



**CHINA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF  
CELLULOSE PULP FROM CANADA**

REPORT OF THE PANEL

*BCI deleted, as indicated [\*\*\*]*

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>9</b>
1.1 Complaint by Canada .....	9
1.2 Panel establishment and composition .....	9
1.3 Panel proceedings.....	9
1.3.1 General .....	9
1.3.2 Additional working procedures concerning business confidential information (BCI) .....	10
<b>2 FACTUAL ASPECTS.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>6 INTERIM REVIEW .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>7 FINDINGS .....</b>	<b>11</b>
7.1 Introduction.....	11
7.2 General principles regarding treaty interpretation, the applicable standard of review, and burden of proof .....	12
7.2.1 Treaty interpretation .....	12
7.2.2 Standard of review.....	12
7.2.3 Burden of proof .....	13
7.3 The legal framework for injury determination.....	13
7.4 Whether MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of dumped imports was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .....	18
7.4.1 Introduction.....	18
7.4.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.2, first sentence .....	19
7.4.3 MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of dumped imports.....	22
7.5 Whether MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .....	25
7.5.1 Introduction.....	25
7.5.2 Legal standard under Article 3.2, second sentence.....	26
7.5.3 MOFCOM's consideration of parallel price trends .....	27
7.5.4 MOFCOM's consideration of the fact that dumped imports were sold at higher prices than the domestic like product.....	31
7.5.5 MOFCOM's consideration of changes in the dumped imports' market share.....	33
7.5.6 MOFCOM's consideration of certain business information .....	36
7.5.7 MOFCOM's consideration of evidence and factors collectively .....	38
7.6 Whether MOFCOM's examination of the impact of dumped imports was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .....	39
7.6.1 Introduction.....	39
7.6.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.4.....	39
7.6.3 MOFCOM's evaluation of market share .....	40
7.6.4 MOFCOM's evaluation of injury factors showing positive trends.....	42

7.7 Whether MOFCOM's demonstration of causation and examination of other factors causing injury were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .....	44
7.7.1 Introduction.....	44
7.7.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.5.....	45
7.7.3 MOFCOM's demonstration of causation.....	45
7.7.4 MOFCOM's examination of other known factors allegedly causing injury and non-attribution .....	48
7.7.4.1 Cotton and VSF prices.....	48
7.7.4.1.1 Introduction .....	48
7.7.4.1.2 Cotton prices .....	49
7.7.4.1.3 VSF prices .....	52
7.7.4.2 Domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction, and inventory build-up .....	53
7.7.4.3 Impact of non-dumped imports .....	58
7.7.4.4 Shortage of cotton linter .....	61
7.8 Consequential claims .....	63
<b>8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION .....</b>	<b>63</b>

## LIST OF ANNEXES

### ANNEX A

#### INTERIM REVIEW AND WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

Contents		Page
Annex A-1	Interim Review	A-2
Annex A-2	Working Procedures of the Panel	A-7
Annex A-3	Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning Business Confidential Information	A-12

### ANNEX B

#### ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

Contents		Page
Annex B-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-2
Annex B-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-15

### ANNEX C

#### ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

Contents		Page
Annex C-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-2
Annex C-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-14

### ANNEX D

#### ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

Contents		Page
Annex D-1	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil	D-2
Annex D-2	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union	D-5
Annex D-3	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan	D-8
Annex D-4	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway	D-11
Annex D-5	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States	D-13

**CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT**

Short title	Full case title and citation
<i>China – Autos (US)</i>	Panel Report, <i>China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles from the United States</i> , WT/DS440/R and Add.1, adopted 18 June 2014, DSR 2014:VII, p. 2655
<i>China – Broiler Products</i>	Panel Report, <i>China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States</i> , WT/DS427/R and Add.1, adopted 25 September 2013, DSR 2013:IV, p. 1041
<i>China – GOES</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States</i> , WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6251
<i>China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)</i>	Appellate Body Reports, <i>China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan / China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union</i> , WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October 2015
<i>China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)</i>	Panel Reports, <i>China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan / China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union</i> , WT/DS454/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 28 October 2015, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS454/AB/R/ WT/DS460/AB/R
<i>China – X-Ray Equipment</i>	Panel Report, <i>China – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union</i> , WT/DS425/R and Add.1, adopted 24 April 2013, DSR 2013:III, p. 659
<i>EC – Bed Linen</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India</i> , WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, p. 2077
<i>EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India</i> , WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 965
<i>EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India</i> , WT/DS141/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/RW, DSR 2003:IV, p. 1269
<i>EC – Fasteners (China)</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China</i> , WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289
<i>EC – Hormones</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)</i> , WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 135
<i>EC – Salmon (Norway)</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway</i> , WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1, DSR 2008:I, p. 3
<i>EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil</i> , WT/DS219/AB/R, adopted 18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613
<i>EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil</i> , WT/DS219/R, adopted 18 August 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R, DSR 2003:VII, p. 2701

Short title	Full case title and citation
<i>EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft</i> , WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
<i>EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina</i> , WT/DS473/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016
<i>EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina</i> , WT/DS473/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS473/AB/R
<i>EU – Footwear (China)</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China</i> , WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:IX, p. 4585
<i>Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages</i> , WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97
<i>Korea – Certain Paper</i>	Panel Report, <i>Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia</i> , WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10637
<i>Korea – Dairy</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products</i> , WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 3
<i>Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice</i> , WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
<i>Mexico – Olive Oil</i>	Panel Report, <i>Mexico – Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communities</i> , WT/DS341/R, adopted 21 October 2008, DSR 2008:IX, p. 3179
<i>Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes</i>	Panel Report, <i>Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala</i> , WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207
<i>Thailand – H-Beams</i>	Panel Report, <i>Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland</i> , WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2741
<i>US – Carbon Steel</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany</i> , WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779
<i>US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea</i> , WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131
<i>US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS</i>	Panel Report, <i>United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea</i> , WT/DS296/R, adopted 20 July 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS296/AB/R, DSR 2005:XVII, p. 8243
<i>US – Hot-Rolled Steel</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan</i> , WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
<i>US – Lamb</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia</i> , WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX, p. 4051
<i>US – Large Civil Aircraft (2<sup>nd</sup> complaint)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint)</i> , WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR 2012:I, p. 7
<i>US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU</i> , WT/DS257/AB/RW, adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11357
<i>US – Upland Cotton</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton</i> , WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3

<b>Short title</b>	<b>Full case title and citation</b>
<i>US – Upland Cotton</i>	Panel Report, <i>United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton</i> , WT/DS267/R, Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p. 299
<i>US – Washing Machines</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea</i> , WT/DS464/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 September 2016
<i>US – Wheat Gluten</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities</i> , WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
<i>US – Wool Shirts and Blouses</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India</i> , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323

### ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Description
Anti-Dumping Agreement	Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
BCI	Business Confidential Information
Cosmo	Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc.
DSB	Dispute Settlement Body
DSU	Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Fortress	Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc.
GATT 1994	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
POI	Period of investigation
Rayonier	Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC.
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679
VSF	Viscose Staple Fibre
WTO	World Trade Organization



## 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Complaint by Canada

1.1. On 15 October 2014, Canada requested consultations with China pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), and Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) with respect to the anti-dumping measure applied by China on imports of cellulose pulp originating from, *inter alia*, Canada.<sup>1</sup>

1.2. Consultations were held on 2 November 2014, but failed to resolve the dispute. On 12 February 2015, Canada requested the establishment of a panel.<sup>2</sup>

### 1.2 Panel establishment and composition

1.3. At its meeting on 10 March 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of Canada in document WT/DS483/2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.<sup>3</sup>

1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:

To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Canada in document WT/DS483/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.<sup>4</sup>

1.5. On 15 April 2015, Canada requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU. On 27 April 2015, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:

Chairperson: Mr. Thomas Cottier  
Members: Mr. Greg Weppner  
Mr. Shahid Bashir

1.6. Brazil, Chile, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Uruguay, and the United States notified their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.<sup>5</sup>

### 1.3 Panel proceedings

#### 1.3.1 General

1.7. The Panel began its work on this case later than it would have wished due to staff constraints in the WTO Secretariat.<sup>6</sup> After consultation with the parties, on 8 January 2016 the Panel adopted its timetable<sup>7</sup> and Working Procedures.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> *China – Cellulose Pulp*, request for consultations by Canada, (dated 15 October 2014, circulated 20 October 2014), WT/DS483/1.

<sup>2</sup> *China – Cellulose Pulp*, request for the establishment of a panel by Canada, (dated 12 February 2015, circulated 13 February 2015), WT/DS483/2 (Canada's panel request).

<sup>3</sup> Dispute Settlement Body, minutes of meeting held on 10 March 2015, (circulated 20 April 2015), WT/DSB/M/358.

<sup>4</sup> *China – Cellulose Pulp*, constitution note of the panel, (dated 10 March 2015, circulated 28 April 2015), WT/DS483/3.

<sup>5</sup> *China – Cellulose Pulp*, constitution note of the panel, (dated 10 March 2015, circulated 28 April 2015), WT/DS483/3.

<sup>6</sup> *China – Cellulose Pulp*, communication from the panel, (issued and circulated on 27 October 2015), WT/DS483/4.

<sup>7</sup> The Panel revised its timetable on 1 March 2016, 19 May 2016, 8 August 2016, and 12 December 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Working Procedures of the Panel, Annex A-2.

1.8. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 11-12 May 2016. A session with the third parties took place on 12 May 2016. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 3 August 2016.<sup>9</sup> On 22 September 2016, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 23 November 2016. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 16 December 2016.

### 1.3.2 Additional working procedures concerning business confidential information (BCI)

1.9. After consultation with the parties, on 8 January 2016 the Panel adopted Additional Working Procedures concerning Business Confidential Information (BCI).<sup>10</sup>

## 2 FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1. This dispute concerns the anti-dumping measure imposed by China on imports of cellulose pulp originating from Canada, as set forth in Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) Notices No. 75 of 6 November 2013 (Preliminary Determination)<sup>11</sup> and No. 18 of 4 April 2014 (Final Determination)<sup>12</sup> and accompanying annexes. Specifically, Canada challenges MOFCOM's determination of injury in the anti-dumping investigation at issue.<sup>13</sup>

2.2. MOFCOM initiated anti-dumping investigations on imports of cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada, and the United States on 6 February 2013<sup>14</sup>, following the submission of an application by Chinese cellulose pulp producers on 13 December 2012.<sup>15</sup> The period of investigation (POI) for the examination of dumping was from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012, and the POI for the examination of injury was from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2012.<sup>16</sup>

2.3. In its Preliminary Determination, published on 6 November 2013, MOFCOM found that the imports of cellulose pulp from the investigated countries were dumped and caused material injury to the domestic industry in China.<sup>17</sup> MOFCOM confirmed these conclusions in its Final Determination, published on 4 April 2014.<sup>18</sup> MOFCOM calculated final dumping margins for Canadian producers ranging from 0.7% to 23.7%.<sup>19</sup> MOFCOM also concluded that the dumped imports, including those from Canada, caused material injury to the Chinese domestic industry producing the like product.<sup>20</sup>

2.4. MOFCOM applied an anti-dumping measure in the form of *ad valorem* duties on imports from producers in the investigated countries.<sup>21</sup> Anti-dumping duties of 13% were imposed on cooperating Canadian producers, and of 23.7% on all other Canadian producers. One Canadian

---

<sup>9</sup> On 15 September 2016, Canada submitted a letter to the Panel commenting on a recently issued Appellate Body report in connection with its arguments in this dispute. Following an invitation from the Panel to respond, China on 23 September 2016 replied asking the Panel not to admit the Canadian letter, and going on to respond to the substance of Canada's comments. Despite the unsolicited nature of Canada's submission, in light of the fact that China had the opportunity to, and did, comment on the substance of the submission, the Panel decided to deny China's request that Canada's letter be rejected.

<sup>10</sup> Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information, Annex A-3.

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement of Anti-Dumping Preliminary Determination on Imported Dissolving Pulp from the United States, Canada, and Brazil, Notice No. 75, 6 November 2013 (Preliminary Determination), (Exhibit CAN-2).

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Final Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation on the Imported Cellulose Pulp Originated in the United States of America, Canada, and Brazil, Notice No. 18, 4 April 2014 (Final Determination), (Exhibits CHN-1 and CAN-3). Canada and China submitted differing English versions of the Final Determination. The Panel refers principally to the version submitted by China throughout this Report. In the few instances where the parties disagreed on the translation from the original Chinese, the Panel refers to both versions.

<sup>13</sup> In footnote 2 of its first written submission, Canada specifically abandoned claims regarding the determination of dumping and procedural aspects of the investigation set out in paragraphs 1-3 and 7-13 of its panel request. (Canada's first written submission, fn 2).

<sup>14</sup> China's first written submission, para. 15; Canada's first written submission, para. 28.

<sup>15</sup> China's first written submission, para. 14; Canada's first written submission, para. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Preliminary Determination, (Exhibit CAN-2), p. 68.

<sup>18</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 86.

<sup>19</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 57 and 86.

<sup>20</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 77 and 78.

<sup>21</sup> Notice on the Final Determination No. 18, 4 April 2014, included in Exhibit CAN-3, pp. 2 and 3.

producer was excluded from the investigation because its dumping margin was determined to be *de minimis*.<sup>22</sup>

### 3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1. Canada requests that the Panel find that the measure at issue is inconsistent with China's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and as a consequence also inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.<sup>23</sup> Canada further requests, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the Panel recommend that China bring its measure into conformity with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.<sup>24</sup>

3.2. China requests that the Panel find that the measure at issue is fully consistent with China's WTO rights and obligations.<sup>25</sup>

### 4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel in accordance with paragraph 19 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2).

### 5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

5.1. The arguments of Brazil, the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the United States are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes D-1-D-5). Chile, Korea, Singapore, and Uruguay did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.

### 6 INTERIM REVIEW

6.1. On 23 November 2016, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 30 November 2016, Canada and China each submitted written requests for the Panel to review aspects of the Interim Report. Neither party requested an interim review meeting. On 7 December 2016, both parties submitted comments on the other party's requests for review.

6.2. The parties' requests made at the interim review stage as well as the Panel's discussion and disposition of those requests are set out in Annex A-1.

### 7 FINDINGS

#### 7.1 Introduction

7.1. This dispute concerns the imposition of anti-dumping duties by China on imports of cellulose pulp from Canada. Cellulose pulp is described as "a kind of cellulosic material made from plant fibers and used for production of chemical fibers, such as viscose fiber and cellulosic acetate".<sup>26</sup> Following an investigation initiated based on an application by Chinese cellulose pulp producers, MOFCOM concluded that cellulose pulp imported from Brazil, Canada, and the United States was dumped and causing material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product in China. MOFCOM applied an *ad valorem* anti-dumping duty on imports of cellulose pulp from producers in the investigated countries. In the case of Canada, those duties were in the amount of 13% for cooperating Canadian producers, and 23.7% for all other Canadian producers.<sup>27</sup>

7.2. Canada requested consultations with China with respect to the anti-dumping measure applied by China on imports of cellulose pulp from Canada. In its request for panel establishment, Canada

---

<sup>22</sup> Notice on the Final Determination, No. 18, 4 April 2014, included in Exhibit CAN-3, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 189; second written submission, para. 196.

<sup>24</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 189; second written submission, para. 196.

<sup>25</sup> China's first written submission, para. 181; second written submission, para. 168.

<sup>26</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 26.

<sup>27</sup> One Canadian producer was excluded from the investigation because its dumping margin was determined to be *de minimis*.

challenged MOFCOM's determinations of injury and dumping, and various procedural aspects of the investigation.<sup>28</sup> In its first written submission, Canada specifically abandoned claims regarding the determination of dumping and procedural aspects of the investigation.<sup>29</sup> Canada has pursued its claims challenging the consistency of MOFCOM's determination of injury with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is those claims which are before us in this dispute.

7.3. In addressing the complaint in this dispute, we will first set out the relevant principles guiding our review, including the relevant principles of treaty interpretation. Second, we will set out our understanding of the framework of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement governing the determination of injury, and the interrelationship of its several provisions. Finally, we will set out our detailed analysis of the application of Article 3 to the facts of the underlying determination and investigation.

## **7.2 General principles regarding treaty interpretation, the applicable standard of review, and burden of proof**

### **7.2.1 Treaty interpretation**

7.4. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the dispute settlement system serves to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law". Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement similarly requires panels to interpret that Agreement's provisions in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.<sup>30</sup> It is generally accepted that the principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are such customary rules.<sup>31</sup>

### **7.2.2 Standard of review**

7.5. Panels generally are bound by the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU, which provides, in relevant part, that:

A panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.

7.6. In addition, Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth the special standard of review applicable to disputes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.

Thus, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement together establish the standard of review we are to apply with respect to both the factual and the legal aspects of the present dispute.

---

<sup>28</sup> Canada's panel request.

<sup>29</sup> Canada's first written submission, fn 2. As a consequence, there is no dispute concerning China's determination that subject imports are dumped.

<sup>30</sup> Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also provides that if a panel finds that a provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, it shall uphold a measure that rests upon one of those interpretations.

<sup>31</sup> Appellate Body Report, *Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II*, p. 10.

7.7. When a panel is reviewing an investigating authority's determination of facts, the "objective assessment" standard in Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to: (a) how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (b) how those factual findings support the overall determination.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, with respect to a "reasoned and adequate explanation", the Appellate Body observed:

What is "adequate" will inevitably depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the particular claims made, but several general lines of inquiry are likely to be relevant. The panel's scrutiny should test whether the reasoning of the authority is coherent and internally consistent. The panel must undertake an in-depth examination of whether the explanations given disclose how the investigating authority treated the facts and evidence in the record and whether there was positive evidence before it to support the inferences made and conclusions reached by it. The panel must examine whether the explanations provided demonstrate that the investigating authority took proper account of the complexities of the data before it, and that it explained why it rejected or discounted alternative explanations and interpretations of the record evidence. A panel must be open to the possibility that the explanations given by the authority are not reasoned or adequate in the light of other plausible alternative explanations, and must take care not to assume itself the role of initial trier of facts, nor to be passive by "simply *accept[ing]* the conclusions of the competent authorities".<sup>33</sup>

Finally, it is clear that a panel should not conduct a *de novo* review of the evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the investigating authority. A panel must limit its examination to the evidence that was before the investigating authority during the course of the investigation and must take into account all such evidence submitted by the parties to the dispute.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, a panel must not simply defer to the conclusions of the investigating authority; a panel's examination of those conclusions must be "in-depth" and "critical and searching".<sup>35</sup>

### 7.2.3 Burden of proof

7.8. The general principles applicable to the allocation of the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO Agreement must assert and prove its claim.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, as the complaining party, Canada bears the burden of demonstrating that the measure at issue is inconsistent with the provisions of the covered agreements that it invokes. The Appellate Body has stated that a complaining party will satisfy its burden when it establishes a *prima facie* case, namely, a case which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party.<sup>37</sup> It is generally for each party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof.<sup>38</sup>

## 7.3 The legal framework for injury determination

7.9. As noted above, Canada challenges MOFCOM's injury determination under various provisions of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Previous decisions of panels and the Appellate Body have elaborated on the meaning of the provisions of Article 3. In our view, it is useful to explain our understanding of the legal framework for injury determination, in order to set out the context for our review of the challenged determination of injury and our conclusions in this dispute.

7.10. Article 3 is entitled "Determination of Injury" and its provisions require an investigating authority to consider, examine, and evaluate a broad range of factors, and to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. As explained below, in our view,

---

<sup>32</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS*, para. 186; and *US – Lamb*, para. 103.

<sup>33</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada)*, para. 93 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *US – Lamb*, para. 106). (emphasis original)

<sup>34</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS*, paras. 187 and 188.

<sup>35</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada)*, para. 93.

<sup>36</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p. 14.

<sup>37</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, para. 104.

<sup>38</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p. 14.

there are noteworthy differences in what an investigating authority must do in order to satisfy these various requirements so as to make a determination of injury consistent with Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Moreover, the provisions of Article 3 are inter-related in the sense that the consideration, examination, and evaluation of the required elements all contribute to the explanation of the ultimate determination whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry.

7.11. The application of anti-dumping measures is subject to the requirements of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The GATT 1994 establishes basic principles for the imposition of anti-dumping (and countervailing) measures, and the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides considerable elaboration of those principles, setting out a series of detailed substantive and procedural obligations which must be complied with before an anti-dumping measure may be applied. A WTO Member is entitled to apply an anti-dumping measure only if the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement have been met. Recently, the Appellate Body observed that:

Taken as a whole, the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is to recognize the right of Members to take anti-dumping measures to counteract injurious dumping while, at the same time, imposing substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules on anti-dumping investigations and on the imposition of anti-dumping measures.<sup>39</sup>

Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets out the rules and conditions that apply with respect to the determination of injury, which is one of the fundamental prerequisites for the imposition of an anti-dumping measure.

7.12. Article 3.1 establishes the basic principles that a determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994:

[S]hall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.

It is well established that "positive evidence" refers to "the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination"<sup>40</sup>, and "the quality of the evidence that an investigating authority may rely upon in making a determination".<sup>41</sup> "Positive" suggests that the evidence should be "affirmative, objective, verifiable, and credible".<sup>42</sup> The "objective examination" relates to the investigative process itself, and requires that it "conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness", and be conducted "in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation".<sup>43</sup>

7.13. These basic principles inform the more detailed provisions set out in the remainder of Article 3. They do not, in our view, establish independent obligations which can be judged in the abstract, or in isolation and separately from the substantive requirements set out in the remainder of Article 3. Instead, they inform the application of all the provisions of Article 3.

7.14. The provisions of Article 3 requiring consideration, examination, and evaluation of various factors contemplate "a logical progression of inquiry leading to an investigating authority's ultimate injury and causation determination".<sup>44</sup> The inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 3.4, together with the inquiries under Articles 3.7 and 3.8 where relevant<sup>45</sup>, "contribute[]" to, rather than duplicate[]"<sup>46</sup>, the overall determination required under Article 3.5. Furthermore, in the event of a dispute, they

---

<sup>39</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 6.25.

<sup>40</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 193.

<sup>41</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 126 (citing *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 192).

<sup>42</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 126 (citing *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 192).

<sup>43</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 126 (citing *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 193).

<sup>44</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>45</sup> Article 3.7 establishes additional criteria to be considered in making a determination of threat of material injury, and clarifies that such a determination must be based on facts, and not merely on allegations, conjecture, or remote possibility, while Article 3.8 requires that the application of anti-dumping measures shall be considered and decided with special care in cases of threat of material injury.

<sup>46</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

inform a panel's conclusion regarding the investigating authority's compliance with Article 3.1 with respect to a determination of injury.

7.15. An investigating authority's determination of injury comprises a broad range of facts which must be considered in accordance with those substantive requirements, and upon the basis of which the authority must ultimately make a determination as to whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry. That determination may become the subject of a dispute, in which case a panel will be required to review it, and decide whether the investigating authority complied with the relevant substantive and procedural obligations, consistently with the fundamental principles set out in Article 3.1. This does not, however, in our view mean that a claim of inconsistency with Article 3.1 can normally be made independently of other provisions of Article 3.

7.16. To us, this seems logical, as the "positive evidence" to be examined by the investigating authority must pertain to the particular substantive elements relevant to the determination made, and the "objective examination" must relate to the consideration and evaluation of that evidence in the investigation at issue. Thus, we do not believe a panel can, on review of a determination, decide whether a particular element of evidence relied upon by an investigating authority is "positive" in some absolute or abstract sense, but only in the context of the role and weight given to it by the investigating authority. A panel must decide whether that evidence is "affirmative, objective, verifiable, and credible" with respect to the substance of the matter in connection with which it is considered and relied upon by the investigating authority.

7.17. Similarly, we do not believe a panel can, on review of a determination, decide whether the examination of the evidence by the investigating authority was objective in the abstract, but only in the context of the substance of the matter with respect to which the authority was considering and relying on that evidence.<sup>47</sup> Whether the decision-making process of the investigating authority "conform[ed] to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness", and was undertaken "in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation" can, in our view, only be determined on the basis of a careful scrutiny of the decisions made by the investigating authority in reaching a conclusion on the question of whether dumped imports caused injury, as set out in the relevant determination and other documents.

7.18. Looking at the substantive obligations of Article 3, we see that Article 3.2 provides more specific guidance regarding the objective examination of the volume of dumped imports and the objective examination of the effect of those imports on prices in the domestic market, as required by Article 3.1. Article 3.2 first sentence provides that:

With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.

In our view, this does not require an investigating authority to make a **determination** regarding the significance of any increase in the volume of dumped imports.<sup>48</sup> Rather, it requires the authorities to **consider** whether there was any increase in dumped imports, and the significance of any such increase, and provides for three different parameters for that consideration.

7.19. Article 3.2 second sentence provides that:

With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing

---

<sup>47</sup> Of course, a general claim of bias on the part of the investigating authority would fall squarely under Article 3.1. But even in such a situation, it is questionable whether the objective nature of the authority's investigation could be determined without going into the substance of the determination which is challenged.

<sup>48</sup> See Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 130. The Appellate Body concluded that consideration of the price effects of dumped imports under Article 3.2 does not require a definitive determination such as that required by Article 3.5 with respect to causation. In our view, the same conclusion applies with respect to the consideration of the volume of dumped imports and the significance of any increase in that volume under the first sentence of Article 3.2.

Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.

Thus, like the first sentence, the second sentence of Article 3.2 does not require an investigating authority to make a **determination** regarding the effects of dumped imports on prices, but rather to **consider** whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports, or whether the effect of dumped imports is otherwise significant price depression or price suppression.<sup>49</sup>

7.20. Article 3.4 sets out a series of "relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry", which must be evaluated by the investigating authority in all cases when examining the consequential impact of dumped imports on that industry, as required by Article 3.1. Like Article 3.2, Article 3.4 does not require an investigating authority to make a **determination** regarding the impact of dumped imports, but rather to undertake an **examination** of that impact, including an **evaluation** of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including those specifically mandated by Article 3.4 itself.

7.21. The fact that Articles 3.2 and 3.4 do not require an investigating authority to make determinations regarding the matters considered, examined, or evaluated, does not diminish the scope of the necessary inquiries under those provisions.<sup>50</sup> With respect to volume, the necessary inquiries call for consideration of the volume of dumped imports and the significance of any increase in that volume. With respect to the effects of dumped imports on prices and their impact on the domestic industry, the necessary inquiries call for consideration of the relationship between the dumped imports and prices of the domestic like product and the factors relevant to the condition of the industry.<sup>51</sup> However, while these inquiries "are necessary in order to answer the **ultimate question ... as to whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry**"<sup>52</sup>, the fact that no determinations are made under these provisions makes it clear that no particular outcome is a necessary prerequisite for reaching and resolving that "ultimate question".<sup>53</sup>

7.22. An investigating authority's objective examination may reveal no increase in dumped imports, or no significant increase in those imports, or no price undercutting, depression, or suppression, or no impact on one or more of the relevant economic factors and indices evaluated. But this does not mean that the investigating authority need not, or may not, go on to an examination of all relevant evidence before it to consider whether or not dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry. Of course, in the absence of any increase in the volume of dumped imports, any price effects, or any impact on the domestic industry, the answer would be expected to be no. But in the more likely situation where the results of the inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 are diverse, a thorough consideration of whether there is a causal relationship between the dumped imports and injury will be necessary before a determination of injury within the meaning of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT can be made.

7.23. The analysis under Article 3.5 covers a broader scope and concerns the ultimate question of whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry.<sup>54</sup> The elements of that ultimate determination are set out in Article 3.5, which requires a demonstration that the dumped imports are, through their volume, price effects, and impact on the domestic industry, causing material injury to that industry. The results of the inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 are "linked through a causation analysis" to the demonstration that there is a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.<sup>55</sup> Article 3.5 specifically refers back to the "effects of dumping, as set forth in [Articles 3.2 and 3.4]" in the context of the

---

<sup>49</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 130.

<sup>50</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 131. While the Appellate Body was referring specifically to Article 3.2 in this context, we are of the view that the observation holds for Article 3.4 as well.

<sup>51</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 136 and 138; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, paras. 5.158-5.160.

<sup>52</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>53</sup> We note in this regard that both Article 3.2 and Article 3.4 provide that no one or several of the factors listed therein can necessarily give decisive guidance. We understand this as indicating that no one or several of the factors listed can give decisive guidance as to the ultimate question whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry.

<sup>54</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 147 and 150.

<sup>55</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 128 and 130 and fn 217.



demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury within the meaning of the Agreement, and requires a demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry based on an examination of all relevant evidence.

7.24. It seems clear that a "causal relationship" is a relationship in which dumped imports contribute to "bringing about", "producing" or "inducing" the material injury.<sup>56</sup> We note that Article 3 does not provide any specific guidance on how an investigating authority should undertake the examination of the relevant evidence in determining whether dumped imports are causing material injury.<sup>57</sup> Thus, "it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation[]"<sup>58</sup> and will enable it to make the required determination consistently with Article 3.<sup>59</sup>

7.25. Article 3.5 also requires that an investigating authority examine known factors other than dumped imports which are causing injury to the domestic industry simultaneously with the dumped imports, and ensure that the injuries caused by such other factors not be attributed to dumped imports. In order to comply with this requirement, an investigating authority must:

[M]ake an appropriate assessment of the injury caused to the domestic industry by the other known factors, and ... must separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other factors. This requires a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.<sup>60</sup>

7.26. While the investigating authority must find a sufficiently clear contribution by dumped imports to demonstrate that they are causing material injury, and explain its determination in that regard, nothing in the first two sentences of Article 3.5 suggests that those imports must be the sole cause of that injury. The language of Article 3.5 as a whole seems clear – the "causal relationship" between dumped imports and material injury may exist even though other factors are also contributing, "at the same time", to the situation of the domestic industry.

7.27. Similarly, the obligation to distinguish between the effects caused by dumped imports and the effects caused by other factors does not necessarily imply that dumped imports on their own must be capable of causing material injury.<sup>61</sup> Finally, there is no requirement that dumped imports alone, or in and of themselves, must be capable of causing material injury.<sup>62</sup> Article 3 does not provide any specific guidance on how an investigating authority should undertake the examination

---

<sup>56</sup> See Appellate Body Report, *US – Wheat Gluten*, para. 67. While the Appellate Body was referring to the meaning of the "causal link" between increased imports and serious injury required under Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement in this case, we are of the view that prior decisions relating to the causation requirement in the Agreement on Safeguards can provide guidance in interpreting the very similar phrase "causal relationship" in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (See Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 230).

<sup>57</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.141 (citing Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, paras. 113 and 118).

<sup>58</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.159.

<sup>59</sup> In this context, we are of the view that the use of the word "all" in the phrases "all relevant economic factors" in Article 3.4 and "all relevant evidence" in Article 3.5 indicates that the effects of any factor may be relevant to the ultimate determination of causation, irrespective of whether the particular factor relates to dumped imports specifically or to the domestic industry more generally. In our view, all the factors and evidence having a bearing on the question are to be included in the investigating authority's assessment, and the contribution of each relevant factor is to be counted in the determination of injury caused by dumped imports according to its impact on the situation of the domestic industry. In this context, we do not consider that factors specifically related to dumped imports should be counted towards a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports, while others – those not related to dumped imports – should be excluded from that determination. (See Appellate Body Report, *US – Wheat Gluten*, para. 67 (referring to Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement)).

<sup>60</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 226.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Appellate Body Report, *US – Wheat Gluten*, para. 67. The Appellate Body was referring to the non-attribution language in the *Agreement on Safeguards*, which can provide guidance in interpreting the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the *Anti-Dumping Agreement*. (Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 230).

<sup>62</sup> See, Appellate Body Report, *US – Wheat Gluten*, para. 79. While the Appellate Body was referring to the causation requirement in Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, we are of the view that its reasoning in that context is highly relevant to understanding the causation requirement in Article 3.5. (Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 230).

of known factors other than the dumped imports which are injuring the domestic industry, nor how it should ensure that injuries caused by these other factors are not attributed to the dumped imports. Thus an investigating authority may rely on any methodology or methodologies it believes will enable it to make the required determination consistently with Article 3.

7.28. In addition to the provisions establishing substantive criteria for the determination of material injury caused by dumped imports, Article 3 contains two additional provisions which might be viewed as more procedural in nature. Article 3.3 establishes criteria for the cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports. A decision to use such a cumulative assessment necessarily will precede the consideration of the volume, price effects and impact of dumped imports, as well as the demonstration of a causal relationship, as it is a necessary element to delimit the corpus of dumped imports to be taken into account under the relevant provisions, Articles 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7. Article 3.6 provides for an alternative to the consideration of the effects of dumped imports on domestic production of the like product in certain circumstances. Again, this provision would necessarily come into play before the examination of the impact of the dumped imports in the context of Article 3.4, as the relevant information on the state of the domestic industry will be different if the alternative allowed for is applied.

7.29. Thus, it seems clear to us that while there is a "logical progression" from consideration of the various substantive elements set out in Articles 3.2, 3.4, and when the issue of threat of material injury is raised, Article 3.7, to the ultimate determination whether the dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry under Article 3.5, there is no obligatory sequence for the analysis by an investigating authority to be undertaken, and "no prescribed template or format" for an investigating authority's determination of injury exists under Article 3 of the AD Agreement.<sup>63</sup> As a consequence, we consider it clear that there is no necessary sequence to be followed by an investigating authority in setting out its consideration, examination, evaluation and determination in relevant documentation.<sup>64</sup>

7.30. Finally, an investigating authority's consideration, examination, evaluation, determinations, and importantly, its reasoning and explanations in connection with the foregoing, must be reflected in relevant documentation, such as a public notice or other separate report of its final determination whether or not to impose an anti-dumping measure.<sup>65</sup> It is this documentation that will be considered, in the first instance, by a panel reviewing a Member's imposition of anti-dumping measures, if challenged. Against the background set out above, it is that task to which we now turn in this dispute.

## **7.4 Whether MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of dumped imports was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

### **7.4.1 Introduction**

7.31. Canada challenges MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of the dumped imports under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM found that the volume of dumped imports increased by 43.82% in absolute terms over the POI.<sup>66</sup> Canada does not disagree with this factual finding, but argues that MOFCOM failed to assess the significance of this increase in light of

---

<sup>63</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>64</sup> We note that the parties are in agreement with us on this point. (Canada's response to Panel question No. 8(i); China's response to Panel question No. 8(i)). Third parties also expressed this view. (Brazil's response to Panel question No. 6(i); Japan's response to Panel question No. 6(i); and United States' response to Panel question No. 6(i)).

<sup>65</sup> Article 12.2 provides that:

Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities.

See, Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 131 (referring to Panel Reports, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161; and *Korea – Certain Paper*, para. 7.253).

<sup>66</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 59.

evidence which Canada alleges indicated that this increase was not significant.<sup>67</sup> Canada bases its claim largely on its interpretation of the term "significant" in the first sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>68</sup> Specifically, Canada argues that in order to consider whether an increase in the absolute volume of the dumped imports is significant, an investigating authority has to examine the factual circumstances surrounding that increase.<sup>69</sup> Canada submits that the relevant factual circumstances will vary from case to case, but may include trends in domestic demand, and trends in the volume of the domestic like product and non-dumped imports.<sup>70</sup>

7.32. China submits that Article 3.2 requires the investigating authority to consider the volume of the dumped imports either in absolute or in relative terms, noting that the text of the provision uses the disjunctive "or" and the words "either" and "absolute".<sup>71</sup> China contends that the interpretation suggested by Canada would require the investigating authorities always to consider an increase in volume in both absolute and relative terms.<sup>72</sup> China points out that MOFCOM considered that there had been a significant increase in dumped imports in absolute terms.<sup>73</sup> According to China, there is no textual basis in Article 3.2 to support Canada's argument that relevant factual circumstances must be taken into account in considering whether there has been a significant increase in the absolute volume of dumped imports. China submits that Article 3.2 clearly specifies how the investigating authorities are required to consider the volume of the dumped imports, and provides a choice between different approaches.<sup>74</sup> China asserts that the term "absolute" suggests that the increase in imports is to be examined on its own, without the need to look at surrounding factual circumstances, and that the magnitude of the increase can be in itself significant.<sup>75</sup>

7.33. We will first address the legal standard under the first sentence of Article 3.2 and then examine each of Canada's allegations in turn.

#### **7.4.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.2, first sentence**

7.34. We start our analysis by considering the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides, in relevant part, that a determination of injury:

[S]hall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.

7.35. The first sentence of Article 3.2 elaborates on the objective examination of the volume of imports required by Article 3.1, providing as follows:

With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.

7.36. As discussed above, consideration of the data and trends with respect to the volume of dumped imports is a step in the logical progression toward a determination whether injury is caused by dumped imports.<sup>76</sup> However, even a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports may not, standing alone, suffice to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing material

---

<sup>67</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 66-76.

<sup>68</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 69; second written submission, para. 19.

<sup>69</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 70.

<sup>70</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 70; second written submission, para. 26.

<sup>71</sup> China's second written submission, para. 25.

<sup>72</sup> China's second written submission, paras. 18 and 37.

<sup>73</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 47 and 48. China notes that, even though not required to do so, MOFCOM also looked at the volume of dumped imports relative to consumption. (China's first written submission, para. 48).

<sup>74</sup> China's second written submission, para. 24.

<sup>75</sup> China's second written submission, para. 25.

<sup>76</sup> It seems clear that the greater the volume of, or any increase in the volume of, dumped imports, the greater the likely impact of those dumped imports with respect to factors such as lost sales and consequent financial effects, inventories, production capacity, and so on.

injury to the domestic industry. The impact of those imports and of any increase in those imports over the period of investigation (POI) on the condition of the domestic industry will have to be considered before that ultimate question can be answered. Nonetheless, even if the consideration of the volume of dumped imports shows no increase, or an insignificant increase, this does not mean a determination that dumped imports are causing material injury is precluded.<sup>77</sup>

7.37. Canada acknowledges that the first sentence of Article 3.2 gives the investigating authorities discretion to consider the increase in dumped imports in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.<sup>78</sup> However, Canada asserts that when considering any of these perspectives, the authorities must conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence, and provide reasoned and adequate explanations of its conclusions.<sup>79</sup> For Canada, this means that the significance of an absolute increase in the volume of dumped imports must be considered in the context of the factual circumstances in the market.

7.38. However, we cannot distinguish what Canada describes as a contextual consideration of the significance of an absolute increase in the volume of dumped imports, taking into account trends in domestic production of the like product and trends in domestic demand, from a consideration of the significance of any increase in dumped imports relative to domestic production or consumption, or indeed from the consideration of the significance of any increase in dumped imports in the analysis of causation. Thus, Canada's argument fails to recognize the separate nature of the three inquiries regarding the volume of dumped imports set out in Article 3.2, which are clearly distinguished in the text. In our view, Canada's argument fails to recognize the difference between the consideration of the volume of dumped imports required under Article 3.2 first sentence and the demonstration of the effects of the volume of dumped imports in the context of the demonstration of a causal relationship between dumped imports and material injury to the domestic industry under Article 3.5.

7.39. While it is clear that Article 3.1 requires that an injury determination must be based on an objective examination of positive evidence, and that this principle applies in general to an investigating authority's consideration of increased imports under Article 3.2, this does not inform the substance of that consideration. Nor does it provide guidance, or establish any limitation, as to which of the alternatives set out in Article 3.2 for consideration of the volume of dumped imports should be undertaken by an investigating authority in any given investigation. The three methods for considering the volume of imports set out in Article 3.2 are not mutually exclusive, and the investigating authority may rely on one, two or all of them in the course of its consideration of the significance of any increase in the volume of dumped imports, as well as in its analysis and determination with regard to injury and causation at later stages. However, in our view, there is no basis in the text of Article 3.2, in light of the disjunctive "either ... or", for Canada's view that investigating authorities can, on the facts of a particular case, be required to consider the significance of any increase in the volume of dumped imports in relative terms, in addition to considering the significance of any absolute increase.<sup>80</sup>

7.40. Turning to the interpretation of "significant", we note that the parties agree that the dictionary meaning of the word "significant" is "important, notable, consequential".<sup>81</sup> In the first sentence of Article 3.2, the term "significant" modifies the word "increase" in the phrase "whether

---

<sup>77</sup> To us, this distinction is appropriate and indeed, may be significant in a particular case. An absolute increase in the volume of imports in a growing market is likely to have a very different impact on the situation of the domestic industry than if the market were stable or contracting. In such a situation, there may be no increase in the volume of dumped imports relative to domestic production or consumption. But these are considerations to be addressed in the context of the ultimate demonstration whether dumped imports are causing injury under Article 3.5.

<sup>78</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 1.

<sup>79</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 2; second written submission, paras. 30-33.

<sup>80</sup> Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the views of previous panels. See Panel Reports, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.171 ("it is sufficient for the purposes of this provision for the investigating authorities to consider whether there has been a significant absolute increase"); and *US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs*, paras. 7.233 and 7.234 (discussing the corresponding, almost identical provision in the SCM Agreement, the panel stated that there are three ways to comply with the obligation to consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports. The investigating authority may consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of the dumped imports: (a) in absolute terms; (b) relative to domestic production; or (c) relative to domestic consumption).

<sup>81</sup> *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 2833; and Canada's first written submission, para. 70.

there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Members". The inquiry as to the significance of any increase in dumped imports implies a consideration of developments, that is, changes or trends, in the volume of dumped imports over the period of the injury investigation. Article 3.2 further specifies *how* the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in imports: in *either* absolute terms, *or* relative to domestic production or consumption.

7.41. The term "absolute" is defined as "not relative", or "not dependent for meaning or significance on a relationship with another term or concept".<sup>82</sup> Thus, the consideration of whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports in absolute terms calls for an assessment of whether the increase in dumped imports, if any, is "important, notable or consequential". In this context, we consider that a "significant" absolute increase may be assessed on the basis of the magnitude of that increase. Of course, this does not diminish the rigour of what has to be considered, namely "whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member".<sup>83</sup> Moreover, such consideration has to be reflected in the final determination in order to demonstrate that the investigating authorities have considered the relevant factors.<sup>84</sup>

7.42. The investigating authority will also have to decide whether any given increase in imports, whether considered significant or not, ultimately supports a determination of injury caused by dumped imports. However, in our view, this is a further evaluation of the significance of any increase in dumped imports as an element of determining causation under Article 3.5.<sup>85</sup> In analysing causation, the investigating authority must *demonstrate* that the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry, based on "all relevant evidence before the authorities", which, in light of the structure and logic of Article 3, includes evidence of increases in dumped imports. In that analysis, the investigating authority will have to take into account any such increases in the context of all the other evidence before it, including evidence concerning, for instance, changes in demand, volume of sales of the domestic industry, and non-dumped imports. However, given that Article 3.2 does not require a *determination* that any increase in imports, whether absolute or relative to domestic production or consumption, is significant<sup>86</sup>, we do not see how these latter elements can be considered necessary aspects of the consideration of the significance of an absolute increase in dumped imports required under Article 3.2.

7.43. A different understanding may be appropriate with respect to the consideration of whether an increase in imports is significant relative to domestic production or consumption. In such a case, the significance of any increase is considered in relation to another variable, requiring some comparison. This suggests a degree of contextual analysis, rather than an assessment of the magnitude of an increase. However, even in this context, consideration of the magnitude of any increase in dumped imports relative to domestic production or consumption may be sufficient for purposes of Article 3.2, keeping in mind that, whether any increase in imports relative to domestic production or consumption, significant or not, is ultimately enough to support a determination of injury caused by dumped imports will still have to be addressed by the investigating authority in

---

<sup>82</sup> Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of "absolute", available at: <<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/679?redirectedFrom=absolute#eid>>, accessed 13 July 2016.

<sup>83</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 131.

<sup>84</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 131.

<sup>85</sup> We note in this regard that an investigating authority may make an affirmative determination of injury caused by dumped imports even where there has been no significant increase, or indeed any increase at all, in the volume of dumped imports. This is in contrast to the situation under the Safeguards Agreement, where increased imports are a necessary prerequisite for the imposition of a safeguard measure.

<sup>86</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 130.

In *Thailand – H-Beams* the panel observed that:

While it would certainly be preferable for a Member explicitly to characterize whether any increase in imports as "significant", and to give a reasoned explanation of that characterization, we believe that the word "significant" does not necessarily need to appear in the text of the relevant document in order for the requirements of this provision to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, we consider that it must be apparent in the relevant documents in the record that the investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, in absolute or relative terms.

(Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161)

We do not disagree. However, as discussed above, in our view this assessment is an element of the ultimate determination of causation.

demonstrating causation. In our view, the consideration of whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports under Article 3.2 does not require a duplicative analysis of causal linkages and other factors.

7.44. Furthermore, Article 3.2 does not provide any guidance as to what circumstances might be relevant to consideration of the "significance" of any increase in imports. Recalling that there is no requirement under Article 3.2 for an investigating authority to **determine** that an observed increase in imports, whether absolute or relative, is significant, and an investigating authority may ultimately find injury caused by dumped imports even in the absence of a significant increase in such imports, it would be inappropriate, in our view, to impose requirements for the analysis of the significance of any increase in imports that are duplicative of elements of the analysis of causation relevant to determining whether the dumped imports, whatever their volume, and whether or not it increased significantly in absolute or relative terms, are causing injury to the domestic industry.

7.45. Canada argues in this respect that the interpretation of the term "significant" in the context of Article 3.2 with respect to the effect of the dumped imports on prices is equally applicable with respect to the consideration of increases in volume.<sup>87</sup> We fail to see how this could be the case. The need for a contextual consideration of the significance of any price undercutting, price depression, or price suppression derives from the word "effect" in the second sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>88</sup> However, unlike the second sentence of Article 3.2, which refers to the effect of dumped imports on prices, and Article 3.4, which refers to the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, the first sentence of Article 3.2 does not refer to any impact or effect of the dumped imports, but simply to consideration of whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports. For us, the notion that an increase in the volume of dumped imports, whether absolute or relative to production or consumption, could be considered as an effect or impact of those same imports is illogical. We are of the view that no such contextual analysis in respect of the effect of the dumped imports is required by the first sentence of Article 3.2. In our view, the significance of any particular volume of or increase in dumped imports is, in the first instance, a question of the magnitude of that increase. Whether any given volume of or increase in dumped imports may be significant in the ultimate determination of whether dumped imports cause material injury to the domestic industry will, of course, depend on the evaluation of all the relevant facts in each case. But that is an inquiry under Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

### 7.4.3 MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of dumped imports

7.46. Turning to the facts of the present case, we note that MOFCOM considered the volume of the dumped imports in both absolute terms and relative to consumption in the Chinese market. Specifically, MOFCOM found an increase in the volume of dumped imports, in absolute terms, of 43.82% over the POI, i.e. 2010-2012.<sup>89</sup> MOFCOM further determined that the market share of the dumped imports also showed an overall upward trend, increasing by 1.31 percentage points over the POI.<sup>90</sup>

7.47. Thus, MOFCOM found that both the absolute quantity and the quantity of the dumped imports relative to consumption showed an increasing trend during the POI. Noting the submissions made by interested parties Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC. (Rayonier) and Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc. (Fortress) asserting that there had been no significant increase in volume of the dumped imports, especially relative to production and consumption in China, MOFCOM further observed that volume of the dumped imports relative to production of the domestic like

---

<sup>87</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 20-26 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.161; *US – Large Civil Aircraft (2<sup>nd</sup> complaint)*, para. 1272; *EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft*, para. 1218; and *US – Upland Cotton*, para. 427; and Panel Report, *US – Upland Cotton*, paras. 7.1328 and 7.1329). Similarly, we consider that the interpretation of the term "significant" in the context of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not applicable to the analysis of the volume of the dumped imports, because it concerns a pattern of export prices which differ significantly, which involves an assessment of price difference. (Canada's letter dated 15 September 2016 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *US – Washing Machines*, paras. 5.63, 5.64, and 5.66, and fns 199 and 202)).

<sup>88</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 134-142; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, paras. 5.155-5.163.

<sup>89</sup> Imports first decreased from 421,000 tonnes in 2010 to 419,000 tonnes in 2011 and then increased to 605,500 tonnes in 2012. (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 59).

<sup>90</sup> After a decline in the dumped imports' market share from 20.70% in 2010 to 18.96% in 2011, dumped imports' market share increased to 22.01% in 2012. (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 59).

product showed an increasing trend.<sup>91</sup> As noted above<sup>92</sup>, while it might have been preferable had MOFCOM explicitly characterized the 43.82% increase as "significant" and given a reasoned explanation of that characterization, we consider that it would have been apparent to the interested parties from the Final Determination.

7.48. In light of our interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2 set out above, we consider that the Final Determination on its face shows that MOFCOM considered, that is, took into account, whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in both absolute and relative terms.

7.49. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to consider the magnitude and factual circumstances surrounding the increase in dumped imports, which it asserts would suggest that the increase in fact was not significant.<sup>93</sup> Canada argues that while the volume of the dumped imports increased by almost 44%, the volume of sales of the domestic like product and non-subject imports increased by 80% and 78% respectively, and domestic demand increased by 35%.<sup>94</sup> Canada also contends that MOFCOM failed to address arguments of the interested parties in this regard<sup>95</sup>, for instance, the Rayonier submission, which asserted<sup>96</sup>:

[D]emand for dissolving pulp in China increased as a result of market factors that were unrelated to subject imports, including the supply shortage and high prices for cotton during the first half of the POI. The domestic industry could not satisfy this increasing demand, despite rapid attempts to expand capacity. Therefore, **downstream producers naturally required increased volumes of subject imports ...**

7.50. In light of our views as set out above, we see no basis to conclude that MOFCOM was required to specifically address arguments regarding the context in which the acknowledged 43.82% increase in dumped imports occurred in its consideration of whether that increase was significant in absolute terms under Article 3.2. In any event, we note that MOFCOM also considered the increase in imports relative to domestic consumption, which of course reflects changes in domestic demand. Moreover, MOFCOM did briefly discuss the volume of dumped imports relative to production of the domestic like product in response to the arguments made by Fortress during the investigation.

7.51. Insofar as Canada argues that MOFCOM was required to consider the interaction between sales of the like domestic product and the volume of dumped imports in its consideration of whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports in absolute terms, as discussed above, we do not view such an inquiry to be necessary in the context of Article 3.2. An evaluation of domestic sales volume is required under Article 3.4 in the context of examining the impact of dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry. The relationship between trends in the volume of dumped imports and trends in domestic sales volume may be relevant in that context, as well as in the demonstration of a causal link between dumped imports and injury under Article 3.5. However, we fail to see how they would be relevant in considering whether there was an increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms. Similarly, the volume or trends in sales of non-dumped imports are not a necessary aspect of consideration of the significance of any increase in dumped imports, although they may well be relevant to a demonstration of causation, and in particular in the context of a non-attribution analysis under Article 3.5.

7.52. Finally, Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its conclusion that there was a significant increase in dumped imports in absolute terms.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 60 and 61.

<sup>92</sup> See fn 86 above.

<sup>93</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 72-74; second written submission, para. 34.

<sup>94</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 74 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CAN-3), p. 73; and Apparent Market and Domestic Production Tables, (Exhibit CAN-28), p. 2).

<sup>95</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 34 and 35 (referring to Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), pp. 23-37; Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), pp. 12-17; and Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 7).

<sup>96</sup> Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 24.

<sup>97</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 21; second written submission, para. 16.

China responds that this allegation should be rejected because Canada did not mention it in the panel request or in the first written submission.<sup>98</sup> China submits that, in any case, the Final Determination makes it clear that MOFCOM considered whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in accordance with the first sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>99</sup>

7.53. Article 6.2 of the DSU provides that a panel request "shall indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly". Compliance with Article 6.2 must be determined on the basis of the language of the panel request and in light of the circumstances of each case.<sup>100</sup> Canada's claim under Article 3.2 in its panel request is as follows:

4. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because China's determination of injury was not based on positive evidence and did not involve an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of those imports on prices in the domestic market for like products. China failed to properly consider whether there had been:

a. **significant increase in dumped imports; ...**<sup>101</sup>

7.54. Although the text of the panel request clearly identifies Canada's claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.2, it does not specifically refer to the lack of a "reasoned and adequate explanation" of China's conclusion of a significant increase in dumped imports, but rather to an alleged failure to properly consider whether there had been such an increase. Canada notes that the alleged failure to explain a conclusion regarding the significant increase in dumped imports is part of its claim under the first sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>102</sup> We are not persuaded that by arguing that MOFCOM failed to provide an explanation of its conclusion regarding the increased volume of the dumped imports, Canada is pursuing a claim distinct from the one identified in its panel request. Canada's claim regarding MOFCOM's analysis of the volume of the dumped imports is based on both Articles 3.1 and 3.2. An investigating authority's compliance with the requirements of Article 3.1 must be assessed based on the record of the investigation, and in particular the information and explanations provided in the Final Determination.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, we consider Canada's allegation that MOFCOM failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of its conclusion regarding a significant increase in imports falls within our terms of reference.

7.55. Canada's specific argument in this regard is that MOFCOM failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how MOFCOM's reference to the share of the dumped imports in total imports supported its conclusion that the volume of the dumped imports increased in absolute terms.<sup>104</sup> In addition, Canada argues that MOFCOM did not take into account the expansion of the market and the increased sales of the domestic like product and non-dumped imports.<sup>105</sup> Based on our views above, consideration of how any increase in the dumped imports correlates with other factors, including sales of the domestic like product and non-dumped imports, is not a required element of the consideration of whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms under Article 3.2. Moreover, we recall that the obligation is to consider – and not to determine – whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports in absolute

---

<sup>98</sup> China's second written submission, para. 38.

<sup>99</sup> China's second written submission, para. 38.

<sup>100</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft*, para. 641; *US – Carbon Steel*, para. 127; and *Korea – Dairy*, paras. 123 and 124.

<sup>101</sup> Canada's panel request, pp. 1 and 2.

<sup>102</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 46, para. 26.

<sup>103</sup> E.g. in *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, the Appellate Body stated that absent "satisfactory explanation" as to why it was not necessary to examine directly or specifically the other parts of the domestic industry, an examination of only certain parts of the domestic industry did not ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and did not satisfy the requirement of "objectivity" under Article 3.1. (Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, paras. 204-206). See also Panel Report, *Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes*, para. 7.252.

<sup>104</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 40 (referring to the Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 77); response to Panel question No. 46, para. 28. In particular, in the section relating to causal link, MOFCOM stated that:

In addition to the continuous growth of the quantity of import, the proportion of the quantity of the dumped imported product to the total quantity of the imported cellulose pulp in China always remained high: 49.32% in 2010, 42.77% in 2011 and 43.96% in 2012.

<sup>105</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 46, para. 28.



terms. In the absence of a requirement to make any determination in this regard, we cannot conclude that there is an obligation to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation under Article 3.2. Whether any increase in dumped imports supports a demonstration that dumped imports cause material injury under Article 3.5 will require explanation in order to be consistent with the requirements of that Article and Article 3.1.

7.56. We therefore conclude that Canada has not demonstrated that MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of the dumped imports was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

## **7.5 Whether MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

### **7.5.1 Introduction**

7.57. Canada asserts that MOFCOM's injury determination was based on a flawed consideration of the effect of dumped imports on the prices of the domestic like product, and thus is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada argues that MOFCOM's finding of price depression from the second half of 2011 to the end of 2012 failed to establish that the effect of the dumped imports could explain the significant depression in the prices of the domestic like product. In particular, Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to:

- a. objectively examine the existence of parallel price trends and explain the relevance of allegedly parallel trends to its finding of significant price depression;
- b. address the evidence that the prices of the dumped imports were higher than the prices of the domestic like product;
- c. conduct an objective examination of positive evidence that the market share of the dumped imports remained essentially stable; and
- d. assess whether the pricing documents and meeting minutes constituted "positive evidence" or, alternatively, conduct an objective examination of this evidence. Canada argues that even if the Panel finds that the pricing documents and meeting minutes constituted positive evidence and were objectively examined, MOFCOM failed to reconcile these documents with other evidence showing a lack of price depression.<sup>106</sup>

7.58. China responds that MOFCOM's price effects analysis complies with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. China submits, first, that MOFCOM had undisputed evidence of parallel price trends on the record and explained their relevance.<sup>107</sup> Second, MOFCOM was not required to find price undercutting to support its finding of price depression.<sup>108</sup> Third, MOFCOM based the price effects analysis on the increased volume of the dumped imports in absolute terms, and it also considered the movements in market share, even though it was not required to do so.<sup>109</sup> Fourth, MOFCOM based its finding of significant price depression on positive evidence, including pricing documents and meeting minutes showing that the domestic industry was forced to lower prices in order to compete with the rapidly increasing volume of dumped imports at declining prices<sup>110</sup>, and an objective examination.<sup>111</sup> Finally, China emphasizes that MOFCOM did not rely on any single factor in its consideration of price effects, but instead relied on a collective evaluation of various factors, including the competitive relationship between the dumped imports and the domestic like product, the significant increase in the volume of dumped imports, the significant decline in the price of the dumped imports, the parallel trends in the prices of the dumped imports and the domestic like product, and the information provided in pricing documents and meeting minutes, which interacted with each other and collectively informed MOFCOM's price depression analysis.<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 10, 46, and 83-103; and second written submission, paras. 43, 46, 55, 56, 81, and 91.

<sup>107</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 65-73; second written submission, paras. 48-58.

<sup>108</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 74-82; second written submission, paras. 71-76.

<sup>109</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 83-91; second written submission, paras. 77-82.

<sup>110</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 92-98; second written submission, paras. 59-70.

<sup>111</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 9, 10, 61, 65-71, and 82.

<sup>112</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 31; second written submission, paras. 41-47; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 20.

7.59. We will first address the legal standard under the second sentence of Article 3.2 and then examine each of Canada's allegations in turn.

### 7.5.2 Legal standard under Article 3.2, second sentence

7.60. The second sentence of Article 3.2 provides, in pertinent part, that the investigating authorities shall "[w]ith regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices ... consider whether there has been [significant price undercutting], or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree ...".<sup>113</sup>

7.61. In *China – GOES*, the Appellate Body noted that price depression means "a situation in which prices are pushed down, or reduced, *by something*".<sup>114</sup> The Appellate Body clarified that the consideration of price depression requires investigating authorities to examine the relationship between dumped imports and domestic prices.<sup>115</sup> The Appellate Body stated that that the mere observation of a price decline is not sufficient to demonstrate that the investigating authority has considered whether the effect of dumped imports is significant for price depression.<sup>116</sup> The investigating authorities must consider whether the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the domestic price depression which is observed to have occurred. However, the Appellate Body made it clear that the consideration under Article 3.2 does not require a conclusion that dumped imports caused price depression.<sup>117</sup> The Appellate Body also noted that the effect of the dumped imports "stems from the relevant aspects of such imports, including the price and/or the volume of such imports".<sup>118</sup>

7.62. Prior panel and Appellate Body reports have recognized that Article 3.2 does not establish a specific methodology for investigating authorities' examination of the effects of dumped imports on prices. However, although an investigating authority enjoys a certain latitude in choosing a methodology for its consideration of the effect of the dumped imports on prices of the domestic like product, this discretion is not unlimited, and is subject to the overarching principle of Article 3.1 that a determination of injury be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination.<sup>119</sup>

7.63. Moreover, it is clear that the consideration of price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression may be independent of one another.<sup>120</sup> Thus, the absence of price undercutting, or even the absence of any consideration of price undercutting, is not in itself inconsistent with Article 3.2, and does not preclude consideration of price depression or price suppression, and potentially reliance on one of those factors in demonstrating that dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry.<sup>121</sup> Of course, reliance on only one of these price effects in the context of a determination that dumped imports are causing injury will only be consistent with Article 3.1 to the extent that the investigating authority does not ignore evidence and arguments

---

<sup>113</sup> The provision goes on to require consideration of whether the effect of dumped imports is significant price suppression, which is not at issue in this case and is not further discussed.

<sup>114</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 141. (emphasis original)

<sup>115</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 136.

<sup>116</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 138 and 141.

<sup>117</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 144 and 145.

<sup>118</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 138.

<sup>119</sup> Panel Reports, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.255; *China – Broiler Products*, para. 7.474; and *China – X-Ray Equipment*, para. 7.41; and Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 113 (discussing the related issue of the investigating authority's examination of the volume of imports).

<sup>120</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 137 (The inquiries regarding price undercutting and price depression and suppression set out in the second sentence of Article 3.2 "are separated by the words "or" and "otherwise". This indicates that the elements relevant to the consideration of significant price undercutting may differ from those relevant to the consideration of significant price depression and suppression".)

<sup>121</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 137, ("even if prices of subject imports do not significantly undercut those of like domestic products, subject imports could still have a price-depressing or price-suppressing effect on domestic prices").

Similarly, in *China – HP-SSST*, the panel noted:

The fact that Article 3.2 identifies three distinct price effects, and distinguishes between price undercutting on the one hand, and price depression and price suppression on the other, suggests that there is no need to establish price depression or suppression when considering the existence of price undercutting, or indeed, vice versa.

(Panel Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 7.129)

on the record before it suggesting that one or both of the other price effects suggests a different result.

7.64. As discussed above, consideration of the effects of dumped imports on prices is a step in the logical progression toward a determination whether injury is caused by dumped imports.<sup>122</sup> However, even significant price undercutting, depression, or suppression may not, standing alone, suffice to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry. The impact of those price effects over the POI on the condition of the domestic industry will have to be considered before that ultimate question can be answered. However, even if the consideration of the effects of dumped imports on prices shows no, or insignificant, price undercutting, depression, or suppression, this does not mean a determination that dumped imports are causing material injury is precluded.

7.65. The need for a contextual analysis in respect of prices derives from the requirement to consider the *effects* of dumped imports on prices in the second sentence of Article 3.2. Simply to observe the trends in prices does not suffice, as those trends may be the effect of different factors other than dumped imports, as well as of the dumped imports. However, it is difficult to undertake a consideration of the effects of dumped imports on prices from the effects of other factors which may be affecting those prices in isolation from the ultimate question whether the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. This is because Article 3.5 specifically provides that the demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury is, in part, dependent on the effects of dumped imports on prices. In our view, it would be entirely appropriate for an investigating authority to observe the levels and trends of dumped import and domestic prices in the first instance without addressing the effect of dumped imports on those levels and trends.<sup>123</sup> But, of course, the investigating authority cannot stop there. The investigating authority must examine these levels and trends in the context of the domestic market and connect them to the effects of the dumped imports – that is, assess the explanatory force of dumped imports for the observed levels and trends in domestic prices – in reaching its ultimate determination regarding whether dumped imports are causing material injury through their effects on prices.<sup>124</sup>

### 7.5.3 MOFCOM's consideration of parallel price trends

7.66. Canada contends that MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence of allegedly parallel price trends between the dumped imports and the domestic like product, and failed to explain the relevance of the allegedly parallel price trends to its finding of price depression.<sup>125</sup> Canada submits that prices did not move in parallel during part of the POI, specifically in 2010, and that even when prices moved in the same direction the rates of change were different.<sup>126</sup> Canada further submits that price trends were different, because the prices of the dumped imports were lower than those of the domestic like product in the first part of the POI, while the dumped imports were priced higher in the second part of the POI, when the price depression was found to be occurring.<sup>127</sup> Canada argues that when prices were increasing in the first part of the POI, dumped import prices were increasing at faster rate; however when prices started to fall in the second part of the POI, domestic like product prices declined faster than the prices of the dumped imports.<sup>128</sup>

---

<sup>122</sup> It seems clear that the greater the effect of dumped imports in terms of price undercutting, price depression, or price suppression, the greater the likely impact of those dumped imports with respect to factors such as lost sales and market share and consequent financial effects such as deteriorating company profits and profitability, as well as on factors such as inventories, production capacity, and so on.

<sup>123</sup> Indeed, this may well be important, if not actually necessary to comply with the requirements of Article 12.2.

<sup>124</sup> As the Appellate Body has observed, this is different from the ultimate analysis of causation under Article 3.5, as it focuses on the effect of the dumped imports on individual factors that may, or may not, be vectors or pathways by which the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. The Article 3.5 analysis focuses on the evaluation of all relevant evidence, including these individual vectors, in making the ultimate determination whether dumped imports cause material injury to the domestic industry.

<sup>125</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 83-87; second written submission; paras. 46-58.

<sup>126</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 47 and 48; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 30 and 31; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 21.

<sup>127</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 47; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 29-32.

<sup>128</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 48 and 49; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 31 and 32.

7.67. China submits that MOFCOM based its finding of parallel price trends on substantial record evidence. China argues that Canada inappropriately focuses on a single point of the POI, when the price trends crossed, whereas MOFCOM examined price trends throughout the POI.<sup>129</sup> China objects to Canada's argument that the prices of the domestic like product declined much faster, arguing that during the second half of the POI the prices of both the dumped imports and the domestic like product declined at almost the same rate.<sup>130</sup> For China, the existence of parallel price trends can indicate the link between prices for imported and domestic products, and can support the conclusion that decreases in the prices of dumped imports lead to decreases in the prices of domestic like product.<sup>131</sup> China submits that MOFCOM explained the relevance of the parallel price trends, referring to pricing documents and meeting minutes, which China contends demonstrated that it was the dumped subject imports that forced down the prices of the domestic like product, as domestic producers had difficulty selling the domestic like product and were repeatedly forced to lower prices to meet subject import competition.<sup>132</sup>

7.68. The relevance of parallel prices for a price depression analysis was addressed by the Appellate Body in *China – GOES*. In that appeal, China argued that the panel had failed to consider a key element of MOFCOM's price effects analysis, namely that dumped import prices and domestic prices followed the same trends. The Appellate Body stated that parallel price trends might support a price depression analysis, e.g. such trends "might indicate the nature of competition between the products" and "may explain the extent to which factors relating to the pricing behaviour of importers have an effect on domestic prices".<sup>133</sup> However, in that case, the Appellate Body noted that there was no basis on which to draw such conclusions, as MOFCOM did not provide a meaningful description of the price trends or any explanation or reasoning regarding the role such trends played in MOFCOM's price effects analysis and findings.<sup>134</sup>

7.69. In the case before us, MOFCOM considered that the effect of the dumped imports was to depress prices to a significant degree. MOFCOM found that the continued decline of prices and increasing volume of the dumped imports in the second part of the POI forced the prices of the domestic like product to fall. The Final Determination states:

From the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the continued decline of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product forced the Domestic Industry to compete with them in terms of prices, leading to a fast and continuous decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry. Based on these facts, the Investigating authority determined that the dumped imported product had a depressing effect on the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.<sup>135</sup>

7.70. Canada's claim raises the question whether MOFCOM's finding of parallel price trends is supported by the evidence, and whether MOFCOM provided a reasoned explanation of the relevance of the parallel prices for its finding of price depression.

7.71. MOFCOM relied on the information shown in Table 1 and depicted graphically in Chart 1 below with regard to the prices of the dumped imports and the domestic like product:

---

<sup>129</sup> China's second written submission, para. 51.

<sup>130</sup> In particular, China argues that over the second part of the POI the prices of the dumped imports and the domestic like product declined by the same amount, 46% and 47% respectively. (China's second written submission, para. 52).

<sup>131</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 67 and 68; second written submission, paras. 55 and 56 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210).

<sup>132</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 69-71; second written submission, paras. 57 and 58 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 65; and Pricing documents and meeting minutes, (Exhibit CHN-2) (BCI)).

<sup>133</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210.

<sup>134</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210.


<sup>135</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 65 and 66.

**Table 1: Trends in average prices of the dumped imports and the domestic like product**

POI	2010		2011		2012	
	H1 2010	H2 2010	H1 2011	H2 2011	H1 2012	H2 2012
Prices of dumped imports (RMB/tonne)	8,819.96	10,050.44	13,040.55	12,313.21	7,877.85	7,024.13
Rate of change		+13.95%	+29.75%	-5.58%	-36.02%	-10.84%
Prices of the like domestic product (RMB/tonne)	10,037.87	10,926.06	11,767.68	9,534.11	7,202.34	6,192.68
Rate of change		+8.85%	+7.70%	-18.98%	-24.46%	-14.02%

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 63 and 64.

**Chart 1: Price Trends of Domestic Like Product and Dumped Imports**



Source: Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, figure 1

7.72. Based on the above, MOFCOM concluded that prices of both the dumped imports and of the domestic like product "first increased and then decreased, showing a decreasing trend in general".<sup>136</sup> Further MOFCOM observed that prices of the dumped imports and of the domestic like product showed the "same trend of changes", namely from the first half of 2010 to the first half of 2011 both had "the same increasing trend" and from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012 – "continuous decreasing trend".<sup>137</sup>

7.73. The product subject to the underlying anti-dumping investigation, cellulose pulp, is a commodity and there is no dispute between the parties that the imported and domestic products were competitive with and substitutable for each other. Hence, their prices might be expected to follow similar trends. On this point MOFCOM observed:

[T]he dumped imported product and the like product of the Domestic Industry were basically identical in terms of the product performance, the quality, the sales areas and the groups of clients, the two were competitive and substitutable to each other and there was a certain relevance between the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.<sup>138</sup>

7.74. Canada alleges that MOFCOM's finding of parallel price trends is without support in the evidence on the record, contending that the price trends were not parallel because they crossed at the end of 2010 (see Chart 1 above).<sup>139</sup> However, even though the trend lines did cross in the second half of 2010, overall, the trend lines moved generally in the same direction. We do not

<sup>136</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 63.

<sup>137</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 64.

<sup>138</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 65.

<sup>139</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 32 and figure 1 (referring to Apparent Market and Domestic Production Tables, (Exhibit CAN-28), p. 1).

consider it unreasonable to view these price trends as being generally parallel. Furthermore, even at the time they crossed, they were moving in the same direction – both domestic and import prices were increasing.

7.75. This is unlike the facts in *China – Autos (US)*, where the domestic and import price trends moved in opposing directions during part of the POI.<sup>140</sup> It is noteworthy that, even in that case, the panel did not find that parallel price trends could not be found in the factual circumstance, but stated that "a situation of diverging trends during a part of the period examined requires explanation before those trends can be characterized as 'parallel'".<sup>141</sup> Therefore, we do not consider that the fact that price trends crossed at one point during the POI undermines MOFCOM's conclusion that the prices of dumped imports and the domestic like product followed the same or parallel trends.

7.76. Canada also asserts that the different rates of change in prices of the dumped imports and the domestic industry, particularly in 2011 were not considered by MOFCOM, and undermine its finding of parallel price trends. In the first half of 2011, the prices of the dumped imports increased by almost 30%, whereas the prices of the domestic like product increased by about 8%. In the second part of 2011, when prices began to decline, the dumped imports' prices declined by about 6%, while the domestic like product's prices declined by 19%. We are not persuaded that these different rates of change undermine the finding of the parallel trends in prices *per se*, given that the prices still moved in the same direction and quickly adjusted to the price decline in the market, showing the close competition between the domestic and imported dumped products.

7.77. At the same time, however, we recognize that the fact of simultaneous declines in the prices of both dumped imports and the domestic like product does not necessarily mean that the domestic prices were pushed down by the declining prices of the dumped imports. As discussed below, the prices of the dumped imports, although declining, were higher than the prices of the domestic like product over the second part of the POI, when MOFCOM considered domestic prices were depressed by the dumped imports. In addition, during the investigation interested parties argued that in fact it was the domestic like product prices that led prices of the dumped imports to decline.<sup>142</sup> The absence of any explanation in the Final Determination of how, in MOFCOM's view, parallel price trends showed the existence of price depression leads us to conclude that the fact of parallel price trends provides little if any support for MOFCOM's conclusion that dumped imports had the effect of depressing the prices of the domestic like product.<sup>143</sup>

7.78. MOFCOM also referred to the coincidence of a "continuous increasing trend" in the volume of dumped imports and a "continuous decreasing trend" in the prices of both dumped imports and the domestic like product from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the period during which MOFCOM found significant price depression. The Final Determination states:

The quantity of the dumped imported product was 220,000 tons in the second half of 2011, 295,100 tons in the first half of 2012 and 310,400 tons in the second half of 2012, showing a continuous increasing trend. In the same periods, both the Price of

---

<sup>140</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.262. In that case, the record showed that from 2006 to 2007, the average unit values (AUVs were used as a proxy for prices) of imports and of the domestic like product moved in different directions: import AUVs decreased by 8.47%, while the AUV of the domestic like product rose by 11.08%. The panel concluded that this information undermined the factual conclusion of parallel prices reached by the investigating authority, and should have been addressed in the investigating authority's determination. In the absence of any explanation the panel stated that it could not conclude that MOFCOM even considered this divergence of price trends, much less how it was resolved, and any finding of parallel prices in these factual circumstances would require some indication of the investigating authority's reasoning in support of a conclusion of parallel prices.

<sup>141</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.264.

<sup>142</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 49 (referring to Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 9; and Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), pp. 38-45).

<sup>143</sup> We also note China's argument that the pricing documents and meeting minutes collected by MOFCOM during the verification showed that the decline of import prices for pulp had led to the domestic industry having difficulty selling the domestic like product and had forced the domestic producers to reduce prices. We address MOFCOM's consideration of the pricing documents and meeting minutes in paras. 7.101-7.108 below.

the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry showed a continuous decreasing trend. The Price of the Dumped Imported Product was 12,313.21 RMB/ton in the second half of 2011, decreased to 7,877.85 RMB/ton in the first half of 2012 and further decreased to 7,024.13 RMB/ton in the second half of 2012. From the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, under the situations that the quantity of the dumped imported product continuously increased and the market share of the dumped imported products continuously increased compared with the first half of 2011, the Price of the Dumped Imported Product continuously decreased and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry also decreased, from 9,534.11 RMB/ton in the second half of 2011 to 7202.34 RMB/ton in the first half of 2012 and further decreased to 6,192.68 RMB/ton in the second half of 2012, at the lowest during the Period of investigation.<sup>144</sup>

7.79. We consider that this assessment is insufficient to allow us to conclude that MOFCOM adequately explained how parallel declining price trends were taken into account in conjunction with the increased volume of dumped imports in its consideration of price depression. While MOFCOM referred to the trends in volume and prices of the dumped imports and prices of the domestic like product, MOFCOM did not provide any explanation of how the prices and volume of the dumped imports interacted to have a depressing effect on domestic prices.

7.80. Without such explanation, the identification of parallel price trends does no more than recognize that two variables, domestic and dumped import prices, move together. Given that the product in question in this dispute is a commodity, and both dumped imports and the domestic like product are sold in similar quantities, at the same level of trade, with few if any discernible differences in quality or other relevant competitive factors<sup>145</sup>, and are in the same market and therefore influenced by the same market pressures and factors, this is hardly surprising. It may be that one of the factors affecting domestic prices is competition with dumped imports, but the mere identification of such a parallel trend cannot alone suffice to show that the decline in the price of the domestic like product is an effect of the dumped imports.

7.81. We therefore conclude that while MOFCOM reasonably found that there were parallel trends between dumped import and domestic like product prices, it failed to explain the role of those parallel price trends in the decline of domestic like product prices and how changes in the prices and volume of the dumped imports affected the domestic like product prices.

#### **7.5.4 MOFCOM's consideration of the fact that dumped imports were sold at higher prices than the domestic like product**

7.82. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence that the dumped imports were sold at higher prices than the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM identified price depression.<sup>146</sup> Canada contends that MOFCOM did not provide any explanation how dumped imports priced between 9% and 29% higher than the domestic like product could have explanatory force for price depression.<sup>147</sup> China responds that MOFCOM is not required to make a finding of price undercutting to conclude that price depression has occurred.<sup>148</sup> Article 3.2 allows an investigating authority to base its finding on one of three possible price effects: price undercutting, price depression, or price suppression.<sup>149</sup> China considers that prices of domestic like products can be depressed by competition with dumped imports, even if the prices of the dumped imports are higher than those of the domestic like product.<sup>150</sup>

---

<sup>144</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 64 and 65.

<sup>145</sup> MOFCOM found the dumped imports and the domestic like product to be "competitive and substitutable to each other". (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 65).

<sup>146</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 88-94; second written submission, paras. 59-66.

<sup>147</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 59 and 60; first written submission, para. 93 (referring to Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.272).

<sup>148</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 75 and 77 (referring to Panel Reports, *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, para. 7.638; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 7.129; and Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, paras. 5.149 and 5.156); second written submission, paras. 71 and 72.

<sup>149</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 75 and 76 (referring to Panel Report, *Korea – Certain Paper*, para. 7.242).

<sup>150</sup> China's first written submission, para. 78.

7.83. In the Final Determination, MOFCOM relied on the following information concerning the prices of the dumped imports and the domestic like product:

**Table 2: Average prices of the dumped imports and like domestic product**

POI	2010		2011		2012	
	H1 2010	H2 2010	H1 2011	H2 2011	H1 2012	H2 2012
Prices of dumped imports (RMB/tonne)	8,819.96	10,050.44	13,040.55	12,313.21	7,877.85	7,024.13
Prices of the like domestic product (RMB/tonne)	10,037.87	10,926.06	11,767.68	9,534.11	7,202.34	6,192.68
Margin of difference	-12.13%	-8.01%	+10.82%	+29.15%	+9.38%	+13.43%

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 64 and 65.<sup>151</sup>

7.84. At the beginning of the POI, in the first half of 2010, the dumped imports undersold the domestic like product by 12%. In the second half of 2010, the prices of both the dumped imports and the domestic like product increased, but the prices of the dumped imports increased faster, and the underselling difference fell to 8%. Prices further increased in the first half of 2011, with dumped import prices again increasing faster to levels above those of the domestic like product. Thus, during the rest of the POI, the prices of the dumped imports were higher than those of the domestic like product. In the first half of 2011, the dumped imports were priced nearly 11% higher than the domestic like product, while in the second half of 2011 the prices of the dumped imports were almost 30% higher. In 2012, the dumped imports were priced higher than the domestic like products by 9% and 13% in the first and second half respectively.

7.85. Several interested parties, including Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc. (Cosmo) and Fortress, raised the issue of higher priced dumped imports during the investigation.<sup>152</sup> They argued that because dumped import prices were consistently higher than the prices of the domestic like product, the dumped imports did not have any effect on domestic prices. In the Final Determination, MOFCOM addressed the interested parties' arguments by noting that it had assessed the effect of dumped imports from all exporting countries subject to the investigation cumulatively, and would not conduct a separate price analysis for each exporting country.<sup>153</sup>

7.86. The question whether a consideration of price depression may be warranted where the prices of dumped imports are higher than the prices of the domestic like product was discussed by the panel in *China – Autos (US)*. In that case, the panel confirmed that price depression is not contingent on the existence of price undercutting, and may be found in a situation where the prices of dumped imports is higher than the price of the domestic like product.<sup>154</sup> However, such a finding requires an explanation of how the investigating authorities reached a conclusion of price depression in a situation where the prices of dumped imports are higher during most of the POI.<sup>155</sup> The panel in *China – Autos (US)* stated:

<sup>151</sup> See Japan's third-party submission, annex II. China confirmed the accuracy of the figures reported by Japan. China's response to Panel question No. 3, para. 3.

<sup>152</sup> Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), p. 17. Canada's first written submission, para. 92 (referring to Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Injury Brief, Industry Injury Investigation for the Anti-Dumping Investigations Against Cellulose Pulp, 5 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-13), p. 7; Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), pp. 8 and 9, and 17-21; Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), pp. 39-45; and American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 7); second written submission, para. 61.

<sup>153</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 71. China's second written submission, para. 74.

<sup>154</sup> See also Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 137:

[E]ven if prices of subject imports do not significantly undercut those of like domestic products, subject imports could still have a price-depressing or price-suppressing effect on domestic prices.

<sup>155</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, paras. 7.272 and 7.274.



We do not preclude the possibility that price depression may be found to exist in a case where there is overselling by subject imports. However, absent analysis and explanation by the investigating authority, it is difficult to understand how a conclusion of price depression was reached in a situation where prices of imports were, for the most part, significantly higher than those of the domestic like product whose prices were purportedly being depressed during the POI.<sup>156</sup>

We agree. This is particularly true where, as here, the issue has been raised by interested parties, the respective products are competitive and substitutable, and the domestic demand is increasing. The mere fact that domestic prices were below dumped import prices and did not remain stable or increase is insufficient to warrant considering that the dumped imports had "explanatory force" for the decline in domestic prices.

7.87. In our view, MOFCOM's reference to the cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports does not address the interested parties' arguments concerning the absence of price undercutting, which referred to the average prices of the dumped imports as well as the prices of imports from the individual investigated countries.<sup>157</sup> MOFCOM did not adequately explain its conclusion that, despite the higher prices of dumped imports, particularly in the latter part of the POI when prices were declining for both dumped imports and the domestic like product, the dumped imports had the effect of significant price depression.

7.88. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM failed to provide an adequate explanation of its consideration of price depression in light of the undisputed fact that the prices of the dumped imports were higher than those of the domestic like product during the latter part of the POI.

#### **7.5.5 MOFCOM's consideration of changes in the dumped imports' market share**

7.89. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to explain how price depression could be an effect of the dumped imports in light of evidence that the market share of the dumped imports remained essentially stable.<sup>158</sup> Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to explain how the essentially stable market share of dumped imports, which increased only 2.66 percentage points from 19.91% to 22.57% from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, could have had any downward pressure on the prices of the domestic like product, which actually gained 7.09 percentage points of market share during this period, from 18.64% of the domestic market in the second half of 2011 to 25.73% in the second half of 2012.<sup>159</sup>

7.90. China responds that MOFCOM focused on the absolute increase in dumped imports in the volume aspect of its price effects analysis, and was not required to consider the changes in market share. China argues that the possibility provided for in the first sentence of Article 3.2 to consider an increase in dumped imports in either absolute or relative terms extends to the consideration of the price effects of those same imports under the second sentence of the same provision. In China's view, this means that since consideration of market share is not obligatory with regard to consideration of the volume of imports, it cannot be compulsory when considering the price effects of those same imports.<sup>160</sup> Nevertheless, China submits that MOFCOM considered changes in market share and found that the dumped imports' market share did not in fact remain stable, but rather increased.<sup>161</sup>

7.91. We begin by addressing China's argument that MOFCOM properly based the volume aspect of its price effects analysis on the increased volume of the dumped imports in absolute terms and was not required, as a matter of law, to also examine the changes in the dumped imports' market share. Article 3.2 requires the investigating authorities to consider the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of these imports on the prices of the domestic like product. As discussed above, the first sentence of Article 3.2 sets out three options for the consideration of the dumped

---

<sup>156</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.272.

<sup>157</sup> Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), p. 17.

<sup>158</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 95; second written submission, paras. 67 and 74.

<sup>159</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 97 and 98; second written submission, paras. 67 and 68.

<sup>160</sup> China's first written submission, para. 84.

<sup>161</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 83 and 87 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 59, 61, and 64); second written submission, paras. 78 and 79.

import volume: in absolute terms, or relative to production, or consumption in the importing Member. Under the second sentence of Article 3.2, the investigating authorities shall consider the effect of the dumped imports on the prices of the domestic like product. The effect of dumped imports on domestic prices may be considered "through the vector of subject import prices, subject import volumes, or both".<sup>162</sup> We recall that the provisions of Article 3 "contemplate a logical progression of inquiry leading to an investigating authority's ultimate injury and causation determination".<sup>163</sup> We consider that the investigating authorities' volume analysis under the first sentence of Article 3.2 also informs the price effects analysis under the second sentence of the same provision. If an investigating authority finds that the dumped imports have increased either in absolute or relative terms, it is likely to consider the effect of such increased volume in its price effects analysis. Nevertheless, we do not consider that by relying on one of the options for volume analysis provided in the first sentence of Article 3.2, the investigating authorities limit the evidence they can rely upon in their further inquiries under Article 3.

7.92. In the investigation at hand, MOFCOM based the price effects analysis on developments in both the prices and the volume of the dumped imports. MOFCOM concluded that the dumped imports had a "depressing effect" on prices of the domestic like product, based on the continued decline of dumped imports' prices and the rapid increase in volume of the dumped imports.<sup>164</sup> In its overall analysis MOFCOM considered the changes in volume of the dumped imports together with price movements of the imported and domestic products over the POI in assessing price depression in the context of injury and causation. This suggests to us that MOFCOM's main focus with respect to the volume aspect of the price effects analysis was the effect of the change in volume of the dumped imports in absolute terms, which it had found increased by 43.82% over the POI.

7.93. At the same time, MOFCOM also took into account the change in market share, observing that the market share of the dumped imports "showed an increasing trend in general". Further, when looking at the price trends of the imported and domestic products together with the increased absolute volume of dumped imports, MOFCOM noted that the dumped imports "accounted for a certain market share in China" from the first half of 2010 to the first half of 2011. In the context of discussing the changes in volume and prices of the dumped imports and the prices of the domestic like product in the second part of the POI, i.e. from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, MOFCOM observed that the market share of the dumped imports "continuously increased compared with the first half of 2011". MOFCOM also considered developments in the domestic industry's market share, which it found had increased.

7.94. The Final Determination contains the following data with regard to market shares of the dumped imports and the domestic like product:

**Table 3: Market shares of the dumped imports and the domestic like product**

POI	2010		2011		2012	
	H1 2010	H2 2010	H1 2011	H2 2011	H1 2012	H2 2012
Market share of dumped imports	20.53%	20.88%	18.02%	19.91%	21.45%	22.57%
change from previous		+0.35	-2.86	+1.89	+1.54	+1.12
Market share of the like domestic product	18.00%	21.36%	17.54%	18.64%	26.71%	25.73%
change from previous		+3.36	-3.82	+1.1	+8.07	-0.98

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 63 and 64.

<sup>162</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 216.

<sup>163</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>164</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 65 and 66. We note that this is unlike the facts in *China – Autos (US)*, where MOFCOM emphasized that market share gains of the dumped imports caused the downward pressure on domestic prices. In that case, the domestic industry lost 4.04 percentage points and the dumped imports gained 3.52 percentage points of the market share over the POI. The panel found that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 by failing to explain the linkage between the dumped import market share gains and its finding of price depression, in light of changes in market share of other market participants and the timing of the changes in market share and prices. (Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, paras. 7.287 and 7.288). In the present case, MOFCOM found that downward pressure was caused by the volume and decline in prices of the dumped imports.

7.95. Looking at this data, it is apparent that during the POI both the dumped imports and the domestic like product gained market share. The market share of the domestic like product increased from 18% to 25.73%, a gain of almost 8 percentage points, over the POI. The market share of the dumped imports also increased, but by a lesser degree, from 20.53% to 22.57%, a gain of 2 percentage points over the same period. Canada argues that the market share of the dumped imports remained "essentially stable" and thus could not have depressed the prices of the domestic like product. The question whether an increase in market share of 2 percentage points over the POI is described as an increase or as market share remaining essentially stable is a question of judgment and interpretation, not a question of fact. It is a fact that the dumped import market share did increase, albeit less overall than the domestic industry market share. We consider that MOFCOM did not err in referring to an increase in dumped import market share in its consideration of price effects.

7.96. The existence of price depression does not necessarily require that there be a concurrent decrease in the domestic industry's market share. Price depression can exist "in a situation where there is no increase, or even in some circumstances a decrease, in the volume or market share of dumped imports".<sup>165</sup> Canada does not disagree that price depression can be found without an increase in volume or market share; however Canada argues that MOFCOM clearly based the volume part of the price depression analysis on the increase of both volume and market share and contends that MOFCOM was under obligation to objectively examine the market share but failed to do so.<sup>166</sup> We do not agree. In the Final Determination, MOFCOM explained that in the second half of 2011, due to the increased demand, the domestic industry increased its output and sales. As a result, the market share of the domestic like product increased by 1.10 percentage points compared to the first half of 2011. MOFCOM considered that in the same period, the prices of the dumped imports decreased "in order to increase its market share". The prices of the dumped imports decreased by 5.58% in the second half of 2011 compared to the first half of 2011, and market share increased by 1.89 percentage points. In addition, MOFCOM observed that in the second part of 2012 the domestic like product lost 0.98 percentage points of market share to the dumped imports, and the domestic industry reduced its prices in order to prevent further declines in market share. We also observe that the domestic industry' market share increased by 8 percentage points in the first half of 2012, but this development was not addressed in MOFCOM's analysis. Although the Final Determination would have benefitted from an explanation regarding the effect of the increase of the domestic industry' market share by 8 percentage points in the first half of 2012, we consider that overall MOFCOM's description and examination of the change in dumped imports' market share was both reasonable and objective, particularly in view of the fact that it relied primarily on the increase in the absolute volume of imports in its consideration of price effects.

7.97. Finally, Canada submits that MOFCOM did not consider market dynamics and changes in the market share of the dumped imports in relation to market shares of the domestic industry and the non-dumped imports.<sup>167</sup> In particular, Canada refers to similar movements in market shares of the domestic industry, increases from 18% to 26%, and the market share of the non-dumped imports, increased from 21% to 28%, during the POI.<sup>168</sup>

7.98. The market shares were as follows:

**Table 4: Market Shares**<sup>169</sup>

	2010	2011	2012
Domestic industry	19.68%	18.09%	26.22%
Other Chinese producers	38.35%	37.57%	23.71%
Dumped imports	20.70%	18.96%	22.01%
Non-dumped imports	21.27%	25.38%	28.06%

Source: Apparent Market and Domestic Production Tables, (Exhibit CAN-28), p. 2.

<sup>165</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.230.

<sup>166</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 75.

<sup>167</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 35-37. See also Canada's first written submission, para. 99 (referring to Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.289).

<sup>168</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 35 and 36.

<sup>169</sup> Apparent Market and Domestic Production Tables, (Exhibit CAN-28), p. 2; Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 36; and China's response to Panel question No. 37, table B.

7.99. Looking at this data, we observe that both the domestic like product and the non-dumped imports gained market share, 6.5 and 6.7 percentage points respectively, the dumped imports gained 1.3 percentage points of market share, and other Chinese producers lost 14.6 percentage points of market share. Canada refers to the *China – Autos (US)* dispute in its argument regarding the need to consider changes in market share of various participants in the market. However, while it is true that the panel in that case faulted MOFCOM for relying on a decline in domestic industry market share without considering and addressing the role and impact of other participants in the market before reaching its conclusions, the facts in *China – Autos (US)* are different from those in this case.<sup>170</sup> In *China – Autos (US)*, the domestic industry had lost market share, and most of that lost market share was gained by non-industry producers and non-dumped imports. MOFCOM had relied on that decline in its analysis of price effects. In the case before us, both the domestic industry and the dumped imports gained market share. Thus, MOFCOM in this case did not rely on lost domestic market share in its consideration of price effects, and a need to explain the relevance of such a loss in the light of the gains of other participants in the market does not arise.

7.100. We therefore conclude that Canada has failed to demonstrate that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in considering changes in the market share of dumped imports in its consideration of price effects.

### 7.5.6 MOFCOM's consideration of certain business information

7.101. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to base its findings of price depression on an objective examination of positive evidence by relying on the minutes of business analysis meetings and pricing reports obtained during on-site verifications.<sup>171</sup>

7.102. MOFCOM referred to certain information obtained during on-site verifications in its consideration of price depression, as follows:

Investigating authority had collected evidences from many domestic producers during its on-site verifications, including the minutes of the business analysis meetings and the pricing reports, which showed that since the second half of 2011, the decline of the import prices of foreign dissolving pulp had led to the difficulty in the sale of the like product of the Domestic Industry, forcing the Domestic Industry to reduce the price. This showed that the domestic producers were affected by the decrease of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product when they set the price of the like product of the Domestic Industry.<sup>172</sup>

7.103. The minutes of the business analysis meetings and the pricing reports referred by MOFCOM in the Final Determination include:

- a. meeting minutes for reporting sales of cellulose pulp by [\*\*\*];
- b. meeting minutes regarding sales of cellulose pulp by [\*\*\*];
- c. the proposal for price adjustment of [\*\*\*].<sup>173</sup>

In response to a question from the Panel, China clarified that these documents represent approximately one-third of the total domestic production and were dated throughout the price depression period.<sup>174</sup>

7.104. Canada asserts that the meeting minutes and pricing documents of [\*\*\*] are not positive evidence because they refer to imported cellulose pulp in general, without specifying exporting countries, and do not provide reliable data with regard to prices of the dumped imports and their relationship with the domestic like product. Five of the meeting minutes from [\*\*\*], and one

---

<sup>170</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 99 (referring to Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7,289).

<sup>171</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 101-103.

<sup>172</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), para. 65.

<sup>173</sup> Pricing documents and meeting minutes, (Exhibit CHN-2) (BCI).

<sup>174</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 40.

proposal for price adjustment of [\*\*\*], do not specifically refer to imports from investigated countries, i.e. Brazil, Canada, and the United States, but to the prices of imported dissolving pulp without specification of origin. Having examined these documents, we consider that although they support MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic producers had to lower their prices due to the intense competition with imported cellulose pulp, the probative value of these documents is limited, because they refer to imported cellulose pulp in general. This means that these documents might refer to price competition with the dumped imports as well as non-dumped imports. Nonetheless, in our view, it was not improper for MOFCOM to have taken this information into account, given the obligation under Article 3.2 is to consider the effect of the dumped imports on prices, rather than to conclude that the price depression was caused by the dumped imports. As well, there is no obligation to conduct a non-attribution analysis under Article 3.2. However, the absence of any indication of the specific source of the imported cellulose pulp referred to in those documents calls into question the weight they should be given in considering the explanatory force of the dumped imports for the existence of price depression, as opposed to the effect of non-dumped imports.

7.105. Further, the meeting minutes and pricing documents of [\*\*\*] do name investigated exporting countries in referring to competition with imported cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada and the United States.<sup>175</sup> In this regard, Canada maintains that the remaining documents from [\*\*\*] are not representative of the domestic industry, because they originate from only one petitioner, which accounted for less than [\*\*\*] of total domestic output.<sup>176</sup> China responds that that there is no requirement that the specific examples of price depression must account for a certain percentage of overall sales during the investigation.<sup>177</sup> China asserts these pricing documents and meeting minutes illustrate specific instances over the POI in which domestic producers were forced to reduce prices due to price pressure from the dumped imports.<sup>178</sup> In our view, MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was primarily driven by the data on the volume and prices of the dumped imports and the prices of the domestic like product. While not determinative, the documents in question do corroborate MOFCOM's view that the domestic prices were depressed by the declining prices and increased volume of the dumped imports. Therefore, we consider that a reasonable and objective investigating authority could have taken this information into account in its consideration of price effects.

7.106. Canada also submits that MOFCOM neither verified the pricing documents against relevant sales contracts, purchase orders, and VAT invoices, nor did it verify this information with purchasers or data collected from the interested parties, e.g. downstream viscose staple fibre (VSF) producers.<sup>179</sup> The Final Determination explicitly states that these documents were obtained during on-site verifications, the very purpose of which is to verify information obtained during the investigation. We note in this regard that while an investigating authority is required to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties pursuant to Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, there is no particular means by which it is required to do so. Verification, as provided for in Article 6.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which may include such steps as suggested by Canada is not a requirement in any case. Moreover, Canada does not even allege any errors or lack of accuracy in the pricing documents or meeting minutes. In these

---

<sup>175</sup> The parties disagree whether the list of exporting countries in these documents is exhaustive. Canada submits that the translation into English omits the word "*deng*", which it asserts means "et cetera" and suggests that the list includes other countries. China responds that the word "*deng*" has two meanings in English: one is "et cetera", and the other is "namely" or "as such". China submits that in the context of these documents the second meaning is more accurate, because the list of countries is followed by the specific percentage of imports, i.e. "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp". China further submits that this is confirmed by import data, because imports from Brazil, Canada, and the United States represent approximately half of total imports. The dumped imports accounted for 49% in 2010, 43% in 2011, and 44% in 2012 of the total imports of cellulose pulp to China, or approximately half of total imports. While some of the imports discussed in the documents may have been from other sources, in our view, the specific references to Brazil, Canada, and the United States are sufficient for MOFCOM to have used the word "*deng*" as meaning "namely" or "as such". (Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 41; response to Panel question No. 12, para. 41; second written submission, para. 85 and fn 105; China's response to Panel question No. 14, paras. 35-38; second written submission, paras. 61-63; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 37 and 38).

<sup>176</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 83 and 84.

<sup>177</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 41.

<sup>178</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 33.

<sup>179</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 85 and 90.

circumstances, and given that Canada has made no claim in this regard, we do not consider that the failure of MOFCOM to undertake "verification" as suggested by Canada was erroneous.

7.107. Canada also contends that MOFCOM failed to explain how the domestic industry could have had difficulty in making sales of the like product, given that the volume of domestic sales increased, as did the domestic market share.<sup>180</sup> In this regard, we note that MOFCOM found that domestic prices declined while market share increased, which is consistent with the domestic industry having achieved increased sales only by lowering prices, which in our view suggest that the industry had difficulty making sales of the like product – until it lowered its prices. The pricing documents and meeting minutes also lend support to this view. In the price effects analysis, MOFCOM specifically found that due to increased demand, in the second half of 2011 the domestic industry increased its output and sales of the like product leading to an increase in market share, but decreased its prices, which again is consistent with a conclusion that the domestic industry had to lower prices to make sales.<sup>181</sup> We note that China has relied heavily on the meeting reports in arguing that MOFCOM did not err in its consideration of price effects. In the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that these documents, on their own, cannot suffice to show that dumped imports had the effect of depressing domestic prices. However, this is a different question from whether taking these documents into account in the consideration of the price effects of dumped imports is, in itself, inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2.

7.108. We therefore find that Canada has failed to demonstrate that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 by taking into account pricing documents and meeting minutes in its consideration of the price effects.

#### **7.5.7 MOFCOM's consideration of evidence and factors collectively**

7.109. China argues that MOFCOM based its conclusion that the dumped imports had an effect to depress prices of the domestic like product on a "variety of evidence", specifically: (a) intense price competition between dumped imports and domestic like product; (b) a dramatic 43% increase in the dumped import volume; (c) a drastic decline in domestic like product prices; (d) parallel price trends; (e) pricing documents and meeting minutes; and (f) significant dumping margins.<sup>182</sup> China asserts that MOFCOM examined these factors "collectively" and did not rely "solely on any single factor".

7.110. We have found that MOFCOM failed to adequately explain the role of parallel price trends in its consideration of price depression and how parallel declining price trends in conjunction with the increased volume of dumped imports explained its consideration of price depression, and how it found price depression in a situation where dumped import prices were higher than those of the domestic like product during the second part of the POI. The fact of price competition between the dumped imports and the domestic like product, even if that competition was intense, may explain the observation of parallel price trends, but goes no further to explain how dumped import prices had the effect of depressing the domestic industry's prices.

7.111. An increase in the volume of dumped imports might lead the domestic industry to lower prices to maintain market share. This would be a rational response if the dumped imports were entering at lower prices than those of the domestic industry, which was not the case during the second half of the POI. Moreover, the increased volume of dumped imports entered a growing and highly price competitive market which further calls into question the explanatory force of dumped imports for the decline in domestic like product prices. Thus, as with the observed parallel price trends, the mere fact that prices declined dramatically in the second half of the POI does not suffice, on its own, to explain how dumped import prices had the effect of depressing the domestic industry's prices.

7.112. We conclude that MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was not consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

---

<sup>180</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 102.

<sup>181</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), para. 65.

<sup>182</sup> China's first written submission, para. 93; second written submission, paras. 41-47; response to Panel question No. 13, paras. 24-31. We note that China refers to the significant dumping margins as one of the factors considered in MOFCOM's consideration of price effects, but we find no mention of the margin of dumping in connection with price effects in the Final Determination.

## 7.6 Whether MOFCOM's examination of the impact of dumped imports was consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

### 7.6.1 Introduction

7.113. Canada claims that MOFCOM's examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because:

- a. MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share; and
- b. MOFCOM failed to properly analyse and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry.<sup>183</sup>

7.114. We will first address the legal standard under Article 3.4 and then examine each of Canada's allegations in turn.

### 7.6.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.4

7.115. The text of Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is set out in paragraph 7.12 above. Article 3.4 reads as follows:

The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

7.116. Article 3.4 requires an investigating authority to examine the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry on the basis of an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. The evaluation of the relevant factors must respect the overarching principle set out in Article 3.1 concerning the objective examination of positive evidence.<sup>184</sup> Neither Article 3.4 nor any other provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides any guidance regarding a specific methodology on how these factors and indices shall be evaluated.

7.117. The "evaluation" required under Article 3.4 suggests that an investigating authority must undertake an analysis and assessment of all relevant economic factors and indices.<sup>185</sup> At the same time, there is no requirement that all relevant factors, or even most or a majority of them, reflect negative developments in order to point to an overall assessment of negative impact on the relevant domestic industry.<sup>186</sup> The last sentence of Article 3.4 specifies that no one or several of the relevant factors can necessarily "give decisive guidance". Article 3.4 requires an overall

---

<sup>183</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 95-117. In its first written submission, Canada refers to the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 3.4 in *China – GOES* to claim that MOFCOM failed to evaluate the relationship between the dumped imports and the state of the domestic industry, and to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry. (Canada's first written submission, paras. 108, 110, and 111). From Canada's response to Panel question number 18, we understand that Canada refers to the interpretation of Article 3.4 developed in *China – GOES* to support its claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 that MOFCOM failed both to objectively evaluate the domestic industry's market share, and to properly analyse and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry.

<sup>184</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, paras. 196 and 197; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.203.

<sup>185</sup> Panel Report, *China – X-Ray Equipment*, para. 7.180 (referring to Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.162).

<sup>186</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Footwear (China)*, para. 7.413 (referring to Panel Reports, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 7.329; and *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.163).

evaluation of the information, in context, as well as an explanation of how the facts considered by an investigating authority support its assessment.<sup>187</sup>

7.118. Article 3.4 does not require merely an examination of the state of the domestic industry in the abstract. Rather, it contemplates that an investigating authority must also "derive an understanding of *the impact of* subject imports on the basis of such an examination".<sup>188</sup> Article 3.4 "[is] concerned with the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry".<sup>189</sup> In other words, Article 3.4 requires an examination of "the explanatory force" of the subject imports for the state of the domestic industry.<sup>190</sup>

7.119. The examination under Article 3.4 is necessary to provide a "meaningful basis" for the authority's determination under Article 3.5 as to whether dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.<sup>191</sup> The examination under Article 3.4 "*contributes to*, rather than duplicates", the determination required under Article 3.5.<sup>192</sup> For this reason, "an investigating authority is required to *examine* the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry", but it "is not required to *demonstrate* that subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry", which is an analysis specifically mandated by Article 3.5.<sup>193</sup> The demonstration of the causal relationship under Article 3.5 requires the examination of "all relevant evidence" as well as other factors causing injury to the domestic industry, and thus covers a broader scope than the examination under Article 3.4.<sup>194</sup>

### 7.6.3 MOFCOM's evaluation of market share

7.120. Canada contends that MOFCOM's evaluation of actual and potential decline in market share was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. Therefore, the question before us is whether MOFCOM's evaluation of the domestic industry's market share, in the context of its overall examination of the state of the industry, was reasonable and objective.

7.121. In the Final Determination, in its evaluation of relevant economic factors and indices, MOFCOM examined the domestic industry's market share and found that:

During the Period of investigation, the market share of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry was 19.68% in 2010; 18.09% in 2011, 1.59 percentage points less than 2010; and 26.22% in 2012, 8.13 percentage points more than 2011.<sup>195</sup>

Further, in its examination of the state of the domestic industry, MOFCOM described the domestic industry's market share as having "remained low".<sup>196, 197</sup>

7.122. There is no disagreement between the parties on the level of the market share held by the domestic industry. Canada however takes issue with MOFCOM's characterization of that level of

---

<sup>187</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Footwear (China)*, para. 7.413 (referring to Panel Reports, *Mexico – Olive Oil*, para. 7.372; *EC – Bed Linen*, paras. 6.163 and 6.213; and *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 7.329).

<sup>188</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205. (emphasis original)

<sup>189</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205.

<sup>190</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205.

<sup>191</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 154; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205.

<sup>192</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205. (emphasis original)

<sup>193</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 150; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.205. (emphasis original)

<sup>194</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 150.

<sup>195</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 72.

<sup>196</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>197</sup> We note that the parties disagree whether the correct translation of the description of market share in the original Chinese, "*shizhong ... dimi*", is "remained low" (China's version) or "consistently depressed" (Canada's version). The Panel considers that it does not have to decide on which of the two translations is correct, given that Canada disagrees with MOFCOM's characterization of the market share regardless of the translation. (China's first written submission, paras. 108 and 109; and Canada's second written submission, paras. 100 and 101).



market share as having "remained low". Canada refers to MOFCOM's own findings that the domestic industry's market share increased by 6.54 percentage points during the POI.<sup>198</sup> Canada also argues that MOFCOM assessed the amount or level of market share, but failed to consider trends in the market share and to evaluate whether there was actual and potential decline in market share, as required by Article 3.4.<sup>199</sup> China responds that MOFCOM did examine trends in market share, referring to MOFCOM's finding that during the POI the market share of the like domestic product was "19.68% in 2010; 18.09% in 2011, 1.59 percentage points less than 2010; and 26.22% in 2012, 8.13 percentage points more than 2011".<sup>200</sup> China further submits that it was not unreasonable for MOFCOM to characterize the market share as having "remained low", given that the domestic industry held approximately one quarter or less of the market during the POI.<sup>201</sup>

7.123. Having considered MOFCOM's finding regarding the market share as mentioned above, we make the following observations. MOFCOM examined trends and developments in market share over the POI on a year-on-year basis, stating that in 2011 market share slightly decreased, and in 2012 increased by 8 percentage points compared with 2010. In its discussion of price effects, MOFCOM looked at developments in market share on a half-yearly basis, acknowledged that the domestic industry's market share was generally increasing, and provided the following assessment of the changes in market share over the POI:

The domestic market share of the like product of the Domestic Industry was generally in an increasing trend: 18.00% in the first half of 2010; 21.36% in the second half of 2010, 3.36 percentage points more than the first half of 2010; 17.54% in the first half of 2011, 3.82 percentage points less than the second half of 2010; 18.64% in the second half of 2011, 1.1 percentage points more than the first half of 2011; 26.71% in the first half of 2012, 8.07 percentage points more than the second half of 2011; and 25.73% in the second half of 2012, 0.98 percentage points less than the first half of 2012 and 7.73 percentage points more than the first half of 2010 at the beginning of the Period of investigation.<sup>202</sup>

In the same context, MOFCOM noted that in the second part of 2011 the domestic industry increased its output in order to meet the growing demand for cellulose pulp in China, leading to an increase in domestic industry's sales, and consequently to an increase in market share. Further, MOFCOM stated that at the end of the POI, in the second part of 2012, the dumped imports "squeezed" the market share of the domestic like product, which declined from 26.71% to 25.73%.<sup>203</sup> Given these findings and explanations by MOFCOM, we consider that MOFCOM did evaluate the trends and developments of the market share over the POI.

7.124. Canada argues however that MOFCOM's characterization of the market share as having "remained low"<sup>204</sup> is not an objective evaluation of the facts. MOFCOM states:

During the Period of investigation, the market share of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry remained low and its operation rate stayed at a low level.<sup>205</sup>

7.125. Moreover, MOFCOM also observed that the market for cellulose pulp in China had expanded.<sup>206</sup> Demand had been growing over the POI, and this had induced the domestic industry to increase its production capacity, output and sales. We consider that the characterization of the domestic market share as "remained low" is not unreasonable in light of the fact that the demand for cellulose pulp had grown considerably, by 35.26% over the POI. In addition, although domestic

---

<sup>198</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 112-114; second written submission, para. 105; and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 50 and 51.

<sup>199</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 103 and 104 (referring to Panel Report in *China – X-Ray Equipment*, paras. 7.201 and 7.216); opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 49; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 31.

<sup>200</sup> China's second written submission, para. 86 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 72); opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 40 and 41.

<sup>201</sup> China's second written submission, para. 87.

<sup>202</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 63.

<sup>203</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 65.

<sup>204</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>205</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>206</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 65, 72, and 76.

production capacity had been increased to meet the increased demand, the domestic industry's market share had not increased commensurate with the available production capacity. In this respect, by the end of the POI, the domestic industry was using only half of its production capacity, its capacity utilization rate decreased from 66.01% in 2010 to 53.77% in 2011 and to 52.35% in 2012.<sup>207</sup> In these circumstances, we consider that MOFCOM's characterization of domestic industry market share as having "remained low" is one a reasonable and objective investigating authority could reach in light of the evidence before it.

7.126. We therefore we conclude that Canada has failed to demonstrate that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its evaluation of the domestic industry's market share.

#### **7.6.4 MOFCOM's evaluation of injury factors showing positive trends**

7.127. Canada contends that MOFCOM failed to evaluate factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry.<sup>208</sup> Canada argues that, while MOFCOM mentioned these factors, it failed to assess them and explain the role, relevance and weight each factor had in the investigation.<sup>209</sup> Canada asserts that apart from the discussion on the relationship between domestic demand and the construction and renovation of production facilities, MOFCOM did not explain the trends of the positive factors and how they related to each other and to the negative factors.<sup>210</sup> In addition, Canada submits that MOFCOM failed to properly assess the role of "market share" and "investing and financing ability" in its overall evaluation of the state of the domestic industry.<sup>211</sup>

7.128. China responds that MOFCOM recognized that trends in several factors were positive, but concluded that dumped imports forced prices to fall, leading to declines in profits, return on investments, and net cash flow.<sup>212</sup> China submits that Article 3.4 calls for overall examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.<sup>213</sup> However, while this examination includes an evaluation of all relevant factors and indices, it does not require examination of the role, relevance, and weight of each individual factor.<sup>214</sup> China refers to the last sentence of Article 3.4 to argue that the existence of positive factors of injury did not preclude MOFCOM from concluding imports had an overall negative impact on the domestic industry.

7.129. We recall that Article 3.4 requires an investigating authority to derive an understanding of the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry based on examination of all relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry. There is no requirement in Article 3.4 that all relevant factors, or even most or a majority of them, have to show negative developments in order to arrive at an understanding that dumped imports are having a negative impact on the domestic industry.<sup>215</sup> At the same time, positive developments in other factors would require an investigating authority to provide a compelling explanation of why and how, despite such positive trends, it ultimately concludes under Article 3.5 that the domestic industry is injured.<sup>216</sup> The question before us is whether MOFCOM's evaluation of the positive and negative trends in examining the state of the domestic industry under Article 3.4 was reasonable and sufficiently explained in the Final Determination.

---

<sup>207</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 73.

<sup>208</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 118.

<sup>209</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 119 (referring to Panel Report, *China – X-Ray Equipment*, para. 7.216).

<sup>210</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 111.

<sup>211</sup> Canada's argument, which refers to MOFCOM's failure to properly assess the role of factors "such as" those mentioned, suggests that MOFCOM's analysis was deficient in other respects. However, Canada only specifically addressed the two factors mentioned, and therefore we will only make findings with respect to them.

<sup>212</sup> China's first written submission, para. 114; second written submission, paras. 90-92 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76).

<sup>213</sup> China's second written submission, para. 96.

<sup>214</sup> China's second written submission, para. 96.

<sup>215</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Footwear (China)*, para. 7.413 (referring to Panel Reports, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 7.329; and *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.163).

<sup>216</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.249.

7.130. In its examination of impact MOFCOM specifically examined the following factors: domestic demand, production capacity, output, sales volume, market share, sales revenue, employment, labour productivity, and salary per capita showed an increasing trend; selling price, pre-tax profit, return on investment, operation rate, net cash flow from operating activities were decreasing; ending inventories grew, and investing and financing abilities were weakened.<sup>217</sup> MOFCOM then provided an overall assessment of the state of the domestic industry<sup>218</sup>, in which it acknowledged that several injury factors showed positive developments, stating:

[D]uring the Period of investigation, the demand of the domestic cellulose pulp market was strong: the demand in 2011 was 8.67% more than 2010 and the demand in 2012 was 24.47% more than 2011; the demand at the end of the Period of investigation was 35.26% more than that at the beginning of the Period of investigation. With the increase of the demand of the domestic cellulose pulp market, the Domestic Industry constructed and renovated a number of production facilities; the production capacity, output, sales volume and sales revenue of the Domestic Industry all showed an increasing trend and the employment, labor productivity and salary per capita all showed a small increase.<sup>219</sup>

7.131. We cannot agree with Canada's view that MOFCOM failed to provide any explanation regarding positive trends in some factors.<sup>220</sup> MOFCOM's Final Determination states that, due to the increase in demand, the domestic industry constructed and renovated a number of production facilities, which led to increases in production capacity, output, sales volume, sales revenue, employment, labour productivity, and salary per capita. Thus, MOFCOM provided a plausible and reasonable explanation of the positive trends in several factors in that they were driven by the expansion of the market for cellulose pulp in China and the domestic industry's expansion.

7.132. Next, MOFCOM observed that prices of the domestic like product continued to decrease and the unit sales cost was in a decreasing trend generally. However, the degree of decline in prices was greater than the decline in the unit sales costs, leading to a significant decline in the gross profits of the domestic industry.<sup>221</sup> As a consequence, the domestic industry showed significant declines in pre-tax profits, and in fact suffered significant losses, declines in return on investments and net cash flow, and also significant increases in ending inventories.<sup>222</sup> MOFCOM stated that domestic producers that submitted questionnaire responses reported reductions of output or shutdowns to some degree. Some of the companies had to sell their assets in order to maintain the operations, and some of them had closed down.<sup>223</sup> MOFCOM noted that the domestic industry's market share remained low, and capacity utilization rate also remained at a low level.<sup>224</sup> Thus, MOFCOM explained its overall assessment of dumped imports' negative impact on the domestic industry notwithstanding positive trends in some factors.

7.133. Canada submits that MOFCOM failed to properly assess the role of two "critical" injury factors, namely market share and ability to raise capital and investments in its overall evaluation of the state of the domestic industry.<sup>225</sup> Canada argues that MOFCOM improperly considered that these two factors supported a finding of injury. We have addressed Canada's arguments regarding the market share above and found that MOFCOM's evaluation of market share complies with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.4. Regarding the ability to raise capital and investment, Canada argues that this factor should have been assessed through the prism of the increased production capacity of the domestic industry and the investments that increase implies.<sup>226</sup> According to Canada, had this been done, MOFCOM could not have found this factor to be indicative of injury.

---

<sup>217</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 71-74.

<sup>218</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 74-76.

<sup>219</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>220</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 111.

<sup>221</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76. The gross profit of the domestic industry was 1,775.31 RMB/tonne in the first half of 2011; -23.16 RMB/tonne (loss) in the second half of 2011; 770.94 RMB/tonne in the first half of 2012; and -327.49 RMB/tonne (loss) in the second half of 2012.

<sup>222</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>223</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>224</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>225</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 114.

<sup>226</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 114.

7.134. MOFCOM noted in examining the impact of the dumped imports the information received from the domestic industry during on-site verifications, and in the responses to questionnaires which indicated that some companies had to sell their assets in order to stay in operation, and some of them had to close down. MOFCOM also noted that the investing and financing abilities of some companies were weakened and plans for capacity expansion were put aside, because banks terminated credits for investment plans due to declining profitability and increasingly worsened business situations.<sup>227</sup> In our view, it was not unreasonable for MOFCOM to consider that the shutdown of companies and selling of assets were negative developments in the state of the domestic industry, even in a situation of the domestic industry's increased capacity. Thus, in our view, MOFCOM's examination in this respect was that of a reasonable and objective investigating authority.<sup>228</sup>

7.135. We recall that under Article 3.4 the investigating authorities are not required to **demonstrate** that the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry, which is an analysis specifically mandated by Article 3.5. The evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices under Article 3.4, including market share and the ability to raise capital and investments, must provide a meaningful basis for the final determination whether injury is caused by dumped imports under Article 3.5.

7.136. Finally, we note China's argument that certain parts of the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry can be found in the causation analysis.<sup>229</sup> We recall that Article 3 "does not prescribe a specific methodology to be relied on by an investigating authority in its determination of injury".<sup>230</sup> Article 3 also does not provide a "prescribed template or format that an investigating authority must adhere to in making its determination of injury, provided that its determination comports with the disciplines that apply under the discrete paragraphs of Article 3".<sup>231</sup> Thus, "it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation."<sup>232</sup>

7.137. We have found above that MOFCOM evaluated the mandatory economic factors and indices set forth in Article 3.4. In doing so, it noted that some of the factors were negative and some were positive. MOFCOM further considered these factors and indices in its demonstration of the causation relationship between dumped imports and material injury.<sup>233</sup> We recall that Article 3 contemplates "a logical progression of inquiry leading to an investigating authority's ultimate injury and causation determination".<sup>234</sup> Thus, it is unsurprising that the outcome of the investigating authorities' examination under Article 3.4 is further discussed in the causation section of a final determination.

7.138. We therefore conclude that Canada has not established that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry.

## **7.7 Whether MOFCOM's demonstration of causation and examination of other factors causing injury were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

### **7.7.1 Introduction**

7.139. Canada claims that MOFCOM's demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada also claims that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine several

---

<sup>227</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 73 and 74.

<sup>228</sup> We also note that increased production capacity and overexpansion of the domestic industry is raised by Canada as an alleged "other factor" causing injury to the domestic industry under Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We address this issue further in paragraphs 7.173-7.185 of the Report.

<sup>229</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 102-107; China's response to Panel question No. 17, paras. 54-62.

<sup>230</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.141; see also *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, paras. 113 and 118.

<sup>231</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>232</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.159.

<sup>233</sup> Part VI.1 "Causal Relationship" (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 77 and 78).

<sup>234</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

other factors allegedly causing injury to the domestic industry simultaneously with the dumped imports, namely: (a) changes in cotton and VSF prices; (b) domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up; (c) non-dumped imports; and (d) shortage of cotton linter.

7.140. We will first address the legal standard under Article 3.5 and then examine each of Canada's allegations in turn.

### 7.7.2 Legal standard under Articles 3.1 and 3.5

7.141. As discussed above, Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the material injury.<sup>235</sup> It provides specifically that it must be "demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury with the meaning of this Agreement". Article 3.5 further requires that the demonstration of the causal relationship "shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities". Article 3.5 also requires the investigating authority to examine any other known factors that may be simultaneously causing injury to the domestic industry and to ensure that the injuries caused by those other factors are not attributed to the dumped imports.<sup>236</sup> It is well established that there are three relevant elements for determining when such a "non-attribution" analysis is required: the "other factor" allegedly causing injury must be: (a) known to the investigating authority; (b) a factor other than dumped imports; and (c) injuring the domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports.<sup>237</sup> If these elements are satisfied, the investigating authority "must appropriately assess the injurious effects of those other factors", which "must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports".<sup>238</sup>

7.142. Article 3.5 does not provide any guidance on methodology for either of these requirements. Thus, there is no specific guidance as to how an investigating authority can or should demonstrate that there is a causal link between dumped imports and injury, or how it can or should ensure that it does not attribute to the dumped imports injuries caused by a known "other factor".<sup>239</sup> Various methods are used by investigating authorities for the required demonstration of a causal link and examination of other factors and assurance of non-attribution. While a number of panel and Appellate Body reports have reviewed the decisions of investigating authorities in these respects, they have focused on the specific facts, analysis and conclusions, rather than on the methods of analysis relied upon, in the abstract. Thus, in the context of non-attribution, prior decisions have generally focused on "a careful and in depth scrutiny" of the determinations made by the investigating authority in order to evaluate whether the investigating authority's explanations and conclusions are "such reasonable conclusions as could be reached by an unbiased and objective investigating authority in light of the facts and arguments before it and explanations given".<sup>240</sup>

### 7.7.3 MOFCOM's demonstration of causation

7.143. In its Final Determination, MOFCOM found that significantly increased volumes of the dumped imports at decreasing prices depressed the prices of the domestic like product. In turn, the depressed price of the domestic like product led to a continuous decline in the domestic industry's pre-tax profit, return on investments and net cash flow from operating activities. Since the degree of decline in the domestic like product's prices was greater than the degree of decline in unit sales costs, profitability declined, and at the end of the POI the domestic industry was showing serious losses. In addition, the domestic industry's market share and capacity utilization rate were low, and inventories increased over the POI. Based on all of these factors, MOFCOM

---

<sup>235</sup> See above paras. 7.23-7.27.

<sup>236</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.438; Appellate Body Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 6.125 (referring to Appellate Body Reports in *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.283; and *China – GOES*, para. 151).

<sup>237</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.438 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 175).

<sup>238</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.438 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 223; *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 188; *China – GOES*, para. 151; and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)*, para. 5.283).

<sup>239</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.439.

<sup>240</sup> Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.439 (referring to Panel Reports, *EU – Footwear (China)*, para. 7.483; and *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, para. 7.655).

determined that during the POI the dumped imports of cellulose pulp caused material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product.<sup>241</sup>

7.144. Canada argues that MOFCOM's causation analysis is based on flawed volume and price effects analyses and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5.<sup>242</sup> In the alternative, Canada submits that MOFCOM failed to demonstrate how dumped imports actually caused injury to the domestic industry, given that the dumped imports' market share did not change considerably, the prices of dumped imports were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product and the volume of sales of the domestic like product increased more than those of the dumped imports.<sup>243</sup>

7.145. China responds that MOFCOM's causation analysis was based on an objective examination of positive evidence demonstrating a dramatic increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms, increased market share of the dumped imports and declining prices of the domestic like product, in parallel with the declining prices of the dumped imports.<sup>244</sup> China submits that documents examined by MOFCOM during the verification showed that domestic producers were forced to lower their prices to maintain sales in the Chinese market.<sup>245</sup> China argues that MOFCOM also carefully considered the economic factors and indices concerning the state of the domestic industry that showed the domestic industry suffered material injury. It found that, due to the dumped imports, the domestic industry had to reduce significantly the prices of the like product, resulting in a significant decline in the profitability and a sharp decline in the pre-tax profit and return on investments of the domestic industry.<sup>246</sup>

7.146. Canada's claim under Article 3.5 regarding MOFCOM's causation analysis is dependent in part on its claims under Articles 3.2 and 3.4. We have found above that China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its consideration of the effect of the dumped imports on prices.<sup>247</sup> In particular, we found that MOFCOM failed to adequately explain both the role of parallel price trends in its consideration of price depression and how the effect of dumped imports was to depress domestic prices in a situation where dumped import prices were higher than those of the domestic like product during the second part of the POI. Thus, to the extent that MOFCOM merely relied on its consideration of price effects under Article 3.2 in demonstrating causation, we conclude that its demonstration of causation was inconsistent with Articles 3.5 and 3.1.<sup>248</sup>

7.147. In its demonstration of causation, MOFCOM specifically acknowledged that the price of the dumped imports was higher than the price of the domestic like product.<sup>249</sup> MOFCOM found that starting from the second half of 2011 until the end of the POI, the prices of the dumped imports decreased continuously and the volume of the dumped imports increased quickly, which forced the domestic industry to decrease its prices, and concluded that the dumped imports depressed the price of the like domestic product.<sup>250</sup> Even though MOFCOM acknowledged that the dumped imports were priced higher in the first half of 2011, it did not explain how, the dumped imports depressed domestic like product prices, thereby contributed to causing material injury to the domestic industry, when the decreasing prices of the dumped imports remained higher than the price of the domestic like product during the remainder of the POI. Therefore, in light its flawed price effects analysis and conclusions, MOFCOM has failed to demonstrate that the dumped imports caused injury to the domestic industry through their price effects.

---

<sup>241</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 77.

<sup>242</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 10 and 48; second written submission, paras. 119-121.

<sup>243</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 125-138; second written submission, para. 122.

<sup>244</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 123, 127, 128, and 129 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 59, 63-66, 77, and 78); second written submission, paras. 9, 79, and 80.

<sup>245</sup> China's first written submission, para. 129 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 65).

<sup>246</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 127-134; second written submission, para. 82.

<sup>247</sup> See section 7.5 above.

<sup>248</sup> In this regard, we recall the panel's statement in *China – Autos (US)* that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a determination of causation consistent with the requirements of the Articles 3 ... in a situation where an important element of that determination, the underlying price effects analysis, is itself inconsistent with the provisions of [the Anti-Dumping Agreement]." (Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.327).

<sup>249</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 77.

<sup>250</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 77 and 78.

7.148. Turning to the role of the volume of dumped imports in MOFCOM's demonstration of causation, we recall our conclusion above that MOFCOM did not act inconsistently with Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its consideration of whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports.<sup>251</sup> In our view, MOFCOM did not rely on the increased volume of imports as an independent causal factor. Rather, we understand MOFCOM to have relied on a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms in its consideration of the effects of dumped imports on prices, and its conclusion that the dumped imports caused material injury.<sup>252</sup> However, MOFCOM failed to explain how parallel declining price trends, even considered in conjunction with the increased volume of dumped imports, played a role in price depression and thus contributed to causing material injury.

7.149. In its demonstration of causation, MOFCOM noted the "significant growth" in the volume of the dumped imports, and that the proportion of the dumped imports in the total imports was high.<sup>253</sup> MOFCOM relied on the "impact brought by the significant growth of the quantity" of the dumped imports to explain the continuous price decline of the domestic like product since the second half of 2011, which in turn led to negative developments in the state of the domestic industry, including decline in profitability, return on investment and net cash flow from operating activities.<sup>254</sup> Thus, MOFCOM's causation determination relies on both the volume and price effects of dumped imports. Nothing in MOFCOM's Final Determination suggests that it took the view that the significantly increased volume of dumped imports alone was a sufficient basis to conclude that those imports caused material injury. We fail to see, and MOFCOM failed to explain, the relevance of the "high proportion" of total imports accounted for by the dumped imports, to its causation demonstration.<sup>255</sup> In this context, we note that while the volume of dumped imports increased by 43.82% over the POI, demand for cellulose pulp in the Chinese market also increased, by 35.26% in the same period.<sup>256</sup> Had MOFCOM considered the increased volume of dumped imports alone to be sufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship to material injury, we would have expected some discussion of the significance of that increase in the context of increasing market demand.

7.150. MOFCOM also referred to the increase in the market share of the dumped imports over the POI in its assessment of causal link, an increase of 1.3 percentage points.<sup>257</sup> In this regard, we note that the domestic industry's market share also increased, by 6.5 percentage points<sup>258</sup>, while the market share of non-dumped imports increased by 6.7 percentage points during the same period.<sup>259</sup> The increase in the market share of non-dumped imports, which were sold at prices close to those of the dumped imports, was not addressed by MOFCOM in the context of its demonstration of a causal relationship between dumped imports and material injury.<sup>260</sup> However, we would have expected a reasonable and objective investigating authority to at least consider in these circumstances the possible role of non-dumped imports in the price depression MOFCOM found to have been contributing to causing material injury to the domestic industry.

---

<sup>251</sup> See section 7.4 above.

<sup>252</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 63-66.

<sup>253</sup> Specifically, MOFCOM stated:

The statistical data of China Customs showed that during the Period of investigation, the quantity of the dumped imported product showed the significant growth in general, 43.82% more at the end of the Period of investigation than at the beginning of the Period of investigation. In addition to the continuous growth of the quantity of import, the proportion of the quantity of the dumped imported product to the total quantity of the imported cellulose pulp in China always remained high: 49.32% in 2010, 42.77% in 2011 and 43.96% in 2012.

(Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 77)

<sup>254</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 78.

<sup>255</sup> In this regard, we note that dumped imports accounted for just under half of total imports throughout the POI, and the volume of non-dumped imports was argued to be, and considered by MOFCOM, as an "other factor" causing injury to the domestic industry simultaneously with the dumped imports.

<sup>256</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 76 and 77.

<sup>257</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 77.

<sup>258</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 72.

<sup>259</sup> Apparent Market and Domestic Production Tables, (Exhibit CAN-28), p. 2; Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 36; and China's response to Panel question No. 37, table B.

<sup>260</sup> MOFCOM did address the allegedly injurious impact of the non-dumped imports on the domestic industry as an "other factor" in its non-attribution analysis. Canada's claim in this regard is discussed below.

7.151. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry consistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.152. We consider that the above findings are a sufficient basis for us to conclude that China has failed to act consistently with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement in connection with the anti-dumping measure at issue in this dispute. However, as it may provide some useful guidance in the context of implementation of any DSB recommendation in this dispute, we go on to consider Canada's claims regarding non-attribution.

#### **7.7.4 MOFCOM's examination of other known factors allegedly causing injury and non-attribution**

##### **7.7.4.1 Cotton and VSF prices**

###### **7.7.4.1.1 Introduction**

7.153. Canada contends that MOFCOM failed to properly examine positive evidence submitted by the interested parties concerning the effects of changes in cotton and VSF prices and failed to separate and distinguish their injurious effect on the domestic industry from the impact of the dumped imports.<sup>261</sup>

7.154. The imported product at issue in the underlying investigation, cellulose pulp, is made from wood, cotton, or bamboo as a principal input, and is in turn the primary raw material in the production of VSF, which is used by the textile industry. The interested parties argued that since VSF is a close substitute for cotton fibre, the price of VSF is highly correlated with the price of cotton.<sup>262</sup> In 2010-2011, due to a global supply shortage of cotton caused by cotton crop failures, global cotton price increased significantly, to historically high levels, leading to high demand for VSF and a similar increase in VSF prices.<sup>263</sup> The increased demand for VSF stimulated demand for cellulose pulp and an increase in prices of cellulose pulp during the first part of the POI.<sup>264</sup> The Chinese government introduced a policy, based on environmental concerns, limiting cotton production in China and favouring VSF production, which also contributed to increased demand for VSF in China.<sup>265</sup> However, in the second part of the POI, starting from the second half of 2011, additional supplies of cotton became available and global cotton prices started to decline.<sup>266</sup> Consequently, the price of VSF also began to fall, leading to a decline in the price of cellulose

---

<sup>261</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 159.

<sup>262</sup> Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 12; Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Injury Brief, Industry Injury Investigation for the Anti-Dumping Investigations Against Cellulose Pulp, 5 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-13), p. 2; and American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 8.

<sup>263</sup> Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 12; Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Injury Brief, Industry Injury Investigation for the Anti-Dumping Investigations Against Cellulose Pulp, 5 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-13), p. 2; American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), pp. 9 and 10; and Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 16.

<sup>264</sup> Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 12; and Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 17.

<sup>265</sup> Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 16; and American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 10.

<sup>266</sup> American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), pp. 11 and 12; and Multi-Client Study: Outlook for Global Dissolving Pulp Market 2011, (Exhibit CAN-6) (BCI), p. 3.



pulp.<sup>267</sup> Interested parties argued that the dramatic decline in prices of cotton and VSF from 2011 to the second half of 2012 pulled down the price of the cellulose pulp in the domestic market.<sup>268</sup>

7.155. MOFCOM discussed the effect of both cotton and VSF prices in the section of the Final Determination concerning its consideration of the effect of dumped imports on domestic prices, and did not specifically address these prices in the section of the Final Determination concerning non-attribution of injury to "other factors" allegedly causing injury to the domestic industry. The Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide any guidance as to the structure of an investigating authority's final determination. Nor does compliance with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require any particular order of analysis, or that aspects of an investigating authority's analysis and determination be specifically linked to the specific requirements of that Agreement. In our view, while it is clear that an investigating authority must comply with the legal requirements set out in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that if challenged in dispute settlement, such compliance must be demonstrable based on the relevant determinations and underlying information in the record, a Member may rely on the entirety of the challenged determination, and refer to supporting information in the record, in doing so, regardless of where the relevant discussion, analysis, or conclusion appears in the determination.<sup>269</sup> Of course, this does not mean that a reviewing panel can be expected to comb through the determination to find the relevant aspects of the investigating authority's discussion, analysis, or conclusion, or that a defending Member can cobble together an analysis from disparate elements in the determination. But it does mean that simply because an explanation for a particular analytical approach or conclusion is set out in one part of a determination in the context of one aspect of the analysis does not mean that it cannot be considered, if relevant, with respect to a different aspect of the analysis addressed principally in another part of the determination. Therefore, the question before us is whether MOFCOM complied with the non-attribution requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, regardless of where the discussion China relies on in defending MOFCOM's determination explicitly appears in the Final Determination.

#### 7.7.4.1.2 Cotton prices

7.156. MOFCOM found that "the cotton price was not the main factor that determined the price of viscose fiber".<sup>270</sup> MOFCOM based its conclusion on several considerations. First, MOFCOM found that, due to differences in the properties of the products, there is no necessary connection between VSF and cotton prices. Second, MOFCOM found that due to government intervention in the Chinese market for cotton, specifically quotas and policies to protect cotton prices, changes in the price of cotton were not the main factor affecting the price of VSF or cotton cellulose pulp. As a result of these interventions, while cotton prices fluctuated on the international market, cotton prices in China were higher and more stable than the international prices.<sup>271</sup> Finally, MOFCOM determined that because the cellulose pulp under investigation included all cellulose pulp products, including wood- and bamboo-based cellulose pulp, and not only cotton-based cellulose pulp, the price of cotton was not the primary factor affecting the prices of the domestic like product. In this regard, MOFCOM noted that during the POI sales of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp reached nearly 70% of the total sales volume of the like product.<sup>272</sup>

7.157. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the relationship between the prices of cotton, VSF, and cellulose pulp.<sup>273</sup> Canada contends that MOFCOM failed to consider evidence submitted by several interested parties regarding the effect of global cotton prices; instead MOFCOM focused on government-supported domestic cotton prices in China.<sup>274</sup> Canada

---

<sup>267</sup> Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), p. 29; and Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 18.

<sup>268</sup> Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 13; and American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 9.

<sup>269</sup> E.g. Panel Report, *EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)*, para. 7.526.

<sup>270</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

<sup>271</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

<sup>272</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

<sup>273</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 131-133.

<sup>274</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 150.

submits that MOFCOM failed to explain how any distinction between products is relevant to the question of whether viscose fibre is a substitute for cotton, referring to the submissions of interested parties suggesting that viscose fibre is a close substitute for cotton fibre.<sup>275</sup> Canada argues that cotton prices affected VSF prices, and in turn, prices of all cellulose pulp, regardless of whether it was produced using wood, bamboo, or cotton linter. Therefore Canada contends that the fact that sales of bamboo- and wood- based cellulose pulp, at their peak, accounted for 70% of the total sales volume of cellulose pulp does not support MOFCOM's finding with respect to the effect of cotton prices.<sup>276</sup>

7.158. China submits that MOFCOM examined the impact of cotton prices, even though it did not have to since the relevant question before it was whether VSF prices impacted the prices of cellulose pulp, and therefore MOFCOM did not have to consider further upstream factors that may have affected the prices of VSF.<sup>277</sup> China asserts that MOFCOM properly relied on domestic cotton prices, rather than on international cotton prices, because the Chinese cotton market was affected by government intervention leading to domestic cotton prices that were higher and more stable than the international prices.<sup>278</sup> China argues that MOFCOM reasonably concluded that there is no necessary relationship between VSF and cotton prices due to the different properties of the products and "non-substitutability", noting that VSF has superior dyeing and moisture absorption properties as compared to cotton fibre.<sup>279</sup> China submits that cotton prices could not constitute the main factor affecting the domestic like product overall, because the domestic cellulose pulp industry includes not only cotton-based pulp, but also wood- and bamboo-based pulp.<sup>280</sup>

7.159. As noted above, there is no prescribed methodology as to how a non-attribution analysis is to be conducted. Thus, the question before us with respect to Canada's claim regarding the allegedly injurious effect of cotton prices is whether a reasonable and objective investigating authority could have concluded that changes in international cotton prices were not the main factor that determined the price of VSF, and therefore were not the main factor affecting the prices of cellulose pulp.

7.160. We begin by addressing Canada's argument that MOFCOM wrongly confined its analysis to the trends in cotton prices in China, while the interested parties argued that VSF prices in China were affected by fluctuations of international cotton prices. MOFCOM found that cotton prices in China were more stable, and higher, than international cotton prices.

7.161. In this regard, MOFCOM reported the prices of cotton, VSF and cotton-based cellulose pulp in China during POI to be as follows:

**Table 5: Average annual prices of cotton, VSF, and cotton-based cellulose pulp in China**

POI	2010	2011	2012
Cotton price (RMB/tonne)	19,563	24,269	19,327
VSF price (RMB/tonne)	20,726	21,524	15,442
Price of cotton cellulose pulp produced by domestic industry (RMB/tonne)	14,610	14,639	8,010

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

MOFCOM stated that the prices of cotton in China "first increased and then decreased and basically remained unchanged", while prices of both VSF and cotton pulp were "in decreasing trend in

<sup>275</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 148 and 149; second written submission, paras. 134 and 135.

<sup>276</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 140.

<sup>277</sup> China's second written submission, para. 114.

<sup>278</sup> China's first written submission, para. 148; second written submission, paras. 117 and 118 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67).


<sup>279</sup> China's first written submission, para. 146; second written submission, para. 115 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67).

<sup>280</sup> China's first written submission, para. 150 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67).

general". MOFCOM concluded that during the POI "the cotton price was not the main factor that determined the price of viscose fiber, and it was not the main factor that affect the price of cotton pulp of the Domestic Industry in Chinese market".<sup>281</sup>

7.162. China contends that these findings suggest that domestic VSF and cotton pulp prices did not follow the trends in domestic cotton prices.<sup>282</sup> We do not consider it inappropriate for MOFCOM to have focussed on domestic prices in its analysis. However, we do not agree that a reasonable and objective investigating authority could reach the conclusion reached by MOFCOM on the basis of the domestic price information before it. It is clear from the data shown in Table 5 and depicted graphically in Chart 2 that the Chinese prices of cotton, VSF and cotton cellulose pulp were closely correlated, especially in the second part of the POI, declining in 2012, at the same time as the prices of domestic like product were allegedly depressed by the dumped imports:

**Chart 2: Average annual prices of cotton, VSF, and cotton-based cellulose pulp in China**



Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

Cotton prices in China, like international cotton prices, increased significantly in 2011 and then dropped in 2012 to about the level they had been at the beginning of the POI. This could be viewed as suggesting that cotton prices in China were affected by the global cotton shortage and consequent price increase, at least to some extent. Yet MOFCOM simply did not address this possible impact of international cotton prices. Furthermore, even accepting that there are some differences in the physical properties of the products, the data suggests that prices of VSF and cotton followed similar trends, especially in the second half of the POI. In our view, this suggests that there is at least some relationship between the prices of these products, which casts doubt on MOFCOM's conclusion, which rests on the finding that there is no necessary relationship between prices of cotton and VSF. China's assertion that there was no general correlation between domestic cotton prices, VSF prices, and cotton cellulose pulp prices is belied by the data. The domestic data that China relied on, in our view, shows the same general trend as international prices – cotton, VSF and cellulose pulp prices rose in the first half of the POI and declined in the second half. The correlation between the domestic prices is less pronounced than that between the international market prices relied on by Canada in its arguments, but is by no means insignificant.

7.163. In addition, we note that although the Chinese cotton market was regulated by the government, international cotton prices would nonetheless appear relevant to MOFCOM's analysis, because Chinese producers of the downstream product, VSF, competed globally and thus would seem likely to be affected by the international market prices for cotton, as it affected other VSF

<sup>281</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67.

<sup>282</sup> China's first written submission, para. 149; second written submission, para. 118 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 67).

producers and thus the world market in which Chinese VSF producers competed. Even though export sales were only [\*\*\*] of VSF production in China<sup>283</sup>, given the size of the Chinese market<sup>284</sup> this is not insignificant. Moreover, export sales of VSF increased rapidly over the POI, by [\*\*\*].<sup>285</sup> To the extent that Chinese VSF producers purchasing domestic cellulose pulp for VSF production sought lower prices to enable them to compete better in export markets with producers whose input costs directly benefitted from the decline in international cotton prices, Chinese prices for cellulose pulp may have been affected by those declines as well. MOFCOM's analysis fails to consider these interconnections at all.

7.164. In addition, MOFCOM considered that since cotton is the raw material for cotton-based cellulose pulp only, prices for cotton had no effect on the prices of wood- and bamboo-based pulp. However, as MOFCOM recognized, all cellulose pulp, regardless of whether it is cotton-, wood- or bamboo-based, is used in the production of VSF.<sup>286</sup> It seems to us likely that there is some correlation, or at least a connection between the prices of cellulose pulp made from the different inputs, as the cellulose pulp, regardless of input, all competes for sales to VSF producers. Thus, while prices for cotton may not have a direct effect on the prices of wood- and bamboo-based pulp as a raw material, the possible indirect effect through the competition for sales to downstream users, would seem to merit consideration, which MOFCOM did not undertake.

7.165. To conclude, we consider that while MOFCOM may have been justified in concluding that the international price of cotton was not the *main* factor affecting the prices of the downstream product VSF, MOFCOM's explanations are insufficient to demonstrate, in light of the arguments and evidence concerning international cotton prices, that they were not *a* factor affecting VSF prices, and consequently cellulose pulp prices. Thus, MOFCOM failed to properly examine whether cotton prices were another factor causing injury to the domestic industry.

#### 7.7.4.1.3 VSF prices

7.166. MOFCOM found that "the change of the price of viscose fiber as a downstream product was not the direct cause of the decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry."<sup>287</sup>

7.167. Canada argues that cellulose pulp is primarily used to produce VSF, which creates a *prima facie* presumption that the price of VSF has a causal impact on the price of cellulose pulp.<sup>288</sup> Canada submits that MOFCOM failed to explain how its discussion regarding growth in VSF output and subsequent growth in demand for cellulose pulp related to correlations between prices of viscose fibre and cellulose pulp.<sup>289</sup> Canada contends that interested parties submitted evidence showing that there is a close link between cellulose pulp and VSF prices; therefore MOFCOM's conclusion that interested parties failed to provide evidence of a direct link between decline in prices of VSF and cellulose pulp cannot stand.<sup>290</sup>

7.168. China responds that MOFCOM properly considered evidence submitted by interested parties, but after objectively examining both this evidence and the supply and demand relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp, determined that VSF prices were not the direct cause of the changes in cellulose pulp prices.<sup>291</sup> China submits that parallel trends in VSF and cellulose pulp prices on their own do not demonstrate that the downward trend in VSF prices led to the

---

<sup>283</sup> CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 35, table 20.

<sup>284</sup> China is "the predominant global producer and user of VSF". (Canada's response to Panel question No. 56, paras. 61-66).

<sup>285</sup> Source: CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 35, table 20.

<sup>286</sup> "The comments and opinions submitted by the downstream companies showed that wood pulp, cotton pulp and bamboo pulp were substitutable to each other when used as raw materials for the production of viscose fibers and the quality of viscose fibers made from any of the three types of pulp was the same." (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 62).

<sup>287</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 69.

<sup>288</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 145.

<sup>289</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 154; second written submission, paras. 147 and 148.

<sup>290</sup> Canada's first written submission; para. 152; second written submission, paras. 143 and 144; response to Panel question No. 28, paras. 55-63.

<sup>291</sup> China's first written submission, para. 152; second written submission, para. 119.

downward trend in cellulose pulp prices.<sup>292</sup> For China, MOFCOM reasonably considered that the relationship between VSF output and domestic demand for cellulose pulp is relevant to the analysis of the impact of VSF prices on cellulose pulp prices, and in this context, considering that domestic demand for cellulose pulp was strong as VSF output increased, and cellulose pulp supply could not meet the demand, the price of cellulose pulp should have remained stable or increased, but instead the price had declined.<sup>293</sup>

7.169. MOFCOM observed that VSF prices declined while VSF output increased rapidly, leading to increased demand for cellulose pulp. It noted that while total domestic production capacity for cellulose pulp was equal to the total demand, total output could not meet that demand.<sup>294</sup> MOFCOM relied on the following data:

**Table 6: Chinese VSF output, demand for cellulose pulp, and total output of cellulose pulp**

POI	2010	2011	2012
VSF output (tonnes)	1,955,500	2,125,000	2,645,000
Total domestic demand for cellulose pulp (tonnes)	2,033,700	2,210,000	2,750,800
Total output of all domestic producers of cellulose pulp (tonnes)	1,329,800	1,397,600	1,641,500

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 68 and 69.

7.170. MOFCOM concluded that since there was strong demand for cellulose pulp in China and domestic supply could not meet the demand, the price for cellulose pulp should have been stable, but instead it had declined.<sup>295</sup> Therefore, the decline in VSF prices was not the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices. However, MOFCOM's analysis is based on the assumption that because domestic supply could not satisfy demand for cellulose pulp, prices should have remained stable, which ignores the presence of a significant supply of imported cellulose pulp in the Chinese market, which might itself be expected to affect domestic prices. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to explain how its conclusion diminishes the relevance of declines in VSF prices at the same time as cellulose pulp prices declined as a possible factor contributing to the decline in Chinese cellulose pulp prices.

7.171. Overall, we are of the view that MOFCOM's explanations fail to engage satisfactorily the arguments of the interested parties concerning the allegedly injurious impact of international cotton prices and VSF prices. Given the fact that MOFCOM's determination of causation was to a large extent driven by the declining price of cellulose pulp, MOFCOM's explanations are thus insufficient to allow us to find that MOFCOM's conclusions in this regard were those of a reasonable and objective investigating authority in light of the evidence and arguments before it.

7.172. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM failed to properly examine the effects of cotton and VSF prices and failed to ensure that any injuries caused by cotton and VSF prices were not attributed to the dumped imports and therefore acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

#### **7.7.4.2 Domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction, and inventory build-up**

7.173. MOFCOM considered the impact of the expansion of domestic production capacity as an "other factor" causing injury to the domestic industry. It concluded that the possible impact of the increased production capacity on the domestic cellulose pulp industry "cannot be excluded", but that the effect of this factor was not sufficient to break the causal link between the dumped

<sup>292</sup> China's first written submission, para. 153 (referring to Canada's first written submission, para. 157); second written submission, para. 120.

<sup>293</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 155 and 156; second written submission, paras. 121-124.

<sup>294</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 68 and 69.

<sup>295</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 68 and 69.

imports and material injury to the domestic industry.<sup>296</sup> In making this conclusion, MOFCOM observed that total production capacity of all domestic cellulose pulp producers increased during the POI, but "there was no serious excessive production capacity", since the increased production capacity was almost equal to the demand for cellulose pulp in China.<sup>297</sup> MOFCOM also examined the domestic industry's unit production costs and inventories, finding that unit production costs of the like domestic product decreased due mainly to declines in raw material costs, and that while the domestic industry's inventories increased, this was not directly caused by the increased output and expanded production capacity.<sup>298</sup>

7.174. Canada submits that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by relying on data pertaining to all domestic cellulose pulp producers, which included data for domestic producers that were not part of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, in addressing the issue of domestic production capacity.<sup>299</sup> Canada argues that this is not permissible under Article 3.5 and distorted the true magnitude of the capacity expansion of the domestic industry.<sup>300</sup> Canada submits that regardless of the data used, production capacity increased far in excess of growth in demand. Canada submits that the examination of manufacturing costs reflects expenses incurred due to increased capacity, and that other costs are irrelevant for this analysis. Finally, Canada argues that the increased inventories and low capacity utilization rate shows that domestic industry's overexpansion resulted in surplus capacity.<sup>301</sup>

7.175. China notes that MOFCOM acknowledged the significant growth of the domestic industry's production capacity and examined the effect of this growth by assessing the domestic industry's costs. MOFCOM found that the unit production costs declined over the POI<sup>302</sup>, showing that expenditures for increased production capacity did not injure the financial performance of the domestic industry.<sup>303</sup> China acknowledges that MOFCOM looked at both the production capacity of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, and that of all Chinese producers of cellulose pulp.<sup>304</sup> China submits that it was reasonable for MOFCOM to examine the relationship between the production capacity of all Chinese producers of cellulose pulp and total domestic demand: since prices for cellulose pulp would be driven by total output and total demand, an overall expansion of production capacity could impact the domestic industry, if it caused the prices of the domestic industry to decline.<sup>305</sup>

7.176. We begin by considering whether it was permissible for MOFCOM to rely on data pertaining to all Chinese cellulose pulp producers in the context of examining production capacity as an alleged other factor causing injury to the domestic industry. We recall that Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authorities to examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which are injuring the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports, and not attribute the injuries caused by these other factors to the dumped imports. It is clear to us that the domestic industry referred to in this aspect of Article 3.5 is the same domestic industry as to which material injury must be demonstrated to be caused by the dumped imports, that is, the domestic industry producing the like product, as defined by the investigating authority in the investigation at issue. It is also clear to us that both the demonstration of causation of material injury to the domestic industry and the ensuring that injury caused by other causal factors is not attributed to dumped imports should be based on information

---

<sup>296</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 82.

<sup>297</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 81.

<sup>298</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 82.

<sup>299</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 164; second written submission, para. 161.

<sup>300</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 164. Canada notes that, according to MOFCOM figures, total domestic demand increased by 35.26% during the POI, while the production capacity of the domestic industry increased by 122.49% and production capacity of all Chinese producers increased by 72.41%. Canada emphasizes that in 2011 the production capacity of the domestic industry increased by 62.98%, whereas the production capacity of other domestic producers declined by 6.71%. Canada also notes that the domestic industry's production capacity increased by 62.98% during 2011-2012, when the prices of the domestic industry were falling and being allegedly depressed and causing injury to the domestic industry. (Canada's first written submission, paras. 163-165; second written submission, paras. 165 and 166 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CAN-3), p. 74)).

<sup>301</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 169.

<sup>302</sup> There was a small increase in manufacturing expenses in 2012, but this represented only 4% of total per unit sales costs. (China's response to Panel question No. 31, para. 96).

<sup>303</sup> China's first written submission, para. 164; second written submission, paras. 137-139.

<sup>304</sup> China's second written submission, paras. 135 and 136.

<sup>305</sup> China's second written submission, paras. 141-143; response to Panel question No. 59.

related to that same domestic industry, as defined.<sup>306</sup> However, this basic principle does not preclude investigating authorities from considering and, in appropriate circumstances, relying on information pertaining to a larger group of domestic producers than the domestic industry as defined, so long as that reliance is properly justified.<sup>307</sup>

7.177. Considering the above, we have examined the particular arguments raised by the interested parties concerning the expanded production capacity of the domestic industry as an "other factor" of injury to see whether there was a justification for MOFCOM to consider data for the larger group of domestic producers. It is apparent that interested parties raised two sets of arguments. First, that the expansion of production capacity caused the cellulose pulp market to slow down, and second, that overcapacity affected domestic producers' costs. It is not clear, however, that these arguments are necessarily limited to only the situation of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM.<sup>308</sup> In our view, it was not unreasonable for MOFCOM to consider the data pertaining to changes in the production capacity of all domestic cellulose pulp producers in addressing the first argument of the interested parties' regarding the slowdown in the Chinese cellulose pulp market. Indeed, to focus only on the capacity of the domestic industry as defined in considering the impact of capacity expansion of the Chinese market for cellulose pulp would be to ignore capacity that would necessarily be affecting that market overall. Thus, we do not consider that MOFCOM erred in considering overall domestic capacity in this context.

7.178. However, turning to the conclusion MOFCOM drew on the basis of that information, it is not clear to us how the fact that, despite having increased, production capacity of all domestic producers was generally in balance with domestic demand, explains how any injury caused by that increase was not attributed to dumped imports. In this regard, we recall that MOFCOM recognized the increased capacity may have had "a certain impact" on the domestic industry, but discounted this impact because "during the Period of investigation, the total output of the domestic cellulose pulp industry was always far less than the total domestic demand" and the situation that total supply of the domestic cellulose pulp industry exceeded the total demand did not occur.<sup>309</sup> Again,

---

<sup>306</sup> In *EC – Bed Linen*, the panel observed that in the context of Article 3.4:

[I]nformation concerning companies that are not within the domestic industry is irrelevant to the evaluation of the "relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry" required under Article 3.4. This is true even though those companies may presently produce, or may have in the past produced, the like product, bed linen.

(Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen*, para. 6.182)

Similarly, in *EC – Fasteners (China)*, in the context of a non-attribution analysis under Article 3.5, the panel noted the "fundamental principle" expressed in the above-quoted statement in *EC – Bed Linen* and concluded:

We see no reason why the same fundamental principle should not be adhered to in the context of analysis of causation, including the examination of other factors which may be causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as imports.

(Panel Report, *EC – Fasteners (China)*, para. 7.437)

<sup>307</sup> Like the panel in *EC-Fasteners (China)*:

We do not preclude the possibility that information for all producers might, in some circumstances, be an appropriate proxy for information specific to the domestic industry at issue, for instance where information for the industry is not available or not provided. However, in such a situation, we would consider it imperative that the investigating authority explain why, in the particular case, it considers reliance on information to be appropriate, and how any weaknesses in the information have been taken into account.

(Panel Report, *EC – Fasteners (China)*, fn 912)

<sup>308</sup> For instance, Fortress argued before MOFCOM that "over-expansion of production capacity of domestic producers further increased their marginal cost and resulted in the market slump". (Fortress Specialty Cellulose Inc., Response to MOFCOM's Preliminary Determination on the Anti-Dumping Investigation against Imported Dissolving Pulp, (Exhibit CAN-17), p. 11). Cosmo submitted that "the increase in actual DC Pulp production capacity and potential production capacity added new supply or potential new supply to the global DC Pulp market which placed downward pressure on global prices for DC Pulp." (American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 12). Weyerhaeuser argued that by the second quarter of 2011 "capacity increases resulted in an almost immediate softening of the market". (Weyerhaeuser, MOFCOM Presentation, 4 June 2013, (Exhibit CAN-21), p. 6). Weyerhaeuser added that "as additional capacity came on, the market became heavily oversupplied and pricing continued to decrease down to the point where higher cost producers were losing money." (Weyerhaeuser, MOFCOM Presentation, 4 June 2013, (Exhibit CAN-21), p. 7).

<sup>309</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 81.

MOFCOM appears to have ignored the presence of substantial volumes of imports on the Chinese market, which supply could be expected to affect prices, and thus exacerbate the effect of increased capacity, resulting in a general situation of over-supply, with a consequent potential negative effect on prices.

7.179. Second, interested parties argued that overcapacity affected the domestic producers' costs. With regard to this argument, MOFCOM relied on information concerning the unit production costs of the domestic industry as defined. MOFCOM found that the unit production costs for the domestic like product declined over the POI, mainly as a result of declines in raw material costs:

[D]uring the Period of investigation, the unit production cost of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry increased first and then dropped, showing a decline in general. Through the analysis of the questionnaire responses *for Domestic Producers*, the Investigating authority found that compared to 2010, the unit production cost of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry reduced by 2,462.72 RMB/ton in 2012; among it, the direct material cost reduced by 2,597.03 RMB/ton, the direct labor cost reduced by 37.12 RMB/ton, the fuel and power cost reduced by 87.99 RMB/ton, and the manufacturing cost increased by 259.42 RMB/ton. It showed that the reduction of the raw material cost was the main cause of the decline of the unit production cost of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.<sup>310</sup>

7.180. Canada argues that evidence before MOFCOM shows that manufacturing costs (which include capital expenses) increased, and asserts that other costs are irrelevant to the question of whether the increased production capacity of the domestic industry had an injurious impact on manufacturing costs.<sup>311</sup> China responds that MOFCOM considered total per unit costs of the domestic industry and found that the total costs declined. China submits that MOFCOM also considered the cost structure of the domestic industry, including manufacturing costs, finding that the increase in manufacturing costs in 2012 represented only 4% of total per unit sales costs. According to China, it reasonably concluded that an increase in costs accounting for such a small proportion of the total costs could not have broken the causal link between the dumped imports and material injury.<sup>312</sup>

7.181. China submitted data from the record of the investigation regarding the components of unit production costs, including manufacturing costs:

**Table 7: Components of production cost of cellulose pulp in China**

POI	2010	2011	2012
A. Direct Materials (RMB/ton)	[***]	[***]	[***]
B. Direct Labour (RMB/ton)	[***]	[***]	[***]
C. Fuel and Power (RMB/ton)	[***]	[***]	[***]
D. Manufacturing Costs (RMB/ton)	[***]	[***]	[***]
A+B+C+D =Total Production Cost (RMB/ton)	[***]	[***]	[***]

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 60, para. 38.

7.182. In our view, it was not unreasonable of MOFCOM to have focused on the decline in total production costs, rather than increase in manufacturing costs in 2012, which represented only a small proportion of total production costs, and did not affect the fact that total production costs declined by almost one third over the POI. Canada may be correct that manufacturing costs are most directly relevant to the question of the effect of increased production capacity on the domestic industry. On the facts of this case, Canada's argument does not persuade us that

<sup>310</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 81 and 82. (italics original, underlining added)

<sup>311</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 168.

<sup>312</sup> China's second written submission, paras. 138 and 139; response to Panel question Nos. 31, paras. 95 and 96 and 60, para. 39.



MOFCOM erred in focusing on the overall decline in production costs, and we therefore consider that MOFCOM's conclusions in this regard are such as could have been reached by a reasonable and objective investigating authority in light of the evidence and arguments before it.

7.183. MOFCOM also examined the increase in the domestic industry's inventories based on the data provided by the domestic producers:

[T]he ending inventory of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry in 2012 was 118,000 tons higher than 2011. Although the production capacity of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry in 2012 increased by 687,800 tons compared to 2011, the output of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry in 2012 increased by merely 344,600 tons compared to 2011, while the domestic sales volume of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry in 2012 increased by 321,500 tons compared to 2011. It showed that, encouraged by the increase of 540,800 tons of the domestic demand in 2012 compared to 2011, the Domestic Industry increased the output, but the increased part of the output due to the expansion of the production capacity was not the direct cause of the increase of the ending inventory of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.<sup>313</sup>

MOFCOM set out the following information regarding domestic demand, production capacity, capacity utilization, output, sales, and inventories:

**Table 8: Domestic demand, capacity, output, sales volume, operating rate, and ending inventories**

POI	2010	2011	2012
Total domestic demand for cellulose pulp (tonnes)	2,033,700	2,210,000 +8.67%	2,750,800 +24.47%
Production capacity (tonnes)	800,000	1,092,100 +36.51%	1,779,900 +62.98%
Output (tonnes)	528,100	587,200 +11.19%	931,800 +58.69%
Domestic sales volume (tonnes)	400,200	399,800 -0.1%	721,300 +80.42%
Operating rate	66.01%	53.77% -12.24	52.35% -1.42
Ending Inventories (tonnes)	66,400	102,300 +54.07%	220,300 +115.35%

Source: Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 72 and 73.

7.184. In the overall evaluation of the state of the domestic industry, MOFCOM noted the significant increase in inventories, by 231.78% over the POI, as one of the "negative factors" showing material injury to the domestic industry. In the causation analysis, MOFCOM also stated that "the ending inventory increased continuously".<sup>314</sup> In this respect, Canada submits that MOFCOM's data shows that the domestic industry's output was exceeding the volume of sales, and that this caused an increase in inventories.<sup>315</sup> Indeed, the data shows that throughout the POI, the domestic industry's output increased roughly in line with increases in capacity, and exceeded its sales, resulting in continued and significant increases in inventories. Thus, the data indicates that the domestic industry increased production capacity in excess of the increase in total domestic demand, which suggests that to the extent injury was manifested in increased inventories, capacity expansion played a role in that injury. MOFCOM failed to address this possibility, and indeed dismissed it altogether.

7.185. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM failed to adequately examine the domestic industry's overcapacity, overexpansion, and inventory build-up as other factors causing injury and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by these other factors were not attributed to the dumped imports, and therefore acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

<sup>313</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 82.

<sup>314</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 76-78.

<sup>315</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 169.

### 7.7.4.3 Impact of non-dumped imports

7.186. With respect to the allegedly injurious impact of non-dumped imports<sup>316</sup>, MOFCOM looked at prices of dumped and non-dumped imports, and found that there were no large differences between imported dumped and non-dumped products in terms of price and quantity, but acknowledged that the dumped imports were generally better quality. MOFCOM noted that non-dumped imports constituted a significant proportion of total imports, and specifically discussed non-dumped imports from the largest sources, i.e. South Africa, Indonesia, and Sweden. MOFCOM concluded that non-dumped imports did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury to the Chinese domestic industry.<sup>317</sup>

7.187. Canada argues that MOFCOM's analysis is based on a consideration of non-dumped imports in relation to the dumped imports.<sup>318</sup> Canada submits that Article 3.5 requires an investigating authority to examine the effect of the non-dumped imports on the domestic industry, not in relation to dumped imports.<sup>319</sup> Canada contends that MOFCOM's analysis was subjective and biased, and asserts that MOFCOM should have considered data on sales volumes, market share and prices of non-dumped imports and compared this data with those for the dumped imports and the domestic industry. In addition, Canada submits that MOFCOM's examination of the non-dumped imports is flawed because MOFCOM failed to present any quantity or price data with regard to non-dumped imports, failed to support its statement regarding a quality difference between dumped and non-dumped imports with "positive evidence", and failed to present any explicit data to support its assertions with regard to imports from South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia.<sup>320</sup>

7.188. China responds that MOFCOM conducted an objective examination of positive evidence with regard to the impact of non-dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry. In particular, MOFCOM observed that non-dumped imports constituted a significant proportion of total imports.<sup>321</sup> It further examined the relationship between the prices of dumped imports and non-dumped imports and concluded that there were no significant differences, albeit the dumped imports were generally of better quality.<sup>322</sup> MOFCOM specifically addressed the relative prices and volume of non-dumped imports from South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia, major producers of cellulose pulp.<sup>323</sup>

7.189. We recall that Article 3.5 does not provide any guidance regarding how a non-attribution analysis is to be conducted. Therefore, we see no basis in the text to support Canada's view that the methodology used by MOFCOM was impermissible. Nor do we see any basis in the text that would require an investigating authority to examine the effect of non-dumped imports on the domestic industry, and not in relation to dumped imports. As discussed above, in the absence of any particular methodological requirements, the question before us is whether MOFCOM sufficiently explained its conclusion that the effect of non-dumped imports did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury to the domestic industry, and thus whether this was a conclusion that could be reached by a reasonable and objective investigating authority on the basis of the evidence before it, and in light of the arguments made by the interested parties.

7.190. MOFCOM found that the share of the non-dumped imports in total imports was 50.68% in 2010, 57.23% in 2011 and 56.04% in 2012.<sup>324</sup> MOFCOM observed that there were no large differences in the quantity and prices of non-dumped imports and dumped imports. While the actual data regarding the volume and prices of non-dumped and dumped imports are not set out in the Final Determination, China provided the following information on the record in this regard:

---

<sup>316</sup> Imports of cellulose pulp not found to be dumped pursuant to the investigation.

<sup>317</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 84 and 85.

<sup>318</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 178.

<sup>319</sup> Canada's second written submission, para. 178.

<sup>320</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 172-174; second written submission, para. 179.

<sup>321</sup> China's first written submission, para. 169; second written submission, paras. 153 and 154.

<sup>322</sup> China's first written submission, para. 169; second written submission, paras. 153-156.

<sup>323</sup> China's first written submission, para. 171.

<sup>324</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 84.

**Table 9: Volume and prices of dumped and non-dumped imports**

POI	2010	2011	2012
Dumped imports (tonnes)	421,009.93	419,050.31	605,470.23
Non-dumped imports (tonnes)	432,584.92	560,720.54	771,971.03
Prices of dumped imports (US dollars)	1384.05	1946.96	1165.33
Prices of non-dumped imports (US dollars)	1378.17	1721.21	1051.75

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 35, paras. 103 and 105.

We observe that in 2010 the quantity of dumped and non-dumped imports was almost identical. During the rest of the POI, the volume of non-dumped imports was greater than that of dumped imports, while the prices of the non-dumped imports were lower. MOFCOM also stated that the dumped imports were generally of better quality than the non-dumped imports, which, China contends, suggests that the dumped imports were in a stronger competitive position relative to the domestic like product than the non-dumped imports and the differences in prices would be mitigated by quality differences.<sup>325</sup> While this explanation is not unreasonable, it does not appear in MOFCOM's Final Determination, which does not discuss this alleged relationship between competition, price, and quality. Thus, it is an *ex post* explanation which we cannot take it into account in our evaluation of MOFCOM's determination.

7.191. MOFCOM specifically discussed the quantity and prices of non-dumped imports only from South Africa, Indonesia, and Sweden.<sup>326</sup> China explains that these were the three largest sources of non-dumped imports.<sup>327</sup> China provided data from the record of the investigation on the volume of non-dumped imports from all sources in support of MOFCOM's conclusions on the impact of non-dumped imports.<sup>328</sup> In our view, given that the non-dumped imports MOFCOM did not specifically discuss accounted for between 18% and 25% of total imports over the POI, a reasonable and objective investigating authority would have to take these imports into account in its non-attribution analysis, which MOFCOM appears to have done in considering the total volume and prices of non-dumped imports. While it might have been preferable had MOFCOM set out and discussed the data on the volumes and prices of non-dumped imports in its Final Determination in greater detail, the failure to do so is not in itself erroneous, as the data were in the record.

**Table 10: Volume of Dumped and Non-Dumped imports and share of total imports accounted for by countries other than South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia**

POI	2010	2011	2012
Volume of dumped imports	421,009.93	419,050.31	605,470.23
Volume of non-dumped imports <sup>329</sup>	432,584.92	560,720.54	771,971.03
Volume of non-dumped imports from South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia*	273,363.38	321,713.66	419,322.73
Volume of non-dumped imports from countries other than South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia	159,221.54	239,006.88	352,648.30
Total imports*	853,594.85	979,770.85	1,377,441.26
Share of total imports accounted of by countries other than South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia*	18.65%	24.40%	25.60%

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 37, table A.

\* calculated by the Secretariat

<sup>325</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 65, para. 56.

<sup>326</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 85.

<sup>327</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 67, para. 60.

<sup>328</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 37, table A.

<sup>329</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 103.

7.192. The data before MOFCOM suggests that the effect of the non-dumped imports on prices and consequently on the domestic industry was similar to that of the dumped imports – the volumes and prices were similar, and moved similarly over the POI. MOFCOM found that the dumped imports were causing injury to the domestic industry. It would seem that non-dumped imports might therefore be having a similarly injurious effect on the domestic industry. Indeed, MOFCOM did not find that non-dumped imports did not have such an effect, but rather concluded that they did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. However, there is little explanation of how MOFCOM reached this conclusion. Simply to state that MOFCOM did indeed separate and distinguish the injury or that non-dumped imports did not break the causal link, without further explanation, does not suffice to persuade us that the investigating authority did in fact undertake the necessary examination and reach an objective conclusion warranted by the evidence and arguments before it that injuries caused by non-dumped imports were not attributed to the dumped imports. Taken together, the failure to specifically discuss non-dumped imports accounting for between 18% and 25% of total imports over the POI, and the failure to explain how MOFCOM reached the conclusion that non-dumped imports, whose volume was greater than that of dumped imports throughout the POI and whose prices were below those of the dumped imports in 2011 and 2012 when MOFCOM found that dumped imports were depressing domestic prices and causing injury, did not break the causal link between dumped imports and material injury, leads us to the view that MOFCOM's conclusions were not such as could have been reached by a reasonable and objective investigating authority in light of the evidence and arguments before it.

**Table 11: Market shares of domestic industry, dumped and non-dumped imports**

POI	H1/2010	H2/2010	H1/2011	H2/2011	H1/2012	H2/2012
Market share of like product of the domestic industry	18%	21.36%	17.54%	18.64%	26.71%	25.73%
Market share of dumped imports	20.53%	20.88%	18.02%	19.91%	21.45%	22.57%
Market share of other Chinese producers	38.35%		37.58%		23.71%	
Market share of non-dumped imports*	21.27%		25.36%		28.06%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 37, table B.

\* calculated by the Secretariat

**Table 12: Prices of dumped and non-dumped imports**

	2010	2011	2012
Prices of dumped imports (USD Annual)	1384.05	1946.96	1165.33
Prices of imports from South Africa (USD Annual)	1049	1397	948
Prices of imports from Indonesia (USD Annual)	1487	1717	1039
Prices of imports from Sweden (USD Annual)	1404	1883	1104
Prices of non-dumped imports from other countries (USD Annual)	1436.75	1810.02	1084.35

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 37, table C.

7.193. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM failed to adequately examine the non-dumped imports as a factor other than dumped imports causing injury and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by these imports were not attributed to the dumped imports, and therefore acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

#### 7.7.4.4 Shortage of cotton linter

7.194. During the investigation, interested parties argued that the domestic industry had a low rate of capacity utilization due to an insufficient supply of cotton linter, the main raw material for production of cotton-based cellulose pulp.<sup>330</sup> MOFCOM addressed these arguments in its examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and concluded that the low capacity utilization rate, which MOFCOM considered an aspect of injury, was not caused by an insufficient supply of cotton linter.<sup>331</sup>

7.195. Canada argues that MOFCOM's conclusion that a shortage of cotton linter was not a cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rate was erroneous because MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence indicating that there were producers of other products using cotton linter as a input, and that total cotton linter demand surpassed total cotton linter supply.<sup>332</sup> China asserts that MOFCOM conducted an objective examination of positive evidence regarding the supply of cotton linter and found that the supply was sufficient and that the changes in supply of cotton linter were not the cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rate and thus there was no need to separate and distinguish the effect of this factor from the injurious effect of dumped imports.<sup>333</sup>

7.196. MOFCOM noted that the domestic industry produced three types of cellulose pulp: wood-, bamboo-, and cotton-based cellulose pulp. Cotton linter is a raw material for the production of cotton-based cellulose pulp only.<sup>334</sup> MOFCOM found that in 2012, the volume of wood- and bamboo-based cellulose pulp accounted for 70% to total sales of cellulose pulp. MOFCOM acknowledged that the output and price of cotton linter had a direct effect on production of cotton-based cellulose pulp, and that cotton linter was mainly used by producers of cotton-based cellulose pulp. MOFCOM examined the total production capacity, output, and capacity utilization of cotton cellulose pulp producers and the domestic supply of cotton linter over the POI.<sup>335</sup> Having considered the supply of cotton linter available on the market MOFCOM found that the capacity utilization rate of the producers of cotton-based cellulose pulp could have been higher had the full production of cotton linter available been used by those pulp producers, however, it stayed at a

---

<sup>330</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 178 (referring to Final Determination, (Exhibit CAN-3), pp. 75 and 76; Cosmo Specialty Fibers, Inc., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Argument of no Injury, 4 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-11), pp. 37 and 38; Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC., Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments Regarding Material Injury and Causality, 29 July 2013, (Exhibit CAN-12), p. 18; American Forest and Paper Association, Anti-Dumping Investigation on Imports of Cellulose Pulp, Comments on Industry Injury Investigation, 24 September 2013, (Exhibit CAN-10), p. 11; Weyerhaeuser, MOFCOM Presentation, 4 June 2013, (Exhibit CAN-21), p. 8; Tangshan Sanyou Group Company Limited, *Impact of "Anti-Dumping [Measures]" Against Imported Dissolving Pulp on the Viscose Industry*, (Exhibit CAN-18), p. 3; and Xingda Chemical Fiber Co., Ltd. of the Tangshan Sanyou Group, *Report on the Impact of Anti-Dumping Measures Applied to Imported Dissolving Pulp*, (5 December 2013), (Exhibit CAN-15), pp. 3 and 4).

<sup>331</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 74-76.

<sup>332</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 181, 182, and 185 (referring to CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2011, (March 2012), (Exhibit CAN-5) (BCI), p. 6; Multi-Client Study: Outlook for Global Dissolving Pulp Market 2011, (Exhibit CAN-6) (BCI), pp. 4 and 8; and CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 6); second written submission, paras. 189 and 190.

<sup>333</sup> China's first written submission, paras. 175-180; second written submission, paras. 160-167.

<sup>334</sup> In this regard, we note that MOFCOM relied in its analysis on a unit consumption ratio of 1 tonne of cotton-based cellulose pulp from approximately 1.3 tonnes of cotton linter. Canada disagrees with this ratio, and argues that the ratio should have been 1 tonne of cotton-based cellulose pulp from approximately [\*\*\*] tonnes of cotton linter. (Canada's first written submission, para. 186). We consider that the difference between the two ratios is so small that the use of Canada's proposed ratio would not have an impact on MOFCOM's analysis, and Canada has not demonstrated otherwise.

<sup>335</sup> MOFCOM found that total production capacity of the domestic cotton cellulose pulp industry was 1.4 million tonnes in 2010, 1.4 million tonnes in 2011, and 1.8 million tonnes in 2012; total output of the domestic cotton cellulose pulp industry was 720,000 tonnes in 2010, 810,000 tonnes in 2011, and 830,000 tonnes in 2012; capacity utilization rate of cotton cellulose pulp industry was 51.43% in 2010, 57.86% in 2011, and 46.11% in 2012. The total domestic supply of cotton linter was 1.44 million tonnes in 2010, 1.35 million tonnes in 2011, and 1.64 million tonnes in 2012. (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 75).

lower rate.<sup>336</sup> MOFCOM concluded that the low capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry was therefore not caused by an insufficient supply of cotton linter.<sup>337</sup>

7.197. Canada argues that MOFCOM failed to consider a report that had been submitted during the investigation indicating that there were producers of products other than cotton-based cellulose pulp using cotton linter as an input, and that overall, cotton linter demand was higher than available supply.<sup>338</sup> China asserts that MOFCOM considered this evidence and found that the supply of cotton linter was sufficient. China notes that the report referred to by Canada supports this conclusion, stating that the shortage of cotton linters was covered by linters made of waste cotton and that "the supply in 2012 was relatively sufficient".<sup>339</sup>

7.198. According to the data referred by Canada, the proportion of total demand for cotton linter from other producers, namely producers of specialty pulp and refined cotton, was approximately [\*\*\*] in 2010, [\*\*\*] in 2011, and [\*\*\*] in 2012.<sup>340</sup> In our view, although it might have been preferable had MOFCOM specifically recognized that there was demand for cotton linter from other producers in its discussion, this omission does not undermine MOFCOM's overall conclusion that a shortage of cotton linter was not a cause of the domestic cellulose pulp industry's low capacity utilization rate. We recall in this regard that the domestic industry produced cellulose pulp from three different raw materials, and cotton linters are used only in the production of cotton-based cellulose pulp. China provided data regarding the shares of cotton-, wood-, and bamboo-based cellulose pulp in total sales of cellulose pulp during the POI:

**Table 13: Share of cotton- based and wood- and bamboo-based cellulose pulp in total sales of cellulose pulp**

Year	Share of Cotton Pulp Sales	Share of Wood and Bamboo Pulp Sales
2010	[***]%	[***]%
2011	[***]%	[***]%
2012	[***]%	[***]%

Source: China's response to Panel question No. 69, para. 70.<sup>341</sup>

7.199. In our view, this data could suggest that the shortage of cotton linter led to increased sales of cellulose pulp made from wood and bamboo. We recall that the sales of the domestic like product increased in general during the POI by 80% and specifically in 2012<sup>342</sup>, when the sales of wood- and bamboo-based cellulose pulp, which had accounted for less than 30% of total sales at the beginning of the POI, accounted for 70% of total sales of the domestic industry. Therefore, it would appear that the domestic industry reacted to any shortage of cotton linter by increasing sales of the other two types of cellulose pulp.

7.200. Canada also argues that MOFCOM failed to examine the proportion of sales of different types of cellulose pulp over the entire POI, but rather focused on the proportion of sales of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp in 2012.<sup>343</sup> The 70% proportion of sales of wood- and bamboo-based cellulose pulp was the highest level during the POI, and occurred during the period in which MOFCOM found material injury caused by dumped imports. Furthermore, MOFCOM found the prices of the domestic like product were depressed by the dumped imports in the second part of the POI, starting from the second part of 2011 until the end of 2012. Therefore, in our view, it was

<sup>336</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 75.

<sup>337</sup> Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 76.

<sup>338</sup> Canada's first written submission paras. 181 and 185, and table 4 (referring to CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 6); second written submission, para. 193.

<sup>339</sup> China's first written submission, para. 176 (referring to CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 5); second written submission, para. 161.

<sup>340</sup> Canada's first written submission, table 4 (referring to CCFGroup, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, (February 2013), (Exhibit CAN-4) (BCI), p. 6).

<sup>341</sup> China clarified that this data was derived by MOFCOM from the responses to questionnaires provided by the domestic industry. (China's response to Panel question No. 69, para. 70).

<sup>342</sup> Sales of the domestic like product were 400,200 tonnes in 2010; 399,800 tonnes in 2011; 721,300 tonnes in 2012. (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), p. 72).

<sup>343</sup> Canada's second written submission, paras. 191 and 192.

not unreasonable for MOFCOM to focus on the fact that in 2012 the main proportion of domestic sales included cellulose pulp made of wood and bamboo.

7.201. In addition, Canada submits that the low capacity utilization rate of cotton pulp producers was driving down the overall capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry.<sup>344</sup> Although the capacity utilization rate of cotton-based cellulose pulp producers was lower than that of the domestic industry during certain parts of the POI, it did not differ considerably.<sup>345</sup> Even granting that the lower rates for the cotton-based cellulose pulp producers accounted for part of the decline in the domestic industry's capacity utilization rate, we note that cotton-based cellulose pulp producers' capacity utilization rate was higher than the domestic industry's rate in 2011, when cotton-based cellulose pulp producers accounted for more than half of production of cellulose pulp, and declined more in 2012 than the capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry, when their share in total domestic production also declined significantly. This does not suggest to us that the decline in cotton-based cellulose pulp producers' capacity utilization drove down the overall capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry.

7.202. We therefore conclude that MOFCOM did not fail to adequately examine the injury allegedly caused by the shortage of cotton linter and did not fail to ensure that such injury was not attributed to the dumped imports, and therefore did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

## 7.8 Consequential claims

7.203. Canada claims that the MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, as a consequence of the alleged violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.<sup>346</sup>

7.204. Canada's claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 are purely consequential, in the sense that they depend on the outcome of other claims brought by Canada under other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As a consequence of the inconsistencies with the Anti-Dumping Agreement above, we find that China acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

## 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, we conclude that Canada has failed to establish that China acted inconsistently with:

- a. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's consideration of the volume of the dumped imports;
- b. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's consideration of price effects in light of changes in dumped imports' market share, and by taking into account pricing documents and meeting minutes in that consideration;
- c. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry; and
- d. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's examination of the shortage of cotton linter as an allegedly known factor other than the dumped imports allegedly causing injury to the domestic industry.

8.2. For the reasons set forth in this Report, we further conclude that Canada has established that China acted inconsistently with:

---

<sup>344</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 182.

<sup>345</sup> The capacity utilization rate for cotton-based cellulose pulp producers was 51.43% in 2010, 57.86% in 2011, and 46.11% in 2012, while the capacity utilization rate for the domestic industry was 66.01% in 2010, 53.77% in 2011, and 52.35% in 2012. (Final Determination, (Exhibit CHN-1), pp. 73 and 75).

<sup>346</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 189; second written submission, para. 196.

- a. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's consideration of price effects by failing to adequately explain both the role of parallel price trends and the fact that dumped import prices were higher than those of the domestic like product;
- b. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to MOFCOM's demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and injury; and
- c. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in connection with MOFCOM's examination of the effects of changes in cotton and VSF prices; domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up; and the impact of non-dumped imports as allegedly known factors other than the dumped imports causing injury to the domestic industry, and MOFCOM's failure to ensure that injuries caused by these factors were not attributed to the dumped imports.

8.3. As a consequence of the inconsistencies we have found, we further conclude that Canada has established that China acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

8.4. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered *prima facie* to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measure at issue has been found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Canada under these agreements.

8.5. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, we recommend that China bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_





---

**CHINA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF  
CELLULOSE PULP FROM CANADA**

REPORT OF THE PANEL

*Addendum*

This *addendum* contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document WT/DS483/R.

---

**LIST OF ANNEXES****ANNEX A**

## INTERIM REVIEW AND WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex A-1	Interim Review	A-2
Annex A-2	Working Procedures of the Panel	A-7
Annex A-3	Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning Business Confidential Information	A-12

**ANNEX B**

## ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex B-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-2
Annex B-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-15

**ANNEX C**

## ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex C-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-2
Annex C-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-14

**ANNEX D**

## ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex D-1	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil	D-2
Annex D-2	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union	D-5
Annex D-3	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan	D-8
Annex D-4	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway	D-11
Annex D-5	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States	D-13

**ANNEX A**

INTERIM REVIEW AND WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex A-1	Interim Review	A-2
Annex A-2	Working Procedures of the Panel	A-7
Annex A-3	Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning Business Confidential Information	A-12

## **ANNEX A-1**

### INTERIM REVIEW

#### **1 INTRODUCTION**

In compliance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this Annex sets out the Panel's discussion of the arguments made at the interim review stage. We have modified certain aspects of the Report in light of the parties' comments where we considered it appropriate, as explained below. In addition, the Panel has made a number of changes of an editorial nature to improve the clarity and accuracy of the Report or to correct typographical and other non-substantive errors, certain of which were suggested by the parties.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of the changes that we have made, the numbering of footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the Interim Report. References to footnotes and paragraph numbers in this section relate to the Final Report.

#### **2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR REVIEW SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES**

##### **2.1 Footnote 9**

China requests that the Panel identify relevant provisions of the DSU and the Working Procedures for deciding to admit Canada's letter dated 15 September 2016. Canada objects to China's request, noting that were the Panel to grant China's request, it could refer to Article 12.1 of the DSU and paragraph 26 of the Working Procedures.

We have decided not to grant China's request. The DSU does not establish strict rules regarding the timing of parties' submissions. Panels adopt their working procedures after consulting with the parties to the dispute, and may adapt their procedures where warranted. In this instance, the Panel provided China with an opportunity to comment on Canada's letter. In its response dated 23 September 2016, China both objected to receipt of Canada's letter, and set out China's views on the substance of the letter. The Panel accepted both Canada's letter and China's response in the exercise of its authority over the conduct of the proceedings.

##### **2.2 Paragraph 7.6**

China suggests referring to "Panel" instead of "panels" in the last sentence of paragraph 7.6 in order to take into account the reference to "the present dispute" at the end of the sentence. Canada objects to China's suggestion and requests that the Panel replace "the present dispute" with "disputes", which would ensure consistency, because the word "panels" is used throughout Section 7.2.2 "Standard of Review".

We have modified paragraph 7.6 to be grammatically and logically correct.

##### **2.3 Paragraph 7.8**

China notes that the reference to both "at issue" and "it challenges" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.8 may be duplicative and suggests deleting one of them. Canada agrees.

We have modified the second sentence of paragraph 7.8 to avoid the duplication.

##### **2.4 Footnote 59**

China suggests adding the word "economic" to the phrase "all relevant factors" in the first sentence of footnote 59 in order to reflect the precise language in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada agrees.

---

<sup>1</sup> These include changes in paragraphs 7.66, 7.84, 7.172, 7.182, 7.183, and 8.2, and in footnotes 183, 256, 286, 334, and 338.

We have amended footnote 59 accordingly.

## **2.5 Paragraph 7.25**

China suggests that the phrase "an investigating authority" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.25 should be changed to "investigating authorities" in order to be grammatically accurate with the succeeding text in the block quote. Canada agrees.

We have modified the quoted text to eliminate the inconsistency.

## **2.6 Paragraph 7.52**

China notes that paragraph 7.52 reflects its procedural objection and requests that the Panel modify this paragraph by adding its non-procedural arguments. Canada objects to China's request, submitting that the arguments China suggests adding relate to its substantive position on Article 3.2 and are not relevant for Panel's consideration of the procedural objection.

Given that we address Canada's arguments on the substance of its allegation after resolving the procedural objection, we have decided to grant China's request and modified paragraph 7.52 accordingly.

## **2.7 Paragraph 7.58**

China requests that the Panel add a new paragraph after paragraph 7.58 to fully reflect its arguments on MOFCOM's price effects analysis. Canada objects to China's request, noting that paragraph 7.57 summarizes Canada's claims regarding MOFCOM's consideration of price effects and paragraph 7.58 summarizes China's response to Canada's claims. According to Canada, the new paragraph suggested by China is not necessary, because it includes arguments that do not directly address Canada's claims.

We have modified paragraph 7.58 to better reflect China's arguments.

## **2.8 Paragraph 7.67**

China requests that the Panel modify paragraph 7.67 to fully reflect its arguments. Canada objects to China's request, asserting that paragraph 7.67 comprehensively summarizes China's arguments regarding Canada's claim on parallel price trends and additional information is not necessary. Canada also notes that the arguments China suggests adding refer to MOFCOM's examination of pricing documents and meeting minutes and are not relevant for the examination of parallel price trends.

We have modified paragraph 7.67 and added footnote 143 to paragraph 7.77 to better reflect China's arguments.

## **2.9 Paragraph 7.82**

China suggests including additional arguments it made at the end of paragraph 7.82 or as a new paragraph. Canada objects to China's request, asserting that paragraph 7.82 succinctly summarizes China's arguments and further summary proposed by China is not necessary.

We have decided to deny China's request. Paragraph 7.82 relates to our analysis of MOFCOM's consideration of the fact that dumped imports were sold at higher prices than the domestic like product. The arguments China wishes to add relate to other aspects of our analysis, and are reflected and addressed elsewhere in the Report. Specifically, MOFCOM's consideration of pricing documents and meeting minutes is addressed in Section 7.5.6 of the Report, and China's argument that all factors and evidence were considered by MOFCOM collectively is addressed in Section 7.5.7 of the Report.

## 2.10 Footnote 164

Canada requests that the Panel clarify the third sentence in footnote 157 (footnote 164 in the Final Report), submitting that it is unclear whether the third sentence refers to the findings in *China – Autos (US)* discussed in that footnote or the facts before the Panel in the present dispute. China objects to Canada's request, maintaining that the sentence clearly refers to the present dispute and Canada's request is not justified.

The third sentence as originally drafted referred to the findings in the present dispute. In order to eliminate any confusion, we have modified the footnote.

## 2.11 Paragraphs 7.104, 7.111 and 7.118

Canada suggests that the Panel revise the last sentence of paragraph 7.104, the third sentence of paragraph 7.111 and the last sentence of paragraph 7.118 to replace the phrase "the explanatory force of the dumped/subject imports for" with the phrase "whether the dumped/subject imports have explanatory force for". China objects to Canada's requests, considering that the proposed changes alter the meaning conveyed by the sentences.

The sentences as originally drafted express the meaning intended by the Panel, and we have therefore decided to deny Canada's requests.

## 2.12 Paragraph 7.144

Canada requests that the Panel replace the phrase "[i]n the alternative" with the phrase "in addition" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.144, asserting that Canada's argument mentioned in that sentence was a separate and additional argument, rather than an alternative one. China objects to Canada's request. For China, the Panel's reference to Canada's argument as one made "[i]n the alternative" is reasonable in light of the language used by Canada, noting that paragraph 133 of Canada's first written submission introduces this argument with the phrase "[e]ven if MOFCOM's volume effects and prices effects analysis were found to be consistent ...".

The paragraph as originally drafted expresses the Panel's understanding of Canada's argument as proposing an alternative basis for a finding that MOFCOM's causation analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 to that referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph. We therefore deny Canada's request.

## 2.13 Paragraph 7.145

China requests that the Panel add a new paragraph following paragraph 7.145 to fully reflect MOFCOM's key findings on causation. Canada objects to China's request, submitting that paragraph 7.145 provides a succinct summary of China's response to Canada's claims regarding MOFCOM causation analysis and the additional paragraph suggested by China would be repetitive.

The additional detailed data underlying MOFCOM's causation analysis China seeks to add in a new paragraph is reflected elsewhere in the Report and discussed in the Panel's analysis as relevant. Thus, we consider it superfluous to include that detailed data in either this or a new paragraph. However, we have modified this paragraph to more fully reflect China's arguments and added relevant references in footnote 244 to indicate where the detailed data China seeks to add can be found in MOFCOM's determination.

## 2.14 Paragraph 7.155

Given the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.155 that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide guidance as to the structure of an investigating authority's final determination, China suggests that the first sentence of this paragraph be amended to replace the phrase "the context of" with the phrase "section of the Final Determination concerning/on the." Canada's did not comment on this suggestion.

As this proposed change does not affect our views as set out in this paragraph, we have decided to grant China's request and amended paragraph 7.155 accordingly.

### **2.15 Paragraph 7.161**

Canada suggests adding the word "while" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.161, after the first quotation. China did not comment on this suggestion.

We have modified paragraph 7.161 accordingly.

### **2.16 Paragraph 7.162**

China suggests clarifying that the fourth sentence of paragraph 7.162 refers to *cotton* cellulose pulp. Canada agrees.

We have modified paragraph 7.162 accordingly.

### **2.17 Paragraph 7.171**

China requests that the Panel revise the last sentence of paragraph 7.171. Canada agrees with China's request and further requests that the sentence be re-ordered and re-worded to improve its clarity.

We have modified paragraph 7.171 in line with the parties' suggestions.

### **2.18 Footnote 304**

China requests that the Panel add a reference to para. 135 of China's second written submission in footnote 296 (footnote 304 in the Final Report). Canada agrees with China's request.

We have added the reference requested by China.

### **2.19 Paragraph 7.178**

China requests that the Panel delete the word "never" in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7.178. Canada agrees with the China's request.

We have amended paragraph 7.178 accordingly.

### **2.20 Paragraph 7.184**

China suggests that the Panel replace the phrase "increased demand" with the phrase "the increase in the total domestic demand" in the penultimate sentence of para. 7.184 to more accurately reflect the data. Canada agrees, but proposes a different formulation of the replacement phrase, "the increase in total domestic demand". China also suggests inserting a footnote reference to the Final Determination following the first and second sentences of paragraph 7.184. Canada agrees with China's suggestion.

We have modified paragraph 7.184 in accordance with the suggestions of the parties and added footnote 314.

### **2.21 Paragraph 7.186**

China requests that the Panel delete the reference to the dumped imports from Canada in paragraph 7.186, since MOFCOM's conclusion that the non-dumped imports did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury to the domestic industry refers to the dumped imports generally, i.e. from all investigated countries. Canada agrees with China's request.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.22 Footnote 320**

China suggests changing the reference in footnote 311 (footnote 320 in the Final Report) to paragraphs 172-174 of Canada's first written submission. Canada agrees with China's suggestion.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.23 Paragraph 7.201**

China requests that the Panel clarify the second sentence of paragraph 7.201 by adding the phrase "during certain parts of the POI". Canada agrees with the suggested change.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.24 Footnote 331**

China suggests that references to the Final Determination in footnote 322 (footnote 331 in the Final Report), be changed from pages 74 and 75 to pages 74 and 76. Canada agrees that the reference in this footnote should be changed, but requests that it be changed to pages 74-76.

We have changed the reference in the footnote to pages 74-76 of the Final Determination.



**ANNEX A-2**

## WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

*Adopted on 8 January 2016*

1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working Procedures shall apply.

**General**

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter "party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted to the Panel by another Member which the submitting Member has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public. The parties shall treat business confidential information in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information.

3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter "third parties"), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.

4. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.

**Submissions**

5. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

6. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If Canada requests such a ruling, China shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission. If China requests such a ruling, Canada shall submit its response to the request prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.

7. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.

8. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO working language of the submission at the same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits

upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the grounds of objection and an alternative translation.

9. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its submissions in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions attached as Annex 1, to the extent that it is practical to do so.

10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course of the dispute. For example, exhibits submitted by Canada could be numbered CAN-1, CAN-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered CAN-5, the first exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered CAN-6.

### **Questions**

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, including prior to each substantive meeting.

### **Substantive meetings**

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

- a. The Panel shall invite Canada to make an opening statement to present its case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite China to present its point of view. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the first working day following the meeting.
- b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask the other party questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with Canada presenting its statement first.

14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

- a. The Panel shall ask China if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If so, the Panel shall invite China to present its opening statement, followed by Canada. If the China chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written

version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

- b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask the other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement first, presenting its closing statement first.

### **Third parties**

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:

- a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
- b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order. Third parties present at the third-party session and intending to present their views orally at that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third-parties with provisional written versions of their statements before they take the floor. Third parties shall make available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the session.
- c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any matter raised in the third parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
- d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

**Descriptive part**

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the case.

19. Each party shall submit an integrated executive summary of the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in its first written submissions, first opening and closing oral statements and responses to questions following the first substantive meeting, and a separate integrated executive summary of its written rebuttal, second opening and closing oral statements and responses to questions following the second substantive meeting, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each integrated executive summary shall be limited to no more than 15 pages. The Panel will not summarize in a separate part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties' responses to questions.

20. Each third party shall submit an executive summary of its arguments as presented in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.

21. The Panel reserves the right to request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts and arguments presented by a party or a third party in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be specified in the timetable.

**Interim review**

22. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.

23. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit written comments on the other party's written request for review, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party's written request for review.

24. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.

**Service of documents**

25. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:

- a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the DS Registry (office No. 2047).
- b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. Exhibits may be filed in 2 copies on CD-ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
- c. Each party and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format, either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided by e-mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to xxxxx@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.

- d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time it provides each document to the Panel.
  - e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipient party or third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.
  - f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the interim report and the final report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
26. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with the parties.

**ANNEX A-3**ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL CONCERNING  
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION*Adopted on 8 January 2016*

The following procedures apply to any business confidential information (BCI) submitted in the course of the Panel proceedings in DS483.

1. For the purposes of these Panel proceedings, BCI is any information that has been designated as such by the party submitting the information and that was previously treated as confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 by the Chinese investigating authority in the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this dispute. However, these procedures do not apply to any information that is available in the public domain. In addition, these procedures do not apply to any BCI if the person who provided the information in the course of the aforementioned investigation agrees in writing to make the information publicly available.
2. As required by Article 18.2 of the DSU, a party or third party having access to BCI submitted in these Panel proceedings shall treat it as confidential and shall not disclose that information other than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these procedures. Any information submitted as BCI under these procedures shall only be used for the purposes of this dispute and for no other purpose. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees and/or outside advisors comply with these working procedures to protect BCI. An outside advisor is not permitted access to BCI if that advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or import of the products that were the subject of the investigation at issue in this dispute, or an officer or employee of an association of such enterprises. All third party access to BCI shall be subject to the terms of these working procedures.
3. No person may have access to BCI except a member of the Secretariat or the Panel, an employee of a party or third party under the terms specified in these procedures, or an outside advisor to a party or third party for the purposes of this dispute.
4. The party submitting BCI shall mark the cover and/or first page of the document containing BCI, and each page of the document, to indicate the presence of such information. The specific information in question shall be placed between double brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]. The first page or cover of the document shall state "Contains Business Confidential Information", and each page of the document shall contain the notice "Contains Business Confidential Information" at the top of the page.
5. Any BCI that is submitted in binary-encoded form shall be clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" on a label of the storage medium, and clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" in the binary-encoded files.
6. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a statement shall inform the Panel before making it that the statement will contain BCI, and the Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 4.
7. If a party or third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party contains information which should have been designated as BCI and objects to such submission without BCI designation, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties. The Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate. Similarly, if a party or third party considers that the other

party or a third party submitted information designated as BCI which should not be so designated, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties, and the Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate.

8. Any person authorized to have access to BCI under the terms of these procedures shall store all documents containing BCI in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such information.
9. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.
10. Submissions containing BCI will be included in the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.





**ANNEX B**

ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex B-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-2
Annex B-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-15

**ANNEX B-1**

## FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

**I. CANADA'S FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION<sup>1</sup>**

1. China's measures imposing duties on cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada and the United States were set out in the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) Notice No. 75 [2013] and Notice No. 18 [2014]. Cellulose pulp is the product subject to MOFCOM's dumping investigation, produced through the chemical treatment of plant fibre substances, such as wood fibre, cotton and bamboo. Cellulose pulp is primarily used for the production of viscose fibres, such as VSF.

**A. Legal Argument**

2. China's anti-dumping measures on imports of cellulose pulp from Canada are a result of flawed findings on injury and causation by (MOFCOM). MOFCOM's findings in relation to volume, price effects, impact, causal link and non-attribution constitute violations of China's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the *Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (ADA).

**1. Standard of Review**

3. The applicable standard of review is set out in Article 11 of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (DSU) and Article 17.6 of the ADA. These provisions require the Panel to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case and to determine whether MOFCOM's finding conforms to the requirements of the ADA. Moreover, the Appellate Body has found that panels must determine whether an investigating authority (IA) has made "reasoned and adequate" conclusions "in the light of the evidence on the record". While an investigating authority has discretion in considering conflicting arguments and evidence, panels must ensure that explanations by an IA reflect the conflicting arguments and evidence considered.

**2. Article 3 Provides a Mandatory Framework for Determining whether Subject Imports Caused Injury**

4. The paragraphs of Article 3 provide "the relevant framework and disciplines" that an IA must follow when conducting an injury and causation analysis. These paragraphs form a "logical progression" for the IA to follow in order to answer the "ultimate question" of whether subject imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry. The analyses required by these paragraphs are "interlinked"; the outcome of each must provide a "meaningful basis" to perform the analysis required by the subsequent paragraph. Although Article 3 does not prescribe a specific methodology that an IA must use in making its injury determination, a finding of injury can only be sustained if an IA can demonstrate that it has met the requirements of each discrete paragraph of Article 3<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> Canada has summarized its first written submission and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel. The latter also constitutes a summary of Canada's closing statement. Summaries of Canada's responses to the Panel's questions are contained in relevant footnotes throughout.

<sup>2</sup> **Response to Question 8i:** The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that the phrase "through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" in Article 3.5 makes it clear that the inquiries set forth in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 of whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry". Furthermore, the outcomes of the Article 3.2 and 3.4 analyses "form the basis for the overall causation analysis" in Article 3.5. While Article 3 does not prescribe a specific methodology, the Appellate Body in *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)* has described the disciplines of Article 3 as "necessary, interlinked elements of a single, overall analysis". Thus, while the inquiries set out in Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 do not need to be performed in any particular order, it may be reasonable for an IA to simultaneously consider many of these inquiries.

### 3. MOFCOM's Volume and Price Effects Analyses are Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA

5. The Appellate Body has established that an IA's consideration<sup>3</sup> of the volume of subject imports and their price effects pursuant to Article 3.2 is subject to the overarching principles of Article 3.1 that it involve an objective examination and that it be based on positive evidence. An IA's consideration of these elements must be reflected in the relevant documentation, such as the Final Determination.

6. MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA because MOFCOM failed to analyze whether the increase in subject imports was "significant". By failing to do so, MOFCOM also failed to consider positive evidence indicating that the increase in subject imports was not significant. Accordingly, China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA.

7. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 require MOFCOM to consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in China<sup>4</sup>. However, in its Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the volume of subject imports increased by 43.82% over the period of investigation (POI). It also calculated the market share of

---

That said, many aspects of Article 3.4's list of economic factors suggest that a consideration of a volume and price effects may logically precede an examination of "decline in sales, profits, output, market share" and "inventories". An IA may therefore conduct its Article 3.2 consideration prior to its Article 3.4 examination.

**Response to Question 8ii:** In accordance with Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the ADA, an IA must make a determination that satisfies the obligations in Article 3 before it may impose anti-dumping duties. Given that Article 3.5 requires the ultimate demonstration that subject imports caused injury "through the effects of dumping as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4", it is clear that an Article 3.5 determination relying on Articles 3.2 and 3.4 analyses is required to impose duties.

In particular, the obligation in the first sentence of Article 3.2 is to consider whether there has been a significant increase in imports. An IA could conclude that there has not been a significant increase or that there was a significant increase, but no price effect under the second sentence. Nevertheless, in order to apply duties, the IA is obliged to conduct Articles 3.4 and 3.5 analyses.

In this case, MOFCOM found, although improperly, that there was a significant increase in dumped imports and price depression. Thus, there is no question that MOFCOM was required to perform impact and causation analyses: it failed to do so in a manner consistent with Articles 3.4 and 3.5.

**Response to Question 8iii:** The last sentences of each of Articles 3.2 and 3.4 do not provide guidance with respect to the order of an Article 3 analysis or whether an IA must continue its analysis under subsequent paragraphs if it finds no significant increase in volume or no significant price effects. Rather, these provisions clarify that, within these analyses, the listed factors do not necessarily give decisive guidance.

<sup>3</sup> **Response to Question 5:** Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.2, an IA must demonstrate that it has properly considered whether any increase in subject import volume is significant. The Appellate Body has explained that the obligation to "consider" in Article 3.2 requires an IA to take something into account in reaching a decision; it does not require the IA to make a definitive determination. However, this does not diminish the rigour required of the inquiry. The "consideration" must also be reflected in relevant documentation.

The exact nature of the statements required in a final determination depend on a number of factors, including: (i) the importance of the conclusion on volume to the subsequent conclusions regarding prices effects, impact and causation; (ii) whether there is competing positive evidence regarding the significance of the increase; or (iii) whether interested parties provided alternative explanations of the evidence.

In this case, all three of these factors were present. Thus, MOFCOM was obliged to more fully demonstrate that it had objectively considered whether the increase in subject imports was significant. It did not. It merely asserted that subject imports increased in absolute terms without providing an adequate explanation of whether this increase was significant as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2.

<sup>4</sup> **Response to Question 7:** An analysis of whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports does not require an IA to consider the effect or impact of the volume of subject imports on the domestic like product. Rather, the relationships between the volume and market share of subject imports and the domestic like product or the domestic industry are dealt with in subsequent analyses under Article 3.

In particular, the second sentence of Article 3.2 requires an IA to consider the effect of subject imports on prices of the domestic like product; this includes a consideration of the absolute volume and market share of subject imports. Article 3.4 requires an IA to examine the impact of subject imports on the state of the domestic industry; this includes an examination of the volume and market share of the subject imports on the economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4. Article 3.5 requires an ultimate determination of the relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry. It specifically refers to the "effects of dumping as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" – making it clear that the IA's much broader Article 3.5 analysis of consideration must incorporate its initial consideration of volume under 3.2. However, these later analyses of the effect or impact of the subject imports are not required to be conducted under the first sentence of Article 3.2.

subject imports to have increased by 1.31 percentage points over the POI. On this basis, MOFCOM determined that the absolute and relative quantity of the dumped imports showed a growth trend during the POI. In Canada's view, this determination fails to meet the standard articulated in Article 3.2 as MOFCOM failed to analyze whether the increase in subject imports was significant.

8. Moreover, the Appellate Body has confirmed that the term "significant" in Article 3.2 means "noteworthy, important, consequential". With respect to a consideration of volume, an IA must objectively examine all positive evidence relating to the magnitude of any increase in volume and the circumstances in which subject imports entered the domestic market to determine whether an increase is significant. An IA may not disregard evidence suggesting that volumes of subject imports are not significant.

9. MOFCOM did not meet this standard. MOFCOM simply set out data with regard to volume and market share and determined that these data showed a growth trend in subject imports. It provided no qualitative or contextual analysis of the magnitude or any other aspect of this trend. In addition, MOFCOM failed to consider the circumstances surrounding the increases in absolute and relative volumes that demonstrated that the increase was not significant, i.e. trends in total domestic demand, volume of sales from the domestic industry and non-subject imports.

10. Positive evidence regarding these trends showed that subject import volumes generally increased in proportion to domestic demand, but only half as quickly as the volume of sales from domestic production or non-subject imports. Also, while the market share of subject imports remained essentially stable over the POI, the market share of both sales from domestic production and sales by non-subject imports increased significantly, by 6.54 and 6.79 percentage points respectively. MOFCOM is silent about these trends that could have provided insight into the circumstances surrounding the increase in subject import volume and helped assess whether any growth in subject import volume was actually significant.

11. MOFCOM's price effects analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA because it is based on an improper consideration of the effect of the subject imports on the price of the domestic like product.

12. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 require MOFCOM to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, whether the effect of the subject imports was to depress prices of the domestic like product to a significant degree or to prevent price increases. The Appellate Body has explained that an IA is required to consider whether subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression or suppression of domestic prices<sup>5</sup>.

13. MOFCOM found that from the second half of 2011 to the end of the POI, subject imports depressed the prices of the domestic like product through a continuing decline in subject import pricing and a rapid increase in subject import volume. MOFCOM's finding is flawed for the following four reasons.

14. First, MOFCOM failed to explain how identifying parallel trends in pricing could substantiate a finding of significant price depression. In its price effect analysis, MOFCOM referred to the prices of subject imports and the domestic like product following the same trend. Both prices first rose and then declined, showing an overall downward trend during the POI. However, as was the case with

---

<sup>5</sup> **Response to Question 11:** Canada paraphrased the Appellate Body in its opening statement (para. 33) that an IA "should have explained how subject imports explained significant price depression".

The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that while the obligation to "consider" in Article 3.2 does not require the IA to make a definitive determination such as that required in Article 3.5, nevertheless, this does not diminish the rigour required of the inquiry. Such consideration must be reflected in relevant documentation. The Appellate Body has also found that an IA "may not disregard evidence that calls into question the explanatory force of [subject imports] for significant price depression [of domestic prices]".

Therefore, under an Article 3.2 analysis an IA "is required to consider the relationship between subject imports and prices of the like products, so as to understand whether subject imports provide explanatory force **for the occurrence of significant price depression [...] of domestic prices**". **This consideration must provide a meaningful basis for the IA's determination as to whether the subject imports, through such price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry.** Thus, the Appellate Body has clearly distinguished a "consideration" of price effects under Article 3.2 from a definitive determination under Article 3.5.

MOFCOM's price effects analyses in *China – GOES*, *China – Autos (US)* and *China – GOES (Article 21.5 – US)*, simply identifying parallel trends in pricing is insufficient<sup>6</sup>.

15. Second, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence that the prices of subject imports were higher than those of the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression. Also, at no time does MOFCOM explain how subject imports, that had prices significantly higher (by as much as 29%) than the domestic like products, could have explanatory force for the depression of the prices of the domestic like product. Instead, MOFCOM appears to have simply relied on its parallel price trend assertions to find price depression.

16. Third, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence that the market share of the subject imports remained essentially stable, while the market share of the domestic like product increased significantly. In *China – Autos (US)*, the panel found that an IA should consider variations in market share levels and movements of the participants in the market before reaching its conclusions. Similarly, here, MOFCOM failed to explain how subject imports could have depressed the price of the domestic like product when the latter increased its relative market share by a factor of more than 2.5 times that of subject imports.

17. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to refer to any positive evidence demonstrating that subject imports depressed the prices of domestic like products. MOFCOM claimed that meeting minutes and pricing reports gathered during on-the-spot verifications showed that starting in the second half of 2011, the decline in subject import prices made it difficult for the domestic industry to clinch deals, forcing it to adjust its price downward. However, MOFCOM failed to explain the exact nature<sup>7</sup> of this apparent evidence or how it explains that the domestic industry was forced to lower its prices. MOFCOM also failed to explain how the domestic industry could have difficulty in clinching deals at a time when its sales and output increased by 78.41% and 62.98%, respectively. Further, it did not explain how higher priced imports could have forced the prices of the domestic industry downward.

#### **4. MOFCOM's Impact Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA**

18. MOFCOM's impact analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA. These articles require MOFCOM to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, the impact of the subject imports on the state of the domestic industry. This involves an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. Jurisprudence confirms that an evaluation of a given factor requires an IA to analyze and interpret this factor in a process that requires judgement. In exercising judgement, an IA must assess the role, relevance and relative weight of each factor. A proper evaluation must involve an analysis of the data pertaining to each factor individually and in relation to other factors as well.

19. While Article 3.4 does not prescribe any methodology, the Appellate Body has clarified that IA's must choose a methodology that enables it to understand the impact of the subject imports

<sup>6</sup> **Response to Question 9:** Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA, MOFCOM was required to consider whether subject imports had explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression of the domestic like product. MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was required to involve an objective assessment based on positive evidence.

While the Appellate Body has accepted that parallel pricing trends might support a price depression finding, an IA is still under an obligation to set out an explanation or reasoning regarding the role of such trends in its price effects analysis and findings.

In this case, MOFCOM did not explain: (i) whether and how any parallel price trends showed that one price exerted downward pressure on the other; (ii) the extent to which these trends demonstrated importer pricing behaviour; or (iii) how significantly higher priced subject imports exerted a depressive effect on the lower priced domestic product. Thus, MOFCOM failed to provide sufficient reasoning as to "what explanatory force parallel price trends had for the depression [...] of domestic prices".

<sup>7</sup> **Response to Question 12:** While MOFCOM provided a general statement that the pricing documents and meeting minutes demonstrated that the "decline in foreign dissolving pulp prices [...] led to difficulty in [making] sales", it failed to reconcile this with positive evidence showing that the domestic industry increased its sales and output by 78% and 63%, respectively, during the same period. MOFCOM failed to explain: (i) how these documents showed any difficulty in making sales when they did not disclose a single lost sale; and (ii) how general pricing information was relevant to an analysis of the price effects of subject imports. See also para. 59 and fn. 16.

on the domestic industry as a whole. Moreover, Article 3.4 requires an examination of the "explanatory force" of subject imports for the state of the industry. The inquiry under Article 3.4 must also contribute to, and provide a "meaningful basis" for, the overall determination required under Article 3.5.<sup>8</sup>

20. MOFCOM failed to meet these requirements for three reasons. First, MOFCOM failed to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry. In its Final Determination, MOFCOM simply set out data regarding factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, assessed whether certain factors other than those listed in Article 3.4 explained the state of the domestic industry and then concluded that the domestic industry suffered injury. Yet, MOFCOM failed to even mention subject imports, much less examine their impact, if any, on the injury that it had found the domestic industry to have suffered.

21. Second, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share. MOFCOM concluded that the domestic industry had suffered injury in part on the basis that the domestic industry's market share was "consistently depressed". MOFCOM pointed to no evidence on the record to support this characterization. In fact, this characterization contradicted MOFCOM's data that the market share of the like product of the domestic industry increased by 6.54 percentage points during the POI.

22. Third, MOFCOM failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry. MOFCOM found factors that showed positive growth trends: domestic demand; production capacity; output; sales volumes and sales revenue; number of employees; labour productivity and per capita wages. MOFCOM failed to address these positive factors in its analysis of whether the domestic industry was injured. Similar to *China – X-Ray Equipment*, MOFCOM failed to assess the weight of each factor. In particular, it failed to describe why the weight given to the factors showing a negative result was greater than that given to those factors showing positive trends. MOFCOM also failed to analyze the evolution of the data relating to each factor individually or within the context of other factors.

## **5. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA**

23. Under Article 3.5, an IA is required to undertake a two-step causation analysis. First, an IA must conduct a "causal link" analysis demonstrating that subject imports caused injury through the volume effects, price effects and impact of dumping. Second, an IA must also conduct a "non-attribution examination" to ensure that injury caused by any other known factors is not wrongly attributed to the dumped imports. As a result, an IA must "separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other factors" and must provide a satisfactory or meaningful explanation of the nature and extent of the other factors' injurious effects.

24. Any determination under Article 3.5 must also comply with the overarching requirement found in Article 3.1 that it be based on "positive evidence" and conducted through an "objective examination".

25. MOFCOM's causal link analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA because it relies on its deficient volume and price effects analyses.

26. MOFCOM's finding that subject imports caused injury to the Chinese domestic industry is, in part, based on its earlier finding that there had been an increase in the volume of subject imports. MOFCOM also relies heavily on parallel pricing trends on which it based its price effect findings to make its causal link finding. However, as Canada demonstrated above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings are inconsistent with Article 3.1 and 3.2. By relying on its flawed volume and price effects analyses, MOFCOM's Article 3.5 causal link analysis is equally flawed.

---

<sup>8</sup> **Response to Question 18:** While an IA is required to "examine" the impact of dumped imports under Article 3.4, it is not required to "demonstrate" that the dumped imports are causing injury. That demonstration is required under Article 3.5. An IA is also not required to examine non-attribution factors in its examination of the impact of dumped imports. However, if an interested party argues or provides evidence suggesting that subject imports do not have explanatory force for the state of the domestic industry, the IA must objectively examine these arguments and evidence.

27. Even if MOFCOM's volume and price effects analyses were found to be consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2, MOFCOM nevertheless failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of whether there was a causal link between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry. Specifically, MOFCOM failed to demonstrate how subject imports resulted in the indicators of injury it itemized (e.g. decline in pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow, a slump in market share, a low operating rate, increasing ending inventory, a shrinking of profitability of the like product of the domestic industry and a worsening of the operational and business situation). It also failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation in this regard.

28. MOFCOM's assertion that subject imports caused injury to the domestic producers of the like products is also contradicted by the evidence demonstrating that subject import prices were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product during the POI. The domestic like product also gained significant market share during the same period while that of subject imports remained essentially stable. Yet, similar to *China – X-Ray Equipment*, MOFCOM offered no explanation as to how subject imports with essentially stable market share and significantly higher prices could have caused injury to the domestic industry.

29. MOFCOM failed to conduct a proper non-attribution analysis as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA. MOFCOM failed to objectively examine evidence showing that any injury suffered by the domestic industry should be attributed to other factors.

30. First, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence showing that the primary cause of both the domestic like product's historic high prices and the decline in price to normal levels was a result of variations in the price of cotton and VSF. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of these factors from any impact of the subject imports.

31. With respect to the effect of cotton prices, MOFCOM found that the price of cotton "was not the primary factor" affecting the price of the like product of the domestic industry. MOFCOM arrived at this conclusion by asserting that VSF had superior dyeing and moisture absorption qualities than cotton and that, therefore it "possesses a certain degree of non-substitutability". However, MOFCOM failed to cite any evidence to support this conclusion. It also ignored submissions by Chinese VSF producers showing that there is a high degree of substitutability between cotton and VSF and that VSF is the best substitute for cotton. MOFCOM's finding of a certain degree of non-substitutability also implied that there is some degree of substitutability between cotton and VSF. MOFCOM failed to address this degree of substitutability in its Final Determination.

32. MOFCOM then commented on how the price of cotton in China was "higher and more stable" than global cotton prices due to Chinese government policies. However, MOFCOM failed to explain the relevance of Chinese domestic cotton prices. Because VSF producers compete in both domestic and international markets for their sale, the domestic and international markets for viscose fibre are integrated and affected by the same market forces, including the impact that global cotton prices have on VSF. Therefore, it is global cotton prices that matter<sup>9</sup>.

33. With respect to the effect of VSF prices on those of cellulose pulp, MOFCOM stated that foreign exporters had failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that there is a direct link between VSF and the like product of the domestic industry. This statement is patently false. Foreign exporters submitted ample positive evidence that VSF prices and cellulose pulp prices were intimately linked<sup>10</sup>. MOFCOM itself conceded that there was a relationship between VSF and

---

<sup>9</sup> **Response to Question 25:** China's *post hoc* rationalization that MOFCOM identified a disconnect between global cotton prices and domestic cotton prices in China is undermined by the arguments and the evidence submitted by interested parties. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of how domestic Chinese cotton prices were relevant to the purchasing decisions of VSF producers who compete in a global textile market.

<sup>10</sup> **Response to Question 28:** These arguments and evidence are identified in fn. 208 of Canada's first written submission. For example, Fortress provided the chart reproduced in Canada's first written submission as Figure 1. This Figure illustrates the strong positive relationship between cotton, viscose and cellulose pulp price. The American Forest & Paper Association (AFPA) also reproduced a graph from the RISI World Dissolving Pulp Monitor demonstrating a strong correlation between global cotton prices and Chinese cellulose pulp price. The AFPA also quoted another RISI publication, which reported that the decline of cotton prices is a "strong indicator" that dissolving pulp prices will also decline. Moreover, Rayonier presented evidence demonstrating the relationship between cotton, VSF and cellulose pulp prices. Rayonier also cited a

cellulose pulp when it derived the total demand for cellulose pulp by applying a constant coefficient to VSF demand.

34. MOFCOM also noted that the "rapid growth trend" of viscose fibre production during the POI led to a rapid growth trend in total domestic demand for cellulose pulp. MOFCOM then asserted that the total production capacity and total demand for cellulose pulp was "basically in balance". However, MOFCOM failed to explain how this comparison relates to the question of whether there is a correlation between VSF and cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM's finding of capacity and demand being in balance is also false. Domestic demand increased by 35.26% over the POI, whereas the production capacity of the domestic industry increased by 122.46% during the same period<sup>11</sup>.

35. MOFCOM then asserted that total output of the domestic industry was not able to meet the demand. Given this, MOFCOM found that the price of the domestic like product should have remained stable. Again, MOFCOM failed to explain its finding which subjectively presumes that the domestic like product should fulfill domestic demand with little or no import contribution.

36. Second, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence concerning the effects of the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of these factors from any impact of the subject imports.

37. MOFCOM found that the domestic cellulose pulp industry's production capacity increase was "basically equal" to the total domestic demand for cellulose pulp. MOFCOM also noted that the domestic industry's total output never exceeded total domestic demand. MOFCOM then concluded that any impact was insufficient to negate the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry.

38. However, in its discussion on expansion of production capacity, MOFCOM skewed the true magnitude of the capacity expansion of the "domestic industry" as defined by selectively focussing on the total production capacity of the entire domestic cellulose pulp industry. As mentioned above, while the total demand for cellulose pulp increased by 35.26% over the course of the POI, the production capacity of the "domestic industry" as defined increased by 122.49%. Specifically, in 2012, the domestic industry increased its capacity by 62.98%. This expansion occurred during the period in which capacity utilization rates were low (53.35%). MOFCOM never addressed why the domestic industry would undertake such expansion in light of such market conditions.

39. With respect to the issue of overproduction and inventory overhangs, MOFCOM attempted to explain that the increased output of the domestic industry was not the direct cause of the increasing ending inventories because output was essentially in balance with cellulose pulp demand and sales volumes. Again, MOFCOM ignored its own data. While total domestic demand increased by 24.27% from 2011 to 2012, the domestic industry's production capacity increased by

---

CITIC Securities International which reported that "[i]n 2010, soaring cotton prices fuelled a sharp rise in prices of viscose staple fibre (substitute product) and dissolving pulp raw material". This same report speculated that if cotton prices declined below RMB 20,000 per tonne, any price advantage for cellulose pulp would be eliminated. Canada notes that the cotton price declined below this level in August 2011. This coincides with the period in which MOFCOM found price depression.

<sup>11</sup> **Response to Questions 29i and ii:** China's explanation that MOFCOM considered production capacity of all producers because changes in cellulose pulp prices would be driven by the total production capacity and output of all producers of cellulose pulp is a *post hoc* rationalization. For this reason alone, it should be rejected by the Panel. Moreover, Article 3.5 expressly requires a demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the "domestic industry". Article 4.1 defines the "domestic industry" as the "domestic producers as a whole of the like products or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products". MOFCOM defined the "domestic industry" in the latter manner. As a result, it was precluded from relying on data for all domestic producers of cellulose pulp in its injury analysis. Doing so constitutes a *prima facie* violation of MOFCOM's obligation to conduct an objective examination.

The Appellate Body in *US - Hot Rolled Steel* found that Article 3 directs IAs to investigate and examine imports in relation to the "domestic industry" as defined. While the panel in *EC - Fasteners (China)* acknowledged that there may be instances in which an IA may be warranted in using information regarding all domestic producers, the panel noted that an IA must explain and justify its use of such information. MOFCOM failed to provide an explanation. Moreover, MOFCOM's assertion that the capacity of domestic producers was in balance with demand is incorrect. This is the case whether one looks at the data: (i) in percentage or in absolute terms; or (ii) for all domestic producers or the "domestic industry" as defined.



62.98% and the domestic industry had a 115.35% increase in ending inventories from 2011 to 2012.

40. Third, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence of the impact of non-subject imports on the domestic industry showing that 1) non-subject imports prices were much lower than those of subject imports and in fact comparable to those of the domestic like product and 2) that any market share loss suffered by the domestic industry was to non-subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports<sup>12</sup>.

41. MOFCOM noted that non-subject imports accounted for over 50% of the total volume of China's imports of cellulose pulp throughout the POI. It then held that the price difference between the subject imports and the non-subject imports was "not large". It did so without presenting any volume or price data. MOFCOM then examined the lower priced imports from South Africa but asserted that the proportion of imports from this country was relatively small during the POI, i.e. between 8.5% and 9.8% of China's total imports. Likewise, MOFCOM also dismissed the impact of imports from Indonesia and Sweden by asserting that any difference in price between them and subject imports was "not large" and their proportion of the total volume of imports showed a downward trend. Again, it did so without presenting any data.

42. MOFCOM's analysis was subjective and did not contain a reasonable and adequate explanation supporting its findings. Non-subject import sales volumes increased by 78.43% during the POI, nearly matching the domestic industry's own 80.23% increase. In contrast, subject imports showed a 43.82% increase over the POI. In terms of market share, sales from non-subject imports increased by 6.79 percentage points, higher than the domestic industry's own increase of 6.54 points and far above that of the subject imports market share which stayed essentially stable.

43. MOFCOM also failed to provide any positive evidence in its Final Determination of non-subject import pricing. Non-subject import pricing reported by China Customs was submitted by an interested party; it showed that the prices of non-subject imports were significantly below those of subject imports and the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression.

44. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence regarding the shortage of cotton linter and its impact on the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports.

45. MOFCOM found that a shortage in cotton linter supply was not the cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. It arrived at this conclusion by noting that cotton linter had no direct impact on the production of wood or bamboo pulp, which at their peak accounted for nearly 70% of the total sales volume of the domestic like product. However, MOFCOM failed to cite any positive evidence to support this finding. It also failed to consider positive evidence showing that cotton linter pulp production formed more than 30% of the total domestic industry dissolving pulp capacity.

46. MOFCOM also found that the total domestic supply of cotton linter far exceeded the domestic cotton linter pulp industry's output and that, on the basis of the supply of cotton linter during the

---

<sup>12</sup> **Response to Question 36:** Several interested parties raised the impact of non-subject imports as a factor causing injury to the domestic industry. Cosmo presented volume and market share data of subject imports, non-subject imports and the domestic like product in arguing that any loss of market share by the domestic industry was as a result of non-subject imports. It also showed that subject imports had higher pricing than the domestic like product during the second half of 2011 and 2012. The AFPA also presented import pricing and volume data demonstrating that subject import pricing was higher than the domestic like product. It also submitted annual non-subject import pricing and volume data from China Customs that Canada used to calculate the non-subject import data presented in Table 3 of Canada's first written submission.

MOFCOM was required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the volume and prices of non-subject imports. MOFCOM was required to consider the arguments and evidence presented to it. This obligated MOFCOM to consider data on sales volume, market share and prices of non-dumped imports, and to compare these data to those of subject imports and domestic like product. MOFCOM failed to comply with these requirements.

POI, the domestic cotton linter pulp industry's capacity utilization rate should have been significantly higher than it actually was.

47. These reasons and this conclusion are unsupported by positive evidence and fail to reflect an objective examination of evidence demonstrating that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total domestic cotton linter supply for each year of the POI. Moreover, in its calculation of whether the total domestic supply of cotton linter was sufficient, MOFCOM erroneously assumed that cotton linter pulp producers would have had access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter. Positive evidence indicated that there were other users of cotton linter in the market.

48. MOFCOM stated that data regarding total production capacity and output of the domestic cotton linter pulp industry was gathered in the course of on-the-spot verification. However, MOFCOM failed to identify this evidence or to explain how information obtained from the parties would have provided verifiable information regarding producers not participating in the investigation. Also, when calculating the output that could have been produced with the available domestic cotton linter, MOFCOM used a unit consumption ratio of 1 tonne of cotton linter pulp to 1.3 tonnes of cotton linter. While MOFCOM stated that this consumption ratio was industry-recognized, it pointed to no evidence on the record to support this description. In contrast, evidence from an independent analyzing organization defined the ratio differently<sup>13</sup>.

## **B. Conclusion**

49. Canada requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's measures are inconsistent with China's obligations under Articles 1 and 3 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Canada asks that the Panel recommend that China bring its measures into conformity with the GATT 1994 and the ADA.

## **II. CANADA'S ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL**

### **A. China's Accusation of a De Novo Hearing is Baseless**

50. Canada has asked the Panel to hold MOFCOM to the same standard of review it has been held to in many other recent cases. MOFCOM has repeatedly failed to objectively establish and assess facts and to undertake an unbiased evaluation of the facts and arguments before it. MOFCOM also failed to provide reasoned and adequate explanations in light of the positive evidence on the record. Ultimately, MOFCOM's finding is a string or repetitive assertions of isolated facts. Requesting that this Panel examine these failures does not amount to a request for a *de novo* review.

### **B. China Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 in its Volume and Price Effects Analyses**

51. Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM's volume analysis failed to meet the standard set by Articles 3.1 and 3.2. China recasts Canada's position as requiring MOFCOM to consider the increase in volume of subject in both absolute and relative terms, extending the volume analysis beyond what contemplated in Article 3.2. China's interpretation is incorrect.

52. An objective examination of whether an increase in the volume of subject imports is significant requires the IA to consider the circumstances in which any increase occurred. Such an interpretation that Article 3.2 is supported by the panel decisions in *US – Washing Machines* and

---

<sup>13</sup> **Response to Question 42:** MOFCOM's use of the unit consumption ratio of 1 to 1.3 provided by petitioners rather than the unit consumption ratio provided by an independent source is an example of how MOFCOM subjectively favoured certain evidence over more objective, verifiable and credible evidence.

MOFCOM's conclusion with regard to the sufficiency of the cotton linter is based on more errors than just the use of the petitioner's ratio. These conclusions are also based on the false assumption that the domestic cotton linter pulp industry would be the only consumer of the entire cotton linter supply. See para. 47. These errors must be corrected before a determination can be made as to whether MOFCOM's conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the cotton linter supply would have been affected. However, MOFCOM's calculations cannot be modified in a manner that properly accounts for additional sources of demand. Another method would need to be used. However, it is not necessary for the Panel to identify this other method for it to conclude that MOFCOM's examination of the supply of cotton linter was not objective.

*US – Upland Cotton*. It is also supported by the Appellate Body's interpretation of the various paragraphs of Article 3 form part of a "logical progression". In particular, the volume analysis must provide a "meaningful basis" for an IA to perform subsequent analyses. To provide a "meaningful basis", the volume analysis must account for relevant market circumstances. Furthermore, this requirement exists whether an IA considers an increase in volume on an absolute or relative basis<sup>14</sup>.

53. In the present case, MOFCOM failed to examine the circumstances in which the increase in absolute volume occurred. In particular, it failed to consider the rapidly expanding Chinese cellulose pulp market and the fact that the volume of the domestic like product and non-subject imports increased significantly more than that of subject imports during the POI.

54. MOFCOM also failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its finding of a significant increase in absolute volume. China argues that this finding was supported by the margin of dumping and the context provided by the subject imports' share of the total imports. However, MOFCOM does not mention the margin of dumping anywhere in its volume analysis. In addition, the subject imports' share of total imports declined over the POI. MOFCOM failed to explain why, despite this positive evidence, it found subject imports' increase in absolute volume to be significant.

55. With respect to MOFCOM's price effects analysis, Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM's finding of price depression fails to meet the standard set by Articles 3.1 and 3.2. China claims that MOFCOM's observation of parallel pricing is undisputed<sup>15</sup> and supports its finding of price depression as a "matter of simple logic". China is mistaken.

56. A proper price effect analysis requires that MOFCOM consider and explain the relationship between subject imports and the prices of the domestic like product. This is necessary in order to determine whether subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression. Here, MOFCOM failed to explain how any parallel pricing trends resulted in price depression.

57. In fact, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the pricing and market share of subject imports during the POI. With regards to pricing, MOFCOM failed to address arguments and evidence presented by interested parties showing that non-subject imports were priced

---

<sup>14</sup> **Response to Question 4:** Article 3.2 requires an IA to consider whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption. An IA must conduct and objective examination and provide reasoned and adequate explanations of its findings. It must thus take sufficient account of the positive evidence that supports a conclusion that is different from the one it reaches and it must respond to competing plausible explanations. Doing so may require an IA to take into account evidence or explanations of more than one "perspective" regarding any significant increase.

Moreover, as mentioned in paragraph 52, a volume analysis must provide a meaningful basis for the IA to continue the logical progression of its injury analysis. This requires an IA to take relevant factual circumstances into account. This does not amount to requiring an IA to consider an increase in both absolute and relative terms. Rather, factual circumstances provide context such as trends and other data that an IA can compare to any absolute or relative increase in subject imports so as to objectively reach a conclusion.

<sup>15</sup> **Response to Question 10:** Canada's claim regards MOFCOM's substantive failure to explain how any parallel price trend provides explanatory force for price depression. There is no question that in the period in which MOFCOM found price depression, both subject import and like product prices were declining. However, China misrepresented Canada's argument by suggesting that "Canada does not claim that there is not substantial evidence of parallel pricing trends". As a result, Canada responded to China's defence in its opening statement at the first meeting of the panel and in reply to further questions from the Panel.

By definition, parallel means two lines that never meet. Figure 1 of Canada's opening statement shows that prices of subject imports and the domestic like product were not parallel at the beginning of the POI (i.e. the lines crossed). Canada also showed that during the first half of the POI, subject import prices rose at a much faster rate than those of the domestic like product. Then, when market prices began to decline, the prices of the domestic like product declined much faster than those of subject imports. These facts support a conclusion that when prices were declining, it was the domestic like product price that was depressing the price of subject imports.

In *China – Autos*, there were also diverging price movements during the POI, and the panel emphasized MOFCOM's failure to adequately explain the relevance of these divergences and differences in its analysis and conclusions on parallel pricing. The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* also addressed similar issues when it questioned MOFCOM's lack of explanations or reasoning as to the significance of parallel pricing trends when the magnitude of changes in prices were significantly divergent. As a result, the "substantial" evidence on the record demonstrates a lack of parallel pricing.

significantly below subject imports throughout the POI. In response, China claims that Canada has argued that MOFCOM was required to find price undercutting in order to make a finding of price depression. Canada has argued nothing of the sort. Rather, Canada has demonstrated that it was incumbent on MOFCOM to explain how significantly higher priced subject imports had explanatory force for significant price depression.

58. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the positive evidence regarding the effect of subject import market share. In particular, MOFCOM's analysis does not contain a reasoned and adequate explanation of how subject imports, having maintained an essentially stable market share, caused price depression while the market share of the domestic industry and non-subject imports grew significantly.

59. Finally, China has now submitted the pricing documents and meeting minutes MOFCOM relied on to make its price depression findings. These documents are unreliable. Of the 10 documents, only four actually refer are even superficially relevant to MOFCOM's analysis. Canada also objects to the translation of these four documents because China neglected to translate a critical word. These four documents were also produced by the same Chinese domestic producer and none actually provide specific relevant information. Furthermore, it is not surprising that customers would use purported lower pricing from other competitors to negotiate better prices. Even if one accepts, *arguendo*, the conclusions that MOFCOM drew from these documents, MOFCOM failed to reconcile these documents with the positive evidence that subject import prices were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product and non-subject imports<sup>16</sup>.

#### **C. MOFCOM Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA in its Impact Analysis**

60. Canada has shown that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share. China now claims that Canada is mistaken as a result of a translation error; the description of the domestic industry's market share should have been translated as "remained low" rather than as "consistently depressed".

61. Regardless of which translation is used, MOFCOM's analysis is improper for two reasons. First, contrary to the requirement set out in Article 3.4, MOFCOM did not consider whether there was a decline or potential decline in market share. Whether the domestic industry's market share was high or low, MOFCOM was required to evaluate the trend in market share. It did not. Second, by describing the domestic industry's market share as either "consistently depressed" or "remained low", MOFCOM mischaracterized this market share which actually increased significantly during the POI. It thus failed to make an objective examination of the evidence.

62. MOFCOM also failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. MOFCOM simply juxtaposed the positive factors with the negative factors, rather than providing a "thorough and persuasive" explanation as to how the positive factors were outweighed by the negative factors. MOFCOM also failed to assess the role played by each factor in its investigation.

#### **D. MOFCOM Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in its Causation Analysis**

63. Canada has established that MOFCOM's finding of a causal link was based on its flawed volume and priced effects analyses. China made no attempt to refute these arguments. China simply replicates MOFCOM's discussion of parallel pricing and increased volume and its reliance on pricing documents and meeting minutes. It then asserts that this constitutes an explanation of how subject imports caused injury. However, China fails to explain how recycling this flawed analysis demonstrates a causal relationship between subject imports and injury.

---

<sup>16</sup> **Response to Questions 12i and ii:** An IA should consider such pricing documents and meeting minutes as evidence in its investigation. However, with respect to these documents, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence. Whether evidence is positive is determined by its quality. Positive evidence is evidence that is "affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible". For the reasons cited in paragraph 59, an IA could not have considered these documents "affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible".

64. China also offers a *post hoc* explanation whereby MOFCOM found that "the market share of the like product declined in the second half of 2012 and that the dumped subject imports gained that lost market share on a one-to-one basis." This statement cannot be found in the Final Determination. Even the pricing documents and meeting minutes filed by China disclose no lost sales by the domestic industry.

65. Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the impact of: cotton and VSF prices; the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up; and non-subject imports. MOFCOM also made no attempt to properly "separate and distinguish" any injury caused by these factors or to provide a satisfactory explanation of their nature and extent. As a result, there is no rational basis for concluding that subject imports caused injury to the domestic industry.

66. First, China has failed to rebut Canada's demonstration that VSF is a close substitute for cotton and that prices of cotton and VSF are closely related. Also, because pulp is primarily used to produce VSF, there is an equally strong relationship between the prices of VSF and cellulose pulp. The primary cause of both the domestic like product's historic high prices and the decline in prices to normal levels during the POI was a result of variations in the prices of cotton and VSF<sup>17</sup>.

67. With respect to the relationship between the prices of cotton and VSF, China repeats MOFCOM's assertion that VSF is superior to cotton because of its dyeing and absorption properties and that therefore "they are not substitutable in the market to a certain extent". China does not rebut any of Canada's arguments with regards to this unsupported assertion. Similarly, China repeats MOFCOM's discussion of Chinese domestic cotton support policies without addressing Canada's argument that it is global cotton prices that matter.

68. With respect to the relationship between the prices of VSF and cellulose pulp, China claims that MOFCOM found data submitted by foreign exporters to be insufficient because it only showed parallel price trends. MOFCOM made no such finding in its Final Determination. As such, China cannot rely on such an explanation now. In addition, this theory is entirely divorced from the ample positive evidence which clearly explains the economic rationale for the price linkages between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

69. Finally, MOFCOM found that cotton prices "were not the main factor" and that the prices of downstream VSF "were not the direct cause" affecting the prices of the like product. Such conclusory statements do not meet the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.5 which required MOFCOM to provide a "satisfactory explanation" of the "nature and extent of the injurious effects" of cotton and VSF prices and to "separate and distinguish" that injury from any caused by the subject imports.

70. Second, China failed to objectively examine the injury caused by the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup. Canada showed that the Chinese domestic industry undertook significant capacity expansion during the POI and this capacity increase far exceeded the increase in total domestic demand. It also occurred in a period where the domestic industry's capacity utilization rates were low and its ending inventories were increasing significantly.

71. In response to this evidence, China criticizes Canada for using data that reflects only the "domestic industry" as defined. China claims that MOFCOM more appropriately relied on the total production capacity of the entire domestic industry. This is a good example of the lack of objectivity of MOFCOM's determination. The purpose of a non-attribution analysis is to examine injury caused by "other known factors" to the "domestic industry" as defined.

---

<sup>17</sup> **Response to Question 27:** Movements in demand for cellulose pulp and VSF output are directly relevant for an analysis of the impact of VSF prices on cellulose pulp prices. During the first half of the POI, when demand and output spiked due to a shortage of cotton, demand for and the price of cellulose pulp spiked. Similarly, when cotton prices began to stabilize in the second half of 2011, so did VSF prices. Coupled with newly added capacity, which led to overcapacity in both Chinese domestic production of VSF and cellulose pulp, this caused cellulose pulp prices to decline. MOFCOM conceded the relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp (see para. 33). Yet, it wrongly concluded that VSF output and prices were not the main factor affecting cellulose pulp prices in China.

72. China also asserts that MOFCOM's finding that the domestic industry's overexpansion may have had some impact, but was not sufficient to break the causal link, meets the requirements of "separating and distinguishing" the injurious effects of domestic overexpansion. China's claim fails. MOFCOM's examination of this factor was not objective. MOFCOM neither explained the "nature and extent" of the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup, nor attempted to "separate and distinguish" this injury from that caused by the subject imports.

73. Third, China failed to rebut Canada's demonstration that non-subject imports were more likely to have caused injury to the domestic industry. China reiterates MOFCOM's analysis and conclusions. China also claims that by comparing prices of subject and non-subject imports, MOFCOM addressed the primary issues raised by foreign respondents. China mischaracterizes the arguments presented to MOFCOM. These arguments went beyond a cursory comparison of the relative proportion and prices between subject and non-subject imports. They called for a comprehensive assessment of changes in non-subject imports sales volumes, market share and price as well as a comparison of these data to those of subject imports and the domestic like product.

74. China also claims that MOFCOM found that "the injurious effects of the non-subject imports were not more than or similar to those caused by the dumped imports and thus, did not break the causal link". This is another *post hoc* explanation. While MOFCOM did conclude that non-subject imports could not break the causal link, it did not explain the "nature and extent" of the injury caused by non-subject imports. Nor did it "separate and distinguish" these injurious effects from those caused by subject imports.

**ANNEX B-2**

## SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

**I. INTEGRATED SUMMARY OF CANADA'S SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION, ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND MEETING, RESPONSES TO PANEL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON CHINA'S RESPONSES****A. Standard of Review**

1. There is no merit to any of the tactics China utilizes in order to distract the Panel's attention from the inconsistency of the measures at issue with the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).

2. First, China's attempt to diminish the Panel's standard of review and overemphasize the discretion owed to an investigating authority is meritless. It is settled law that this Panel must be guided by the general standard of review set out in Article 11 of the DSU, the particular rules contained in Article 17.6 of the ADA, as well as the standard set out in Article 3.1 of the ADA. Therefore, the Panel's standard of review is broad.

3. Second, China's accusation that Canada is requesting a *de novo* review is disingenuous as Canada's claims are entirely congruent with the Panel's standard of review.

4. Third, China repeatedly attempts to rehabilitate MOFCOM's injury determination with *post hoc* explanations and references to evidence that were not part of the determination. These explanations merely highlight the portions of MOFCOM's findings that China implicitly admits failed to meet the standards of an "objective examination" based on positive evidence and "reasoned and adequate" conclusions.

5. Finally, China also claims that Canada has a burden of demonstrating how MOFCOM should have conducted various analyses pursuant to Article 3 of the ADA. However, there is no such burden on Canada. Moreover, Canada has met its burden to establish a *prima facie* case of violation by demonstrating that MOFCOM's volume, price effects, impact, causal link and non-attribution analyses failed to meet the standards set by the ADA.

**B. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2**

6. MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM failed to consider the factual circumstances surrounding the increase in subject imports and failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its conclusion that this increase was significant.

7. China's claim that MOFCOM was not required to consider contextual elements when considering the significance of an absolute increase in subject imports is meritless.

8. First, the ordinary meaning of the term "significant", which is "important, notable or consequential", connotes a broader analysis than just a consideration of the numerical quantity or amount of an increase. In the context of the first sentence of Article 3.2, this broader analysis includes consideration of the factual context or circumstances in which an increase in subject imports occurred. Although the factual context or circumstances relevant to this analysis will vary from case to case, context or circumstances relevant to an inquiry of absolute volumes may include trends in domestic demand, the volume of the domestic like product and the volume of non-subject imports.

9. Appellate Body and panel decisions support this interpretation of the term "significant". In *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, the Appellate Body explained that an investigating authority must consider whether price undercutting is "significant". It found that "[w]hat amounts to *significant price undercutting* [...] will [...] depend on the circumstances of each case." The Appellate Body's reasoning relating to the proper interpretation of "significant" under the second sentence of Article 3.2 is equally applicable to its interpretation in the first sentence. The panels in *US – Upland Cotton* and *US – Washing Machines* also considered that factual circumstances may be relevant to the assessment of "significance". Although the panel in *US – Washing Machines* rejected the specific type of qualitative analysis advocated by Korea, its statement that "[i]n

certain factual circumstances, the size or scale of a price difference may need to be assessed in light of the prevailing factual circumstances" shows that it did not reject all qualitative analyses. Finally, the Appellate Body in *EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft* and *US – Large Civil Aircraft* confirmed that the term "significant" has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The Appellate Body accepted reliance on primarily qualitative reasons to find "significant" lost sales.

10. Second, Canada's interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2 is confirmed by its context. The Appellate Body has found that the paragraphs of Article 3 must be viewed holistically. Each paragraph forms part of a "logical progression"<sup>1</sup>. These paragraphs are "interlinked" and the outcome of each must provide a "meaningful basis" for subsequent analyses under Article 3. An investigating authority can ensure that its conclusion will provide a "meaningful basis" for subsequent analyses only by considering whether an increase in volume is "significant" in light of the factual circumstances that will by necessity be relevant to subsequent analyses.

11. The obligation under Article 3.1 to make an injury determination on the basis of "positive evidence" and an "objective examination" further confirms that MOFCOM was required to consider the factual circumstances in its volume analysis. Article 3.1 required MOFCOM to consider all relevant evidence, including conflicting evidence and competing plausible arguments of that evidence raised by interested parties, in an unbiased manner. It also required MOFCOM to conduct an investigation in a manner that conforms to the principles of "good faith and fundamental fairness". MOFCOM failed to do so when it failed to take into account: (i) evidence that subject import growth occurred in a rapidly expanding market and that the volume of the domestic like product increased by 80%; and (ii) arguments raised by interested parties that the increase in subject imports, either in absolute or relative terms, was not significant.

12. Canada's interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2 does not contain an effects-based test; it does not require an investigating authority to consider the effect or impact of the volume of subject imports on the domestic like product or the domestic industry. Such analyses are conducted under the second sentence of Article 3.2 and under Articles 3.4 and 3.5<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, even though there must be a "logical progression" between Articles 3.2 and 3.5, this does not mean that an affirmative response to the volume analysis must lead to an affirmative response to the causation analysis.

13. This interpretation also does not conflict with the words "either [...] or" in Article 3.2 as it does not require an investigating authority to consider the significance of an increase in both absolute and relative terms. An investigating authority has the discretion to consider the significance of an increase on either basis. Nevertheless, this discretion is not unlimited - an investigating authority must take into account positive evidence conflicting with its conclusion and must respond to competing plausible explanations of the evidence. Objectively examining such evidence and explanation does not convert an absolute volume analysis into a relative one or alter the scope of the analysis<sup>3</sup>. The investigating authority would simply be using relevant evidence about the market to inform its analysis of whether an increase in volume is significant and to ensure that its analysis is objective.

---

<sup>1</sup> Question 43: It is settled law that the WTO Agreements and the ADA must be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body clarified in *US – Continued Zeroing* that discerning the ordinary meaning of a word or term in isolation is only the beginning of the interpretation exercise and that recourse must be made to context and object and purpose in order to elucidate the ordinary meaning of a word or term. This shows that a consideration of context is necessary and essential to proper treaty interpretation. In its interpretation of Article 3 generally and Article 3.2, second sentence, specifically, the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* demonstrated the importance of accounting for context in a proper interpretation of the Article 3 paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup> Question 44: Although the texts of the first and second sentences of Article 3.2 are different in that the first does not contain an effects-based test, they are similar in that: (i) both require an investigating authority to "consider" the "significance" of a particular phenomenon; (ii) both are subject to the same overarching obligation in Article 3.1 to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence; and (iii) both are part of the logical progression of the injury and causation analysis in Article 3. Moreover, the panel's interpretation of "significant" in Article 2.4.2 of the ADA in *US – Washing Machines* confirms that the ordinary meaning of the word "significant" does not change because the first sentence in Article 3.2 does not contain an effects-based test.

<sup>3</sup> Question 45: This is confirmed by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams*, which found the investigating authority's analysis of absolute volume to be consistent with Article 3.2 specifically because the investigating authority had considered the context in which the increase occurred. The panel did not find that this consideration of the context turned the analysis of absolute volumes into an analysis of relative volumes.



14. The Panel should reject China's groundless argument that one can consider whether the increase in the volume is "significant" in absolute terms without having to also consider other circumstances. If the Panel accepts China's position, then the 44% increase found by MOFCOM to be significant in this case would effectively become a numerical threshold for future cases. If this threshold is reached, the increase in absolute volume would be significant, regardless of the context in which the increase occurred. Such a result would be inconsistent with Article 3.1 because it would bar an investigating authority from considering anything more than the magnitude of the increase; the investigating authority would no longer be able to conduct an objective examination and on the basis of all positive evidence.

15. Furthermore, the Panel should reject China's groundless argument that the requirement to consider the factual circumstances conflicts with other textual elements in the first sentence of Article 3.2. The terms "absolute", "relative to production" and "[relative to] consumption" have a more limited scope than that ascribed to them by China. They describe only the manner in which subject imports are to be measured – either by quantity, in the case of absolute volume, or by quantity expressed as a percentage of domestic consumption or production, in the case of relative volume. They do not describe or limit the scope of the entire volume analysis.

16. Finally, the Panel should reject China's claim that there is no basis in Article 3.2 to require an investigating authority to consider the trends in domestic demand, the volume of the domestic like product and the volume of non-subject imports. The legal bases for considering this factual context are Article 3.2's requirement to consider whether an increase is "significant" and Article 3.1's obligation to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence. Although consideration of these particular trends may be unnecessary in some cases, Canada has demonstrated that these elements were relevant to MOFCOM's inquiry in this case.

17. MOFCOM also failed to provide a "reasoned and adequate" explanation for its conclusion that there was a significant increase in subject imports<sup>4</sup>. China's argument that this finding was supported by the margin of dumping and the context provided by the subject imports' share of total imports is meritless. First, MOFCOM did not mention the margin of dumping anywhere in its volume analysis or suggest anywhere else that the margin of dumping was relevant to its volume analysis. Second, MOFCOM failed to explain how its finding regarding subject imports' share of total imports supported its conclusion that the increase in volume was significant.

18. China's assertion that the Panel should reject this claim because Canada failed to mention it in our first written submission or panel request is meritless. This claim is part of Canada's claim under the first sentence of Article 3.2. Moreover, it is within the Panel's jurisdiction as Canada's **panel request states that "China failed to properly consider whether there had been [...] a significant increase in dumped imports"**.

### **C. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2**

19. MOFCOM's price effects analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because it is based on an improper consideration of the effect of the subject imports on the price of the domestic like product. MOFCOM was required to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, whether subject imports depressed prices of the domestic like product significantly or prevented price increases.

20. First, China failed to demonstrate that MOFCOM objectively examined whether there was a parallel price trend between subject imports and the domestic like product. In fact, the price trends of subject imports and the domestic like product moved at significantly different rates and even met in 2010. Even if MOFCOM had properly found a parallel price trend, it failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how such a trend significantly depressed the price of the domestic like product. The mere existence of a parallel price trend may indicate a link in prices but, as the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* confirmed, it does not necessarily support a finding that a decline in the price of one product was caused by the price of the other. Thus, MOFCOM's conclusion that subject import prices caused the price decline in the domestic like product is far from a matter of "simple logic" and exposes MOFCOM's subjectivity. MOFCOM neither explained

---

<sup>4</sup> Question 46: The Appellate Body's description in *US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada)* of the requirements of a "reasoned and adequate" explanation shows that MOFCOM's explanation was required to demonstrate that MOFCOM took proper account of the complexities of the data before it and the conflicting evidence. Its explanation was also required to show why it rejected the alternative explanations of record evidence advanced by Rayonier and Cosmo.

how these trends "indicated the nature of competition" nor how they explained "the extent to which factors relating to the pricing behaviour of [purchasers] have an effect on domestic prices".

21. Second, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence showing that subject imports were priced significantly higher than the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression. MOFCOM does not explain how higher priced subject imports could have depressed domestic like product prices or whether it was in fact the domestic like product that dragged market prices down. The only explanation provided by China is its repeated observation of parallel pricing, which it stated could be an indicator of a link, and its reference to unreliable pricing documents and meeting minutes. Moreover, China failed to point to any specific discussion by MOFCOM addressing the interested parties' arguments and evidence of the impact of higher priced subject import pricing.

22. Third, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence showing that the market share of the subject imports remained essentially stable because it did not consider both the absolute volume and market share of subject imports as part of its price effects analysis. Canada has demonstrated that the text of Article 3.2, second sentence, refers to "whether the effect of [subject] imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree". Therefore, consideration of changes in absolute volume, market share and prices are all relevant to a price effects analysis, which the Appellate Body has described as a "dynamic comparison" between subject imports and the domestic like product.

23. China claims that MOFCOM properly considered market share. However, MOFCOM failed to explain how essentially stable subject import market share could have depressed prices of the domestic like product when the latter increased its market share by nearly eight percentage points. Since MOFCOM based the volumetric aspect of its price effects conclusion on the increased market share of subject imports, it was under the obligation to do so objectively.

24. Finally, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence in determining that subject imports depressed the price of the domestic like product<sup>5</sup>. The evidence on which MOFCOM relied is of limited probative value and cannot be considered "positive evidence" of price depression. As the Appellate Body has explained in the context of Article 3.2, "an IA is **required to consider whether [...] subject imports – has explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression of [...] domestic prices**". **Positive evidence of price effects must** therefore support a connection between (i) subject imports and (ii) depressed domestic prices<sup>6</sup>. However, the pricing documents and meeting minutes do not constitute positive evidence that subject imports explain price depression. First, only four even mention subject imports. Second, documents collected from only two out of seven petitioners cannot be representative of a meaningful volume of the domestic like product. Third, there is no evidence that MOFCOM verified any of the domestic companies' pricing documents against relevant sales contracts or purchase orders. Finally, these documents failed to disclose an actual lost sale, a specific instance of subject imports alone depressing domestic producers' prices or a confirmed pattern of price depression by the subject imports.

25. China offers little new in its second written submission to justify MOFCOM's flawed price depression analysis. First, in an attempt to rebut Canada's demonstration that subject import and domestic like product prices did not display a parallel price trend, China provides misleading calculations suggesting that the level of decline in the prices of subject imports and the domestic like product were "at basically the same level" and "nearly identical". China's comparisons between disparate and unconnected time periods fail to capture the relative movement in prices. Instead, as Canada has demonstrated, the pricing trends of subject imports and the domestic like product were quite different: while market prices were escalating, subject import prices were rising at a

---

<sup>5</sup> Question 47: In its second written submission, China pointed to the margin of dumping as evidence that MOFCOM relied on to support its price depression finding. In response to this question, China now appears to concede that MOFCOM did not rely on margins of dumping. Canada agrees with this concession. Moreover, Canada considers that dumping margins are irrelevant to an investigating authority's price effects analysis and therefore MOFCOM could not have properly relied on them.

<sup>6</sup> Question 48: A finding that subject imports explain the occurrence of price depression must be supported by evidence that is credible and that is "of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character", i.e. it must be supported by "positive evidence". Canada's argument was not meant to imply that evidence that does not support a conclusion is not "positive evidence". Whether evidence is "positive" refers to its quality and "positive evidence" may support or undermine a conclusion that subject imports have explanatory force for price depression.

much faster rate. Moreover, as raised by interested parties, the fact that the price of the domestic like product declined almost four times faster than that of the subject imports suggests that the domestic like product led the price decline.

#### **D. MOFCOM's Impact Analysis in Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4**

26. Canada demonstrated that MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as "consistently depressed" contradicts positive evidence on the record that this market share increased over the period of investigation. Canada also demonstrated that MOFCOM failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors showing an improvement in the state of the domestic industry in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4.

27. Although China argued that Canada's claim that MOFCOM mischaracterized the domestic industry's market share is based on a translation error, Canada demonstrates that its translation of "*shizhong ... dimi*" is preferable to China's because it is a more complete translation. Further, China's response with regard to the translation of these Chinese words demonstrates that there is no material dispute between the parties regarding their translation.

28. More importantly however, MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share is improper regardless of which translation is used. First, Article 3.4 required MOFCOM not simply to compile market share data but to "analyze and interpret" it by analyzing trends in this data in the context of their own development and the development of other factors. Contrary to this requirement, MOFCOM's analysis appears to have simply assessed the amount or level of the domestic industry's market share rather than its trends. Second, MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as "consistently depressed" or "remained low" contradicted positive evidence on the record. The domestic industry's market share did not stay at a depressed or lower-than-normal level during the period of investigation but rather rose from 19.68% in 2010 to 26.22% in 2012, or by 6.54 percentage points<sup>7</sup>.

29. MOFCOM also failed to properly analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry<sup>8</sup>. It failed to properly assess and explain the role, relevance and weight of each factor even though several panels have found a requirement to do so. MOFCOM did not adequately place data relating to particular positive factors within the context of the other factors examined. MOFCOM discussed only the relationship between domestic demand and the construction and renovation of production facilities. With regard to the rest of the positive factors, it simply acknowledged that they showed increases.

30. Furthermore, MOFCOM failed to properly assess the role of the domestic industry's market share and investing and financing ability and improperly considered that these two factors supported a finding of injury<sup>9</sup>. With regard to the domestic industry's investing and financing ability, MOFCOM failed to explain how it could find that some domestic producers had to reduce output, shut down or sell assets when positive evidence on the record showed that production capacity and output increased dramatically over the period of investigation and that the domestic industry had constructed and renovated production facilities<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>7</sup> Comment on Question 53: The fact that the domestic industry market share increased while that of subject imports stayed essentially stable suggests that subject imports were not responsible for the injury suffered by the domestic industry.

<sup>8</sup> Question 52: MOFCOM was required to ensure that its reasoning with regard to the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry was reflected in its Final Determination in such a way that an interested party could verify that it had conducted this analysis. Here, an interested party would not have been able to conclude that MOFCOM's assessment of whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry is in the causation section without China's *post hoc* explanation. This is because MOFCOM does not provide any indication that it conducted this part of the impact analysis in the causation section. Thus, MOFCOM failed to comply with its obligation to provide a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of its conclusion.

<sup>9</sup> Question 49: The last sentence of Article 3.4 does not prevent an investigating authority from finding that one or more factors gives decisive guidance as to whether the domestic industry is injured.

<sup>10</sup> Question 51: MOFCOM could not conclude that the "fact" that some domestic producers had to reduce output, shut down or sell assets was a negative factor supporting a finding of injury because this "fact" is contradicted by MOFCOM's findings that the domestic industry increased production capacity, constructed and renovated a number of production facilities, and increased output and because this "fact" does not reflect an understanding of the domestic industry as a whole as required by Article 3.4.

31. MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic industry was injured is premised, in part, on an improper understanding of the domestic industry's market share and investing and financing ability. Thus, MOFCOM's failure to objectively examine these factors undermines its overall assessment of the state of the domestic industry. Similar to the conclusion in *China – X-Ray Equipment*, this Panel should find MOFCOM's impact analysis to be inconsistent with Article 3.4 even though it is not based exclusively on market share or investing and financing ability.

32. Furthermore, MOFCOM did not identify the relative contribution of the domestic industry's market share or investing and financing ability to its finding on injury or suggest that its finding on injury could be reached without the support of its conclusions regarding these two factors. Accordingly, the Panel should refrain from attempting to conduct these analyses as otherwise it risks engaging in a *de novo* review. Because the Panel cannot conclude that MOFCOM's findings regarding the impact of subject imports can be upheld on the basis of the negative impact factors other than market share and investing and financing ability, it must conclude that MOFCOM's analysis is inconsistent with Article 3.4. This conclusion is consistent with the Appellate Body's decision in *China – GOES*, where the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision not to conduct an analysis of whether subject imports' volume effects were, on their own, sufficient to sustain MOFCOM's finding that there was significant price depression when MOFCOM had not conducted such an analysis.

33. MOFCOM also failed to provide a "thorough and persuasive explanation" of how the positive factors were outweighed by the negative factors even though such an explanation was required by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams*. MOFCOM did little more than recognize the presence of positive injury factors before simply juxtaposing these factors against the negative factors and then concluding that the domestic industry had been injured. MOFCOM provided no explanation, much less a "thorough and persuasive explanation", regarding how, despite rapid and large improvements in many injury factors, the domestic industry was injured. Furthermore, MOFCOM did not provide an explanation of the weight given to the positive factors, either individually or collectively.

## **E. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5**

### **1. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis**

34. MOFCOM causal link analysis fails because it was based on MOFCOM's flawed volume and price effects analyses. China merely recites the evidence MOFCOM relied on in its causal link analysis, which was the very same evidence MOFCOM relied on in its flawed volume, price effects and impact analyses<sup>11</sup>. MOFCOM's conclusory assertions do not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how subject imports, through the effects of dumping, caused injury to the domestic industry. As was concluded in *China – X-Ray Equipment*, it was incumbent on MOFCOM to explain how subject imports could have caused injury to the domestic industry, particularly when: (a) the prices of subject imports were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product; (b) the absolute volume of the domestic like product increased twice as much as that of the subject

---

<sup>11</sup> Question 54i: Canada has also demonstrated that even if the Panel found that MOFCOM conducted volume, price effects and impact analyses consistently with Articles 3.2 and 3.4, MOFCOM still failed to demonstrate the causal relationship through which subject imports caused injury to the domestic industry (i.e. MOFCOM failed to demonstrate how subject imports caused injury)<sup>11</sup>. Simply reciting that volume increased, that subject imports had the effect of depressing prices or that the domestic industry suffered negative impacts does not amount to a demonstration of the causal relationship through which subject imports caused the specific forms of injury the domestic industry suffered. The causal link analysis, "by definition, covers a broader scope" and must go beyond simple reliance on volume, price effects and impact analyses.

Question 54ii: As a result, evidence different from that considered under Articles 3.2 and 3.4, may need to be examined in the context of Article 3.5. Moreover, the nature of that evidence will be driven by the different scope and content of Article 3.5, which is focused on a demonstration of the causal relationship between subject imports and the specific injury suffered by the domestic industry. Thus, it is likely that evidence relevant to demonstrating the causal relationship between subject imports and the specific injury suffered by the domestic industry will be different from that used, for example, to consider whether there was a significant increase in volume or whether subject imports had the effect of significantly depressing the prices of the domestic like product. For instance, nothing in these prior analyses would have necessarily required MOFCOM to have considered evidence relevant to how a significant increase in imports or significant price depression by subject imports caused declines in the domestic industry's pre-tax profits, returns on investment or net cash flows.

imports; and (c) the market share of the domestic like product increased by nearly eight percentage points while that of subject imports remained essentially stable.

## 2. MOFCOM's Non-Attribution Analysis

35. MOFCOM failed to conduct an "objective examination" based on "positive evidence" of four "other known factors" that caused injury to the domestic industry. MOFCOM also failed to "separate and distinguish" the injuries caused by them from any injury caused by subject imports. As a result, MOFCOM failed to provide reasoned and adequate conclusions for its non-attribution findings.

36. With respect to the appropriate legal standard, while – as China recognizes – there is no specific prescribed methodology in the ADA, the Appellate Body in *US – Hot Rolled Steel* ruled that a proper non-attribution analysis of other known factors required an investigating authority to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other known factors and to separate and distinguish those effects from any caused by the subject imports. Moreover, while the Appellate Body recognized that it may not be easy as a practical matter to isolate the injurious effects of the other factors or to separate and distinguish them, this analysis is nevertheless required by Article 3.5.

37. Moreover, as noted in *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips*, an investigating authority must do more than simply list other known factors and then dismiss their role with bare qualitative assertions, such as the factor did not contribute in any significant way to the injury.

38. China relies on three prior panel decisions to support its position that MOFCOM's non-attribution analysis was consistent with Article 3.5. China also attempts to undermine Canada's reliance on the panel's findings in *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips*. These arguments are unconvincing. First, China relies on *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, China – HP-SSST* and *EU – Footwear (China)* because the panels in those cases endorsed a "break the causal link methodology". However, Canada's claim is not with respect to the form of MOFCOM's conclusions. Rather, Canada's position is that MOFCOM failed to comply with the substantive legal requirement to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious impact of the non-attribution factors and to separate and distinguish that injury from any caused by subject imports. Second, the panel decision in *China – HP-SSST* does not support China's position because it correctly articulates the substantive "nature and extent" and "separate and distinguish" legal standard advanced by Canada. Third, China claims that the *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips* case is an "outlier to the extent that it implied that a quantitative or economic modeling analysis was required". However, in contrast to the cases on which China relies, the panel in this case articulated and applied the full and correct legal standard.

39. We now turn to MOFCOM's treatment of each other known factor. First, contrary to China's claims, MOFCOM's Final Determination failed to provide a non-attribution analysis of international cotton and VSF price declines. While it does contain a discussion of cotton and VSF prices in the context of its price effects analysis, it contains no analysis of whether international cotton and VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry or otherwise indicate that the discussion of cotton and VSF prices is a non-attribution analysis. As such, MOFCOM could not have provided a satisfactory explanation of the injury caused by this other known factor or separated and distinguished its effects from those of the subject imports. China's claim to the contrary is no more than *post hoc* explanation. Nevertheless, even if this analysis is found to constitute a non-attribution analysis, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence.

40. China argues that whether international cotton prices affect VSF "is not directly relevant" to factors driving the price of Chinese cellulose pulp and, as a result, MOFCOM was not required to examine these prices. However, Articles 3.1 and 3.5 required MOFCOM to examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which were causing injury at the same time as the subject imports. There is no limitation on this requirement that absolves MOFCOM from examining a known factor.

41. Regarding the relationship between the prices of cotton and VSF, China repeats MOFCOM's assertion that VSF is superior to cotton because of its dyeing and absorption properties and that

therefore "they are not substitutable in the market to a certain extent". However, Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM ignored positive evidence of the substitutability of cotton and VSF<sup>12</sup>. China fails to rebut any of Canada's arguments in this respect. Similarly, China repeats MOFCOM's discussion of Chinese domestic cotton support policies without addressing Canada's argument that it was global cotton prices that mattered. Moreover, MOFCOM never considered the "positive evidence" submitted by interested parties demonstrating that, because Chinese VSF producers sold into a global marketplace in competition with other VSF and cotton producers, it was global, rather than domestic, cotton prices that affected VSF prices.

42. Moreover, independent empirical evidence and commentary confirmed that both the increase and decline of cellulose pulp prices in China was caused by the international cotton price spike and subsequent decline. MOFCOM only examined Chinese domestic cotton prices without providing a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of how these prices were relevant.

43. MOFCOM also failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injury caused and failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence that VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry and failed to provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of its finding.

44. MOFCOM failed to consider substantial argument and evidence demonstrating that the decline in VSF prices led to the decline in cellulose pulp prices. Moreover, China mischaracterized the evidence of the causal relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices by claiming that evidence of parallel price trends between VSF and cellulose pulp was the only evidence demonstrating that the downward trend in VSF prices led to the downward trend in cellulose pulp prices. Evidence of parallel price trends creates a *prima facie* presumption that the price of VSF had a causal impact on the price of cellulose pulp. Moreover, Canada demonstrated that there was significant evidence on MOFCOM's record demonstrating the causal relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices that MOFCOM failed to evaluate.

45. China also attempts to justify MOFCOM's finding that changes in VSF prices were not the "direct cause" of the decline in cellulose pulp prices by pointing to MOFCOM's examination of changes in VSF output and total domestic cellulose pulp production capacity and output. However, MOFCOM failed to consider the impact of the significant decline in VSF prices in its purported examination of cellulose pulp market dynamics. Yet, substantial "positive evidence" on the record clearly demonstrated that while VSF output increased significantly during the period of investigation, VSF prices plummeted in the second quarter of 2011 and continued to decline throughout the rest of the period of investigation.

46. Second, MOFCOM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of injury caused by domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up and failed to separate and distinguish this injury from any caused by the subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to objectively examine positive evidence concerning the effects of this other known factor.

47. While, it may have been appropriate to consider the impact of total capacity in the context of assessing whether domestic industry capacity overexpansion had an impact on market prices, MOFCOM itself never adequately explained or justified its use of data relating to the total production capacity of all domestic producers in this manner. Such an explanation would have been particularly important for an objective investigating authority to make because the production capacity of the "domestic industry" as defined increased significantly during the period of investigation, whereas that of domestic producers not included in the "domestic industry" as defined declined. Furthermore, MOFCOM's analysis of capacity failed to account for any import contribution and was therefore subjective and incomplete. Moreover, it is far from clear from MOFCOM's discussion that it was actually assessing whether capacity expansion depressed market prices and thereby caused injury; rather, it is China's *post hoc* comments that explain this. Ultimately, an analysis of a non-attribution factor must relate to the domestic industry as defined.

---

<sup>12</sup> Question 56: MOFCOM's analysis of international cotton and VSF prices was confined only to a discussion of whether cotton and VSF prices were responsible for any price depression. In this respect, despite China's *post hoc* concession that cotton and VSF prices "played some role", MOFCOM's Final Determination contains no analysis of whether cotton and VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry.

48. MOFCOM also failed to objectively examine the positive evidence related to the increase in production costs caused by the domestic industry's overexpansion<sup>13</sup>. The impact of an expansion in production capacity will be felt specifically on manufacturing costs and not on production costs generally. The evidence showed that manufacturing costs, which would include capital expenses incurred to expand production capacity, increased by over 70% over the course of the period of investigation. In addition, Canada established that MOFCOM ignored data on its record when it concluded that domestic industry overproduction was not the direct cause of the domestic industry's increasing inventory overhang. The significant increase in ending inventories, as well as the domestic industry's low utilization rate of 52.35% in 2012, both constitute positive evidence that the domestic industry's overexpansion led to surplus capacity.

49. Third, MOFCOM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of injury caused by non-subject imports or to separate and distinguish that injury from any caused by subject imports. It also failed to conduct an objective examination of the impact of non-subject imports based on positive evidence.

50. MOFCOM's analysis of the impact of non-subject imports is flawed because it was focused entirely on comparing subject and non-subject imports, rather than being focused on the impact of non-subject imports on the domestic industry<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, MOFCOM did not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how an analysis focused solely on non-subject and subject imports was relevant to the question of whether non-subject imports injured the domestic industry.

51. China's attempt to justify the difference in price between subject and non-subject goods because of a quality difference is not supported by any MOFCOM analysis<sup>15</sup>. While some interested parties had argued that there was a quality difference between pulp produced using hardwood and pulp produced using softwood, MOFCOM clearly rejected the relevance of such a difference.

52. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the positive evidence on the record as well as plausible arguments presented by interested parties showing that non-subject imports were more likely to have directly competed with the domestic like product and, as a result, were more likely to have injured the domestic industry. In particular, MOFCOM ignored the significant increases in the volume and market share of non-subject imports and their significantly lower prices<sup>16</sup>. This evidence on the record and the related interested parties' arguments clearly required

---

<sup>13</sup> Question 57: Canada's view is that overexpansion caused increased competition in the market due to the increase in supply. This increased competition drove down market prices and thereby negatively affected the profitability of the cellulose pulp producers in the market. The fact that the domestic industry was already suffering from injury in a declining market and decided to add 63% more capacity strongly suggests that its injury was self-inflicted. However, MOFCOM failed to account for any of these facts in its flawed non-attribution analysis of this factor.

<sup>14</sup> Question 63: China's claim that the panel's decision in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings* supports MOFCOM's findings on non-subject imports is incorrect because a careful reading of this panel decision shows that the investigating authority in that case actually examined and explained the injurious effects of non-subject imports on the domestic industry. Moreover, in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, non-subject import volumes decreased by 14%, market share was essentially stable and prices were higher than average market prices. These facts sit in stark contrast to the facts of the case before MOFCOM.

<sup>15</sup> Question 65: Even when asked, China failed to shed light on the nature of the quality difference between subject and non-subject imports beyond describing it as "differences in fiber content". Furthermore, China failed to provide details regarding the evidence underlying MOFCOM's conclusion on the quality difference.

<sup>16</sup> Question 66: China presented no references demonstrating where any of the data came from. In addition, the data demonstrates that MOFCOM's conclusion that the differences in quantity and price "were not big" is patently false. In fact, during a period exhibiting price depression allegedly caused by subject imports, non-subject import volumes were between 22 and 25% higher than those of subject imports and non-subject import prices were between 11 and 13% lower than those of subject imports. This evidence suggests that non-subject imports were far more likely than subject imports to be a cause of injury to the domestic industry.

These issues with the data presented by China call into question whether MOFCOM's purported non-attribution analysis of non-subject imports was conducted in an objective manner. First, it is unclear how MOFCOM could have properly compared prices of non-subject imports in USD with those of the domestic like product in RMB. Second, it is equally unclear how MOFCOM could have properly compared full-year non-subject import prices with half-year domestic like product prices. Third, MOFCOM's Final Determination clearly states that it obtained import data directly from China Customs. However, in its non-attribution analysis, MOFCOM relied on customs data from the Petition instead of data directly from China Customs. Finally, "MOFCOM's internal calculation document" of the non-subject import prices does not appear to have been submitted into evidence to this Panel. As a result, neither Canada nor the Panel has had an opportunity to review or verify this apparent data source.

an analysis beyond a cursory comparison of the relative quantity and prices of non-subject imports, as they relate to subject imports.

53. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence regarding the shortage of cotton linter and its impact on the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. As a result, it failed to properly consider the shortage of cotton linter as another known factor of injury to the domestic industry requiring a non-attribution analysis.

54. China failed to rebut Canada's assertion that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total supply. China subjectively relied on evidence from the CCF Viscose Industry Chain Report that indicated that the supply of cotton linter was sufficient in 2012. Moreover, its use of data for the period in which the use of cotton linter as a feedstock was at its lowest was inherently subjective. Positive evidence on MOFCOM's record suggested that cotton linter pulp accounted for considerably more than 30% of total sales in both 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, MOFCOM failed to properly account for other sources of cotton linter demand; demand from these sources was hardly "very small". If MOFCOM had properly considered this additional demand, it could not have concluded that there was a sufficient supply of cotton linter. MOFCOM also stated that data regarding the total production capacity and output of the domestic cotton linter pulp industry was gathered in the course of on-the-spot verification. However, MOFCOM failed to identify this evidence or to explain how information obtained from the parties would have provided verifiable information regarding producers not participating in the investigation.

---



**ANNEX C**

ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex C-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-2
Annex C-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-14

**ANNEX C-1**

## FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) conducted a detailed and thorough injury analysis in its anti-dumping investigation of cellulose pulp from Canada. MOFCOM's determination was based on an objective examination of positive evidence on the record and is fully consistent with China's obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

**II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF**

2. The standard of review applicable in this dispute is set out in Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada is improperly seeking to re-litigate the underlying anti-dumping investigation of cellulose pulp and asking the Panel to carry out a *de novo* review, instead of examining whether MOFCOM's determination was based on an objective examination of positive record evidence.

3. Canada, as the complaining party, bears the burden of demonstrating a violation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada must establish a *prima facie* case of inconsistency with a provision of a WTO covered agreement before MOFCOM, as the defending party, has the burden of showing consistency with that provision.<sup>1</sup>

**III. ARGUMENT****A. Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement Does Not Prescribe a Specific Methodology for Injury Determinations**

4. Article 3 "does not prescribe a specific methodology to be relied on by an investigating authority in its determination of injury."<sup>2</sup> Article 3 also does not provide a "prescribed template or format that an investigating authority must adhere to in making its determination of injury, provided that its determination comports with the disciplines that apply under the discrete paragraphs of Article 3."<sup>3</sup> Thus, "it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation."<sup>4</sup>

**B. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

5. MOFCOM objectively examined positive evidence concerning the significant increase in the volume of imports over the period of investigation (POI), consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

6. The use of the disjunctive "or" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 indicates that the investigating authority need not consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports from *both* an absolute and a relative perspective.<sup>5</sup> MOFCOM considered that the increase in dumped imports in absolute terms was significant, and specifically stated that "the quantity of the dumped imported product showed the significant growth."<sup>6</sup> MOFCOM explained that dumped imports amounted to 421,000 tons in 2010, 419,100 tons in 2011, and 605,500 tons in 2012.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, para. 109 (citing Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, at pp. 14-16); see also Panel Report, *China – Broiler Products*, para. 7.6.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141; see also *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, paras. 113 and 118.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>4</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.159.

<sup>5</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.171.

<sup>6</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 59-61, 77.

<sup>7</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

This represented a significant increase of 43.82 per cent in the volume of dumped imports during the POI. In light of this increase, MOFCOM found that there had been a "quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product," and that "the quantity of the import increased quickly..."<sup>8</sup>

7. Furthermore, MOFCOM explained that the subject imports were a significant portion – nearly one half – of total imports.<sup>9</sup> MOFCOM thus looked at the growth in the volume of subject imports in the context of total imports. Moreover, even though not required under Article 3.2, MOFCOM also looked at the volume of dumped imports in relation to consumption.<sup>10</sup>

8. Thus, MOFCOM took account of whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports. Canada refers to the *Thailand – H-Beams* panel's interpretation of "significant" as meaning "noteworthy, important, consequential".<sup>11</sup> China notes that in the anti-dumping investigation in this case, the volume of dumped imports increased 43.82 per cent during the POI, in a context in which dumped imports represented almost half of total imports and where the margins of the dumped imports had been significant. An increase of 43.82 per cent in the volume of dumped imports during the POI, in light of the share of dumped imports in total imports and the margin of dumping that had been determined by MOFCOM, is "noteworthy, important, consequential," and therefore "significant".

9. Canada erroneously faults MOFCOM for failing "to consider the trends in total domestic demand, the volume of sales from domestic industry production and the volume of sales from non-subject imports".<sup>12</sup> As noted, under Article 3.2, an investigating authority may consider the volume of dumped imports from either an absolute *or* relative perspective. MOFCOM found that there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms. MOFCOM was not required to additionally consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports in relative terms was also significant.

### **C. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

10. MOFCOM found that the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product were "competitive and substitutable to each other."<sup>13</sup> MOFCOM then objectively examined positive evidence indicating that the rapidly rising volume of dumped imports at declining prices pushed down the domestic producers' prices during the second half of the POI.

#### 1. MOFCOM Explained the Relevance of the Undisputed Parallel Pricing Trends

11. Canada first claims that MOFCOM failed to explain the relevance of the undisputed parallel pricing trends between subject imports and the domestic like product.<sup>14</sup> Substantial record evidence supported MOFCOM's finding of parallel price trends. MOFCOM examined price trends for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product<sup>15</sup> and concluded that prices for both "...first increased and then decreased, showing a decreasing trend in general" over the POI.<sup>16</sup> MOFCOM also found that the prices of the dumped imported product and the like product "first increased and then decreased, showing a same trend of changes".<sup>17</sup> MOFCOM then focused further on price trends in the second half of the POI, when the volume of subject imports increased dramatically from 220,000 tons in the second half of 2011 to 310,400 tons in the second half of 2012, and concluded that "[i]n the same periods, both the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry showed a continuous decreasing trend."<sup>18</sup> MOFCOM noted further that over this same time period, "the Price of the Dumped

<sup>8</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65, 77.

<sup>9</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 74, 75.

<sup>10</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>11</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 70 (referring to Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.163).

<sup>12</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 73.

<sup>13</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>14</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 84.

<sup>15</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>16</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

Imported Product continuously decreased and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry also decreased..."<sup>19</sup> MOFCOM also found that "there was a certain relevance between the price of the dumped imported product and the price of the like product of the domestic industry" over this same time period. Canada does not dispute the existence of substantial record evidence of parallel price trends.

12. Prior WTO cases have confirmed that a finding of parallel price trends can evidence a causal link.<sup>20</sup> In addition, MOFCOM also examined the relevance of the parallel pricing trends it found. MOFCOM found that "the decline of the import prices of foreign dissolving pulp had led to the difficulty in the sale of the like product of the Domestic Industry, forcing the Domestic Industry to reduce the price."<sup>21</sup> MOFCOM also examined in an objective and thorough manner confidential pricing reports and minutes of business meetings that MOFCOM obtained at the verification of the Chinese domestic producers. MOFCOM noted in its Final Determination that the "[i]nvestigating authority had collected evidences from many domestic producers during its on-site verifications, including the minutes of the business analysis meetings and the pricing reports, which showed that since the second half of 2011, the decline of the import prices of foreign dissolving pulp had led to the difficulty in the sale of the like product of the Domestic Industry, forcing the Domestic Industry to reduce the price."<sup>22</sup>

13. Exhibit CHN-02 provides translations of the pricing reports that MOFCOM examined at verification and discussed in its Final Determination. These documents provide confirmation that the domestic producers were forced to reduce their sale prices in order to compete with the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports. A number of the documents refer specifically to imports from Brazil, Canada and the U.S.

14. China disputes Canada's translation of the word "deng" that appears after each reference to the subject countries in the specified pricing documents. The more accurate interpretation of the word "deng" that appears after each reference to the subject countries (Brazil, Canada, and the U.S.) is that it is being used to conclude the list and is not to be translated as "etcetera." As China explained during the First Substantive Meeting, in reviewing page 1 of Exhibit CAN-29, the word "deng" is followed by a specific percentage – i.e., "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp." This demonstrates that "deng" is being used to conclude the preceding list of subject countries. Moreover, regardless of the translation of the word "deng", the pricing documents specifically identify the three subject countries when demonstrating that imports from these countries depressed domestic prices.

## 2. MOFCOM Was Not Required To Find Price Undercutting In Order To Make a Finding of Price Depression

15. Canada next claims that the absence of price undercutting "calls into question" MOFCOM's finding that subject imports depressed the prices of the domestic like product.<sup>23</sup> The plain text of Article 3.2 demonstrates that the existence of price undercutting is not required in order to find price depression. The three possible findings of price undercutting, price depression or price suppression are disjunctive, and any one of them alone can support an adverse price effects finding.<sup>24</sup> Both the panel reports in *Korea – Certain Paper*<sup>25</sup> and in *EC – Salmon (Norway)*<sup>26</sup> and the Appellate Body<sup>27</sup> have supported this plain text interpretation.

16. MOFCOM's price analysis explained how imports pushed down domestic prices. MOFCOM fully explained how on the facts of this case domestic producers were forced to lower prices to compete with the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports. MOFCOM found that the interaction between the declining prices for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product forced the domestic producers to lower prices. MOFCOM found there was positive evidence

<sup>19</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>20</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210; Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.261.

<sup>21</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>22</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 94.

<sup>24</sup> See Panel Report, *US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS*, (as modified by Appellate Body Report), para. 7.265.

<sup>25</sup> Panel Report, *Korea – Certain Paper*, para. 7.242.

<sup>26</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, para. 7.638.

<sup>27</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.149 and 5.156.

on the record in the form of the verification documents demonstrating that the dumped subject imports forced the domestic industry to reduce prices, thereby depressing the domestic prices. Moreover, the interested parties that had alleged that lower domestic prices demonstrated domestic producers were the price leaders made assertions but did not provide supporting evidence. Objectively examining the evidence on the record, MOFCOM concluded that the dumped subject imports depressed the domestic prices.

3. MOFCOM Properly Considered the Volume Effects on Prices of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry

17. Canada's claim that MOFCOM failed to consider evidence that the market share of the subject imports allegedly remained "stable" also lacks merit.<sup>28</sup> Even though MOFCOM's price depression finding was based on movements in the absolute quantity of subject imports, MOFCOM also considered movements in market share in its price effects analysis.

(a) Article 3.2 Does Not Require an Investigating Authority to Consider Both the Absolute Volume and Market Share of Subject Imports

18. Article 3.2 allows an investigating authority to "consider" whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports "either in absolute terms *or* relative to production or consumption in the importing Member." Therefore, the plain text makes clear that an investigating authority is not obligated to consider relative increases in subject imports, as Canada argues. As a matter of logical progression, the authority set out in the first sentence for an investigating authority to consider whether there has been an increase in dumped imports either in absolute or relative terms must likewise extend to the investigating authority's consideration of price effects in the second sentence. Consideration of a relative increase in imports – market share – thus cannot be a compulsory mode of analysis when considering the price effects of subject imports.

(b) MOFCOM's Price Depression Finding Was Based on Movements in Absolute Quantity

19. MOFCOM's price effects analysis focused on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports rather than on market share. MOFCOM found that, "[f]rom the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the continued decline of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product forced the Domestic Industry to compete with them in terms of prices, leading to a fast and continuous decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry. Based on these facts, the Investigating authority determined that the dumped imported product had a depressing effect on the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry".<sup>29</sup> Similarly, MOFCOM's price effects analysis noted that "...due to the increase of quantity and the decrease of price of the dumped imported product, the Domestic Industry was forced to continuously reduce the Price of the Like Product".<sup>30</sup>

20. It is undisputed that the volume of the subject imports dumped at significant margins increased dramatically over the POI. In addition, prices of subject imports plummeted in the second half of the POI, from RMB 12,313/ton in the second half of 2011 to only RMB 7,024/ton at the end of the POI.<sup>31</sup> It is simply not reasonable that such a massive increase in dumped subject import volume at rapidly declining prices could not have had an adverse price effect in the Chinese market.

(c) MOFCOM Also Considered Market Share Data, Even Though It was Not Required to

21. Even though MOFCOM properly based the volume effects portion of its price depression finding on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports, and was not required under Article 3.2 to consider movements in market share, it nonetheless still did so. MOFCOM found that the market share of subject imports increased from 18.96 per cent in 2011 to 22.01 per cent

---

<sup>28</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 95.

<sup>29</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65-66.

<sup>30</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>31</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

in 2012.<sup>32</sup> MOFCOM further observed that the "quantity of the dumped imported product showed an increasing trend in general...and its market share also showed an increasing trend in general".<sup>33</sup> MOFCOM also noted that "...the Investigating authority concluded that both the quantity and the market share of the dumped imported product...showed a general trend of increase during the Period of investigation".<sup>34</sup>

22. China notes that a price depression finding can be valid even in the case of small increases in market share. The *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)* panel noted that when a price depression analysis is based on the absolute increase in imports, it does not matter that the market share of subject imports did not increase significantly.<sup>35</sup>

23. The fact that the domestic industry did not lose even more market share was due to the fact that the domestic producers were forced to lower their prices in order to continue making sales. The meeting minutes examined at verification and discussed above demonstrates this reality concretely. MOFCOM thus reasonably found that "in order to prevent a further decline of the market share,... the Domestic Industry reduced the price".<sup>36</sup>

4. MOFCOM's Finding of Price Depression Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

24. Canada next argues that MOFCOM's price depression finding was not based on an objective examination of positive evidence because MOFCOM only referred generally to certain evidence gathered during the verification of the Chinese domestic producers.<sup>37</sup> MOFCOM's price depression finding was fully based on positive evidence and a reasoned explanation set out in MOFCOM's Final Determination. MOFCOM's Final Determination documents and explains its reasoning that subject imports and the domestic like product were directly competitive and competed on price.<sup>38</sup> MOFCOM observed that the absolute quantity of the dumped subject imports kept growing significantly and that the market share of subject imports increased generally at the same time as the prices for dumped subject imports declined significantly, beginning in the second half of 2011.<sup>39</sup> MOFCOM further based its analysis on the fact that prices of the dumped imported product fell dramatically in the second half of the POI<sup>40</sup>, and that prices for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product moved in tandem in the second half of the POI.<sup>41</sup> **MOFCOM noted that "...in order to prevent a further decline of the market share...the Domestic Industry reduced the price of the like product..."**<sup>42</sup> In its causation analysis, MOFCOM noted further that the prices of the dumped subject imports decreased continually and the quantity of the subject imports increased quickly, "forcing the Domestic Industry to compete with it on...prices; as a result, the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry decreased quickly and continuously; therefore, the dumped imported product depressed the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry".<sup>43</sup>

25. MOFCOM's analysis of the meeting minutes examined at verification and discussed previously, shows that the rapidly rising volume of subject imports forced the domestic producers to lower prices. Canada claims that MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic industry had "difficulty in clinching deals" contradicts the fact that the domestic industry's sales in fact increased.<sup>44</sup> But the "difficulty in clinching deals" referenced in the meeting minutes is a reference to the fact that the domestic industry was forced to reduce prices in order to make sales and thus avoid losing further market share.

<sup>32</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>33</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 61.

<sup>35</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)*, para. 6.230.

<sup>36</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>37</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 101 and 103.

<sup>38</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 58.

<sup>39</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 59, 63.

<sup>40</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>41</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-65, 77-78.

<sup>42</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>43</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 77-78.

<sup>44</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 102.

**D. MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

26. Canada errs in claiming that MOFCOM's injury determination failed to comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM did not fail to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry.<sup>45</sup> MOFCOM properly examined the domestic industry's market share, and adequately considered factors showing improvement in the domestic industry's condition.

1. MOFCOM Properly Examined Whether Subject Imports Explain the State of the Domestic Industry

27. While Article 3.4 requires an examination of the impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry, it does not require an investigating authority "to demonstrate that subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry".<sup>46</sup> Moreover, Article 3.4 "does not address the manner in which the results of this evaluation are to be set out, nor the type of evidence that may be produced before a panel for the purpose of demonstrating that this evaluation was indeed conducted".<sup>47</sup>

28. Contrary to Canada's assertion, MOFCOM did examine the impact of dumped imports. Canada's claim that "MOFCOM entirely failed to evaluate the relationship between the subject imports and the state of **the domestic industry or...whether subject imports explain the state of the domestic industry** as required by Article 3.4 of the ADA" is simply incorrect.<sup>48</sup>

2. Canada's Argument that MOFCOM Failed to Objectively Examine Market Share Is Based on a Translation Error

29. Canada's assertion that MOFCOM improperly found that "the domestic industry's market share of the like product was consistently depressed" is based on an incorrect translation of the Final Determination and therefore is groundless.<sup>49</sup> The correct translation of the Final Determination, submitted as Exhibit CHN-01, shows that MOFCOM found that "[d]uring the Period of investigation, the market share of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry remained low..."<sup>50</sup>

3. MOFCOM Properly Examined Factors Showing Improvement in the State of the Domestic Industry

30. MOFCOM examined numerous indicia of the domestic industry's condition, including production capacity, output, sales volume, sales revenue, labor productivity and per capita salaries.<sup>51</sup> MOFCOM found that despite the positive factors, dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow. MOFCOM also found the domestic industry's market share and operation rate were low, and its ending inventory had increased substantially.<sup>52</sup>

31. MOFCOM considered both the positive and negative injury factors and the interplay between them. In doing so, MOFCOM assessed the various factors, conducted an overall analysis of those factors, and placed the data for the various factors in context. MOFCOM's conclusion is based on its overall assessment of the factors.

32. Article 3.4 expressly provides that none of the factors listed in Article 3.4, individually or several combined, necessarily give decisive guidance. Thus, MOFCOM was entitled to find that dumped imports negatively affected the domestic industry on the basis of its overall assessment of

<sup>45</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 111, 112 and 114.

<sup>46</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 149-150. (emphasis omitted)

<sup>47</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 131.

<sup>48</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 111.

<sup>49</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 112 (quoting Canada's translation of the Final Determination at Exhibit CAN-3, at p. 78).

<sup>50</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76. (emphasis added)

<sup>51</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>52</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 78.

the factors, even if some factors showed positive trends. Previous panels have confirmed that "there is no requirement in Article 3.4 that each and every injury factor, individually, must be indicative of injury".<sup>53</sup>

**E. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

33. MOFCOM conducted an objective examination of the record evidence concerning causation. MOFCOM's causation analysis was based on several factors, including the fact that the quantity of the dumped subject imports skyrocketed. Moreover, the price of the dumped imported product declined precipitously in the second half of the POI. This combination of significant increases in import volume and rapid declines in prices forced the domestic industry to compete on prices, and as a result the price of the like product of the domestic industry was depressed.<sup>54</sup> The domestic industry lost market share on an almost one-to-one basis in 2012 in the price depression period.<sup>55</sup> The price depression caused by the dumped subject imports led to a continuous decline of the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow from operating activities of the domestic industry.<sup>56</sup>

1. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Properly Relied On Its Volume and Price Effects Findings

34. Canada alleges that MOFCOM's causal link analysis relies on faulty volume and price effects findings. As discussed above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings were fully consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM thus properly based its causation analysis in part on its prior volume and price effects findings.

2. MOFCOM Appropriately Considered Whether There Was A Causal Link Between Subject Imports and the Material Injury Suffered by the Domestic Industry

35. Canada next alleges that MOFCOM "asserted that subject imports caused injury to the domestic producers of like goods, [but] it failed to demonstrate *how*".<sup>57</sup> MOFCOM objectively considered positive evidence demonstrating a causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry, and explained that link fully.

36. MOFCOM found that the absolute volume of the dumped subject imports increased dramatically, from 421,000 tons in 2010 to 605,500 tons in 2012, an increase of 43.82 per cent over the POI. MOFCOM also found that the market share of the dumped subject imports increased, from 18.96 per cent in 2011 to 22.01 per cent in 2012.<sup>58</sup> MOFCOM found that prices of the dumped subject imports declined dramatically from the first half of 2011 to the end of the POI, from RMB 13,040/ton to RMB 7,024/ton.<sup>59</sup> MOFCOM found further that the domestic market share of the like product "was generally in an increasing trend",<sup>60</sup> but that the market share of the like product declined in the second half of 2012 and that the dumped subject imports gained that lost market share on a one-to-one basis.<sup>61</sup> MOFCOM found further that the prices of the dumped imports and the like product generally moved in parallel during the period of price depression.<sup>62</sup> MOFCOM also found that "from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the continued decline of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product forced the Domestic Industry to compete with them in terms of price, leading to a fast and continuous decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.

<sup>53</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.163. See also Panel Report, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 7.329.

<sup>54</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 77.

<sup>55</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-65.

<sup>56</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 77-78.

<sup>57</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 133.

<sup>58</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>59</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>60</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>61</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>62</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-66, 77-78.



Based on these facts, the Investigating authority determined that the dumped imported product **had a depressing effect on the Price of the Like Product...**<sup>63</sup>

37. MOFCOM in the "Causal Relationship" section of its determination focused on the significant growth of the quantity of the dumped imported product, as well as the precipitous price declines of the dumped imported product, which had the effect of "forcing the domestic industry to compete **with it on the prices...**"<sup>64</sup> MOFCOM found further that documents examined at verification and discussed above demonstrated the price depressing effect that the increase in volume of significantly dumped imports had on domestic prices, as domestic producers were forced to lower their price to maintain sales in the Chinese market.<sup>65</sup>

38. MOFCOM also carefully examined the various economic factors and indices concerning the condition of the domestic industry.<sup>66</sup> MOFCOM examined both those economic indicators that showed the domestic industry was suffering from material injury, and other factors that showed more positive trends.<sup>67</sup> MOFCOM took this whole constellation of economic factors and indices into account.

39. MOFCOM's causation analysis thus examined the relationship of the dumped imports to those economic indicators showing more positive financial results for the domestic industry, as well as those that showed that the domestic industry was in fact suffering material injury. MOFCOM's causation analysis stated that "due to the impact of the dumped imported product, the domestic industry had to reduce significantly the price of its like product, resulting in the significant decline of the profitability and the sharp decline of the pre-tax profit and ROI. In 2012, the pre-tax profit and ROI of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry both dropped to the lowest level during the Period of investigation and both were negative values; the domestic industry suffered serious losses...[b]ased on the comprehensive consideration of the above facts and evidence, the Investigating authority determined that...the dumped imported product had caused the material injury to the Domestic Industry".<sup>68</sup>

3. MOFCOM's Analysis of Any Other Known Factors Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

40. In addition to linking the rapidly growing volume of dumped imports at steeply declining prices with the material injury suffered by the domestic industry, MOFCOM also thoroughly examined the role played by other known factors.

41. The other known factors identified in Canada's submission can be classified into two categories. The first are the known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, but which MOFCOM determined in its Final Determination did not break the causal link between dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry. These are cotton and VSF prices, the domestic industry's capacity expansion, and non-subject imports. The second category that Canada challenges is the known factor – cotton linter – that MOFCOM determined did not cause injury to the domestic industry.

(a) MOFCOM Properly Separated and Distinguished the Injurious Effects of Certain Other Known Factors from the Injurious Effects of the Dumped Imports

42. With respect to the first category of factors identified in Canada's submission, subject imports need only be a "cause," and not the sole cause of material injury to the domestic industry. The Appellate Body has stated that the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "applies solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic industry **at the same time**."<sup>69</sup> In order to ensure that the

<sup>63</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65-66; see also Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 73, 77-78.

<sup>64</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 77-78.

<sup>65</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>66</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>67</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>68</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 78.

<sup>69</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 223.

injurious effects of the other known factors are not "attributed" to dumped imports, the investigating authority's non-attribution analysis "requires 'separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports'."<sup>70</sup> However, as long as an investigating authority carries out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors, the "particular methods and approaches" are not prescribed by the Anti-Dumping Agreement.<sup>71</sup>

- (i) MOFCOM's Examination of the Effects of Cotton and VSF Prices on Cellulose Pulp Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

43. Canada argues that there is an alleged correlation between global cotton fibre, global VSF and Chinese cellulose pulp pricing.<sup>72</sup> Contrary to Canada's claims, MOFCOM conducted an objective examination based on positive evidence before determining that cotton prices were not the main factor that determined the price of VSF, and cotton prices were also not the main factor that affected the price of cotton pulp in the domestic industry.<sup>73</sup>

44. As MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination, evidence indicated that VSF has superior dyeing and moisture absorption properties as compared to cotton fiber.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, based on an objective examination of the positive evidence, MOFCOM reached the conclusion that the different properties between VSF and cotton fiber rendered them "not substitutable in the market to a certain extent".<sup>75</sup> As a result, because VSF and cotton fiber are, to a certain degree, not substitutable in the market, MOFCOM reasonably found that there is no necessary relationship between the prices of VSF and cotton.<sup>76</sup>

45. In addition, as MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination, during the POI, China's import quotas on cotton and other Chinese Government policies created a disconnect between global cotton prices and the domestic cotton prices in China. Thus, domestic cotton market dynamics differ from the global market dynamics relied on by Canada, and MOFCOM properly reviewed *domestic* Chinese cotton prices instead of global cotton prices when analysing whether cotton prices impacted *domestic* VSF prices in China.

46. In reviewing domestic cotton prices, the data demonstrated that the domestic VSF and cotton pulp prices in China did not follow the trends in domestic cotton prices in China. As a result, based on the above data, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that during the POI, cotton prices were not the main factor that determined the price of VSF, and cotton prices were also not the main factor that affected the price of cotton cellulose pulp.

47. In any event, Canada's arguments concerning the alleged relationship between cotton and VSF prices are not even directly relevant to an analysis of factors driving cellulose pulp prices. The more even hypothetically relevant question is whether there is a relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

48. Canada argues that Figure 1 in its first written submission, which is based on data submitted by foreign exporters, demonstrates there is a causal relationship between cotton, VSF, and cellulose pulp prices.<sup>77</sup> However, MOFCOM reasonably found that the information on the record did not constitute sufficient evidence demonstrating the alleged direct *causal* relationship between VSF and overall cellulose pulp prices.<sup>78</sup> The parallel price trends on their own do not demonstrate that the downward trend in VSF prices led to the downward trend in cellulose pulp prices. Balancing all positive evidence, including data showing strong total domestic demand for cellulose pulp during the POI as discussed below, demonstrates that MOFCOM reasonably concluded that the evidence did not show a direct *causal* relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

---

<sup>70</sup> Panel Report, *China – GOES*, para. 7.618; Appellate Body Reports, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 223 and *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 188.

<sup>71</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 224.

<sup>72</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 3-6 and 157.

<sup>73</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>74</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>75</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>76</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>77</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 157.

<sup>78</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 68.

49. MOFCOM reasonably demonstrated that an examination of VSF output and total domestic demand for cellulose pulp is relevant to an analysis of the ultimate alleged impact of VSF prices on cellulose pulp prices. In the Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the output of VSF during the POI rapidly increased.<sup>79</sup> MOFCOM reasonably explained that the rapid growth in output of VSF as the downstream product in turn resulted in the rapid growth of total domestic demand for cellulose pulp.<sup>80</sup> In addition, MOFCOM also found that the total output could not always meet the total demand of cellulose pulp. As a result, the price of cellulose pulp should have at least remained stable. But it did not. Therefore, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that factors other than VSF output or prices, which are intimately linked with output, were the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices.<sup>81</sup>

50. Therefore, MOFCOM's findings that (1) cotton prices were not a main factor in affecting VSF prices or cellulose pulp prices, and (2) changes in VSF prices were not the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices were based on an objective examination of positive evidence, consistent with the standards of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(ii) MOFCOM's Examination of the Domestic Industry's Capacity Expansion and Inventory Build-up Was Based On an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

51. Contrary to Canada's claim, MOFCOM fully examined and addressed the issues relating to the increased production capacity of the domestic industry during the POI. MOFCOM determined that the domestic industry added capacity due to the significant "increase of the demand of the domestic cellulose pulp market."<sup>82</sup> MOFCOM noted that the domestic production capacity increased to match the significant growth in total domestic demand for cellulose pulp, which increased from 2.03 million tons in 2010 to 2.75 million tons in 2012. MOFCOM further concluded that the "slightly proactive increase of their production capacity" was reasonable in order to meet the expected growth in demand.<sup>83</sup> In addition, MOFCOM concluded that the industry's production capacity even after the increase in 2012 "was basically equal to the total domestic demand for cellulose pulp."<sup>84</sup> MOFCOM then compared capacity and demand levels, and noted that the total output of the domestic cellulose pulp industry was "always far less" than the total domestic demand.<sup>85</sup>

52. In addition, MOFCOM determined that some of the new capacity was not put in place until the end of the POI, further reducing the impact of that increased capacity on the state of the domestic industry during the POI.<sup>86</sup> MOFCOM then further examined the impact of increased capacity on the domestic industry's per unit costs. MOFCOM found that the unit production costs of the domestic industry *declined* in general over the POI, further indicating that expenditures for increased production capacity did not harm the financial performance of the domestic industry.<sup>87</sup>

53. Canada next alleges that MOFCOM inappropriately used production capacity of the entire domestic industry, not merely that for the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM.<sup>88</sup> However, when examining the overall relationship between production capacity and demand, MOFCOM's use of total production capacity for the entire industry in relation to total demand better reflects the overall market dynamics.

54. Canada claims that MOFCOM failed to adequately examine the relationship between the domestic industry's increased production capacity and the increase in inventory.<sup>89</sup> However, MOFCOM's determination states that "the investigating authority also took into consideration the obvious increase of the inventory of the Domestic Industry."<sup>90</sup> MOFCOM examined the increase in production and sales volume from 2012 compared with 2011, and reasonably concluded that the

<sup>79</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 68.

<sup>80</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 69.

<sup>81</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 69.

<sup>82</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76.

<sup>83</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>84</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>85</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>86</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>87</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 81-82.

<sup>88</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 164.

<sup>89</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 168.

<sup>90</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

increased portion of production due to the expansion of production capacity was not the direct cause of the increase of the ending inventory.<sup>91</sup>

55. MOFCOM concluded its analysis by acknowledging that while the increase in production capacity may have had some impact, the record evidence did not demonstrate that the increased capacity was sufficient to break the causal relationship between the dumped imported product and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.<sup>92</sup>

(iii) MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Non-Subject Imports Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

56. Contrary to Canada's claims, MOFCOM specifically examined in detail the role played by non-subject imports, and concluded that they could not break the causal relationship between the dumped subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

57. MOFCOM analysed the relative proportion of non-dumped imports in relation to total imports, and concluded that they were a significant proportion of total imports, over 50 per cent in each year of the POI.<sup>93</sup> MOFCOM then examined the price relationship between dumped and non-dumped imports, and concluded that the difference in prices were "not big."<sup>94</sup> MOFCOM also noted that it learned in the investigation from the downstream customers that the dumped imports were **"generally better...in terms of the quality and consumer comments"** than were the non-dumped subject imports.<sup>95</sup> The fact that the dumped imports were better quality further supported MOFCOM's conclusion that the not large differences in price between them and the non-dumped imports would not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry.

58. MOFCOM acknowledged that the price of the cellulose pulp imported from South Africa was lower than the price of the dumped subject imports, but that the quantity of imports of cellulose pulp from South Africa were relatively small, and less than 10 per cent of total imports in each year of the POI. MOFCOM further analysed relative prices, and noted that cellulose pulp imported from Indonesia and Sweden were imported at similar prices to those of the dumped imported product, but that their quantities as a portion of total quantity of imports into China was declining over the POI.<sup>96</sup>

(b) MOFCOM Properly Determined that the Supply of Cotton Linter Was Not Causing Injury to the Domestic Industry

59. The other known factor challenged by Canada is the alleged shortage of domestic cotton linter supply and its alleged injurious effects on the domestic industry.<sup>97</sup> MOFCOM reasonably determined that the supply of domestic cotton linter was not another known factor that was at the same time injuring the domestic industry.

60. Canada claims that an insufficient quantity of domestic cotton linter, an input to the production of cotton linter cellulose pulp, was a significant cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>98</sup>

61. Canada first argues that MOFCOM failed to examine evidence indicating that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total domestic cotton linter supply for each year of the POI.<sup>99</sup> However, in the paragraph following the table in the China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012 that Canada relied on,<sup>100</sup> CCFGroup indicates that any shortage in cotton linter supply was mainly filled by waste cotton linters. Coupled with the latter, the supply of cotton linter in 2012 was in fact

<sup>91</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

<sup>92</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

<sup>93</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 84.

<sup>94</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>95</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>96</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>97</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 178.

<sup>98</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 178.

<sup>99</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 181.

<sup>100</sup> See CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-4, at p. 6.

"relatively sufficient."<sup>101</sup> As a result, MOFCOM properly concluded that there was sufficient total domestic cotton linter supply in 2012.

62. Canada next argues that MOFCOM's analysis assumes that cotton linter pulp producers would have access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter.<sup>102</sup> As demonstrated above, MOFCOM considered the information in the CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012 that indicated cotton linter supply was in fact sufficient. MOFCOM then reasonably explained that because cotton linter was mainly used for the production of cotton linter pulp, as shown in Table 4 of Canada's submission, MOFCOM properly applied a unit consumption ratio of 1 ton of cotton pulp to approximately 1.3 tons of cotton linter, in order to determine what the domestic output of cotton pulp should have been over the POI.<sup>103</sup> However, the actual output of cotton pulp, as well as the capacity utilization rate of the domestic cotton pulp industry, were much lower. As a result, MOFCOM properly determined that the low capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry was not caused by changes in the supply of cotton linter.

63. Finally, MOFCOM properly relied on positive evidence derived from injury questionnaire responses demonstrating that during the POI, the sales volumes of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp, at their highest level in 2012, accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total sales volume of the like product of the domestic industry.<sup>104</sup> As cotton linter is not a raw material for the production of wood pulp or bamboo pulp, MOFCOM reasonably found that changes in the supply of cotton linter were not the cause of the overall domestic cellulose pulp industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>105</sup>

64. MOFCOM reasonably found that the supply of cotton linter was sufficient, and therefore was not a factor that caused injury to the domestic industry. Because the supply of cotton linter was not a factor contributing at the same time to the situation of the domestic industry, there was no need to "separate and distinguish" any injurious effects.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

65. For the reasons set forth in this submission, China requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's determinations in the underlying investigations were fully consistent with China's WTO rights and obligations.

---

<sup>101</sup> See CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-4, at p. 6.

<sup>102</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 185.

<sup>103</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 75.

<sup>104</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 74.

<sup>105</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76.

**ANNEX C-2**

## SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. As China's prior submissions have demonstrated, MOFCOM objectively examined positive evidence and fully complied with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM found that the volume of significantly dumped imports increased dramatically over the period of investigation (POI), over 40 per cent. MOFCOM also found that the prices of those rapidly growing dumped imports plummeted, and forced domestic producers to lower their prices in the face of severe price competition with those dumped imports. In addition, MOFCOM properly examined the various factors having a bearing on the state of the industry, both positive and negative, and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. Finally, China has also demonstrated that Canada's arguments concerning MOFCOM's non-attribution analyses should be rejected. There is no prescribed methodology, approach, or qualitative or quantitative analysis. Each such analysis must be judged on its own merits.

**II. ARGUMENT****A. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

2. Canada has failed to establish that MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.2 provides an investigating authority with the option of considering whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in either absolute or relative terms.

3. The use of the disjunctive "or" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 indicates that the investigating authority need not consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports from *both* an absolute and a relative perspective. Rather it is sufficient for the investigating authority to consider one of the two perspectives. That the investigating authority need not consider *both* perspectives is confirmed by the use of the term "either" before "in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption". It is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of "absolute".

4. Canada recognizes that the first sentence of Article 3.2 "gives an investigating authority the discretion to consider this increase in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption".<sup>1</sup> However, Canada still argues that an investigating authority is required to consider the "relevant circumstances in a manner that provides a meaningful basis to conduct subsequent analyses".

5. First, there is no textual basis in Article 3.2 for the "requirement to consider the relevant circumstances". Second, Canada's strained attempt to find a textual basis for its requirement in the term "significant" does not work. It is perfectly possible to consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports is "significant" in absolute terms without having to additionally consider other circumstances. Here, the volume of dumped imports increased more than 40 per cent during the POI. Therefore, it is perfectly possible to give effect to the term "significant" while respecting the ordinary meaning of the other terms used in the first sentence of Article 3.2, such as "or", "either" and "absolute".

6. Canada also attempts to find support for its "requirement" in "the context provided by the other paragraphs of Article 3." However, Canada does not explain how the text of those provisions provides support for its overly expansive interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2. Having strayed completely from the text of Article 3.2, and more generally from the text of Article 3, Canada argues that "[t]o provide a 'meaningful basis' for subsequent analysis under Article 3, the volume analysis must account for relevant market circumstances and not consider subject imports

---

<sup>1</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 1.

in isolation".<sup>2</sup> This statement reveals another fundamental flaw that is at the core of Canada's argument. As it does repeatedly throughout this case, Canada is collapsing the various obligations set out in Article 3 and improperly trying to import into the first sentence of Article 3.2 analyses that are contemplated only in other provisions of Article 3.

7. Canada is essentially arguing that MOFCOM was required, under the first sentence of Article 3.2, to consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports was such that it was the cause of injury to the domestic industry. This, however, is not the analysis that is contemplated under the first sentence of Article 3.2. And, while there may be a "logical progression" between Articles 3.2 and 3.5 and the two provisions may be "interlinked", this does not mean that the requirements of both are the same. Canada's argument would seem to be that a volume analysis is only consistent under Article 3.2 if it *necessarily* leads to an affirmative finding of causation. However, an investigating authority is entitled to consider that the increase in the volume of dumped imports is significant and yet arrive at a negative finding of causation.

8. Canada's argument implies that an absolute increase in the volume of dumped imports, no matter how large in numerical terms, could not by itself, provide a meaningful basis for the subsequent analysis under Article 3, unless the increase is coupled with lost sales or the substitution of market share of the domestic industry. This is incorrect both in light of the plain text of the first sentence of Article 3.2 and the provisions that follow.

9. Moreover, Canada specifically asserts that MOFCOM failed to consider three factors under the first sentence of Article 3.2, namely, domestic consumption, domestic sales and non-dumped imports. The first two factors are mentioned in the first sentence of Article 3.2 in connection with the option of considering whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports in relative terms. The fact that these two factors are expressly referred to in connection with relative import volume, and are not mentioned in connection with absolute volume, further undermines Canada's contention that the consideration of volume in absolute terms requires an investigating authority to consider market share. Moreover, even with respect to relative volume, the first sentence of Article 3.2 refers to production or consumption. The use of the disjunctive "or" means that, even in the case of relative volume, an investigating authority is not required to consider both. Furthermore, the reference to production or consumption is exhaustive – there is no "for example" or "including" in the first sentence of Article 3.2. Thus, there is no basis for Canada's contention that an investigating authority is also required to consider trends in non-subject imports as part of the analysis undertaken under the first sentence of Article 3.2.

10. Canada seems to suggest that the requirement to consider the three additional factors is case-specific.<sup>3</sup> However, in practice, Canada's proposed approach would impose an obligation on all investigating authorities in all investigations to consider whether there is a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in relative terms or to assess the volume of dumped imports against "relevant circumstances". Furthermore, in order to consider whether such "relevant circumstances" exist, the investigating authority would be required to consider factors other than the absolute volume of the dumped imports, including, but possibly not limited to, the factors raised by Canada in this dispute. Only after the investigating authority has conducted such analysis and has concluded that the "relevant circumstances" do not require examining other factors, could the investigating authority consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms. This effectively makes consideration of the relative increase in the volume of the dumped imports obligatory for all investigating authorities in all investigations.

11. Finally, at the First Substantive Meeting, Canada claimed that MOFCOM "failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its finding of a significant increase in absolute volume". Canada did not include this claim in its panel request.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the Panel should reject Canada's claim on this

---

<sup>2</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 5 and 8-9. See, Japan's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Canada's request for the establishment of a panel, para. 4.

basis alone. In any event, Canada's allegation is once again grounded on a misunderstanding of the requirements of the first sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>5</sup>

**B. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

12. MOFCOM's finding of price depression was consistent with MOFCOM's obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

1. MOFCOM Reasonably Relied on a Variety of Record Evidence To Support Its Price Depression Finding

13. MOFCOM examined a variety of evidence that supported its conclusion that the dumped subject imports had a depressing effect on the prices of the domestic like product in the second half of the POI. MOFCOM found that the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product were directly competitive because they were "basically identical in terms of the product's performance, the quality, the sales area and the group of clients."

14. MOFCOM also relied on the significant increase in the absolute volume of dumped imports over the POI, which increased dramatically from approximately 421,000 tons in 2010 to 605,500 tons in 2012, an increase of 43 per cent.<sup>6</sup> MOFCOM further relied on the drastic fall in prices for subject imports over the second half of the POI. Prices for subject imports fell from 13,040 RMB/ton in early 2011 to only 7,024 RMB/ton at the end of the POI.

15. In addition, MOFCOM had calculated significant dumping margins for the dumped subject imports, ranging from 13 to 23.7 per cent for Canadian producers, to 16.9 and 17.2 per cent for the investigated U.S. producers, and an all-others margin of 33.5 per cent for other U.S. producers. MOFCOM also calculated a margin of 6.8 per cent for the Brazilian respondents and an all-others rate of 11.5 per cent for all other Brazilian exporters.

16. In addition, MOFCOM reasonably found that there were parallel pricing trends. MOFCOM **concluded that prices for subject imports and the domestic like product over the POI "...first increased and then decreased, showing a decreasing trend in general."**<sup>7</sup> MOFCOM also found parallel price trends in the second half of the POI, and noted that "[i]n the same period, both the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry showed a continuous decreasing trend."

17. In addition, as discussed further below and in China's prior submissions, MOFCOM also relied in part on the pricing minutes, which demonstrated concretely that subject imports forced the domestic producers to reduce prices for the domestic like product.

18. China notes that the plain text of Article 3.2 requires only that MOFCOM "shall **consider whether...the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree...**" (emphasis added). The text does not define how the investigating authority "shall consider" these factors, which provide an investigating authority discretion when undertaking its price depression analysis so long as it undertakes an objective examination based on positive evidence. Moreover, the Appellate Body has stated that an investigating authority "is not required to make a definitive determination of significant price depression and suppression, such as the determination contemplated in [Article 3.5 to] 'demonstrate' the causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic **industry.**" **The Appellate Body has stated that "...the authority's consideration of price effects must be reflected in relevant documentation produced by the**

<sup>5</sup> China recalls that the obligation under the first sentence of Article 3.2 is to "consider" whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports. The Appellate Body has found that the term "consider" in Article 3.2 connotes an obligation "to take something into account", but does "not impose an obligation on an investigating authority to make a definitive determination on the volume of subject imports". Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 130. (emphasis omitted)

<sup>6</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 64.



authority in its investigation, and must be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination..."<sup>8</sup> MOFCOM's price effects analysis fully meets this standard.

2. MOFCOM Reasonably Found Parallel Price Trends and Explained Their Relevance

19. Canada has shifted its argument, and now attempts to argue that subject imports and the domestic like product did not exhibit parallel price trends, at least not over the entire POI. Canada's claim in this regard is unavailing. MOFCOM found parallel price trends both early in the POI, and also in the more critical period later in the POI during which MOFCOM found price depression. MOFCOM did not rely on a price depression finding only in a single isolated period of the overall POI, but rather, appropriately, looked at longer-term price trends and general movements in prices over longer time periods. In contrast, Canada improperly focuses on only a single point in time early in the overall POI in which the lines showing prices for subject imports and the domestic like product cross.

20. Canada also incorrectly argues that "the price of the domestic like product declined much faster than those of subject imports" once prices began to decline. During the second half of the POI, the prices for the domestic like product declined 47.38 per cent, while the dumped imports declined at basically the same level, 46.14 per cent. Over the first half-year of 2011 compared with the first-half year of 2012, the price of the dumped subject imports declined by 39.59 per cent, while the price for the domestic like product declined by a nearly identical 38.80 per cent, providing further confirmation of parallel price trends and contradicting to Canada's claim that the price of the domestic like product "declined much faster" than those of subject imports.

21. Canada also now claims that the panel's finding in *China – Autos (US)*, which concerned a finding of parallel prices in a different case, applies equally here.<sup>9</sup> The *China – Autos (US)* case, however, is not applicable. In that case, the panel noted that the prices moved in different directions and the average unit values declined at a "considerably different" rate of change.<sup>10</sup> And in *China – GOES*, prices for subject imports declined only 1.25 per cent, while prices for the domestic like product declined by 30.25 per cent.<sup>11</sup> In this case, however, there is clear evidence both of parallel pricing and of similar movements in average unit value between subject imports and the domestic like product. Moreover, the panel in *China – Autos (US)* stated that an investigating authority does not need to find "perfect correlation in prices" to support a finding of parallel pricing. And the Appellate Body stated in *China – GOES* that it could "conceive of ways in which an observation of parallel price trends might support a price depression or suppression analysis.

22. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM "gave no explanation or reasoning regarding how any parallel price trend indicated the nature of competition between subject imports and the domestic like product."<sup>12</sup> The existence of parallel price trends can be an indicator of a link between prices for subject imports and the domestic like product. The fact that prices for subject imports and the domestic like product move in tandem can be evidence of a causal relationship. In addition, the pricing minutes that MOFCOM examined demonstrated concretely that the dumped subject imports were forcing the domestic producers to lower prices.

3. The Pricing Documents and Meeting Minutes are Reliable, Concrete Evidence of Price Depression

23. Contrary to Canada's assertions, the pricing documents and meeting minutes that MOFCOM examined concretely demonstrated that domestic producers were forced to lower prices in the face of the rapidly rising volume of significantly dumped imports at rapidly declining prices. Those documents are reliable, contemporaneous accounts of the adverse pricing pressure that the domestic producers faced in the normal course of their business operations during the POI.

<sup>8</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 158.

<sup>9</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, paras. 7.262-7.263.

<sup>11</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, fn. 350.

<sup>12</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 9, para. 26.

24. Canada's translation of the phrase "deng" is not correct. The dictionary definition of "deng" in Exhibit CHN-06 indicates that the phrase has two uses, and that the word can mean either "et cetera" when a preceding list of items is not complete and there are other items that are not identified, or it can be used to finish or wind up the list of items preceding "deng." In the present case, the list of items preceding the phrase "deng" is closed or complete, and there are no other items that form part of the specified list. In this respect, the "deng" can be translated as "namely" or "as such." In addition, the phrase "deng" is followed by a specific percentage, *i.e.*, "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp." Thus, the phrase "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp" can *only* make sense if the phrase "Brazil, Canada and USA" is an exhaustive list. The import data also confirms that imports from Brazil, Canada and the United States do indeed account for approximately one-half of total imports of cellulose pulp into China. For these reasons, Canada's translation of the phrase "deng" in the context of these pricing documents is inaccurate.

25. Canada claims further that the pricing documents and meeting minutes are not reliable. However, the Final Determination states that "[the] investigating authority had collected evidences from many domestic producers during its on-site verifications, including the minutes of the **business analysis meetings and the pricing reports...**" **There is thus no question that MOFCOM** examined these documents during the verification. Moreover, the documents are representative of the situation for the domestic industry, because the companies that submitted these documents are some of the most important producers and their total production and sales accounted for a considerable portion, approximately one-third, of total domestic production.

26. The documents were also all dated well before the initiation of the investigation, demonstrating that they were authentic records recorded in the company's normal course of business, and were not prepared for the investigation itself. Moreover, the documents covered a significant portion of the overall POI. In addition, the pricing minutes and meeting documents from the multiple companies' records included in Exhibit CHN-02 corroborated each other.

27. In light of all these circumstances, there was no requirement that MOFCOM undertake any specific, pre-determined method to verify or examine the pricing documents and meeting minutes that MOFCOM in part relied on. Indeed, the panel in *EC – Fasteners (Article 21.5 – China)* stated that while Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement generally requires an investigating authority to "satisfy [itself] as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which [its] findings are based," the Anti-Dumping Agreement "does not prescribe specific ways in which this general obligation has to be observed." Canada has not pursued claims under Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

28. Canada also argues that MOFCOM failed to explain how the pricing documents "showed any difficulty in making sales..." **Similarly, Canada claims that MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic** industry had "difficulty in clinching deals" contradicts the fact that the domestic industry's sales increased over the POI. But the "difficulty in clinching deals" referenced in the meeting minutes refers to the fact that the domestic industry was forced to reduce prices in order to make sales, and thus avoid losing even more sales and further market share. This is the very essence of price depression.

4. MOFCOM Reasonably Found Price Depression and Was Not Required to Also Find Price Undercutting

29. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM could not objectively find price depression when subject imports were priced somewhat higher than the domestic like product. However, the plain text of Article 3.2 and relevant case law demonstrate that price depression can be found in the absence of price undercutting.<sup>13</sup> There is simply no requirement that an investigating authority must find price undercutting before it can find price depression.

30. MOFCOM also examined relative price levels and the arguments of interested parties in the underlying investigation that prices for the dumped subject imports were higher than prices for the domestic like product. MOFCOM rejected the arguments of foreign producers Cosmo and Fortress that the dumped imports could not have caused injury because prices of the dumped imported product from the U.S. and Canada were higher than the price of the domestic like product.

<sup>13</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 16, paras. 49-53.

MOFCOM concluded that the argument failed because MOFCOM appropriately was conducting a cumulative assessment of prices, and that "the investigating authority would not conduct a separate analysis and assessment on the import price of individual countries."

5. MOFCOM Also Considered Market Share Information, Even Though it Was Not Required to Do So

31. Canada argues that subject imports could not have even conceivably caused price depression when their market share did not increase. China again notes that MOFCOM properly focused the volume effects portion of its price depression finding on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports, and was not required under Article 3.2 to also consider movements in market share.

32. Prior panels have noted that in a price depression analysis based on an absolute increase in import volume, it does not matter that the market share of subject imports did not increase significantly. Even though MOFCOM was not required under Article 3.2 to also consider movements in market share, it nonetheless still did so. Moreover, the Final Determination notes that at the height of the period of price depression, "particularly in the second half of 2012, the dumped imported product squeezed the market share of the like product of the domestic industry which declined to 25.73 percent from 26.71 percent and the lost 0.98 percentage points were all taken by the dumped imported product."

**C. MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

33. Canada alleges that MOFCOM failed to: (i) to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share; and (ii) properly analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry.<sup>14</sup> Neither allegation has merit.

1. MOFCOM Objectively Examined Market Share Data

34. In its Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the market share of the domestic industry "remained low."<sup>15</sup> Canada asserts that MOFCOM's statement concerning the market share of the domestic industry should be translated as "consistently depressed", rather than "remained low." However, Canada appears to acknowledge the tenuousness of its position when it argues that "more importantly, regardless of which translation is used, MOFCOM's analysis is improper". Both reasons put forward by Canada to support this contention are groundless. First, Canada asserts that MOFCOM should have considered the trend in the market share rather than whether the domestic industry's market share was high or low. MOFCOM, however, did in fact examine trends in market share. Second, Canada submits that "MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as remaining low contradicts positive evidence on MOFCOM's record that the domestic industry's market share increased". There is no contradiction between MOFCOM's statement and the evidence on record. MOFCOM's statement does not indicate that the domestic industry's market share was decreasing. Rather, MOFCOM simply made a general statement about the share of the overall market held by the domestic industry.

35. Regardless, MOFCOM found that the increasing volumes of dumped imports at steeply declining prices were impacting negatively on the state of the industry because the dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow, among other factors.<sup>16</sup> Thus, even assuming *arguendo* that MOFCOM erred in its characterization of market share, this does not invalidate MOFCOM's Article 3.4 analysis, which did not turn on market share.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Based on its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, it would appear that Canada no longer intends to pursue its allegation that MOFCOM failed to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry. Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, paras. 47-57.

<sup>15</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 76.

<sup>16</sup> See, China's response to Panel question No. 17, para. 58.

<sup>17</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 53, para. 11.

2. MOFCOM Properly Examined Factors Showing Improvement in the State of the Domestic Industry

36. MOFCOM considered both the positive and negative factors in its Article 3.4 analysis. MOFCOM found that, even though not all of the factors showed a negative trend, the increasing volumes of dumped imports at steeply declining prices were impacting negatively on the state of the industry because the dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow. MOFCOM additionally noted that, as the volume of dumped imports increased, the market share of the domestic industry remained low and inventory increased continuously. Finally, MOFCOM noted that the operation rate of the domestic industry remained low, and also referred to its findings that the domestic industry had to put on hold its plans for expansion. Therefore, MOFCOM's Final Determination demonstrates that MOFCOM properly examined the various factors having a bearing on the state of the industry, both positive and negative, and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry, in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

37. It is incorrect in these circumstances for Canada to allege that MOFCOM "simply juxtaposed the positive with the negative factors".<sup>18</sup> Rather, MOFCOM identified how the impact of the dumped imports manifested itself more clearly in some factors than in others because the effect of the dumped imports was mainly being felt in the prices of the domestic like product. These reduced prices, in turn, negatively affected other factors, such as profits, return on investment and cash flow.

38. Canada, moreover, once again improperly expands the analysis required under Article 3.4 when it argues that MOFCOM was required "to assess each factor's role, relevance and relative weight".<sup>19</sup> Article 3.4 calls for an overall examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. While this examination includes an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, it does not require the individualized assessment of "each factor's role, relevance and relative weight" as proposed by Canada. Canada has failed to distinguish its overly expansive view of what it argues is required under Article 3.4 from the non-attribution requirement of Article 3.5. Canada's statement of what an investigating authority must do under Article 3.4 reads very much like a requirement to perform a non-attribution analysis.

39. The Panel asked Canada to explain how its proposed analysis under Article 3.4 is different from the analysis required under Article 3.5. Canada has not been able to explain the difference between the two in concrete terms. This is not surprising given that Canada is effectively conflating the requirements of Article 3.4 and those of Article 3.5.

40. Canada also raises the panel reports in *Thailand – H-Beams* and in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, but a close look at these reports shows that neither supports Canada's position. As regards *Thailand – H-Beams*, Canada simply cites a statement made by the panel without referring to the panel's actual analysis. This analysis shows that the facts before that panel were dramatically different from the facts in this case. The panel in that case concluded that there was an "absence of even a minimally satisfactory explanation of how the factors relied upon by the Thai authorities support their affirmative injury determination". By contrast, in this case, MOFCOM provided an adequate explanation of how the factors it relied upon supported its affirmative injury determination and Canada has not challenged MOFCOM's analysis of any these factors with the exception of market share.

41. Turning to *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, Canada paraphrases the panel as having stated that "an investigating authority may not simply disregard factors that are not relevant or have little weight in the determination but must explain its conclusion regarding their lack of relevance or weight". However, in this case MOFCOM did not "simply disregard factors", nor did it fail to explain its conclusions. Rather, MOFCOM examined production capacity, output, sales volume, sales revenue, labor productivity and salaries, and recognized that they were positive. MOFCOM found that, despite these positive factors, the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports at declining prices were forcing the domestic producers to reduce prices, which led to a significant decline in pretax profit, return on investment, and cash flow.

<sup>18</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 54.

<sup>19</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 57.

42. Finally, China recalls that Article 3.4 provides that none of the factors listed in Article 3.4, individually or several combined, necessarily give decisive guidance. Thus, the fact that some of the Article 3.4 factors were positive did not preclude MOFCOM from finding injury.

**D. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

43. Canada continues to allege that MOFCOM's causation analysis was deficient because it relied on faulty volume and price effects analyses, and because it conducted an inappropriate non-attribution analysis. As discussed below, both of Canada's claims fail.

1. MOFCOM's Volume and Price Effects Analyses Fully Supported Its Causation Analysis

44. Canada claims that MOFCOM's volume and price effect analyses were faulty. For the reasons discussed above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM therefore properly based its causation analysis in part on its prior volume and price effects findings.

2. MOFCOM's Analyzed the Role Played by Other Known Factors Consistent With Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

45. Canada has continued to claim that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the impact of cotton and VSF prices, the domestic industry's capacity expansion, non-subject imports, and the supply of cotton linter as a raw material in its non-attribution analysis, as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. While the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to "separate and distinguish" the injurious effects of other known factors, it does not prescribe "the particular methods and approaches by which WTO Members choose to carry out the process."<sup>20</sup>

46. During the First Substantive Meeting, Canada incorrectly asserted that it did not have the burden of demonstrating what China should have done differently in its non-attribution analysis in order to be consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As the complainant in this proceeding, Canada does in fact have this burden and has failed to meet it. Canada merely asserts that MOFCOM's analysis is insufficient. In fact, far from Canada's blanket allegation that MOFCOM "made *no attempt* to properly 'separate and distinguish' any injury caused by these factors,"<sup>21</sup> MOFCOM thoroughly examined the role played by other known factors, in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(a) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Effects of Cotton and VSF Prices on the Domestic Industry

47. MOFCOM objectively assessed the role played by movements in cotton and VSF prices in its Final Determination. Canada continues to argue that there is a correlation between global cotton fibre, global VSF and Chinese cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM, considered the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence on the record concerning trends in cotton and VSF prices.<sup>22</sup>

48. Canada continues to argue that global cotton prices impacted VSF prices. The only hypothetically relevant question is whether VSF prices impacted cellulose pulp prices. Examining whether VSF prices impacted cellulose pulp prices does not mean that the investigating authority had to then also consider the further upstream factors that may have impacted VSF prices. Nevertheless, MOFCOM still considered the submissions by interested parties on the impact of cotton prices on VSF prices and addressed this factor.

49. With respect to MOFCOM's analysis of cotton prices, Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM failed to consider evidence allegedly indicating that VSF is a close substitute for cotton,

<sup>20</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 224.

<sup>21</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 64. (emphasis added)

<sup>22</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 66 and 68.

and that therefore prices of VSF and cotton are related. However, MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination<sup>23</sup> that evidence presented during the investigation showed that VSF has superior dyeing and moisture absorption properties as compared with cotton fiber. Because VSF and cotton fiber have different chemical properties, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that VSF and cotton fiber are "not substitutable in the market to a certain extent."

50. In addition, Canada argues that fluctuations in global cotton prices caused similar fluctuations in VSF prices, which then impacted cellulose pulp prices in China. However, MOFCOM reasonably explained in its Final Determination that the domestic cotton prices in China differed significantly from global cotton prices. This disconnect between cotton prices on the international market and cotton prices in China is explicitly addressed in the Final Determination, and is not, as Canada argues, a *post hoc* rationalization. In addition, according to positive evidence on the record, VSF exports encompassed only between 5 and 10 per cent of total domestic VSF output in China. Therefore, the impact on domestic VSF prices from global cotton prices, if any, would be minimal, and MOFCOM properly examined domestic Chinese cotton prices to determine any impact on domestic VSF prices. The data demonstrated that domestic VSF and cotton pulp prices in China did not follow the trends for domestic cotton prices in China.

51. Canada continues to argue that there is a direct, causal relationship between VSF prices and cellulose pulp prices. However, evidence of parallel price trends on their own do not demonstrate there was a causal or direct relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM considered the evidence submitted by interested parties but also carefully examined the supply and demand relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp.

52. MOFCOM found that the rapid growth in output of VSF as the downstream product in turn resulted in the rapid growth of total domestic demand for cellulose pulp during the POI. The demand was strong, such that the total output of cellulose pulp could not meet the total demand for cellulose pulp. Thus, MOFCOM noted that the price of cellulose pulp should have at least remained stable, but it instead declined. MOFCOM reasonably concluded that factors other than VSF output or prices were the "direct cause of the decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry."

53. MOFCOM's examination of the total domestic production capacity, the total domestic output, and the total domestic demand of cellulose pulp in China is central to its analysis, as they all drive cellulose pulp prices in China. This is a matter of simple economic logic, and not *post hoc* rationalization, as Canada argues.

54. Canada still asserts that MOFCOM was incorrect when it stated that the total production capacity of domestic producers was in balance with domestic demand. The absolute levels of the total production capacity and total demand in each year of the POI are indeed quite close. Canada continues to improperly focus instead on the *change* or *variation* in production capacity and demand between each year of the POI.

55. Finally, Canada continues to challenge MOFCOM's use of total production capacity data for all domestic producers, instead of production capacity for the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM.<sup>24</sup> In support of its argument, Canada cites to the panel in *EC – Fasteners (China)*. However, in *EC – Fasteners (China)*, the panel found it improper to examine export data for all EU producers of fasteners when assessing the potential injurious effects of poor export performance to the domestic industry as defined by the Commission. In contrast, MOFCOM was not determining whether total production capacity was another known factor causing injury to the domestic industry. Rather, total production capacity was an intermediate data point for determining trends in cellulose pulp prices.

56. Ultimately, cellulose pulp prices in China would be driven by the total production capacity, total output, and total demand of the entire domestic Chinese cellulose pulp industry. In addition, unlike in *EC – Fasteners (China)*, it would not have been possible for MOFCOM to determine separately the demand for only the defined domestic industry, as there is only one unified demand for products of all domestic producers, including producers not within the defined domestic

<sup>23</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 67.

<sup>24</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 65-68.

industry. As a result, MOFCOM reasonably relied on total production capacity of all domestic producers in order to conduct an apples-to-apples comparison with total domestic demand.

57. In conclusion, MOFCOM's findings that (1) cotton prices were not a main factor in affecting VSF prices or cellulose pulp prices, and (2) changes in VSF prices were not the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5.

(b) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Domestic Industry's Capacity Expansion and Inventory Build-up

58. MOFCOM examined the role played by the expansion of production capacity of the domestic industry.<sup>25</sup> First, MOFCOM's Final Determination sets out the growth and production capacity of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, and acknowledges the significant growth of that production capacity.<sup>26</sup>

59. Second, MOFCOM objectively analyzed whether the expansion of capacity of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM increased its own per unit costs. MOFCOM found that "during the period of investigation, the unit production costs of the like product of the domestic industry increased first and then dropped, showing a decline in general." Thus, the costs of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM in fact **declined**.

60. MOFCOM in its Final Determination then noted that while the "manufacturing costs" increased, other elements of its costs, such as material, labor and raw materials, declined even more substantially. Through the verification of the accounting books of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, MOFCOM found that per unit sales costs declined from 9768 RMB/ton in 2011 to only 6474 RMB/ton in 2012. Thus, the very small increase in manufacturing overhead expenses in 2012 (of 259 RMB/ton) represented only approximately four per cent of the total per unit sales costs in 2012.<sup>27</sup>

61. Finally, MOFCOM objectively examined whether the capacity expansion caused prices to decline. When undertaking such a price analysis, prices in the market logically will be a function of total domestic capacity (and output) and total demand. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for MOFCOM to examine the relationship between the total production capacity of the total domestic industry and total domestic demand. Canada claims that MOFCOM's approach showed a "lack of objectivity."<sup>28</sup> In fact, MOFCOM's analysis was the only appropriate way to analyze the impact of capacity expansion on price.

62. MOFCOM's Final Determination demonstrated that total production capacity over the POI was essentially in balance with total domestic demand. MOFCOM also recognized that although the total production capacity of the domestic industry was slightly higher than the total demand in 2011 and 2012, in light of the explosive growth in demand, the "slightly proactive increase of the production capacity was of certain reasonability in order to meet the demand in the timely manner."<sup>29</sup> In addition, when analyzing the impact of expansion on market prices, market prices will be driven more directly by the actual supply or output of product in the market. MOFCOM then further noted that during the POI, the total output of the domestic cellulose pulp industry was always far less than the total domestic demand.

63. Finally, Canada now claims that MOFCOM "never explained the 'nature and extent' of the **injury to the domestic industry as a result of its overexpansion...**"<sup>30</sup> But as discussed above, Canada has affirmatively declined to state how **specifically** any such non-attribution analysis allegedly should be performed in practice. MOFCOM's analysis of the role played by the capacity expansion of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM was based on positive evidence. MOFCOM reasonably concluded that while the expansion of capacity may have played some role, it was not sufficient to break the causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

<sup>25</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 81-83.

<sup>26</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 73.

<sup>27</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 31, para. 96.

<sup>28</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 78.

<sup>29</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 81.

<sup>30</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 81.

(c) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Impact of Non-Subject Imports

64. MOFCOM also objectively examined the role played by non-subject imports and concluded that while the non-dumped imports may have played some role, they did not break the causal relationship between subject imports and the injury of the domestic industry.<sup>31</sup>

65. Canada argues that MOFCOM was "obligated" to follow a specific and detailed methodology when assessing the role played by non-subject imports, and that MOFCOM was required to "consider data on sales volume, market share and prices of non-dumped imports and to compare those data to those of subject imports and domestic like product."<sup>32</sup> Canada has cited only to the general admonitions under Article 3.1 and 3.5 that the analysis should be based on an objective examination of positive evidence. However, there is no specific methodology, approach or analysis that is required for undertaking a non-attribution analysis.

66. MOFCOM did, nonetheless, conduct a comprehensive analysis of the role played by non-subject imports. In fact, MOFCOM compared data on the volume and prices of non-subject and subject imports, and in essence undertook the very tests that Canada proffers.

67. MOFCOM examined the relative proportion that non-subject imports represented of total import volume. MOFCOM also examined the actual volume of non-subject and subject imports, and **concluded that "the differences between the quantity...of the imported product that was not sold at the dumped price and those of the dumped imported products were not big."**<sup>33</sup> The actual data confirms that the non-subject and subject import volumes followed similar trends over the POI.<sup>34</sup> MOFCOM also found that the percentage of total imports that non-subject imports represented grew considerably from 2010 to 2011, which was early in the POI and which pre-dated the period of price depression found by MOFCOM. In contrast, during the period 2011-2012 in which MOFCOM found price depression, MOFCOM found further that the non-subject import's share of total imports in fact **declined**, further confirming that non-subject imports did not break the causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

68. In addition, MOFCOM compared prices for subject and non-subject imports during the POI. MOFCOM concluded that "the differences between the quantity and price of the imported product that was not sold at the dumped price and those of the dumped imported products were not big." MOFCOM examined in further detail the prices from the three largest non-subject countries, South Africa, Sweden and Indonesia. MOFCOM noted that the price of the South African cellulose pulp was lower than that of subject imports, but South Africa was a "relatively small" source of imports. MOFCOM further noted that the prices for pulp from Indonesia and Sweden "were similar" to the price of the subject imports, but their volumes "showed a declining trend" and their proportion of total imports also declined. MOFCOM has also provided the underlying pricing information, which confirms its conclusions that the price differences "were not big."<sup>35</sup>

69. In addition, MOFCOM's analysis also showed that the dumped imported product was generally better than the non-dumped imports in terms of the quality and consumer preferences. Thus, MOFCOM found that any price differences would be mitigated somewhat by the quality differences between dumped and non-subject imports.<sup>36</sup>

(d) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Role of Cotton Linter Supply

70. Canada continues to claim that an insufficient supply of domestic cotton linter, an input to the production of cotton linter cellulose pulp, was a cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. MOFCOM thoroughly examined this issue and reasonably determined that there was no shortage of domestic cotton linter and thus the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rate was not caused by changes in cotton linter supply.

<sup>31</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 86.

<sup>32</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 78; Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 85.

<sup>33</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 86.

<sup>34</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 35, paras. 103-104.

<sup>35</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 105.

<sup>36</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 65(iii).



71. Positive evidence on the record indicated that any shortage in cotton linter supply was mainly filled by waste cotton linters and that the supply of cotton linter in 2012 was in fact "relatively sufficient."<sup>37</sup> Regardless, MOFCOM proceeded further to consider whether changes in cotton linter supply could explain the low capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM's analysis improperly assumes cotton linter pulp producers would have access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter. Contrary to Canada's claim, MOFCOM's approach was reasonable given the fact that the other sources of demand for cotton linter were very small compared to total cotton linter supply.

72. MOFCOM then applied a unit consumption ratio to determine what the domestic output of cotton pulp should have been over the POI, given the available supply of cotton linter. MOFCOM found that the actual output of cotton pulp, as well as the capacity utilization rate of the domestic cotton pulp industry, were in fact much lower than they should have been given the supply of cotton linter available. As a result, MOFCOM reasonably determined that the low capacity utilization rates of the domestic industry were not caused by changes in the supply of cotton linter.

73. MOFCOM reasonably used the unit consumption ratio provided in petitioners' injury comments. However, Canada has argued that alternative calculations would need to be conducted "in order to fully assess the impact on MOFCOM's conclusion of using" other proposed ratios.<sup>38</sup> Canada does not further explain what "alternative calculations" would be needed to account for "the competition among producers of the various products for the available supply," or indeed what that would even entail.

74. Finally, MOFCOM proceeded further and found that during the POI, the sales volumes of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp, at its highest level in 2012, accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total sales volume of the like product of the domestic industry. MOFCOM reasonably considered this 2012 data to be most significant, as 2012 represents most of the price depression period relevant to MOFCOM's injury analysis. As cotton linter is not a raw material for the production of wood pulp or bamboo pulp, MOFCOM reasonably found that changes in the supply of cotton linter were not the cause of the overall domestic cellulose pulp industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>39</sup>

### **III. CONCLUSION**

75. For the reasons set forth in this submission, China requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's determinations in the underlying investigation are fully consistent with China's WTO rights and obligations.

---

---

<sup>37</sup> See, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-04, p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 42, para. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 77.



**ANNEX D**

## ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex D-1	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil	D-2
Annex D-2	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union	D-5
Annex D-3	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan	D-8
Annex D-4	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway	D-11
Annex D-5	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States	D-13

**ANNEX D-1**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL

**INTRODUCTION**

1. According to the Working Procedures of the present case, Brazil would like to present its Executive Summary to the Panel, focusing on the most important issues of law being discussed. As a major cellulose pulp producer and exporter, Brazil has deep-rooted interest on the results of these proceedings.

**(I) Volume of dumped import analysis (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA)**

2. In Brazil's view, under the ADA there is no requirement for the investigating authority to consider whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports both in absolute terms and relative to production and consumption in the importing Member. As the wording of the text makes clear, the obligation is to make an assessment considering the increase either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. Although no provision in the ADA prevents the investigating authority to assess more than one of the methods, in Brazil's opinion, it cannot be stated that there is an automatic violation of Article 3.2 of the ADA just because the investigating authority has utilized only one of the alternative methods presented by the rule.

3. Furthermore, Brazil recalls that the Appellate Body has confirmed<sup>1</sup> the finding of the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* regarding the meaning of the word "consider" in Article 3.2. Likewise, Brazil understands that there is no obligation for the investigating authority to determine the existence of a significant increase in the volume of imports, it is only necessary that it considers such existence. In the present case, it appears to Brazil that MOFCOM demonstrated in the relevant documents that the significant increase was considered, as the complainant itself recognized<sup>2</sup>. Thus, it does not seem to Brazil that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.2 of the ADA.

4. As for the contention that MOFCOM provided no qualitative or contextual analysis of the magnitude of the increase trends and did not consider the circumstances surrounding the increases, Brazil understands that, since the Agreement is clear about the necessity to consider the increase in dumped imports either in absolute or relative to domestic production or consumption, it would make no sense to compel the investigating authority to consider all methods in considering whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports, particularly when an increase in absolute terms has occurred. This contextual analysis may of course be relevant, depending on the case, for the causation assessment, but it is not a requirement for establishing the consistency of an investigating practice with Article 3.2 of the ADA.

**(II) Price effect analysis (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA)**

5. As for the claim related to price effect analysis, Brazil understands that the matter is intrinsically inserted in the context of the relationship between correlation vs. causality. Drawing on definitions from statistics theories, it could be said that while the correlation is a necessary condition for the causality, it is not sufficient for its determination.

6. In Brazil's view, in order to assess the effect of dumped imports in prices, Article 3.2 requires that the investigating authority establishes more than a mere correlation between the price reduction of the subject imports and the domestic like product. The language of Article 3.2 is clear: "the investigating authority shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by (emphasis added) the dumped imports".

---

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 139 (e).

<sup>2</sup> Canada FWS paragraph 67.

7. In this regard, a conclusion about the price depression of the domestic like products being caused by the downward trend of the prices of the subject imports could not be based merely on the existence of the parallel trend between them. Indeed, the correlation between subject imports and the domestic like products prices could be due to different reasons: (a) subject imports prices affect the prices of domestic like products; (b) prices of domestic like products affect the price of subject imports; (c) an external factor (e.g. raw material prices are affecting both prices); or (d) mere coincidence.

8. For Brazil, the lack of an "objective examination" of the "positive evidence" that the price effect was caused by the dumped imports constitutes a breach of Article 3.2 and, consequently, of Article 3.1. In *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, the Appellate Body defined "positive evidence" as related "to the quality of the evidence that an investigating authority may rely upon in making a determination"<sup>3</sup>, and consider the term "positive" as meaning that "the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible"<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, "objective examination" means that an investigation must be held in "an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties"<sup>5</sup>.

9. As asserted in Brazil's Third Party Submission and answers to the panel's questions, Brazil is not convinced that the evidence presented in business "meeting minutes" and "internal pricing reports" would be sufficient to meet an adequate standard for the determination of a causal link, as argued in MOFCOM's investigating report. These documents do not seem to be technically grounded, or to involve external or impartial opinions. They may be used in an investigation, exceptionally, as a means to support a more technical and impartial kind of evidence.

### **(III) Impact and causation analysis (Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the ADA)**

10. Another contentious issue under the present dispute is whether the examination of the impact of the dumped imports under Article 3.4 of the ADA requires the investigating authorities to assess the "explanatory force" of the subject imports on the state of the domestic industry and the relationship of such an analysis with the causation analysis under Article 3.5.

11. Brazil recalls that Article 3.4 is concerned with the state of the domestic industry and its relationship with subject imports. It requires an investigating authority to examine the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry on the basis of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. In other words, under Article 3.4 the investigating authority is required to conduct "an examination of the explanatory force of subject imports for the **state of the domestic industry; (...) but is not required to demonstrate that subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.** Rather, the latter analysis is specifically mandated by Article 3.5".<sup>6</sup>

12. The text in Article 3.5 makes clear that the considerations set forth in Article 3.2, and the examination required in Article 3.4, are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 as to whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. The outcome of these inquiries thus form the basis for the overall causation analysis contemplated in Article 3.5.<sup>7</sup> This analysis also requires separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports (non-attribution).

13. Therefore, under Article 3, the obligation for the "demonstration of a causal relationship" appears clearly and solely in paragraph 5. This is the moment where a causation analysis is demanded. Paragraphs 2 and 4 mention the "effects" and the "impact" of the dumped imports on prices and on the domestic industry, respectively, and make no reference to a "demonstration of causal relationship" in that context.

14. Brazil believes that the Agreement does not set forth a specific manner in which an investigating authority should conduct the examination and the determination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. What matters is whether the investigating authority

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 192.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, para. 143.

does conduct a proper examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry or not, as it is required under Article 3.4 of the ADA, and not if this examination is conducted in conjunction with the assessment of the state of the domestic industry or separated from it, for example, under the causation analysis.

15. Brazil understands that under Section VI (Causal link) of its Report, MOFCOM did conduct an analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. The fact that this analysis was not in the part of the report dedicated to the assessment of the economic factors required by Article 3.4 is, in our view, irrelevant for establishing per se a violation of this article.

**ANNEX D-2**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

**1. INTRODUCTION**

1. In this executive summary, the European Union summarizes its positions in respect of the Parties' legal claims and its responses to the Panel's questions.

**2. EU OBSERVATIONS ON THE PARTIES' LEGAL CLAIMS****2.1. MOFCOM'S VOLUME AND PRICE EFFECTS ANALYSES**

2. Article 3.2 requires an investigating authority to "consider" the volume and price effects of the relevant imports. By the use of the word "consider", Article 3.2 does not impose an obligation on an investigating authority to make a *definitive* determination on the volume of dumped imports and the effect of such imports on domestic prices. Nonetheless, an authority's consideration of the volume and price effects of the imports must be based on positive evidence and requires an objective examination, which is the overarching obligation under Article 3.1.

3. With respect to import volumes, the Panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* has found that "significant" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 means "noteworthy, important, consequential". That Panel has also noted that investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* in absolute terms *or* relative to production *or* consumption in the importing Member. The Panel held that it is enough for an investigating authority to consider whether there has been a significant absolute increase. Thus, the European Union considers that under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, MOFCOM was required to consider whether, either in absolute or relative terms, the increase in dumped imports was "significant".

4. With respect to price effects, Article 3.2 requires a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of like domestic products over the duration of the period of investigation. An investigating authority's inquiry regarding the price effects listed in Article 3.2 must provide it with a meaningful understanding of whether subject imports have explanatory force for the significant undercutting, depression or suppression of domestic prices that may be occurring in the domestic market, without disregarding any evidence that may call into question such explanatory force. Therefore, the European Union considers that merely identifying parallel pricing trends is not sufficient, when it is not accompanied by a consideration of whether and how the parallel pricing trends have "explanatory force" for the price depression. The Panel thus needs to consider whether MOFCOM did more than simply noting parallel pricing trends.

5. The European Union also considers that in a situation where import prices were significantly higher than the domestic prices during the POI, an investigating authority should be particularly careful to explain how higher import prices explain the effects on domestic prices.

6. Further, the European Union considers that, as part of its analysis of the price effects, the investigating authority may also consider the developments in the market shares during the POI. If such evidence is available, it may not be disregarded if it may call into question the explanatory force of the subject imports for the price effects.

**2.2. MOFCOM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY**

7. As the Appellate Body noted in *US – Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan*, Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement are interlinked insofar as an important aspect of the objective examination required by Article 3.1 is further elaborated in Article 3.4 as an obligation to examine the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry through an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry.

8. Article 3.4 contains a mandatory – rather than illustrative – list of fifteen factors which must *always* be evaluated by the investigating authorities in every investigation. The Panel in *Egypt – Steel Rebar* held that, for an investigating authority to "evaluate" evidence concerning a given factor in the sense of Article 3.4, it must not only gather data, but it must analyse and interpret those data. Only on the basis of the evaluation of data in the determination would a reviewing panel be able to assess whether the conclusions drawn from the examination are those of an unbiased and objective authority.

9. The Appellate Body in *US – Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan* and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)* have stressed that, according to Articles 3.1 and 3.4, investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor having a bearing on the state of the industry and the weight to be attached to it. In assessing the state of the domestic industry, investigating authorities must evaluate all factors listed in Article 3.4 and any other relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry in the case at hand. This analysis cannot be limited to a mere identification of the "relevance or irrelevance" of each factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry.

10. Therefore, the Panel should examine whether MOFCOM's analysis explains in a satisfactory way why the evaluation of the injury factors set out under Article 3.4 leads to the determination of material injury, including an explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction do not, overall, undermine the conclusion of material injury.

### 2.3. MOFCOM'S CAUSATION ANALYSIS

11. In concert with the Article 3.1 requirement of an "objective examination" of "positive evidence", Article 3.5 requires that an investigating authority establish a "causal relationship" between dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. This issue can be separated into two principal sub-issues: (i) the determination that a causal relationship exists between dumped imports and any injury ("causation"); and, (ii) the treatment of other possible causal factors ("non-attribution").

12. With respect to causation, investigating authorities are required to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury "through the effects of" dumping "[a]s set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4". Thus, the inquiry set forth in Article 3.2 and the examination required in Article 3.4 are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 as to whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.

13. With respect to non-attribution, Article 3.5 mandates the investigating authorities to examine other known factors and gives an illustrative list of such factors. In addition, it mandates the authority not to attribute to dumped imports injury caused by such other factors which are injuring the domestic industry at the same time. The authority must make an assessment that involves "separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports".

14. Thus, pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 AD Agreement, investigating authorities are called upon to make a determination that the material injury found was caused by the dumped imports. Moreover, investigating authorities have to examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.

15. In light of this, the Panel should investigate whether MOFCOM's establishment of the facts was proper and their evaluation of those facts unbiased and objective so that MOFCOM's explanations are reasonable and supported by the evidence cited. In addition, the Panel should examine closely whether MOFCOM's causal link finding is based on an objective examination of positive evidence, and whether it constitutes a reasoned and adequate explanation of a causal relationship between the subject imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The European Union has doubts whether MOFCOM sufficiently explained how the subject imports with essentially a stable market share and significantly higher prices caused injury to the domestic industry.



16. Concerning the non-attribution analysis, Canada refers to a number of other known factors which, when objectively examined, would provide an explanation for injury suffered by the domestic industry. The European Union is not yet fully convinced that China has fully addressed Canada's claims. The Panel should carefully consider the different arguments raised by Canada and China, and whether MOFCOM's explanations are reasonable and supported by the evidence relied on.

**ANNEX D-3**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN

**I. Introduction**

1. In this dispute, Canada challenges the anti-dumping measures imposed by China on cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada and the United States, raising a number of claims pertaining to the application of Article 3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).

2. Japan considers that this dispute raises issues of fundamental and systemic importance regarding the manner in which the World Trade Organization (WTO) Members conduct their injury determinations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the ADA. Japan submits that these provisions should not be interpreted in isolation but in light of the fact that these provisions contemplate a "logical progression of inquiry".<sup>1</sup>

**II. The Logical Progression of Inquiry Under Article 3 of the ADA**

3. The Appellate Body has clarified that the paragraphs of Article 3 of the ADA contemplate a "logical progression of inquiry" in the investigating authority's examination of injury and causation.<sup>2</sup> The Appellate Body has also emphasized that the inquiries under Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 should "not viewed in isolation", but rather be logically interlinked with each other so as to form "a single, overall analysis addressing the question of whether dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry".<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the analyses under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 must provide a "meaningful basis" for the ultimate determination of injury and causation pursuant to Article 3.5.<sup>4</sup> In addition, when examining the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry under Article 3.4, an investigating authority may be required to take into account the outcomes of its Article 3.2 volume and price effects analyses.<sup>5</sup>

**III. The Article 3.2 Volume Analysis**

4. With respect to the volume of dumped imports, the first sentence of Article 3.2 provides that investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* in absolute terms *or* relative to production *or* consumption in the importing Member. However, this provision does not provide an investigating authority *unlimited* discretion as to the choice between an absolute increase and a relative increase. Rather, in order to assess whether or not the increase in dumped imports is "significant", i.e. "important, notable, consequential",<sup>6</sup> an investigating authority may be required to examine any positive evidence pertaining to the characteristics of the market and/or interaction between the dumped imports and domestic production/consumption. Indeed, a given degree (e.g. 5%) of increase in dumped imports in absolute terms may bear different significances, depending on whether the domestic consumption has expanded or shrunk.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, a mere increase in dumped imports may not necessarily constitute a "meaningful basis" for an ultimate determination of injury and causation, because such imports may have increased by replacing products *other than* the like domestic products. In addition, Article 3.2 read together with Article 3.1 requires that the volume analysis be based on "positive evidence" involving an "objective examination", i.e. a "fair" and "unbiased" analysis.<sup>8</sup> Such an analysis would be compromised if an investigating authority was able to cherry-pick evidence submitted to its review and disregard evidence pointing toward the absence

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>4</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 144-145 and 154; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.170 and 5.211.

<sup>5</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.209; see also para. 5.211.

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.161.

<sup>7</sup> See Panel Reports, *US – Washing Machines*, paras. 7.48-7.50; *US – Upland Cotton*, paras. 7.1328-7.1330, which emphasized the relevance of the factual market circumstances in the assessment of "significance".

<sup>8</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 193.

of "significance" from a relative perspective. Accordingly, Article 3.2 may require an examination of the *interaction* between the dumped imports and the domestic production/consumption, especially where the facts show that a mere numerical increase of the volume of dumped imports would not "necessarily give decisive guidance"<sup>9</sup> as to the examination of the volume under Article 3.2.

#### IV. The Article 3.2 Price Effects Analysis

5. Turning to the analysis of the effect of dumped imports on the domestic prices under Article 3.2, the Appellate Body has established that the consideration of significant price undercutting under Article 3.2 must involve a "dynamic assessment" of the "relationship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of the domestic like products".<sup>10</sup> Similarly, with respect to significant price depression and price suppression, an investigating authority must assess whether the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the observed price depression or price suppression. As the prior WTO jurisprudence has made clear, the mere existence of parallel price trends is insufficient for a finding of "explanatory force" of the dumped imports for the purported significant price depression or price depression under Article 3.2, without further explanation as to why the parallel price trends can indeed explain the depression or suppression of domestic prices.<sup>11</sup>

#### V. The Impact Analysis Under Article 3.4

6. Japan notes that Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA require the investigating authority to examine the "impact" or "consequent impact" of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry, or in other words, whether the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the state of the domestic industry.<sup>12</sup> The 15 factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 must not be seen in isolation because Article 3.4 is "concerned with the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry".<sup>13</sup> In this regard, as the Appellate Body found in *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, an investigating authority may be required, as appropriate, to take into account the outcomes of its Article 3.2 analyses.<sup>14</sup> For example, a finding that the subject imports did not significantly increase or did not have an effect on domestic prices should be taken into account when considering the state of the domestic industry.<sup>15</sup>

#### VI. Determination of Injury and Causation Under Article 3.5

7. Japan considers that the analysis under Article 3.5 consists in a holistic and conclusive evaluation, encompassing "all relevant evidence before the authorities" in order to determine (i) whether the trends identified under Article 3.4, taken as a whole, amount to "material" injury in the sense of footnote 9 of the ADA, and (ii) whether the dumped imports "through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" are causing such injury. Furthermore, the investigating authority must perform, under Article 3.5, a non-attribution analysis. Thus, while the inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 must involve assessment of the *relationship* between the dumped imports and the like domestic products or the state of the domestic industry, such assessment provides a "meaningful basis"<sup>16</sup> for, or "*contributes to*, rather than duplicates",<sup>17</sup> the ultimate determination of injury and causation under Article 3.5. Taken altogether, the analytical steps of Article 3 contemplate the "logical progression of inquiry" that form "a single, overall analysis".<sup>18</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Article 3.2, final sentence.

<sup>10</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.161.

<sup>11</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210; Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.265.

<sup>12</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>13</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.203.

<sup>14</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.209; see also para. 5.211.

<sup>15</sup> See Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.211.

<sup>16</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 144-145 and 154; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.170 and 5.211.

<sup>17</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>18</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

## **VII. Conclusion**

8. Japan respectfully requests the Panel to consider the views that Japan has expressed above, and carefully examine whether MOFCOM's injury analyses conform to the concept of the "logical progression of inquiry" contemplated under Article 3 of the ADA.

**ANNEX D-4**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NORWAY

1. According to Canada, MOFCOM's determination "that subject imports, both in absolute and relative terms, 'showed a growth trend' **fails to meet the standard [...] with respect to the rigorous inquiry required by Article 3.2.**<sup>1</sup>

2. The Appellate Body has stated that Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "is an overarching provision that sets forth a Member's fundamental, substantive obligation concerning the injury determination, and informs the more detailed obligations in the succeeding paragraphs".<sup>2</sup> According to this provision, the investigating authority is required to conduct an "objective examination" of the economic state of the "domestic industry" on the basis of "positive evidence". The Appellate Body, in *EC – Bed Linen (India - 21.5)*, ruled that an "objective examination" requires authorities to reach a result that is "*unbiased, even-handed, and fair*".<sup>3</sup> In *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, the Appellate Body found that it would not be "even-handed" for investigating authorities:

to conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes *more likely* that, as a result of the fact-finding or evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is injured.<sup>4</sup>

3. According to Canada, MOFCOM's determination "that subject imports, both in absolute and relative terms, 'showed a growth trend' **fails to meet the standard [...] with respect to the rigorous inquiry required by Article 3.2.**<sup>5</sup>

4. Furthermore, the Appellate Body stated in the same appeal, that "an 'objective examination' requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation".<sup>6</sup>

5. Among others, Article 3.1 requires the investigating authority to examine objectively "the volume of the dumped imports". Article 3.2 elaborates on this obligation, stating that the authority must examine whether there has been a "significant increase in dumped imports". The term "significant" was interpreted by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* to mean "noteworthy, important, consequential".<sup>7</sup>

6. Canada contends that China violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the *Anti-Dumping Agreement* by failing to "objectively examine all positive evidence relating to the magnitude of any increase in volume and the circumstances in which subject imports entered the domestic market, including trends in domestic demand, domestic like product volumes and non-subject import volumes, to determine whether an increase is significant".<sup>8</sup> China does not appear to contest the factual matter, but argues that "Article 3.2 does not require the investigating authority to make a 'determination' but rather to 'consider'".<sup>9</sup> This is supported by Brazil in its written and oral third party submission.<sup>10</sup> Both China and Brazil appear to base their arguments on the panel's remarks in *Thailand – H-Beams*.<sup>11</sup> In the first part of paragraph 7.161 of that report, the panel

<sup>1</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.137; *China – GOES*, para. 126; *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 133 (emphasis original).

<sup>4</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, para. 196 (emphasis added).

<sup>5</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 69.

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, para. 193 (emphasis added).

<sup>7</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.163.

<sup>8</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 70.

<sup>9</sup> China's First Written Submission, para. 42.

<sup>10</sup> Brazil's Third Party Submission, para. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161.

noted that a definition of the term "consider" does not entail an "explicit 'finding' or 'determination'".

7. In Norway's view, one must bear in mind that even though there is no obligation to **make an explicit determination**, it is a prerequisite in the provision that the increase to be considered is in fact significant. In order to complete the analysis required in Article 3.2, it is necessary to either directly or indirectly note the existence of a significant increase for it to be possible to consider this. This is also in line with the panel report in *Thailand – H-Beams*, which held that even though the term "significant" need not necessarily "appear in the text of the relevant document", it "[n]evertheless, [...] must be **apparent** in the relevant documents in the record that the investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports".<sup>12</sup>

8. Norway would caution against overemphasising the meaning of the first part of paragraph 7.161 of the panel report in *Thailand – H-Beams*. Reading the first sentences of that paragraph without taking into account the proper context of the following sentences of the same paragraph, could lead to an interpretation of Article 3.2 which would render the provision void. Additionally, such an interpretation would be contrary to the obligation in Article 3.1 of the *Anti-Dumping Agreement* to carry out an "objective examination".

---

<sup>12</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161 (emphasis added).

**ANNEX D-5**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION****I. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING PRICE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.2 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

1. The United States agrees with Canada and China that the obligations of Article 3.2 of the *Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (the "AD Agreement") must be considered in conjunction with the overarching principles of Article 3.1 of that Agreement.

2. Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement sets forth two overarching obligations that apply to multiple aspects of an authority's injury determination. The first overarching obligation is that the injury determination be based on "positive evidence." The Appellate Body has endorsed a description of "positive evidence" as "evidence that is relevant and pertinent with respect to the issue being decided, and that has the characteristics of being inherently reliable and trustworthy." The second obligation is that the injury determination involves an "objective examination" of the volume of the dumped imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic industry. The Appellate Body has stated that, to be "objective," an injury analysis must be "based on data which provides an accurate and unbiased picture of what it is that one is examining" and be conducted "without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation." The plain text of Article 3.1 makes clear that these obligations extend to an authority's price effects analysis.

3. Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement outlines the examination that authorities must conduct to determine the price effects of dumped imports on the domestic market. The text contemplates three inquiries with regard to the effects of dumped imports on prices: price undercutting, price depression and price suppression.

4. The United States observes that Article 3.2 requires that an authority "consider" the volume and price effects of the relevant imports. The United States recalls that the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* found that Article 3.2 does not require an authority "to make a **definitive determination**" on price effects, recognizing the distinction between use of the verb "consider" in Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement and the verb "demonstrate" in Article 3.5. However, the fact that no definitive determination is required "does not diminish the scope of **what** the investigating authority is required to consider." The Appellate Body has explained that the inquiry must provide the authority with a "meaningful understanding of whether subject imports have explanatory force" for price depression or suppression, and, as required by Article 3.1, that understanding must be based on positive evidence and an objective examination.

5. In assessing price depression or suppression, the authority may not confine its consideration to an analysis of domestic prices. Rather, the plain text of Article 3.2 envisions an inquiry into the relationship between subject imports and domestic prices. Article 3.2 introduces the obligations on price effects by clarifying that the nature of the inquiry is to understand the "effect of the dumped imports on prices." An authority's analysis of the three delineated price effects – price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression – must necessarily be in reference to the dumped imports. The Appellate Body has endorsed this interpretation that it is not enough for an authority to simply observe what is happening to domestic prices.

6. Although the United States does not address the factual underpinnings of MOFCOM's cellulose pulp injury determination, the United States recalls that prior panels and the Appellate Body have considered the analysis by investigating authorities under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of pricing parallels between subject imports and domestic like products, and of overselling by subject imports. The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that Article 3.2 requires an investigating

authority in its final determination to provide sufficient reasoning as to what explanatory force parallel pricing trends have for the depression or suppression of domestic prices.

7. As China has observed, the AD Agreement does not prescribe a particular methodology to be used in an investigating authority's price effects analysis. Nevertheless, Article 3.2 does set certain parameters for how the analysis is to be performed, as elaborated above. Based on these parameters, the Panel must evaluate whether the investigating authority provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings, and how those factual findings supported the overall determination of price depression.

## **II. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.4 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

8. Any determinations or findings made in connection with Article 3.4 must be based on "positive evidence" and "involve an objective examination," as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.

9. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement sets out an authority's obligation to ascertain the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. The United States observes that Article 3.4 imposes an obligation on the authority to conduct an "examination" of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. And the text of Article 3.4 expressly requires investigating authorities to examine the "impact" of subject imports on a domestic industry, and not just the state of the industry.

10. As recognized by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, subject imports can influence a domestic industry's performance through volume and price effects. Thus, to examine the impact of subject imports on a domestic industry, an authority would need to consider the relationship between subject imports – including subject import price undercutting, and the price depressing or suppressing effects of subject imports – and the domestic industry's performance during the period of investigation.

11. This interpretation is supported by the Appellate Body's observations in *China – GOES*:

**Articles 3.4 and 15.4...do not merely require an examination of the state of the domestic industry, but contemplate that an investigating authority must derive an understanding of *the impact of* subject imports on the basis of such an examination. Consequently, Articles 3.4 and 15.4 are concerned with the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry, and this relationship is analytically akin to the type of link contemplated by the term "the effect of" under Articles 3.2 and 15.2.**

12. Thus, as both Canada and China observe, in examining "the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry" pursuant to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, an authority must consider whether changes in the state of the industry are the consequences of subject imports and whether subject imports have explanatory force for the industry's performance trends. The "examination" contemplated by Article 3.4 must be based on a "thorough evaluation of the state of the industry" and it must "contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of relevant factors led to the determination of injury."

13. Article 3.4 does not dictate the methodology that should be employed by the authority, or the manner in which the results of this evaluation are to be set out. However, the United States observes that the Panel must be able to discern that the authority's examination of the impact on the domestic industry – an examination that necessarily includes an evaluation of relevant economic factors – is based on positive evidence and an objective examination.

## **III. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

14. As with Articles 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement, the Appellate Body has recognized that it is appropriate to read the obligations of Article 3.5 in conjunction with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. That is, any determinations or findings made in connection with Article 3.5 must be based on "positive evidence" and "involve an objective examination," as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.



15. As Canada observes, Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement involves a two-part analysis: (1) an authority's demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry ("causation"); and (2) an authority's examination of known factors other than dumped imports that could be the cause of injury to the domestic industry ("non-attribution").

16. The United States does not take a position on Canada's claims that MOFCOM's findings on volume and price depression are inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement. With respect to the interpretation of Articles 3.2 and 3.5, however, the United States agrees with Canada's argument that a deficient volume or price effects analysis could compromise a causation analysis where the findings on volume or price effects serve as a key element of the causation analysis. As the Appellate Body explained in *China – GOES*, the provisions in Article 3 "contemplate a logical progression in an authority's examination leading to the ultimate injury and causation determination." Fatal deficiencies in a volume or price effects analysis could compromise the objective nature of the causation analysis.

17. The first sentence of Article 3.5 sets out the general requirement for a demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury under the AD Agreement, and contains an explicit link back to Articles 3.2 (volume and price effects) and 3.4 (impact on domestic industries). If the volume or price effects findings are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2, or the impact findings are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4, an Article 3.5 causal link analysis relying on such findings would fail. That is, if an authority relies on a volume or price effects finding to support its impact and injury determinations, its decision must be supported by positive evidence on these counts. In such circumstances, a failure to demonstrate volume or price effects or significant impact would constitute a failure to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury, as required by the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.

18. As the panel in *China – Autos (US)* explained "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a determination of causation consistent with the requirements of Articles 3 and 15 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively, in a situation where an important element of that determination, the underlying price effects analysis, is itself inconsistent with the provisions of those Agreements." The panel properly recognized that a final injury determination is the product of multiple intermediate determinations, each of which must be supported by positive evidence and an objective examination.

19. The third sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement provides that, in addition to examining the effects of the dumped imports, an authority must examine other known factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry. As the Appellate Body has found, if a known factor other than dumped imports is a cause of injury, the third sentence of Article 3.5 requires the authority to engage in a non-attribution analysis to ensure that the effects of that other factor are not attributed to the dumped imports. If there are no known factors other than the dumped imports that are injuring the domestic industry, Article 3.5 does not require an authority to conduct a non-attribution analysis. Indeed, in such circumstances, the authority can appropriately attribute all injury to the dumped imports.

20. The AD Agreement does not specify the particular methods and approaches an authority may use to conduct a non-attribution analysis. The question of whether an investigating authority's analysis is consistent with Article 3 should turn on whether the authority has in fact evaluated these factors and whether its evaluation is supported by positive evidence and reflects an objective examination, as required by Article 3.1.

21. The United States takes no position on Canada's factual assertions regarding MOFCOM's analysis under Article 3.5. Based on the above discussion of the applicable provisions, however, the United States observes that the Panel must determine whether the investigating authority demonstrated that it examined other "known factors" within the meaning of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement, and based its causation analysis on an objective examination of all relevant evidence.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PANEL'S QUESTIONS TO THE THIRD PARTIES**

22. Under the text of the AD Agreement, a difference exists between the volume consideration in the first sentence of Article 3.2, and the consideration, under Articles 3.4 and 3.5, of whether there is a causal relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry. With regard to the application of the first sentence of Article 3.2, the use of the word "or" indicates that for this element of the analysis, an absolute increase could suffice. In particular, Article 3.2 states that "the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* [1] in absolute terms *or* [2] relative to production *or* [3] consumption in the importing Member" (emphasis added). As these three methods of measuring change in volume are expressed in the alternative, in any particular investigation, Article 3.2 does not require an investigating authority to consider volume in all three contexts if the authority considers volume to be significant in one of the contexts.

23. The AD Agreement contains a distinction between the volume analysis required under the first sentence of Article 3.2, and the analysis required under Articles 3.4 and 3.5. Accordingly, the United States does not agree that any kind of "mini-causation" analysis is required in connection with the consideration of the volume of dumped imports under the first sentence of Article 3.2. With respect to volume, Article 3.2 requires an investigating authority to consider a single question: whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports when viewed in any of several possible contexts. Articles 3.4 and 3.5, on the other hand, respectively address the multifaceted relationship among "all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the [domestic] industry" and predicate an affirmative determination on "[t]he demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the industry. . . based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities."

24. In the United States' view, an investigating authority is required to consider and examine all of the factors listed in the provisions of Article 3, and to carry out the obligations contained therein, in a manner consistent with the overarching obligations of Article 3.1. To that end, the AD Agreement does not set out a specific sequence in which these considerations and examinations must occur.

25. The obligations to consider price effects, in Article 3.2, and the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, in Article 3.4, are not contingent on whether an investigating authority considers a volume increase to be significant. Thus, even if an investigating authority considers that there is no significant increase in subject imports, either in absolute or relative terms, the authority must consider price effects and impact.

26. The last sentences of Articles 3.2 and 3.4 recognize that an authority should weigh the evidence developed in an investigation based on the particular conditions of the industry being investigated and the conditions of competition in which that industry operates, and that some of the factors discussed may be more important in certain investigations than in others. These sentences also underscore that authorities should consider and examine *all* of the relevant evidence in an investigation, and not give undue weight to isolated factors.

---



---

**CHINA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF  
CELLULOSE PULP FROM CANADA**

REPORT OF THE PANEL

*Addendum*

This *addendum* contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document WT/DS483/R.

---

**LIST OF ANNEXES****ANNEX A**

## INTERIM REVIEW AND WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex A-1	Interim Review	A-2
Annex A-2	Working Procedures of the Panel	A-7
Annex A-3	Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning Business Confidential Information	A-12

**ANNEX B**

## ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex B-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-2
Annex B-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-15

**ANNEX C**

## ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex C-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-2
Annex C-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-14

**ANNEX D**

## ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex D-1	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil	D-2
Annex D-2	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union	D-5
Annex D-3	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan	D-8
Annex D-4	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway	D-11
Annex D-5	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States	D-13

**ANNEX A**

## INTERIM REVIEW AND WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex A-1	Interim Review	A-2
Annex A-2	Working Procedures of the Panel	A-7
Annex A-3	Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning Business Confidential Information	A-12

## **ANNEX A-1**

### INTERIM REVIEW

#### **1 INTRODUCTION**

In compliance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this Annex sets out the Panel's discussion of the arguments made at the interim review stage. We have modified certain aspects of the Report in light of the parties' comments where we considered it appropriate, as explained below. In addition, the Panel has made a number of changes of an editorial nature to improve the clarity and accuracy of the Report or to correct typographical and other non-substantive errors, certain of which were suggested by the parties.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of the changes that we have made, the numbering of footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the Interim Report. References to footnotes and paragraph numbers in this section relate to the Final Report.

#### **2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR REVIEW SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES**

##### **2.1 Footnote 9**

China requests that the Panel identify relevant provisions of the DSU and the Working Procedures for deciding to admit Canada's letter dated 15 September 2016. Canada objects to China's request, noting that were the Panel to grant China's request, it could refer to Article 12.1 of the DSU and paragraph 26 of the Working Procedures.

We have decided not to grant China's request. The DSU does not establish strict rules regarding the timing of parties' submissions. Panels adopt their working procedures after consulting with the parties to the dispute, and may adapt their procedures where warranted. In this instance, the Panel provided China with an opportunity to comment on Canada's letter. In its response dated 23 September 2016, China both objected to receipt of Canada's letter, and set out China's views on the substance of the letter. The Panel accepted both Canada's letter and China's response in the exercise of its authority over the conduct of the proceedings.

##### **2.2 Paragraph 7.6**

China suggests referring to "Panel" instead of "panels" in the last sentence of paragraph 7.6 in order to take into account the reference to "the present dispute" at the end of the sentence. Canada objects to China's suggestion and requests that the Panel replace "the present dispute" with "disputes", which would ensure consistency, because the word "panels" is used throughout Section 7.2.2 "Standard of Review".

We have modified paragraph 7.6 to be grammatically and logically correct.

##### **2.3 Paragraph 7.8**

China notes that the reference to both "at issue" and "it challenges" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.8 may be duplicative and suggests deleting one of them. Canada agrees.

We have modified the second sentence of paragraph 7.8 to avoid the duplication.

##### **2.4 Footnote 59**

China suggests adding the word "economic" to the phrase "all relevant factors" in the first sentence of footnote 59 in order to reflect the precise language in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada agrees.

---

<sup>1</sup> These include changes in paragraphs 7.66, 7.84, 7.172, 7.182, 7.183, and 8.2, and in footnotes 183, 256, 286, 334, and 338.

We have amended footnote 59 accordingly.

## **2.5 Paragraph 7.25**

China suggests that the phrase "an investigating authority" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.25 should be changed to "investigating authorities" in order to be grammatically accurate with the succeeding text in the block quote. Canada agrees.

We have modified the quoted text to eliminate the inconsistency.

## **2.6 Paragraph 7.52**

China notes that paragraph 7.52 reflects its procedural objection and requests that the Panel modify this paragraph by adding its non-procedural arguments. Canada objects to China's request, submitting that the arguments China suggests adding relate to its substantive position on Article 3.2 and are not relevant for Panel's consideration of the procedural objection.

Given that we address Canada's arguments on the substance of its allegation after resolving the procedural objection, we have decided to grant China's request and modified paragraph 7.52 accordingly.

## **2.7 Paragraph 7.58**

China requests that the Panel add a new paragraph after paragraph 7.58 to fully reflect its arguments on MOFCOM's price effects analysis. Canada objects to China's request, noting that paragraph 7.57 summarizes Canada's claims regarding MOFCOM's consideration of price effects and paragraph 7.58 summarizes China's response to Canada's claims. According to Canada, the new paragraph suggested by China is not necessary, because it includes arguments that do not directly address Canada's claims.

We have modified paragraph 7.58 to better reflect China's arguments.

## **2.8 Paragraph 7.67**

China requests that the Panel modify paragraph 7.67 to fully reflect its arguments. Canada objects to China's request, asserting that paragraph 7.67 comprehensively summarizes China's arguments regarding Canada's claim on parallel price trends and additional information is not necessary. Canada also notes that the arguments China suggests adding refer to MOFCOM's examination of pricing documents and meeting minutes and are not relevant for the examination of parallel price trends.

We have modified paragraph 7.67 and added footnote 143 to paragraph 7.77 to better reflect China's arguments.

## **2.9 Paragraph 7.82**

China suggests including additional arguments it made at the end of paragraph 7.82 or as a new paragraph. Canada objects to China's request, asserting that paragraph 7.82 succinctly summarizes China's arguments and further summary proposed by China is not necessary.

We have decided to deny China's request. Paragraph 7.82 relates to our analysis of MOFCOM's consideration of the fact that dumped imports were sold at higher prices than the domestic like product. The arguments China wishes to add relate to other aspects of our analysis, and are reflected and addressed elsewhere in the Report. Specifically, MOFCOM's consideration of pricing documents and meeting minutes is addressed in Section 7.5.6 of the Report, and China's argument that all factors and evidence were considered by MOFCOM collectively is addressed in Section 7.5.7 of the Report.

## 2.10 Footnote 164

Canada requests that the Panel clarify the third sentence in footnote 157 (footnote 164 in the Final Report), submitting that it is unclear whether the third sentence refers to the findings in *China – Autos (US)* discussed in that footnote or the facts before the Panel in the present dispute. China objects to Canada's request, maintaining that the sentence clearly refers to the present dispute and Canada's request is not justified.

The third sentence as originally drafted referred to the findings in the present dispute. In order to eliminate any confusion, we have modified the footnote.

## 2.11 Paragraphs 7.104, 7.111 and 7.118

Canada suggests that the Panel revise the last sentence of paragraph 7.104, the third sentence of paragraph 7.111 and the last sentence of paragraph 7.118 to replace the phrase "the explanatory force of the dumped/subject imports for" with the phrase "whether the dumped/subject imports have explanatory force for". China objects to Canada's requests, considering that the proposed changes alter the meaning conveyed by the sentences.

The sentences as originally drafted express the meaning intended by the Panel, and we have therefore decided to deny Canada's requests.

## 2.12 Paragraph 7.144

Canada requests that the Panel replace the phrase "[i]n the alternative" with the phrase "in addition" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.144, asserting that Canada's argument mentioned in that sentence was a separate and additional argument, rather than an alternative one. China objects to Canada's request. For China, the Panel's reference to Canada's argument as one made "[i]n the alternative" is reasonable in light of the language used by Canada, noting that paragraph 133 of Canada's first written submission introduces this argument with the phrase "[e]ven if MOFCOM's volume effects and prices effects analysis were found to be consistent ...".

The paragraph as originally drafted expresses the Panel's understanding of Canada's argument as proposing an alternative basis for a finding that MOFCOM's causation analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 to that referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph. We therefore deny Canada's request.

## 2.13 Paragraph 7.145

China requests that the Panel add a new paragraph following paragraph 7.145 to fully reflect MOFCOM's key findings on causation. Canada objects to China's request, submitting that paragraph 7.145 provides a succinct summary of China's response to Canada's claims regarding MOFCOM causation analysis and the additional paragraph suggested by China would be repetitive.

The additional detailed data underlying MOFCOM's causation analysis China seeks to add in a new paragraph is reflected elsewhere in the Report and discussed in the Panel's analysis as relevant. Thus, we consider it superfluous to include that detailed data in either this or a new paragraph. However, we have modified this paragraph to more fully reflect China's arguments and added relevant references in footnote 244 to indicate where the detailed data China seeks to add can be found in MOFCOM's determination.

## 2.14 Paragraph 7.155

Given the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.155 that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide guidance as to the structure of an investigating authority's final determination, China suggests that the first sentence of this paragraph be amended to replace the phrase "the context of" with the phrase "section of the Final Determination concerning/on the." Canada's did not comment on this suggestion.

As this proposed change does not affect our views as set out in this paragraph, we have decided to grant China's request and amended paragraph 7.155 accordingly.



### **2.15 Paragraph 7.161**

Canada suggests adding the word "while" in the second sentence of paragraph 7.161, after the first quotation. China did not comment on this suggestion.

We have modified paragraph 7.161 accordingly.

### **2.16 Paragraph 7.162**

China suggests clarifying that the fourth sentence of paragraph 7.162 refers to *cotton* cellulose pulp. Canada agrees.

We have modified paragraph 7.162 accordingly.

### **2.17 Paragraph 7.171**

China requests that the Panel revise the last sentence of paragraph 7.171. Canada agrees with China's request and further requests that the sentence be re-ordered and re-worded to improve its clarity.

We have modified paragraph 7.171 in line with the parties' suggestions.

### **2.18 Footnote 304**

China requests that the Panel add a reference to para. 135 of China's second written submission in footnote 296 (footnote 304 in the Final Report). Canada agrees with China's request.

We have added the reference requested by China.

### **2.19 Paragraph 7.178**

China requests that the Panel delete the word "never" in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7.178. Canada agrees with the China's request.

We have amended paragraph 7.178 accordingly.

### **2.20 Paragraph 7.184**

China suggests that the Panel replace the phrase "increased demand" with the phrase "the increase in the total domestic demand" in the penultimate sentence of para. 7.184 to more accurately reflect the data. Canada agrees, but proposes a different formulation of the replacement phrase, "the increase in total domestic demand". China also suggests inserting a footnote reference to the Final Determination following the first and second sentences of paragraph 7.184. Canada agrees with China's suggestion.

We have modified paragraph 7.184 in accordance with the suggestions of the parties and added footnote 314.

### **2.21 Paragraph 7.186**

China requests that the Panel delete the reference to the dumped imports from Canada in paragraph 7.186, since MOFCOM's conclusion that the non-dumped imports did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury to the domestic industry refers to the dumped imports generally, i.e. from all investigated countries. Canada agrees with China's request.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.22 Footnote 320**

China suggests changing the reference in footnote 311 (footnote 320 in the Final Report) to paragraphs 172-174 of Canada's first written submission. Canada agrees with China's suggestion.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.23 Paragraph 7.201**

China requests that the Panel clarify the second sentence of paragraph 7.201 by adding the phrase "during certain parts of the POI". Canada agrees with the suggested change.

We have made the requested change.

### **2.24 Footnote 331**

China suggests that references to the Final Determination in footnote 322 (footnote 331 in the Final Report), be changed from pages 74 and 75 to pages 74 and 76. Canada agrees that the reference in this footnote should be changed, but requests that it be changed to pages 74-76.

We have changed the reference in the footnote to pages 74-76 of the Final Determination.

**ANNEX A-2**

## WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

*Adopted on 8 January 2016*

1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working Procedures shall apply.

**General**

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter "party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted to the Panel by another Member which the submitting Member has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public. The parties shall treat business confidential information in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information.

3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter "third parties"), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.

4. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.

**Submissions**

5. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

6. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If Canada requests such a ruling, China shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission. If China requests such a ruling, Canada shall submit its response to the request prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.

7. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.

8. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO working language of the submission at the same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits

upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the grounds of objection and an alternative translation.

9. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its submissions in accordance with the WTO Editorial Guide for Panel Submissions attached as Annex 1, to the extent that it is practical to do so.

10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course of the dispute. For example, exhibits submitted by Canada could be numbered CAN-1, CAN-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered CAN-5, the first exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered CAN-6.

### **Questions**

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, including prior to each substantive meeting.

### **Substantive meetings**

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

- a. The Panel shall invite Canada to make an opening statement to present its case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite China to present its point of view. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the first working day following the meeting.
- b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask the other party questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with Canada presenting its statement first.

14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

- a. The Panel shall ask China if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If so, the Panel shall invite China to present its opening statement, followed by Canada. If the China chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written

version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

- b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask the other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
- d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement first, presenting its closing statement first.

### **Third parties**

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:

- a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
- b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order. Third parties present at the third-party session and intending to present their views orally at that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third-parties with provisional written versions of their statements before they take the floor. Third parties shall make available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the session.
- c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any matter raised in the third parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
- d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

**Descriptive part**

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the case.

19. Each party shall submit an integrated executive summary of the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in its first written submissions, first opening and closing oral statements and responses to questions following the first substantive meeting, and a separate integrated executive summary of its written rebuttal, second opening and closing oral statements and responses to questions following the second substantive meeting, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each integrated executive summary shall be limited to no more than 15 pages. The Panel will not summarize in a separate part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties' responses to questions.

20. Each third party shall submit an executive summary of its arguments as presented in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.

21. The Panel reserves the right to request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts and arguments presented by a party or a third party in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be specified in the timetable.

**Interim review**

22. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.

23. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit written comments on the other party's written request for review, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party's written request for review.

24. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.

**Service of documents**

25. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:

- a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the DS Registry (office No. 2047).
- b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. Exhibits may be filed in 2 copies on CD-ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
- c. Each party and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format, either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided by e-mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to xxxxx@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.

- d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time it provides each document to the Panel.
  - e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipient party or third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.
  - f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the interim report and the final report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
26. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with the parties.

**ANNEX A-3**ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL CONCERNING  
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION*Adopted on 8 January 2016*

The following procedures apply to any business confidential information (BCI) submitted in the course of the Panel proceedings in DS483.

1. For the purposes of these Panel proceedings, BCI is any information that has been designated as such by the party submitting the information and that was previously treated as confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 by the Chinese investigating authority in the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this dispute. However, these procedures do not apply to any information that is available in the public domain. In addition, these procedures do not apply to any BCI if the person who provided the information in the course of the aforementioned investigation agrees in writing to make the information publicly available.
2. As required by Article 18.2 of the DSU, a party or third party having access to BCI submitted in these Panel proceedings shall treat it as confidential and shall not disclose that information other than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these procedures. Any information submitted as BCI under these procedures shall only be used for the purposes of this dispute and for no other purpose. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees and/or outside advisors comply with these working procedures to protect BCI. An outside advisor is not permitted access to BCI if that advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or import of the products that were the subject of the investigation at issue in this dispute, or an officer or employee of an association of such enterprises. All third party access to BCI shall be subject to the terms of these working procedures.
3. No person may have access to BCI except a member of the Secretariat or the Panel, an employee of a party or third party under the terms specified in these procedures, or an outside advisor to a party or third party for the purposes of this dispute.
4. The party submitting BCI shall mark the cover and/or first page of the document containing BCI, and each page of the document, to indicate the presence of such information. The specific information in question shall be placed between double brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]. The first page or cover of the document shall state "Contains Business Confidential Information", and each page of the document shall contain the notice "Contains Business Confidential Information" at the top of the page.
5. Any BCI that is submitted in binary-encoded form shall be clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" on a label of the storage medium, and clearly marked with the statement "Business Confidential Information" in the binary-encoded files.
6. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a statement shall inform the Panel before making it that the statement will contain BCI, and the Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 4.
7. If a party or third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party contains information which should have been designated as BCI and objects to such submission without BCI designation, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties. The Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate. Similarly, if a party or third party considers that the other



party or a third party submitted information designated as BCI which should not be so designated, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties, and the Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate.

8. Any person authorized to have access to BCI under the terms of these procedures shall store all documents containing BCI in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such information.
9. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.
10. Submissions containing BCI will be included in the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.

---



**ANNEX B**

ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex B-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-2
Annex B-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada	B-15

**ANNEX B-1**

## FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

**I. CANADA'S FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION<sup>1</sup>**

1. China's measures imposing duties on cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada and the United States were set out in the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) Notice No. 75 [2013] and Notice No. 18 [2014]. Cellulose pulp is the product subject to MOFCOM's dumping investigation, produced through the chemical treatment of plant fibre substances, such as wood fibre, cotton and bamboo. Cellulose pulp is primarily used for the production of viscose fibres, such as VSF.

**A. Legal Argument**

2. China's anti-dumping measures on imports of cellulose pulp from Canada are a result of flawed findings on injury and causation by (MOFCOM). MOFCOM's findings in relation to volume, price effects, impact, causal link and non-attribution constitute violations of China's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the *Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (ADA).

**1. Standard of Review**

3. The applicable standard of review is set out in Article 11 of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (DSU) and Article 17.6 of the ADA. These provisions require the Panel to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case and to determine whether MOFCOM's finding conforms to the requirements of the ADA. Moreover, the Appellate Body has found that panels must determine whether an investigating authority (IA) has made "reasoned and adequate" conclusions "in the light of the evidence on the record". While an investigating authority has discretion in considering conflicting arguments and evidence, panels must ensure that explanations by an IA reflect the conflicting arguments and evidence considered.

**2. Article 3 Provides a Mandatory Framework for Determining whether Subject Imports Caused Injury**

4. The paragraphs of Article 3 provide "the relevant framework and disciplines" that an IA must follow when conducting an injury and causation analysis. These paragraphs form a "logical progression" for the IA to follow in order to answer the "ultimate question" of whether subject imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry. The analyses required by these paragraphs are "interlinked"; the outcome of each must provide a "meaningful basis" to perform the analysis required by the subsequent paragraph. Although Article 3 does not prescribe a specific methodology that an IA must use in making its injury determination, a finding of injury can only be sustained if an IA can demonstrate that it has met the requirements of each discrete paragraph of Article 3<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> Canada has summarized its first written submission and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel. The latter also constitutes a summary of Canada's closing statement. Summaries of Canada's responses to the Panel's questions are contained in relevant footnotes throughout.

<sup>2</sup> **Response to Question 8i:** The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that the phrase "through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" in Article 3.5 makes it clear that the inquiries set forth in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 of whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry". Furthermore, the outcomes of the Article 3.2 and 3.4 analyses "form the basis for the overall causation analysis" in Article 3.5. While Article 3 does not prescribe a specific methodology, the Appellate Body in *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)* has described the disciplines of Article 3 as "necessary, interlinked elements of a single, overall analysis". Thus, while the inquiries set out in Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 do not need to be performed in any particular order, it may be reasonable for an IA to simultaneously consider many of these inquiries.

### 3. MOFCOM's Volume and Price Effects Analyses are Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA

5. The Appellate Body has established that an IA's consideration<sup>3</sup> of the volume of subject imports and their price effects pursuant to Article 3.2 is subject to the overarching principles of Article 3.1 that it involve an objective examination and that it be based on positive evidence. An IA's consideration of these elements must be reflected in the relevant documentation, such as the Final Determination.

6. MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA because MOFCOM failed to analyze whether the increase in subject imports was "significant". By failing to do so, MOFCOM also failed to consider positive evidence indicating that the increase in subject imports was not significant. Accordingly, China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA.

7. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 require MOFCOM to consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in China<sup>4</sup>. However, in its Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the volume of subject imports increased by 43.82% over the period of investigation (POI). It also calculated the market share of

---

That said, many aspects of Article 3.4's list of economic factors suggest that a consideration of a volume and price effects may logically precede an examination of "decline in sales, profits, output, market share" and "inventories". An IA may therefore conduct its Article 3.2 consideration prior to its Article 3.4 examination.

**Response to Question 8ii:** In accordance with Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the ADA, an IA must make a determination that satisfies the obligations in Article 3 before it may impose anti-dumping duties. Given that Article 3.5 requires the ultimate demonstration that subject imports caused injury "through the effects of dumping as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4", it is clear that an Article 3.5 determination relying on Articles 3.2 and 3.4 analyses is required to impose duties.

In particular, the obligation in the first sentence of Article 3.2 is to consider whether there has been a significant increase in imports. An IA could conclude that there has not been a significant increase or that there was a significant increase, but no price effect under the second sentence. Nevertheless, in order to apply duties, the IA is obliged to conduct Articles 3.4 and 3.5 analyses.

In this case, MOFCOM found, although improperly, that there was a significant increase in dumped imports and price depression. Thus, there is no question that MOFCOM was required to perform impact and causation analyses: it failed to do so in a manner consistent with Articles 3.4 and 3.5.

**Response to Question 8iii:** The last sentences of each of Articles 3.2 and 3.4 do not provide guidance with respect to the order of an Article 3 analysis or whether an IA must continue its analysis under subsequent paragraphs if it finds no significant increase in volume or no significant price effects. Rather, these provisions clarify that, within these analyses, the listed factors do not necessarily give decisive guidance.

<sup>3</sup> **Response to Question 5:** Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.2, an IA must demonstrate that it has properly considered whether any increase in subject import volume is significant. The Appellate Body has explained that the obligation to "consider" in Article 3.2 requires an IA to take something into account in reaching a decision; it does not require the IA to make a definitive determination. However, this does not diminish the rigour required of the inquiry. The "consideration" must also be reflected in relevant documentation.

The exact nature of the statements required in a final determination depend on a number of factors, including: (i) the importance of the conclusion on volume to the subsequent conclusions regarding prices effects, impact and causation; (ii) whether there is competing positive evidence regarding the significance of the increase; or (iii) whether interested parties provided alternative explanations of the evidence.

In this case, all three of these factors were present. Thus, MOFCOM was obliged to more fully demonstrate that it had objectively considered whether the increase in subject imports was significant. It did not. It merely asserted that subject imports increased in absolute terms without providing an adequate explanation of whether this increase was significant as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.2.

<sup>4</sup> **Response to Question 7:** An analysis of whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports does not require an IA to consider the effect or impact of the volume of subject imports on the domestic like product. Rather, the relationships between the volume and market share of subject imports and the domestic like product or the domestic industry are dealt with in subsequent analyses under Article 3.

In particular, the second sentence of Article 3.2 requires an IA to consider the effect of subject imports on prices of the domestic like product; this includes a consideration of the absolute volume and market share of subject imports. Article 3.4 requires an IA to examine the impact of subject imports on the state of the domestic industry; this includes an examination of the volume and market share of the subject imports on the economic factors and indices listed in Article 3.4. Article 3.5 requires an ultimate determination of the relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry. It specifically refers to the "effects of dumping as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" – making it clear that the IA's much broader Article 3.5 analysis of consideration must incorporate its initial consideration of volume under 3.2. However, these later analyses of the effect or impact of the subject imports are not required to be conducted under the first sentence of Article 3.2.

subject imports to have increased by 1.31 percentage points over the POI. On this basis, MOFCOM determined that the absolute and relative quantity of the dumped imports showed a growth trend during the POI. In Canada's view, this determination fails to meet the standard articulated in Article 3.2 as MOFCOM failed to analyze whether the increase in subject imports was significant.

8. Moreover, the Appellate Body has confirmed that the term "significant" in Article 3.2 means "noteworthy, important, consequential". With respect to a consideration of volume, an IA must objectively examine all positive evidence relating to the magnitude of any increase in volume and the circumstances in which subject imports entered the domestic market to determine whether an increase is significant. An IA may not disregard evidence suggesting that volumes of subject imports are not significant.

9. MOFCOM did not meet this standard. MOFCOM simply set out data with regard to volume and market share and determined that these data showed a growth trend in subject imports. It provided no qualitative or contextual analysis of the magnitude or any other aspect of this trend. In addition, MOFCOM failed to consider the circumstances surrounding the increases in absolute and relative volumes that demonstrated that the increase was not significant, i.e. trends in total domestic demand, volume of sales from the domestic industry and non-subject imports.

10. Positive evidence regarding these trends showed that subject import volumes generally increased in proportion to domestic demand, but only half as quickly as the volume of sales from domestic production or non-subject imports. Also, while the market share of subject imports remained essentially stable over the POI, the market share of both sales from domestic production and sales by non-subject imports increased significantly, by 6.54 and 6.79 percentage points respectively. MOFCOM is silent about these trends that could have provided insight into the circumstances surrounding the increase in subject import volume and helped assess whether any growth in subject import volume was actually significant.

11. MOFCOM's price effects analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA because it is based on an improper consideration of the effect of the subject imports on the price of the domestic like product.

12. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 require MOFCOM to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, whether the effect of the subject imports was to depress prices of the domestic like product to a significant degree or to prevent price increases. The Appellate Body has explained that an IA is required to consider whether subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression or suppression of domestic prices<sup>5</sup>.

13. MOFCOM found that from the second half of 2011 to the end of the POI, subject imports depressed the prices of the domestic like product through a continuing decline in subject import pricing and a rapid increase in subject import volume. MOFCOM's finding is flawed for the following four reasons.

14. First, MOFCOM failed to explain how identifying parallel trends in pricing could substantiate a finding of significant price depression. In its price effect analysis, MOFCOM referred to the prices of subject imports and the domestic like product following the same trend. Both prices first rose and then declined, showing an overall downward trend during the POI. However, as was the case with

---

<sup>5</sup> **Response to Question 11:** Canada paraphrased the Appellate Body in its opening statement (para. 33) that an IA "should have explained how subject imports explained significant price depression".

The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that while the obligation to "consider" in Article 3.2 does not require the IA to make a definitive determination such as that required in Article 3.5, nevertheless, this does not diminish the rigour required of the inquiry. Such consideration must be reflected in relevant documentation. The Appellate Body has also found that an IA "may not disregard evidence that calls into question the explanatory force of [subject imports] for significant price depression [of domestic prices]".

Therefore, under an Article 3.2 analysis an IA "is required to consider the relationship between subject imports and prices of the like products, so as to understand whether subject imports provide explanatory force **for the occurrence of significant price depression [...] of domestic prices**". This consideration must provide a meaningful basis for the IA's determination as to whether the subject imports, through such price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry. Thus, the Appellate Body has clearly distinguished a "consideration" of price effects under Article 3.2 from a definitive determination under Article 3.5.

MOFCOM's price effects analyses in *China – GOES*, *China – Autos (US)* and *China – GOES (Article 21.5 – US)*, simply identifying parallel trends in pricing is insufficient<sup>6</sup>.

15. Second, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence that the prices of subject imports were higher than those of the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression. Also, at no time does MOFCOM explain how subject imports, that had prices significantly higher (by as much as 29%) than the domestic like products, could have explanatory force for the depression of the prices of the domestic like product. Instead, MOFCOM appears to have simply relied on its parallel price trend assertions to find price depression.

16. Third, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence that the market share of the subject imports remained essentially stable, while the market share of the domestic like product increased significantly. In *China – Autos (US)*, the panel found that an IA should consider variations in market share levels and movements of the participants in the market before reaching its conclusions. Similarly, here, MOFCOM failed to explain how subject imports could have depressed the price of the domestic like product when the latter increased its relative market share by a factor of more than 2.5 times that of subject imports.

17. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to refer to any positive evidence demonstrating that subject imports depressed the prices of domestic like products. MOFCOM claimed that meeting minutes and pricing reports gathered during on-the-spot verifications showed that starting in the second half of 2011, the decline in subject import prices made it difficult for the domestic industry to clinch deals, forcing it to adjust its price downward. However, MOFCOM failed to explain the exact nature<sup>7</sup> of this apparent evidence or how it explains that the domestic industry was forced to lower its prices. MOFCOM also failed to explain how the domestic industry could have difficulty in clinching deals at a time when its sales and output increased by 78.41% and 62.98%, respectively. Further, it did not explain how higher priced imports could have forced the prices of the domestic industry downward.

#### **4. MOFCOM's Impact Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA**

18. MOFCOM's impact analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA. These articles require MOFCOM to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, the impact of the subject imports on the state of the domestic industry. This involves an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. Jurisprudence confirms that an evaluation of a given factor requires an IA to analyze and interpret this factor in a process that requires judgement. In exercising judgement, an IA must assess the role, relevance and relative weight of each factor. A proper evaluation must involve an analysis of the data pertaining to each factor individually and in relation to other factors as well.

19. While Article 3.4 does not prescribe any methodology, the Appellate Body has clarified that IA's must choose a methodology that enables it to understand the impact of the subject imports

<sup>6</sup> **Response to Question 9:** Pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA, MOFCOM was required to consider whether subject imports had explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression of the domestic like product. MOFCOM's consideration of price effects was required to involve an objective assessment based on positive evidence.

While the Appellate Body has accepted that parallel pricing trends might support a price depression finding, an IA is still under an obligation to set out an explanation or reasoning regarding the role of such trends in its price effects analysis and findings.

In this case, MOFCOM did not explain: (i) whether and how any parallel price trends showed that one price exerted downward pressure on the other; (ii) the extent to which these trends demonstrated importer pricing behaviour; or (iii) how significantly higher priced subject imports exerted a depressive effect on the lower priced domestic product. Thus, MOFCOM failed to provide sufficient reasoning as to "what explanatory force parallel price trends had for the depression [...] of domestic prices".

<sup>7</sup> **Response to Question 12:** While MOFCOM provided a general statement that the pricing documents and meeting minutes demonstrated that the "decline in foreign dissolving pulp prices [...] led to difficulty in [making] sales", it failed to reconcile this with positive evidence showing that the domestic industry increased its sales and output by 78% and 63%, respectively, during the same period. MOFCOM failed to explain: (i) how these documents showed any difficulty in making sales when they did not disclose a single lost sale; and (ii) how general pricing information was relevant to an analysis of the price effects of subject imports. See also para. 59 and fn. 16.

on the domestic industry as a whole. Moreover, Article 3.4 requires an examination of the "explanatory force" of subject imports for the state of the industry. The inquiry under Article 3.4 must also contribute to, and provide a "meaningful basis" for, the overall determination required under Article 3.5.<sup>8</sup>

20. MOFCOM failed to meet these requirements for three reasons. First, MOFCOM failed to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry. In its Final Determination, MOFCOM simply set out data regarding factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, assessed whether certain factors other than those listed in Article 3.4 explained the state of the domestic industry and then concluded that the domestic industry suffered injury. Yet, MOFCOM failed to even mention subject imports, much less examine their impact, if any, on the injury that it had found the domestic industry to have suffered.

21. Second, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share. MOFCOM concluded that the domestic industry had suffered injury in part on the basis that the domestic industry's market share was "consistently depressed". MOFCOM pointed to no evidence on the record to support this characterization. In fact, this characterization contradicted MOFCOM's data that the market share of the like product of the domestic industry increased by 6.54 percentage points during the POI.

22. Third, MOFCOM failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry. MOFCOM found factors that showed positive growth trends: domestic demand; production capacity; output; sales volumes and sales revenue; number of employees; labour productivity and per capita wages. MOFCOM failed to address these positive factors in its analysis of whether the domestic industry was injured. Similar to *China – X-Ray Equipment*, MOFCOM failed to assess the weight of each factor. In particular, it failed to describe why the weight given to the factors showing a negative result was greater than that given to those factors showing positive trends. MOFCOM also failed to analyze the evolution of the data relating to each factor individually or within the context of other factors.

## **5. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA**

23. Under Article 3.5, an IA is required to undertake a two-step causation analysis. First, an IA must conduct a "causal link" analysis demonstrating that subject imports caused injury through the volume effects, price effects and impact of dumping. Second, an IA must also conduct a "non-attribution examination" to ensure that injury caused by any other known factors is not wrongly attributed to the dumped imports. As a result, an IA must "separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other factors" and must provide a satisfactory or meaningful explanation of the nature and extent of the other factors' injurious effects.

24. Any determination under Article 3.5 must also comply with the overarching requirement found in Article 3.1 that it be based on "positive evidence" and conducted through an "objective examination".

25. MOFCOM's causal link analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA because it relies on its deficient volume and price effects analyses.

26. MOFCOM's finding that subject imports caused injury to the Chinese domestic industry is, in part, based on its earlier finding that there had been an increase in the volume of subject imports. MOFCOM also relies heavily on parallel pricing trends on which it based its price effect findings to make its causal link finding. However, as Canada demonstrated above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings are inconsistent with Article 3.1 and 3.2. By relying on its flawed volume and price effects analyses, MOFCOM's Article 3.5 causal link analysis is equally flawed.

---

<sup>8</sup> **Response to Question 18:** While an IA is required to "examine" the impact of dumped imports under Article 3.4, it is not required to "demonstrate" that the dumped imports are causing injury. That demonstration is required under Article 3.5. An IA is also not required to examine non-attribution factors in its examination of the impact of dumped imports. However, if an interested party argues or provides evidence suggesting that subject imports do not have explanatory force for the state of the domestic industry, the IA must objectively examine these arguments and evidence.



27. Even if MOFCOM's volume and price effects analyses were found to be consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2, MOFCOM nevertheless failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of whether there was a causal link between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry. Specifically, MOFCOM failed to demonstrate how subject imports resulted in the indicators of injury it itemized (e.g. decline in pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow, a slump in market share, a low operating rate, increasing ending inventory, a shrinking of profitability of the like product of the domestic industry and a worsening of the operational and business situation). It also failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation in this regard.

28. MOFCOM's assertion that subject imports caused injury to the domestic producers of the like products is also contradicted by the evidence demonstrating that subject import prices were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product during the POI. The domestic like product also gained significant market share during the same period while that of subject imports remained essentially stable. Yet, similar to *China – X-Ray Equipment*, MOFCOM offered no explanation as to how subject imports with essentially stable market share and significantly higher prices could have caused injury to the domestic industry.

29. MOFCOM failed to conduct a proper non-attribution analysis as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA. MOFCOM failed to objectively examine evidence showing that any injury suffered by the domestic industry should be attributed to other factors.

30. First, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence showing that the primary cause of both the domestic like product's historic high prices and the decline in price to normal levels was a result of variations in the price of cotton and VSF. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of these factors from any impact of the subject imports.

31. With respect to the effect of cotton prices, MOFCOM found that the price of cotton "was not the primary factor" affecting the price of the like product of the domestic industry. MOFCOM arrived at this conclusion by asserting that VSF had superior dyeing and moisture absorption qualities than cotton and that, therefore it "possesses a certain degree of non-substitutability". However, MOFCOM failed to cite any evidence to support this conclusion. It also ignored submissions by Chinese VSF producers showing that there is a high degree of substitutability between cotton and VSF and that VSF is the best substitute for cotton. MOFCOM's finding of a certain degree of non-substitutability also implied that there is some degree of substitutability between cotton and VSF. MOFCOM failed to address this degree of substitutability in its Final Determination.

32. MOFCOM then commented on how the price of cotton in China was "higher and more stable" than global cotton prices due to Chinese government policies. However, MOFCOM failed to explain the relevance of Chinese domestic cotton prices. Because VSF producers compete in both domestic and international markets for their sale, the domestic and international markets for viscose fibre are integrated and affected by the same market forces, including the impact that global cotton prices have on VSF. Therefore, it is global cotton prices that matter<sup>9</sup>.

33. With respect to the effect of VSF prices on those of cellulose pulp, MOFCOM stated that foreign exporters had failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that there is a direct link between VSF and the like product of the domestic industry. This statement is patently false. Foreign exporters submitted ample positive evidence that VSF prices and cellulose pulp prices were intimately linked<sup>10</sup>. MOFCOM itself conceded that there was a relationship between VSF and

---

<sup>9</sup> **Response to Question 25:** China's *post hoc* rationalization that MOFCOM identified a disconnect between global cotton prices and domestic cotton prices in China is undermined by the arguments and the evidence submitted by interested parties. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of how domestic Chinese cotton prices were relevant to the purchasing decisions of VSF producers who compete in a global textile market.

<sup>10</sup> **Response to Question 28:** These arguments and evidence are identified in fn. 208 of Canada's first written submission. For example, Fortress provided the chart reproduced in Canada's first written submission as Figure 1. This Figure illustrates the strong positive relationship between cotton, viscose and cellulose pulp price. The American Forest & Paper Association (AFPA) also reproduced a graph from the RISI World Dissolving Pulp Monitor demonstrating a strong correlation between global cotton prices and Chinese cellulose pulp price. The AFPA also quoted another RISI publication, which reported that the decline of cotton prices is a "strong indicator" that dissolving pulp prices will also decline. Moreover, Rayonier presented evidence demonstrating the relationship between cotton, VSF and cellulose pulp prices. Rayonier also cited a

cellulose pulp when it derived the total demand for cellulose pulp by applying a constant coefficient to VSF demand.

34. MOFCOM also noted that the "rapid growth trend" of viscose fibre production during the POI led to a rapid growth trend in total domestic demand for cellulose pulp. MOFCOM then asserted that the total production capacity and total demand for cellulose pulp was "basically in balance". However, MOFCOM failed to explain how this comparison relates to the question of whether there is a correlation between VSF and cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM's finding of capacity and demand being in balance is also false. Domestic demand increased by 35.26% over the POI, whereas the production capacity of the domestic industry increased by 122.46% during the same period<sup>11</sup>.

35. MOFCOM then asserted that total output of the domestic industry was not able to meet the demand. Given this, MOFCOM found that the price of the domestic like product should have remained stable. Again, MOFCOM failed to explain its finding which subjectively presumes that the domestic like product should fulfill domestic demand with little or no import contribution.

36. Second, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence concerning the effects of the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of these factors from any impact of the subject imports.

37. MOFCOM found that the domestic cellulose pulp industry's production capacity increase was "basically equal" to the total domestic demand for cellulose pulp. MOFCOM also noted that the domestic industry's total output never exceeded total domestic demand. MOFCOM then concluded that any impact was insufficient to negate the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry.

38. However, in its discussion on expansion of production capacity, MOFCOM skewed the true magnitude of the capacity expansion of the "domestic industry" as defined by selectively focussing on the total production capacity of the entire domestic cellulose pulp industry. As mentioned above, while the total demand for cellulose pulp increased by 35.26% over the course of the POI, the production capacity of the "domestic industry" as defined increased by 122.49%. Specifically, in 2012, the domestic industry increased its capacity by 62.98%. This expansion occurred during the period in which capacity utilization rates were low (53.35%). MOFCOM never addressed why the domestic industry would undertake such expansion in light of such market conditions.

39. With respect to the issue of overproduction and inventory overhangs, MOFCOM attempted to explain that the increased output of the domestic industry was not the direct cause of the increasing ending inventories because output was essentially in balance with cellulose pulp demand and sales volumes. Again, MOFCOM ignored its own data. While total domestic demand increased by 24.27% from 2011 to 2012, the domestic industry's production capacity increased by

---

CITIC Securities International which reported that "[i]n 2010, soaring cotton prices fuelled a sharp rise in prices of viscose staple fibre (substitute product) and dissolving pulp raw material". This same report speculated that if cotton prices declined below RMB 20,000 per tonne, any price advantage for cellulose pulp would be eliminated. Canada notes that the cotton price declined below this level in August 2011. This coincides with the period in which MOFCOM found price depression.

<sup>11</sup> **Response to Questions 29i and ii:** China's explanation that MOFCOM considered production capacity of all producers because changes in cellulose pulp prices would be driven by the total production capacity and output of all producers of cellulose pulp is a *post hoc* rationalization. For this reason alone, it should be rejected by the Panel. Moreover, Article 3.5 expressly requires a demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the "domestic industry". Article 4.1 defines the "domestic industry" as the "domestic producers as a whole of the like products or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products". MOFCOM defined the "domestic industry" in the latter manner. As a result, it was precluded from relying on data for all domestic producers of cellulose pulp in its injury analysis. Doing so constitutes a *prima facie* violation of MOFCOM's obligation to conduct an objective examination.

The Appellate Body in *US - Hot Rolled Steel* found that Article 3 directs IAs to investigate and examine imports in relation to the "domestic industry" as defined. While the panel in *EC - Fasteners (China)* acknowledged that there may be instances in which an IA may be warranted in using information regarding all domestic producers, the panel noted that an IA must explain and justify its use of such information. MOFCOM failed to provide an explanation. Moreover, MOFCOM's assertion that the capacity of domestic producers was in balance with demand is incorrect. This is the case whether one looks at the data: (i) in percentage or in absolute terms; or (ii) for all domestic producers or the "domestic industry" as defined.

62.98% and the domestic industry had a 115.35% increase in ending inventories from 2011 to 2012.

40. Third, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence of the impact of non-subject imports on the domestic industry showing that 1) non-subject imports prices were much lower than those of subject imports and in fact comparable to those of the domestic like product and 2) that any market share loss suffered by the domestic industry was to non-subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports<sup>12</sup>.

41. MOFCOM noted that non-subject imports accounted for over 50% of the total volume of China's imports of cellulose pulp throughout the POI. It then held that the price difference between the subject imports and the non-subject imports was "not large". It did so without presenting any volume or price data. MOFCOM then examined the lower priced imports from South Africa but asserted that the proportion of imports from this country was relatively small during the POI, i.e. between 8.5% and 9.8% of China's total imports. Likewise, MOFCOM also dismissed the impact of imports from Indonesia and Sweden by asserting that any difference in price between them and subject imports was "not large" and their proportion of the total volume of imports showed a downward trend. Again, it did so without presenting any data.

42. MOFCOM's analysis was subjective and did not contain a reasonable and adequate explanation supporting its findings. Non-subject import sales volumes increased by 78.43% during the POI, nearly matching the domestic industry's own 80.23% increase. In contrast, subject imports showed a 43.82% increase over the POI. In terms of market share, sales from non-subject imports increased by 6.79 percentage points, higher than the domestic industry's own increase of 6.54 points and far above that of the subject imports market share which stayed essentially stable.

43. MOFCOM also failed to provide any positive evidence in its Final Determination of non-subject import pricing. Non-subject import pricing reported by China Customs was submitted by an interested party; it showed that the prices of non-subject imports were significantly below those of subject imports and the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression.

44. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence regarding the shortage of cotton linter and its impact on the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. MOFCOM also failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports.

45. MOFCOM found that a shortage in cotton linter supply was not the cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. It arrived at this conclusion by noting that cotton linter had no direct impact on the production of wood or bamboo pulp, which at their peak accounted for nearly 70% of the total sales volume of the domestic like product. However, MOFCOM failed to cite any positive evidence to support this finding. It also failed to consider positive evidence showing that cotton linter pulp production formed more than 30% of the total domestic industry dissolving pulp capacity.

46. MOFCOM also found that the total domestic supply of cotton linter far exceeded the domestic cotton linter pulp industry's output and that, on the basis of the supply of cotton linter during the

---

<sup>12</sup> **Response to Question 36:** Several interested parties raised the impact of non-subject imports as a factor causing injury to the domestic industry. Cosmo presented volume and market share data of subject imports, non-subject imports and the domestic like product in arguing that any loss of market share by the domestic industry was as a result of non-subject imports. It also showed that subject imports had higher pricing than the domestic like product during the second half of 2011 and 2012. The AFPA also presented import pricing and volume data demonstrating that subject import pricing was higher than the domestic like product. It also submitted annual non-subject import pricing and volume data from China Customs that Canada used to calculate the non-subject import data presented in Table 3 of Canada's first written submission.

MOFCOM was required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the volume and prices of non-subject imports. MOFCOM was required to consider the arguments and evidence presented to it. This obligated MOFCOM to consider data on sales volume, market share and prices of non-dumped imports, and to compare these data to those of subject imports and domestic like product. MOFCOM failed to comply with these requirements.

POI, the domestic cotton linter pulp industry's capacity utilization rate should have been significantly higher than it actually was.

47. These reasons and this conclusion are unsupported by positive evidence and fail to reflect an objective examination of evidence demonstrating that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total domestic cotton linter supply for each year of the POI. Moreover, in its calculation of whether the total domestic supply of cotton linter was sufficient, MOFCOM erroneously assumed that cotton linter pulp producers would have had access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter. Positive evidence indicated that there were other users of cotton linter in the market.

48. MOFCOM stated that data regarding total production capacity and output of the domestic cotton linter pulp industry was gathered in the course of on-the-spot verification. However, MOFCOM failed to identify this evidence or to explain how information obtained from the parties would have provided verifiable information regarding producers not participating in the investigation. Also, when calculating the output that could have been produced with the available domestic cotton linter, MOFCOM used a unit consumption ratio of 1 tonne of cotton linter pulp to 1.3 tonnes of cotton linter. While MOFCOM stated that this consumption ratio was industry-recognized, it pointed to no evidence on the record to support this description. In contrast, evidence from an independent analyzing organization defined the ratio differently<sup>13</sup>.

## **B. Conclusion**

49. Canada requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's measures are inconsistent with China's obligations under Articles 1 and 3 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Canada asks that the Panel recommend that China bring its measures into conformity with the GATT 1994 and the ADA.

## **II. CANADA'S ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL**

### **A. China's Accusation of a De Novo Hearing is Baseless**

50. Canada has asked the Panel to hold MOFCOM to the same standard of review it has been held to in many other recent cases. MOFCOM has repeatedly failed to objectively establish and assess facts and to undertake an unbiased evaluation of the facts and arguments before it. MOFCOM also failed to provide reasoned and adequate explanations in light of the positive evidence on the record. Ultimately, MOFCOM's finding is a string or repetitive assertions of isolated facts. Requesting that this Panel examine these failures does not amount to a request for a *de novo* review.

### **B. China Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 in its Volume and Price Effects Analyses**

51. Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM's volume analysis failed to meet the standard set by Articles 3.1 and 3.2. China recasts Canada's position as requiring MOFCOM to consider the increase in volume of subject in both absolute and relative terms, extending the volume analysis beyond what contemplated in Article 3.2. China's interpretation is incorrect.

52. An objective examination of whether an increase in the volume of subject imports is significant requires the IA to consider the circumstances in which any increase occurred. Such an interpretation that Article 3.2 is supported by the panel decisions in *US – Washing Machines* and

---

<sup>13</sup> **Response to Question 42:** MOFCOM's use of the unit consumption ratio of 1 to 1.3 provided by petitioners rather than the unit consumption ratio provided by an independent source is an example of how MOFCOM subjectively favoured certain evidence over more objective, verifiable and credible evidence.

MOFCOM's conclusion with regard to the sufficiency of the cotton linter is based on more errors than just the use of the petitioner's ratio. These conclusions are also based on the false assumption that the domestic cotton linter pulp industry would be the only consumer of the entire cotton linter supply. See para. 47. These errors must be corrected before a determination can be made as to whether MOFCOM's conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the cotton linter supply would have been affected. However, MOFCOM's calculations cannot be modified in a manner that properly accounts for additional sources of demand. Another method would need to be used. However, it is not necessary for the Panel to identify this other method for it to conclude that MOFCOM's examination of the supply of cotton linter was not objective.

*US – Upland Cotton*. It is also supported by the Appellate Body's interpretation of the various paragraphs of Article 3 form part of a "logical progression". In particular, the volume analysis must provide a "meaningful basis" for an IA to perform subsequent analyses. To provide a "meaningful basis", the volume analysis must account for relevant market circumstances. Furthermore, this requirement exists whether an IA considers an increase in volume on an absolute or relative basis<sup>14</sup>.

53. In the present case, MOFCOM failed to examine the circumstances in which the increase in absolute volume occurred. In particular, it failed to consider the rapidly expanding Chinese cellulose pulp market and the fact that the volume of the domestic like product and non-subject imports increased significantly more than that of subject imports during the POI.

54. MOFCOM also failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its finding of a significant increase in absolute volume. China argues that this finding was supported by the margin of dumping and the context provided by the subject imports' share of the total imports. However, MOFCOM does not mention the margin of dumping anywhere in its volume analysis. In addition, the subject imports' share of total imports declined over the POI. MOFCOM failed to explain why, despite this positive evidence, it found subject imports' increase in absolute volume to be significant.

55. With respect to MOFCOM's price effects analysis, Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM's finding of price depression fails to meet the standard set by Articles 3.1 and 3.2. China claims that MOFCOM's observation of parallel pricing is undisputed<sup>15</sup> and supports its finding of price depression as a "matter of simple logic". China is mistaken.

56. A proper price effect analysis requires that MOFCOM consider and explain the relationship between subject imports and the prices of the domestic like product. This is necessary in order to determine whether subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression. Here, MOFCOM failed to explain how any parallel pricing trends resulted in price depression.

57. In fact, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the pricing and market share of subject imports during the POI. With regards to pricing, MOFCOM failed to address arguments and evidence presented by interested parties showing that non-subject imports were priced

---

<sup>14</sup> **Response to Question 4:** Article 3.2 requires an IA to consider whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption. An IA must conduct and objective examination and provide reasoned and adequate explanations of its findings. It must thus take sufficient account of the positive evidence that supports a conclusion that is different from the one it reaches and it must respond to competing plausible explanations. Doing so may require an IA to take into account evidence or explanations of more than one "perspective" regarding any significant increase.

Moreover, as mentioned in paragraph 52, a volume analysis must provide a meaningful basis for the IA to continue the logical progression of its injury analysis. This requires an IA to take relevant factual circumstances into account. This does not amount to requiring an IA to consider an increase in both absolute and relative terms. Rather, factual circumstances provide context such as trends and other data that an IA can compare to any absolute or relative increase in subject imports so as to objectively reach a conclusion.

<sup>15</sup> **Response to Question 10:** Canada's claim regards MOFCOM's substantive failure to explain how any parallel price trend provides explanatory force for price depression. There is no question that in the period in which MOFCOM found price depression, both subject import and like product prices were declining. However, China misrepresented Canada's argument by suggesting that "Canada does not claim that there is not substantial evidence of parallel pricing trends". As a result, Canada responded to China's defence in its opening statement at the first meeting of the panel and in reply to further questions from the Panel.

By definition, parallel means two lines that never meet. Figure 1 of Canada's opening statement shows that prices of subject imports and the domestic like product were not parallel at the beginning of the POI (i.e. the lines crossed). Canada also showed that during the first half of the POI, subject import prices rose at a much faster rate than those of the domestic like product. Then, when market prices began to decline, the prices of the domestic like product declined much faster than those of subject imports. These facts support a conclusion that when prices were declining, it was the domestic like product price that was depressing the price of subject imports.

In *China – Autos*, there were also diverging price movements during the POI, and the panel emphasized MOFCOM's failure to adequately explain the relevance of these divergences and differences in its analysis and conclusions on parallel pricing. The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* also addressed similar issues when it questioned MOFCOM's lack of explanations or reasoning as to the significance of parallel pricing trends when the magnitude of changes in prices were significantly divergent. As a result, the "substantial" evidence on the record demonstrates a lack of parallel pricing.

significantly below subject imports throughout the POI. In response, China claims that Canada has argued that MOFCOM was required to find price undercutting in order to make a finding of price depression. Canada has argued nothing of the sort. Rather, Canada has demonstrated that it was incumbent on MOFCOM to explain how significantly higher priced subject imports had explanatory force for significant price depression.

58. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the positive evidence regarding the effect of subject import market share. In particular, MOFCOM's analysis does not contain a reasoned and adequate explanation of how subject imports, having maintained an essentially stable market share, caused price depression while the market share of the domestic industry and non-subject imports grew significantly.

59. Finally, China has now submitted the pricing documents and meeting minutes MOFCOM relied on to make its price depression findings. These documents are unreliable. Of the 10 documents, only four actually refer are even superficially relevant to MOFCOM's analysis. Canada also objects to the translation of these four documents because China neglected to translate a critical word. These four documents were also produced by the same Chinese domestic producer and none actually provide specific relevant information. Furthermore, it is not surprising that customers would use purported lower pricing from other competitors to negotiate better prices. Even if one accepts, *arguendo*, the conclusions that MOFCOM drew from these documents, MOFCOM failed to reconcile these documents with the positive evidence that subject import prices were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product and non-subject imports<sup>16</sup>.

#### **C. MOFCOM Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA in its Impact Analysis**

60. Canada has shown that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share. China now claims that Canada is mistaken as a result of a translation error; the description of the domestic industry's market share should have been translated as "remained low" rather than as "consistently depressed".

61. Regardless of which translation is used, MOFCOM's analysis is improper for two reasons. First, contrary to the requirement set out in Article 3.4, MOFCOM did not consider whether there was a decline or potential decline in market share. Whether the domestic industry's market share was high or low, MOFCOM was required to evaluate the trend in market share. It did not. Second, by describing the domestic industry's market share as either "consistently depressed" or "remained low", MOFCOM mischaracterized this market share which actually increased significantly during the POI. It thus failed to make an objective examination of the evidence.

62. MOFCOM also failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. MOFCOM simply juxtaposed the positive factors with the negative factors, rather than providing a "thorough and persuasive" explanation as to how the positive factors were outweighed by the negative factors. MOFCOM also failed to assess the role played by each factor in its investigation.

#### **D. MOFCOM Failed to Comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in its Causation Analysis**

63. Canada has established that MOFCOM's finding of a causal link was based on its flawed volume and priced effects analyses. China made no attempt to refute these arguments. China simply replicates MOFCOM's discussion of parallel pricing and increased volume and its reliance on pricing documents and meeting minutes. It then asserts that this constitutes an explanation of how subject imports caused injury. However, China fails to explain how recycling this flawed analysis demonstrates a causal relationship between subject imports and injury.

---

<sup>16</sup> **Response to Questions 12i and ii:** An IA should consider such pricing documents and meeting minutes as evidence in its investigation. However, with respect to these documents, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence. Whether evidence is positive is determined by its quality. Positive evidence is evidence that is "affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible". For the reasons cited in paragraph 59, an IA could not have considered these documents "affirmative, objective, verifiable and credible".

64. China also offers a *post hoc* explanation whereby MOFCOM found that "the market share of the like product declined in the second half of 2012 and that the dumped subject imports gained that lost market share on a one-to-one basis." This statement cannot be found in the Final Determination. Even the pricing documents and meeting minutes filed by China disclose no lost sales by the domestic industry.

65. Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the impact of: cotton and VSF prices; the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up; and non-subject imports. MOFCOM also made no attempt to properly "separate and distinguish" any injury caused by these factors or to provide a satisfactory explanation of their nature and extent. As a result, there is no rational basis for concluding that subject imports caused injury to the domestic industry.

66. First, China has failed to rebut Canada's demonstration that VSF is a close substitute for cotton and that prices of cotton and VSF are closely related. Also, because pulp is primarily used to produce VSF, there is an equally strong relationship between the prices of VSF and cellulose pulp. The primary cause of both the domestic like product's historic high prices and the decline in prices to normal levels during the POI was a result of variations in the prices of cotton and VSF<sup>17</sup>.

67. With respect to the relationship between the prices of cotton and VSF, China repeats MOFCOM's assertion that VSF is superior to cotton because of its dyeing and absorption properties and that therefore "they are not substitutable in the market to a certain extent". China does not rebut any of Canada's arguments with regards to this unsupported assertion. Similarly, China repeats MOFCOM's discussion of Chinese domestic cotton support policies without addressing Canada's argument that it is global cotton prices that matter.

68. With respect to the relationship between the prices of VSF and cellulose pulp, China claims that MOFCOM found data submitted by foreign exporters to be insufficient because it only showed parallel price trends. MOFCOM made no such finding in its Final Determination. As such, China cannot rely on such an explanation now. In addition, this theory is entirely divorced from the ample positive evidence which clearly explains the economic rationale for the price linkages between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

69. Finally, MOFCOM found that cotton prices "were not the main factor" and that the prices of downstream VSF "were not the direct cause" affecting the prices of the like product. Such conclusory statements do not meet the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.5 which required MOFCOM to provide a "satisfactory explanation" of the "nature and extent of the injurious effects" of cotton and VSF prices and to "separate and distinguish" that injury from any caused by the subject imports.

70. Second, China failed to objectively examine the injury caused by the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup. Canada showed that the Chinese domestic industry undertook significant capacity expansion during the POI and this capacity increase far exceeded the increase in total domestic demand. It also occurred in a period where the domestic industry's capacity utilization rates were low and its ending inventories were increasing significantly.

71. In response to this evidence, China criticizes Canada for using data that reflects only the "domestic industry" as defined. China claims that MOFCOM more appropriately relied on the total production capacity of the entire domestic industry. This is a good example of the lack of objectivity of MOFCOM's determination. The purpose of a non-attribution analysis is to examine injury caused by "other known factors" to the "domestic industry" as defined.

---

<sup>17</sup> **Response to Question 27:** Movements in demand for cellulose pulp and VSF output are directly relevant for an analysis of the impact of VSF prices on cellulose pulp prices. During the first half of the POI, when demand and output spiked due to a shortage of cotton, demand for and the price of cellulose pulp spiked. Similarly, when cotton prices began to stabilize in the second half of 2011, so did VSF prices. Coupled with newly added capacity, which led to overcapacity in both Chinese domestic production of VSF and cellulose pulp, this caused cellulose pulp prices to decline. MOFCOM conceded the relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp (see para. 33). Yet, it wrongly concluded that VSF output and prices were not the main factor affecting cellulose pulp prices in China.

72. China also asserts that MOFCOM's finding that the domestic industry's overexpansion may have had some impact, but was not sufficient to break the causal link, meets the requirements of "separating and distinguishing" the injurious effects of domestic overexpansion. China's claim fails. MOFCOM's examination of this factor was not objective. MOFCOM neither explained the "nature and extent" of the domestic industry's overexpansion, overproduction and inventory buildup, nor attempted to "separate and distinguish" this injury from that caused by the subject imports.

73. Third, China failed to rebut Canada's demonstration that non-subject imports were more likely to have caused injury to the domestic industry. China reiterates MOFCOM's analysis and conclusions. China also claims that by comparing prices of subject and non-subject imports, MOFCOM addressed the primary issues raised by foreign respondents. China mischaracterizes the arguments presented to MOFCOM. These arguments went beyond a cursory comparison of the relative proportion and prices between subject and non-subject imports. They called for a comprehensive assessment of changes in non-subject imports sales volumes, market share and price as well as a comparison of these data to those of subject imports and the domestic like product.

74. China also claims that MOFCOM found that "the injurious effects of the non-subject imports were not more than or similar to those caused by the dumped imports and thus, did not break the causal link". This is another *post hoc* explanation. While MOFCOM did conclude that non-subject imports could not break the causal link, it did not explain the "nature and extent" of the injury caused by non-subject imports. Nor did it "separate and distinguish" these injurious effects from those caused by subject imports.



**ANNEX B-2**

## SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

**I. INTEGRATED SUMMARY OF CANADA'S SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION, ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND MEETING, RESPONSES TO PANEL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON CHINA'S RESPONSES****A. Standard of Review**

1. There is no merit to any of the tactics China utilizes in order to distract the Panel's attention from the inconsistency of the measures at issue with the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).

2. First, China's attempt to diminish the Panel's standard of review and overemphasize the discretion owed to an investigating authority is meritless. It is settled law that this Panel must be guided by the general standard of review set out in Article 11 of the DSU, the particular rules contained in Article 17.6 of the ADA, as well as the standard set out in Article 3.1 of the ADA. Therefore, the Panel's standard of review is broad.

3. Second, China's accusation that Canada is requesting a *de novo* review is disingenuous as Canada's claims are entirely congruent with the Panel's standard of review.

4. Third, China repeatedly attempts to rehabilitate MOFCOM's injury determination with *post hoc* explanations and references to evidence that were not part of the determination. These explanations merely highlight the portions of MOFCOM's findings that China implicitly admits failed to meet the standards of an "objective examination" based on positive evidence and "reasoned and adequate" conclusions.

5. Finally, China also claims that Canada has a burden of demonstrating how MOFCOM should have conducted various analyses pursuant to Article 3 of the ADA. However, there is no such burden on Canada. Moreover, Canada has met its burden to establish a *prima facie* case of violation by demonstrating that MOFCOM's volume, price effects, impact, causal link and non-attribution analyses failed to meet the standards set by the ADA.

**B. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2**

6. MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM failed to consider the factual circumstances surrounding the increase in subject imports and failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its conclusion that this increase was significant.

7. China's claim that MOFCOM was not required to consider contextual elements when considering the significance of an absolute increase in subject imports is meritless.

8. First, the ordinary meaning of the term "significant", which is "important, notable or consequential", connotes a broader analysis than just a consideration of the numerical quantity or amount of an increase. In the context of the first sentence of Article 3.2, this broader analysis includes consideration of the factual context or circumstances in which an increase in subject imports occurred. Although the factual context or circumstances relevant to this analysis will vary from case to case, context or circumstances relevant to an inquiry of absolute volumes may include trends in domestic demand, the volume of the domestic like product and the volume of non-subject imports.

9. Appellate Body and panel decisions support this interpretation of the term "significant". In *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, the Appellate Body explained that an investigating authority must consider whether price undercutting is "significant". It found that "[w]hat amounts to *significant price undercutting* [...] will [...] depend on the circumstances of each case." The Appellate Body's reasoning relating to the proper interpretation of "significant" under the second sentence of Article 3.2 is equally applicable to its interpretation in the first sentence. The panels in *US – Upland Cotton* and *US – Washing Machines* also considered that factual circumstances may be relevant to the assessment of "significance". Although the panel in *US – Washing Machines* rejected the specific type of qualitative analysis advocated by Korea, its statement that "[i]n

certain factual circumstances, the size or scale of a price difference may need to be assessed in light of the prevailing factual circumstances" shows that it did not reject all qualitative analyses. Finally, the Appellate Body in *EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft* and *US – Large Civil Aircraft* confirmed that the term "significant" has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The Appellate Body accepted reliance on primarily qualitative reasons to find "significant" lost sales.

10. Second, Canada's interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2 is confirmed by its context. The Appellate Body has found that the paragraphs of Article 3 must be viewed holistically. Each paragraph forms part of a "logical progression"<sup>1</sup>. These paragraphs are "interlinked" and the outcome of each must provide a "meaningful basis" for subsequent analyses under Article 3. An investigating authority can ensure that its conclusion will provide a "meaningful basis" for subsequent analyses only by considering whether an increase in volume is "significant" in light of the factual circumstances that will by necessity be relevant to subsequent analyses.

11. The obligation under Article 3.1 to make an injury determination on the basis of "positive evidence" and an "objective examination" further confirms that MOFCOM was required to consider the factual circumstances in its volume analysis. Article 3.1 required MOFCOM to consider all relevant evidence, including conflicting evidence and competing plausible arguments of that evidence raised by interested parties, in an unbiased manner. It also required MOFCOM to conduct an investigation in a manner that conforms to the principles of "good faith and fundamental fairness". MOFCOM failed to do so when it failed to take into account: (i) evidence that subject import growth occurred in a rapidly expanding market and that the volume of the domestic like product increased by 80%; and (ii) arguments raised by interested parties that the increase in subject imports, either in absolute or relative terms, was not significant.

12. Canada's interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2 does not contain an effects-based test; it does not require an investigating authority to consider the effect or impact of the volume of subject imports on the domestic like product or the domestic industry. Such analyses are conducted under the second sentence of Article 3.2 and under Articles 3.4 and 3.5<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, even though there must be a "logical progression" between Articles 3.2 and 3.5, this does not mean that an affirmative response to the volume analysis must lead to an affirmative response to the causation analysis.

13. This interpretation also does not conflict with the words "either [...] or" in Article 3.2 as it does not require an investigating authority to consider the significance of an increase in both absolute and relative terms. An investigating authority has the discretion to consider the significance of an increase on either basis. Nevertheless, this discretion is not unlimited - an investigating authority must take into account positive evidence conflicting with its conclusion and must respond to competing plausible explanations of the evidence. Objectively examining such evidence and explanation does not convert an absolute volume analysis into a relative one or alter the scope of the analysis<sup>3</sup>. The investigating authority would simply be using relevant evidence about the market to inform its analysis of whether an increase in volume is significant and to ensure that its analysis is objective.

---

<sup>1</sup> Question 43: It is settled law that the WTO Agreements and the ADA must be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body clarified in *US – Continued Zeroing* that discerning the ordinary meaning of a word or term in isolation is only the beginning of the interpretation exercise and that recourse must be made to context and object and purpose in order to elucidate the ordinary meaning of a word or term. This shows that a consideration of context is necessary and essential to proper treaty interpretation. In its interpretation of Article 3 generally and Article 3.2, second sentence, specifically, the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* demonstrated the importance of accounting for context in a proper interpretation of the Article 3 paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup> Question 44: Although the texts of the first and second sentences of Article 3.2 are different in that the first does not contain an effects-based test, they are similar in that: (i) both require an investigating authority to "consider" the "significance" of a particular phenomenon; (ii) both are subject to the same overarching obligation in Article 3.1 to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence; and (iii) both are part of the logical progression of the injury and causation analysis in Article 3. Moreover, the panel's interpretation of "significant" in Article 2.4.2 of the ADA in *US – Washing Machines* confirms that the ordinary meaning of the word "significant" does not change because the first sentence in Article 3.2 does not contain an effects-based test.

<sup>3</sup> Question 45: This is confirmed by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams*, which found the investigating authority's analysis of absolute volume to be consistent with Article 3.2 specifically because the investigating authority had considered the context in which the increase occurred. The panel did not find that this consideration of the context turned the analysis of absolute volumes into an analysis of relative volumes.

14. The Panel should reject China's groundless argument that one can consider whether the increase in the volume is "significant" in absolute terms without having to also consider other circumstances. If the Panel accepts China's position, then the 44% increase found by MOFCOM to be significant in this case would effectively become a numerical threshold for future cases. If this threshold is reached, the increase in absolute volume would be significant, regardless of the context in which the increase occurred. Such a result would be inconsistent with Article 3.1 because it would bar an investigating authority from considering anything more than the magnitude of the increase; the investigating authority would no longer be able to conduct an objective examination and on the basis of all positive evidence.

15. Furthermore, the Panel should reject China's groundless argument that the requirement to consider the factual circumstances conflicts with other textual elements in the first sentence of Article 3.2. The terms "absolute", "relative to production" and "[relative to] consumption" have a more limited scope than that ascribed to them by China. They describe only the manner in which subject imports are to be measured – either by quantity, in the case of absolute volume, or by quantity expressed as a percentage of domestic consumption or production, in the case of relative volume. They do not describe or limit the scope of the entire volume analysis.

16. Finally, the Panel should reject China's claim that there is no basis in Article 3.2 to require an investigating authority to consider the trends in domestic demand, the volume of the domestic like product and the volume of non-subject imports. The legal bases for considering this factual context are Article 3.2's requirement to consider whether an increase is "significant" and Article 3.1's obligation to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence. Although consideration of these particular trends may be unnecessary in some cases, Canada has demonstrated that these elements were relevant to MOFCOM's inquiry in this case.

17. MOFCOM also failed to provide a "reasoned and adequate" explanation for its conclusion that there was a significant increase in subject imports<sup>4</sup>. China's argument that this finding was supported by the margin of dumping and the context provided by the subject imports' share of total imports is meritless. First, MOFCOM did not mention the margin of dumping anywhere in its volume analysis or suggest anywhere else that the margin of dumping was relevant to its volume analysis. Second, MOFCOM failed to explain how its finding regarding subject imports' share of total imports supported its conclusion that the increase in volume was significant.

18. China's assertion that the Panel should reject this claim because Canada failed to mention it in our first written submission or panel request is meritless. This claim is part of Canada's claim under the first sentence of Article 3.2. Moreover, it is within the Panel's jurisdiction as Canada's **panel request states that "China failed to properly consider whether there had been [...] a significant increase in dumped imports"**.

### **C. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2**

19. MOFCOM's price effects analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because it is based on an improper consideration of the effect of the subject imports on the price of the domestic like product. MOFCOM was required to consider, based on positive evidence and through an objective examination, whether subject imports depressed prices of the domestic like product significantly or prevented price increases.

20. First, China failed to demonstrate that MOFCOM objectively examined whether there was a parallel price trend between subject imports and the domestic like product. In fact, the price trends of subject imports and the domestic like product moved at significantly different rates and even met in 2010. Even if MOFCOM had properly found a parallel price trend, it failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how such a trend significantly depressed the price of the domestic like product. The mere existence of a parallel price trend may indicate a link in prices but, as the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* confirmed, it does not necessarily support a finding that a decline in the price of one product was caused by the price of the other. Thus, MOFCOM's conclusion that subject import prices caused the price decline in the domestic like product is far from a matter of "simple logic" and exposes MOFCOM's subjectivity. MOFCOM neither explained

---

<sup>4</sup> Question 46: The Appellate Body's description in *US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada)* of the requirements of a "reasoned and adequate" explanation shows that MOFCOM's explanation was required to demonstrate that MOFCOM took proper account of the complexities of the data before it and the conflicting evidence. Its explanation was also required to show why it rejected the alternative explanations of record evidence advanced by Rayonier and Cosmo.

how these trends "indicated the nature of competition" nor how they explained "the extent to which factors relating to the pricing behaviour of [purchasers] have an effect on domestic prices".

21. Second, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence showing that subject imports were priced significantly higher than the domestic like product during the period in which MOFCOM found price depression. MOFCOM does not explain how higher priced subject imports could have depressed domestic like product prices or whether it was in fact the domestic like product that dragged market prices down. The only explanation provided by China is its repeated observation of parallel pricing, which it stated could be an indicator of a link, and its reference to unreliable pricing documents and meeting minutes. Moreover, China failed to point to any specific discussion by MOFCOM addressing the interested parties' arguments and evidence of the impact of higher priced subject import pricing.

22. Third, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of the positive evidence showing that the market share of the subject imports remained essentially stable because it did not consider both the absolute volume and market share of subject imports as part of its price effects analysis. Canada has demonstrated that the text of Article 3.2, second sentence, refers to "whether the effect of [subject] imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree". Therefore, consideration of changes in absolute volume, market share and prices are all relevant to a price effects analysis, which the Appellate Body has described as a "dynamic comparison" between subject imports and the domestic like product.

23. China claims that MOFCOM properly considered market share. However, MOFCOM failed to explain how essentially stable subject import market share could have depressed prices of the domestic like product when the latter increased its market share by nearly eight percentage points. Since MOFCOM based the volumetric aspect of its price effects conclusion on the increased market share of subject imports, it was under the obligation to do so objectively.

24. Finally, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence in determining that subject imports depressed the price of the domestic like product<sup>5</sup>. The evidence on which MOFCOM relied is of limited probative value and cannot be considered "positive evidence" of price depression. As the Appellate Body has explained in the context of Article 3.2, "an IA is **required to consider whether [...] subject imports – has explanatory force for the occurrence of significant price depression of [...] domestic prices**". **Positive evidence of price effects must** therefore support a connection between (i) subject imports and (ii) depressed domestic prices<sup>6</sup>. However, the pricing documents and meeting minutes do not constitute positive evidence that subject imports explain price depression. First, only four even mention subject imports. Second, documents collected from only two out of seven petitioners cannot be representative of a meaningful volume of the domestic like product. Third, there is no evidence that MOFCOM verified any of the domestic companies' pricing documents against relevant sales contracts or purchase orders. Finally, these documents failed to disclose an actual lost sale, a specific instance of subject imports alone depressing domestic producers' prices or a confirmed pattern of price depression by the subject imports.

25. China offers little new in its second written submission to justify MOFCOM's flawed price depression analysis. First, in an attempt to rebut Canada's demonstration that subject import and domestic like product prices did not display a parallel price trend, China provides misleading calculations suggesting that the level of decline in the prices of subject imports and the domestic like product were "at basically the same level" and "nearly identical". China's comparisons between disparate and unconnected time periods fail to capture the relative movement in prices. Instead, as Canada has demonstrated, the pricing trends of subject imports and the domestic like product were quite different: while market prices were escalating, subject import prices were rising at a

---

<sup>5</sup> Question 47: In its second written submission, China pointed to the margin of dumping as evidence that MOFCOM relied on to support its price depression finding. In response to this question, China now appears to concede that MOFCOM did not rely on margins of dumping. Canada agrees with this concession. Moreover, Canada considers that dumping margins are irrelevant to an investigating authority's price effects analysis and therefore MOFCOM could not have properly relied on them.

<sup>6</sup> Question 48: A finding that subject imports explain the occurrence of price depression must be supported by evidence that is credible and that is "of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character", i.e. it must be supported by "positive evidence". Canada's argument was not meant to imply that evidence that does not support a conclusion is not "positive evidence". Whether evidence is "positive" refers to its quality and "positive evidence" may support or undermine a conclusion that subject imports have explanatory force for price depression.

much faster rate. Moreover, as raised by interested parties, the fact that the price of the domestic like product declined almost four times faster than that of the subject imports suggests that the domestic like product led the price decline.

#### **D. MOFCOM's Impact Analysis in Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4**

26. Canada demonstrated that MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as "consistently depressed" contradicts positive evidence on the record that this market share increased over the period of investigation. Canada also demonstrated that MOFCOM failed to analyze and interpret data relating to factors showing an improvement in the state of the domestic industry in a manner consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4.

27. Although China argued that Canada's claim that MOFCOM mischaracterized the domestic industry's market share is based on a translation error, Canada demonstrates that its translation of "*shizhong ... dimi*" is preferable to China's because it is a more complete translation. Further, China's response with regard to the translation of these Chinese words demonstrates that there is no material dispute between the parties regarding their translation.

28. More importantly however, MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share is improper regardless of which translation is used. First, Article 3.4 required MOFCOM not simply to compile market share data but to "analyze and interpret" it by analyzing trends in this data in the context of their own development and the development of other factors. Contrary to this requirement, MOFCOM's analysis appears to have simply assessed the amount or level of the domestic industry's market share rather than its trends. Second, MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as "consistently depressed" or "remained low" contradicted positive evidence on the record. The domestic industry's market share did not stay at a depressed or lower-than-normal level during the period of investigation but rather rose from 19.68% in 2010 to 26.22% in 2012, or by 6.54 percentage points<sup>7</sup>.

29. MOFCOM also failed to properly analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry<sup>8</sup>. It failed to properly assess and explain the role, relevance and weight of each factor even though several panels have found a requirement to do so. MOFCOM did not adequately place data relating to particular positive factors within the context of the other factors examined. MOFCOM discussed only the relationship between domestic demand and the construction and renovation of production facilities. With regard to the rest of the positive factors, it simply acknowledged that they showed increases.

30. Furthermore, MOFCOM failed to properly assess the role of the domestic industry's market share and investing and financing ability and improperly considered that these two factors supported a finding of injury<sup>9</sup>. With regard to the domestic industry's investing and financing ability, MOFCOM failed to explain how it could find that some domestic producers had to reduce output, shut down or sell assets when positive evidence on the record showed that production capacity and output increased dramatically over the period of investigation and that the domestic industry had constructed and renovated production facilities<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>7</sup> Comment on Question 53: The fact that the domestic industry market share increased while that of subject imports stayed essentially stable suggests that subject imports were not responsible for the injury suffered by the domestic industry.

<sup>8</sup> Question 52: MOFCOM was required to ensure that its reasoning with regard to the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry was reflected in its Final Determination in such a way that an interested party could verify that it had conducted this analysis. Here, an interested party would not have been able to conclude that MOFCOM's assessment of whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry is in the causation section without China's *post hoc* explanation. This is because MOFCOM does not provide any indication that it conducted this part of the impact analysis in the causation section. Thus, MOFCOM failed to comply with its obligation to provide a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of its conclusion.

<sup>9</sup> Question 49: The last sentence of Article 3.4 does not prevent an investigating authority from finding that one or more factors gives decisive guidance as to whether the domestic industry is injured.

<sup>10</sup> Question 51: MOFCOM could not conclude that the "fact" that some domestic producers had to reduce output, shut down or sell assets was a negative factor supporting a finding of injury because this "fact" is contradicted by MOFCOM's findings that the domestic industry increased production capacity, constructed and renovated a number of production facilities, and increased output and because this "fact" does not reflect an understanding of the domestic industry as a whole as required by Article 3.4.

31. MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic industry was injured is premised, in part, on an improper understanding of the domestic industry's market share and investing and financing ability. Thus, MOFCOM's failure to objectively examine these factors undermines its overall assessment of the state of the domestic industry. Similar to the conclusion in *China – X-Ray Equipment*, this Panel should find MOFCOM's impact analysis to be inconsistent with Article 3.4 even though it is not based exclusively on market share or investing and financing ability.

32. Furthermore, MOFCOM did not identify the relative contribution of the domestic industry's market share or investing and financing ability to its finding on injury or suggest that its finding on injury could be reached without the support of its conclusions regarding these two factors. Accordingly, the Panel should refrain from attempting to conduct these analyses as otherwise it risks engaging in a *de novo* review. Because the Panel cannot conclude that MOFCOM's findings regarding the impact of subject imports can be upheld on the basis of the negative impact factors other than market share and investing and financing ability, it must conclude that MOFCOM's analysis is inconsistent with Article 3.4. This conclusion is consistent with the Appellate Body's decision in *China – GOES*, where the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision not to conduct an analysis of whether subject imports' volume effects were, on their own, sufficient to sustain MOFCOM's finding that there was significant price depression when MOFCOM had not conducted such an analysis.

33. MOFCOM also failed to provide a "thorough and persuasive explanation" of how the positive factors were outweighed by the negative factors even though such an explanation was required by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams*. MOFCOM did little more than recognize the presence of positive injury factors before simply juxtaposing these factors against the negative factors and then concluding that the domestic industry had been injured. MOFCOM provided no explanation, much less a "thorough and persuasive explanation", regarding how, despite rapid and large improvements in many injury factors, the domestic industry was injured. Furthermore, MOFCOM did not provide an explanation of the weight given to the positive factors, either individually or collectively.

## **E. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis is Inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5**

### **1. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis**

34. MOFCOM causal link analysis fails because it was based on MOFCOM's flawed volume and price effects analyses. China merely recites the evidence MOFCOM relied on in its causal link analysis, which was the very same evidence MOFCOM relied on in its flawed volume, price effects and impact analyses<sup>11</sup>. MOFCOM's conclusory assertions do not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how subject imports, through the effects of dumping, caused injury to the domestic industry. As was concluded in *China – X-Ray Equipment*, it was incumbent on MOFCOM to explain how subject imports could have caused injury to the domestic industry, particularly when: (a) the prices of subject imports were significantly higher than those of the domestic like product; (b) the absolute volume of the domestic like product increased twice as much as that of the subject

---

<sup>11</sup> Question 54i: Canada has also demonstrated that even if the Panel found that MOFCOM conducted volume, price effects and impact analyses consistently with Articles 3.2 and 3.4, MOFCOM still failed to demonstrate the causal relationship through which subject imports caused injury to the domestic industry (i.e. MOFCOM failed to demonstrate how subject imports caused injury)<sup>11</sup>. Simply reciting that volume increased, that subject imports had the effect of depressing prices or that the domestic industry suffered negative impacts does not amount to a demonstration of the causal relationship through which subject imports caused the specific forms of injury the domestic industry suffered. The causal link analysis, "by definition, covers a broader scope" and must go beyond simple reliance on volume, price effects and impact analyses.

Question 54ii: As a result, evidence different from that considered under Articles 3.2 and 3.4, may need to be examined in the context of Article 3.5. Moreover, the nature of that evidence will be driven by the different scope and content of Article 3.5, which is focused on a demonstration of the causal relationship between subject imports and the specific injury suffered by the domestic industry. Thus, it is likely that evidence relevant to demonstrating the causal relationship between subject imports and the specific injury suffered by the domestic industry will be different from that used, for example, to consider whether there was a significant increase in volume or whether subject imports had the effect of significantly depressing the prices of the domestic like product. For instance, nothing in these prior analyses would have necessarily required MOFCOM to have considered evidence relevant to how a significant increase in imports or significant price depression by subject imports caused declines in the domestic industry's pre-tax profits, returns on investment or net cash flows.

imports; and (c) the market share of the domestic like product increased by nearly eight percentage points while that of subject imports remained essentially stable.

## 2. MOFCOM's Non-Attribution Analysis

35. MOFCOM failed to conduct an "objective examination" based on "positive evidence" of four "other known factors" that caused injury to the domestic industry. MOFCOM also failed to "separate and distinguish" the injuries caused by them from any injury caused by subject imports. As a result, MOFCOM failed to provide reasoned and adequate conclusions for its non-attribution findings.

36. With respect to the appropriate legal standard, while – as China recognizes – there is no specific prescribed methodology in the ADA, the Appellate Body in *US – Hot Rolled Steel* ruled that a proper non-attribution analysis of other known factors required an investigating authority to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other known factors and to separate and distinguish those effects from any caused by the subject imports. Moreover, while the Appellate Body recognized that it may not be easy as a practical matter to isolate the injurious effects of the other factors or to separate and distinguish them, this analysis is nevertheless required by Article 3.5.

37. Moreover, as noted in *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips*, an investigating authority must do more than simply list other known factors and then dismiss their role with bare qualitative assertions, such as the factor did not contribute in any significant way to the injury.

38. China relies on three prior panel decisions to support its position that MOFCOM's non-attribution analysis was consistent with Article 3.5. China also attempts to undermine Canada's reliance on the panel's findings in *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips*. These arguments are unconvincing. First, China relies on *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, China – HP-SSST* and *EU – Footwear (China)* because the panels in those cases endorsed a "break the causal link methodology". However, Canada's claim is not with respect to the form of MOFCOM's conclusions. Rather, Canada's position is that MOFCOM failed to comply with the substantive legal requirement to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious impact of the non-attribution factors and to separate and distinguish that injury from any caused by subject imports. Second, the panel decision in *China – HP-SSST* does not support China's position because it correctly articulates the substantive "nature and extent" and "separate and distinguish" legal standard advanced by Canada. Third, China claims that the *EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips* case is an "outlier to the extent that it implied that a quantitative or economic modeling analysis was required". However, in contrast to the cases on which China relies, the panel in this case articulated and applied the full and correct legal standard.

39. We now turn to MOFCOM's treatment of each other known factor. First, contrary to China's claims, MOFCOM's Final Determination failed to provide a non-attribution analysis of international cotton and VSF price declines. While it does contain a discussion of cotton and VSF prices in the context of its price effects analysis, it contains no analysis of whether international cotton and VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry or otherwise indicate that the discussion of cotton and VSF prices is a non-attribution analysis. As such, MOFCOM could not have provided a satisfactory explanation of the injury caused by this other known factor or separated and distinguished its effects from those of the subject imports. China's claim to the contrary is no more than *post hoc* explanation. Nevertheless, even if this analysis is found to constitute a non-attribution analysis, MOFCOM failed to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence.

40. China argues that whether international cotton prices affect VSF "is not directly relevant" to factors driving the price of Chinese cellulose pulp and, as a result, MOFCOM was not required to examine these prices. However, Articles 3.1 and 3.5 required MOFCOM to examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which were causing injury at the same time as the subject imports. There is no limitation on this requirement that absolves MOFCOM from examining a known factor.

41. Regarding the relationship between the prices of cotton and VSF, China repeats MOFCOM's assertion that VSF is superior to cotton because of its dyeing and absorption properties and that

therefore "they are not substitutable in the market to a certain extent". However, Canada has demonstrated that MOFCOM ignored positive evidence of the substitutability of cotton and VSF<sup>12</sup>. China fails to rebut any of Canada's arguments in this respect. Similarly, China repeats MOFCOM's discussion of Chinese domestic cotton support policies without addressing Canada's argument that it was global cotton prices that mattered. Moreover, MOFCOM never considered the "positive evidence" submitted by interested parties demonstrating that, because Chinese VSF producers sold into a global marketplace in competition with other VSF and cotton producers, it was global, rather than domestic, cotton prices that affected VSF prices.

42. Moreover, independent empirical evidence and commentary confirmed that both the increase and decline of cellulose pulp prices in China was caused by the international cotton price spike and subsequent decline. MOFCOM only examined Chinese domestic cotton prices without providing a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of how these prices were relevant.

43. MOFCOM also failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injury caused and failed to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of this factor from any impact of the subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence that VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry and failed to provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of its finding.

44. MOFCOM failed to consider substantial argument and evidence demonstrating that the decline in VSF prices led to the decline in cellulose pulp prices. Moreover, China mischaracterized the evidence of the causal relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices by claiming that evidence of parallel price trends between VSF and cellulose pulp was the only evidence demonstrating that the downward trend in VSF prices led to the downward trend in cellulose pulp prices. Evidence of parallel price trends creates a *prima facie* presumption that the price of VSF had a causal impact on the price of cellulose pulp. Moreover, Canada demonstrated that there was significant evidence on MOFCOM's record demonstrating the causal relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices that MOFCOM failed to evaluate.

45. China also attempts to justify MOFCOM's finding that changes in VSF prices were not the "direct cause" of the decline in cellulose pulp prices by pointing to MOFCOM's examination of changes in VSF output and total domestic cellulose pulp production capacity and output. However, MOFCOM failed to consider the impact of the significant decline in VSF prices in its purported examination of cellulose pulp market dynamics. Yet, substantial "positive evidence" on the record clearly demonstrated that while VSF output increased significantly during the period of investigation, VSF prices plummeted in the second quarter of 2011 and continued to decline throughout the rest of the period of investigation.

46. Second, MOFCOM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of injury caused by domestic industry overexpansion, overproduction and inventory build-up and failed to separate and distinguish this injury from any caused by the subject imports. MOFCOM also failed to objectively examine positive evidence concerning the effects of this other known factor.

47. While, it may have been appropriate to consider the impact of total capacity in the context of assessing whether domestic industry capacity overexpansion had an impact on market prices, MOFCOM itself never adequately explained or justified its use of data relating to the total production capacity of all domestic producers in this manner. Such an explanation would have been particularly important for an objective investigating authority to make because the production capacity of the "domestic industry" as defined increased significantly during the period of investigation, whereas that of domestic producers not included in the "domestic industry" as defined declined. Furthermore, MOFCOM's analysis of capacity failed to account for any import contribution and was therefore subjective and incomplete. Moreover, it is far from clear from MOFCOM's discussion that it was actually assessing whether capacity expansion depressed market prices and thereby caused injury; rather, it is China's *post hoc* comments that explain this. Ultimately, an analysis of a non-attribution factor must relate to the domestic industry as defined.

---

<sup>12</sup> Question 56: MOFCOM's analysis of international cotton and VSF prices was confined only to a discussion of whether cotton and VSF prices were responsible for any price depression. In this respect, despite China's *post hoc* concession that cotton and VSF prices "played some role", MOFCOM's Final Determination contains no analysis of whether cotton and VSF prices caused injury to the domestic industry.



48. MOFCOM also failed to objectively examine the positive evidence related to the increase in production costs caused by the domestic industry's overexpansion<sup>13</sup>. The impact of an expansion in production capacity will be felt specifically on manufacturing costs and not on production costs generally. The evidence showed that manufacturing costs, which would include capital expenses incurred to expand production capacity, increased by over 70% over the course of the period of investigation. In addition, Canada established that MOFCOM ignored data on its record when it concluded that domestic industry overproduction was not the direct cause of the domestic industry's increasing inventory overhang. The significant increase in ending inventories, as well as the domestic industry's low utilization rate of 52.35% in 2012, both constitute positive evidence that the domestic industry's overexpansion led to surplus capacity.

49. Third, MOFCOM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of injury caused by non-subject imports or to separate and distinguish that injury from any caused by subject imports. It also failed to conduct an objective examination of the impact of non-subject imports based on positive evidence.

50. MOFCOM's analysis of the impact of non-subject imports is flawed because it was focused entirely on comparing subject and non-subject imports, rather than being focused on the impact of non-subject imports on the domestic industry<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, MOFCOM did not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how an analysis focused solely on non-subject and subject imports was relevant to the question of whether non-subject imports injured the domestic industry.

51. China's attempt to justify the difference in price between subject and non-subject goods because of a quality difference is not supported by any MOFCOM analysis<sup>15</sup>. While some interested parties had argued that there was a quality difference between pulp produced using hardwood and pulp produced using softwood, MOFCOM clearly rejected the relevance of such a difference.

52. Moreover, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the positive evidence on the record as well as plausible arguments presented by interested parties showing that non-subject imports were more likely to have directly competed with the domestic like product and, as a result, were more likely to have injured the domestic industry. In particular, MOFCOM ignored the significant increases in the volume and market share of non-subject imports and their significantly lower prices<sup>16</sup>. This evidence on the record and the related interested parties' arguments clearly required

---

<sup>13</sup> Question 57: Canada's view is that overexpansion caused increased competition in the market due to the increase in supply. This increased competition drove down market prices and thereby negatively affected the profitability of the cellulose pulp producers in the market. The fact that the domestic industry was already suffering from injury in a declining market and decided to add 63% more capacity strongly suggests that its injury was self-inflicted. However, MOFCOM failed to account for any of these facts in its flawed non-attribution analysis of this factor.

<sup>14</sup> Question 63: China's claim that the panel's decision in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings* supports MOFCOM's findings on non-subject imports is incorrect because a careful reading of this panel decision shows that the investigating authority in that case actually examined and explained the injurious effects of non-subject imports on the domestic industry. Moreover, in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, non-subject import volumes decreased by 14%, market share was essentially stable and prices were higher than average market prices. These facts sit in stark contrast to the facts of the case before MOFCOM.

<sup>15</sup> Question 65: Even when asked, China failed to shed light on the nature of the quality difference between subject and non-subject imports beyond describing it as "differences in fiber content". Furthermore, China failed to provide details regarding the evidence underlying MOFCOM's conclusion on the quality difference.

<sup>16</sup> Question 66: China presented no references demonstrating where any of the data came from. In addition, the data demonstrates that MOFCOM's conclusion that the differences in quantity and price "were not big" is patently false. In fact, during a period exhibiting price depression allegedly caused by subject imports, non-subject import volumes were between 22 and 25% higher than those of subject imports and non-subject import prices were between 11 and 13% lower than those of subject imports. This evidence suggests that non-subject imports were far more likely than subject imports to be a cause of injury to the domestic industry.

These issues with the data presented by China call into question whether MOFCOM's purported non-attribution analysis of non-subject imports was conducted in an objective manner. First, it is unclear how MOFCOM could have properly compared prices of non-subject imports in USD with those of the domestic like product in RMB. Second, it is equally unclear how MOFCOM could have properly compared full-year non-subject import prices with half-year domestic like product prices. Third, MOFCOM's Final Determination clearly states that it obtained import data directly from China Customs. However, in its non-attribution analysis, MOFCOM relied on customs data from the Petition instead of data directly from China Customs. Finally, "MOFCOM's internal calculation document" of the non-subject import prices does not appear to have been submitted into evidence to this Panel. As a result, neither Canada nor the Panel has had an opportunity to review or verify this apparent data source.

an analysis beyond a cursory comparison of the relative quantity and prices of non-subject imports, as they relate to subject imports.

53. Fourth, MOFCOM failed to objectively examine positive evidence regarding the shortage of cotton linter and its impact on the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. As a result, it failed to properly consider the shortage of cotton linter as another known factor of injury to the domestic industry requiring a non-attribution analysis.

54. China failed to rebut Canada's assertion that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total supply. China subjectively relied on evidence from the CCF Viscose Industry Chain Report that indicated that the supply of cotton linter was sufficient in 2012. Moreover, its use of data for the period in which the use of cotton linter as a feedstock was at its lowest was inherently subjective. Positive evidence on MOFCOM's record suggested that cotton linter pulp accounted for considerably more than 30% of total sales in both 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, MOFCOM failed to properly account for other sources of cotton linter demand; demand from these sources was hardly "very small". If MOFCOM had properly considered this additional demand, it could not have concluded that there was a sufficient supply of cotton linter. MOFCOM also stated that data regarding the total production capacity and output of the domestic cotton linter pulp industry was gathered in the course of on-the-spot verification. However, MOFCOM failed to identify this evidence or to explain how information obtained from the parties would have provided verifiable information regarding producers not participating in the investigation.

---

**ANNEX C**

ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex C-1	First integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-2
Annex C-2	Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of China	C-14

**ANNEX C-1**

## FIRST INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) conducted a detailed and thorough injury analysis in its anti-dumping investigation of cellulose pulp from Canada. MOFCOM's determination was based on an objective examination of positive evidence on the record and is fully consistent with China's obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

**II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF**

2. The standard of review applicable in this dispute is set out in Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada is improperly seeking to re-litigate the underlying anti-dumping investigation of cellulose pulp and asking the Panel to carry out a *de novo* review, instead of examining whether MOFCOM's determination was based on an objective examination of positive record evidence.

3. Canada, as the complaining party, bears the burden of demonstrating a violation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada must establish a *prima facie* case of inconsistency with a provision of a WTO covered agreement before MOFCOM, as the defending party, has the burden of showing consistency with that provision.<sup>1</sup>

**III. ARGUMENT****A. Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement Does Not Prescribe a Specific Methodology for Injury Determinations**

4. Article 3 "does not prescribe a specific methodology to be relied on by an investigating authority in its determination of injury."<sup>2</sup> Article 3 also does not provide a "prescribed template or format that an investigating authority must adhere to in making its determination of injury, provided that its determination comports with the disciplines that apply under the discrete paragraphs of Article 3."<sup>3</sup> Thus, "it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation."<sup>4</sup>

**B. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

5. MOFCOM objectively examined positive evidence concerning the significant increase in the volume of imports over the period of investigation (POI), consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

6. The use of the disjunctive "or" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 indicates that the investigating authority need not consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports from *both* an absolute and a relative perspective.<sup>5</sup> MOFCOM considered that the increase in dumped imports in absolute terms was significant, and specifically stated that "the quantity of the dumped imported product showed the significant growth."<sup>6</sup> MOFCOM explained that dumped imports amounted to 421,000 tons in 2010, 419,100 tons in 2011, and 605,500 tons in 2012.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, para. 109 (citing Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, at pp. 14-16); see also Panel Report, *China – Broiler Products*, para. 7.6.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141; see also *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, paras. 113 and 118.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>4</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.159.

<sup>5</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.171.

<sup>6</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 59-61, 77.

<sup>7</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

This represented a significant increase of 43.82 per cent in the volume of dumped imports during the POI. In light of this increase, MOFCOM found that there had been a "quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product," and that "the quantity of the import increased quickly..."<sup>8</sup>

7. Furthermore, MOFCOM explained that the subject imports were a significant portion – nearly one half – of total imports.<sup>9</sup> MOFCOM thus looked at the growth in the volume of subject imports in the context of total imports. Moreover, even though not required under Article 3.2, MOFCOM also looked at the volume of dumped imports in relation to consumption.<sup>10</sup>

8. Thus, MOFCOM took account of whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports. Canada refers to the *Thailand – H-Beams* panel's interpretation of "significant" as meaning "noteworthy, important, consequential".<sup>11</sup> China notes that in the anti-dumping investigation in this case, the volume of dumped imports increased 43.82 per cent during the POI, in a context in which dumped imports represented almost half of total imports and where the margins of the dumped imports had been significant. An increase of 43.82 per cent in the volume of dumped imports during the POI, in light of the share of dumped imports in total imports and the margin of dumping that had been determined by MOFCOM, is "noteworthy, important, consequential," and therefore "significant".

9. Canada erroneously faults MOFCOM for failing "to consider the trends in total domestic demand, the volume of sales from domestic industry production and the volume of sales from non-subject imports".<sup>12</sup> As noted, under Article 3.2, an investigating authority may consider the volume of dumped imports from either an absolute *or* relative perspective. MOFCOM found that there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms. MOFCOM was not required to additionally consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports in relative terms was also significant.

### **C. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

10. MOFCOM found that the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product were "competitive and substitutable to each other."<sup>13</sup> MOFCOM then objectively examined positive evidence indicating that the rapidly rising volume of dumped imports at declining prices pushed down the domestic producers' prices during the second half of the POI.

#### 1. MOFCOM Explained the Relevance of the Undisputed Parallel Pricing Trends

11. Canada first claims that MOFCOM failed to explain the relevance of the undisputed parallel pricing trends between subject imports and the domestic like product.<sup>14</sup> Substantial record evidence supported MOFCOM's finding of parallel price trends. MOFCOM examined price trends for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product<sup>15</sup> and concluded that prices for both "...first increased and then decreased, showing a decreasing trend in general" over the POI.<sup>16</sup> MOFCOM also found that the prices of the dumped imported product and the like product "first increased and then decreased, showing a same trend of changes".<sup>17</sup> MOFCOM then focused further on price trends in the second half of the POI, when the volume of subject imports increased dramatically from 220,000 tons in the second half of 2011 to 310,400 tons in the second half of 2012, and concluded that "[i]n the same periods, both the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry showed a continuous decreasing trend."<sup>18</sup> MOFCOM noted further that over this same time period, "the Price of the Dumped

<sup>8</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65, 77.

<sup>9</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 74, 75.

<sup>10</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>11</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 70 (referring to Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.163).

<sup>12</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 73.

<sup>13</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>14</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 84.

<sup>15</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>16</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

Imported Product continuously decreased and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry also decreased..."<sup>19</sup> MOFCOM also found that "there was a certain relevance between the price of the dumped imported product and the price of the like product of the domestic industry" over this same time period. Canada does not dispute the existence of substantial record evidence of parallel price trends.

12. Prior WTO cases have confirmed that a finding of parallel price trends can evidence a causal link.<sup>20</sup> In addition, MOFCOM also examined the relevance of the parallel pricing trends it found. MOFCOM found that "the decline of the import prices of foreign dissolving pulp had led to the difficulty in the sale of the like product of the Domestic Industry, forcing the Domestic Industry to reduce the price."<sup>21</sup> MOFCOM also examined in an objective and thorough manner confidential pricing reports and minutes of business meetings that MOFCOM obtained at the verification of the Chinese domestic producers. MOFCOM noted in its Final Determination that the "[i]nvestigating authority had collected evidences from many domestic producers during its on-site verifications, including the minutes of the business analysis meetings and the pricing reports, which showed that since the second half of 2011, the decline of the import prices of foreign dissolving pulp had led to the difficulty in the sale of the like product of the Domestic Industry, forcing the Domestic Industry to reduce the price."<sup>22</sup>

13. Exhibit CHN-02 provides translations of the pricing reports that MOFCOM examined at verification and discussed in its Final Determination. These documents provide confirmation that the domestic producers were forced to reduce their sale prices in order to compete with the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports. A number of the documents refer specifically to imports from Brazil, Canada and the U.S.

14. China disputes Canada's translation of the word "deng" that appears after each reference to the subject countries in the specified pricing documents. The more accurate interpretation of the word "deng" that appears after each reference to the subject countries (Brazil, Canada, and the U.S.) is that it is being used to conclude the list and is not to be translated as "etcetera." As China explained during the First Substantive Meeting, in reviewing page 1 of Exhibit CAN-29, the word "deng" is followed by a specific percentage – i.e., "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp." This demonstrates that "deng" is being used to conclude the preceding list of subject countries. Moreover, regardless of the translation of the word "deng", the pricing documents specifically identify the three subject countries when demonstrating that imports from these countries depressed domestic prices.

## 2. MOFCOM Was Not Required To Find Price Undercutting In Order To Make a Finding of Price Depression

15. Canada next claims that the absence of price undercutting "calls into question" MOFCOM's finding that subject imports depressed the prices of the domestic like product.<sup>23</sup> The plain text of Article 3.2 demonstrates that the existence of price undercutting is not required in order to find price depression. The three possible findings of price undercutting, price depression or price suppression are disjunctive, and any one of them alone can support an adverse price effects finding.<sup>24</sup> Both the panel reports in *Korea – Certain Paper*<sup>25</sup> and in *EC – Salmon (Norway)*<sup>26</sup> and the Appellate Body<sup>27</sup> have supported this plain text interpretation.

16. MOFCOM's price analysis explained how imports pushed down domestic prices. MOFCOM fully explained how on the facts of this case domestic producers were forced to lower prices to compete with the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports. MOFCOM found that the interaction between the declining prices for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product forced the domestic producers to lower prices. MOFCOM found there was positive evidence

<sup>19</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>20</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210; Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.261.

<sup>21</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>22</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 94.

<sup>24</sup> See Panel Report, *US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS*, (as modified by Appellate Body Report), para. 7.265.

<sup>25</sup> Panel Report, *Korea – Certain Paper*, para. 7.242.

<sup>26</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, para. 7.638.

<sup>27</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.149 and 5.156.

on the record in the form of the verification documents demonstrating that the dumped subject imports forced the domestic industry to reduce prices, thereby depressing the domestic prices. Moreover, the interested parties that had alleged that lower domestic prices demonstrated domestic producers were the price leaders made assertions but did not provide supporting evidence. Objectively examining the evidence on the record, MOFCOM concluded that the dumped subject imports depressed the domestic prices.

3. MOFCOM Properly Considered the Volume Effects on Prices of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry

17. Canada's claim that MOFCOM failed to consider evidence that the market share of the subject imports allegedly remained "stable" also lacks merit.<sup>28</sup> Even though MOFCOM's price depression finding was based on movements in the absolute quantity of subject imports, MOFCOM also considered movements in market share in its price effects analysis.

(a) Article 3.2 Does Not Require an Investigating Authority to Consider Both the Absolute Volume and Market Share of Subject Imports

18. Article 3.2 allows an investigating authority to "consider" whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports "either in absolute terms *or* relative to production or consumption in the importing Member." Therefore, the plain text makes clear that an investigating authority is not obligated to consider relative increases in subject imports, as Canada argues. As a matter of logical progression, the authority set out in the first sentence for an investigating authority to consider whether there has been an increase in dumped imports either in absolute or relative terms must likewise extend to the investigating authority's consideration of price effects in the second sentence. Consideration of a relative increase in imports – market share – thus cannot be a compulsory mode of analysis when considering the price effects of subject imports.

(b) MOFCOM's Price Depression Finding Was Based on Movements in Absolute Quantity

19. MOFCOM's price effects analysis focused on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports rather than on market share. MOFCOM found that, "[f]rom the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the continued decline of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product forced the Domestic Industry to compete with them in terms of prices, leading to a fast and continuous decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry. Based on these facts, the Investigating authority determined that the dumped imported product had a depressing effect on the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry".<sup>29</sup> Similarly, MOFCOM's price effects analysis noted that "...due to the increase of quantity and the decrease of price of the dumped imported product, the Domestic Industry was forced to continuously reduce the Price of the Like Product".<sup>30</sup>

20. It is undisputed that the volume of the subject imports dumped at significant margins increased dramatically over the POI. In addition, prices of subject imports plummeted in the second half of the POI, from RMB 12,313/ton in the second half of 2011 to only RMB 7,024/ton at the end of the POI.<sup>31</sup> It is simply not reasonable that such a massive increase in dumped subject import volume at rapidly declining prices could not have had an adverse price effect in the Chinese market.

(c) MOFCOM Also Considered Market Share Data, Even Though It was Not Required to

21. Even though MOFCOM properly based the volume effects portion of its price depression finding on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports, and was not required under Article 3.2 to consider movements in market share, it nonetheless still did so. MOFCOM found that the market share of subject imports increased from 18.96 per cent in 2011 to 22.01 per cent

---

<sup>28</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 95.

<sup>29</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65-66.

<sup>30</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>31</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

in 2012.<sup>32</sup> MOFCOM further observed that the "quantity of the dumped imported product showed an increasing trend in general...and its market share also showed an increasing trend in general".<sup>33</sup> MOFCOM also noted that "...the Investigating authority concluded that both the quantity and the market share of the dumped imported product...showed a general trend of increase during the Period of investigation".<sup>34</sup>

22. China notes that a price depression finding can be valid even in the case of small increases in market share. The *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)* panel noted that when a price depression analysis is based on the absolute increase in imports, it does not matter that the market share of subject imports did not increase significantly.<sup>35</sup>

23. The fact that the domestic industry did not lose even more market share was due to the fact that the domestic producers were forced to lower their prices in order to continue making sales. The meeting minutes examined at verification and discussed above demonstrates this reality concretely. MOFCOM thus reasonably found that "in order to prevent a further decline of the market share,... the Domestic Industry reduced the price".<sup>36</sup>

4. MOFCOM's Finding of Price Depression Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

24. Canada next argues that MOFCOM's price depression finding was not based on an objective examination of positive evidence because MOFCOM only referred generally to certain evidence gathered during the verification of the Chinese domestic producers.<sup>37</sup> MOFCOM's price depression finding was fully based on positive evidence and a reasoned explanation set out in MOFCOM's Final Determination. MOFCOM's Final Determination documents and explains its reasoning that subject imports and the domestic like product were directly competitive and competed on price.<sup>38</sup> MOFCOM observed that the absolute quantity of the dumped subject imports kept growing significantly and that the market share of subject imports increased generally at the same time as the prices for dumped subject imports declined significantly, beginning in the second half of 2011.<sup>39</sup> MOFCOM further based its analysis on the fact that prices of the dumped imported product fell dramatically in the second half of the POI<sup>40</sup>, and that prices for the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product moved in tandem in the second half of the POI.<sup>41</sup> **MOFCOM noted that "...in order to prevent a further decline of the market share...the Domestic Industry reduced the price of the like product..."**<sup>42</sup> In its causation analysis, MOFCOM noted further that the prices of the dumped subject imports decreased continually and the quantity of the subject imports increased quickly, "forcing the Domestic Industry to compete with it on...prices; as a result, the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry decreased quickly and continuously; therefore, the dumped imported product depressed the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry".<sup>43</sup>

25. MOFCOM's analysis of the meeting minutes examined at verification and discussed previously, shows that the rapidly rising volume of subject imports forced the domestic producers to lower prices. Canada claims that MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic industry had "difficulty in clinching deals" contradicts the fact that the domestic industry's sales in fact increased.<sup>44</sup> But the "difficulty in clinching deals" referenced in the meeting minutes is a reference to the fact that the domestic industry was forced to reduce prices in order to make sales and thus avoid losing further market share.

<sup>32</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>33</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 61.

<sup>35</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)*, para. 6.230.

<sup>36</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>37</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 101 and 103.

<sup>38</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 58.

<sup>39</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 59, 63.

<sup>40</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>41</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-65, 77-78.

<sup>42</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>43</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 77-78.

<sup>44</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 102.



**D. MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

26. Canada errs in claiming that MOFCOM's injury determination failed to comply with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM did not fail to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry.<sup>45</sup> MOFCOM properly examined the domestic industry's market share, and adequately considered factors showing improvement in the domestic industry's condition.

1. MOFCOM Properly Examined Whether Subject Imports Explain the State of the Domestic Industry

27. While Article 3.4 requires an examination of the impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry, it does not require an investigating authority "to demonstrate that subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry".<sup>46</sup> Moreover, Article 3.4 "does not address the manner in which the results of this evaluation are to be set out, nor the type of evidence that may be produced before a panel for the purpose of demonstrating that this evaluation was indeed conducted".<sup>47</sup>

28. Contrary to Canada's assertion, MOFCOM did examine the impact of dumped imports. Canada's claim that "MOFCOM entirely failed to evaluate the relationship between the subject imports and the state of **the domestic industry or...whether subject imports explain the state of the domestic industry** as required by Article 3.4 of the ADA" is simply incorrect.<sup>48</sup>

2. Canada's Argument that MOFCOM Failed to Objectively Examine Market Share Is Based on a Translation Error

29. Canada's assertion that MOFCOM improperly found that "the domestic industry's market share of the like product was consistently depressed" is based on an incorrect translation of the Final Determination and therefore is groundless.<sup>49</sup> The correct translation of the Final Determination, submitted as Exhibit CHN-01, shows that MOFCOM found that "[d]uring the Period of investigation, the market share of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry remained low..."<sup>50</sup>

3. MOFCOM Properly Examined Factors Showing Improvement in the State of the Domestic Industry

30. MOFCOM examined numerous indicia of the domestic industry's condition, including production capacity, output, sales volume, sales revenue, labor productivity and per capita salaries.<sup>51</sup> MOFCOM found that despite the positive factors, dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow. MOFCOM also found the domestic industry's market share and operation rate were low, and its ending inventory had increased substantially.<sup>52</sup>

31. MOFCOM considered both the positive and negative injury factors and the interplay between them. In doing so, MOFCOM assessed the various factors, conducted an overall analysis of those factors, and placed the data for the various factors in context. MOFCOM's conclusion is based on its overall assessment of the factors.

32. Article 3.4 expressly provides that none of the factors listed in Article 3.4, individually or several combined, necessarily give decisive guidance. Thus, MOFCOM was entitled to find that dumped imports negatively affected the domestic industry on the basis of its overall assessment of

<sup>45</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 111, 112 and 114.

<sup>46</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, paras. 149-150. (emphasis omitted)

<sup>47</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 131.

<sup>48</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 111.

<sup>49</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 112 (quoting Canada's translation of the Final Determination at Exhibit CAN-3, at p. 78).

<sup>50</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76. (emphasis added)

<sup>51</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>52</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 78.

the factors, even if some factors showed positive trends. Previous panels have confirmed that "there is no requirement in Article 3.4 that each and every injury factor, individually, must be indicative of injury".<sup>53</sup>

**E. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

33. MOFCOM conducted an objective examination of the record evidence concerning causation. MOFCOM's causation analysis was based on several factors, including the fact that the quantity of the dumped subject imports skyrocketed. Moreover, the price of the dumped imported product declined precipitously in the second half of the POI. This combination of significant increases in import volume and rapid declines in prices forced the domestic industry to compete on prices, and as a result the price of the like product of the domestic industry was depressed.<sup>54</sup> The domestic industry lost market share on an almost one-to-one basis in 2012 in the price depression period.<sup>55</sup> The price depression caused by the dumped subject imports led to a continuous decline of the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow from operating activities of the domestic industry.<sup>56</sup>

1. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Properly Relied On Its Volume and Price Effects Findings

34. Canada alleges that MOFCOM's causal link analysis relies on faulty volume and price effects findings. As discussed above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings were fully consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM thus properly based its causation analysis in part on its prior volume and price effects findings.

2. MOFCOM Appropriately Considered Whether There Was A Causal Link Between Subject Imports and the Material Injury Suffered by the Domestic Industry

35. Canada next alleges that MOFCOM "asserted that subject imports caused injury to the domestic producers of like goods, [but] it failed to demonstrate *how*".<sup>57</sup> MOFCOM objectively considered positive evidence demonstrating a causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry, and explained that link fully.

36. MOFCOM found that the absolute volume of the dumped subject imports increased dramatically, from 421,000 tons in 2010 to 605,500 tons in 2012, an increase of 43.82 per cent over the POI. MOFCOM also found that the market share of the dumped subject imports increased, from 18.96 per cent in 2011 to 22.01 per cent in 2012.<sup>58</sup> MOFCOM found that prices of the dumped subject imports declined dramatically from the first half of 2011 to the end of the POI, from RMB 13,040/ton to RMB 7,024/ton.<sup>59</sup> MOFCOM found further that the domestic market share of the like product "was generally in an increasing trend",<sup>60</sup> but that the market share of the like product declined in the second half of 2012 and that the dumped subject imports gained that lost market share on a one-to-one basis.<sup>61</sup> MOFCOM found further that the prices of the dumped imports and the like product generally moved in parallel during the period of price depression.<sup>62</sup> MOFCOM also found that "from the second half of 2011 to the second half of 2012, the continued decline of the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the quick increase of the quantity of the dumped imported product forced the Domestic Industry to compete with them in terms of price, leading to a fast and continuous decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry.

<sup>53</sup> Panel Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 6.163. See also Panel Report, *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 7.329.

<sup>54</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 77.

<sup>55</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-65.

<sup>56</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 77-78.

<sup>57</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 133.

<sup>58</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 59.

<sup>59</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>60</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 63.

<sup>61</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>62</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 63-66, 77-78.

Based on these facts, the Investigating authority determined that the dumped imported product **had a depressing effect on the Price of the Like Product...**<sup>63</sup>

37. MOFCOM in the "Causal Relationship" section of its determination focused on the significant growth of the quantity of the dumped imported product, as well as the precipitous price declines of the dumped imported product, which had the effect of "forcing the domestic industry to compete **with it on the prices...**"<sup>64</sup> MOFCOM found further that documents examined at verification and discussed above demonstrated the price depressing effect that the increase in volume of significantly dumped imports had on domestic prices, as domestic producers were forced to lower their price to maintain sales in the Chinese market.<sup>65</sup>

38. MOFCOM also carefully examined the various economic factors and indices concerning the condition of the domestic industry.<sup>66</sup> MOFCOM examined both those economic indicators that showed the domestic industry was suffering from material injury, and other factors that showed more positive trends.<sup>67</sup> MOFCOM took this whole constellation of economic factors and indices into account.

39. MOFCOM's causation analysis thus examined the relationship of the dumped imports to those economic indicators showing more positive financial results for the domestic industry, as well as those that showed that the domestic industry was in fact suffering material injury. MOFCOM's causation analysis stated that "due to the impact of the dumped imported product, the domestic industry had to reduce significantly the price of its like product, resulting in the significant decline of the profitability and the sharp decline of the pre-tax profit and ROI. In 2012, the pre-tax profit and ROI of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry both dropped to the lowest level during the Period of investigation and both were negative values; the domestic industry suffered serious losses...[b]ased on the comprehensive consideration of the above facts and evidence, the Investigating authority determined that...the dumped imported product had caused the material injury to the Domestic Industry".<sup>68</sup>

3. MOFCOM's Analysis of Any Other Known Factors Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

40. In addition to linking the rapidly growing volume of dumped imports at steeply declining prices with the material injury suffered by the domestic industry, MOFCOM also thoroughly examined the role played by other known factors.

41. The other known factors identified in Canada's submission can be classified into two categories. The first are the known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, but which MOFCOM determined in its Final Determination did not break the causal link between dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry. These are cotton and VSF prices, the domestic industry's capacity expansion, and non-subject imports. The second category that Canada challenges is the known factor – cotton linter – that MOFCOM determined did not cause injury to the domestic industry.

(a) MOFCOM Properly Separated and Distinguished the Injurious Effects of Certain Other Known Factors from the Injurious Effects of the Dumped Imports

42. With respect to the first category of factors identified in Canada's submission, subject imports need only be a "cause," and not the sole cause of material injury to the domestic industry. The Appellate Body has stated that the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "applies solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic industry **at the same time**."<sup>69</sup> In order to ensure that the

<sup>63</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 65-66; see also Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 73, 77-78.

<sup>64</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 77-78.

<sup>65</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 65.

<sup>66</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>67</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 71-74.

<sup>68</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 78.

<sup>69</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 223.

injurious effects of the other known factors are not "attributed" to dumped imports, the investigating authority's non-attribution analysis "requires 'separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports'."<sup>70</sup> However, as long as an investigating authority carries out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors, the "particular methods and approaches" are not prescribed by the Anti-Dumping Agreement.<sup>71</sup>

- (i) MOFCOM's Examination of the Effects of Cotton and VSF Prices on Cellulose Pulp Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

43. Canada argues that there is an alleged correlation between global cotton fibre, global VSF and Chinese cellulose pulp pricing.<sup>72</sup> Contrary to Canada's claims, MOFCOM conducted an objective examination based on positive evidence before determining that cotton prices were not the main factor that determined the price of VSF, and cotton prices were also not the main factor that affected the price of cotton pulp in the domestic industry.<sup>73</sup>

44. As MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination, evidence indicated that VSF has superior dyeing and moisture absorption properties as compared to cotton fiber.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, based on an objective examination of the positive evidence, MOFCOM reached the conclusion that the different properties between VSF and cotton fiber rendered them "not substitutable in the market to a certain extent".<sup>75</sup> As a result, because VSF and cotton fiber are, to a certain degree, not substitutable in the market, MOFCOM reasonably found that there is no necessary relationship between the prices of VSF and cotton.<sup>76</sup>

45. In addition, as MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination, during the POI, China's import quotas on cotton and other Chinese Government policies created a disconnect between global cotton prices and the domestic cotton prices in China. Thus, domestic cotton market dynamics differ from the global market dynamics relied on by Canada, and MOFCOM properly reviewed *domestic* Chinese cotton prices instead of global cotton prices when analysing whether cotton prices impacted *domestic* VSF prices in China.

46. In reviewing domestic cotton prices, the data demonstrated that the domestic VSF and cotton pulp prices in China did not follow the trends in domestic cotton prices in China. As a result, based on the above data, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that during the POI, cotton prices were not the main factor that determined the price of VSF, and cotton prices were also not the main factor that affected the price of cotton cellulose pulp.

47. In any event, Canada's arguments concerning the alleged relationship between cotton and VSF prices are not even directly relevant to an analysis of factors driving cellulose pulp prices. The more even hypothetically relevant question is whether there is a relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

48. Canada argues that Figure 1 in its first written submission, which is based on data submitted by foreign exporters, demonstrates there is a causal relationship between cotton, VSF, and cellulose pulp prices.<sup>77</sup> However, MOFCOM reasonably found that the information on the record did not constitute sufficient evidence demonstrating the alleged direct *causal* relationship between VSF and overall cellulose pulp prices.<sup>78</sup> The parallel price trends on their own do not demonstrate that the downward trend in VSF prices led to the downward trend in cellulose pulp prices. Balancing all positive evidence, including data showing strong total domestic demand for cellulose pulp during the POI as discussed below, demonstrates that MOFCOM reasonably concluded that the evidence did not show a direct *causal* relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices.

---

<sup>70</sup> Panel Report, *China – GOES*, para. 7.618; Appellate Body Reports, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 223 and *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, para. 188.

<sup>71</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 224.

<sup>72</sup> Canada's first written submission, paras. 3-6 and 157.

<sup>73</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>74</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>75</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>76</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 67.

<sup>77</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 157.

<sup>78</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 68.

49. MOFCOM reasonably demonstrated that an examination of VSF output and total domestic demand for cellulose pulp is relevant to an analysis of the ultimate alleged impact of VSF prices on cellulose pulp prices. In the Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the output of VSF during the POI rapidly increased.<sup>79</sup> MOFCOM reasonably explained that the rapid growth in output of VSF as the downstream product in turn resulted in the rapid growth of total domestic demand for cellulose pulp.<sup>80</sup> In addition, MOFCOM also found that the total output could not always meet the total demand of cellulose pulp. As a result, the price of cellulose pulp should have at least remained stable. But it did not. Therefore, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that factors other than VSF output or prices, which are intimately linked with output, were the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices.<sup>81</sup>

50. Therefore, MOFCOM's findings that (1) cotton prices were not a main factor in affecting VSF prices or cellulose pulp prices, and (2) changes in VSF prices were not the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices were based on an objective examination of positive evidence, consistent with the standards of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(ii) MOFCOM's Examination of the Domestic Industry's Capacity Expansion and Inventory Build-up Was Based On an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

51. Contrary to Canada's claim, MOFCOM fully examined and addressed the issues relating to the increased production capacity of the domestic industry during the POI. MOFCOM determined that the domestic industry added capacity due to the significant "increase of the demand of the domestic cellulose pulp market."<sup>82</sup> MOFCOM noted that the domestic production capacity increased to match the significant growth in total domestic demand for cellulose pulp, which increased from 2.03 million tons in 2010 to 2.75 million tons in 2012. MOFCOM further concluded that the "slightly proactive increase of their production capacity" was reasonable in order to meet the expected growth in demand.<sup>83</sup> In addition, MOFCOM concluded that the industry's production capacity even after the increase in 2012 "was basically equal to the total domestic demand for cellulose pulp."<sup>84</sup> MOFCOM then compared capacity and demand levels, and noted that the total output of the domestic cellulose pulp industry was "always far less" than the total domestic demand.<sup>85</sup>

52. In addition, MOFCOM determined that some of the new capacity was not put in place until the end of the POI, further reducing the impact of that increased capacity on the state of the domestic industry during the POI.<sup>86</sup> MOFCOM then further examined the impact of increased capacity on the domestic industry's per unit costs. MOFCOM found that the unit production costs of the domestic industry *declined* in general over the POI, further indicating that expenditures for increased production capacity did not harm the financial performance of the domestic industry.<sup>87</sup>

53. Canada next alleges that MOFCOM inappropriately used production capacity of the entire domestic industry, not merely that for the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM.<sup>88</sup> However, when examining the overall relationship between production capacity and demand, MOFCOM's use of total production capacity for the entire industry in relation to total demand better reflects the overall market dynamics.

54. Canada claims that MOFCOM failed to adequately examine the relationship between the domestic industry's increased production capacity and the increase in inventory.<sup>89</sup> However, MOFCOM's determination states that "the investigating authority also took into consideration the obvious increase of the inventory of the Domestic Industry."<sup>90</sup> MOFCOM examined the increase in production and sales volume from 2012 compared with 2011, and reasonably concluded that the

<sup>79</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 68.

<sup>80</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 69.

<sup>81</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 69.

<sup>82</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76.

<sup>83</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>84</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>85</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>86</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 81.

<sup>87</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at pp. 81-82.

<sup>88</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 164.

<sup>89</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 168.

<sup>90</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

increased portion of production due to the expansion of production capacity was not the direct cause of the increase of the ending inventory.<sup>91</sup>

55. MOFCOM concluded its analysis by acknowledging that while the increase in production capacity may have had some impact, the record evidence did not demonstrate that the increased capacity was sufficient to break the causal relationship between the dumped imported product and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.<sup>92</sup>

(iii) MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Non-Subject Imports Was Based on an Objective Examination of Positive Evidence

56. Contrary to Canada's claims, MOFCOM specifically examined in detail the role played by non-subject imports, and concluded that they could not break the causal relationship between the dumped subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

57. MOFCOM analysed the relative proportion of non-dumped imports in relation to total imports, and concluded that they were a significant proportion of total imports, over 50 per cent in each year of the POI.<sup>93</sup> MOFCOM then examined the price relationship between dumped and non-dumped imports, and concluded that the difference in prices were "not big."<sup>94</sup> MOFCOM also noted that it learned in the investigation from the downstream customers that the dumped imports were **"generally better...in terms of the quality and consumer comments"** than were the non-dumped subject imports.<sup>95</sup> The fact that the dumped imports were better quality further supported MOFCOM's conclusion that the not large differences in price between them and the non-dumped imports would not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry.

58. MOFCOM acknowledged that the price of the cellulose pulp imported from South Africa was lower than the price of the dumped subject imports, but that the quantity of imports of cellulose pulp from South Africa were relatively small, and less than 10 per cent of total imports in each year of the POI. MOFCOM further analysed relative prices, and noted that cellulose pulp imported from Indonesia and Sweden were imported at similar prices to those of the dumped imported product, but that their quantities as a portion of total quantity of imports into China was declining over the POI.<sup>96</sup>

(b) MOFCOM Properly Determined that the Supply of Cotton Linter Was Not Causing Injury to the Domestic Industry

59. The other known factor challenged by Canada is the alleged shortage of domestic cotton linter supply and its alleged injurious effects on the domestic industry.<sup>97</sup> MOFCOM reasonably determined that the supply of domestic cotton linter was not another known factor that was at the same time injuring the domestic industry.

60. Canada claims that an insufficient quantity of domestic cotton linter, an input to the production of cotton linter cellulose pulp, was a significant cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>98</sup>

61. Canada first argues that MOFCOM failed to examine evidence indicating that total domestic demand for cotton linter surpassed total domestic cotton linter supply for each year of the POI.<sup>99</sup> However, in the paragraph following the table in the China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012 that Canada relied on,<sup>100</sup> CCFGroup indicates that any shortage in cotton linter supply was mainly filled by waste cotton linters. Coupled with the latter, the supply of cotton linter in 2012 was in fact

<sup>91</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

<sup>92</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 82.

<sup>93</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 84.

<sup>94</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>95</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>96</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 85.

<sup>97</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 178.

<sup>98</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 178.

<sup>99</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 181.

<sup>100</sup> See CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-4, at p. 6.

"relatively sufficient."<sup>101</sup> As a result, MOFCOM properly concluded that there was sufficient total domestic cotton linter supply in 2012.

62. Canada next argues that MOFCOM's analysis assumes that cotton linter pulp producers would have access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter.<sup>102</sup> As demonstrated above, MOFCOM considered the information in the CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012 that indicated cotton linter supply was in fact sufficient. MOFCOM then reasonably explained that because cotton linter was mainly used for the production of cotton linter pulp, as shown in Table 4 of Canada's submission, MOFCOM properly applied a unit consumption ratio of 1 ton of cotton pulp to approximately 1.3 tons of cotton linter, in order to determine what the domestic output of cotton pulp should have been over the POI.<sup>103</sup> However, the actual output of cotton pulp, as well as the capacity utilization rate of the domestic cotton pulp industry, were much lower. As a result, MOFCOM properly determined that the low capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry was not caused by changes in the supply of cotton linter.

63. Finally, MOFCOM properly relied on positive evidence derived from injury questionnaire responses demonstrating that during the POI, the sales volumes of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp, at their highest level in 2012, accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total sales volume of the like product of the domestic industry.<sup>104</sup> As cotton linter is not a raw material for the production of wood pulp or bamboo pulp, MOFCOM reasonably found that changes in the supply of cotton linter were not the cause of the overall domestic cellulose pulp industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>105</sup>

64. MOFCOM reasonably found that the supply of cotton linter was sufficient, and therefore was not a factor that caused injury to the domestic industry. Because the supply of cotton linter was not a factor contributing at the same time to the situation of the domestic industry, there was no need to "separate and distinguish" any injurious effects.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

65. For the reasons set forth in this submission, China requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's determinations in the underlying investigations were fully consistent with China's WTO rights and obligations.

---

<sup>101</sup> See CCFGroup China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-4, at p. 6.

<sup>102</sup> Canada's first written submission, para. 185.

<sup>103</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 75.

<sup>104</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 74.

<sup>105</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, at p. 76.

**ANNEX C-2**

## SECOND INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CHINA

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. As China's prior submissions have demonstrated, MOFCOM objectively examined positive evidence and fully complied with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM found that the volume of significantly dumped imports increased dramatically over the period of investigation (POI), over 40 per cent. MOFCOM also found that the prices of those rapidly growing dumped imports plummeted, and forced domestic producers to lower their prices in the face of severe price competition with those dumped imports. In addition, MOFCOM properly examined the various factors having a bearing on the state of the industry, both positive and negative, and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. Finally, China has also demonstrated that Canada's arguments concerning MOFCOM's non-attribution analyses should be rejected. There is no prescribed methodology, approach, or qualitative or quantitative analysis. Each such analysis must be judged on its own merits.

**II. ARGUMENT****A. MOFCOM's Volume Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

2. Canada has failed to establish that MOFCOM's volume analysis is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.2 provides an investigating authority with the option of considering whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in either absolute or relative terms.

3. The use of the disjunctive "or" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 indicates that the investigating authority need not consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports from *both* an absolute and a relative perspective. Rather it is sufficient for the investigating authority to consider one of the two perspectives. That the investigating authority need not consider *both* perspectives is confirmed by the use of the term "either" before "in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption". It is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of "absolute".

4. Canada recognizes that the first sentence of Article 3.2 "gives an investigating authority the discretion to consider this increase in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption".<sup>1</sup> However, Canada still argues that an investigating authority is required to consider the "relevant circumstances in a manner that provides a meaningful basis to conduct subsequent analyses".

5. First, there is no textual basis in Article 3.2 for the "requirement to consider the relevant circumstances". Second, Canada's strained attempt to find a textual basis for its requirement in the term "significant" does not work. It is perfectly possible to consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports is "significant" in absolute terms without having to additionally consider other circumstances. Here, the volume of dumped imports increased more than 40 per cent during the POI. Therefore, it is perfectly possible to give effect to the term "significant" while respecting the ordinary meaning of the other terms used in the first sentence of Article 3.2, such as "or", "either" and "absolute".

6. Canada also attempts to find support for its "requirement" in "the context provided by the other paragraphs of Article 3." However, Canada does not explain how the text of those provisions provides support for its overly expansive interpretation of the first sentence of Article 3.2. Having strayed completely from the text of Article 3.2, and more generally from the text of Article 3, Canada argues that "[t]o provide a 'meaningful basis' for subsequent analysis under Article 3, the volume analysis must account for relevant market circumstances and not consider subject imports

---

<sup>1</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 1.



in isolation".<sup>2</sup> This statement reveals another fundamental flaw that is at the core of Canada's argument. As it does repeatedly throughout this case, Canada is collapsing the various obligations set out in Article 3 and improperly trying to import into the first sentence of Article 3.2 analyses that are contemplated only in other provisions of Article 3.

7. Canada is essentially arguing that MOFCOM was required, under the first sentence of Article 3.2, to consider whether the increase in the volume of dumped imports was such that it was the cause of injury to the domestic industry. This, however, is not the analysis that is contemplated under the first sentence of Article 3.2. And, while there may be a "logical progression" between Articles 3.2 and 3.5 and the two provisions may be "interlinked", this does not mean that the requirements of both are the same. Canada's argument would seem to be that a volume analysis is only consistent under Article 3.2 if it *necessarily* leads to an affirmative finding of causation. However, an investigating authority is entitled to consider that the increase in the volume of dumped imports is significant and yet arrive at a negative finding of causation.

8. Canada's argument implies that an absolute increase in the volume of dumped imports, no matter how large in numerical terms, could not by itself, provide a meaningful basis for the subsequent analysis under Article 3, unless the increase is coupled with lost sales or the substitution of market share of the domestic industry. This is incorrect both in light of the plain text of the first sentence of Article 3.2 and the provisions that follow.

9. Moreover, Canada specifically asserts that MOFCOM failed to consider three factors under the first sentence of Article 3.2, namely, domestic consumption, domestic sales and non-dumped imports. The first two factors are mentioned in the first sentence of Article 3.2 in connection with the option of considering whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports in relative terms. The fact that these two factors are expressly referred to in connection with relative import volume, and are not mentioned in connection with absolute volume, further undermines Canada's contention that the consideration of volume in absolute terms requires an investigating authority to consider market share. Moreover, even with respect to relative volume, the first sentence of Article 3.2 refers to production or consumption. The use of the disjunctive "or" means that, even in the case of relative volume, an investigating authority is not required to consider both. Furthermore, the reference to production or consumption is exhaustive – there is no "for example" or "including" in the first sentence of Article 3.2. Thus, there is no basis for Canada's contention that an investigating authority is also required to consider trends in non-subject imports as part of the analysis undertaken under the first sentence of Article 3.2.

10. Canada seems to suggest that the requirement to consider the three additional factors is case-specific.<sup>3</sup> However, in practice, Canada's proposed approach would impose an obligation on all investigating authorities in all investigations to consider whether there is a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in relative terms or to assess the volume of dumped imports against "relevant circumstances". Furthermore, in order to consider whether such "relevant circumstances" exist, the investigating authority would be required to consider factors other than the absolute volume of the dumped imports, including, but possibly not limited to, the factors raised by Canada in this dispute. Only after the investigating authority has conducted such analysis and has concluded that the "relevant circumstances" do not require examining other factors, could the investigating authority consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms. This effectively makes consideration of the relative increase in the volume of the dumped imports obligatory for all investigating authorities in all investigations.

11. Finally, at the First Substantive Meeting, Canada claimed that MOFCOM "failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its finding of a significant increase in absolute volume". Canada did not include this claim in its panel request.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the Panel should reject Canada's claim on this

---

<sup>2</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 4, paras. 5 and 8-9. See, Japan's response to Panel question No. 1, para. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Canada's request for the establishment of a panel, para. 4.

basis alone. In any event, Canada's allegation is once again grounded on a misunderstanding of the requirements of the first sentence of Article 3.2.<sup>5</sup>

**B. MOFCOM's Price Effects Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

12. MOFCOM's finding of price depression was consistent with MOFCOM's obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

1. MOFCOM Reasonably Relied on a Variety of Record Evidence To Support Its Price Depression Finding

13. MOFCOM examined a variety of evidence that supported its conclusion that the dumped subject imports had a depressing effect on the prices of the domestic like product in the second half of the POI. MOFCOM found that the dumped subject imports and the domestic like product were directly competitive because they were "basically identical in terms of the product's performance, the quality, the sales area and the group of clients."

14. MOFCOM also relied on the significant increase in the absolute volume of dumped imports over the POI, which increased dramatically from approximately 421,000 tons in 2010 to 605,500 tons in 2012, an increase of 43 per cent.<sup>6</sup> MOFCOM further relied on the drastic fall in prices for subject imports over the second half of the POI. Prices for subject imports fell from 13,040 RMB/ton in early 2011 to only 7,024 RMB/ton at the end of the POI.

15. In addition, MOFCOM had calculated significant dumping margins for the dumped subject imports, ranging from 13 to 23.7 per cent for Canadian producers, to 16.9 and 17.2 per cent for the investigated U.S. producers, and an all-others margin of 33.5 per cent for other U.S. producers. MOFCOM also calculated a margin of 6.8 per cent for the Brazilian respondents and an all-others rate of 11.5 per cent for all other Brazilian exporters.

16. In addition, MOFCOM reasonably found that there were parallel pricing trends. MOFCOM **concluded that prices for subject imports and the domestic like product over the POI "...first increased and then decreased, showing a decreasing trend in general."**<sup>7</sup> MOFCOM also found parallel price trends in the second half of the POI, and noted that "[i]n the same period, both the Price of the Dumped Imported Product and the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry showed a continuous decreasing trend."

17. In addition, as discussed further below and in China's prior submissions, MOFCOM also relied in part on the pricing minutes, which demonstrated concretely that subject imports forced the domestic producers to reduce prices for the domestic like product.

18. China notes that the plain text of Article 3.2 requires only that MOFCOM "shall **consider whether...the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree...**" (emphasis added). The text does not define how the investigating authority "shall consider" these factors, which provide an investigating authority discretion when undertaking its price depression analysis so long as it undertakes an objective examination based on positive evidence. Moreover, the Appellate Body has stated that an investigating authority "is not required to make a definitive determination of significant price depression and suppression, such as the determination contemplated in [Article 3.5 to] 'demonstrate' the causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic **industry.**" **The Appellate Body has stated that "...the authority's consideration of price effects must be reflected in relevant documentation produced by the**

<sup>5</sup> China recalls that the obligation under the first sentence of Article 3.2 is to "consider" whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports. The Appellate Body has found that the term "consider" in Article 3.2 connotes an obligation "to take something into account", but does "not impose an obligation on an investigating authority to make a definitive determination on the volume of subject imports". Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 130. (emphasis omitted)

<sup>6</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 64.

authority in its investigation, and must be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination..."<sup>8</sup> MOFCOM's price effects analysis fully meets this standard.

2. MOFCOM Reasonably Found Parallel Price Trends and Explained Their Relevance

19. Canada has shifted its argument, and now attempts to argue that subject imports and the domestic like product did not exhibit parallel price trends, at least not over the entire POI. Canada's claim in this regard is unavailing. MOFCOM found parallel price trends both early in the POI, and also in the more critical period later in the POI during which MOFCOM found price depression. MOFCOM did not rely on a price depression finding only in a single isolated period of the overall POI, but rather, appropriately, looked at longer-term price trends and general movements in prices over longer time periods. In contrast, Canada improperly focuses on only a single point in time early in the overall POI in which the lines showing prices for subject imports and the domestic like product cross.

20. Canada also incorrectly argues that "the price of the domestic like product declined much faster than those of subject imports" once prices began to decline. During the second half of the POI, the prices for the domestic like product declined 47.38 per cent, while the dumped imports declined at basically the same level, 46.14 per cent. Over the first half-year of 2011 compared with the first-half year of 2012, the price of the dumped subject imports declined by 39.59 per cent, while the price for the domestic like product declined by a nearly identical 38.80 per cent, providing further confirmation of parallel price trends and contradicting to Canada's claim that the price of the domestic like product "declined much faster" than those of subject imports.

21. Canada also now claims that the panel's finding in *China – Autos (US)*, which concerned a finding of parallel prices in a different case, applies equally here.<sup>9</sup> The *China – Autos (US)* case, however, is not applicable. In that case, the panel noted that the prices moved in different directions and the average unit values declined at a "considerably different" rate of change.<sup>10</sup> And in *China – GOES*, prices for subject imports declined only 1.25 per cent, while prices for the domestic like product declined by 30.25 per cent.<sup>11</sup> In this case, however, there is clear evidence both of parallel pricing and of similar movements in average unit value between subject imports and the domestic like product. Moreover, the panel in *China – Autos (US)* stated that an investigating authority does not need to find "perfect correlation in prices" to support a finding of parallel pricing. And the Appellate Body stated in *China – GOES* that it could "conceive of ways in which an observation of parallel price trends might support a price depression or suppression analysis.

22. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM "gave no explanation or reasoning regarding how any parallel price trend indicated the nature of competition between subject imports and the domestic like product."<sup>12</sup> The existence of parallel price trends can be an indicator of a link between prices for subject imports and the domestic like product. The fact that prices for subject imports and the domestic like product move in tandem can be evidence of a causal relationship. In addition, the pricing minutes that MOFCOM examined demonstrated concretely that the dumped subject imports were forcing the domestic producers to lower prices.

3. The Pricing Documents and Meeting Minutes are Reliable, Concrete Evidence of Price Depression

23. Contrary to Canada's assertions, the pricing documents and meeting minutes that MOFCOM examined concretely demonstrated that domestic producers were forced to lower prices in the face of the rapidly rising volume of significantly dumped imports at rapidly declining prices. Those documents are reliable, contemporaneous accounts of the adverse pricing pressure that the domestic producers faced in the normal course of their business operations during the POI.

<sup>8</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 158.

<sup>9</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, paras. 7.262-7.263.

<sup>11</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, fn. 350.

<sup>12</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 9, para. 26.

24. Canada's translation of the phrase "deng" is not correct. The dictionary definition of "deng" in Exhibit CHN-06 indicates that the phrase has two uses, and that the word can mean either "et cetera" when a preceding list of items is not complete and there are other items that are not identified, or it can be used to finish or wind up the list of items preceding "deng." In the present case, the list of items preceding the phrase "deng" is closed or complete, and there are no other items that form part of the specified list. In this respect, the "deng" can be translated as "namely" or "as such." In addition, the phrase "deng" is followed by a specific percentage, *i.e.*, "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp." Thus, the phrase "more than half of China's total imports of cellulose pulp" can *only* make sense if the phrase "Brazil, Canada and USA" is an exhaustive list. The import data also confirms that imports from Brazil, Canada and the United States do indeed account for approximately one-half of total imports of cellulose pulp into China. For these reasons, Canada's translation of the phrase "deng" in the context of these pricing documents is inaccurate.

25. Canada claims further that the pricing documents and meeting minutes are not reliable. However, the Final Determination states that "[the] investigating authority had collected evidences from many domestic producers during its on-site verifications, including the minutes of the **business analysis meetings and the pricing reports...**" **There is thus no question that MOFCOM** examined these documents during the verification. Moreover, the documents are representative of the situation for the domestic industry, because the companies that submitted these documents are some of the most important producers and their total production and sales accounted for a considerable portion, approximately one-third, of total domestic production.

26. The documents were also all dated well before the initiation of the investigation, demonstrating that they were authentic records recorded in the company's normal course of business, and were not prepared for the investigation itself. Moreover, the documents covered a significant portion of the overall POI. In addition, the pricing minutes and meeting documents from the multiple companies' records included in Exhibit CHN-02 corroborated each other.

27. In light of all these circumstances, there was no requirement that MOFCOM undertake any specific, pre-determined method to verify or examine the pricing documents and meeting minutes that MOFCOM in part relied on. Indeed, the panel in *EC – Fasteners (Article 21.5 – China)* stated that while Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement generally requires an investigating authority to "satisfy [itself] as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which [its] findings are based," the Anti-Dumping Agreement "does not prescribe specific ways in which this general obligation has to be observed." Canada has not pursued claims under Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

28. Canada also argues that MOFCOM failed to explain how the pricing documents "showed any difficulty in making sales..." **Similarly, Canada claims that MOFCOM's conclusion that the domestic** industry had "difficulty in clinching deals" contradicts the fact that the domestic industry's sales increased over the POI. But the "difficulty in clinching deals" referenced in the meeting minutes refers to the fact that the domestic industry was forced to reduce prices in order to make sales, and thus avoid losing even more sales and further market share. This is the very essence of price depression.

4. MOFCOM Reasonably Found Price Depression and Was Not Required to Also Find Price Undercutting

29. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM could not objectively find price depression when subject imports were priced somewhat higher than the domestic like product. However, the plain text of Article 3.2 and relevant case law demonstrate that price depression can be found in the absence of price undercutting.<sup>13</sup> There is simply no requirement that an investigating authority must find price undercutting before it can find price depression.

30. MOFCOM also examined relative price levels and the arguments of interested parties in the underlying investigation that prices for the dumped subject imports were higher than prices for the domestic like product. MOFCOM rejected the arguments of foreign producers Cosmo and Fortress that the dumped imports could not have caused injury because prices of the dumped imported product from the U.S. and Canada were higher than the price of the domestic like product.

<sup>13</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 16, paras. 49-53.

MOFCOM concluded that the argument failed because MOFCOM appropriately was conducting a cumulative assessment of prices, and that "the investigating authority would not conduct a separate analysis and assessment on the import price of individual countries."

5. MOFCOM Also Considered Market Share Information, Even Though it Was Not Required to Do So

31. Canada argues that subject imports could not have even conceivably caused price depression when their market share did not increase. China again notes that MOFCOM properly focused the volume effects portion of its price depression finding on movements in the absolute volume of subject imports, and was not required under Article 3.2 to also consider movements in market share.

32. Prior panels have noted that in a price depression analysis based on an absolute increase in import volume, it does not matter that the market share of subject imports did not increase significantly. Even though MOFCOM was not required under Article 3.2 to also consider movements in market share, it nonetheless still did so. Moreover, the Final Determination notes that at the height of the period of price depression, "particularly in the second half of 2012, the dumped imported product squeezed the market share of the like product of the domestic industry which declined to 25.73 percent from 26.71 percent and the lost 0.98 percentage points were all taken by the dumped imported product."

**C. MOFCOM's Examination of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Domestic Industry Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

33. Canada alleges that MOFCOM failed to: (i) to objectively examine the domestic industry's market share; and (ii) properly analyze and interpret data relating to factors that showed an improvement in the state of the domestic industry.<sup>14</sup> Neither allegation has merit.

1. MOFCOM Objectively Examined Market Share Data

34. In its Final Determination, MOFCOM found that the market share of the domestic industry "remained low."<sup>15</sup> Canada asserts that MOFCOM's statement concerning the market share of the domestic industry should be translated as "consistently depressed", rather than "remained low." However, Canada appears to acknowledge the tenuousness of its position when it argues that "more importantly, regardless of which translation is used, MOFCOM's analysis is improper". Both reasons put forward by Canada to support this contention are groundless. First, Canada asserts that MOFCOM should have considered the trend in the market share rather than whether the domestic industry's market share was high or low. MOFCOM, however, did in fact examine trends in market share. Second, Canada submits that "MOFCOM's characterization of the domestic industry's market share as remaining low contradicts positive evidence on MOFCOM's record that the domestic industry's market share increased". There is no contradiction between MOFCOM's statement and the evidence on record. MOFCOM's statement does not indicate that the domestic industry's market share was decreasing. Rather, MOFCOM simply made a general statement about the share of the overall market held by the domestic industry.

35. Regardless, MOFCOM found that the increasing volumes of dumped imports at steeply declining prices were impacting negatively on the state of the industry because the dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow, among other factors.<sup>16</sup> Thus, even assuming *arguendo* that MOFCOM erred in its characterization of market share, this does not invalidate MOFCOM's Article 3.4 analysis, which did not turn on market share.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Based on its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, it would appear that Canada no longer intends to pursue its allegation that MOFCOM failed to examine whether subject imports explained the state of the domestic industry. Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, paras. 47-57.

<sup>15</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 76.

<sup>16</sup> See, China's response to Panel question No. 17, para. 58.

<sup>17</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 53, para. 11.

2. MOFCOM Properly Examined Factors Showing Improvement in the State of the Domestic Industry

36. MOFCOM considered both the positive and negative factors in its Article 3.4 analysis. MOFCOM found that, even though not all of the factors showed a negative trend, the increasing volumes of dumped imports at steeply declining prices were impacting negatively on the state of the industry because the dumped imports were pushing prices downward and this led to a continuous decline in the pre-tax profit, return on investment and net cash flow. MOFCOM additionally noted that, as the volume of dumped imports increased, the market share of the domestic industry remained low and inventory increased continuously. Finally, MOFCOM noted that the operation rate of the domestic industry remained low, and also referred to its findings that the domestic industry had to put on hold its plans for expansion. Therefore, MOFCOM's Final Determination demonstrates that MOFCOM properly examined the various factors having a bearing on the state of the industry, both positive and negative, and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry, in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

37. It is incorrect in these circumstances for Canada to allege that MOFCOM "simply juxtaposed the positive with the negative factors".<sup>18</sup> Rather, MOFCOM identified how the impact of the dumped imports manifested itself more clearly in some factors than in others because the effect of the dumped imports was mainly being felt in the prices of the domestic like product. These reduced prices, in turn, negatively affected other factors, such as profits, return on investment and cash flow.

38. Canada, moreover, once again improperly expands the analysis required under Article 3.4 when it argues that MOFCOM was required "to assess each factor's role, relevance and relative weight".<sup>19</sup> Article 3.4 calls for an overall examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. While this examination includes an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, it does not require the individualized assessment of "each factor's role, relevance and relative weight" as proposed by Canada. Canada has failed to distinguish its overly expansive view of what it argues is required under Article 3.4 from the non-attribution requirement of Article 3.5. Canada's statement of what an investigating authority must do under Article 3.4 reads very much like a requirement to perform a non-attribution analysis.

39. The Panel asked Canada to explain how its proposed analysis under Article 3.4 is different from the analysis required under Article 3.5. Canada has not been able to explain the difference between the two in concrete terms. This is not surprising given that Canada is effectively conflating the requirements of Article 3.4 and those of Article 3.5.

40. Canada also raises the panel reports in *Thailand – H-Beams* and in *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, but a close look at these reports shows that neither supports Canada's position. As regards *Thailand – H-Beams*, Canada simply cites a statement made by the panel without referring to the panel's actual analysis. This analysis shows that the facts before that panel were dramatically different from the facts in this case. The panel in that case concluded that there was an "absence of even a minimally satisfactory explanation of how the factors relied upon by the Thai authorities support their affirmative injury determination". By contrast, in this case, MOFCOM provided an adequate explanation of how the factors it relied upon supported its affirmative injury determination and Canada has not challenged MOFCOM's analysis of any these factors with the exception of market share.

41. Turning to *EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings*, Canada paraphrases the panel as having stated that "an investigating authority may not simply disregard factors that are not relevant or have little weight in the determination but must explain its conclusion regarding their lack of relevance or weight". However, in this case MOFCOM did not "simply disregard factors", nor did it fail to explain its conclusions. Rather, MOFCOM examined production capacity, output, sales volume, sales revenue, labor productivity and salaries, and recognized that they were positive. MOFCOM found that, despite these positive factors, the rapidly rising volume of dumped subject imports at declining prices were forcing the domestic producers to reduce prices, which led to a significant decline in pretax profit, return on investment, and cash flow.

<sup>18</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 54.

<sup>19</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 57.

42. Finally, China recalls that Article 3.4 provides that none of the factors listed in Article 3.4, individually or several combined, necessarily give decisive guidance. Thus, the fact that some of the Article 3.4 factors were positive did not preclude MOFCOM from finding injury.

**D. MOFCOM's Causation Analysis Was Fully Consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

43. Canada continues to allege that MOFCOM's causation analysis was deficient because it relied on faulty volume and price effects analyses, and because it conducted an inappropriate non-attribution analysis. As discussed below, both of Canada's claims fail.

1. MOFCOM's Volume and Price Effects Analyses Fully Supported Its Causation Analysis

44. Canada claims that MOFCOM's volume and price effect analyses were faulty. For the reasons discussed above, MOFCOM's volume and price effects findings were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. MOFCOM therefore properly based its causation analysis in part on its prior volume and price effects findings.

2. MOFCOM's Analyzed the Role Played by Other Known Factors Consistent With Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

45. Canada has continued to claim that MOFCOM failed to objectively examine the impact of cotton and VSF prices, the domestic industry's capacity expansion, non-subject imports, and the supply of cotton linter as a raw material in its non-attribution analysis, as required by Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. While the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to "separate and distinguish" the injurious effects of other known factors, it does not prescribe "the particular methods and approaches by which WTO Members choose to carry out the process."<sup>20</sup>

46. During the First Substantive Meeting, Canada incorrectly asserted that it did not have the burden of demonstrating what China should have done differently in its non-attribution analysis in order to be consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As the complainant in this proceeding, Canada does in fact have this burden and has failed to meet it. Canada merely asserts that MOFCOM's analysis is insufficient. In fact, far from Canada's blanket allegation that MOFCOM "made *no attempt* to properly 'separate and distinguish' any injury caused by these factors,"<sup>21</sup> MOFCOM thoroughly examined the role played by other known factors, in accordance with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(a) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Effects of Cotton and VSF Prices on the Domestic Industry

47. MOFCOM objectively assessed the role played by movements in cotton and VSF prices in its Final Determination. Canada continues to argue that there is a correlation between global cotton fibre, global VSF and Chinese cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM, considered the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence on the record concerning trends in cotton and VSF prices.<sup>22</sup>

48. Canada continues to argue that global cotton prices impacted VSF prices. The only hypothetically relevant question is whether VSF prices impacted cellulose pulp prices. Examining whether VSF prices impacted cellulose pulp prices does not mean that the investigating authority had to then also consider the further upstream factors that may have impacted VSF prices. Nevertheless, MOFCOM still considered the submissions by interested parties on the impact of cotton prices on VSF prices and addressed this factor.

49. With respect to MOFCOM's analysis of cotton prices, Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM failed to consider evidence allegedly indicating that VSF is a close substitute for cotton,

<sup>20</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 224.

<sup>21</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 64. (emphasis added)

<sup>22</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 66 and 68.

and that therefore prices of VSF and cotton are related. However, MOFCOM explained in the Final Determination<sup>23</sup> that evidence presented during the investigation showed that VSF has superior dyeing and moisture absorption properties as compared with cotton fiber. Because VSF and cotton fiber have different chemical properties, MOFCOM reasonably concluded that VSF and cotton fiber are "not substitutable in the market to a certain extent."

50. In addition, Canada argues that fluctuations in global cotton prices caused similar fluctuations in VSF prices, which then impacted cellulose pulp prices in China. However, MOFCOM reasonably explained in its Final Determination that the domestic cotton prices in China differed significantly from global cotton prices. This disconnect between cotton prices on the international market and cotton prices in China is explicitly addressed in the Final Determination, and is not, as Canada argues, a *post hoc* rationalization. In addition, according to positive evidence on the record, VSF exports encompassed only between 5 and 10 per cent of total domestic VSF output in China. Therefore, the impact on domestic VSF prices from global cotton prices, if any, would be minimal, and MOFCOM properly examined domestic Chinese cotton prices to determine any impact on domestic VSF prices. The data demonstrated that domestic VSF and cotton pulp prices in China did not follow the trends for domestic cotton prices in China.

51. Canada continues to argue that there is a direct, causal relationship between VSF prices and cellulose pulp prices. However, evidence of parallel price trends on their own do not demonstrate there was a causal or direct relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp prices. MOFCOM considered the evidence submitted by interested parties but also carefully examined the supply and demand relationship between VSF and cellulose pulp.

52. MOFCOM found that the rapid growth in output of VSF as the downstream product in turn resulted in the rapid growth of total domestic demand for cellulose pulp during the POI. The demand was strong, such that the total output of cellulose pulp could not meet the total demand for cellulose pulp. Thus, MOFCOM noted that the price of cellulose pulp should have at least remained stable, but it instead declined. MOFCOM reasonably concluded that factors other than VSF output or prices were the "direct cause of the decline of the Price of the Like Product of the Domestic Industry."

53. MOFCOM's examination of the total domestic production capacity, the total domestic output, and the total domestic demand of cellulose pulp in China is central to its analysis, as they all drive cellulose pulp prices in China. This is a matter of simple economic logic, and not *post hoc* rationalization, as Canada argues.

54. Canada still asserts that MOFCOM was incorrect when it stated that the total production capacity of domestic producers was in balance with domestic demand. The absolute levels of the total production capacity and total demand in each year of the POI are indeed quite close. Canada continues to improperly focus instead on the *change* or *variation* in production capacity and demand between each year of the POI.

55. Finally, Canada continues to challenge MOFCOM's use of total production capacity data for all domestic producers, instead of production capacity for the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM.<sup>24</sup> In support of its argument, Canada cites to the panel in *EC – Fasteners (China)*. However, in *EC – Fasteners (China)*, the panel found it improper to examine export data for all EU producers of fasteners when assessing the potential injurious effects of poor export performance to the domestic industry as defined by the Commission. In contrast, MOFCOM was not determining whether total production capacity was another known factor causing injury to the domestic industry. Rather, total production capacity was an intermediate data point for determining trends in cellulose pulp prices.

56. Ultimately, cellulose pulp prices in China would be driven by the total production capacity, total output, and total demand of the entire domestic Chinese cellulose pulp industry. In addition, unlike in *EC – Fasteners (China)*, it would not have been possible for MOFCOM to determine separately the demand for only the defined domestic industry, as there is only one unified demand for products of all domestic producers, including producers not within the defined domestic

<sup>23</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 67.

<sup>24</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 65-68.



industry. As a result, MOFCOM reasonably relied on total production capacity of all domestic producers in order to conduct an apples-to-apples comparison with total domestic demand.

57. In conclusion, MOFCOM's findings that (1) cotton prices were not a main factor in affecting VSF prices or cellulose pulp prices, and (2) changes in VSF prices were not the direct cause of the decline in cellulose pulp prices were consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5.

(b) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Domestic Industry's Capacity Expansion and Inventory Build-up

58. MOFCOM examined the role played by the expansion of production capacity of the domestic industry.<sup>25</sup> First, MOFCOM's Final Determination sets out the growth and production capacity of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, and acknowledges the significant growth of that production capacity.<sup>26</sup>

59. Second, MOFCOM objectively analyzed whether the expansion of capacity of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM increased its own per unit costs. MOFCOM found that "during the period of investigation, the unit production costs of the like product of the domestic industry increased first and then dropped, showing a decline in general." Thus, the costs of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM in fact *declined*.

60. MOFCOM in its Final Determination then noted that while the "manufacturing costs" increased, other elements of its costs, such as material, labor and raw materials, declined even more substantially. Through the verification of the accounting books of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM, MOFCOM found that per unit sales costs declined from 9768 RMB/ton in 2011 to only 6474 RMB/ton in 2012. Thus, the very small increase in manufacturing overhead expenses in 2012 (of 259 RMB/ton) represented only approximately four per cent of the total per unit sales costs in 2012.<sup>27</sup>

61. Finally, MOFCOM objectively examined whether the capacity expansion caused prices to decline. When undertaking such a price analysis, prices in the market logically will be a function of total domestic capacity (and output) and total demand. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for MOFCOM to examine the relationship between the total production capacity of the total domestic industry and total domestic demand. Canada claims that MOFCOM's approach showed a "lack of objectivity."<sup>28</sup> In fact, MOFCOM's analysis was the only appropriate way to analyze the impact of capacity expansion on price.

62. MOFCOM's Final Determination demonstrated that total production capacity over the POI was essentially in balance with total domestic demand. MOFCOM also recognized that although the total production capacity of the domestic industry was slightly higher than the total demand in 2011 and 2012, in light of the explosive growth in demand, the "slightly proactive increase of the production capacity was of certain reasonability in order to meet the demand in the timely manner."<sup>29</sup> In addition, when analyzing the impact of expansion on market prices, market prices will be driven more directly by the actual supply or output of product in the market. MOFCOM then further noted that during the POI, the total output of the domestic cellulose pulp industry was always far less than the total domestic demand.

63. Finally, Canada now claims that MOFCOM "never explained the 'nature and extent' of the **injury to the domestic industry as a result of its overexpansion...**"<sup>30</sup> But as discussed above, Canada has affirmatively declined to state how *specifically* any such non-attribution analysis allegedly should be performed in practice. MOFCOM's analysis of the role played by the capacity expansion of the domestic industry as defined by MOFCOM was based on positive evidence. MOFCOM reasonably concluded that while the expansion of capacity may have played some role, it was not sufficient to break the causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

<sup>25</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, pp. 81-83.

<sup>26</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 73.

<sup>27</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 31, para. 96.

<sup>28</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 78.

<sup>29</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 81.

<sup>30</sup> Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 81.

(c) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Impact of Non-Subject Imports

64. MOFCOM also objectively examined the role played by non-subject imports and concluded that while the non-dumped imports may have played some role, they did not break the causal relationship between subject imports and the injury of the domestic industry.<sup>31</sup>

65. Canada argues that MOFCOM was "obligated" to follow a specific and detailed methodology when assessing the role played by non-subject imports, and that MOFCOM was required to "consider data on sales volume, market share and prices of non-dumped imports and to compare those data to those of subject imports and domestic like product."<sup>32</sup> Canada has cited only to the general admonitions under Article 3.1 and 3.5 that the analysis should be based on an objective examination of positive evidence. However, there is no specific methodology, approach or analysis that is required for undertaking a non-attribution analysis.

66. MOFCOM did, nonetheless, conduct a comprehensive analysis of the role played by non-subject imports. In fact, MOFCOM compared data on the volume and prices of non-subject and subject imports, and in essence undertook the very tests that Canada proffers.

67. MOFCOM examined the relative proportion that non-subject imports represented of total import volume. MOFCOM also examined the actual volume of non-subject and subject imports, and **concluded that "the differences between the quantity...of the imported product that was not sold at the dumped price and those of the dumped imported products were not big."**<sup>33</sup> The actual data confirms that the non-subject and subject import volumes followed similar trends over the POI.<sup>34</sup> MOFCOM also found that the percentage of total imports that non-subject imports represented grew considerably from 2010 to 2011, which was early in the POI and which pre-dated the period of price depression found by MOFCOM. In contrast, during the period 2011-2012 in which MOFCOM found price depression, MOFCOM found further that the non-subject import's share of total imports in fact **declined**, further confirming that non-subject imports did not break the causal link between subject imports and the material injury suffered by the domestic industry.

68. In addition, MOFCOM compared prices for subject and non-subject imports during the POI. MOFCOM concluded that "the differences between the quantity and price of the imported product that was not sold at the dumped price and those of the dumped imported products were not big." MOFCOM examined in further detail the prices from the three largest non-subject countries, South Africa, Sweden and Indonesia. MOFCOM noted that the price of the South African cellulose pulp was lower than that of subject imports, but South Africa was a "relatively small" source of imports. MOFCOM further noted that the prices for pulp from Indonesia and Sweden "were similar" to the price of the subject imports, but their volumes "showed a declining trend" and their proportion of total imports also declined. MOFCOM has also provided the underlying pricing information, which confirms its conclusions that the price differences "were not big."<sup>35</sup>

69. In addition, MOFCOM's analysis also showed that the dumped imported product was generally better than the non-dumped imports in terms of the quality and consumer preferences. Thus, MOFCOM found that any price differences would be mitigated somewhat by the quality differences between dumped and non-subject imports.<sup>36</sup>

(d) MOFCOM Objectively Examined the Role of Cotton Linter Supply

70. Canada continues to claim that an insufficient supply of domestic cotton linter, an input to the production of cotton linter cellulose pulp, was a cause of the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rates. MOFCOM thoroughly examined this issue and reasonably determined that there was no shortage of domestic cotton linter and thus the domestic industry's low capacity utilization rate was not caused by changes in cotton linter supply.

<sup>31</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 86.

<sup>32</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 78; Canada's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, para. 85.

<sup>33</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 86.

<sup>34</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 35, paras. 103-104.

<sup>35</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 105.

<sup>36</sup> China's response to Panel question No. 65(iii).

71. Positive evidence on the record indicated that any shortage in cotton linter supply was mainly filled by waste cotton linters and that the supply of cotton linter in 2012 was in fact "relatively sufficient."<sup>37</sup> Regardless, MOFCOM proceeded further to consider whether changes in cotton linter supply could explain the low capacity utilization rate of the domestic industry. Canada continues to argue that MOFCOM's analysis improperly assumes cotton linter pulp producers would have access to the entire domestic supply of cotton linter. Contrary to Canada's claim, MOFCOM's approach was reasonable given the fact that the other sources of demand for cotton linter were very small compared to total cotton linter supply.

72. MOFCOM then applied a unit consumption ratio to determine what the domestic output of cotton pulp should have been over the POI, given the available supply of cotton linter. MOFCOM found that the actual output of cotton pulp, as well as the capacity utilization rate of the domestic cotton pulp industry, were in fact much lower than they should have been given the supply of cotton linter available. As a result, MOFCOM reasonably determined that the low capacity utilization rates of the domestic industry were not caused by changes in the supply of cotton linter.

73. MOFCOM reasonably used the unit consumption ratio provided in petitioners' injury comments. However, Canada has argued that alternative calculations would need to be conducted "in order to fully assess the impact on MOFCOM's conclusion of using" other proposed ratios.<sup>38</sup> Canada does not further explain what "alternative calculations" would be needed to account for "the competition among producers of the various products for the available supply," or indeed what that would even entail.

74. Finally, MOFCOM proceeded further and found that during the POI, the sales volumes of wood and bamboo cellulose pulp, at its highest level in 2012, accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total sales volume of the like product of the domestic industry. MOFCOM reasonably considered this 2012 data to be most significant, as 2012 represents most of the price depression period relevant to MOFCOM's injury analysis. As cotton linter is not a raw material for the production of wood pulp or bamboo pulp, MOFCOM reasonably found that changes in the supply of cotton linter were not the cause of the overall domestic cellulose pulp industry's low capacity utilization rates.<sup>39</sup>

### **III. CONCLUSION**

75. For the reasons set forth in this submission, China requests that the Panel find that MOFCOM's determinations in the underlying investigation are fully consistent with China's WTO rights and obligations.

---

---

<sup>37</sup> See, China Viscose Industry Chain Report 2012, Exhibit CAN-04, p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Canada's response to Panel question No. 42, para. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Final Determination, Exhibit CHN-01, p. 77.



**ANNEX D**

## ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<b>Contents</b>		<b>Page</b>
Annex D-1	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil	D-2
Annex D-2	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union	D-5
Annex D-3	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan	D-8
Annex D-4	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway	D-11
Annex D-5	Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States	D-13

**ANNEX D-1**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL

**INTRODUCTION**

1. According to the Working Procedures of the present case, Brazil would like to present its Executive Summary to the Panel, focusing on the most important issues of law being discussed. As a major cellulose pulp producer and exporter, Brazil has deep-rooted interest on the results of these proceedings.

**(I) Volume of dumped import analysis (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA)**

2. In Brazil's view, under the ADA there is no requirement for the investigating authority to consider whether there was a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports both in absolute terms and relative to production and consumption in the importing Member. As the wording of the text makes clear, the obligation is to make an assessment considering the increase either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. Although no provision in the ADA prevents the investigating authority to assess more than one of the methods, in Brazil's opinion, it cannot be stated that there is an automatic violation of Article 3.2 of the ADA just because the investigating authority has utilized only one of the alternative methods presented by the rule.

3. Furthermore, Brazil recalls that the Appellate Body has confirmed<sup>1</sup> the finding of the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* regarding the meaning of the word "consider" in Article 3.2. Likewise, Brazil understands that there is no obligation for the investigating authority to determine the existence of a significant increase in the volume of imports, it is only necessary that it considers such existence. In the present case, it appears to Brazil that MOFCOM demonstrated in the relevant documents that the significant increase was considered, as the complainant itself recognized<sup>2</sup>. Thus, it does not seem to Brazil that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.2 of the ADA.

4. As for the contention that MOFCOM provided no qualitative or contextual analysis of the magnitude of the increase trends and did not consider the circumstances surrounding the increases, Brazil understands that, since the Agreement is clear about the necessity to consider the increase in dumped imports either in absolute or relative to domestic production or consumption, it would make no sense to compel the investigating authority to consider all methods in considering whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports, particularly when an increase in absolute terms has occurred. This contextual analysis may of course be relevant, depending on the case, for the causation assessment, but it is not a requirement for establishing the consistency of an investigating practice with Article 3.2 of the ADA.

**(II) Price effect analysis (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA)**

5. As for the claim related to price effect analysis, Brazil understands that the matter is intrinsically inserted in the context of the relationship between correlation vs. causality. Drawing on definitions from statistics theories, it could be said that while the correlation is a necessary condition for the causality, it is not sufficient for its determination.

6. In Brazil's view, in order to assess the effect of dumped imports in prices, Article 3.2 requires that the investigating authority establishes more than a mere correlation between the price reduction of the subject imports and the domestic like product. The language of Article 3.2 is clear: "the investigating authority shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by (emphasis added) the dumped imports".

---

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 139 (e).

<sup>2</sup> Canada FWS paragraph 67.

7. In this regard, a conclusion about the price depression of the domestic like products being caused by the downward trend of the prices of the subject imports could not be based merely on the existence of the parallel trend between them. Indeed, the correlation between subject imports and the domestic like products prices could be due to different reasons: (a) subject imports prices affect the prices of domestic like products; (b) prices of domestic like products affect the price of subject imports; (c) an external factor (e.g. raw material prices are affecting both prices); or (d) mere coincidence.

8. For Brazil, the lack of an "objective examination" of the "positive evidence" that the price effect was caused by the dumped imports constitutes a breach of Article 3.2 and, consequently, of Article 3.1. In *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, the Appellate Body defined "positive evidence" as related "to the quality of the evidence that an investigating authority may rely upon in making a determination"<sup>3</sup>, and consider the term "positive" as meaning that "the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible"<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, "objective examination" means that an investigation must be held in "an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties"<sup>5</sup>.

9. As asserted in Brazil's Third Party Submission and answers to the panel's questions, Brazil is not convinced that the evidence presented in business "meeting minutes" and "internal pricing reports" would be sufficient to meet an adequate standard for the determination of a causal link, as argued in MOFCOM's investigating report. These documents do not seem to be technically grounded, or to involve external or impartial opinions. They may be used in an investigation, exceptionally, as a means to support a more technical and impartial kind of evidence.

### **(III) Impact and causation analysis (Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the ADA)**

10. Another contentious issue under the present dispute is whether the examination of the impact of the dumped imports under Article 3.4 of the ADA requires the investigating authorities to assess the "explanatory force" of the subject imports on the state of the domestic industry and the relationship of such an analysis with the causation analysis under Article 3.5.

11. Brazil recalls that Article 3.4 is concerned with the state of the domestic industry and its relationship with subject imports. It requires an investigating authority to examine the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry on the basis of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. In other words, under Article 3.4 the investigating authority is required to conduct "an examination of the explanatory force of subject imports for the **state of the domestic industry; (...) but is not required to demonstrate that subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.** Rather, the latter analysis is specifically mandated by Article 3.5".<sup>6</sup>

12. The text in Article 3.5 makes clear that the considerations set forth in Article 3.2, and the examination required in Article 3.4, are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 as to whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. The outcome of these inquiries thus form the basis for the overall causation analysis contemplated in Article 3.5.<sup>7</sup> This analysis also requires separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports (non-attribution).

13. Therefore, under Article 3, the obligation for the "demonstration of a causal relationship" appears clearly and solely in paragraph 5. This is the moment where a causation analysis is demanded. Paragraphs 2 and 4 mention the "effects" and the "impact" of the dumped imports on prices and on the domestic industry, respectively, and make no reference to a "demonstration of causal relationship" in that context.

14. Brazil believes that the Agreement does not set forth a specific manner in which an investigating authority should conduct the examination and the determination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. What matters is whether the investigating authority

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 192.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, para. 143.

does conduct a proper examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry or not, as it is required under Article 3.4 of the ADA, and not if this examination is conducted in conjunction with the assessment of the state of the domestic industry or separated from it, for example, under the causation analysis.

15. Brazil understands that under Section VI (Causal link) of its Report, MOFCOM did conduct an analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. The fact that this analysis was not in the part of the report dedicated to the assessment of the economic factors required by Article 3.4 is, in our view, irrelevant for establishing per se a violation of this article.



**ANNEX D-2**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

**1. INTRODUCTION**

1. In this executive summary, the European Union summarizes its positions in respect of the Parties' legal claims and its responses to the Panel's questions.

**2. EU OBSERVATIONS ON THE PARTIES' LEGAL CLAIMS****2.1. MOFCOM'S VOLUME AND PRICE EFFECTS ANALYSES**

2. Article 3.2 requires an investigating authority to "consider" the volume and price effects of the relevant imports. By the use of the word "consider", Article 3.2 does not impose an obligation on an investigating authority to make a *definitive* determination on the volume of dumped imports and the effect of such imports on domestic prices. Nonetheless, an authority's consideration of the volume and price effects of the imports must be based on positive evidence and requires an objective examination, which is the overarching obligation under Article 3.1.

3. With respect to import volumes, the Panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* has found that "significant" in the first sentence of Article 3.2 means "noteworthy, important, consequential". That Panel has also noted that investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* in absolute terms *or* relative to production *or* consumption in the importing Member. The Panel held that it is enough for an investigating authority to consider whether there has been a significant absolute increase. Thus, the European Union considers that under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, MOFCOM was required to consider whether, either in absolute or relative terms, the increase in dumped imports was "significant".

4. With respect to price effects, Article 3.2 requires a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of like domestic products over the duration of the period of investigation. An investigating authority's inquiry regarding the price effects listed in Article 3.2 must provide it with a meaningful understanding of whether subject imports have explanatory force for the significant undercutting, depression or suppression of domestic prices that may be occurring in the domestic market, without disregarding any evidence that may call into question such explanatory force. Therefore, the European Union considers that merely identifying parallel pricing trends is not sufficient, when it is not accompanied by a consideration of whether and how the parallel pricing trends have "explanatory force" for the price depression. The Panel thus needs to consider whether MOFCOM did more than simply noting parallel pricing trends.

5. The European Union also considers that in a situation where import prices were significantly higher than the domestic prices during the POI, an investigating authority should be particularly careful to explain how higher import prices explain the effects on domestic prices.

6. Further, the European Union considers that, as part of its analysis of the price effects, the investigating authority may also consider the developments in the market shares during the POI. If such evidence is available, it may not be disregarded if it may call into question the explanatory force of the subject imports for the price effects.

**2.2. MOFCOM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY**

7. As the Appellate Body noted in *US – Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan*, Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement are interlinked insofar as an important aspect of the objective examination required by Article 3.1 is further elaborated in Article 3.4 as an obligation to examine the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry through an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry.

8. Article 3.4 contains a mandatory – rather than illustrative – list of fifteen factors which must *always* be evaluated by the investigating authorities in every investigation. The Panel in *Egypt – Steel Rebar* held that, for an investigating authority to "evaluate" evidence concerning a given factor in the sense of Article 3.4, it must not only gather data, but it must analyse and interpret those data. Only on the basis of the evaluation of data in the determination would a reviewing panel be able to assess whether the conclusions drawn from the examination are those of an unbiased and objective authority.

9. The Appellate Body in *US – Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan* and *China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)* have stressed that, according to Articles 3.1 and 3.4, investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor having a bearing on the state of the industry and the weight to be attached to it. In assessing the state of the domestic industry, investigating authorities must evaluate all factors listed in Article 3.4 and any other relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry in the case at hand. This analysis cannot be limited to a mere identification of the "relevance or irrelevance" of each factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry.

10. Therefore, the Panel should examine whether MOFCOM's analysis explains in a satisfactory way why the evaluation of the injury factors set out under Article 3.4 leads to the determination of material injury, including an explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction do not, overall, undermine the conclusion of material injury.

### 2.3. MOFCOM'S CAUSATION ANALYSIS

11. In concert with the Article 3.1 requirement of an "objective examination" of "positive evidence", Article 3.5 requires that an investigating authority establish a "causal relationship" between dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. This issue can be separated into two principal sub-issues: (i) the determination that a causal relationship exists between dumped imports and any injury ("causation"); and, (ii) the treatment of other possible causal factors ("non-attribution").

12. With respect to causation, investigating authorities are required to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury "through the effects of" dumping "[a]s set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4". Thus, the inquiry set forth in Article 3.2 and the examination required in Article 3.4 are necessary in order to answer the ultimate question in Article 3.5 as to whether subject imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.

13. With respect to non-attribution, Article 3.5 mandates the investigating authorities to examine other known factors and gives an illustrative list of such factors. In addition, it mandates the authority not to attribute to dumped imports injury caused by such other factors which are injuring the domestic industry at the same time. The authority must make an assessment that involves "separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports".

14. Thus, pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 AD Agreement, investigating authorities are called upon to make a determination that the material injury found was caused by the dumped imports. Moreover, investigating authorities have to examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.

15. In light of this, the Panel should investigate whether MOFCOM's establishment of the facts was proper and their evaluation of those facts unbiased and objective so that MOFCOM's explanations are reasonable and supported by the evidence cited. In addition, the Panel should examine closely whether MOFCOM's causal link finding is based on an objective examination of positive evidence, and whether it constitutes a reasoned and adequate explanation of a causal relationship between the subject imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The European Union has doubts whether MOFCOM sufficiently explained how the subject imports with essentially a stable market share and significantly higher prices caused injury to the domestic industry.

16. Concerning the non-attribution analysis, Canada refers to a number of other known factors which, when objectively examined, would provide an explanation for injury suffered by the domestic industry. The European Union is not yet fully convinced that China has fully addressed Canada's claims. The Panel should carefully consider the different arguments raised by Canada and China, and whether MOFCOM's explanations are reasonable and supported by the evidence relied on.

**ANNEX D-3**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN

**I. Introduction**

1. In this dispute, Canada challenges the anti-dumping measures imposed by China on cellulose pulp from Brazil, Canada and the United States, raising a number of claims pertaining to the application of Article 3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).

2. Japan considers that this dispute raises issues of fundamental and systemic importance regarding the manner in which the World Trade Organization (WTO) Members conduct their injury determinations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the ADA. Japan submits that these provisions should not be interpreted in isolation but in light of the fact that these provisions contemplate a "logical progression of inquiry".<sup>1</sup>

**II. The Logical Progression of Inquiry Under Article 3 of the ADA**

3. The Appellate Body has clarified that the paragraphs of Article 3 of the ADA contemplate a "logical progression of inquiry" in the investigating authority's examination of injury and causation.<sup>2</sup> The Appellate Body has also emphasized that the inquiries under Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 should "not viewed in isolation", but rather be logically interlinked with each other so as to form "a single, overall analysis addressing the question of whether dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry".<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the analyses under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 must provide a "meaningful basis" for the ultimate determination of injury and causation pursuant to Article 3.5.<sup>4</sup> In addition, when examining the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry under Article 3.4, an investigating authority may be required to take into account the outcomes of its Article 3.2 volume and price effects analyses.<sup>5</sup>

**III. The Article 3.2 Volume Analysis**

4. With respect to the volume of dumped imports, the first sentence of Article 3.2 provides that investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* in absolute terms *or* relative to production *or* consumption in the importing Member. However, this provision does not provide an investigating authority *unlimited* discretion as to the choice between an absolute increase and a relative increase. Rather, in order to assess whether or not the increase in dumped imports is "significant", i.e. "important, notable, consequential",<sup>6</sup> an investigating authority may be required to examine any positive evidence pertaining to the characteristics of the market and/or interaction between the dumped imports and domestic production/consumption. Indeed, a given degree (e.g. 5%) of increase in dumped imports in absolute terms may bear different significances, depending on whether the domestic consumption has expanded or shrunk.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, a mere increase in dumped imports may not necessarily constitute a "meaningful basis" for an ultimate determination of injury and causation, because such imports may have increased by replacing products *other than* the like domestic products. In addition, Article 3.2 read together with Article 3.1 requires that the volume analysis be based on "positive evidence" involving an "objective examination", i.e. a "fair" and "unbiased" analysis.<sup>8</sup> Such an analysis would be compromised if an investigating authority was able to cherry-pick evidence submitted to its review and disregard evidence pointing toward the absence

<sup>1</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 128.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

<sup>4</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 144-145 and 154; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.170 and 5.211.

<sup>5</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.209; see also para. 5.211.

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.161.

<sup>7</sup> See Panel Reports, *US – Washing Machines*, paras. 7.48-7.50; *US – Upland Cotton*, paras. 7.1328-7.1330, which emphasized the relevance of the factual market circumstances in the assessment of "significance".

<sup>8</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel*, para. 193.

of "significance" from a relative perspective. Accordingly, Article 3.2 may require an examination of the *interaction* between the dumped imports and the domestic production/consumption, especially where the facts show that a mere numerical increase of the volume of dumped imports would not "necessarily give decisive guidance"<sup>9</sup> as to the examination of the volume under Article 3.2.

#### IV. The Article 3.2 Price Effects Analysis

5. Turning to the analysis of the effect of dumped imports on the domestic prices under Article 3.2, the Appellate Body has established that the consideration of significant price undercutting under Article 3.2 must involve a "dynamic assessment" of the "relationship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of the domestic like products".<sup>10</sup> Similarly, with respect to significant price depression and price suppression, an investigating authority must assess whether the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the observed price depression or price suppression. As the prior WTO jurisprudence has made clear, the mere existence of parallel price trends is insufficient for a finding of "explanatory force" of the dumped imports for the purported significant price depression or price depression under Article 3.2, without further explanation as to why the parallel price trends can indeed explain the depression or suppression of domestic prices.<sup>11</sup>

#### V. The Impact Analysis Under Article 3.4

6. Japan notes that Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA require the investigating authority to examine the "impact" or "consequent impact" of the dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry, or in other words, whether the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the state of the domestic industry.<sup>12</sup> The 15 factors and indices listed in Article 3.4 must not be seen in isolation because Article 3.4 is "concerned with the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry".<sup>13</sup> In this regard, as the Appellate Body found in *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, an investigating authority may be required, as appropriate, to take into account the outcomes of its Article 3.2 analyses.<sup>14</sup> For example, a finding that the subject imports did not significantly increase or did not have an effect on domestic prices should be taken into account when considering the state of the domestic industry.<sup>15</sup>

#### VI. Determination of Injury and Causation Under Article 3.5

7. Japan considers that the analysis under Article 3.5 consists in a holistic and conclusive evaluation, encompassing "all relevant evidence before the authorities" in order to determine (i) whether the trends identified under Article 3.4, taken as a whole, amount to "material" injury in the sense of footnote 9 of the ADA, and (ii) whether the dumped imports "through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" are causing such injury. Furthermore, the investigating authority must perform, under Article 3.5, a non-attribution analysis. Thus, while the inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 3.4 must involve assessment of the *relationship* between the dumped imports and the like domestic products or the state of the domestic industry, such assessment provides a "meaningful basis"<sup>16</sup> for, or "*contributes to*, rather than duplicates",<sup>17</sup> the ultimate determination of injury and causation under Article 3.5. Taken altogether, the analytical steps of Article 3 contemplate the "logical progression of inquiry" that form "a single, overall analysis".<sup>18</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Article 3.2, final sentence.

<sup>10</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.161.

<sup>11</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 210; Panel Report, *China – Autos (US)*, para. 7.265.

<sup>12</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>13</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, para. 149; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.203.

<sup>14</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.209; see also para. 5.211.

<sup>15</sup> See Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.211.

<sup>16</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – GOES*, paras. 144-145 and 154; *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, paras. 5.170 and 5.211.

<sup>17</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – GOES*, para. 149.

<sup>18</sup> Appellate Body Report, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.141.

## **VII. Conclusion**

8. Japan respectfully requests the Panel to consider the views that Japan has expressed above, and carefully examine whether MOFCOM's injury analyses conform to the concept of the "logical progression of inquiry" contemplated under Article 3 of the ADA.

**ANNEX D-4**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NORWAY

1. According to Canada, MOFCOM's determination "that subject imports, both in absolute and relative terms, 'showed a growth trend' **fails to meet the standard [...] with respect to the rigorous inquiry** required by Article 3.2.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Appellate Body has stated that Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "is an overarching provision that sets forth a Member's fundamental, substantive obligation concerning the injury determination, and informs the more detailed obligations in the succeeding paragraphs".<sup>2</sup> According to this provision, the investigating authority is required to conduct an "objective examination" of the economic state of the "domestic industry" on the basis of "positive evidence". The Appellate Body, in *EC – Bed Linen (India - 21.5)*, ruled that an "objective examination" requires authorities to reach a result that is "*unbiased, even-handed, and fair*".<sup>3</sup> In *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, the Appellate Body found that it would not be "even-handed" for investigating authorities:

to conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes *more likely* that, as a result of the fact-finding or evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is injured.<sup>4</sup>

3. According to Canada, MOFCOM's determination "that subject imports, both in absolute and relative terms, 'showed a growth trend' **fails to meet the standard [...] with respect to the rigorous inquiry** required by Article 3.2.<sup>5</sup>

4. Furthermore, the Appellate Body stated in the same appeal, that "an 'objective examination' requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation".<sup>6</sup>

5. Among others, Article 3.1 requires the investigating authority to examine objectively "the volume of the dumped imports". Article 3.2 elaborates on this obligation, stating that the authority must examine whether there has been a "significant increase in dumped imports". The term "significant" was interpreted by the panel in *Thailand – H-Beams* to mean "noteworthy, important, consequential".<sup>7</sup>

6. Canada contends that China violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the *Anti-Dumping Agreement* by failing to "objectively examine all positive evidence relating to the magnitude of any increase in volume and the circumstances in which subject imports entered the domestic market, including trends in domestic demand, domestic like product volumes and non-subject import volumes, to determine whether an increase is significant".<sup>8</sup> China does not appear to contest the factual matter, but argues that "Article 3.2 does not require the investigating authority to make a 'determination' but rather to 'consider'".<sup>9</sup> This is supported by Brazil in its written and oral third party submission.<sup>10</sup> Both China and Brazil appear to base their arguments on the panel's remarks in *Thailand – H-Beams*.<sup>11</sup> In the first part of paragraph 7.161 of that report, the panel

<sup>1</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Appellate Body Reports, *China – HP-SSST (Japan and EU)*, para. 5.137; *China – GOES*, para. 126; *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)*, para. 133 (emphasis original).

<sup>4</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, para. 196 (emphasis added).

<sup>5</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 69.

<sup>6</sup> Appellate Body Report, *US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB)*, para. 193 (emphasis added).

<sup>7</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.163.

<sup>8</sup> Canada's First Written Submission, para. 70.

<sup>9</sup> China's First Written Submission, para. 42.

<sup>10</sup> Brazil's Third Party Submission, para. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161.

noted that a definition of the term "consider" does not entail an "explicit 'finding' or 'determination'".

7. In Norway's view, one must bear in mind that even though there is no obligation to **make an explicit determination**, it is a prerequisite in the provision that the increase to be considered is in fact significant. In order to complete the analysis required in Article 3.2, it is necessary to either directly or indirectly note the existence of a significant increase for it to be possible to consider this. This is also in line with the panel report in *Thailand – H-Beams*, which held that even though the term "significant" need not necessarily "appear in the text of the relevant document", it "[n]evertheless, [...] must be **apparent** in the relevant documents in the record that the investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports".<sup>12</sup>

8. Norway would caution against overemphasising the meaning of the first part of paragraph 7.161 of the panel report in *Thailand – H-Beams*. Reading the first sentences of that paragraph without taking into account the proper context of the following sentences of the same paragraph, could lead to an interpretation of Article 3.2 which would render the provision void. Additionally, such an interpretation would be contrary to the obligation in Article 3.1 of the *Anti-Dumping Agreement* to carry out an "objective examination".

---

<sup>12</sup> Panel Report, *Thailand – H-Beams*, para. 7.161 (emphasis added).



**ANNEX D-5**

## INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION****I. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING PRICE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.2 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

1. The United States agrees with Canada and China that the obligations of Article 3.2 of the *Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (the "AD Agreement") must be considered in conjunction with the overarching principles of Article 3.1 of that Agreement.

2. Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement sets forth two overarching obligations that apply to multiple aspects of an authority's injury determination. The first overarching obligation is that the injury determination be based on "positive evidence." The Appellate Body has endorsed a description of "positive evidence" as "evidence that is relevant and pertinent with respect to the issue being decided, and that has the characteristics of being inherently reliable and trustworthy." The second obligation is that the injury determination involves an "objective examination" of the volume of the dumped imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic industry. The Appellate Body has stated that, to be "objective," an injury analysis must be "based on data which provides an accurate and unbiased picture of what it is that one is examining" and be conducted "without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation." The plain text of Article 3.1 makes clear that these obligations extend to an authority's price effects analysis.

3. Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement outlines the examination that authorities must conduct to determine the price effects of dumped imports on the domestic market. The text contemplates three inquiries with regard to the effects of dumped imports on prices: price undercutting, price depression and price suppression.

4. The United States observes that Article 3.2 requires that an authority "consider" the volume and price effects of the relevant imports. The United States recalls that the Appellate Body in *China – GOES* found that Article 3.2 does not require an authority "to make a **definitive determination**" on price effects, recognizing the distinction between use of the verb "consider" in Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement and the verb "demonstrate" in Article 3.5. However, the fact that no definitive determination is required "does not diminish the scope of **what** the investigating authority is required to consider." The Appellate Body has explained that the inquiry must provide the authority with a "meaningful understanding of whether subject imports have explanatory force" for price depression or suppression, and, as required by Article 3.1, that understanding must be based on positive evidence and an objective examination.

5. In assessing price depression or suppression, the authority may not confine its consideration to an analysis of domestic prices. Rather, the plain text of Article 3.2 envisions an inquiry into the relationship between subject imports and domestic prices. Article 3.2 introduces the obligations on price effects by clarifying that the nature of the inquiry is to understand the "effect of the dumped imports on prices." An authority's analysis of the three delineated price effects – price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression – must necessarily be in reference to the dumped imports. The Appellate Body has endorsed this interpretation that it is not enough for an authority to simply observe what is happening to domestic prices.

6. Although the United States does not address the factual underpinnings of MOFCOM's cellulose pulp injury determination, the United States recalls that prior panels and the Appellate Body have considered the analysis by investigating authorities under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of pricing parallels between subject imports and domestic like products, and of overselling by subject imports. The Appellate Body in *China – GOES* explained that Article 3.2 requires an investigating

authority in its final determination to provide sufficient reasoning as to what explanatory force parallel pricing trends have for the depression or suppression of domestic prices.

7. As China has observed, the AD Agreement does not prescribe a particular methodology to be used in an investigating authority's price effects analysis. Nevertheless, Article 3.2 does set certain parameters for how the analysis is to be performed, as elaborated above. Based on these parameters, the Panel must evaluate whether the investigating authority provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings, and how those factual findings supported the overall determination of price depression.

## **II. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.4 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

8. Any determinations or findings made in connection with Article 3.4 must be based on "positive evidence" and "involve an objective examination," as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.

9. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement sets out an authority's obligation to ascertain the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. The United States observes that Article 3.4 imposes an obligation on the authority to conduct an "examination" of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. And the text of Article 3.4 expressly requires investigating authorities to examine the "impact" of subject imports on a domestic industry, and not just the state of the industry.

10. As recognized by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement, subject imports can influence a domestic industry's performance through volume and price effects. Thus, to examine the impact of subject imports on a domestic industry, an authority would need to consider the relationship between subject imports – including subject import price undercutting, and the price depressing or suppressing effects of subject imports – and the domestic industry's performance during the period of investigation.

11. This interpretation is supported by the Appellate Body's observations in *China – GOES*:

**Articles 3.4 and 15.4...do not merely require an examination of the state of the domestic industry, but contemplate that an investigating authority must derive an understanding of *the impact of* subject imports on the basis of such an examination. Consequently, Articles 3.4 and 15.4 are concerned with the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry, and this relationship is analytically akin to the type of link contemplated by the term "the effect of" under Articles 3.2 and 15.2.**

12. Thus, as both Canada and China observe, in examining "the relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry" pursuant to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, an authority must consider whether changes in the state of the industry are the consequences of subject imports and whether subject imports have explanatory force for the industry's performance trends. The "examination" contemplated by Article 3.4 must be based on a "thorough evaluation of the state of the industry" and it must "contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of relevant factors led to the determination of injury."

13. Article 3.4 does not dictate the methodology that should be employed by the authority, or the manner in which the results of this evaluation are to be set out. However, the United States observes that the Panel must be able to discern that the authority's examination of the impact on the domestic industry – an examination that necessarily includes an evaluation of relevant economic factors – is based on positive evidence and an objective examination.

## **III. CANADA'S CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

14. As with Articles 3.2 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement, the Appellate Body has recognized that it is appropriate to read the obligations of Article 3.5 in conjunction with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement. That is, any determinations or findings made in connection with Article 3.5 must be based on "positive evidence" and "involve an objective examination," as required by Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.

15. As Canada observes, Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement involves a two-part analysis: (1) an authority's demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry ("causation"); and (2) an authority's examination of known factors other than dumped imports that could be the cause of injury to the domestic industry ("non-attribution").

16. The United States does not take a position on Canada's claims that MOFCOM's findings on volume and price depression are inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the AD Agreement. With respect to the interpretation of Articles 3.2 and 3.5, however, the United States agrees with Canada's argument that a deficient volume or price effects analysis could compromise a causation analysis where the findings on volume or price effects serve as a key element of the causation analysis. As the Appellate Body explained in *China – GOES*, the provisions in Article 3 "contemplate a logical progression in an authority's examination leading to the ultimate injury and causation determination." Fatal deficiencies in a volume or price effects analysis could compromise the objective nature of the causation analysis.

17. The first sentence of Article 3.5 sets out the general requirement for a demonstration that dumped imports are causing injury under the AD Agreement, and contains an explicit link back to Articles 3.2 (volume and price effects) and 3.4 (impact on domestic industries). If the volume or price effects findings are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2, or the impact findings are found to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4, an Article 3.5 causal link analysis relying on such findings would fail. That is, if an authority relies on a volume or price effects finding to support its impact and injury determinations, its decision must be supported by positive evidence on these counts. In such circumstances, a failure to demonstrate volume or price effects or significant impact would constitute a failure to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury, as required by the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement.

18. As the panel in *China – Autos (US)* explained "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a determination of causation consistent with the requirements of Articles 3 and 15 of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements, respectively, in a situation where an important element of that determination, the underlying price effects analysis, is itself inconsistent with the provisions of those Agreements." The panel properly recognized that a final injury determination is the product of multiple intermediate determinations, each of which must be supported by positive evidence and an objective examination.

19. The third sentence of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement provides that, in addition to examining the effects of the dumped imports, an authority must examine other known factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry. As the Appellate Body has found, if a known factor other than dumped imports is a cause of injury, the third sentence of Article 3.5 requires the authority to engage in a non-attribution analysis to ensure that the effects of that other factor are not attributed to the dumped imports. If there are no known factors other than the dumped imports that are injuring the domestic industry, Article 3.5 does not require an authority to conduct a non-attribution analysis. Indeed, in such circumstances, the authority can appropriately attribute all injury to the dumped imports.

20. The AD Agreement does not specify the particular methods and approaches an authority may use to conduct a non-attribution analysis. The question of whether an investigating authority's analysis is consistent with Article 3 should turn on whether the authority has in fact evaluated these factors and whether its evaluation is supported by positive evidence and reflects an objective examination, as required by Article 3.1.

21. The United States takes no position on Canada's factual assertions regarding MOFCOM's analysis under Article 3.5. Based on the above discussion of the applicable provisions, however, the United States observes that the Panel must determine whether the investigating authority demonstrated that it examined other "known factors" within the meaning of Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement, and based its causation analysis on an objective examination of all relevant evidence.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PANEL'S QUESTIONS TO THE THIRD PARTIES**

22. Under the text of the AD Agreement, a difference exists between the volume consideration in the first sentence of Article 3.2, and the consideration, under Articles 3.4 and 3.5, of whether there is a causal relationship between subject imports and the state of the domestic industry. With regard to the application of the first sentence of Article 3.2, the use of the word "or" indicates that for this element of the analysis, an absolute increase could suffice. In particular, Article 3.2 states that "the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, *either* [1] in absolute terms *or* [2] relative to production *or* [3] consumption in the importing Member" (emphasis added). As these three methods of measuring change in volume are expressed in the alternative, in any particular investigation, Article 3.2 does not require an investigating authority to consider volume in all three contexts if the authority considers volume to be significant in one of the contexts.

23. The AD Agreement contains a distinction between the volume analysis required under the first sentence of Article 3.2, and the analysis required under Articles 3.4 and 3.5. Accordingly, the United States does not agree that any kind of "mini-causation" analysis is required in connection with the consideration of the volume of dumped imports under the first sentence of Article 3.2. With respect to volume, Article 3.2 requires an investigating authority to consider a single question: whether there has been a significant increase in subject imports when viewed in any of several possible contexts. Articles 3.4 and 3.5, on the other hand, respectively address the multifaceted relationship among "all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the [domestic] industry" and predicate an affirmative determination on "[t]he demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the industry. . . based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities."

24. In the United States' view, an investigating authority is required to consider and examine all of the factors listed in the provisions of Article 3, and to carry out the obligations contained therein, in a manner consistent with the overarching obligations of Article 3.1. To that end, the AD Agreement does not set out a specific sequence in which these considerations and examinations must occur.

25. The obligations to consider price effects, in Article 3.2, and the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, in Article 3.4, are not contingent on whether an investigating authority considers a volume increase to be significant. Thus, even if an investigating authority considers that there is no significant increase in subject imports, either in absolute or relative terms, the authority must consider price effects and impact.

26. The last sentences of Articles 3.2 and 3.4 recognize that an authority should weigh the evidence developed in an investigation based on the particular conditions of the industry being investigated and the conditions of competition in which that industry operates, and that some of the factors discussed may be more important in certain investigations than in others. These sentences also underscore that authorities should consider and examine *all* of the relevant evidence in an investigation, and not give undue weight to isolated factors.

---