematic attacks;
Considering that overseeing the above facts, it has been proven that there
were involvements (actively, as well as passively) of the members of TNI
under his effective command and control, therefore the Panel of Judges
consider the Defendant should be responsible for the crime against humanity
as indicted in this case;
Ad. 4. The lack of Adequate Control over the Troops
Considering that referring to the essence of the Article 87 of the
Additional Protocol I, that a Commander should have the responsibility of
making the practical measures which should be preventive, as well as
corrective, to make sure the troops under his control, would abide by the
norms of Law, whereas a commander should ensure:
- That the members of his troops should have the adequate training in the
field of Humanitarian Law, in which the norms should be reflected in every
decision in the Military Operations;
- The achievement of effective reporting system, so that the Commander would
immediately identify the possible violations of Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law;
- The establishment of the observation system that his instructions have
been effectively carried out by the subordinates, including in the
arrangement of the Humanitarian and Human Rights Law;
- The execution of corrective measures in the case of violations that would
possibly happen, or that just happened, or that had happened.
Considering the revealed facts in court showed that the Defendant as PANGDAM
IX UDAYANA, in his capacity as the executor of the control and supervision
in the execution of operational tasks of the troops, made no effective
supervision over above the incidents, proven by the testimony of the
witnesses, that he never came to the crime scenes.
Considering the facts revealed before the court, it has not been proven that
the Defendant had carried out one role in his power as PANGKOOPS, which was
the officer who should hand over the case in his operation area, and as the
Top Official Supervisor who had the Right to Give Penalty in his operation
area, as none of his subordinates who should have been responsible for the
incidents as indicted in this case were examined, investigated, or
prosecuted in court. Therefore the Defendant failed to do the corrective
measures over the violations committed by, or involving the troops under his
effective command and control.
Ad. 5. Knew or based on the Condition at the Time, should have Known;
Considering that before the Panel consider whether or not the element of the
responsibility of a commander exists in the Defendant's self, the Panel
would quote several arguments which have become the opinio comunis doctorum,
in practice in some international cases;
Considering in the case of TIHOMIR BLASKIC (ICTY), as explained before, the
Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor as well as the Panel of Judges in the case, argued
that the element could be proven by the fact that the Commander had the
factual knowledge through the direct or situational evidence;
Considering that in the case, the element of knowledge, could be proven by
the relevant factors such as the number of victims, forms and the coverage
of the actions that violated the Law, and whenever possible, the
geographical locations of the actions that violated the Law;
Considering that in the case, there should be statements of the element of "should
have known." The Panel of Judges have concluded that in the post World War
II, there had been standards of responsibility of a Commander over the
crimes committed by his subordinates, in case he fails to learn the coming
violations at the time, and fails to predict the result, could be considered
as an omission, as the commander has duty to make whatever reasonable and
applicable measures to prevent violations. The failure to do that would
become his responsibility;
Considering that in the practice of the international court, the Defendant's
knowledge over the crimes committed by his subordinates without the
commander's adequate actions, could be used to determine the means rea, or
the responsibility of the Commander;
Considering that in this court, the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor have presented
some of the evidence in the form of official record, on the conditions,
incidents, as well as the geographical locations of the incidents that
resulted in many victims, that had been known by the supervisor of the
Defendant, which was General WIRANTO, even in his testimony, he always said
that he always received official report from his subordinate, which was the
Defendant, so that General WIRANTO, as the ABRI Commander, could always be
well informed and kept up with the last situation in East Timor, enough to
prove that the Defendant knew or had known what happened;
Considering that overseeing the above description, the Panel of Judges
consider this element has been proven;
Considering that based on the above considerations, viewed from the
concurrence and relations of each other, and related to the developing
actual theory, principle and norms (treaty and customary international norms),
and the practice in the International Courts of the case over the crimes
against humanity, the Panel concluded that the indicted crime (actus reus)
in the first indictment has been legitimately and convincingly proven, and
therefore the Defendant should be responsible in command over the incidents
in East Timor, as indicted by the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor;
Considering that the Defendant has been indicted in the second indictment as
regulated in: Article 42 Paragraph (1) a and b jis, Article 7 b, Article 9 h,
Article 40 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, of the Human Rights Court; on
Crimes against Humanity in the forms of spreading and systematic attacks
which he knew, were aimed at civilians in the form of abuse;
Considering that according to the Panel, the elements of the second
Indictment should be as follows:
1. A Military Commander or a person who could effectively act as a Military
Commander;
2. The Effective Control;
3. Are Committing or just Committed Grave Human Rights Violations in the
form of Abuse;
4. The Lack of Adequate Control over the troops;
5. Knew or based on the Condition at the Time, Should Have Known;
Considering that over the Ad. 1 up to the Ad 5, have been considered by the
Panel in the considerations of the elements of the first indictment, then
the Panel take over the legal consideration in the legal considerations of
the first indictment, as the legal consideration in the second indictment;
Considering the Panel particularly consider the consideration in Ad. 3., as
the actions that had injured victims due to abuses, as the facts revealed in
court, whereas a number of people injured and properties destroyed,
resulting from the attacks at Liquisa Church and at the residence of Pastor
RAFAEL DOS SANTOS at the 6th of April 1999, at the house of MANUEL
CARASCALAO on the 17th of April 1999, at Diocese Dili and the house of
Bishop BELO on the 5th and 6th of September 1999, also at the Ave Maria
Church, Suai on the 6th of September 1999;
Considering that based on the testimony of the witnesses presented in court,
also the facts revealed in court, those who fell victims were civilians from
the Pro-Independence Group;
Considering that the meaning of abuse in the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, is
the translation of the word persecution according to Statuta Rome, which
means all forms of the revocation of the fundamental rights which violate
the International Law, in various forms, from tortures and ruthless and
inhuman punishments and treatments, humiliation of a person's dignity, cruel
arrests, slavery, to other acts of inhuman revocation of rights, done to a
certain group of people or community;
Considering that finally the Panel disagreed to the prosecution/ requisition
of the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor in the free-of-all-charge indictment on the
Defendant Maj. Gen TNI ADAM R. DAMIRI, as the free-of-all-charge indictment
is not in accordance with the subjects that have been considered by the
Panel of Judges earlier, and the indictment is discriminative and has
brought no justice to the other defendants in the separated (splitsing)
cases, besides that, the Panel had no ties with the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor
who had made the free-of-all-charge indictment on the Defendant, but the
Panel only tied (binding) to the facts revealed in court;
Considering that according to the Panel, the Defendant as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA,
should be responsible for the spreading violence in East Timor, before the
People's Consultation/ Ballot, as well as after the People's Consultation/
Ballot;
Considering that the Defendant has been proven of committing the crimes as
regulated in the first indictment, in which he has violated the Article 42
Paragraph (1) a and b jis, Article 9 a, Article 37 of the Law No 26 of the
year 2000, on the Human Rights Court, and the second indictment in which he
has violated Article 42 Paragraph (1) a and b jis, Article 7 b, Article 9 h,
Article 40 of the Law No. 26 of the year 2000, on the Human Rights Court,
with the minimum sentence of 10 years;
Considering the evidence including the letters, such as the visum et
repertum reports No. 001/TT.3002/SK.II/XI/1999, up to No. 026/TT.3002/SK.II/XI/1999,
and the other letters, firearms, ammunition, and the
video-cassette-recording, the Panel has instructed to attach them on the
dossiers of this case;
Considering that before the Panel comes to the Order (Amar) of Indictment in
this case, the Panel would first consider the issues that implicate and
commutate the Defendant:
The issues that implicate:
1. The incidents indicted by the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor have been proven
to victimize many lives and properties, which happened during his position
as PANGDAM IX UDAYANA who supervised East Timor region;
2. The violence which occurred in East Timor during which the Defendant held
the position of PANGDAM IX UDAYANA, have dishonored the name of Indonesia in
the International circle and International Community, especially in regard
of upholding Human Rights;
The issues that commutate:
1. The Defendant has made efforts to mediate peace between the conflicting
parties during the time before the People's Consultation/ Ballot, and after
the People's Consultation/ Ballot;
2. The Defendant as a Professional Officer who has reached the rank of the
Major General TNI, has long dedicated himself to the nation and the country;
3. In the Defendant's long career as a Professional Officer of TNI, he has
received 7 (seven) awards from the government, including the SATYA SEROJA
Award;
Considering as the Defendant has been found guilty, therefore he should pay
the financial charge of the court of Rp. 5,000,- (five thousands rupiahs);
Observing the result of the discussion of the Panel of Judges on Thursday of
the 31st of July 2003;
Observing the Law Number 8 of the year 1981, the Law Number 39 of the year
1999, the Law Number 26 of the year 2000, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the other Law and Regulations related to this case:
PRESIDING
- Declare the Defendant: MAJ. GEN. TNI ADAM R. DAMIRI has been legitimately
and convincingly proven guilty of committing the crimes as indicted in the
first and second indictments;
"GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE FORM OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"
- Sentence the Defendant therefore, with 3 (three) years imprisonment;
- Declare the evidence as mentioned in the list of evidence, and the video
as well as letters of evidence presented in court, have been handed over to
the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor to be used as evidence in this case;
- Sentence the Defendant of paying the financial charge of the court of Rp.
5,000,- (Five Thousands Rupiahs);
Therefore it has been decided on Thursday, the 31st of July 2003: in the
Discussion Meeting of the Panel of Judges of the Central Jakarta Human
Rights Ad Hoc Court, which consisted of: Mrs. Hj. MARNI EMMY, SH., MH., as
the Head of the Panel of Judges, ROKI PANJAITAN, SH., Dr. KOMARIAH EMONG
SAPARDJAJA, SH., RUDI M. RIZKI, SH., LL. M., SULAIMAN HAMID, SH., each of
them respectively acted as a member of the Panel, whose decision has been
declared on Tuesday, the 5th of August 2003 in the court declared open to
public by the Head of the Panel of Judges, accompanied by the members of the
Panel, and has been assisted by SRI SUNARYATI, SH., and SITI AGUSTIATI
DJAMILAH, SH., as the Acting Clerks of the Human Rights Ad Hoc Court,
attended by HOZIE, SH., the Ad Hoc Public Prosecutor at the RI Attorney
General Office, the Defendant, and the Team of Attorneys of the Defendant.
Members of the Panel Head of the Judges
ROKI PANJAITAN, SH. Mrs. Hj. MARNI EMMY, SH., M Hum.
Dr. KOMARIAH EMONG S., SH.
RUDI M. RIZKI, SH., LL.M.
SULAIMAN HAMID, SH.
The Acting Clerks of the Court
SRI SUNARYATI, SH.
SITI AGUSTIATI DJAMILAH, SH. |
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