| |
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. The Complainant, Michael Majuru (hereinafter called the Complainant),
submitted this Communication against the Republic of Zimbabwe, (hereinafter
called the Respondent State), a State Party to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter). The Complainant is a citizen of
the Respondent State and is currently residing in the Republic of South
Africa.
2. The Complainant submits that the Respondent State has committed gross
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms against him through acts
committed by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and
the Central Intelligence Organisations (CIO) under the Office of the
President and Cabinet.
3. The Complainant alleges further that that in committing the gross
violations, the aforementioned organisations, individuals and organs of the
state were acting in the course and scope of their employment as Respondent
State's agents.
4. The Complainant submits further that his rights were abused because of
his role as a presiding Judge in a case in which the Associated Newspaper
Group of Zimbabwe (ANZ), a publishing house in the Respondent State, sought
to challenge, before the Administrative Court, the Respondent State's act of
banning ANZ from publishing its two newspapers, the Daily News and the Daily
News on Sunday. The matter was lodged before the Administrative Court on or
about 23 September 2003 and he presided over the matter.
5. The Complainant states that following his decision in favour of the ANZ,
he became a target of human rights abuses wrought upon him by agents of the
Respondent State and recounts the chronology of events that depict incidents
in which the Respondent State allegedly violated his human rights.
6. The first incident is reported to have occurred on or about 24 September
2003. It is alleged that the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs, the Hon. Patrick Chinamasa invited the Complainant's workmate, who
was also a Judge at the Administrative Court (Justice Chipo Machaka) to his
office to issue instructions that the matter relating to the ANZ case that
was to be presided over by the Complainant should be conducted in a manner
that the said Minister was going to dictate. Justice Machaka was instructed
by the Minister to convey these instructions to the Complainant, with an
order that Complainant should comply with such orders.
7. It is further alleged that the Minister also instructed that the
Administrative Court should delay the court proceedings until February 2004,
noting that the ANZ did not deserve impartial treatment by the Judiciary
because it was a front of western nations and �other imperialists'. Secondly,
Justice Machaka is alleged to have been told that if the ANZ were granted
its application for an urgent appeal hearing and thereafter allowed
publication at that stage this would jeopardize continuing negotiations
between ZANU PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), (the biggest
opposition party in Zimbabwe), which according to the Minister, had reached
a delicate stage. As proof of this delicate relationship between ZANU PF and
MDC, Justice Machaka was shown a draft constitution agreed upon between the
two parties and some other supporting documents.
8. The Complainant submits that he disregarded the aforesaid instructions
and upon considering the ANZ's application on its merits ruled in favour of
the ANZ by granting the application for an urgent appeal hearing on or about
27 September 2003. From 15 to 19 October 2003, the Complainant presided over
the appeal hearing between the two parties. He adjourned the matter for
judgment to 24 October 2003.
9. Subsequently, the Complainant states that he was summoned by Enoch
Kamushinda, a suspected member of the CIO for a meeting at Kamushinda's
office on 22 October 2003. This information was conveyed through another CIO
operative with instructions that the Complainant should dismiss the ANZ
appeal. As a reward for dismissing the ANZ appeal, Kamushinda promised the
Complainant a fully developed farm in Mashonaland West Province.
10. The Complainant further states that on 23 October 2003 at around 21:00
hours, the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Hon.
Patrick Chinamasa, telephoned and enquired from the Complainant whether he
had finalised the judgment in the ANZ matter and what decision he had
reached. The Complainant advised him that he was in the process of
finalising the judgment and that he was going to allow the appeal. The
Complainant states that the Minister expressed his displeasure with the said
decision and further attempted to unduly influence and/or threaten the
Complainant.
11. The Complainant claims that he went ahead to deliver the judgment in
favour of ANZ at about 1600 hours on 24 November 2003. Subsequently, at
about 2130 hours, Hon. Chinamasa in an angry telephone call to the
Complainant, accused the latter of pre-determining the matter and berated
him for delivering a judgment dictated by British agents and other
imperialist forces.
12. Subsequently, the Media and Information Commission (MIC) appealed to the
Supreme Court against the decision of the Administrative Court. ANZ on the
other hand decided to approach the Administrative Court seeking an order
that its original decision be rendered operative notwithstanding the
institution of an appeal by the MIC.
13. The Complainant claims that upon the lodging of this application by the
ANZ, the Complainant was placed under immense pressure from agents of the
Respondent State urging him to desist from dealing with the matter. The
Complainant claims that the Respondent sent members of the CIO to track,
trail and monitor the Complainant's movements and interactions with other
people.
14. The Complainant alleges that on several occasions he was approached by
Ben Chisvo, a suspected CIO informer, a former ruling ZANU PF Councillor of
the City of Harare and also a war veteran. Chisvo sought to persuade the
Complainant to recuse himself from presiding over the matter, claiming that
the case was serious and sensitive and that President Mugabe did not want
the ANZ to be registered. Chisvo further indicated that the President had
set up a team led by a senior assistant commissioner of Zimbabwe, Changara,
to monitor the proceedings in the ANZ matter and confirmed that the
Complainant was being monitored by state security agents.
15. On 23 November 2003, at around 2300 hours, the Complainant received a
telephone call from Chisvo in which he claimed that his car had had a
puncture close to the Complainant's residence and requested for assistance.
Upon meeting the Complainant, Chisvo demanded to know whether the former
would preside over the ANZ matter or recuse himself as previously ordered.
The Complainant informed Chisvo that he would be presiding over the ANZ
matter.
16. The Complainant further alleges that, on 24 November 2003, following the
Complainant's postponement of the ANZ matter upon the request of the two
parties to the case, he received a telephone call from Hon. Chinamasa at
around 21:00 hours. The Complainant states that the Minister alleged that he
had information linking the Complainant to British agents and other
imperialists and that the complainant was under investigation for these
alleged links with the British agents and imperialists. The Minister also
indicated that he was aware through his informants that the ANZ was going to
succeed in the second matter which was pending before the Complainant.
Shortly thereafter, Justice Machaka phoned the Complainant and advised him
that the Minister of Justice had also phoned her ordering her to meet him at
his office the following morning. She informed the Complainant that the
Minister wanted to be advised on how the Complainant intended to decide the
ANZ matter in order for him to brief the Cabinet that morning. Soon after
this telephone call from Justice Machaka, the Minister telephoned the
Complainant once again ordering that they meet the following morning at his
office at 0800 hours.
17. On 25 November 2003, the Complainant met with the Minister as instructed.
The Minister wanted to know what the Complainant's decision in the ANZ
matter would be but the Complainant declined to inform him stating that he
had not yet heard the parties' arguments on the matter and was therefore in
no position to know the outcome. The Complainant alleges that the Minister
informed him that the Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri had approached
him the previous night with information that the Complainant was under
investigation for colluding with British agents over the ANZ matter and was
considering arresting him.
18. The Minister is also reported to have shown the Complainant the Herald
newspaper which carried an article on its front page alleging that the
Complainant was under probe over the ANZ matter. The Minister also produced
an affidavit, which he said had been obtained from Chisvo by the Police
Commissioner. In the said affidavit, Chisvo had made statements to the
effect that the Complainant had informed Chisvo that the ANZ matter was
predetermined.
19. The Complainant claims that as a result of such sustained and relentless
pressure he had no other option but to recuse himself from the matter.
Notwithstanding the recusal, the Complainant remained under surveillance by
state security agents.
20. The Complainant states that on 1 December 2003, he received a telephone
call from a member of the legal fraternity and the Police informing him that
the Respondent State was fabricating a case against him and that he was to
be arrested and incarcerated on unspecified charges as punishment for
defying the Respondent's orders.
21. The Complainant alleges that fearing for his safety and security; he
decided to go into hiding until 9 December when he fled to South Africa,
where he remains in exile.
22. The Complainant submits that he is not the only member of the Judiciary
who has been persecuted but that there is a systematic, consistent and
sustained pattern of interference with the Judiciary by the Executive in the
Republic of Zimbabwe.
COMPLAINT
23. The Complainants allege that Articles 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 26
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights have been violated.
24. The Complainant requests that the African Commission should:
a. Urge the Respondent State to institute an inquiry and investigation that
should result in the Government of Zimbabwe bringing those who perpetrated
the violations to justice b. Order the Respondent State to pay compensation
for the physical pain, psychological trauma, loss of earnings and job and
access to family suffered by the Complainant.
PROCEDURE
25. The Communication is dated 2 November 2005 and was sent by email to the
Secretariat, and was received on 8 November 2005.
26. On 17 November 2005, the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the
Communication and informed the Complainant that the Communication would be
scheduled for consideration by the African Commission at its 38th Ordinary
Session.
27. At its 38th Ordinary Session held from 21 November - 5 December 2005 in
Banjul, The Gambia, the African Commission considered the Communication and
decided to be seized of it.
28. By Note Verbale dated 8 December 2005, the Secretariat transmitted a
copy of the Communication to the Respondent State by DHL and requested it to
forward its submissions on admissibility within 3 months. The Complainant
was also requested to send his submissions on admissibility within 3 months.
29. By letter and Note Verbale dated 20 March 2006, the parties to the
Communication were reminded to forward their written submissions on
admissibility of the Communication.
30. On 3 April 2006, the Secretariat received submissions on admissibility
of the Communication from one Gabriel Shumba. By letter dated 12 April 2006,
the Secretariat of the African Commission wrote to Gabriel Shumba informing
him that the Communication had been brought before the African Commission by
Michael Majuru who had never made any indication to the African Commission
that Gabriel Shumba could make representations on his behalf. This letter
was also copied to the Complainant- Michael Majuru.
31. As at the 40th Ordinary Session there had been no reply from the
Complainant. The Communication was therefore deferred to the 41st Ordinary
Session pending the reply of the Complainant and Mr. Shumba, as well as the
Respondent State's submission on admissibility.
32. By letter and Note Verbale dated 11 December 2006, written to the
Complainant and Respondent State respectively, the parties were informed by
the Secretariat, about the decision of the African Commission during its
40th Session, to consider the admissibility of the Communication during its
41st Session. The parties were asked to send their Submissions on
admissibility within 3 months of receiving the letters.
33. The Complainant sent an email on 18 December 2006, confirming that
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum to which Gabriel Shumba is the Executive Director are
his agents in the matter and that the Secretariat should acknowledge
submissions made by them.
34. By Note Verbale dated 4 January 2007, the Secretariat reminded the
Respondent State of the Commission's decision during its 40th Ordinary
Session, and asked them to make their submissions on admissibility within 3
months of receipt of the notification. Another reminder by way of a Note
Verbale dated 10 April 2007 was also sent to the Respondent State.
35. On 24 April 2007, the Secretariat received the Respondent State's
submission on admissibility. The Respondent State's submission was forwarded
to the Complainant by email and he was asked to make additional submissions
(if any), in order to address some important points which were raised by the
Respondent State in its submission.
36. During its 41st Ordinary Session, the African Commission decided to
defer consideration of the Communication to its 42nd Ordinary Session for
its decision on admissibility.
37. By letter ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/308/2005/ZIM/TN dated 20 July 2007 and by
Note Verbale ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/308/2005/ZIM/RE, with the same date, the
parties were informed of the decision of the African Commission to defer
consideration of the Communication to its 42nd Ordinary Session.
38. At its 42nd Ordinary session held in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, the
Commission considered this communication and decided to defer further
consideration into the 43rd ordinary session due to lack of time.
39. By note verbale of 19 December 2007 and letter of the same date, the
Secretariat of the Commission notified both parties of the Commission's
decision.
COMPLAINANT'S SUBMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
40. The Complainant submitted that he has local standing before the African
Commission as the Communication is brought by himself, a citizen of Zimbabwe,
the Respondent State in this matter. Regarding compatibility, the
Complainant submitted that the Communication raises a prima facie violation
of the African Charter committed by the Respondent State. He submitted
further that the evidence he has submitted reveals that the Communication is
not based exclusively on news disseminated by the mass media, adding that it
is based on first hand evidence � including reports by reputable human
rights organizations.
41. On the exhaustion of local remedies, the Complainant submitted that the
onus is on the State to demonstrate that remedies are available, citing the
Commission's decisions in the cases of Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense
des Droits de l 'Homme v. Zambia[FN34] and Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia[FN35].
The Complainant added that the remedy in his particular circumstance is not
available because he cannot make use of it, that he was forced to flee
Zimbabwe for fear of his life and that of his immediate family, because of
his work as a judge of the Administrative Court. That he fled to the
Republic of South Africa following threats of arrest and unspecified harm by
the Respondent State.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN34] Communication 71/1992.
[FN35] Communication 146/96.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. The Complainant drew the Commission's attention to its decision on
Rights International v Nigeria,[FN36] where the Commission held that a
complainant's inability to pursue local remedies following his flight for
fear of his life to Benin, and was subsequently granted asylum was
sufficient to establish a standard for constructive exhaustion of local
remedies. He concluded by noting that considering the fact that he was no
longer in the Respondent State's territory where remedies could be sought,
and that he fled the country against his will due to threat to his life,
remedies could not be pursued without impediments.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN36] Communication 215/98
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
43. The Complainant also challenged the effectiveness of the remedies noting
that remedies are effective only where they offer a prospect of success. He
claimed the Respondent State's reaction to court rulings that go against it
is well documented by reputable international and African NGOs, noting that
the Respondent State treats court rulings that go against it with
indifference and disfavour, and that he does not expect that in his case,
any decision of the court would be adhered to. He said there was a tendency
in the Respondent State to ignore court rulings that went against it and
added that the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights had documented at least 12
instances where the State had ignored court rulings since 2000. He cited the
ruling of the High Court in the Commercial Farmers Union, the Mark
Chavunduka and Ray Choto cases, where, in the latter case, the duo were
allegedly abducted and tortured by the army. He concluded that given the
prevailing circumstances and the nature of his complaint and the Respondent
State's well publicized practice of non-enforcement of court decisions, his
case had no prospect of success if local remedies were pursued and according
to him, not worth pursuing. Finally, the Complainant submitted that he could
not have exhausted local remedies as any such exhaustion would have to
comply with the States Liabilities Act which prevents the complainant from
suing the Respondent State after the expiration of two months of the date of
the incident complained of, if no prior notice has been given.
44. The Complainant further submitted that the Communication was submitted
22 months after the violation because he hoped that the situation in the
country would improve to enable him utilize domestic remedies. He said there
is instead a deterioration of the situation and hope of improvement is
highly unlikely in the near future, adding that �continuing to wait whilst
the Complainant is undergoing tremendous psychological torture and suffering
attributable to his persecution will undoubtedly cause irreparable harm'.
The Complainant added that since he fled to South Africa he has been
undergoing psycho-therapy and was not in a position to submit his
Communication to the Commission.
45. The Complainant indicated other reasons that prevented him from
submitting his complaint on time, including the fact that the judiciary
abides by a code of conduct in terms of which they do not ordinarily speak
out and take positions against the establishment, noting that out of eight
or so members who have left Zimbabwe because of persecution, he is the only
one who was speaking out. He added that he was afraid for the lives of
members of his immediate family that were at risk of persecution because of
him and that he was unable to submit immediately for want of resources and
facilities, noting that the submission was made possible through the
assistance and support of well wishers.
46. Finally, Complainant further submitted that the Communication had not
been before any other international body for settlement as required by
Article 56 (7).
RESPONDENT STATE'S SUBMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
47. The Respondent State briefly restated the facts of the Communication and
indicated that it will attend to the matters of fact, pertaining to the
complaint �in order to put the Communication in proper perspective'. The
State submitted that the Complainant was appointed to the Office of
Administrative Court President in terms of Section 79 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe, read together with the Administrative Court Act. The State added
that while performing his functions as a Magistrate, Presidents of the
Administrative Court are not judges, noting that in essence, the Complainant
was not a judge.
48. According to the State, the Complainant was supposed to be in a court in
Bulawayo, but due to his poor health and his relationship with the Minister
of Justice, he was appointed to the Administrative Court in Harare. The
State noted that Complainant was a sick man throughout his whole duration at
the court and added that �in fact from the time of his appointment as a
Court President, the Complainant used to travel to South Africa to seek
medical attention'.
49. The State claims that Complainant applied for two weeks vacation from 9
� 31 December 2003 and went to South Africa for medical attention. That he
then tendered his resignation on 14 January 2004. The State observed that
even though the letter has a Zimbabwean address, an examination of the
delivery slip showed that it had been dispatched from South Africa. The
State concluded that the above circumstances which show how Complainant left
the country do not amount to forced flight as he claims.
50. The State questioned why Complainant would take steps to regularize his
absence from office by applying for vacation leave and tender his
resignation to the Minister who was threatening him. Without producing any
document, the state added that it is apparent from the documents available
that he was maintaining dialogue with a government which he claims was
persecuting him. The State observed further that the letter of resignation
even showed the address Complainant was residing and �assuming the
government of Zimbabwe really wanted his life, it would have used the
address he had volunteered to track him'. The State concluded by stating
that the truth is that �complainant was never threatened by anyone, anywhere
both within and outside Zimbabwe'.
51. On the admissibility of the Communication, the State argued that the
Communication be declared inadmissible for non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 56 (2), (5) and (6) of the Charter.
52. The State argued that the Communication is not compatible as required by
Article 56 (2) of the Charter, as it makes general allegations without
substantiating, adding that, for a complaint to be compatible with the
Charter or the Constitutive Act, it must prove a prima facie violation of
the Charter. According to the State, the facts raised in the Communication
do not raise any violation of the Charter, noting that �basically the facts
and issues in dispute do not fall within the rationae materae and rationae
personae of the jurisdiction of the Commission.
53. On the exhaustion of local remedies under article 56 (5), the State
submitted that local remedies were available to the Complainant, citing
section 24 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which provides the course of
action to be taken where there is human rights violation. The State added
that there is no evidence to prove that the Complainant pursued local
remedies. The State further indicated that in terms of Zimbabwe law, where
one is engaged in acts that violate the rights of another person, that other
person can obtain an interdict from the court restraining the violator from
such act.
54. On the effectiveness of the remedies, the State submitted that the
Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary in the exercise
of its mandate in conformity with both the UN Principle on an independent
Judiciary and the African Commission's Guidelines on the right to a fair
trial.
55. The State dismissed the Complainant's argument that his case is similar
to those brought by Sir Dawda Jawara against The Gambia and Rights
International (on behalf of Charles Baridorn Wiza) against Nigeria, adding
that in the latter cases, there was proof of real threat to life. The State
went further to indicate instances where the government has implemented
court decisions that went against it.
56. The State further indicated that in terms of Zimbabwe law, it is not a
legal requirement for a Complainant to be physically present in the country
in order to access local remedies, adding that both the High Court Act and
the Supreme Court Act permit any person to make an application to either
court through his/her lawyer. The State added that in the Ray Choto and Mark
Chavhunduka case, the victims were tortured by State agents and they applied
for compensation while they were both in the United Kingdom and succeeded in
their claim. The State concluded that the Complainant is not barred from
pursuing remedies in a similar manner.
57. The State further submitted that since his resignation, the government
of Zimbabwe continues to pay the Complainant his pension benefits and argued
that the excuse raised by the Complainant of lack of resources to enable him
submit his complaint on time is therefore without merit, adding that he
could have instructed his counsel in Zimbabwe to attend to his claim on his
behalf.
58. According to the State, the Complainant sought to mislead the Commission
by claiming that under the State Liabilities Act, claims against the State
are prescribed within a period of sixty days. The State indicated that
section 6 of the Act is clear that the sixty days is in respect of a notice
of intention to sue. The Act prescribes that a summons against a State in
certain matters must be delivered sixty days after the notice of intention
to sue, and according to the State, this would actually work well for the
Complainant, adding that the period of proscription of claims is three years
and complainant's claim was not yet three years and thus not proscribed.
59. The State also submitted that the complaint does not conform to article
56 (6) of the Charter indicating that the Communication should be lodged
within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies, but where
Complainant realizes that local remedies shall be unduly prolonged, he/she
must submit the complaint to the Commission immediately. According to the
State, although the Charter does not specify what constitute a reasonable
time, the Commission should get inspiration from the other jurisdictions,
including the Inter-American Commission which has fixed six months as
reasonable time, adding that even the draft protocol merging the African
Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights provides
for six months.
60. The State argued that the Communication was submitted 22 months after
the alleged violation, which according to the State �was filed well out of
time'. On Complainant's submission that he had been seeking psychotherapy
treatment, the State argued that Complainant had been the centre of
attraction in South Africa since 2004, demonizing the Respondent State,
adding that articles published by Complainant in the South African press do
not show someone with a psychological ailment. The State added that no proof
had been given of the alleged treatment or an expert diagnosis of how such
condition was acquired. On Complainants' claim that he had no resources, the
State argued that he had his pension benefits which he could have used to
submit his complaint to the Commission.
61. The state concluded its submissions by noting that �no cogent reasons
have been given for the failure to pursue local remedies or remedies before
the Commission within a reasonable time', and as such the Communication
should be declared inadmissible.
LAW
ADMISSIBILITY
COMPETENCE OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
62. In the present Communication, the Respondent State raises a question
regarding the competence of the African Commission to deal with this
Communication. The State avers that: (quote) "...basically the facts and
issues in dispute do not fall within the rationae materae and rationae
personae of the jurisdiction of the Commission". This statement thus
challenges the competence of the African Commission to deal with this
Communication. The Commission will thus, first deal with the preliminary
issue of its competence raised by the Respondent State.
63. Black's law dictionary defines rationae materae as "by reason of the
matter involved; in consequence of, or from the nature of, the
subject-matter" While rationae personae is defined as "By reason of the
person concerned; from the character of the person".[FN37]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN37] HC Black , JN Nolan-Haley & JR Nolan Blacks LAW Dictionary (6 ed)
1990, 1262-1263. St Paul Minn. West Publishing Co.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
64. Given the nature of the allegations contained in the Communication, such
as allegations of violation of personal integrity or security, intimidation
and torture, the Commission is of the view that the Communication raises
material elements which may constitute human rights violation, and as such,
it has competence rationae materae to deal with the matter, because the
Communication alleges violations to human rights protected in the Charter.
With regards to the Commission's competence rationae personae, the
Communication indicates the name of the author, an individual, whose rights
under the African Charter, the Respondent State is committed to respecting
and protecting. With regards to the State, the Commission notes that
Zimbabwe, the Respondent State in this case, has been a State Party to the
African Charter since 1986. Therefore, both the Complainant and the State
have locus standi before the Commission, and the Commission thus has
competence rationae personae to examine the Communication.
65. Having decided that it has competence rationae materae and rationae
personae, the African Commission will now proceed to pronounce on the
admissibility requirements and the contentious areas between the parties.
DECISION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
66. The admissibility of Communications before the African Commission is
determined by the requirements of Article 56 of the African Charter. This
Article provides seven requirements which must all be met before the
Commission can consider and declare a Communication admissible. If one of
the conditions/requirements is not met, the Commission shall declare the
Communication inadmissible, unless the complainant provides justifications
why any of the requirements could not be met.
67. In the present Communication, the Complainant avers that his complaint
meets the requirements under Article 56 (1) - (4), (6) and (7). He admits
that he did not attempt to comply with the requirement provided under
Article 56 (5) dealing with the exhaustion of local remedies, but added that
given the nature of his case, and the circumstances under which he left the
Respondent State, and is living in South Africa, the exception rule under
this sub-section of Article 56, should be invoked.
68. The State on the other hand argues that the Complainant has not complied
with the provisions of Article 56 (2), (5) and (6) of the Charter, and urges
the Commission to declare the Communication inadmissible, based on
non-compliance with these requirements.
69. The African Commission will thus examine each of the provisions under
Article 56 of the African Charter, whether it is disputed or not, as the
African Commission has a responsibility to ensure that every requirement in
Article 56 has been fulfilled before admitting a Communication.
70. The requirements under Article 56 of the Charter are meant to ensure
that a Communication is properly brought before the Commission, and seek to
sieve frivolous and vexatious Communications before they reach the merits
stage. Thus, declaring a Communication admissible does not mean the State
Party concerned has violated the provisions of the Charter. It simply means
that the Communication meets the requirements necessary for it to be
considered on the merits. As indicated earlier, for a Communication to be
declared admissible, it must meet all the requirements under Article 56.
Therefore, if a party contends that another party has not complied with one
of the requirements, the Commission must pronounce itself on the contentious
issues between the parties, as well as the non-contentious issues.
71. Article 56(1) of the African Charter provides that Communications will
be admitted if they indicate their authors, even if they request anonymity.
In the present case the author of this Communication is identified as
Michael Majuru, he has also not requested that his identity be hidden. The
respondent State has also been clearly identified as the Republic of
Zimbabwe. Therefore the provision of Article 56(1) has been adequately
complied with.
72. Article 56(2) of the African Charter provides that a Communication must
be compatible with the Charter of the OAU (now Constitutive Act of the
African Union) or with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In
the present Communication, the Respondent State argues that the
Communication does not comply with this requirement. The State asserts in
this regard that, for a complaint to be compatible with the Charter or the
Constitutive Act, it must prove a prima facie violation of the Charter.
73. Compatibility denotes �in compliance' or �in conformity with' or �not
contrary to' or �against'.[FN38] In the present Communication, the
Complainant alleges among others, violations of his right to personal
integrity and being subjected to intimidation, harassment and psychological
torture. He alleges further that agents of the intelligence service of the
Respondent State constantly harassed him and prevented him from exercising
his duties freely. These allegations do raise a prima facie violation of
human rights, in particular, the right to the security of the person or
personal integrity and the right to work under satisfactory condition as
stipulated in the Charter. In the jurisprudence of this Commission,
Complainants need not specify which articles of the Charter have been
violated, or even which right is being invoked, so long as they have raised
the substance of the issue in question. That, in the view of the Commission,
has been established in this case. Based on the above, the African
Commission is satisfied that the requirement of Article 56(2) of the African
Charter has been sufficiently complied with.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN38]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
74. Article 56(3) of the Charter provides that a Communication will be
admitted if they are not written in disparaging or insulting language
directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the
Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union). In the present case,
the Communication sent by the Complainant, does not, in the view of the
African Commission, contain any disparaging or insulting language, and as a
result of this, the requirement of Article 56(3) has been fulfilled.
75. Article 56(4) of the Charter provides that the Communication must not be
based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media. This
Communication was submitted by the complainant himself and gives an account
of his personal experience with the law enforcement agents of the Respondent
State. As a result of this, the requirement of Article 56(4) has also been
met.
76. Article 56(5) of the Charter provides that a Communication will be
admitted only after all local remedies have been exhausted. The Respondent
State contends that the Complainant has not brought his case before the
courts of the State in compliance with this provision of the Charter. The
State argues that there are sufficient and effective local remedies
available to the Complainant in the State, and the Complainant has not
sought these remedies before bringing the present Communication before the
Commission. On the other hand, the Complainant argues that since he had to
flee the country due to fear for his life, he could not come back to the
country to pursue these local remedies.
77. The rationale for the exhaustion of local remedies is to ensure that
before proceedings are brought before an international body, the State
concerned must have the opportunity to remedy the matter through its own
local judicial system. This prevents the international tribunal from acting
as a court of first instance, rather than as a body of last resort.[FN39]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN39] Communications 25/84, 74/92 and 83/92.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
78. Three major criteria could be deduced from the practice and
jurisprudence of the Commission in determining compliance with this
requirement, namely: the remedy must be available, effective and sufficient.
79. In Jawara v The Gambia, the Commission stated that "a remedy is
considered available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment; it
is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found
sufficient if it is capable of redressing the complaint". In the Jawara
Communication, which both parties have cited, the Commission held that "the
existence of a remedy must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but
also in practice, failing which, it will lack the requisite accessibility
and effectiveness. ...Therefore, if the applicant cannot turn to the judiciary
of his country because of fear for his life (or even those of his relatives),
local remedies would be considered to be unavailable to him".
80. The Complainant in the present Communication claims that he left his
country out of fear for his life due to intimidation, harassment and undue
influence in the exercise of his duties. The Complainant has also alleged a
history of non-compliance with the orders of the court of the Respondent,
and alleges that a human rights NGO in Zimbabwe � the Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Human Rights, has documented 12 cases since the year 2000, where the State
has ignored court rulings that go against it. According to the Complainant,
it is noteworthy that although local remedies may be available in the
Respondent State, there is no assurance of its effectiveness or its
implementation due to the fact that if the court rules in favour of the
complainant, there is no guarantee that the ruling will be complied with by
the State.
81. The Complainant cited the African Commission's decisions in the Jawara
case and the cases of Alhassan Abubakar v Ghana[FN40] and Rights
International/ Nigeria[FN41] in which he said the Commission found that the
Complainants in these cases could not be expected to pursue domestic
remedies in their country due to the fact that they had fled their country
and were in fact residing outside their country at the time the
Communications were brought before the Commission.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN40] Communication 103/93
[FN41] Communications 215/98
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
82. Having studied the Complainant's submissions, and comparing it with the
above cases cited in support of his claim, this Commission is of the opinion
that the above cases cited by the Complainant are not similar to his case.
In the Jawara case for example, the Complainant was a former Head of State
who had been overthrown in a Military coup. Mr. Jawara alleged that after
the coup, there was "blatant abuse of power by ... the military junta". The
military government was alleged to have initiated a reign of terror,
intimidation and arbitrary detention. He further alleged the abolition of
the Bill of Rights as contained in the 1970 Gambia Constitution by Military
Decree No. 30/31, ousting the competence of the courts to examine or
question the validity of any such Decree. The Communication alleged the
banning of political parties and of Ministers of the former civilian
government from taking part in any political activity. The Communication
further alleged restrictions on freedom of expression, movement and religion.
These restrictions were manifested, according to the Complainant, by the
arrest and detention of people without charge, kidnappings, torture and the
burning of a mosque.
83. In the Jawara case, the Commission concluded that "the Complainant in
this case had been overthrown by the military, he was tried in absentia,
former Ministers and Members of Parliament of his government have been
detained and there was terror and fear for lives in the country. There is no
doubt that there was a generalised fear perpetrated by the regime as alleged
by the complainant. This created an atmosphere not only in the mind of the
author but also in the minds of right thinking people that returning to his
country at that material moment, for whatever reason, would be risky to his
life. Under such circumstances, domestic remedies cannot be said to have
been available to the complainant". The Commission finally noted that, "it
would be an affront to common sense and logic to require the complainant to
return to his country to exhaust local remedies".
84. In the Alhassan Abubakar case, it should be recalled that Mr. Alhassan
Abubakar was a Ghanaian citizen who was arrested by the Ghanaian authorities
in the 1980s for allegedly cooperating with political dissidents. He was
detained without charge or trial for over 7 years until his escape from a
prison hospital on 19 February 1992 to Cote d'Ivoire. After his escape, his
sister and wife, who had been visiting him in Cote d'Ivoire, were arrested
and held for two weeks in an attempt to get information on the Complainant's
whereabouts. The Complainant's brother informed him that the police have
been given false information about his return, and have on several occasions
surrounded his house, searched it, and subsequently searched for him in his
mother's village.
85. In the early part of 1993, the UNHCR in Côte d'Ivoire informed the
Complainant that they had received a report on him from Ghana assuring that
he was free to return without risk of being prosecuted for fleeing from
prison. The report further stated that all those detained for political
reasons had been released. Complainant on the other hand maintained that
there is a law in Ghana which subjects escapees to penalties from 6 months
to 2 years imprisonment, regardless of whether the detention from which they
escaped was lawful or not. On the basis of the above, the Commission held
that "considering the nature of the Complaint it would not be logical to ask
the Complainant to go back to Ghana in order to seek a remedy from national
legal authorities. Accordingly, the Commission does not consider that local
remedies are available for the complainant".
86. In Rights International v. Nigeria[FN42], the victim, a certain Mr.
Charles Baridorn Wiwa, a Nigerian student in Chicago was arrested and
tortured at a Nigerian Military Detention Camp in Gokana. It was alleged
that Mr. Wiwa was arrested on 3 January 1996 by unknown armed soldiers in
the presence of his mother and other members of his family and remained in
the said Military detention camp from 3-9 January 1996. While in detention,
Mr. Wiwa was horsewhipped and placed in a cell with forty-five other
detainees. When he was identified as a relative of Mr. Ken Saro -Wiwa he was
subjected to various forms of torture. Enclosed in the Communication was
medical evidence of Mr. Wiwa's physical torture. After 5 days in the
detention camp in Gokana, Mr. Wiwa was transferred to the State Intelligence
Bureau (SIB) in Port Harcourt. Mr. Wiwa was held from 9-11 January 1996,
without access to a legal counsel or relatives, except for a five minutes
discussion with his grandfather. On 11 January 1996, Mr. Wiwa and 21 other
Ogonis were brought before the Magistrate Court 2 in Port-Harcourt, charged
with unlawful assembly in violation of Section 70 of the Criminal Code Laws
of Eastern Nigeria 1963. Mr. Wiwa was granted bail, but while out on bail
some un-known people believed to be government agents abducted him and
threatened his life by forcing him into a car in Port-Harcourt. On the
advice of human rights lawyers, Mr. Wiwa fled Nigeria on 18 March 1996 to
Cotonou, Republic of Benin, where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
declared him a refugee. On September 17 1996, the US government granted him
refugee status and he has been residing in the United States since then.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN42] Communication 215/98.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87. In this case, the African Commission declared the Communication
admissible on grounds that there was lack of available and effective
domestic remedies for human rights violations in Nigeria under the military
regime. It went further to assert that "the standard for constructive
exhaustion of domestic remedies is satisfied where there is no adequate or
effective remedy available to the individual. In this particular case, ... Mr.
Wiwa was unable to pursue any domestic remedy following his flight for fear
of his life to the Republic of Benin and the subsequent granting of refugee
status to him by the United States of America".
88. The present Communication brought by Mr. Michael Majuru should also be
differentiated from Gabriel Shumba v Republic of Zimbabwe.[FN43] In the
Shumba case, the Complainant alleged that, he, in the presence of 3 others,
namely Bishop Shumba, Taurai Magayi and Charles Mutama, was taking
instructions from one of his clients, a Mr. John Sikhala, in a matter
involving alleged political harassment by members of the Zimbabwe Republic
Police (ZRP). Mr. John Sikhala is a Member of Parliament for the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), which is an opposition party in Zimbabwe. At
about 11:00 pm riot police accompanied by plain-clothes policemen and
personnel identified to be from the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)
stormed the room and arrested everyone present. During the arrest, the
Complainant's law practicing certificate, diary, files, documents and cell
phone were confiscated and he was slapped and kicked several times by, among
others, the Officer in Charge of Saint Mary's Police Station.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN43] Communication 288/2004.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
89. The Complainant and the others were taken to Saint Mary's Police Station
where he was detained without charge and denied access to legal
representation. He was also denied food and water. The Complainant claimed
that on the next day following his arrest, he was removed from the cell, a
hood was placed over his head and he was driven to an unknown location where
he was led down what seemed like a tunnel to a room underground. The hood
was removed, he was stripped naked and his hands and feet were bound in a
foetal position and a plank was thrust between his legs and arms. While in
this position, the Complainant was questioned and threatened with death by
about 15 interrogators. The Complainant further alleged that he was also
electrocuted intermittently for 8 hours and a chemical substance was applied
to his body. He lost control of his bodily functions, vomited blood and he
was forced to drink his vomit. The Complainant submitted a certified copy of
the medical report describing the injuries found on his body. Following his
interrogation, at around 7pm of the same day, the Complainant was unbound
and forced to write several statements implicating himself and several
senior MDC members in subversive activities. At around 7.30pm he was taken
to Harare Police Station and booked into a cell. On the third day of his
arrest, his lawyers who had obtained a High Court injunction ordering his
release to court were allowed to access him. The Complainant was
subsequently charged under section 5 of the Public Order and Security Act
that relates to organizing, planning or conspiring to overthrow the
government through unconstitutional means. He then fled Zimbabwe for fear of
his life.
90. In the above cases, there is one thing in common � the clear
establishment of the element of fear perpetrated by identified state
institutions, fear which in the Jawara case, the Commission observed that
"it would be reversing the clock of justice to request the complainant to
attempt local remedies".
91. In the Communication under consideration, however, Mr. Michael Majuru
alleges that he fled the country for fear of his life, that he was
intimidated and harassed by the Minister of Justice and by suspected state
agents. He also indicated that he received �a telephone call from a
sympathetic member of the legal fraternity and the police that the
Respondent State was fabricating a case against him and that he was to be
arrested and incarcerated on unspecified charges as punishment for defying
the Respondent's orders'.
92. In this Communication, it is clear that the Complainant has simply made
general accusations and has not corroborated his allegations with
documentary evidence, sworn affidavits or testimonies of others. He claims
the Minister sent an instruction through a colleague of his but there is no
way of ascertaining this fact. The applicant was the President of the
Administrative Court, and has not show how the instruction purportedly sent
by the Minister through the Complainant's colleague, who the Commission is
not told the kind of influence he had over the Complainant, could have or
did intimidate him. Apart from the direct telephone call the Complainant
claims he received from the Minister on 23 October and 24 November 2003, all
the alleged threats, intimidations and harassment he claims, were
perpetrated by persons he suspects were government agents. Most of his
allegations are unsubstantiated. For example, he indicated in paragraph
2.5.4.7 of his submissions that "the Minister expressed his displeasure with
the said decision and further attempted to unduly influence and/or threaten
the Complainant". He fails to show how this attempted influence or threat by
the Minister was carried out.
93. It is further observed by the Commission that the alleged threat or
pressure claimed by the Complainant to have been meted by Enoch Kamushinda,
who the complainant himself refers to as a suspected Central Intelligence
Organisation (CIO) operative, has not been substantiated; neither has the
purported pressure and entrapment alleged to have been made by Mr. Ben
Chisvo, who according to the Complainant, is a suspected CIO informer.
Furthermore, the Complainant alleged he received a telephone call from a
sympathetic member of the legal fraternity and the police that the
Respondent State was fabricating a case against him, and that he was to be
arrested and incarcerated on unspecified charges as punishment for defying
the Respondent's orders. All the above allegations are not substantiated.
Take the latter for example, what if the �sympathetic member of the legal
fraternity' was a hoax? What if he was acting on his own or wanted to
benefit from the misfortune of the Complainant? His or her name is not even
known.
94. It is not possible for the Commission to determine the level of
intimidation or harassment that is needed to instil fear in a person, to
force that person to flee for their life. However, in the instant case,
there is no concrete evidence to link the complainant's fear to the
Respondent State.
95. It is therefore the opinion of the Commission that the Complainant has
not sufficiently demonstrated that his life or those of his close relatives
were threatened by the Respondent State, forcing him to flee the country,
and as such, cannot hold that the Complainant left the country due to
threats and intimidation from the State.
96. However, the question is, having left the country, could the Complainant
still have exhausted local remedies or better still is he required to
exhaust local remedies?
97. The first test that a local remedy must pass is that it must be
available to be exhausted. The word "available" means "readily obtainable";
"accessible";[FN44] or "attainable, reachable; on call, on hand, ready,
present; . . . convenient, at one's service, at one's command, at one's
disposal, at one's beck and call."[FN45] According to the African Commission,
a remedy is considered to be available if the petitioner can pursue it
without impediments or if he can make use of it in the circumstances of his
case.[FN46] In the present Communication, the question to be asked is
whether there were remedies available to the Complainant even from outside
the Respondent State?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN44]Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language
102 (1989).
[FN45] Longman Synonym Dictionary 82 (1986).
[FN46] Jawara v. The Gambia, supra.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
98. The State indicates that in terms of its laws, a Complainant need not be
physically present in the country in order to access local remedies, adding
that both the High Court Act and the Supreme Court Act permit any person to
make an application to either court through his/her lawyer. In support of
this, the State cited the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka case where the
victims were tortured by state agents and they applied for compensation
while they were both in the United Kingdom and succeeded in their claim. The
State concluded that the Complainant is not barred from pursuing remedies in
a similar manner. The State further argues that since his resignation, the
government of Zimbabwe continues to pay the Complainant his pension benefits
which he could have used to instruct his counsel in Zimbabwe to attend to
his claim on his behalf.
99. The Complainant does not dispute the availability of local remedies in
the Respondent State, but argues that in his particular case, having fled
the country for fear of his life, and now out of the country, local remedies
are not available to him.
100. The African Commission holds the view that having failed to establish
that he left the country involuntarily, and in view of the fact that in
Zimbabwe law, one need not be physically in the country to access local
remedies, the Complainant cannot claim that local remedies were not
available to him.
101. The Complainant argues that even if local remedies were available, they
were not effective because the State has the tendency of ignoring court
rulings taken against it, citing among others, the High Court decision in
the Commercial Farmers Union and the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka cases,
and added that the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights has documented at least
12 instances where the state has ignored court rulings since 2000.
102. The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission provide that "[t]he
Commission shall determine questions of admissibility pursuant to Article 56
of the Charter."[FN47] Generally, the rules require applicants to set out in
their submissions the steps taken to exhaust domestic remedies. They must
provide some prima facie evidence of an attempt to exhaust local remedies.
The Human Rights Committee has stated that the mere fact that a domestic
remedy is inconvenient or unattractive, or does not produce a result
favorable to the petitioner does not, in itself, demonstrate the lack of
exhaustion of all effective remedies.[FN48] In the Committee's decision on A
v Australia,[FN49] it held that "mere doubts about the effectiveness of
local remedies or prospect of financial costs involved did not absolve the
author from pursuing such remedies."[FN50] In Article 19 v Eritrea, the
Commission held that "it is incumbent on the Complainant to take all
necessary steps to exhaust, or at least attempt the exhaustion of local
remedies. It is not enough for the Complainant to cast aspersion on the
ability of the domestic remedies of the State due to isolated incidences".
The European Court of Human Rights on its part has held that even if the
applicants have reason to believe that available domestic remedies and
possible appeals will be ineffective, they should seek those remedies since
"it is generally incumbent on an aggrieved individual to allow the domestic
courts the opportunity to develop existing rights by way of interpretation."[FN51]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN47] See Rule 116 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.
[FN48] Nos. 220/1987, T. K. v. France; 222/1987, M. K. v. France; 306/1988,
J. G. v. The Netherlands, in 2 Report of the Human Rights Committee 188,
122; 127, 130; 180, 182�83, UN Doc. A/45/40 (1990) [hereinafter HRC 1990
Report].
[FN49] Communication No. 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997).
[FN50] See also L Emil Kaaber v Iceland, Communication No. 674/1995. UN Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/674/1995 (1996). See also Ati Antoine Randolph v. Togo,
Communication No. 910/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/910/2000 (2003).
[FN51] PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 79
(2001) (quoting Earl Spencer and Countess Spencer v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 28851/95, 28852/95 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1998)).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. From the above analysis, this Commission is of the view that the
complainant ignored to utilize the domestic remedies available to him in the
respondent State, which had he attempted, might have yielded some
satisfactory resolution of the complaint.
104. Article 56(6) of the Charter provides that "Communications received by
the Commission will be considered if they are submitted within a reasonable
period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the
Commission is seized with the matter..." The respondent State contends that
the present Communication was not submitted on time by the complainant, as
required by the African Charter.
105. The present Communication was received at the Secretariat of the
Commission on 8 November 2005 (even though dated 2 November 2005). It was
considered for seizure by the Commission in November 2005, that is, two
years after the Complainant allegedly fled from the country. The Complainant
never approached the courts of the Respondent State. He left the country in
December 2003 and only seized the Commission twenty two months later. The
Complainant submits without substantiating that he had been undergoing
psychotherapy while in South Africa, and also indicated that he did not have
the financial means to bring the case before the Commission. He also stated
that he had hoped the situation in the country would improve to enable him
utilize domestic remedies but there was instead a deterioration.
106. The Commission notes that the Complainant is not residing in the
Respondent State and notes further that the Complainant indicated that he
was prevented from submitting his complaint on time, because the judiciary
abides by a code of conduct in terms of which they do not ordinarily speak
out and take positions against the establishment, noting that out of eight
or so members who have left Zimbabwe because of persecution, he is the only
one who was speaking out. He added that he was afraid for the lives of
members of his immediate family that were at risk of persecution because of
him.
107. The State on its part argues that "no cogent reasons have been given
for the failure to pursue local remedies or remedies before the Commission
within a reasonable time'. The State submits that the Communication was
submitted 22 months after the alleged violation, which according to the
State �was filed well out of time'. On Complainant's submission that he had
been seeking psycho-therapy treatment, the State argued that Complainant had
been the centre of attraction in South Africa since 2004 demonizing the
Respondent State, adding that articles published by the Complainant do not
show someone with a psychological ailment. The State added that no proof had
been given of the alleged treatment or an expert diagnosis of how such
condition was acquired. On Complainants' claim that he had no resources, the
State argued that he had his pension benefits which he could have used to
submit his complaint to the Commission.
108. The Charter does not provide for what constitutes "reasonable period".
However, the Commission has the mandate to interpret the provisions of the
Charter [FN52] and in doing so, it takes cognizance of its duty to protect
human and people's rights as stipulated in the Charter. The provisions of
other international/ regional instruments like the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights, are almost similar and state that they ... may only deal with
the matter... within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken"[FN53], after this period has elapsed the Court/Commission
will no longer entertain the Communication.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN52] Article 45 (3) African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
[FN53] Article 26 European Convention on Human rights.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
109. The Commission is urged in Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter to
consider as subsidiary measures to determine the applicable principles of
law "other general or special international instruments, laying down rules
expressly recognized by member states of the African Union...". Going by the
practice of similar regional human rights instruments, such as the
Inter-American Commission and Court and the European Court, six months seem
to be the usual standard. This notwithstanding, each case must be treated on
its own merit. Where there is good and compelling reason why a Complainant
could not submit his/her complaint for consideration on time, the Commission
may examine the complaint to ensure fairness and justice.
110. In the present Communication, the arguments advanced by the Complainant
as impediments for his late submission of the complaint do not appear
convincing. The complainant does not supply the Commission with medical
proof to indicate he was suffering from mental problems, he does not
indicate what gave him the impression that things might improve in Zimbabwe,
after he himself noted in his complaint that since 2000 there has been
documented evidence to show that things were deteriorating, including the
fact that the government does not respect court judgments. Even if the
Commission accepts that he fled the country and needed time to settle, or
that he was concerned for the safety of his relatives, twenty two (22)
months after fleeing the country is clearly beyond a reasonable man's
understanding of reasonable period of time. The African Commission thus
holds that the submission of the Communication was unduly delayed and thus
does not comply with the requirements under Article 56 (6) of the Charter.
111. Article 56(7) of the African Charter provides that the Communication
must not deal with cases which have been settled by the States, in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations, or the Charter of the
OAU or the African Charter. In the present case, this case has not been
settled by any of these international bodies, and as a result of this, the
requirement of Article 56(7) has been fulfilled by the complainant.
The African Commission finds that in the present Communication, that is,
Communication 308/05 - Michael Majuru/Zimbabwe, the Complainant has not
complied with sub-sections (5) and (6) of Article 56 of the African Charter,
and thus declares the Communication inadmissible.
Adopted at the 44th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, 10 - 24 November 2008, Abuja, Nigeria. |
|
