CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

REPORT OF THE PANEL
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Complaint by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ........................................ 10  
1.2 Panel establishment and composition ......................................................... 10  
1.3 Panel proceedings ....................................................................................... 10  
1.3.1 General .................................................................................................. 10  
1.3.2 Working procedures on Business Confidential Information (BCI) .......... 11

## 2 FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1 The measures at issue .................................................................................. 11

## 3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

## 5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

## 6 INTERIM REVIEW

6.1 Paragraphs 6.9, 6.49, 6.50, 6.72, 6.91, 6.102, 6.113, 6.123, 6.149, 6.166, and 6.213 (paragraphs 7.9, 7.49, 7.50, 7.51, 7.73, 7.92, 7.103, 7.114, 7.124, 7.150, 7.167, and 7.214 of the Final Report) ................................................................. 14


6.3 Paragraph 6.53 (paragraph 7.54 of the Final Report) .................................. 14

6.4 Paragraph 6.64 (paragraph 7.65 of the Final Report) .................................. 15

6.5 Paragraph 6.79 (paragraph 7.80 of the Final Report) .................................. 15

6.6 Paragraph 6.84 (paragraph 7.85 of the Final Report) .................................. 15

6.7 Paragraphs 6.109 and 6.111 (paragraphs 7.110 and 7.112 of the Final Report) ................................................................. 15

6.8 Paragraphs 6.133 and 6.135 (paragraphs 7.134 and 7.136 of the Final Report) ................................................................. 16

6.9 Paragraph 6.142 (paragraph 7.143 of the Final Report) ............................... 16

6.10 Paragraphs 6.144 and 6.145 (paragraphs 7.145 and 7.146 of the Final Report) ................................................................. 16


## 7 FINDINGS

7.1 General principles regarding treaty interpretation, the applicable standard of review, and burden of proof .................................................................................. 17

7.1.1 Treaty Interpretation ................................................................................. 17

7.1.2 Standard of Review .................................................................................. 17

7.1.3 Burden of Proof ....................................................................................... 17

7.2 Immediate termination under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: exporter-specific or country-wide margins of dumping? ........................................... 18

7.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 18

7.2.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................. 18

7.2.3 Main arguments of third parties ............................................................. 19

7.2.3.1 Brazil .................................................................................................. 19

7.2.3.2 European Union .................................................................................... 19

7.2.3.3 Norway ................................................................................................ 19

7.2.3.4 United Arab Emirates .......................................................................... 20

7.2.3.5 United States ....................................................................................... 20
7.2.4 Evaluation by the Panel ............................................................................................................................ 20
7.2.4.1 Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ........................................................................................... 22
7.2.4.2 Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ........................................................................................... 23
7.2.4.3 De minimis exporters in Article 9.5 new shipper reviews ...................................................................... 25
7.2.4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 25
7.3 Multiple margins of dumping: Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ........................................................ 26
7.3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 26
7.3.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................................................ 26
7.3.3 Main arguments of third parties ............................................................................................................. 26
7.3.3.1 Brazil.................................................................................................................................................. 26
7.3.4 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................................................... 26
7.4 Provisional measures on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping: Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ..................................................... 27
7.4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 27
7.4.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................................................ 27
7.4.3 Main arguments of third parties ............................................................................................................. 29
7.4.3.1 Brazil.................................................................................................................................................. 29
7.4.4 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................................................... 29
7.5 Additional claims under Articles 1, 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 ...................................................................................................................... 31
7.5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 31
7.5.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................................................ 32
7.5.3 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................................................... 32
7.6 The treatment of imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping in the injury investigation: Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .................................................................................. 33
7.6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 33
7.6.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................................................ 33
7.6.3 Main arguments of third parties ............................................................................................................. 34
7.6.3.1 Brazil.................................................................................................................................................. 34
7.6.3.2 United Arab Emirates ......................................................................................................................... 34
7.6.4 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................................................... 34
7.7 The treatment of factors other than dumped imports in the causation analysis: Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .................................................................................................................. 35
7.7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 35
7.7.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................................................ 36
7.7.2.1 The effect of subsidization ................................................................................................................ 36
7.7.2.2 Overcapacity ..................................................................................................................................... 36
7.7.3 Main arguments of third parties ............................................................................................................. 36
7.7.3.1 Brazil.................................................................................................................................................. 36
7.7.3.2 European Union .................................................................................................................................. 37
7.7.3.3 United States ..................................................................................................................................... 37
7.7.4 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................................................... 37
7.7.4.1 The effect of subsidization ......................................................................................37
7.7.4.2 Overcapacity ........................................................................................................39
7.8 The use of facts available in the determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters": Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .................................................................40
7.8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................40
7.8.1.1 The relevant provisions ........................................................................................41
7.8.1.2 Factual background ............................................................................................41
7.8.2 Main arguments of the parties ................................................................................42
7.8.3 Main arguments of third parties .............................................................................44
7.8.3.1 European Union ....................................................................................................44
7.8.3.2 United States .......................................................................................................45
7.8.4 Evaluation by the Panel ........................................................................................45
7.9 The treatment of imports of new product models or types ...........................................48
7.9.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................48
7.9.2 The relevance of the margin of dumping established during the investigation: Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ........................................................................................................49
7.9.2.1 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................49
7.9.2.2 Main arguments of third parties .........................................................................50
7.9.2.2.1 European Union ...............................................................................................50
7.9.2.3 Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................51
7.9.3 The CBSA's use of facts available: Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ...................................................................................................................54
7.9.3.1 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................54
7.9.3.2 Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................55
7.9.4 The determination of normal values for new product models or types: Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ........................................................................................................56
7.9.4.1 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................56
7.9.4.2 Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................57
7.9.5 The determination of an additional margin of dumping: Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ...........................................................................................................57
7.9.5.1 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................57
7.9.5.2 Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................58
7.10 Additional claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 ..................................................................................................................58
7.10.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................58
7.10.2 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................58
7.10.3 Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................58
7.11 "As such" claims concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1, and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA ..............................................................................................................59
7.11.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................59
7.11.2 Main arguments of the parties .............................................................................59
7.11.3 Main arguments of third parties ...........................................................................60
7.11.3.1 United States ................................................................. 60
7.11.4 Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................... 61
7.12 "As such" claims concerning subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR ................................................................. 64
7.13 Additional "as such" claims concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR ................................................................. 65

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION .................................................. 66
LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX D
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>D-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Norway</td>
<td>D-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>D-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States</td>
<td>D-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short title</th>
<th>Full case title and citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Dumping Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCI</td>
<td>Business Confidential Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Taipei</td>
<td>The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITT</td>
<td>Canadian International Trade Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSWP</td>
<td>Carbon Steel Welded Pipe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT 1994</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrakesh Agreement</td>
<td>Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention</td>
<td>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMA</td>
<td>Special Import Measures Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMR</td>
<td>Special Import Measures Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Complaint by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu

1.1. On 25 June 2014, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) requested consultations with Canada pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) with respect to provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe (CSWP) originating in or exported from Chinese Taipei and the investigations underlying the measures.¹

1.2. On 7 November 2014, Chinese Taipei, in an addendum to its initial request for consultations, requested further consultations with Canada on other aspects of the above-mentioned anti-dumping measures and on certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR).²

1.3. Consultations were held on 24 July 2014 and 4 December 2014, but failed to resolve the dispute. On 22 January 2015, Chinese Taipei requested the establishment of a panel.³

1.2 Panel establishment and composition

1.4. At its meeting on 10 March 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of Chinese Taipei in document WT/DS482/2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.⁴

1.5. The Panel’s terms of reference are the following:

To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu in document WT/DS482/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.⁵

1.6. Following the agreement of the parties, the Panel was composed on 12 May 2015 as follows:

Chairperson: Mr Jose Antonio Buencamino
Members: Ms Andrea Marie Dawes (née Brown)
           Mr David Evans

1.7. Brazil, China, the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.

1.3 Panel proceedings

1.3.1 General


⁴ See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of meeting held on 10 March 2015, WT/DSB/M/358 (circulated 20 April 2015).
1.9. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 16 and 17 March 2016. A session with the third parties took place on 17 March 2016. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 28 and 29 June 2016. On 5 August 2016, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 7 October 2016. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 18 November 2016.

1.3.2 Working procedures on Business Confidential Information (BCI)

2 FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1 The measures at issue

2.1. This dispute concerns the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures applied by Canada on imports of certain CSWP originating in or exported from Chinese Taipei, as well as certain provisions of SIMA and SIMR, in particular subsection 2(1), section 30.1, and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA, as well as subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR.

2.2. On 14 May 2012, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) initiated investigations with respect to dumping of certain CSWP from, among others, Chinese Taipei. On 15 May 2012, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) issued a notice of commencement of a preliminary injury inquiry.

2.3. On 13 July 2012, the CITT determined that there was evidence that disclosed a reasonable indication that the dumping of CSWP had caused injury or retardation or was threatening to cause injury. The CBSA issued its preliminary dumping determination on 13 August 2012 and its final dumping determination on 9 November 2012. On 11 December 2012, the CITT issued its final (threat of) injury determination.

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7 See the Panel’s Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information, Annex A-2.
8 CBSA, Notice of Initiation of the Investigation, 14 May 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-4). See also CBSA, Statement of Reasons concerning the initiation of investigations into the dumping of certain CSWP originating in or exported from TPKM, India, Oman, Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates and the subsidizing of certain CSWP originating in or exported from India, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, 29 May 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-5). The investigation also extended to the subsidizing of certain CSWP from countries other than Chinese Taipei.
11 CBSA, Decision, Preliminary Determinations of Dumping and Subsidizing, 13 August 2012, Canada Gazette 2012.I.146.34 (25 August 2012), p. 2518, (Exhibit TPKM-9). See also CBSA, Statement of Reasons concerning the preliminary determinations with respect to the dumping of certain CSWP originating in or exported from TPKM, India, Oman, Korea, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and the subsidizing of certain CSWP originating in or exported from India, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, 28 August 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-10).
12 CBSA, Decision, Final Determinations Dumping and Subsidizing, 9 November 2012, Canada Gazette 2012.I.146.47 (24 November 2012), pp. 3172 and 3173, (Exhibit TPKM-12). See also CBSA, Statement of Reasons concerning the making of Final Determinations of Dumping and Subsidizing and the Termination of Dumping and Subsidizing Investigations respecting certain CSWP originating in or exported from TPKM, India, Oman, Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, 26 November 2012 (Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination), (Exhibit TPKM-2).
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to find that:\textsuperscript{14}

a. With respect to the treatment of exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping Canada violated:

i. Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping;

ii. Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada failed to determine only one individual margin of dumping for each exporter in its determination of whether to continue the investigation and the subsequent determination of duty rates;

iii. Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada applied provisional anti-dumping measures in the absence of a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping when it applied such measures to imports of certain CSWP from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping;

iv. Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping, Canada caused anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury; and

v. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the possibility to levy an anti-dumping duty only applies "in order to offset or prevent dumping" and therefore not with respect to imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping.

b. With respect to the treatment of non-dumped imports and of factors other than the dumped imports in the injury and causation analyses Canada violated:

i. Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, for the purpose of the injury and causation analyses, Canada failed to exclude from the dumped imports, the imports of the exporters with a \textit{de minimis} dumping margin thereby failing to properly consider the volume of dumped imports, the effects of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market, the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and whether the dumped imports are causing injury and/or threat of injury to the domestic industry.

ii. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which at the same time were injuring the domestic industry – including the overcapacity of the domestic industry and the subsidies – and failed to ensure that the injury caused by such other factors was not attributed to the alleged dumped imports.

c. With respect to the dumping determination and determination of the duty rate for "all other exporters" Canada violated:

i. Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada improperly applied facts available in determining the dumping margin and duty rate applicable to "all other exporters" without complying with the conditions laid down in those provisions.

\textsuperscript{14} See Chinese Taipei's first written submission, paras. 318-321.
d. With respect to the treatment of new product types to be exported by cooperating producers Canada violated:

i. Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada imposed anti-dumping duties on new product types of the cooperating exporters that exceed their margin of dumping as established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

ii. Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada resorted to facts available for the calculation of the normal values with respect to imports of new product types of the cooperating exporters, thus resorting to facts available even though the conditions laid down in these provisions had not been met;

iii. Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada calculated normal values for new product types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology which is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

iv. Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because Canada determined more than one individual margin of dumping for cooperating exporters; and

e. As a consequence of the above-mentioned violations, Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

3.2. Furthermore, Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to find that the provisions of SIMA and SIMR are inconsistent "as such" with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, and more specifically that:

a. subsection 2(1), section 30.1, and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994; and

b. subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent "as such" with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.3. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to also find that, as a consequence of the above, Canada acted inconsistently with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement insofar as it failed to take all steps to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According to Chinese Taipei, this also results in the violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

3.4. In light of the above, Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to recommend that the DSB request Canada to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.

3.5. Canada requests that the Panel reject all of Chinese Taipei’s claims in this dispute.

4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel in accordance with paragraph 19 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1 to B-4 and C-1 to C-4).

5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

5.1. The arguments of Brazil, the European Union, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes D-1 to D-5). China and Korea did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW


6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Panel Report sets out the Panel’s response to the parties’ requests made at the interim review stage. The Panel modified aspects of its Report in the light of the parties’ comments where it considered it appropriate, as explained below. Due to changes as a result of our review, certain numbering of the paragraphs and footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the Interim Report. The text below refers to the numbers in the Interim Report, with the numbers in the Final Report in parentheses for ease of reference.

6.3. In addition to the modifications specified below, the Panel also corrected a number of typographical and other non-substantive errors throughout the Report, including those identified by the parties. The Panel is grateful for the assistance of the parties in this regard.

6.1 Paragraphs 6.9, 6.49, 6.50, 6.51, 6.72, 6.91, 6.102, 6.113, 6.123, 6.149, 6.166, and 6.213 (paragraphs 7.9, 7.49, 7.50, 7.51, 7.73, 7.92, 7.103, 7.114, 7.124, 7.150, 7.167, and 7.214 of the Final Report)

6.4. Chinese Taipei asks the Panel to supplement and/or amend its description of Chinese Taipei’s arguments in a number of parts of the Interim Report.

6.5. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei’s request.

6.6. We have decided to accommodate the requests by Chinese Taipei. The amendments proposed by Chinese Taipei all reflect arguments made in Chinese Taipei’s submissions to the Panel. Although the current summaries of those arguments are not inaccurate, we see no reason not to include further elements that more closely mirror the actual arguments made by Chinese Taipei. With respect to paragraph 6.9, we consider it more appropriate to use a wording that differs from Chinese Taipei’s proposal in order to accurately reflect the arguments made. With respect to paragraph 6.50, we have decided to include the proposed additional sentence in a footnote at the end of that paragraph and with a slight modification to the suggested source reference. Regarding paragraph 6.72, rather than adding a supplementary description of Chinese Taipei’s arguments at the end of the paragraph, we consider it more appropriate to include this description in a sentence that precedes that paragraph’s last sentence.


6.7. Chinese Taipei proposes that the Panel supplements its description of Norway’s arguments to fully reflect the arguments presented by Norway.

6.8. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei’s request.

6.9. We have decided to accommodate Chinese Taipei’s request.

6.3 Paragraph 6.53 (paragraph 7.54 of the Final Report)

6.10. Canada requests that the footnote reference to “Canada’s second written submission, para. 47” be changed to “Canada’s second written submission, paras. 49-52”.

6.11. Chinese Taipei disagrees with the suggested change, to the extent that paragraphs other than paragraph 49 of Canada’s second written submission should be referenced in this footnote.

6.12. We agree with Chinese Taipei that only paragraph 49 of Canada’s second written submission should be included in the footnote and have made the modification accordingly.
6.4 Paragraph 6.64 (paragraph 7.65 of the Final Report)

6.13. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to include discussion of Chinese Taipei's arguments in relation Article 7.1(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its relevance to the issue before the Panel. Chinese Taipei also does not support Canada's request to delete the reference to that article in the paragraph.

6.14. Canada suggests that the statements relating to Article 7.1(iii) in the last three sentences of the paragraph are outside of the Panel's terms of reference, and therefore requests deletion thereof. Should the Panel decide to accede to Chinese Taipei's request, Canada asks that the Panel also include Canada's response to Chinese Taipei's arguments.

6.15. We have not made any changes to our Report concerning this matter. Since there is no claim under Article 7.1(iii), there is no need for us to examine this provision in great detail. We refer to it merely to explain our treatment of certain arguments made by Chinese Taipei concerning the object and purpose of Article 7.1.

6.5 Paragraph 6.79 (paragraph 7.80 of the Final Report)

6.16. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to amend its description of Canada's arguments in order to clarify that observations relating to the case law invoked by Chinese Taipei were made by Canada.

6.17. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei's request.

6.18. We have decided to accommodate Chinese Taipei's request.

6.6 Paragraph 6.84 (paragraph 7.85 of the Final Report)

6.19. Canada requests the Panel to modify this paragraph to accurately reflect Canada's position as set out in paragraph 72 of its second written submission. Canada contends that it does not argue that Chinese Taipei's claim is undermined by the fact that there are no Appellate Body decisions that endorse the approach advanced by Chinese Taipei. Rather, Canada's point is that the Appellate Body report cited by Chinese Taipei does not, contrary to Chinese Taipei's submission, address the issue of whether imports from exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping are to be excluded in an injury analysis.

6.20. Chinese Taipei disagrees with Canada and considers that the paragraph accurately reflects Canada's argument.

6.21. We have decided to accommodate Canada's request by modifying the paragraph accordingly.


6.22. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to modify paragraph 6.109 to more accurately reflect Chinese Taipei's reliance in its submissions on specific statements made by the interested party Knightsbridge in the CSWP investigation. In light of this modification, Chinese Taipei also requests that paragraphs 6.109 and 6.111 be changed to no longer state that Chinese Taipei did not specify exactly which statement made by Knightsbridge it was relying on.

6.23. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei's request.

6.24. We have decided to accommodate Chinese Taipei's request, albeit not in the exact manner as suggested by Chinese Taipei.

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6.8 Paragraphs 6.133 and 6.135 (paragraphs 7.134 and 7.136 of the Final Report)

6.25. Chinese Taipei understands that the Ministerial Specification is not a document that is published and made available to the public. Chinese Taipei observes that it is thus not a "published report", contrary to its characterization in these paragraphs.

6.26. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei's request.

6.27. We have decided to change the description of the documents referred to in paragraph 6.133. Instead of referring to "published reports", we now refer to "documents in the record of the investigation". A consequential change is made in paragraph 6.135 which now refers to the "record's relevant documents".

6.9 Paragraph 6.142 (paragraph 7.143 of the Final Report)

6.28. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to insert a footnote following the paragraph's second sentence. Chinese Taipei recalls its position that while the fact of imposing residual duties may allow investigating authorities to preclude circumvention and to provide an incentive to cooperate, this objective does not itself justify the use of one of the worst possible information available.

6.29. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei's request.

6.30. We have decided not to accommodate Chinese Taipei's request. The Panel's statement, in respect of which Chinese Taipei seeks clarification of its argument, accurately reflects a specific issue on which the parties' views did not diverge.


6.31. Canada requests the Panel to correct factual inaccuracies with respect to the Panel's description of the operation of Canada's prospective normal value system.

6.32. Chinese Taipei makes no comment on Canada's request.

6.33. We have decided to correct the inaccuracies identified by Canada. In the interest of clarity, we revised the relevant sentence in paragraph 6.145.


6.34. Chinese Taipei requests the Panel to address Chinese Taipei's argument that the conditions set forth in Article 6.8 or Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were not met because the information concerning new product types was not "held" by the cooperating exporters as such information was non-existent at the time of the original investigation.

6.35. Canada makes no comment on Chinese Taipei's request.

6.36. We have decided not to accommodate Chinese Taipei's request. Addressing Chinese Taipei's argument in addition to the reasoning contained in the relevant parts of the Report is not necessary for resolving the dispute. As we observed in the Report, Canada did not contend that relevant information was requested from the exporters when a determination based on facts available was made in the original investigation. As a result, the issue of whether such information was in fact "held" by the relevant exporters does not arise in the analysis under Article 6.8 and Annex II.
7 FINDINGS

7.1 General principles regarding treaty interpretation, the applicable standard of review, and burden of proof

7.1.1 Treaty Interpretation

7.1. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the dispute settlement system serves to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law". It is generally accepted that the principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are such customary rules.

7.1.2 Standard of Review

7.2. Panels generally are bound by the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU, which provides, in relevant part:

[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.\(^\text{16}\)

7.3. The Appellate Body has stated that the "objective assessment" to be made by a panel reviewing an investigating authority's determination is to be informed by an examination of whether the agency provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to: (a) how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (b) how those factual findings supported the overall determination.\(^\text{17}\)

7.4. The Appellate Body has also commented that a panel reviewing an investigating authority's determination may not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the investigating authority. A panel must limit its examination to the evidence that was before the agency during the course of the investigation and must take into account all such evidence submitted by the parties to the dispute.\(^\text{18}\) At the same time, a panel must not simply defer to the conclusions of the investigating authority. A panel's examination of those conclusions must be "in-depth" and "critical and searching".\(^\text{19}\)

7.5. Further to Article 11 of the DSU, Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets forth a specific standard of review applicable to anti-dumping disputes, namely:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; and

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.

7.1.3 Burden of Proof

7.6. The general principles applicable to the allocation of the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO Agreement must assert and prove its claim.\(^\text{20}\) Therefore, Chinese Taipei bears the burden of demonstrating that the

\(^{\text{16}}\) Emphasis added.
Canadian measures are inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. The Appellate Body has stated that a complaining party will satisfy its burden when it establishes a *prima facie* case, namely a case which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party. Finally, it is generally for each party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof.

### 7.2 Immediate termination under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: exporter-specific or country-wide margins of dumping?

#### 7.2.1 Introduction

This claim concerns the interpretation and application of the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides:

> There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible.

Chinese Taipei's claim is brought under the first part of this provision, concerning termination of an investigation in respect of *de minimis* margins of dumping. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated this provision by failing to terminate the investigation in respect of two Chinese Taipei exporters for which the CBSA had determined *de minimis* margins of dumping. Canada asks the Panel to reject Chinese Taipei's claim, arguing that the second sentence of Article 5.8 only requires immediate termination in respect of country-wide margins of dumping that are *de minimis*.

#### 7.2.2 Main arguments of the parties

Chinese Taipei's arguments are based principally on the Appellate Body's finding in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* that the phrase "margin of dumping" in the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer, rather than a country-wide margin of dumping. Chinese Taipei relies in particular on the Appellate Body's finding that "the second sentence of Article 5.8 requires the immediate termination of the investigation in respect of exporters for which an *individual* margin of dumping of zero or *de minimis* is determined". Chinese Taipei further submits that the ordinary meaning of the words used in Article 5.8 as well as the context provided by other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, including Article 3.3 and 9.4, do not support Canada's position that Article 5.8 requires immediate termination of the investigation when the country-wide margin of dumping is *de minimis*.

Canada submits that the termination of an investigation under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is only required when the country-wide margin of dumping is *de minimis*. Canada contends that the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the second sentence of Article 5.8 is consistent with this approach. Canada contends that there is nothing in Article 5.8 or elsewhere in the Anti-Dumping Agreement that subdivides an investigation into any number of separate

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23 Chinese Taipei's claim concerns Article 5.8 termination in the context of final margins of dumping that are *de minimis* ("Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be *de minimis* within the meaning of that provision"). (Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 43).
24 We confirm at paras. 7.63.-7.64 below that the second sentence of Article 5.8 only applies in respect of final margins of dumping that are *de minimis*. Our findings here therefore only concern the issue of whether or not Canada should have immediately terminated the investigation after finding that the final margins of dumping of two Chinese Taipei exporters were *de minimis*.
26 Canada's first written submission, para. 56.
investigations that could be individually terminated for individual exporters.\textsuperscript{28} Canada submits that the immediate context of Article 5.8 taken as a whole shows that termination under the second sentence of Article 5.8 pertains to a country, particularly since it is clear that termination in respect of negligible volume or injury must pertain to a country.

7.11. Regarding broader context, Canada observes that Article 5 provides for the initiation of a single investigation in relation to a product of a country of export.\textsuperscript{29} Canada also argues that Chinese Taipei’s interpretation of Article 5.8 would render Article 9.4 redundant, because there would be no need any longer to exclude \textit{de minimis} margins at the assessment stage if the investigation had already been terminated in respect of exporters with individual \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping.\textsuperscript{30} Canada further asserts that the specific reference in Article 3.3 to a country-based margin of dumping, “as defined” in Article 5.8, provides further confirmation that the \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping found in Article 5.8 is also country-based.\textsuperscript{31} Canada also argues that Chinese Taipei’s interpretation of Article 5.8 would result in inconsistent treatment of exporters under Article 9.5. In particular, Canada contends that any termination pursuant to Article 5.8 would not apply to new shippers, since the investigation would already have been completed and measures put in place. Canada asserts that new shippers found to have dumped would therefore be subject to anti-dumping measures pursuant to Article 9.5, even if their margin of dumping were only \textit{de minimis}. Canada asserts that this inconsistent treatment does not occur if termination under Article 5.8 for a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping pertains to a country. Canada submits that its arguments provide cogent reasons for the Panel to depart from the interpretation of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement developed by the WTO adjudicators in \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}.\textsuperscript{32}

7.2.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.2.3.1 Brazil

7.12. Brazil contends that if the factual background presented by Chinese Taipei is accurate, the investigation should have been terminated with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be \textit{de minimis}. Brazil asserts that the combined interpretation of the articles mentioned by Chinese Taipei, as supported by the jurisprudence of the DSB, leads to the conclusion that during an investigation the competent authority should take into account individual margins of dumping for each exporter or producer, whenever it is possible for the authority to determine them. The investigating authority cannot rely on a country-wide margin of dumping when the individual margins are determined.\textsuperscript{33}

7.2.3.2 European Union

7.13. The European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has already clarified that the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 refers to “individual” margins of dumping of the exporters, as opposed to a “country-wide” margin of dumping. The European Union also recalls that panels are expected, even in practice “obliged” to follow previous Appellate Body findings with respect to previously decided legal issues.\textsuperscript{34}

7.2.3.3 Norway

7.14. Norway disagrees with the position that the requirement to immediately terminate an investigation pertains to a country rather than the individual producer. Norway holds that the determination of \textit{de minimis} dumping is by nature producer-specific. The wording of Article 5.8, as well as the context and the consistency with the other articles of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, clearly leads to this conclusion. Norway observes that the panel and the Appellate Body in \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice} reached this very same conclusion on this exact

\textsuperscript{28} Canada’s second written submission, para. 20. 
\textsuperscript{29} Canada’s second written submission, paras. 22 and 23. 
\textsuperscript{30} Canada’s second written submission, para. 30. 
\textsuperscript{31} Canada’s second written submission, para. 25. 
\textsuperscript{32} Canada’s first written submission, paras. 85-92; second written submission, paras. 12-44. 
\textsuperscript{33} Brazil’s third-party submission, para. 3. 
\textsuperscript{34} European Union’s third-party submission, paras. 7-10.
question.\textsuperscript{35} Norway contends that the context provided by Article 9.4 supports the interpretation that the obligation to terminate an investigation under Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping is \textit{de minimis} pertains to the individual producer.\textsuperscript{36}

7.2.3.4 United Arab Emirates

7.15. The United Arab Emirates shares the analysis provided by Chinese Taipei. The United Arab Emirates considers that Chinese Taipei's claim is justified by the language of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and confirmed by previous panels and the Appellate Body.\textsuperscript{37}

7.2.3.5 United States

7.16. The United States, while taking no position on the merits of the factual allegations made by both parties, agrees with Chinese Taipei that a proper interpretation of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the investigating authority terminate an investigation with respect to an exporter or producer for which an individual margin of dumping is determined as zero or \textit{de minimis}. Accordingly, the United States understands that Canada did not comply with its Anti-Dumping Agreement obligations if, as was the case here, these two exporters were included in the scope of the definitive anti-dumping measure.\textsuperscript{38}

7.17. The United States contends that panels are not obliged to follow Appellate Body findings. The United States asserts that, to the extent a panel finds prior Appellate Body or panel reasoning to be persuasive, a panel may rely on that reasoning in conducting its own objective assessment of the matter. Nowhere in the DSU, however, is a panel given the authority not to assess objectively the legal issues in dispute, including by applying customary rules of interpretation to the text of the covered agreements, nor does the DSU require, or permit, a panel to follow – without any examination – prior Appellate Body findings.\textsuperscript{39}

7.2.4 Evaluation by the Panel

7.18. The parties agree that the second sentence of Article 5.8 requires immediate termination of an investigation in the event that the "margin of dumping" is \textit{de minimis}.\textsuperscript{40} The parties disagree whether the "margin of dumping" that triggers immediate termination relates to the exporting country as a whole, or to each exporter or producer individually. This is the issue that we must resolve.

7.19. The same issue was addressed by the panel and Appellate Body in \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}. Both the panel and the Appellate Body found that the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8 refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping. The panel noted that Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "the authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation".\textsuperscript{41} The panel considered that this provision provides for the general rule of calculating an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer. The panel observed that the exception to this rule is provided for in Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The panel stated that both the general rule and the exception to the rule provide for the calculation of individual margins of dumping, and do not envisage the calculation of a country-wide margin. The panel then examined the rest of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to see whether there is anything in the Agreement that contradicts this conclusion that the term "margin of dumping" in the Anti-Dumping Agreement is company-specific rather than country-wide. The panel found that there was not. According to the panel, "whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of

\textsuperscript{35} Norway's third-party submission, para. 5.
\textsuperscript{36} Norway's third-party statement, paras. 5 and 6.
\textsuperscript{37} United Arab Emirates' third-party submission, paras. 5 and 8.
\textsuperscript{38} United States' third-party submission, para. 3.
\textsuperscript{39} United States' third-party statement, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{40} The parties also agree that Article 5.8 only requires immediate termination in respect of \textit{final} margins of dumping that are \textit{de minimis}.
\textsuperscript{41} See Panel Report, \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 7.137.
dumping determined for the individual exporter”.\footnote{Panel Report, \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 7.140.} The panel also noted that, in Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the margin of dumping is juxtaposed to the volume of dumped imports. The panel observed that while it is expressly stipulated that the latter is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is made with regard to the margin of dumping. This further confirmed the panel’s view that the reference to the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is a reference to the individual margin of dumping determined on an exporter-specific basis.\footnote{Panel Report, \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, paras. 7.137-7.141.}

7.20. The Appellate Body agreed with the reasoning of the panel.\footnote{Appellate Body Report, \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 217.} The Appellate Body further observed that:

\begin{quote}
The Panel’s position – that the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8 refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping – is consistent with the use of the term "margins of dumping" in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as stated by the Appellate Body in \emph{US – Hot-Rolled Steel}:

"[M]argins" means the individual margin of dumping determined for each of the investigated exporters and producers of the product under investigation, for that particular product.\footnote{Appellate Body Report, \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 216. (fns omitted)}
\end{quote}

7.21. For our part, we consider that the ordinary meaning of the text of the second sentence of Article 5.8 does not unambiguously resolve the legal issue before us, since it does not clarify whether the "margin of dumping" that triggers immediate termination should be established for an exporting country or for individual exporters in a given exporting country.\footnote{Canada asserts at para. 56 of its first written submission that the ordinary meaning of the second sentence of Article 5.8 is “consistent” with termination occurring on a country-wide basis. We consider rather that the ordinary meaning is ambiguous in this regard.} The text of the phrase "margin of dumping" offers no guidance in this respect. The "investigation" to be immediately terminated is expressed in the singular, suggesting that it pertains to a singular investigation of exports of a given product from some or all of the producers/exporters of that product in a given exporting country as a whole. However, Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for a general rule that a margin of dumping is to be determined for each foreign producer/exporter. Thus, a single investigation could be "terminated" \textit{in respect of some} of those individual producers/exporters (even if it remains active for others).\footnote{Appellate Body Report, \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 218.} We agree with the panel and Appellate Body in \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice} that, when viewed in the context of other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the "margin of dumping" that triggers immediate termination under the second sentence of Article 5.8 should be understood to relate to the margin of dumping established for each producer or exporter individually, rather than a margin of dumping established for the exporting country as a whole.

7.22. The findings of the panel and Appellate Body in \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice} have been adopted by the DSB. It is well established that adopted reports create legitimate expectations, such that the same legal issues should be resolved in the same way in subsequent cases, absent cogent reasons for finding differently.\footnote{See, for example, Appellate Body Reports, \emph{Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II}, p. 14; and \emph{US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)}, para. 160.} Canada contends that there are cogent reasons why we should not follow the decisions of the panel and Appellate Body in \emph{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}. Canada points to the reference to a country-wide margin of dumping in Article 3.3, the alleged redundancy of part of Article 9.4, and the alleged inconsistent treatment of \textit{de minimis} exporters under Article 9.5. We shall address each of these elements in turn.
7.2.4.1 Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.23. Canada submits that the interpretation of the phrase "margin of dumping" by the panel and Appellate Body in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* is at odds with Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which establishes conditions for the cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from multiple exporting countries. Article 3.3 provides in relevant part:

> Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than *de minimis* as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 …

7.24. Canada observes that Article 3.3 refers to a single margin of dumping being established for all imports from an exporting country, i.e. a country-wide margin of dumping. According to Canada, the specific reference in Article 3.3 to the Article 5.8 *de minimis* standard "implies that the type of margin of dumping is the same in both provisions – a margin of dumping with respect to a country". Canada therefore concludes that Article 5.8, like Article 3.3, refers to a country-wide margin of dumping. Canada contends that the panel ignored Article 3.3 in its analysis, and that the Appellate Body endorsed the panel's analysis without referring to that error by the panel.

7.25. We recall that the *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* panel reasoned that "whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter". In making this statement, the panel did not refer to Article 3.3 in its analysis. However, the Appellate Body did consider the relevance of this provision, because Mexico made arguments regarding Article 3.3 to the Appellate Body that are similar to those being made by Canada in the present case. The Appellate Body rejected Mexico's arguments on the ground that "Article 3.3 does not add to the analysis of Article 5.8". The Appellate Body reasoned as follows:

First, Article 3.3 establishes conditions for cumulation of the effects of the imports from more than one country, which is unrelated to the termination of an investigation under Article 5.8. Secondly, although, as Mexico pointed out, Article 3.3 refers to Article 5.8, this reference concerns uniquely the definition of a *de minimis* margin of dumping (defined in the third sentence of Article 5.8 as a margin of less than two per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price). Mexico's contention that the Panel erred in the interpretation of Article 5.8 does not relate to the definition of "*de minimis*". Accordingly, we are of the view that the reference to Article 5.8 in Article 3.3 is not relevant to Mexico's argument under Article 5.8. Thirdly, it is explicitly provided in Article 3.3 that "the margin of dumping [is] established in relation to the imports from each country". It could be argued that this specific language was incorporated into Article 3.3 to mark a departure from the general rule that the term "margin of dumping" refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer. In other words, although Mexico contends that Article 3.3 provides context to suggest that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 5.8, it could also be viewed as context that supports the Panel's interpretation of Article 5.8, as no language similar to that of Article 3.3 ("the margin of dumping [is] established in relation to imports from each country") can be found in Article 5.8. Accordingly, we are of the view that, contrary to what Mexico argues, Article 3.3 does not provide useful context for interpreting the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8.

7.26. We agree. In our view, Article 3.3 marks a departure from the general rule that the term "margin of dumping" refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer. Neither Canada's argument that Article 3.3 refers to the margin of dumping "as defined" in Article 5.8, nor Canada's suggestion that both provisions therefore refer to the same type of margin of dumping (i.e. a country-wide margin), persuade us otherwise. As the Appellate Body

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49 Canada's first written submission, para. 83.
50 Canada's first written submission, para. 87.
53 Ibid.
observed, this reference in Article 3.3 concerns uniquely the definition of *de minimis*. The fact that Article 3.3 refers to the Article 5.8 *de minimis* standard does not mean that the basis for determining the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 must necessarily be the same as the one referred to in Article 3.3. It simply means that the definition of *de minimis* provided for in Article 5.8 (i.e. a margin of less than 2%) applies under Article 3.3. Under Article 3.3, this standard is applied per country, whereas the same standard is applied per-exporter or producer under Article 5.8. There is nothing to suggest that Article 3.3, a provision that concerns the unrelated matter of cumulation, is intended to import any meaning into Article 5.8.

7.2.4.2 Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

Canada also relies on Article 9.4, which regulates the maximum amount of anti-dumping duty that may be imposed or collected in respect of imports from exporters that were not individually examined, in cases where authorities limit their examination in accordance with the second sentence of Article 6.10. Article 9.4 provides in relevant part that the anti-dumping duty applied to imports from exporters not included in the investigating authority's examination shall not exceed:

(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the selected exporters or producers or,

(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices of exporters or producers not individually examined,

provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero and *de minimis* margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.

Canada suggests that the requirement in Article 9.4 to disregard zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping of individual exporters when calculating a weighted average margin of dumping or a weighted average normal value for non-examined exporters is most telling for interpreting Article 5.8. Canada asserts that the application of duties contemplated in Article 9.4 takes place during the period of duty assessment, and therefore after an investigation has been completed. Canada submits that, had the investigation already been terminated with respect to individual exporters with zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping pursuant to Article 5.8, there would be no need to exclude their margins under Article 9.4. According to Canada, the need to expressly exclude zero or *de minimis* exporter-specific margins of dumping at this stage confirms that an investigation is only terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is *de minimis*. Canada contends that an interpretation of Article 5.8 supporting termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping would make part of Article 9.4 redundant, contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Canada further observes that, unlike Article 3.3, Article 9.4 does not contain any reference to the definition of a *de minimis* margin of dumping in Article 5.8. Canada submits that the absence of such a reference indicates that the margin of dumping referred to in Article 9.4, i.e. an exporter-specific margin of dumping, is not the same type as that in Article 5.8, i.e. a country-based margin of dumping.

We are not persuaded by Canada's argument. First, Article 9.4 provides that the anti-dumping duties for non-examined exporters or producers shall not exceed the weighted average normal values or weighted average margins of dumping of investigated exporters or producers. Nothing in this provision is inconsistent with the proposition that Article 5.8 requires immediate termination in the event that an exporter has a *de minimis* individual margin of dumping. It is worth emphasising that Article 9.4 is unrelated to the termination of an investigation under the second sentence of Article 5.8. These provisions concern discrete issues, and there is nothing in the text of Article 9.4 to suggest that it has any bearing on the termination of an investigation under Article 5.8.

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54 Ibid.
55 Canada's first written submission, paras. 80 and 81.
56 Canada's first written submission, para. 84.
7.30. Second, we consider that the distinction drawn by Canada between the investigation and assessment phases is overly rigid. We do not consider that all elements addressed in Article 9 must necessarily be viewed as pertaining only to a post-investigation phase of duty assessment. Canada relies\(^{57}\) on the statement by the Appellate Body stated in \textit{EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)} that the use of the present perfect tense in sub-paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 9:

[\textbf{[1]}] indicates that the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties under Article 9 is a separate and distinct phase of an anti-dumping action that necessarily occurs after the determination of dumping, injury, and causation under Articles 2 and 3 has been made. Members have the right to impose and collect anti-dumping duties only after the completion of an investigation in which it has been established that the requirements of dumping, injury, and causation "have been fulfilled".\(^{58}\)

7.31. \textit{EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)} did not present the Appellate Body with the legal issue currently before us, namely the relevance of Article 9.4 for the interpretation of Article 5.8. We note that the Appellate Body also stated in \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice} that "the issuance of the order that establishes anti-dumping duties – or the decision not to issue an order – is the ultimate step of the 'investigation' contemplated in Article 5.8".\(^{59}\)

7.32. For us, there is a logical progression in the investigation and imposition of anti-dumping duties. In order to issue an order imposing anti-dumping duties on non-examined exporters, an investigating authority must determine the amount of anti-dumping duty to be imposed and collected.\(^{60}\) In order to do that, it must first calculate the ceiling for the amount of duty that may legimitely be imposed and collected in respect of imports from such exporters. It seems to us that the calculation of that ceiling, governed by Article 9.4, would be part of the authority's investigation of dumping, and be undertaken after the calculation of the investigated exporters' individual margins of dumping, but before the imposition of any anti-dumping duty.\(^{61}\)

7.33. Third, in any event, we recall that Article 9.4 provides that the ceiling for non-examined exporters be fixed by reference to the margins of dumping established for investigated exporters. The simple fact that an investigation has already been terminated in respect of an exporter having a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping does not mean that the margin of dumping determined for that investigated exporter would necessarily be excluded by the investigating authority when determining the ceiling for non-examined exporters. The fact that the investigation has been terminated in respect of an exporter does not remove that exporter from the category of exporters that were investigated, i.e. the category that is used as the basis for determining the ceiling for non-examined exporters. Nor does termination in respect of an investigated exporter mean that the data pertaining to that exporter is expunged from the investigating authority's record. Since the data pertains to an investigated exporter, it would seem reasonable that an investigating authority might subsequently use that data when establishing the ceiling for duty collection in respect of non-examined exporters, consistent with the general approach set forth in the first part of Article 9.4 (up to and including sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii)). It is only the express textual exclusion of zero and \textit{de minimis} margins in the latter part of Article 9.4 that prevents the authority from doing so.\(^{62}\) Indeed, one might consider that this express textual exclusion is only

\(^{57}\) For example, Canada's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 14.

\(^{58}\) Appellate Body Report, \textit{EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)}, para. 123. (emphasis original, fn omitted)


\(^{60}\) Indeed, the fact that the Article 12.2.2 public notice refers to the "conclusion … of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty" suggests to us that the "determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty" is made before the investigation is concluded.

\(^{61}\) This would be consistent with the scope of the investigation envisaged by the Appellate Body in \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, discussed above at para. 7.31. Furthermore, the determination of a duty rate for unexamined exporters, at some level below the calculated ceiling, could be viewed as the corollary to the determination of margins of dumping for examined exporters under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

\(^{62}\) It is similarly possible that facts pertaining to an exporter with a zero or \textit{de minimis} margin could be used as facts available under Article 6.8 (if properly verified, etc.). For example, the authority may use cost data pertaining to that exporter as facts available in constructing a normal value for a different exporter. The fact that the investigation in respect of the exporter whose data is being used is terminated under Article 5.8 does not necessarily undermine the utility of that exporter's data in the context of Article 6.8. Absent any express exclusion of the use of such facts, there is no reason why they should not be used by the
required precisely because the zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping might otherwise be retained by the investigating authority.

### 7.2.4.3 *De minimis* exporters in Article 9.5 new shipper reviews

7.34. Canada submits that, because the *de minimis* standard under Article 5.8 does not apply to new exporter reviews under Article 9.5, a new exporter with a *de minimis* margin would be subject to anti-dumping duties, while an exporter with the same margin would be subject to termination in an original investigation.\(^63\)

7.35. Canada's argument is premised on a conclusion of law concerning the relationship between Articles 5.8 and 9.5, a question that has not been addressed in WTO dispute settlement.\(^64\) It is not clear to us that, in the context of an Article 9.5 new shipper review, an anti-dumping duty could be imposed on a new shipper for which a *de minimis* margin of dumping is determined in that review.\(^65\)

7.36. In any event, Article 9.5 is unrelated to the termination of an investigation under the second sentence of Article 5.8. We do not consider that Article 9.5 informs the interpretation of the second sentence of Article 5.8. These provisions concern discrete issues, and there is nothing in the text of Article 9.5 to suggest that it should import meaning into the second sentence of Article 5.8.

### 7.2.4.4 Conclusion

7.37. We recall our view that the second sentence of Article 5.8, when read in light of the context of the phrase "margin of dumping" as used in other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, requires immediate termination of an investigation in respect of exporters that have individual *de minimis* margins of dumping. We further recall that this approach is consistent with the decisions of the panel and Appellate Body regarding the same issue in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*. For the reasons explained above, we find that Canada has failed to establish that there are cogent reasons for us to depart from those decisions. We therefore uphold Chinese Taipei's claim that Canada violated the second sentence of Article 5.8 by failing to immediately terminate the investigation in respect of two Chinese Taipei exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping.

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\(^63\) Canada's second written submission, paras. 39-44.

\(^64\) Canada observes that the Appellate Body stated at para. 341 of its report in *EC – Fasteners (China)* that all of the paragraphs of Article 9 concern the imposition of duties. Canada understands that Article 9.5, like the remainder of Article 9, only applies to the duty assessment phase, as distinct from the investigation phase. We also observe that the Appellate Body found in *US – Carbon Steel* that the *de minimis* standard set forth in the equivalent provision in the SCM Agreement (i.e. Article 11.9) did not apply in the context of sunset reviews undertaken under Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, *US – Carbon Steel*, para. 68). However, in neither of these cases was the Appellate Body considering the application of the immediate termination mechanism in the context of new shipper reviews.

\(^65\) It may be that an Article 9.5 new shipper review should rather be viewed as a supplementary investigation, bearing in mind that it is the first time that the margin of dumping is being established for that shipper. Canada accepts that the Article 6.8 facts available mechanism applies in the context of Article 9.5 reviews, even though that provision applies when an interested party fails to provide necessary information or significantly impedes the "investigation". (Canada's response to Panel question No. 7.4, para. 13). There is some inconsistency, therefore, in Canada's argument that provisions pertaining to the "investigation" phase should not apply in the context of new shipper reviews. Canada contends that there is no justifiable reason why the criteria in Article 5.8 would be applicable to new shipper reviews. (Canada's response to Panel question No. 7.4, para. 16). It seems to us that there is an obvious reason why the relevant parts of Article 5.8 might apply in this context, namely to ensure that new shippers with *de minimis* margins of dumping are not subject to anti-dumping duties in the same way as exporters examined in the original investigation. The first sentence of Article 9.2 may also apply in this context, to ensure appropriateness and non-discrimination in respect of the anti-dumping duties.
7.3 Multiple margins of dumping: Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.3.1 Introduction

7.38. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated the first sentence of Article 6.10, whereby:

The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.

7.39. Canada asks the Panel to reject Chinese Taipei's claim.

7.3.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.40. Chinese Taipei submits that the CBSA failed to comply with the requirement in the first sentence of Article 6.10 to determine a single margin of dumping for each known exporter. Chinese Taipei asserts that the CBSA determined – and the exporters and producers were confronted with – two margins for each exporter, namely one company-specific margin established under Article 2, and a second, country-wide dumping margin used for assessing the need for immediate termination under the second sentence of Article 5.8. Chinese Taipei stresses that what violates Article 6.10 is not the simple fact that Canada has calculated more than one margin of dumping for each exporter, but rather that Canada used the additional, country-wide margin of dumping for the purpose of applying Article 5.8.66

7.41. Canada rejects Chinese Taipei's claim on the basis that the CBSA complied with the Article 6.10 requirement to determine individual exporter-specific margins of dumping. Canada asserts that the determination of an additional, country-wide margin of dumping is irrelevant under Article 6.10.67

7.3.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.3.3.1 Brazil

7.42. Brazil considers that Canada has not violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Brazil asserts that the CBSA complied with the Article 6.10 obligation to "determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer". According to Brazil, the mere fact that the CBSA calculated a country-based margin of dumping does not in itself violate Article 6.10, and such calculation may be used for other purposes in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, such as in Article 3.3(a).68

7.3.4 Evaluation by the Panel

7.43. We see neither a factual nor a legal foundation for Chinese Taipei's claim. Chinese Taipei asserts, as a matter of fact, that the CBSA determined "two margins [of dumping] for each exporter".69 However, the second allegedly exporter-specific margin of dumping identified by Chinese Taipei is actually the country-wide margin established for Chinese Taipei as a whole.70 By definition, the country-wide margin pertains to the country, rather than to any given exporter.

7.44. As a matter of law, nothing in the text of the first sentence of Article 6.10 precludes an investigating authority from determining – in addition to exporter-specific margins of dumping – a country-wide margin of dumping.71

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66 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, paras. 36-39.
67 Canada's first written submission, para. 94.
68 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 6.
69 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 38.
70 See Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 38: "Canada determined – and the exporters and producers were confronted with – two margins for each exporter, namely one company-specific margin established under Article 2, and a second, country-wide dumping margin, which was to be applied to each and every exporter from that country, in order to determine whether their dumping margin was de minimis". There is nothing on the record to suggest that Canada somehow used the country-wide margin to determine whether or not individual exporter margins were de minimis.
71 According to para. 39 of Chinese Taipei's second written submission, Chinese Taipei's main concern in bringing this Article 6.10 claim is to address the manner in which the CBSA used the country-wide margin for
7.45. We therefore reject Chinese Taipei’s claim that Canada acted in a manner inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 6.10.

7.4 Provisional measures on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping: Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.4.1 Introduction

7.46. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing provisional measures on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary margin of dumping below the 2% de minimis threshold set forth in Article 5.8. Canada imposed provisional duties on this exporter after determining that the preliminary country-wide margin of dumping for Chinese Taipei was greater than de minimis. The amount of provisional duty was based on the individual exporter’s preliminary margin of dumping.72

7.47. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:

Provisional measures may be applied only if:

(i) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;

(ii) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry; and

(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation.

7.48. Canada asks the Panel to reject Chinese Taipei’s claim, principally on the basis that provisional duties may be imposed in respect of any exporter found to have dumped.

7.4.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.49. Chinese Taipei submits that there can be no "preliminary affirmative determination ... of dumping" (within the meaning of Article 7.1(ii)) for a specific exporter if the preliminary margin of dumping for that exporter is de minimis as defined by Article 5.8. Chinese Taipei reiterates this point in a finding by the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway) that "a finding of de minimis dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer or exporter in question".73 Chinese Taipei notes that the term "preliminary affirmative determination" can be understood as "initial positive finding" of dumping.74 Chinese Taipei submits that Canada’s investigating authorities could not make such "initial positive finding" of dumping since imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping cannot be treated as "dumped".

72 On a number of occasions in its first written submission (see, for example, paras. 97 and 105 of Chinese Taipei’s first written submission), Chinese Taipei makes reference to the alleged WTO-inconsistency of Canada’s imposition of a 0% preliminary anti-dumping duty on imports from Chung Hung Steel Corporation, a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary margin of dumping of zero. We note that there is no claim regarding this issue in Chinese Taipei’s request for the establishment, which refers only to the imposition of provisional measures in respect of exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. (Canada – Welded Pipe, Chinese Taipei’s request for the establishment of a panel, WT/DS482/2 (dated 22 January 2015, circulated 27 January 2015), p. 3, bullet 4). Nor is this issue referred to in para. 318 of Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, where Chinese Taipei summarizes the findings that it would like the Panel to make. Bearing in mind that our terms of reference are circumscribed by Chinese Taipei’s request for the establishment, we do not address this issue in our findings.


74 Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, paras. 43-44; response to Panel question No. 1.15, para. 33.
7.50. Chinese Taipei submits that, in accordance with Article 5.8, an investigation needs to be terminated with regard to producers/exporters with a final margin of dumping that is de minimis. Chinese Taipei asserts that it logically follows that no definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports since they are no longer part of the investigation. This also implies that imports with a de minimis margin of dumping have to be excluded from the injury analysis. Chinese Taipei submits that the consistent interpretation of the term "dumped" requires that the same reasoning be applied in the context of Article 7.1(ii) with regard to the imposition of provisional measures, even if Article 5.8 is not directly applicable at the preliminary stage of the investigation. According to Chinese Taipei, it therefore follows that Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement precludes the application of provisional anti-dumping measures on exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping.

7.51. Chinese Taipei also asserts that the conditions for the imposition of provisional measures are stricter than those for the imposition of definitive measures since pursuant to Article 7.1(iii) they must be "necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation". Chinese Taipei posits that if no definitive measure can be imposed on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping pursuant to Article 5.8, a fortiori no anti-dumping measure may be applied at the provisional stage on imports of such exporters. Chinese Taipei also argues that since no injury can be caused "through the effects of dumping" by imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, the imposition of provisional measures to offset de minimis margins of dumping is unnecessary to prevent injury.

7.52. Chinese Taipei contends that its interpretation is confirmed by the object and purpose of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which is to balance the potentially conflicting interests of offsetting injury caused by dumped imports with the due process rights of investigated exporters. Chinese Taipei contends that the Anti-Dumping Agreement therefore provides for a statutory threshold for the margin of dumping, below which a product cannot be considered as "dumped".

7.53. Canada asserts that Chinese Taipei's claim must fail for two reasons. First, because the specific reference in Article 7.1(i) to a single investigation being initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 contradicts Chinese Taipei's argument that the preliminary affirmative determination of dumping relates to individual exporters, rather than the exporting country as a whole. Canada observes that there are not as many preliminary determinations as there are exporters. Article 7.1(ii), read with the chapeau, sets out that "[p]rovisional measures may be applied only if ... a preliminary affirmative determination has been made". According to Canada, this singular determination relates to the investigation as a whole, without reference to individual exporters, per Article 7.1(i), and will be affirmative if dumping has been preliminarily found to be occurring, per Article 7.1(ii).

7.54. Second, Canada asserts that there is no legal basis for Chinese Taipei's assertion that exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping may not be considered as dumping. Canada asserts that the definition of dumping is found in Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, where a product is considered to be dumped if it is imported into a country at an export price less than its normal value. The operation of comparing whether the export price is less than the normal value to determine if dumping exists is a clear and simple comparison; there is no additional threshold or percentage that must be factored in. According to Canada, this definition of dumping does not distinguish between goods being dumped at a margin above de minimis or below de minimis.

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75 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 45.
76 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 46. Chinese Taipei makes a distinction between terminating the investigation and applying the provisional duty. (Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 1.2, paras. 6 and 7; second written submission, paras. 49 and 50). According to Chinese Taipei, while the investigation may continue in case of finding of preliminary de minimis margin of dumping, the authorities cannot apply any measures during the remaining part of the investigation.
77 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 47; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 28.
78 Chinese Taipei's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
79 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 1.15, para. 42.
80 Canada's second written submission, paras. 46-48.
81 Canada's second written submission, para. 49.
7.55. Canada also objects to Chinese Taipei’s argument that the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provide for a statutory threshold for the margin of dumping, below which a product cannot be considered to be dumped. Canada contends that there is no basis in the Agreement for these arguments, either in terms of its object and purpose or in terms of Chinese Taipei’s assertion of the existence of a “statutory threshold”. Canada observes that the Appellate Body has noted specifically that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not contain an explicit indication of its object and purpose.\textsuperscript{82} Canada also observes that Chinese Taipei refers to the panel report in \textit{US – Zeroing (EC)} in an attempt to justify its argument regarding the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According to Canada, that reference is taken out of context.\textsuperscript{83} Canada also refers to the findings of the panel in \textit{EC – Salmon (Norway)} to argue that it is the normal value that constitutes the point of reference when imposing anti-dumping duties, not the normal value less an additional \textit{de minimis} threshold. Moreover, Canada suggests that Article 7.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides relevant context to Article 7.1(ii). Article 7.2 stipulates that provisional measures may be applied, through the imposition of duties or by use of a security, in an amount "equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated, being not greater than the provisionally estimated margin of dumping". Canada observes that there is no exception in Article 7.2 that the provisional measure must not be applied if the margin of dumping is \textit{de minimis}, and no such exception should be read into that provision.\textsuperscript{84}

\section*{7.4.3 Main arguments of third parties}

\subsection*{7.4.3.1 Brazil}

7.56. Brazil considers that neither provisional nor definitive anti-dumping duties may be imposed on imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping.\textsuperscript{85}

\subsection*{7.4.4 Evaluation by the Panel}

7.57. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that provisional measures may be applied only if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions, set forth in sub-paragraph (ii), is that "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping". Chinese Taipei’s claim is premised on two factors. First, that this "preliminary affirmative determination" needs to be made for each foreign producer/exporter, rather than for each exporting country, and second, that the term "dumping" in this context only refers to margins of dumping exceeding the 2\% \textit{de minimis} threshold set forth in Article 5.8.

7.58. Regarding the nature of the "preliminary affirmative determination" to be made, we have already explained in the context of Chinese Taipei’s Article 5.8 claim that determinations of dumping are generally made in respect of individual exporters.\textsuperscript{86} The fact that a single investigation is undertaken is not inconsistent with this approach, since, as we have concluded above, such an investigation may be terminated in respect of a given exporter. Similarly, a "preliminary affirmative determination" may be made in respect of multiple exporters. In addition, Article 7.2 provides that provisional measures should take the form of a cash deposit or bond equal to "the amount of anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated". Article 7.5 states that the relevant provisions of Article 9 should be followed in the application of provisional measures. This includes the requirement in Article 9.2 to collect anti-dumping duties from "all sources found to be dumped". The Appellate Body has confirmed that the term "sources" relates to individual exporters, rather than exporting countries.\textsuperscript{87} Read together, these considerations indicate that the "preliminary affirmative determination" should be made in respect of individual exporters. It is difficult to conceive of the utility of Article 7.1(ii) providing for a country-wide preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, if provisional duties are to be applied on the basis of exporter-specific margins of dumping.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Canada’s second written submission, para. 54 (referring to Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada)}, para. 118).
\item Canada’s second written submission, para. 54.
\item Canada’s second written submission, para. 59.
\item Brazil’s third-party submission, para. 9.
\item With the exception of the margin of dumping referred to in Article 3.3.
\item Appellate Body Report, \textit{EC – Fasteners (China)}, para. 338.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
We now turn to the second premise of Chinese Taipei’s claim, namely that the exporter-specific determination of dumping referred to in Article 7.1(ii) contains a *de minimis* component. The term “dumping” is defined in Article 2.1 as referring to a situation where a product is “introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value”. By virtue of this definition, a product is either dumped (i.e. the export price is less than normal value), or it is not dumped (i.e. the export price is equal to or greater than normal value). There is no scope in this definition for any notion of *de minimis* dumping, in the sense of the export price being less than normal value by only a particular degree. Had the drafters intended to define “dumping” with a *de minimis* component, they could readily have done so.

Chinese Taipei argues that its interpretation of Article 7.1(ii) is supported by case law. We disagree. As we explain below, the findings cited by Chinese Taipei were made by panels addressing different issues than the one before us in this dispute. Furthermore, only one of the panels provided any rationale for its findings, and that rationale does not apply in respect of provisional measures.

Chinese Taipei refers to the findings of three panels that imports from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping may not be treated as “dumped imports” for the purpose of the Article 3 injury analysis. This is not the issue currently before us. In the first two cases, namely EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) and Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, neither panel provided any rationale for its finding. While the Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties panel stated that, “[o]n the basis of the ordinary meaning of the text … the term ‘dumped imports’ refers to all imports attributable to producers or exporters for which a margin of dumping greater than *de minimis* has been calculated”, that panel did not explain how the ordinary meaning of the phrase “dumped imports” supported that finding. In particular, the panel made no reference to the definition of the term “dumping” set forth in Article 2.1.

Chinese Taipei then notes that a similar approach was adopted by the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway). That panel explained its approach by reference to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:

We consider that imports attributable to a producer or exporter for which a *de minimis* margin of dumping is calculated may not be treated as “dumped” for purposes of the injury analysis in that investigation. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides that there shall be “immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*”. Thus, it is clear that no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. In our view, a finding of *de minimis* dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer or exporter in question. If there is no legally cognizable dumping by a particular producer or exporter, as a result of a finding of *de minimis* margins, then it seems inescapable to us that imports attributable to such producer or exporter may not be treated as “dumped” imports for any aspect of that investigation.

We see logic in the panel referring to the second sentence of Article 5.8 when considering the meaning of the phrase "dumped imports" in Article 3, since the requirement to immediately terminate an investigation in respect of an exporter with a final *de minimis* margin of dumping suggests that imports from that exporter should not be treated as dumped. However, the relevance of the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel’s finding in the present case is not apparent since, for the reasons outlined below, we do not consider that the second sentence of Article 5.8 applies in respect of preliminary affirmative determinations of dumping.

Article 7.2 makes it clear that the preliminary determination relates to “the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated”, and the “provisionally estimated margin of dumping”. This "preliminary affirmative determination" of dumping is therefore no more than a provisional estimate. This reflects the fact that the provisional determination may be based on data that is incomplete, or that the investigating authority has not yet satisfied itself is accurate. We do not consider that an investigating authority would be required to immediately terminate an
investigation on the basis of only a provisional estimate of the amount of dumping determined using unverified data. Nor do we consider that the "legal cognizance" of dumping should be based on no more than a provisional estimate. The parties also agree that it is only a final determination of a de minimis margin of dumping that triggers immediate termination under Article 5.8. Chinese Taipei even goes so far as to assert that "[t]his finding relating to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is irrelevant to the issue of the application of provisional measures". In these circumstances, the findings of the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel are not relevant to the interpretation of the term "dumping" in the context of Article 7.1(ii), and those findings therefore provide no support for an argument that there is no legally cognizable dumping once a preliminary affirmative determination of de minimis dumping has been made.

7.65. In addition, Chinese Taipei also refers to the object and purpose of Article 7.1. Chinese Taipei asserts that Article 7.1 is designed to strike a balance between the need to safeguard free trade as long as there is no final determination that anti-dumping duties are actually justified and the application of provisional measures in case these are necessary to prevent injury being caused while the investigation is carried out. As indicated by Canada, the Appellate Body has already stated that no object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has been formulated. Furthermore, even if Chinese Taipei had correctly identified the object and purpose of Article 7.1, we note that such purpose is broadly reflected in the requirement, set forth in Article 7.1(iii), that "the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation". It is entirely possible that an investigating authority might determine that provisional measures are not necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation by imports from an exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping. However, this determination would be made pursuant to Article 7.1(iii), rather than Article 7.1(ii). Chinese Taipei has not pursued any claim under Article 7.1(iii).

7.66. For the above reasons, we reject Chinese Taipei’s claim that Canada acted in violation of Article 7.1(ii) by applying provisional measures in respect of imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping.

7.5 Additional claims under Articles 1, 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

7.5.1 Introduction

7.67. Chinese Taipei contends that the imposition of provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping is inconsistent with Articles 1, 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.

7.68. The first sentence of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:

An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

7.69. Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides in relevant part:

When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which price undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted.

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91 Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, para. 53.
92 We note that the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel also stated that imports attributable to a de minimis producer or exporter should not be treated as dumped "for any aspect of that investigation". However, consistent with our reasoning above, we do not interpret this to be referring to the provisional measure stage of the investigation.
93 Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, para. 48.
95 Fn omitted.
7.70. Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:

The relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures.

7.71. The first sentence of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides:

In order to offset or prevent dumping, a Member may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.

7.72. Canada asks the Panel to reject Chinese Taipei’s claims.

7.5.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.73. Chinese Taipei asserts that exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping do not constitute "sources found to be dumped" within the meaning of Article 9.2 first sentence of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei contends that the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on exporters with de minimis margins of dumping is therefore inconsistent with Article 9.2.\textsuperscript{96} Chinese Taipei submits that Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies equally to the imposition of provisional measures, by virtue of Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei contends that the phrase "sources found to be dumped" cannot be given a different meaning in the context of provisional measures.\textsuperscript{97} According to Chinese Taipei, therefore, Canada’s imposition of provisional duties on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping is inconsistent with Article 7.5.\textsuperscript{98}

7.74. Chinese Taipei contends that Canada violated Article VI:2 first sentence of the GATT 1994 by imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with preliminary de minimis dumping margins, and by imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping.\textsuperscript{99} According to Chinese Taipei, the existence of de minimis margins of dumping means that there was no dumping to offset or prevent as required under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Chinese Taipei alleges that the violation of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 necessarily entails a violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.\textsuperscript{100}

7.75. Canada insists that the CBSA acted in accordance with the requirements of Articles 7.5 and 9.2. In particular, Canada argues that Article 9.2 allows the imposition of anti-dumping duties on all sources found to be dumped. Canada asserts that Article 9.2 contains no exception for individual exporters with de minimis margins of dumping.\textsuperscript{101} Canada contends that there is therefore no basis to uphold Chinese Taipei’s consequential claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{102}

7.5.3 Evaluation by the Panel

7.76. We recall our finding that Canada violated the second sentence of Article 5.8 by failing to terminate its investigation in respect of individual Chinese Taipei exporters with margins of dumping of less than 2%. We also recall our findings that the second sentence of Article 5.8 only applies in respect of final margins of dumping that are de minimis. It follows that exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping should not have been treated as "sources found to be dumped" for the purpose of duty imposition under Article 9.2. The investigation in respect of those exporters should have been terminated immediately after final determinations of de minimis margins of dumping were made for those producers, and no anti-dumping measures should have been imposed on them. We therefore uphold Chinese Taipei’s claim that the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures in respect of imports from these exporters is inconsistent with

\textsuperscript{96} Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, paras. 87-93.
\textsuperscript{97} Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, para. 57.
\textsuperscript{98} Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, paras. 94-97.
\textsuperscript{99} Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, para. 105.
\textsuperscript{100} Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, para. 107.
\textsuperscript{101} Canada’s first written submission, para. 108.
\textsuperscript{102} Canada’s first written submission, para. 112.
Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As a result, we also uphold Chinese Taipei's claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 in respect of the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures on these exporters.

7.77. We have rejected Chinese Taipei's claim that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 7.1(ii) by imposing provisional anti-dumping measures on a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping. At the stage of its preliminary determination, the CBSA was entitled to treat this exporter as a "source[] found to be dumped" within the meaning of Article 9.2. At this preliminary stage, immediate termination under the second sentence of Article 5.8 was not required. There is therefore no basis for us to find that the imposition of provisional measures in respect of imports from this exporter is inconsistent with Articles 1 or 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, or Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.

7.6 The treatment of imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping in the injury investigation: Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.6.1 Introduction

7.78. Article 3, and the various sub-paragraphs thereof, require the investigating authority to demonstrate that "dumped imports" are causing material injury to a domestic industry. Chinese Taipei challenges the CITT's decision to treat imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" for the purpose of its injury and causation determinations.

7.6.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.79. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated each of the provisions of Article 3 that address the treatment of "dumped imports" in the investigating authority's injury and causation determinations (Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). In particular, Chinese Taipei asserts that Canada acted inconsistently with each of these paragraphs of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by treating imports from exporters determined by the CBSA to have de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" within the meaning of these provisions.103 Chinese Taipei contends that imports from de minimis exporters may not be treated as "dumped" within the meaning of Article 3, and refers to case law in support.104 According to Chinese Taipei, such imports should be excluded from the investigating authority's assessment of the injurious effects of "dumped imports".

7.80. Canada contends that imports with a de minimis margin of dumping remain "dumped" within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and are therefore properly treated as "dumped imports" for the purpose of the Article 3 injury and causation analyses. Canada asserts that only non-dumped imports should be excluded from the category of "dumped imports". In considering whether imports are "dumped", Canada contends that there is no distinction between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and imports that are dumped at a margin below de minimis. Canada relies on findings by the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel to support its position.105 Canada rejects the case law relied on by Chinese Taipei, either because it contends that those cases concerned exporters for which the margins of dumping or duties were zero, or because it contends that the panels were only making obiter dicta.106

103 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 115; second written submission, para. 69.
104 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, paras. 118-128 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)); and Panel Reports, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties; EC – Salmon (Norway); and EC – Fasteners (China)).
105 Canada's first written submission, para. 122 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 80).
106 Canada's first written submission, para. 123.
7.6.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.6.3.1 Brazil

7.81. Brazil agrees with Chinese Taipei that the term "dumped imports" does not include imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Brazil asserts that the DSB has already addressed this issue on different occasions.107

7.6.3.2 United Arab Emirates

7.82. The United Arab Emirates agrees with Chinese Taipei’s arguments and analysis that by failing to exclude from the “dumped imports” the imports of exporters for which a de minimis dumping margin had been determined, the investigating authority acts inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.108

7.6.4 Evaluation by the Panel

7.83. We have already examined, in the context of Chinese Taipei’s Article 7.1(ii) claim, the finding by the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel that imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping may not be treated as "dumped" for purposes of the injury analysis.109 The panel’s finding was based on the immediate termination requirement set forth in the second sentence of Article 5.8. On the understanding that the finding by the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel applies only in respect of a final determination of an exporter’s margin of dumping, we agree with that finding. Article 5.8 effectively means that there is no legally cognizable dumping by an exporter with a final de minimis margin of dumping. As a result, imports from that exporter should not be treated as "dumped" for the purpose of the analysis and final determinations of injury and causation.

7.84. Canada suggests that the facts of the present case should be distinguished from the facts at issue in EC – Salmon (Norway), because the definitive anti-dumping duty for the relevant exporter in that case was zero.110 Although Canada is correct as a factual matter that a zero duty was applied in the EC – Salmon (Norway) case, the amount of the duty was irrelevant to the finding of the panel. The panel’s finding was based rather on the fact that a de minimis margin of dumping had been established for that exporter. The panel stated expressly that "an interpretation of ‘dumped imports’ in Article 3 which would allow an investigating authority to include in the volume of dumped imports for purposes of injury analysis imports attributable to a producer/exporter for which a de minimis margin has been calculated is impermissible".111 The panel rejected arguments by the respondent that the fact that no anti-dumping duties were ultimately imposed on this exporter should justify the inclusion of its exports as "dumped imports".112

7.85. Canada also argues that, contrary to Chinese Taipei’s proposition, there are no Appellate Body decisions that endorse the approach advanced by Chinese Taipei.113 It is true that the Appellate Body jurisprudence invoked by Chinese Taipei did not address the issue of whether imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping are to be excluded from the injury analysis. Nevertheless, we consider this fact irrelevant. The findings of the EC – Salmon (Norway) panel have been adopted by the DSB. As a result, they give rise to legitimate expectations on the part of WTO Members, including Chinese Taipei.

7.86. Canada argues that there is Appellate Body support for its position that the phrase "dumped imports" includes any imports that are dumped, including those with only a de minimis rate of dumping. Canada refers in this regard to the finding by the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel

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107 Brazil’s third-party submission, para. 9.
109 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.628. We recall that the same finding was also made by the EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) and Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties panels.
110 Canada’s first written submission, para. 123; second written submission, para. 72.
111 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.628. (emphasis added)
112 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), paras. 7.627 and 7.628.
113 Canada’s second written submission, para. 71. We understand Canada to refer to Chinese Taipei’s reliance, at paragraphs 118 and 119 of its first written submission, on the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 111 and 113.
that the meaning of the term "subsidization" in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) is not confined to subsidization greater than \textit{de minimis}. \footnote{Canada's first written submission, para. 122; second written submission, para. 73 (both referring to Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Carbon Steel}, para. 80).}

7.87. The facts of the present case are very different from the facts in \textit{US – Carbon Steel}. In that case, the Appellate Body was examining whether or not the \textit{de minimis} standard set forth in Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement applies in Article 21.3 sunset reviews. The Appellate Body found that it did not:

\textit{[N]}one of the words in Article 11.9 suggests that the \textit{de minimis} standard that it contains is applicable \textit{beyond} the investigation phase of a countervailing duty proceeding. In particular,Article 11.9 does \textit{not} refer to Article 21.3, nor to reviews that may follow the imposition of a countervailing duty. \footnote{Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Carbon Steel}, para. 68. (emphasis original, fn omitted)}

7.88. The Appellate Body in the above extract was considering only whether the equivalent provision in the SCM Agreement should apply "beyond" the investigation phase. A different result is warranted in the factual circumstances of the present case, which concerns an original investigation. We are in no doubt that Article 5.8 applies in original investigations. The application of Article 5.8 means that there is no legally cognizable dumping by an exporter with a final \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping. Accordingly, imports from that exporter may not be treated as "dumped imports" for the purpose of the Article 3 injury analysis.

7.89. In light of the above, we find that Canada acted in a manner inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by treating imports from two Chinese Taipei exporters with final \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the CIT\textsc{t's} analysis and final determinations of injury and causation.

\textbf{7.7 The treatment of factors other than dumped imports in the causation analysis: Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement}

\textbf{7.7.1 Introduction}

7.90. Chinese Taipei's claims are based on the so-called "non-attribution" requirement set forth in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. After the first sentence of Article 3.5 requires the investigating authorities to demonstrate that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury, the third sentence provides:

\begin{quote}
The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.
\end{quote}

Previous panel and Appellate Body reports have established that investigating authorities are thereby required to "separate and distinguish" any injury caused by other known factors from the injury caused by the subject imports. \footnote{Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Hot-Rolled Steel}, para. 226.}

7.91. Following a negative determination of present material injury, the CIT\textsc{t} made an affirmative determination that dumped imports were causing a threat of material injury. In its threat determination, the CIT\textsc{t} considered the potential injury caused by two known other factors. Chinese Taipei submits that the CIT\textsc{t} should also have considered potential injury caused by two additional factors, namely: (a) the effect of subsidies provided in respect of imports from India (that were also dumped); and (b) overcapacity in the domestic industry.
7.7.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.7.2.1 The effect of subsidization

7.92. Chinese Taipei argues that the CITT failed to separate and distinguish the effect of the subsidy from the effect of the dumping in respect of imports from India that were both subsidized and dumped. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada thereby acted inconsistently with Article 3.5 and, as a result, Article 3.1. Chinese Taipei contends that Canada thereby rendered inutile the words "through the effects of dumping" contained in the first sentence of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.\(^\text{117}\) According to Chinese Taipei, the fact that Article 3.5 calls for a demonstration that the dumped imports are causing injury "through the effects of dumping" implies that the investigating authority needs to separate any effects that are not the result of dumping. In Chinese Taipei’s view, when the same goods are both dumped and subsidized, there may be effects of subsidization that are not directly reflected in the dumping margin, particularly in cases where subsidization leads to lower prices without increasing the dumping margin.\(^\text{118}\) Chinese Taipei submits that without analysing the relationship between the 36 subsidy programs available in India, including some non-export-oriented programs, and dumping in that country, Canada could not have assumed that there is no need to distinguish between the effects of dumping and the effects of subsidization.\(^\text{119}\)

7.93. Canada denies that an investigating authority is required to determine that injury or threat thereof was caused by the effects of the dumping specifically, as opposed to the dumped imports more generally. Canada submits that the Appellate Body established in Japan – DRAMS (Korea) that there is no requirement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement to determine that the effect of the dumping specifically caused or threatened to cause injury.\(^\text{120}\) The central issue is rather whether dumped imports caused or threatened to cause injury. Canada submits that, because all subsidized imports from India were also dumped, it was not improper for the CITT to include those imports in its causation analysis, without separating and distinguishing the subsidy and dumping effects embodied within those imports.\(^\text{121}\)

7.7.2.2 Overcapacity

7.94. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to separate and distinguish the effect of alleged overcapacity. Chinese Taipei submits that this factor was "known" to the CITT as a potential cause of injury.\(^\text{122}\)

7.95. Canada understands Chinese Taipei to equate overcapacity with low utilization of capacity.\(^\text{123}\) Canada contends that, pursuant to Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, capacity utilization is an indicator of injury rather than a potential cause of injury.\(^\text{124}\) According to Canada, therefore, there was no need for the CITT to examine this factor in the context of its non-attribution analysis. Canada contends that, even assuming that excess capacity may be a cause of injury in certain cases, Chinese Taipei has not demonstrated that it was a known cause of injury in the CSWP inquiry that the CITT had to examine in its threat of injury analysis.\(^\text{125}\)

7.7.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.7.3.1 Brazil

7.96. Brazil submits that, since Canada made a finding of threat of material injury, the non-attribution requirement in Article 3.5 does not apply. In Brazil's opinion, the legal standard that should guide the causation assessment in the present case should be that foreseen in Article 3.7, which makes reference to the obligation of an investigating authority to take into

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\(^\text{117}\) Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 94.
\(^\text{118}\) Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 95.
\(^\text{119}\) Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 101.
\(^\text{120}\) Canada's first written submission, para. 141; second written submission, para. 89.
\(^\text{121}\) Canada's second written submission, para. 92.
\(^\text{122}\) Chinese Taipei's first written submission, paras. 156 and 157; second written submission, para. 107.
\(^\text{123}\) Canada's first written submission, para. 146.
\(^\text{124}\) Canada's first written submission, paras. 146 and 147.
\(^\text{125}\) Canada's second written submission, para. 98.
consideration several factors that might contribute to a threat of damage to the domestic industry, such as those enshrined in subheadings (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of Article 3.7.  

7.7.3.2 European Union

7.97. The European Union observes that, according to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigating authority must demonstrate that the dumped imports, “through the effects of dumping”, are causing injury to the domestic industry within the meaning of that Agreement. The European Union is of the view that, as long as the prices are found to be dumped, subsidization causing the dumping is irrelevant for the injury and causation analysis under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  

7.7.3.3 United States

7.98. The United States considers that Chinese Taipei’s claims lack legal merit. The United States asserts that, by its plain text, Article 3.5 requires an examination of known factors other than the dumped imports, whereas Chinese Taipei would somehow require a non-attribution analysis with respect to these same dumped imports. The United States asserts that, by definition, in the context of applying Article 3.5, the dumped imports cannot simultaneously be both “dumped imports” and “factors other than the dumped imports”.  

7.7.4 Evaluation by the Panel

7.7.4.1 The effect of subsidization

7.99. Chinese Taipei’s claim concerns the CITT’s investigation of imports from India that were both dumped and subsidized. Chinese Taipei claims that the CITT should have separated the subsidy and dumping effects in those imports, and shown that injury was caused by the dumping effect only. Chinese Taipei’s position is that the non-attribution provision requires the investigating authority “to separate any effects that are not the result of dumping”.  

7.100. Chinese Taipei’s claim is inconsistent with the text of Article 3.5. The text of this provision focuses the injury analysis on the effect of the dumped imports, rather than on the effects of the dumping per se. The first sentence of Article 3.5 requires the investigating authority to “demonstrate[] that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury”. The first sentence of Article 3.5 therefore refers to injury being caused by the dumped imports that are the subject of the investigation, rather than by the effects of dumping. Moreover, “effects of the dumping” is modified by the phrase “as set forth in [Articles 3.2 and 3.4]”. Article 3.2 requires investigating authorities to consider the volume and price effects of the dumped imports. Similarly, Article 3.4 requires investigating authorities to examine “the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry”. The focus on the dumped imports continues in the non-attribution provision in the third sentence of Article 3.5, which requires investigating authorities to examine any known factors “other than the dumped imports” which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and ensure that any injury caused by such other factors is not attributed “to the dumped imports”. Logically, the imports subject to the investigation cannot simultaneously be both the “dumped imports” referred to in these provisions and factors “other than the dumped imports” referred to in the third sentence of Article 3.5.  

7.101. Chinese Taipei suggests that a focus on the effect of the dumped imports, as opposed to the effect of the dumping, reads the words “through the effects of dumping” out of the first sentence of Article 3.5. We disagree. As discussed above, the first sentence of Article 3.5 requires the investigating authority to demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury through the

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126 Brazil’s third-party submission, paras. 16 and 17.  
127 European Union’s third-party submission, para. 15.  
128 European Union’s third-party submission, para. 16.  
129 United States’ third-party statement, para. 11.  
130 Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, para. 94.
effects of dumping "as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4". This textual formulation indicates that information relating to the volume and price effects (Article 3.2) and the consequent impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry (Article 3.4) define the "effects of dumping" for purposes of determining whether material injury is caused by dumped imports through those effects. Provided a proper consideration and evaluation are undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3, the authority may properly demonstrate that dumped imports are causing injury through the effects of dumping.

7.102. Our understanding of the text of Article 3.5 is consistent with the findings of the Appellate Body in Japan – DRAMS (Korea). That case concerned the equivalent provision of the SCM Agreement, i.e. Article 15.131 Like Chinese Taipei in the present case, Korea argued before the Appellate Body inter alia that the panel's focus on the subsidized imports, rather than the effect of the subsidization, would read the "through the effects of subsidy" language out of Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body rejected Korea's appeal on the basis inter alia that:

It is clear from the architecture of Articles 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 that, for determining whether the "subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury" to the domestic industry, what is required is the examination of the effects of the subsidized imports as set forth in Articles 15.2 and 15.4. These paragraphs neither envisage nor require the two distinct types of examinations suggested by Korea, namely, an examination of the effects of the subsidized imports as per Articles 15.2 and 15.4; and, a second examination of the effects of the subsidies as distinguished from the effects of the subsidized imports on a case-by-case basis.

... We are therefore of the view that, if an investigating authority carries out the examination required under Articles 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5, such examination suffices to demonstrate that "subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury" within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.132

7.103. Chinese Taipei argues that the Appellate Body's findings are of limited utility because while the Appellate Body found that there is no obligation to distinguish the effects of subsidies from the effects of the subsidized imports it "did not address at all the distinction between the effects of dumping and the effects of the subsidies".133 Chinese Taipei therefore maintains its position that the phrase "'through the effects of dumping' implies that the investigating authority needs to separate any effects that are not the result of dumping".134 In making this argument, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize the full implications of the Appellate Body's findings for its claim. The Appellate Body confirmed that there is no need for the investigating authority to analyse the effect of the subsidy, as opposed to the effect of the subsidized imports. The starting point for Chinese Taipei's argument, namely the focus on the effect of the dumping or subsidy, is therefore flawed. The proper starting point for the causation and non-attribution analysis in an anti-dumping investigation is rather the effect of the dumped imports. There is no obligation to "separate any effects that are not the result of dumping" (such as effects that are the result of subsidization), because there is in any event no need to isolate the effects that are the result of dumping.

7.104. Chinese Taipei asserts that its position is supported by the findings of the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China). That case concerned Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994, which prohibits the concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization. In considering the meaning of the phrase "same situation", the Appellate Body observed that domestic subsidies will

131 Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement is virtually identical to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The reference in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the effects of dumping "as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4" is provided for in fn 47 to Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. Furthermore, Ministers have recognized "the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures". (Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Party V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
132 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMS (Korea), paras. 264 and 268.
133 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, paras. 91-93.
134 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 94.
generally affect the prices at which a producer sells its goods in the domestic market and in export markets in the same way and to the same extent, so that any lowering of prices attributable to the subsidy will be reflected on both sides of the dumping margin calculation. The Appellate Body contrasted this to the situation of an export subsidy, which will result in a pro rata reduction in the export price of a product but not the price of domestic sales of that product, resulting in a higher margin of dumping.\textsuperscript{135} Chinese Taipei contends that this finding supports its position that there may be situations where the effects of subsidies are unrelated to the effects of dumping.\textsuperscript{136}

7.105. We do not consider that the findings in \textit{US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)} offer any guidance for the interpretation of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. That case concerned a different provision of a different Agreement and an entirely different issue. No reference was made by the Appellate Body to the provisions governing causation or non-attribution requirements. Furthermore, the conclusion that Chinese Taipei seeks to draw from these findings is at odds with the above-mentioned findings made by the Appellate Body in \textit{Japan – DRAMs (Korea)}, concerning the very same issue arising under the essentially identical provision in the SCM Agreement.\textsuperscript{137} The fact that the Appellate Body has suggested in a different context that subsidies and dumping can have different effects is irrelevant, since the causation/non-attribution analysis is not focused on the dumping or subsidy effect.

7.106. For these reasons, we reject Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CITT acted inconsistently with Article 3.5 (and Article 3.1) by failing to separate the effect of the subsidization from the effect of the dumping in respect of subsidized and dumped imports from India.

\textbf{7.7.4.2 Overcapacity}

7.107. The Article 3.5 non-attribution requirement applies only in respect of other injurious factors that are "known" to the investigating authority. Chinese Taipei identifies two grounds for asserting that "overcapacity" was "known" to the CITT as a cause of injury that should have been examined pursuant to the non-attribution requirement: (a) the CITT’s reference to "the significant unused capacity of the domestic industry"\textsuperscript{138}; and (b) the written submission made by Knightsbridge, an interested party in the investigation.\textsuperscript{139, 140}

7.108. We understand the CITT’s reference to "the significant unused capacity of the domestic industry" as referring to the low capacity utilization rates prevailing in the domestic industry during the period of investigation, rather than overcapacity.\textsuperscript{141} Low capacity utilization and overcapacity are different concepts. This is acknowledged by Chinese Taipei itself:

TPKM considers that "low capacity utilization rates" and "overcapacity" are two distinct concepts that should not be equated. As explained in TPKM's replies to questions from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)}, para. 568.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Chinese Taipei’s second written submission, para. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{137} We emphasise that Ministers have recognized “the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures”. (Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Party V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
\item \textsuperscript{138} See CITT, Finding and Reasons, Injury Inquiry No. NQ-2012-003, 27 December 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-14), para. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{139} See Knightsbridge International Corp., Submission to CITT related to the Preliminary Injury Inquiry PI-2012-003, 18 June 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-16).
\item \textsuperscript{140} See Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, para. 154 (Chinese Taipei refers to "this huge overcapacity" immediately after citing the CITT’s reference to "the significant unused capacity of the domestic industry").
\item \textsuperscript{141} The reference to "the significant unused capacity of the domestic industry" is properly understood in its context. The first paragraph (para. 125) of the section entitled "Production, Capacity and Capacity Utilization" in Exhibit TPKM-14 addresses domestic production. The beginning of the first sentence of para. 126 refers to "stable" production capacity. The second part of that first sentence observes that there were, however, "very low utilization rates". The remainder of the CITT discussion in that section discusses those capacity utilization rates. In this context, the reference in para. 129 to "the significant unused capacity of the domestic industry" is properly understood as a continued reference to those same "very low [capacity] utilization rates". (CITT, Finding and Reasons, Injury Inquiry No. NQ-2012-003, 27 December 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-14)).
\end{itemize}
the Panel, while "overcapacity" stands for a situation where producer has capacity much larger than what is required by the demand on the market, the term "low capacity utilization rates" refers to the actual production as a percentage of the total (over-) capacity.\textsuperscript{142}

7.109. Since low capacity utilization and overcapacity are, in the words of Chinese Taipei, "two distinct concepts that should not be equated", the fact that the CITT knew of, and refers to, low capacity utilization is not sufficient to establish that overcapacity was also "known" to the CITT as a cause of injury.\textsuperscript{143}

7.110. Chinese Taipei refers to page 2 of Knightsbridge's submission which provides in relevant part:

In this case, we are all aware of the economic downturn affecting the majority of industry. We are all operating at less than 50% of where we were at. This is a reality that all business must adjust to. The ERW Pipe and Tube from the named countries are not to blame for reduced sales and profitability. There remains a need for this product to be imported to give customers access to a full product range and competitive prices.\textsuperscript{144}

7.111. Canada contends that this statement does not indicate that excess capacity was a cause of injury in the CSWP investigation. Canada suggests that Knightsbridge does not refer to excess capacity, but rather to a decline in the utilization of capacity, an indicator of injury listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada notes that, in the same paragraph of its submission, Knightsbridge also refers to reduced sales and profitability, two other listed indicators of injury.\textsuperscript{145}

7.112. We understand Knightsbridge's statement that "[w]e are all operating at less than 50% of where we were at" to mean that the industry in general was utilizing less than half of the capacity that it had previously utilized. In other words, this statement again refers to low capacity utilization, rather than overcapacity. Since the decline in capacity utilization could be caused by dumped imports, rather than overcapacity, this statement is not sufficient to establish that overcapacity was "known" to the CITT as an "other factor" causing injury.

7.113. In light of the above, we find that Chinese Taipei has failed to establish that overcapacity in the domestic industry was "known" to the CITT as a factor causing injury to the domestic industry. Accordingly, there is no basis for us to find that the CITT acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 3.5 (and Article 3.1) by failing to undertake a non-attribution analysis in respect of this factor.

7.8 The use of facts available in the determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters": Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.8.1 Introduction

7.114. Chinese Taipei challenges the way in which the CBSA used facts available for determining the dumping margin and duty rate for imports from non-cooperating exporters from Chinese Taipei, hereinafter also referred to as "all other exporters".\textsuperscript{146} Chinese Taipei asserts that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because

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\textsuperscript{142} Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 104.

\textsuperscript{143} Chinese Taipei argues at para. 105 of its second written submission that overcapacity "may be the cause of low capacity utilization rates". This is true. However, the fact that overcapacity may cause low capacity utilization simply confirms that the two concepts are distinct. And the fact that overcapacity "may" cause low capacity utilization demonstrates that the existence of low capacity utilization does not in and of itself demonstrate the existence of overcapacity. This is because the low capacity utilization may also be caused by other factors, such as dumped imports.


\textsuperscript{146} In this dispute, we use the term "all other exporters" as per the parties' use of this term.
the CBSA used facts available in determining the dumping margin and duty rate applicable to "all other exporters" without complying with the conditions laid down in those provisions. Chinese Taipei's claim does not concern the CBSA's resort to facts available per se. It is rather concerned with the nature of the available facts that the CBSA relied on and the methodology followed by the CBSA to determine the facts available.\footnote{Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 140.}

7.8.1.1 The relevant provisions

7.115. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its Annex II, paragraph 7, set out the requirements under which facts available can be resorted to. Article 6.8 provides that:

In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.

7.116. Annex II is entitled "Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6". Paragraph 7 thereof allows an investigating authority to base its determination on information from a secondary source, subject to certain conditions. Paragraph 7 provides that:

If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.

7.8.1.2 Factual background

7.117. The CBSA established the dumping margin and duty rate of 54.2% for "all other exporters" on the basis of facts available.\footnote{Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), paras. 112 and 198.} The margin and rate were determined using the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative producer from any country subject to the investigation.\footnote{Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), para. 110.} The relevant transaction was made by a cooperating producer from a country other than Chinese Taipei.\footnote{See Canada's and Chinese Taipei's responses to Panel question No. 4.6, para. 49 and para. 90, respectively.}

7.118. The CBSA explained its determination of the dumping margin for "all other exporters" as follows:

For all other exporters that did not provide the requested information during the course of the dumping investigation, normal values were determined in accordance with subsection 29(1) of SIMA, as in the opinion of the President, sufficient information has not been furnished or is not available to enable the determination of normal value as provided in sections 15 to 23 of the Act. In accordance with the ministerial specification, the normal values of the goods sold to the importer in Canada were determined by advancing the export prices of the goods as determined under section 24 of SIMA by the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction (54.2%) for a cooperative exporter.

For all of the other exporters, import pricing information available from the CBSA's internal information systems was used for the purposes of determining export price.
The subject goods exported to Canada by all other exporters during the POI were found to be dumped by a margin of dumping of 54.2%, expressed as a percentage of export price.\textsuperscript{151}

7.119. With regard to the applicable duty rate, the CBSA stated:

Exporters of subject goods who did not provide sufficient information in the dumping investigation will have normal values established by advancing the export price by 54.2% based on a ministerial specification pursuant to section 29 of SIMA. Anti-dumping duty will apply based on the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price of the subject goods.\textsuperscript{152}

7.120. The Ministerial Specification referred to by the CBSA provided the following:

Pursuant to subsection 29(1) of the \textit{Special Import Measures Act} (SIMA), I hereby specify that where, in your opinion, sufficient information has not been furnished or is not available to enable the determination of the normal value or the export price as provided for in sections 15 to 28 of SIMA, the normal value or the export price of the subject goods originating in or exported from Chinese Taipei, the Republic of India, the Sultanate of Oman, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, as the case may be, shall be determined in the following manner:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [a)] The normal value shall be determined on the basis of the export price as determined under section 24, 25 or 29 of SIMA, plus an amount equal to 54.2% of that export price.
  \item [b)] The export price shall be the selling price to the Canadian importer declared on customs entry documentation, adjusted by deducting therefrom all costs, charges, expenses, duties and taxes described in subparagraph 24(a)(i) to (iii) of SIMA, where this information is included with the customs documentation.\textsuperscript{153}
\end{itemize}

7.121. Section 5.12.2 of the SIMA Handbook entitled "Ministerial Specifications for Dumping Purposes" provides in relevant part that:

For the purposes of the final determination, and ... in respect of goods for which an exporter is required to provide information and fails to provide a complete response, normal values will be established by a ministerial specification pursuant to subsection 29(1) of SIMA. Normal values of the goods will be based on the export price determined under section 24 or 25 of SIMA plus an amount equal to the highest margin of dumping (expressed as a percentage of the export price), found for the final determination from exporters who were required to provide information and who fully complied with the Agency’s request for information.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{7.8.2 Main arguments of the parties}

7.122. Chinese Taipei submits that the CBSA's reliance on the highest transaction-specific amount of dumping for a non-Chinese Taipei exporter in its use of facts available is inconsistent with Article 6.8, and Annex II, paragraph 7. This claim is based on the following three grounds.

7.123. First, referring to WTO case law to the effect that facts available must not be applied to punish non-cooperation, Chinese Taipei submits that the CBSA's use of the highest

\textsuperscript{151} Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), paras. 110-112.
\textsuperscript{152} Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), para. 198.
\textsuperscript{153} CBSA, \textit{Ministerial Specification}, (Exhibit TPKM-20). Section 29(1) of SIMA, referred to in the Ministerial Specification, provides that "[w]here, in the opinion of the President, sufficient information has not been furnished or is not available to enable the determination of normal value or export price ... the normal value or export price, as the case may be, shall be determined in such manner as the Minister specifies." (Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15 (last amended on 1 November 2014), (Exhibits TPKM-25 and CAN-12) (exhibited twice), section 29(1)).
\textsuperscript{154} CBSA, \textit{SIMA Handbook}, sections 5.12-5.14, (Exhibit TPKM-17), section 5.12.2. The SIMA Handbook is a non-binding reference guide for the CBSA and provides a collection of its administrative practice.
transaction-specific amount of dumping was punitive.\textsuperscript{155} Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's final dumping determination shows that the CBSA considered the failure to provide requested information itself as being sufficient to justify the automatic use of the highest dumping margin.\textsuperscript{156} In support of its characterization of the CBSA's approach as punitive, Chinese Taipei observes that the CBSA selected the worst or among the most adverse information possible. Chinese Taipei also relies on the reference contained in the SIMA Handbook that failure to provide necessary information should not benefit the exporter.\textsuperscript{157}

7.124. Second, Chinese Taipei contends that the CBSA mechanistically relied on the highest transaction-specific amount of dumping, the approach essentially provided for at paragraph 5.12.2 of the SIMA Handbook, without evaluating and assessing in a comparative manner the available information on file in order to identify the "best information available" to reasonably replace the information that the "all other exporters" failed to provide.\textsuperscript{158} In making this argument, Chinese Taipei emphasizes that the CBSA's determination does not contain any explanation reflecting why it used the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for one cooperating exporter and which other available facts it had considered. In fact, according to Chinese Taipei, the CBSA ignored other information available on the record, in particular the information provided by the cooperating exporters from Chinese Taipei.\textsuperscript{159}

7.125. Third, Chinese Taipei argues that by resorting to information pertaining to the highest transaction-specific amount of dumping for a non-Chinese Taipei producer, the CBSA failed to consider what would be the "best information available" for determining the dumping margin and duty rate applicable to "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei.\textsuperscript{160} Chinese Taipei asserts that there is no logical relationship between the rate of 54.2\% and the exports from Chinese Taipei.\textsuperscript{161} It recalls that individual dumping margins had been determined for cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters accounting for a vast majority of exports from Chinese Taipei. It contends that information concerning those cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters would have been more representative for the Chinese Taipei market and its exports as a whole, and thus would have been the most fitting or most appropriate information to use in the calculation of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei.\textsuperscript{162}

7.126. Canada denies that the CBSA's use of facts available was punitive under the specific circumstances of the case.\textsuperscript{163} It emphasizes that the use of facts available may legitimately lead to less favourable results in case of non-cooperation, as foreseen in the third sentence of paragraph 7 of Annex II and recognized in WTO jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{164} Canada stresses that the investigating authority is allowed to draw adverse inferences from the exporter's failure to cooperate. Canada also asserts that the CBSA's use of facts available was based on verified facts gathered during the investigation, and on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate in the investigation.\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, Canada argues that the CBSA's approach could not be deemed punitive because it serves a legitimate policy purpose, namely encouraging participation of exporters in investigations and preventing circumvention through non-cooperation.\textsuperscript{166} Given that the CBSA did not use information from the petition, it also rejected the proposition that the worst information available had been used as facts available.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{155} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 178 (referring to Panel Reports, \textit{Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice}, para. 7.238; and \textit{China – GOES}, para. 7.302); second written submission, paras. 109-129.  
\textsuperscript{156} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 178.  
\textsuperscript{157} Chinese Taipei's second written submission, paras. 113, 123, and 128; first written submission, para. 178.  
\textsuperscript{158} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 179; second written submission, paras. 130-136.  
\textsuperscript{159} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 180; second written submission, para. 135.  
\textsuperscript{160} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 182; second written submission, paras. 137-141.  
\textsuperscript{161} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 182; second written submission, para. 139.  
\textsuperscript{162} Chinese Taipei's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46; second written submission, para. 139.  
\textsuperscript{163} Canada's first written submission, paras. 160-168; second written submission, para. 118.  
\textsuperscript{164} See references to, e.g. the Appellate Body Report, \textit{US – Carbon Steel (India)}, paras. 4.468 and 4.469; and Panel Report, \textit{EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips}, paras. 7.60 and 7.61.  
\textsuperscript{165} Canada's first written submission, para. 168.  
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.}
7.127. Canada asserts that the CBSA undertook a proper comparative assessment of all information on the record, without acting "mechanistically" or "automatically" when resorting to the highest transaction-specific amount of dumping for a cooperating exporter. It submits that the CBSA properly determined that the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price found on an individual transaction made by a cooperating non-Chinese Taipei exporter was "an appropriate basis" for establishing normal values for "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei. According to Canada, this determination was based on a careful evaluation and comparative assessment of all available evidence on the record of the investigation, including information provided by cooperating exporters from Chinese Taipei. Canada asserts that this is demonstrated by the record of the CSWP investigation, either explicitly, or by necessary implication. Canada argues that the CBSA's flexibility in evaluating facts available permitted the CBSA to conduct its comparative evaluation and assessment as part of the overall assessment of the information on the record instead of conducting a discrete analysis. Moreover, the CSWP investigation should be distinguished from instances where violations of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement have been found, such as cases where an investigating authority simply used facts provided by the petitioner without further scrutiny, selected facts in an arbitrary manner, or made determinations devoid of any factual foundation. Canada also suggests that the general practice of the CBSA to consider whether to disregard anomalous or aberrant transactions when selecting facts available necessarily involved taking into account every export transaction which ensured that the CBSA did not apply facts available in a "mechanistic" or "automatic" manner.

7.128. Canada recognizes that the information selected in the application of facts available must have a logical relationship to the information missing from the record. However, Canada asserts that Chinese Taipei failed to establish that the information selected, which pertained to actual sales transactions of subject goods during the period of investigation, lacks such logical relationship with exports from Chinese Taipei.

7.129. Canada also rejects Chinese Taipei's argument that the CBSA should have taken into account information pertaining to exporters from Chinese Taipei. Canada argues that the obligations under Annex II, paragraph 7, are procedural in nature and entrust the investigating authority with discretion and flexibility when selecting facts available. Hence, they do not require the CBSA to rely specifically on information provided by the cooperating exporters from Chinese Taipei. Nor do they guarantee a specific outcome among different legitimate options. In any event, Chinese Taipei may not request the Panel to conduct a de novo review as to what specific information the CBSA should have used in order to establish the margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei.

7.8.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.8.3.1 European Union

7.130. The European Union argues that adverse inferences may be drawn under the disciplines of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its Annex II, paragraph 7. Moreover, to the extent that the facts selected for establishing normal values are not devoid of factual foundation and can contribute to arriving at an accurate determination for the non-cooperating exporters, the
European Union considers the selection of adverse facts to be consistent with Article 6.8, and Annex II, paragraph 7.

7.8.3.2 United States

7.131. The United States argues that the alleged insufficiency of the CBSA’s explanation of the basis for its application of facts available should be addressed under Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not Article 6.8 thereof. In the view of the United States, the Panel should assess in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II whether the other exporters refused access to, or otherwise did not provide information that was necessary to the investigation within a reasonable period, or significantly impeded the investigation by CBSA. The Panel should also assess whether the CBSA provided a sufficient basis for its application of the facts available to the "all other exporters".

7.8.4 Evaluation by the Panel

7.132. This claim raises the issue of whether Canada acted in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect of the facts used by the CBSA to determine the margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters".

7.133. We begin our analysis by examining Chinese Taipei's argument that the CBSA failed to conduct a comparative evaluation and assessment of all the available facts. According to Chinese Taipei, Article 6.8, and Annex II, paragraph 7, required the CBSA to undertake a comparative evaluation and assessment of all the available evidence when selecting facts available. We observe that Chinese Taipei's argument is consistent with the applicable legal standard under Article 6.8, and Annex II, paragraph 7, developed by WTO adjudicators. In particular, we observe that the panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice found in respect of Article 6.8, and Annex II:

"The use of the term "best information" means that information has to be not simply correct or useful per se, but the most fitting or "most appropriate" information available in the case at hand. Determining that something is "best" inevitably requires, in our view, an evaluative, comparative assessment as the term "best" can only be properly applied where an unambiguously superlative status obtains. It means that, for the conditions of Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement and Annex II to be complied with, there can be no better information available to be used in the particular circumstances. Clearly, an investigating authority can only be in a position to make that judgement correctly if it has made an inherently comparative evaluation of the "evidence available"."

The panel's approach was upheld by the Appellate Body. We agree with the legal standard applied by the panel and Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, and shall apply it in the present case. The requisite comparative evaluation and assessment necessarily involves consideration and comparison of "all substantiated facts on the record", and must be sufficiently reflected in the investigation's published reports.

179 European Union's third-party submission, para. 27.
180 United States' third-party submission, para. 19.
181 United States' third-party submission, para. 20.
182 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.166 (emphasis original). See also Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.312.
183 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 289. Although instances may arise in which a comparative evaluation and assessment may not necessarily be required (see Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.434), none of the parties have invoked such circumstances to apply in the case at hand and the Panel has no reason to consider that the CBSA was not required to conduct a comparative evaluation and assessment.
184 Canada also accepts that this legal standard applies to the CBSA.
185 Appellate Body Reports, US – Carbon Steel (India), paras. 4.421 and 4.424; and US – Countervailing Measures (China), para. 4.179.
7.134. In the CSWP investigation, there were two relevant documents in the record of the investigation, namely the CBSA’s Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determinations of Dumping and Subsidizing, and the Ministerial Specification. The Statement of Reasons, in the relevant sections on the dumping margin and duty rate for “all other exporters”, states:

In accordance with the ministerial specification, the normal values of the goods sold to the importer in Canada were determined by advancing the export prices of the goods as determined under section 24 of SIMA by the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction (54.2%) for a cooperative exporter.

Exporters of subject goods who did not provide sufficient information in the dumping investigation will have normal values established by advancing the export price by 54.2% based on a ministerial specification pursuant to section 29 of SIMA.

7.135. The Statement of Reasons contains no comparative evaluation of the facts available, nor any explanation of why the CBSA relied on the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative exporter. It also does not contain any alternative considerations. The Statement of Reasons refers simply to the Ministerial Specification. That Ministerial Specification, though, also contains no reference to any comparative evaluation of facts on the record, but instead is limited in relevant part to the statement that:

The normal value shall be determined on the basis of the export price as determined under section 24, 25 or 29 of SIMA, plus an amount equal to 54.2% of that export price.

7.136. There is therefore nothing in the record’s relevant documents to suggest that the CBSA conducted any comparative evaluation or assessment of all available facts on the record before determining the basis for the margin of dumping and duty rate for “all other exporters”.

7.137. Canada alleges that the Ministerial Specification was established only after a careful, comparative and systematic evaluation and assessment of all the evidence on the record, on the basis of a three-step methodology employed by the CBSA. In particular, Canada submits:

[T]hat the record of the CSWP investigation establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA performed the following steps when selecting facts available in the determination of normal values for non-cooperating exporters:

- First, the CBSA examined all information on the record, including information provided in the complaint, information provided by cooperating exporters, and customs documentation.

- Second, the CBSA considered whether the information presented by the cooperating exporters, rather than information provided in other secondary sources (e.g., the complaint), was the best information on which to base the methodology for determining normal values.

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186 Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2).
188 Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), para. 110.
189 Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), para. 198.
191 We note that section 5.12.2 of the SIMA Handbook provides for increasing export prices by an amount equal to the highest amount of dumping found for a cooperating exporter as the default methodology when establishing facts available for the determination of normal values. It does not refer to any comparative evaluation and assessment of all available record evidence. It appears that in the CSWP investigation the CBSA followed the approach set out in section 5.12.2 of the SIMA Handbook. (CBSA, SIMA Handbook, sections 5.12-5.14, (Exhibit TPKM-17)).
192 Canada’s first written submission, paras. 170-172.
Third, after determining that verified information from the cooperating exporters was appropriate, the CBSA examined the difference between normal value and export price for each individual transaction for the exporters who provided sufficient information in order to identify an appropriate margin for the ministerial specification. In this process, the CBSA considered whether it was necessary to disregard any of those transactions as anomalies or aberrations. Based on its standard practice, the CBSA also took into account whether it was necessary to make any adjustments based on "[c]ommon sense, fairness and other practical considerations".  

7.138. At the first substantive meeting with the parties, the Panel asked Canada to explain in detail, by reference to record evidence and relevant documentation, the basis for its assertion that the record establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA had engaged in a systematic evaluation of all of the information on the record. Canada was unable to identify any precise element of the record in this regard. Instead, Canada merely referred to the entire Statement of Reasons, taken as a whole. Canada points to the parts of the Statement of Reasons according to which the CBSA had issued requests for information to all potential exporters and importers, considered their responses, issued supplemental requests for information, conducted on-site verifications, and provided its analysis in respect of each cooperating exporter. In addition, Canada refers to the ruling letters sent to the individual cooperating exporters, in particular those from Chinese Taipei, as providing further detail on the methodologies used to calculate each individual exporter's normal values and export prices and as showing how the CBSA had conducted a systematic evaluation of all of the information on the record for each exporter.

7.139. At the second substantive meeting with the parties, Canada maintained that the CBSA had considered it "appropriate" to resort to the highest margin of dumping found for a cooperating exporter in respect of a single transaction when selecting facts available. The Panel requested Canada to explain why the CBSA had considered this approach appropriate in the present case and to indicate where in the record this explanation is reflected. In response, Canada repeated the elements already mentioned above.

7.140. The factors identified by Canada fail, individually or taken as a whole, to show that the CBSA conducted a comparative evaluation and assessment of all the facts on record when selecting facts available in respect of the margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters". No element referred to by Canada expressly or implicitly addresses the issue of whether and, if so, how the CBSA evaluated and assessed the available information specifically with respect to and for purposes of determining the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters". The investigative and procedural steps taken by the CBSA, also invoked by Canada as part of the three-step methodology, are entirely unrelated to the specific issue of the selection of facts available in respect of "all other exporters". They simply demonstrate that the CBSA collected and verified a large volume of data. Collecting data is not the same as undertaking a comparative and systematic evaluation and assessment of that data for the purpose of applying facts available. Nor does checking for anomalies, aberrations, or the need for adjustments equate
to a comparative evaluation and assessment.\textsuperscript{202} Despite several specific requests from the Panel, Canada failed to provide any indication as to how the CBSA determined that the highest transaction-specific dumping margin from a cooperating exporter was appropriate, and even the best fitting information, for establishing dumping margins and duty rates for "all other exporters".\textsuperscript{203}

7.141. In light of the above, we conclude that the CBSA applied facts available in respect of the margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters" without undertaking a comparative evaluation and assessment of all the available information on the record before applying facts available in respect of "all other exporters".

7.142. Regarding Chinese Taipei’s argument that the CBSA should have relied on information concerning the cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters as the most fitting or most appropriate information, we recall our finding that the CBSA failed to conduct a comparative and evaluative assessment of all the record evidence when determining that the highest amount of dumping for a specific transaction for any cooperating exporter should be used as facts available. Absent any such comparative and evaluative assessment by the CBSA, the Panel has no basis on which to determine whether information concerning cooperative exporters from Chinese Taipei would have been the "best information available".

7.143. Considering the above, we do not need to reach a definitive conclusion in respect of Chinese Taipei’s argument that the CBSA used facts available to punish "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei. We observe, however, that both parties accept that any punitive use of facts available is inconsistent with the disciplines on facts available.\textsuperscript{204} They also share the view that duty rates for non-cooperating exporters – based on facts available – may serve to encourage cooperation and prevent anti-dumping duty circumvention. We do not disagree. There may be a fine line between, on the one hand, incentivizing cooperation and preventing circumvention and, on the other hand, punishing non-cooperating exporters. In the case at hand, it appears to us that by singling out the highest transaction-specific amount of dumping from a cooperative exporter without any comparative evaluation and assessment, and without any form of explanation, the CBSA went beyond what was appropriate and necessary to achieve the objectives of encouraging cooperation and preventing circumvention.\textsuperscript{205}

7.144. In light of the above, we find that the CBSA acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its Annex II, paragraph 7, when establishing the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters" on the basis of the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative producer from any country subject to the investigation.

7.9 The treatment of imports of new product models or types

7.9.1 Introduction

7.145. Under a prospective normal value duty assessment system as operated by Canada, the amount of anti-dumping duty is generally equivalent to the difference between the export price and the pre-determined, or prospective, normal value established for the particular product model being imported. Prospective normal values are usually established during the investigation for the models or types of the product subject to the investigation to the extent that such models or types have been exported by foreign producers/exporters to Canada during the period of investigation.

7.146. A difficulty arises in the event that a producer/exporter exports new product models or types after the investigation has been completed and an anti-dumping measure is imposed. Such

\textsuperscript{202} It is more than obvious that the fact that a transaction is not anomalous or aberrant or does not need adjustment does not mean that it is appropriate to use as facts available.

\textsuperscript{203} See the second step of the CBSA’s methodology invoked by Canada.

\textsuperscript{204} This is in line with established WTO case law. (See Panel Reports, China – GOES, para. 7.302; and Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.238; and Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.468).

\textsuperscript{205} We do not exclude that there could be circumstances in which a single transaction made by a cooperating exporter may appropriately be selected as facts available. However, the onus would be on the investigating authority to explain the need for such an approach.
product models or types will not have been examined during the investigation, since they did not exist or were not exported to Canada during the period of investigation. Consequently, the investigating authority will not have established any normal values for them. Accordingly, anti-dumping duties cannot be assessed by simply comparing the export price to a model-specific prospective normal value. This claim concerns the determination by the CBSA of the alternative basis for duty assessment to be used for new product models or types.

7.147. In its Final Determination, the CBSA established an amount of duty for imports of new product models or types from two investigated and cooperative Chinese Taipei exporters using facts available. The CBSA determined that the amount of duty would be the difference between the export price and the export price increased by 54.2%.206 This is the same methodology as it used for establishing the facts available duty rate for "all other exporters".207 This margin of dumping is significantly higher than the de minimis margins of dumping that had been determined for the Chinese Taipei exporters at issue in the original investigation.

7.148. Chinese Taipei pursues a number of claims concerning the CBSA's determination. First, Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 9.3 because the anti-dumping duty applied in respect of new product models or types is the same as the all others rate, and therefore does not reflect the margin of dumping established for the relevant exporters during the original investigation. Second, Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it resorted to facts available for the calculation of the normal value for new product types without finding that the relevant exporters had failed to cooperate. Third, Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for new product models or types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology that is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Fourth, Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in establishing a second margin of dumping for new product models or types, Canada determined more than one individual margin of dumping for the cooperating exporters. We discuss each of these claims below.

7.9.2 The relevance of the margin of dumping established during the investigation: Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.9.2.1 Main arguments of the parties

7.149. Chinese Taipei's claim is based on the chapeau of Article 9.3, which provides that "the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2".

7.150. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada improperly applied anti-dumping duties on imports of new product models or types for investigated and cooperative exporters on the basis of the residual duty rate, rather than using the margins of dumping established for those exporters during the original investigation.208 In particular, Chinese Taipei claims that in a prospective normal value system, such as the one in Canada, the normal value calculated for the purposes of determining the dumping margin during the original investigation constitutes the relevant benchmark when determining the anti-dumping duty.209 Chinese Taipei claims that the margin of dumping established by the CBSA for each exporter during the original investigation was necessarily for the product under investigation as a whole for each exporter.210 Chinese Taipei submits that because new product types still fall within the category of the product under investigation, a margin of dumping had already been established for those product types during the investigation. Chinese Taipei contends that, consistent with the chapeau of Article 9.3, the anti-dumping duties collected on imports of new product models or types should therefore not exceed the margin of dumping established during the investigation.

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206 See, for example, CBSA, Final Dumping Determination regarding Chung Hung Steel Corporation, 9 November 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-22) (BCI), appendices 2 and 3.
207 See above at para. 7.117.
208 Chinese Taipei's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 56; second written submission, para. 157.
209 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 163.
210 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 212.
7.151. Canada contends that Chinese Taipei ignores that the chapeau of Article 9.3 contains a general obligation that is implemented through the more specific sub-paragraphs of that provision.\(^{211}\) Canada suggests that the Appellate Body has found that Members comply with Article 9.3 by refunding any excess duties collected:

The sub-paragraphs of Article 9.3 – including, of particular relevance here, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 – specify in greater detail how investigating authorities are to comply with this more general obligation, namely, by providing for refunds to respondents whose duties have exceeded their dumping margins. Article 9.3.1 deals with such refunds for Members employing a retrospective system for the assessment and collection of anti-dumping duties, whereas Article 9.3.2 deals with those Members, such as Mexico, employing a prospective system.\(^{212}\)

7.152. According to Canada, Members that employ prospective normal value systems comply with Article 9.3 by following the obligations under Article 9.3.2. Canada observes that, under Article 9.3.2, a refund for overpayment of duties is available if: (a) an importer of subject goods actually pays anti-dumping duties; and (b) that importer requests a refund for overpayment that is duly supported by evidence. Canada asserts that, because no evidence on the record indicates that Chinese Taipei exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request, the CBSA cannot be said to have violated Article 9.3.2 or the general obligation under Article 9.3.\(^{213}\) Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claim is therefore premature, and must be rejected on the basis that Chinese Taipei has not established a prima facie case of violation.

7.153. Furthermore, Canada denies that the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 is limited to the margin of dumping established for the product as a whole in the original investigation. Canada contends that Chinese Taipei’s position is contradicted by case law concerning the payment and collection of anti-dumping duties in prospective normal value systems. First, Canada relies on the finding by the Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties panel that the margin of dumping established during the investigation was not the ceiling for the levy of anti-dumping measures.\(^{213}\) Canada also relies on the finding by the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway), in the specific context of duty assessment conducted on a prospective basis, that anti-dumping duties should not exceed the actual margin of dumping determined on the sales that are subject to duty assessment.\(^{215}\)

7.9.2.2 Main arguments of third parties

7.9.2.2.1 European Union

7.154. The European Union understands that Canada operates a prospective duty assessment system, which is explicitly authorised under Article 9.3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The European Union contends that it is in the nature of such a system that anti-dumping duties assessed on a prospective basis are subject to final assessment, so that the importer of the product is entitled to obtain, upon request, a prompt refund of any such duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping.\(^{216}\) The European Union asserts that there is no indication that the Anti-Dumping Agreement excludes the possibility for an authority to assess the amount of duties on a prospective basis in respect of product types or models for which a normal value has not previously been determined, because such types or models of subject products were not exported to the territory of that authority during the period of investigation.\(^{217}\) Provided that all the obligations in Article 9.3.2 are complied with, the European Union regards the operation of a prospective duty assessment system, and its application to new types or models of products

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\(^{211}\) Canada’s first written submission, paras. 196 and 197; second written submission, para. 136.

\(^{212}\) Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 311. (emphasis original)

\(^{213}\) Canada’s first written submission, para. 199.

\(^{214}\) Canada’s first written submission, para. 201; second written submission, para. 139.

\(^{215}\) Canada’s first written submission, para. 202.

\(^{216}\) European Union’s third-party submission, para. 37.

\(^{217}\) European Union’s third-party submission, para. 39.
subject to an anti-dumping investigation, as being consistent with the basic requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.²¹⁸

7.9.2.3 Evaluation by the Panel

7.155. The *chapeau* of Article 9.3 establishes a general requirement that the amount of anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping.²¹⁹ As discussed elsewhere in this Report, the phrase "margin of dumping" is exporter-specific.²²⁰ The Appellate Body has explained, in reference to the *chapeau* of Article 9.3, that investigating authorities "are required to ensure that the total amount of anti-dumping duties collected on the entries of a product from a given exporter shall not exceed the margin of dumping established for that exporter".²²¹ This finding reflects the fact that the *chapeau* of Article 9.3 establishes a fundamental link between: (a) a particular exporter’s margin of dumping; and (b) the maximum amount of anti-dumping duty applicable to imports from that particular exporter. According to its title, Article 9 governs both the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties. The margin of dumping established for an exporter therefore serves as a ceiling for the amount of anti-dumping duty imposed or collected in respect of imports from that exporter.

7.156. Canada argues²²² that, in the context of a prospective normal value or variable duty assessment system, the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 need not be restricted to the margin of dumping established in the original investigation. Instead, the ceiling may be determined by reference to the "actual" margin of dumping referred to in Article 9.3.2. Canada’s argument is consistent with the finding by the panel in *EC – Salmon (Norway)* that:

> [T]he obligation in Article 9.3 to ensure that anti-dumping duties are not collected in excess of the "margin of dumping as established under Article 2" does not prohibit an investigating authority from imposing and collecting anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping calculated in the *original investigation*. In the specific context of duty assessment conducted "on a prospective basis", which is the situation that is before us at present as regards the application of the fixed duties, what is important in terms of compliance with Article 9.3 (and Article 9.1) of the AD Agreement is that any duties imposed and collected on investigated parties do not exceed the *actual* margin of dumping determined on the sales that are subject to duty assessment.²²³

7.157. We agree with this finding. If an updated, "actual" margin of dumping is determined with respect to particular imports at some time after the original investigation has been completed, that updated margin of dumping serves as the ceiling for the amount of anti-dumping duty that may be imposed or assessed on those imports. In other words, the ceiling for the imposition or collection of anti-dumping duties is the exporter-specific margin of dumping prevailing at any given time. However, recognizing that an exporter’s margin of dumping may change over time is very different from allowing a particular exporter’s margin of dumping to be ignored, and the duty ceiling for that exporter to be established by reference to some other exporter’s data.

7.158. Even if the margin of dumping established in the original investigation is subsequently replaced by an updated, "actual" margin of dumping, the updated margin of dumping still relates to the particular exporter at issue. The findings of the *EC – Salmon (Norway)* panel do not envisage anti-dumping duties be imposed or collected with respect to imports from one exporter by reference to some other exporter’s margin of dumping. The panel explicitly stated that the updated, "actual" margin of dumping must "represent[,] the difference between an investigated party’s normal value and the export price of the transaction subject to duty assessment".²²⁴

²¹⁸ European Union’s third-party submission, para. 40.
²¹⁹ We note that the Appellate Body has referred to the *chapeau* as containing a "general obligation". (See Appellate Body Report, *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, para. 311). The Appellate Body has also referred to the "overarching requirement" set forth in the *chapeau* of Article 9.3. (See Appellate Body Report, *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)*, para. 102).
²²⁰ See above, paras. 7.18–7.37.
²²² Canada’s second written submission, paras. 147–152.
²²³ Panel Report, *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, para. 7.760 (fn omitted, emphasis original). The same approach was taken by the panel in *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*.
We emphasise in this regard the panel's reference to the updated margin of dumping still being based on the "investigated party's normal value".

7.159. In this case, we are not dealing with a situation where the margins of dumping established for the relevant exporters determined during the investigation were replaced by updated, "actual" margins of dumping established for those same exporters. Nor did Canada use normal values determined for those exporters in establishing a duty rate for imports of new models or types of the product from those exporters. Rather, the CBSA established a duty rate for such imports from these two exporters based on data collected during the original investigation from a different exporter. The CBSA thereby failed to preserve the fundamental link, established by the chapeau to Article 9.3, between the amount of the anti-dumping duty imposed or collected in respect of a given exporter and a margin of dumping established for that exporter. There is no basis in the findings of EC – Salmon (Norway) panel for the CBSA's approach and determination.225

7.160. Canada argues that Members comply with the chapeau of Article 9.3 by complying with the obligations under Article 9.3.2. Canada refers in this regard to the Appellate Body's finding in US – Continued Zeroing that "[t]he collection of anti-dumping duties on the basis of a prospective normal value is only an intermediate stage of collection, since it is subject to final assessment and 'a prompt refund, upon request', under Article 9.3.2".226 Canada also refers to the Appellate Body's finding in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice that "[t]he sub-paragraphs of Article 9.3 ... specify in greater detail how investigating authorities are to comply with [the] more general obligation [set forth in the chapeau], namely, by providing for refunds to respondents whose duties have exceeded their dumping margins."227

7.161. Canada's reliance on these Appellate Body findings is not well-founded. These cases addressed different issues, and nothing in the Appellate Body's findings suggests that anti-dumping duties may be imposed on imports from one exporter on the basis of the margin of dumping established for another exporter. Nor do we read the Appellate Body as finding that the fundamental link between the margin of dumping established for an exporter and the amount of duty imposed or collected in respect of that exporter, established in the chapeau of Article 9.3, does not apply at the intermediate stage of collection.228

7.162. We do not accept that the Appellate Body's findings should be interpreted to mean that, in the context of a prospective normal value duty assessment system, a Member may initially impose whatever anti-dumping duty it chooses, provided there is a refund mechanism consistent with Article 9.3.2. Article 9.3.2 simply provides that, under a prospective assessment system, "provision shall be made for a prompt refund". Such a refund mechanism certainly establishes one means of ensuring that duty collection remains consistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article 9.3.2. However, this does not mean that the provision of an effective refund mechanism addresses all potential violations of the chapeau of Article 9.3.229 If it did, there would be no need for the chapeau.

7.163. In the context of a retrospective assessment system, the Appellate Body has stated that "Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is subject to the overarching requirement in Article 9.3 that the amount of anti-dumping duty 'shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2' of that Agreement".230 We consider that this statement applies equally

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225 Canada also invokes the findings of the panel in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties. Although that panel accepted the use of variable anti-dumping duties, there is nothing in the findings of that panel to support the approach adopted by Canada in respect of new product model types.

226 Canada’s first written submission, para. 204 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 295). (emphasis original)

227 Canada’s second written submission, para. 138 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 311).

228 Indeed, the fact that the Appellate Body refers in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice to refunds for respondents "whose duties have exceeded their dumping margins" rather confirms this fundamental link. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 311 (emphasis added))

229 Canada observes that Article 18.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers to "refund procedures" under paragraph 3 of Article 9. (Canada's response to Panel question No. 10.2, para. 34). We do not read this to mean that Article 9.3 is concerned exclusively with refund procedures.

in respect of Article 9.3.2.\textsuperscript{231} If the refund mechanism provided for in sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9.3 remains "subject to" the "overarching requirement" of the chapeau, the chapeau must have application independently of those refund mechanisms.

7.164. In addition, if the chapeau of Article 9.3 were understood to allow the approach taken by Canada, any Member could impose an anti-dumping duty that is so high that imports effectively cease, and argue that it was not acting inconsistently with Article 9.3 because its refund mechanism ensured compliance. But the absence of imports would preclude any refund proceeding, and interested parties could be left without recourse under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.\textsuperscript{232}

7.165. Canada further contends that, without recourse to facts available, anti-dumping duties could "never" be collected on new models.\textsuperscript{233} This is also not correct. Without resolving the question of how anti-dumping duties may be imposed or collected in respect of new product models or types in a prospective normal value system, we note that Canada has explained that it can initiate "re-investigations" to determine normal values for future imports of new product model types not covered by the original investigation.\textsuperscript{234} Anti-dumping duties in respect of new product models or types could be collected once the re-investigation is complete. In the meantime, reasonable security could be required, pursuant to the first paragraph of the Ad Note to Article VI:2 and 3 of the GATT 1994. Alternatively, anti-dumping duties in respect of imports of new product models or types could initially be collected on the basis of the normal value(s) established for the relevant exporter or other relevant information from the original investigation. We note in this regard Canada's statement that "[i]t is a reasonable starting point to apply information from the original investigation to imports of new product models subject to an ongoing anti-dumping measure when there is no other information available in relation to those imports".\textsuperscript{235} We do not disagree. However, in such a case, the information from the original investigation to use as a starting point must pertain to the exporter in question, and not to some other exporter.

7.166. Finally, we note Canada's argument that Chinese Taipei's Article 9.3 claim is premature, because no imports of new product model types have yet been assessed, and no refund proceeding has yet taken place. As explained above, we consider that the chapeau to Article 9.3 applies independently of Article 3.2.1 (or Article 9.3.1 in respect of retrospective assessment systems).\textsuperscript{236} The chapeau applies whenever an anti-dumping duty is imposed or collected. It therefore applies when an anti-dumping duty is imposed, even if the absence of imports means that no duty is actually collected. Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that a matter may be referred to the DSB provided "final action has been taken ... to levy definitive anti-dumping duties". Canada acknowledges that "final action" has been taken, in that the CBSA has put in place a mechanism that will lead to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties when new models or types are imported.\textsuperscript{237} For these reasons, we see no basis to conclude that Chinese Taipei's claim is premature.

\textsuperscript{231} We also observe that Article 9.3.2 does not even refer to prospective normal value duty assessment specifically (it refers more generally to duty assessment "on a prospective basis"). We therefore consider it unlikely that provision of an effective refund mechanism would necessarily cover all possible issues arising in such a duty assessment system.

\textsuperscript{232} Canada asserts that our interpretation of the chapeau of Article 9.3 would lead to the result that an investigating authority would comply with Article 9.3 by providing an appropriate refund, yet violate Article 9.3 by collecting duties in excess of the appropriate amount. (Canada's response to Panel question No. 10.2, para. 37). However, as explained above, the chapeau imposes a requirement that the amount of duty imposed or collected in respect of imports from an exporter shall not exceed the margin of dumping established for that exporter. Breach of this requirement cannot be remedied through the Article 9.3.2 refund mechanism.

\textsuperscript{233} Canada's first written submission, para. 209.

\textsuperscript{234} Canada's response to Panel question Nos. 5.10 and 7.3.

\textsuperscript{235} Canada's response to Panel question No. 5.9, para. 73.

\textsuperscript{236} This is consistent with the finding by the panel in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina) that the European Union violated Article 9.3 by imposing anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping that should have been established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, independent of any finding under Articles 9.3.1 or 9.3.2. (Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.367).

\textsuperscript{237} Canada's response to Panel question No. 10.2, para. 33. Canada contends that the fact that "final action" has been taken does not allow a complaining party to disregard substantive elements of treaty obligations. We recall that the chapeau to Article 9.3 imposes an overarching requirement of broad application, independent of Articles 9.3.1 and 9.3.2. Accordingly, the substantive elements of the chapeau are not being ignored.
7.9.3 The CBSA's use of facts available: Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.9.3.1 Main arguments of the parties

7.167. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by resorting to facts available for the calculation of the duty rate for imports of new product models or types from cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters without complying with the conditions laid down in those provisions. Chinese Taipei contends that it is only when the interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, the necessary information or when it significantly impedes the investigation that the investigating authority is allowed to use other information for making its preliminary and final determinations. Chinese Taipei notes that the CBSA never determined that the relevant exporters had failed to cooperate with its investigation in any way. Furthermore, Chinese Taipei submits that it cannot be claimed that cooperating exporters refused access to or did not provide "necessary information" given that such information was "non-existent". Otherwise, according to Chinese Taipei, this could lead to the result that an interested party which fully participates and cooperates in the investigation could be subject to facts available determinations simply because it did not provide information that was non-existent.

7.168. Chinese Taipei also submits that, even if the use of facts available had been warranted, by using the highest margin of dumping calculated for a single transaction concerning an exporter from another country, the CBSA failed to use the "best information available", or the "most appropriate information available". Chinese Taipei asserts that the information provided by the two cooperating exporters themselves in the original investigation would constitute the "best information available". China recognises that an anti-dumping duty may be applied even to the category of producers/exporters who did not exist, or did not export during the POI, until they request an individual rate through a new-shipper review; "best information available". Article 6.8 and Annex II are very explicit regarding the conditions that must exist before an investigating authority may resort to facts available. The existence of a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mean that the conditions should be ignored in order to fill the gap. Although the lack of guidance in the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding how dumping margins should be calculated for unknown exporters, Article 6.8 and Annex II are very explicit regarding the conditions that must exist before an investigating authority may resort to facts available. The existence of a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mean that the conditions should be ignored in order to fill the gap. Although the lack of guidance in the Anti-Dumping Agreement may leave investigating authorities with some discretion regarding the calculation of margins of dumping for unknown exporters, in our view, this discretion should not extend to acting inconsistently with the express terms of Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II.

7.169. Canada justifies its recourse to facts available in respect of new product models or types by arguing that, without recourse to facts available, anti-dumping duties could "never" be levied on new models. Referring to panel and Appellate Body reports concerning the use of facts available for determining residual rates for unknown or non-existing exporters, Canada suggests that an investigating authority may resort to facts available in situations where they act to the best of their ability to seek out all relevant information from interested parties under investigation. Canada asserts that the CBSA sought all relevant information from exporters during the initial investigation and the re-investigation. Canada submits that Chinese Taipei has presented no evidence showing that the CBSA failed to consider information relevant to new product models. Canada also contends that, when claiming that the CBSA's application of the ministerial specification contravenes paragraph 7 of Annex II, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize the variety

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238 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 217.
239 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 226.
240 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 227.
241 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 227; second written submission, para. 165.
242 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 232.
243 Ibid.
244 Canada's first written submission, para. 209.
245 Canada's first written submission, para. 210 and fn 165 (quoting Panel Reports, China – Autos (US), para. 7.130: "a residual duty rate may be determined on the basis of facts available if the record of the investigation shows that the [investigating authority] took all reasonable steps that might be expected from an objective and unbiased [investigating authority] to specify in detail the information requested from unknown producers"; China – Broiler Products, para. 7.302: "Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement implicitly recognises that an anti-dumping duty may be applied even to the category of producers/exporters who did not exist, or did not export during the POI, until they request an individual rate through a new-shipper review"; and China – GOES, para. 7.390: "[w]hile the Panel agrees that there is indeed a gap in the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding how dumping margins should be calculated for unknown exporters, Article 6.8 and Annex II are very explicit regarding the conditions that must exist before an investigating authority may resort to facts available. The existence of a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mean that the conditions should be ignored in order to fill the gap. Although the lack of guidance in the Anti-Dumping Agreement may leave investigating authorities with some discretion regarding the calculation of margins of dumping for unknown exporters, in our view, this discretion should not extend to acting inconsistently with the express terms of Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II.")
246 Statement of Reasons concerning the Final Determination, (Exhibit TPKM-2), paras. 20 and 21.
247 See CBSA, Notice of Conclusion of Re-Investigation, Dumping case AD/1396, 7 May 2013, (Exhibit TPKM-15).
248 See para. 7.120 above.
of review procedures under Canada’s trade remedies regime that fairly accommodate exporters and importers of new product models of subject goods. Canada observes that importers may seek re-determinations of the duty assessments and exporters may request re-investigations with respect to their normal values. Canada asserts that, so long as an exporter cooperates with these review procedures, duty assessments on new product models can be adjusted, and duties paid will be refunded, if warranted, consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.9.3.2 Evaluation by the Panel

7.170. Article 6.8 provides that facts available may only be used when an interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide "necessary information" within a reasonable period, or significantly impedes the investigation. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Annex II, use of facts available is subject to the investigating authority having “specif[ed] in detail the information required”, and having ensured that the party is aware that if information is not supplied within reasonable time, it may resort to facts available.

7.171. The CBSA did not apply facts available on the basis of the conditions set forth in Article 6.8 or Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, Canada acknowledges that these exporters “fully cooperated in the original investigation”. \(^{249}\) Furthermore, Canada asserts that “because the CBSA requires a model-specific normal value to assess duties, it uses facts available for product models it has yet to investigate”. \(^{250}\) Since the CBSA had “yet to investigate” the new product models or types at issue, there could be no basis for any determination that the Chinese Taipei exporters failed to provide any necessary information requested by the CBSA in the investigation thereof. In these circumstances, the CBSA’s use of facts available did not meet the requirements of Article 6.8 or Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. \(^{251}\)

7.172. Canada suggests that the CBSA’s reliance on facts available in the present case is supported by the approach taken in WTO dispute settlement to the application of facts available in respect of the determination of all other rates for unknown exporters. According to Canada, these decisions suggest that an investigating authority may resort to facts available in situations where they act to the best of their ability to seek out all relevant information from interested parties under investigation. \(^{252}\) Canada refers in this regard to the findings of the panels in China – Autos (US), China – Broiler Products, and China – GOES.

7.173. None of these cases support the CBSA’s resort to facts available in respect of imports of new product model types from cooperative exporters, since none of these cases allow the use of facts available outside of the conditions identified in Article 6.8 and Annex II. Indeed, in China – GOES, the panel stated specifically that although "there is indeed a gap in the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding how dumping margins should be calculated for unknown exporters, Article 6.8 and Annex II are very explicit regarding the conditions that must exist before an investigating authority may resort to facts available. The existence of a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mean that the conditions should be ignored in order to fill the gap." \(^{253}\) Furthermore, although in China – Autos (US) the panel accepted that facts available could potentially be used to determine the all others rate for unknown exporters, the panel found in that case that the investigating authority had failed to comply with the Annex II:1 requirement to “specify in detail to the unknown exporters the information required from them for the determination of the residual AD rate”. \(^{254}\) The panel in China – Broiler Products also insisted on compliance with Annex II:1, ultimately finding that the need for the relevant necessary

\(^{249}\) Canada’s response to Panel question No. 5.5, para. 51. Canada asserts that it requested information in respect of new product models as part of its re-investigation that concluded on 7 May 2013. (Canada’s response to Panel question No. 5.8, para. 65; see also second written submission, paras. 159–161). However, we note that facts available were applied for new product models or types in the CBSA’s final determination for the original investigation. Canada does not contend that relevant information was requested in the original investigation.

\(^{250}\) See Canada’s response to Panel question No. 5.6, para. 53.

\(^{251}\) In the alternative, even if the conditions for resort to facts available were considered to have been met by Canada, the CBSA’s actual selection of the facts on which to base its determination has already been shown to be flawed. The facts relied on by the CBSA in this context are the same as used by the CBSA to establish the rate for “all other exporters”. As explained above, the CBSA failed to undertake any comparative evaluation or assessment of all available information on the record in selecting those facts.

\(^{252}\) Canada’s first written submission, para. 210.

\(^{253}\) Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.390.

\(^{254}\) Panel Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.133.
information had been adequately communicated to interested parties.\textsuperscript{255} In all three cases, therefore, recourse to facts available was evaluated in light of the requirements of Article 6.8 and Annex II. In the present case, as outlined above at paragraph 7.171 those requirements have plainly not been met, and the CBSA’s use of facts available is inconsistent with those provisions.

7.174. Canada also argues\textsuperscript{256} that Chinese Taipei has presented no evidence showing that the CBSA failed to consider information relevant to new product models or types. This argument is not persuasive, since the burden is on Canada to demonstrate that the investigating authority informed interested parties of the information that was required of them and of the possibility that facts available would be used if that information was not provided, and that those parties failed to cooperate in the provision of that necessary information. There has been no such demonstration in the present case. On the contrary, as noted above, Canada has confirmed that the relevant exporters cooperated fully with the CBSA during the original investigation.

7.175. Finally, we note Canada’s argument that the CBSA was required to resort to facts available in order to fill a “gap”\textsuperscript{257} in the WTO anti-dumping disciplines. We are not persuaded that there is any gap in the relevant WTO disciplines. As explained in the previous section, other methods were open to Canada to impose or collect anti-dumping duties in respect of imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters, without resorting to facts available. Furthermore, even if there were a gap in the disciplines, we agree with the abovementioned finding of the panel in China – GOES that “[t]he existence of a lacuna in the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mean that the conditions [of Article 6.8 and Annex II] should be ignored in order to fill the gap”.\textsuperscript{258}

7.176. For the above reasons, we uphold Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CBSA’s use of facts available to determine the amount of anti-dumping duty imposed or collected on imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.9.4  The determination of normal values for new product models or types: Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7.9.4.1 Main arguments of the parties

7.177. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for imports of new product models or types from investigated exporters on the basis of a methodology that is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.\textsuperscript{259}

7.178. Canada notes that Chinese Taipei has not referred to a single shipment of a new product model by one of its exporters that was subject to the treatment that Chinese Taipei alleges violates Article 2.2.\textsuperscript{260} Moreover, even if the CBSA had applied the ministerial specification to establish normal values for new product models, Chinese Taipei’s argument under Article 2.2 would still be flawed because the obligations under Article 2.2 presuppose that an investigating authority has the information necessary to calculate normal values.\textsuperscript{261} Canada asserts that an investigating authority is not in a position to determine model-specific normal values for new product models when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated. Canada asserts that Chinese Taipei ignores this, and does not explain how the CBSA could properly apply one of the

\textsuperscript{255} Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.306.
\textsuperscript{256} Canada’s first written submission, para. 210.
\textsuperscript{257} Canada’s first written submission, para. 209.
\textsuperscript{258} Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.390. In its response to Panel question No. 5, at para. 61, Canada similarly suggests that investigating authorities enjoy flexibility with regard to the treatment of new model types for the purpose of duty assessment (because the Anti-Dumping Agreement is silent on this issue). Canada argues that the CBSA’s application of facts available to establish normal values for new product model types was in line with that flexibility. We disagree. Whatever flexibility might exist for Members assessing anti-dumping duties under a prospective normal value assessment system, the use of facts available is circumscribed by the requirements of Article 6.8. Facts available may not be used outside of the conditions set forth in that provision.
\textsuperscript{259} Chinese Taipei’s first written submission, para. 234; second written submission, para. 178.
\textsuperscript{260} Canada’s first written submission, para. 214.
\textsuperscript{261} Canada’s first written submission, para. 215.
Article 2.2 methodologies to new models of subject goods exported to Canada after the original CSWP investigation.\textsuperscript{262} Canada submits that, in the absence of the required information, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits the CBSA to use facts available from the original investigation to determine a normal value for new product models or types.\textsuperscript{263}

\textbf{7.9.4.2 Evaluation by the Panel}

7.179. We have already upheld Chinese Taipei's Article 9.3 and 6.8 claims concerning the CBSA's determination of the amount of anti-dumping duty imposed or collected on imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters. Chinese Taipei's Article 2.2 claim is concerned with essentially the same issue regarding the CBSA's methodology. It is therefore not necessary for us to also evaluate that additional claim in order to effectively resolve this dispute or provide guidance in the event this issue arises in implementation.

\textbf{7.9.5 The determination of an additional margin of dumping: Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement}

\textbf{7.9.5.1 Main arguments of the parties}

7.180. Chinese Taipei submits that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it determined more than one individual margin of dumping for investigated Chinese Taipei exporters.\textsuperscript{264} In particular, Chinese Taipei contends that after establishing an individual margin of dumping for the product of each producer as a whole, the CBSA calculated the duty for new product types on the basis of the highest dumping margin found for a different exporter. According to Chinese Taipei, this additional step results in the determination for the same exporting producer of two different dumping margins, namely the dumping margin established for the subject product during the investigation and a residual dumping margin applicable to new model types of the subject product.\textsuperscript{265}

7.181. Canada contends that Chinese Taipei's claim is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the term "margin of dumping" and a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada's prospective duty assessment system. The CBSA would not be establishing two margins of dumping for cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters in the event it applied the ministerial specification to establish normal values for new product models.\textsuperscript{266}

7.182. According to Canada, Chinese Taipei fails to take into account that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, "margins of dumping" are not specific to a particular product model or export transaction, but instead are determined for all export transactions from a particular exporter or producer, pertaining to products within the same defined scope over a designated period of time.\textsuperscript{267} In US – Zeroing (Japan), the Appellate Body made this clear when it found that:

A product under investigation may be defined by an investigating authority. But "dumping" and "margins of dumping" can be found to exist only in relation to that product as defined by that authority. They cannot be found to exist for only a type, model, or category of that product. Nor, under any comparison methodology, can "dumping" and "margins of dumping" be found to exist at the level of an individual transaction.\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{262} Canada's first written submission, para. 216.
\textsuperscript{263} Canada's first written submission, para. 217.
\textsuperscript{264} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 243; second written submission, para. 183.
\textsuperscript{265} Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 247.
\textsuperscript{266} Canada's first written submission, para. 221.
\textsuperscript{267} Indeed, at paras. 198 and 199 of its first written submission, Chinese Taipei itself acknowledges this. (Canada's first written submission, para. 222).
\textsuperscript{268} Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), para. 115. (emphasis original, fn's omitted)
7.183. Canada asserts that a "margin of dumping", by definition, cannot be based on transactions pertaining only to specific product models.\(^{269}\) Canada submits therefore that, what Chinese Taipei claims is a second margin of dumping for new product models is nothing of the sort.

7.184. Canada further asserts that the general rule under Article 6.10 has limited relevance after the conclusion of an anti-dumping investigation, since in Canada's system the margin of dumping for a particular exporter calculated during the investigation phase has no relevance during the enforcement phase. During the latter phase, the CBSA compares the relevant normal value to an individual export transaction price to determine the appropriate amount, if any, of the anti-dumping duty to be collected. Canada recalls that the calculation of an anti-dumping duty on this basis does not constitute a determination of a "margin of dumping". This is the case regardless of whether the normal value for a particular product model was established during the investigation or is established by ministerial specification during the enforcement phase.\(^{270}\)

7.9.5.2 Evaluation by the Panel

7.185. We have already upheld Chinese Taipei's Article 9.3 and 6.8 claims concerning the CBSA's determination of the amount of anti-dumping duty imposed or collected on imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters. Chinese Taipei's Article 6.10 claim is concerned with essentially the same issue (in the sense that Chinese Taipei alleges that the residual margin of dumping established for new product models or types constitutes a second exporter-specific margin of dumping not envisaged by Article 6.10). It is therefore not necessary for us to also evaluate that additional claim in order to effectively resolve this dispute or provide guidance in the event this issue arises in implementation.

7.10 Additional claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

7.10.1 Introduction

7.186. Chinese Taipei has also raised a claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 regarding all the measures contested in the sections above.

7.10.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.187. Chinese Taipei argues that the alleged violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement discussed in the sections above entail a violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.\(^{271}\)

7.188. Canada insists that it acted in accordance with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and that there is therefore no basis for Chinese Taipei's consequential claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.\(^{272}\)

7.10.3 Evaluation by the Panel

7.189. We observe that these are consequential claims. As a consequence of the violations of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 9.2, and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its Annex II (including its paragraph 7) found above, we also find that Canada has acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. To the extent that we have rejected Chinese Taipei's claims above, we also reject its claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

\(^{269}\) Canada's first written submission, para. 223 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 120).

\(^{270}\) Canada's first written submission, para. 225.

\(^{271}\) Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 249; second written submission, para. 186.

\(^{272}\) Canada's first written submission, para. 229.
7.11 "As such" claims concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1, and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA

7.11.1 Introduction

7.190. Chinese Taipei claims that certain provisions of SIMA, namely subsection 2(1), section 30.1, and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA, are inconsistent, "as such", with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.273 According to Chinese Taipei, the crux of these claims is the fact that the challenged provisions of SIMA improperly provide for a de minimis-test on a country-wide, rather than an exporter-specific basis.274

7.11.2 Main arguments of the parties

7.191. Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims are in substance similar to the "as applied" claims addressed above. For the most part, Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims are therefore based on the arguments already advanced in that context275, in particular the argument that the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires immediate termination in respect of exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping.

7.192. Canada also relies principally on the arguments it made in respect of Chinese Taipei's "as applied" claims.276 Regarding the Article 5.8 "as such" claim specifically, Canada denies that this provision requires termination on the basis of exporter-specific margins of dumping. Canada also asserts that subsection 43(1) of SIMA in any event provides the CITT with discretion to exclude exporters with de minimis margins of dumping from the affirmative injury findings, thereby terminating the investigation in respect of such exporters in accordance with the second sentence of Article 5.8.277

7.193. Chinese Taipei disagrees that subsection 43(1) of SIMA gives the CITT discretion to exclude exporters from the injury analysis specifically based on their de minimis margins of dumping.278 Chinese Taipei asserts that there is no reference in the text of subsection 43(1) of SIMA to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, and that this discretion appears to be entirely unrelated to the challenged provisions.279 Chinese Taipei also submits that it is not aware of any instance in the CITT’s past practice in which this provision has been used to exclude an exporter on the basis of an individual margin of dumping being de minimis.280 Chinese Taipei cites in this regard the example of Conares, an exporter from the United Arab Emirates in the CSWP investigation, whose request for producer exclusion under subsection 43(1) of SIMA was denied – and an affirmative threat of injury determination was made – even though a zero dumping margin

273 In response to Panel question No. 11.10, paras. 14-17, Chinese Taipei clarified that it claims that: (a) subsection 38(1) of SIMA, read together with subsection 2(1), section 30.1 as well as subsections 35(1) and 35(2), is "as such" inconsistent with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; (b) subsection 41(1) of SIMA, read together with subsection 2(1) and section 30.1, is "as such" inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; (c) subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are "as such" inconsistent with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and (d) subsection 2(1), section 30.1, subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are "as such" inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Canada does not contest Chinese Taipei's understanding of the operation of SIMA, nor does it contest the scope of the SIMA provisions challenged by Chinese Taipei.

274 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 255.


276 China's first written submission, paras. 239, 244, and 249.

277 China's first written submission, paras. 245-247; second written submission, paras. 169-176.

278 We also understand Canada to invoke subsection 43(1) of SIMA in response to Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims under Articles 1 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. (See Canada's first written submission, paras. 253 and 256 and fn 185).

279 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 6.1, paras. 119-124; second written submission, paras. 197-204.

280 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 6.1, para. 120; second written submission, paras. 200 and 201.
had been found for this exporter. Chinese Taipei also refers to a statement made by the CITT in the CSWP investigation in which it "reiterate[d] that producer exclusions are typically not appropriate other than in the most specific set of circumstances". In the view of Chinese Taipei, this leaves no room for the CITT to exclude producers having de minimis margins of dumping.

7.194. In addition, Chinese Taipei advances three arguments according to which the exclusion of exporters pursuant to subsection 43(1) of SIMA could not, in any case, satisfy the requirements of the second sentence of Article 5.8. First, Chinese Taipei contends that Article 5.8 imposes a positive obligation and does not allow for any type of discretion in deciding on the termination of the investigation. Second, Chinese Taipei contends that excluding an exporter from an injury finding is not the same as terminating the investigation in respect of such exporter. Finally, Chinese Taipei claims that for "immediate termination" as contemplated in Article 5.8 to occur, termination would need to be decided by the CBSA, and not the CITT.

7.195. Canada asserts that the CITT's past practice regarding the exclusion of de minimis exporters under subsection 43(1) of SIMA is irrelevant to the assessment of Chinese Taipei's claim. Canada suggests that the Panel should instead focus its analysis on the wording of subsection 43(1) of SIMA. Canada also submits that Chinese Taipei has ignored subsection 43(1) of SIMA in making its "as such" claims. According to Canada, the burden is on Chinese Taipei to demonstrate that subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not grant the CITT discretion to exclude exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. Canada contends that Chinese Taipei has failed to adduce evidence to this effect.

7.196. Regarding Chinese Taipei's argument that Article 5.8 precludes any form of discretion to exclude relevant exporters, Canada points out that this proposition is inconsistent with WTO jurisprudence according to which an "as such" violation cannot be found if discretion exists that allows a WTO Member to comply with its WTO obligations. In addition, Canada argues that the exclusion of de minimis exporters from the CITT's affirmative injury finding is consistent with the Appellate Body's statement that "immediate termination" is in most cases achieved through exclusion from the scope of the order establishing the definitive anti-dumping duties.

7.11.3 Main arguments of third parties

7.11.3.1 United States

7.197. Without taking any position on the merits of the alleged "as such" inconsistency, the United States submits that the Panel's assessment should focus on whether SIMA and SIMR require WTO-inconsistent conduct or provide discretion to Canada's investigating authority to comply with its WTO obligations. In case Chinese Taipei could show that SIMA and SIMR require Canada to act in a WTO-inconsistent manner or preclude WTO-consistent action, Chinese Taipei

281 Chinese Taipei's second written submission, para. 208; see also CIT, Finding and Reasons, Injury Inquiry No. NQ-2012-003, 27 December 2012, (Exhibit TPKM-14), para. 181.
283 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 6.1, para. 122; second written submission, paras. 205-207.
284 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 6.1, para. 123; second written submission, para. 208.
285 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 6.1, para. 124; second written submission, para. 209.
286 Response of Canada to a question put by Chinese Taipei through the Panel at the first substantive meeting. See also Canada's second written submission, paras. 180 and 182; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 104.
287 Canada's second written submission, para. 183.
288 Canada's response to Panel question No. 11.2, para. 48; comments on Chinese Taipei's response to the Panel question No. 11.9, para. 11.
289 Canada's second written submission, paras. 177 and 180.
290 Canada's second written submission, para. 179.
291 Canada's second written submission, paras. 186 and 187.
292 United States' third-party submission, para. 25.
should prevail on its claims. Moreover, the United States submits that past practice may serve, in
some circumstances, as evidence for the "as such" inconsistency of a challenged measure.\footnote{United States' third-party response to Panel question No. 3.1, paras. 10 and 13.}

\subsection*{7.11.4 Evaluation by the Panel}

7.198. The crux of Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims concerns the fact that SIMA bases the de minimis-test on a country-wide, rather than an exporter-specific margin of dumping. We therefore begin with this claim. In doing so, we recall our earlier finding that the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires immediate termination of the investigation in respect of exporters for whom a final determination has established individual de minimis margins of dumping. We also recall our rejection of many of the arguments that Canada also relies on to rebut Chinese Taipei's "as such" claim under Article 5.8.

7.199. With regard to the final dumping determination, the application of a country-wide de minimis-test is provided for in subsection 41(1) of SIMA.\footnote{Consistent with Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 11.10, para. 16, we read subsection 41(1) of SIMA together with subsection 2(1) and section 30.1 of SIMA.} In the circumstances of this case, to prevail with its "as such" claim under Article 5.8, Chinese Taipei must demonstrate that subsection 41(1) of SIMA necessarily leads to WTO-inconsistent conduct or prevents WTO-consistent conduct, by precluding the termination of an investigation in respect of exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping.\footnote{Appellate Body Reports, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 172; and US – Carbon Steel, para. 157.} Chinese Taipei has shown that this provision of SIMA requires a final dumping determination to be made in respect of all goods of a country, i.e. including those from exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping, if that country's margin of dumping is 2% or more.\footnote{Section 41(1) of SIMA provides, in relevant part, that a final determination of dumping shall only be made if, among others, "the margin of dumping of ... the goods of that country or of any of those countries is not insignificant". (Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15 (last amended on 1 November 2014), (Exhibits TPKM-25 and CAN-12) (exhibited twice)).} The text of subsection 41(1) of SIMA only provides for termination of the investigation when there is a country-wide de minimis margin of dumping. It does not provide for immediate termination in respect of exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping, contrary to the requirement of the second sentence of Article 5.8. We therefore conclude that Chinese Taipei has established a prima facie case that subsection 41(1) of SIMA is "as such" inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 5.8.\footnote{Where the meaning and content of the challenged provision are clear on its face, as it is the case here, an analysis of its text may suffice to establish the "as such" inconsistency of the challenged provision. (See Appellate Body Reports, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157; and US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 168.).}

7.200. Canada contends that subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides the CITT with discretion to immediately terminate investigations in respect of exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, as required by Article 5.8. We shall therefore consider whether this provision is sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of WTO-inconsistency established by Chinese Taipei.\footnote{Our conclusions in respect of subsection 43(1) of SIMA apply irrespective of which party bears the burden of proof regarding the operation of this provision. Nevertheless, we do not accept Canada's argument that it was Chinese Taipei's burden to establish that subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not allow the CITT to exclude exporters based on their de minimis margin of dumping. Nothing in the text of the relevant provisions suggests that the mandatory provision of subsection 41(1) of SIMA should be viewed in light of the discretion contained in subsection 43(1) of SIMA. The provisions concern the distinct issues of dumping and injury determinations to be made by different authorities. Past practice also indicates that exclusions under subsection 43(1) of SIMA are made on the basis of the potential for injury, rather than the extent of an exporter's margin of dumping. In the absence of any apparent nexus between subsections 41(1) and 43(1) of SIMA, Chinese Taipei was not required to identify, and discharge a burden of proof with respect to, subsection 43(1) of SIMA in making its "as such" claim in this case. The burden was rather on Canada, as the defending party, to assert and demonstrate that subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides sufficient discretion for Canada to act in a manner consistent with the second sentence of Article 5.8.}

7.201. Subsection 43(1) of SIMA reads in relevant part:

[The CITT shall] not later than one hundred and twenty days after the date of receipt of notice of a preliminary determination with respect to the goods, make such order or
finding with respect to the goods to which the final determination applies as the nature of the matter may require, and shall declare to what goods, including, where applicable, from what supplier and from what country of export, the order or finding applies.299

7.202. Upon completion of an injury inquiry, the CITT makes an affirmative or negative finding in respect of whether the dumped imports have caused or are threatening to cause material injury to the domestic industry.300 Subsection 43(1) requires the CITT to specify to what goods, suppliers (i.e. exporters) or countries such an affirmative finding applies. In exercising its discretion under subsection 43(1), the CITT can exclude certain goods, exporters or countries from the application of an affirmative final injury finding. Canada argues that absent any express limitations, this discretion is sufficiently broad to allow the CITT to exclude exporters with de minimis margins of dumping from the affirmative injury findings.301 When specifically asked by the Panel, Canada confirmed that the CITT is able to make such exclusion solely on the basis of an exporter's individual margin of dumping being de minimis.302 Canada also confirmed to the Panel that, in the absence of any statutory limitation on the CITT's discretion under subsection 43(1) of SIMA, such exclusion would be consistent with the mandate and statutory role of the CITT.303

7.203. Bearing in mind the absence of any express textual limitations on the type of exporter exclusion that may be made by the CITT under subsection 43(1) of SIMA, and taking into account the assurances provided by Canada in this respect, we do not exclude that subsection 43(1) of SIMA might operate in the manner explained by Canada.304 However, the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the termination of the investigation in respect of de minimis exporters must be "immediate". As explained in the following, we are not persuaded that any termination of an investigation by way of a producer exclusion under subsection 43(1) of SIMA would occur with the degree of immediacy required by Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.204. In Canada's bifurcated anti-dumping regime, the final dumping determination is issued by the CBSA, and the final injury determination is issued by the CITT. Exclusion under subsection 43(1) of SIMA only becomes effective once the CITT issues its final injury determination, and that final injury determination is only made approximately one month (or more) after the CBSA's final dumping determination.305 Thus, even though the CBSA determines that an exporter's final margin of dumping is de minimis, the investigation will continue to apply in respect of that exporter until such time as the CITT issues its final injury determination.

7.205. The text of the second sentence of Article 5.8 Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that "[t]here shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis". It is the final determination of an exporter's de minimis margin of dumping that triggers the obligation to terminate the investigation. Textually, termination must follow "immediately" thereafter. The text of Article 5.8 does not allow for the continuation of the investigation in respect of that exporter beyond the final dumping determination, pending issuance of the final injury determination at some later date, as envisaged under subsection 43(1) of

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299 Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15 (last amended on 1 November 2014), (Exhibits TPKM-25 and CAN-12) (exhibited twice). The term "preliminary determination" refers to the preliminary dumping determination issued by the CBSA pursuant to subsection 38(1) of SIMA; the term "final determination" refers to the final dumping determination issued by the CBSA pursuant to subsection 41(1) of SIMA; the terms "order or finding" refer to the actual decision made by the CITT pursuant to subsection 43(1) of SIMA following its injury analysis conducted under subsection 42(1) of SIMA as to whether or not dumped imports have caused or are threatening to cause injury. (See Canada's response to Panel question No. 11.3, para. 50).

300 Canada's second written submission, para. 170.

301 Canada's second written submission, para. 177; opening statement at the second meeting with the Panel, para. 104; and response to Panel question No. 11.8, paras. 64 and 66.

302 Canada's response to Panel question No. 11.8, para. 64.

303 Canada's response to Panel question No. 11.8, para. 66.

304 Such an approach would be contrary to current CITT policy. However, we do not exclude that the CITT has sufficient discretion to change that policy in light of a proper interpretation of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

305 Canada's responses to Panel question Nos. 11.4, para. 51, 11.6, para. 58, and 11.12, para. 70. In the underlying CSWP investigation, the CBSA issued its final dumping determination on 9 November 2012, and the CITT issued its final injury determination on 11 December 2012.
7.206. Our interpretation of "immediate" termination under Article 5.8 is consistent with our findings in relation to Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, interpreted in light of Article 5.8. Imports from exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping should not be treated as "dumped imports" in the CITT's final injury analysis, precisely because the investigation should already have been terminated in respect of such exporters.\(^{307}\) Our approach is also consistent with the fact that the Canadian anti-dumping legislation foresees termination of the investigation immediately after the determination of a country-wide de minimis margin of dumping is made.\(^{308}\) Thus, the CBSA terminated the CSWP investigation in respect of Turkey (based on Turkey having a de minimis country-wide margin of dumping) on the same day that the CBSA issued its final dumping determination, i.e. on 9 November 2012.\(^{309}\)

7.207. Canada argues that the Appellate Body's findings in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice provide support for its position that exclusion from the CITT's final injury determination under subsection 43(1) of SIMA constitutes immediate termination within the meaning of Article 5.8. Canada refers in this regard to the Appellate Body's statement that "the only way to terminate immediately an investigation, in respect of producers or exporters for which a de minimis margin of dumping is determined, is to exclude them from the scope of the order" that establishes the anti-dumping duties.\(^{310}\)

7.208. The facts of the present case are very different from those in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. That case concerned Mexico's unitary anti-dumping system, under which the dumping and injury determinations are made simultaneously by the same investigating authority, and the issuance of the order imposing anti-dumping duties is the ultimate step of the investigation following those final determinations.\(^{311}\) The situation is very different under Canada's bifurcated system. Here the CITT issues its final injury determination approximately one month (or more) after the CBSA issues its final determination.

7.209. The Appellate Body did not contemplate how immediate termination should occur in such situations, where further investigative steps are taken following issuance of the final dumping determination.\(^{312}\) There is nothing in the Appellate Body's findings to suggest that, in such circumstances, termination under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, rather than being "immediate", may be delayed until those additional investigative steps have been undertaken. Furthermore, the fact that the CBSA terminates the investigation in respect of countries with de minimis margins of dumping at the same time that it issues its final dumping determination demonstrates that exclusion from the order (via exclusion from the CITT's injury determination) is not "the only way" to immediately terminate an investigation in the context of Canada's bifurcated system.

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\(^{306}\) The term "immediate" is commonly defined to mean "present or nearest in time; most urgent, occurring or taking effect without delay; done at once, instant". (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 1330). An investigation could not be said to be terminated "without delay" or "at once" if it could continue following the final determination of a de minimis margin of dumping.

\(^{307}\) Under Canada's approach, provisional duties would continue to be levied in respect of de minimis exporters until the CITT's injury determination is issued. (See Canada's response to Panel question No. 11.6, para. 58). We see no basis for imposing provisional duties on exporters in respect of which the investigation should already have been terminated pursuant to a final determination of de minimis dumping. Even if those provisional duties are subsequently refunded, exporters subject to such duties suffer commercial inconvenience that should normally be avoided as a result of immediate termination of the investigation under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.


\(^{310}\) Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 219. (emphasis original)

\(^{311}\) See Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 2.6 and 2.7 and fn 4; and Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 219.

\(^{312}\) The Appellate Body specifically qualified its analysis with the remark that "in most cases" termination of the investigation in respect of a de minimis exporter would occur through the order imposing anti-dumping duties. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 219). In other cases, therefore, an alternative means of termination may be required.
7.210. We conclude that exclusions from the injury findings under subsection 43(1) of SIMA do not constitute immediate termination as required under Article 5.8. Accordingly, we find that subsection 43(1) of SIMA is not sufficient to rebut the *prima facie* case of WTO-inconsistency established by Chinese Taipei in respect of subsection 41(1) of SIMA. We therefore find that subsection 41(1) of SIMA, read together with section 30.1 and subsection 2(1) of SIMA, is "as such" inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 5.8.

7.211. Chinese Taipei also claims that subsection 38(1) of SIMA, read together with subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1) and 35(2) of SIMA, is "as such" inconsistent with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because this provision requires an affirmative preliminary dumping determination to be made for exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is more than *de minimis*. 313 Above, we have rejected Chinese Taipei's "as applied" claim that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 7.1(ii) by imposing provisional anti-dumping measures on a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary *de minimis* margin of dumping. Similarly, there is no basis for us to find that subsection 38(1) of SIMA is "as such" inconsistent with Article 7.1(ii). We therefore reject Chinese Taipei's "as such" claim under Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.212. Chinese Taipei also challenges subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA as being inconsistent "as such" with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei submits that these provisions of SIMA require affirmative preliminary and definitive dumping determinations to be made for exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping when the country-wide margins of dumping is above the *de minimis* level, thereby causing anti-dumping duties to be collected from such exporters. 314 Canada does not contest that the challenged provisions of SIMA result in duty imposition on imports from such exporters. We recall our earlier finding that the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties in respect of imports from exporters with final *de minimis* margins of dumping is inconsistent with Article 9.2. Accordingly, we find that the challenged provisions of SIMA are "as such" inconsistent with Article 9.2, to the extent that they result in the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on exporters with final *de minimis* margins of dumping. Above, however, we have rejected Chinese Taipei's "as applied" claim that the imposition of provisional measures in respect of exporters with a preliminarily determined *de minimis* margin of dumping is inconsistent with Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Consequently, we also reject Chinese Taipei's "as such" claim under Article 7.5.

7.213. Chinese Taipei also claims that subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent "as such" with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. To the extent that we have found subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA to be "as such" inconsistent with Articles 5.8 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we also find that these provisions of SIMA are, as a consequence, "as such" inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. To the extent that we have rejected Chinese Taipei's claims concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA under Articles 7.1(ii) and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we also reject its claim of "as such" inconsistency under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.

7.12 "As such" claims concerning subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR

7.214. Chinese Taipei argues that subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are, as such, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei contends that these provisions result in the treatment of imports from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the analysis and determinations of injury and causation, contrary to the referenced paragraphs of Article 3. 315

313 Chinese Taipei's response to Panel question No. 11.10, para. 16.
314 Ibid.
315 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 291; second written submission, para. 215.
Chinese Taipei relies on the same arguments made in the context of its corresponding "as applied" claims, in particular invoking case law regarding the interpretation of the term "dumped imports."  

Canada does not contest that, in the context of the preliminary and final determinations of injury and causation, the challenged provisions result in the treatment of imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping as "dumped imports." As above in the context of the "as applied" claims, Canada denies, however, that the meaning of the term "dumped imports" is limited to imports that are dumped at a margin above the de minimis threshold.  

We have already addressed the issue of the interpretation of "dumped imports" under Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We have found that Canada acted in a manner inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 by treating imports from two Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the CITT's final determinations of injury and causation. The same reasoning applies in respect of Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims. We therefore find that subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are "as such" inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that the challenged provisions relate to the final determinations of injury and causation. To the extent that the challenge is brought in relation to the preliminary determinations of injury and causation, we reject the claims.

7.13 Additional "as such" claims concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR

Chinese Taipei pursues additional "as such" claims of violation of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect of subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR.

7.220. Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that:

Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.

7.221. Chinese Taipei argues that it follows from the alleged inconsistencies of SIMA and SIMR addressed in the sections above that Canada has not ensured conformity of its laws with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, contrary to Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Moreover, Chinese Taipei separately challenges these provisions of SIMA and SIMR "as such" under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

7.222. Referencing its arguments set forth above, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims are without merit.

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316 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, para. 298.
317 Canada's first written submission, paras. 264 and 265.
318 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, paras. 304-315.
319 Chinese Taipei's first written submission, paras. 316 and 317.
320 Canada's first written submission, paras. 267-270.
We observe that these are consequential claims. They are therefore addressed in light of the Panel's evaluation of the claims on which they depend. In respect of the final dumping and injury determinations, we found above that subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are "as such" inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As a result, we also uphold Chinese Taipei's corresponding consequential claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. In relation to the preliminary dumping and injury determinations, we rejected above Chinese Taipei's "as such" claims under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 7.1(ii), and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerning subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR. To the same extent, we therefore also reject Chinese Taipei's consequential claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:

a. Canada acted inconsistently with the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to immediately terminate the investigation in respect of exporters from Chinese Taipei with final de minimis margins of dumping;

b. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to determine only one individual margin of dumping for each exporter from Chinese Taipei with a de minimis margin of dumping when basing the de minimis-test on a country-wide margin of dumping;

c. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by applying provisional anti-dumping measures in respect of imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a preliminary de minimis margin of dumping;

d. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping;

e. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with preliminary de minimis margins of dumping;

f. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, to the extent that Canada imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, to the extent that Canada imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with preliminary de minimis margins of dumping;

g. Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by treating imports from two Chinese Taipei exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the analysis and final determinations of injury and causation;

h. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to undertake a non-attribution analysis in respect of the effect of subsidization for imports from India and the effect of overcapacity in the domestic industry;
i. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its Annex II, paragraph 7, by establishing the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters" on the basis of the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative producer from any country subject to the investigation;

j. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by imposing anti-dumping duties on new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters from Chinese Taipei that exceeded their margins of dumping as established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

k. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its Annex II, by using facts available to determine the amount of anti-dumping duty imposed or collected on imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters from Chinese Taipei;

l. Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, to the extent that Canada has been found to violate Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 9.2, and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its Annex II (including its paragraph 7). Chinese Taipei failed to establish that Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, to the extent that Chinese Taipei's claims under Articles 3.1, 3.5, 6.10, 7.1(ii), and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement have been rejected;

m. subsection 41(1) of SIMA, read together with section 30.1 and subsection 2(1) of SIMA, is inconsistent "as such" with the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it bases the de minimis-test for the final dumping determination on a country-wide, rather than an exporter-specific margin of dumping;

n. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that section 38(1) of SIMA, read together with subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1) and 35(2) of SIMA, is inconsistent "as such" with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it requires an affirmative preliminary dumping determination to be made for exporters with de minimis margins of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is more than de minimis;

o. subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent "as such" with Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA result in the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping;

p. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent "as such" with Article 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA result in the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with preliminary de minimis margins of dumping;

q. subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent "as such" with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA have been found to be inconsistent "as such" with Articles 5.8 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei failed to establish that subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent "as such" with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA have not been found to be inconsistent "as such" with Articles 7.1(ii) and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;

r. subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent "as such" with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA and SIMR result in the treatment of imports from exporters with final de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the final determinations of injury and causation. Chinese Taipei
failed to establish that subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent "as such" with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA and SIMR result in the treatment of imports from exporters with preliminary de minimis margins of dumping as "dumped imports" in the preliminary determinations of injury and causation; and

s. subsection 2(1), section 30.1 and subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent "as such" with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, to the extent that these provisions of SIMA and SIMR have been found to be inconsistent "as such" with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, namely in relation to the final determinations of dumping and injury. To the extent that these provisions of SIMA and SIMR have not been found to be inconsistent "as such" with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 7.1(ii), and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, namely in relation to the preliminary determinations of dumping and injury, Chinese Taipei failed to establish that they are inconsistent "as such" with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

8.2. We do not consider it necessary to address Chinese Taipei’s claims under Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement concerning the determination of the amount of anti-dumping duties imposed or collected on imports of new product models or types from investigated and cooperative exporters from Chinese Taipei.

8.3. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue are inconsistent with certain provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994 and the Marrakesh Agreement, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Chinese Taipei under those agreements.

8.4. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, we recommend that Canada bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the above-mentioned Agreements.
CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

REPORT OF THE PANEL

Addendum

This addendum contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document WT/DS482/R.
LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX D
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>D-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Norway</td>
<td>D-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>D-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States</td>
<td>D-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX A

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX A-1

CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU (WT/DS482)

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL (AS AMENDED)

Adopted on 12 August 2015

1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working Procedures shall apply.

General

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter "party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted to the Panel by another Member which the submitting Member has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.

3. The parties and third parties shall treat business confidential information in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information adopted by the Panel.

4. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter “third parties”), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it. The Panel shall open its substantive meetings with the parties to the public, in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Panel after consulting with the parties.

5. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.

Submissions

6. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

7. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If Chinese Taipei requests such a ruling, Canada shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission. If Canada requests such a ruling, Chinese Taipei shall submit its response to the request prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
8. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.

9. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO working language of the submission at the same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the grounds of objection and an alternative translation.

10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exhibit on its cover page. For example, exhibits submitted by the complaining Member could indicate "Name of Complaining Member–1", "Name of Complaining Member–2", etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was "Name of Complaining Member -5", the first exhibit in connection with the next submission thus would be "Name of Complaining Member-6".

Questions

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, including prior to each substantive meeting.

Substantive meetings

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

a. The Panel shall invite Chinese Taipei to make an opening statement to present its case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its point of view. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the first working day following the meeting.

b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with Chinese Taipei presenting its statement first.
14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

   a. The Panel shall ask Canada if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If so, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its opening statement, followed by Chinese Taipei. If Canada chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Panel shall invite Chinese Taipei to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

   b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party’s written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

   c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

   d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement first, presenting its closing statement first.

Third parties

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:

   a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.

   b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order. Third parties present at the third-party session and intending to present their views orally at that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third-parties with provisional written versions of their statements before they take the floor. Third parties shall make available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the session.

   c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any matter raised in the third parties’ submissions or statements. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

Descriptive part

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel’s examination of the case.

19. Each party shall submit executive summaries of the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in its written submissions, other than responses to questions, and its oral statements, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each executive summary of a written submission shall be limited to no more than 10 pages, and each summary submitted by each party of both opening and closing statements presented at a substantive meeting shall be limited to no more than 5 pages. The Panel will not summarize in the descriptive part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties’ responses to questions.

20. Each third party shall submit an executive summary of its arguments as presented in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.

21. The Panel reserves the right to request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts and arguments presented by a party or a third party in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be specified in the timetable.

Interim review

22. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.

23. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit written comments on the other party’s written request for review, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party’s written request for review.

24. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.

Service of documents

25. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:

a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the DS Registry (office No. 2047).

b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. Exhibits may be filed in 2 copies on CD-ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
c. Each party and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format, either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided by e-mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to xxxxxx@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.

d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time it provides each document to the Panel.

e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipient party or third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.

f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the interim report and the final report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.

26. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with the parties.
ANNEX A-2

CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU (WT/DS482)

ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES ON BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Adopted on 15 September 2015

The following procedures apply to any business confidential information (BCI) submitted in the course of the Panel proceedings in DS482.

1. For the purposes of these Panel proceedings, BCI is any information that has been designated as such by the party submitting the information and that was previously treated as confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 by the Canadian investigating authorities in the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this dispute. However, these procedures do not apply to any information that is available in the public domain. In addition, these procedures do not apply to any BCI if the person who provided the information in the course of the aforementioned investigation agrees in writing to make the information publicly available.

2. As required by Article 18.2 of the DSU, a party or third party having access to BCI submitted in these Panel proceedings shall treat it as confidential and shall not disclose that information other than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these procedures. Any information submitted as BCI under these procedures shall only be used for the purposes of this dispute and for no other purpose. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees and/or outside advisors comply with these working procedures to protect BCI. An outside advisor is not permitted access to BCI if that advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or import of the products that were the subject of the investigation at issue in this dispute, or an officer or employee of an association of such enterprises. All third party access to BCI shall be subject to the terms of these working procedures.

3. No person may have access to BCI except a member of the Secretariat or the Panel, an employee of a party or third party under the terms specified in these procedures or an outside advisor to a party or third party for the purposes of this dispute.

4. The party submitting BCI shall mark the cover and/or first page of the document containing BCI, and each page of the document, to indicate the presence of such information. The specific information in question shall be placed between double brackets, as follows: [[xx,xxx.xx]]. The first page or cover of the document shall state "Contains Business Confidential Information", and each page of the document shall contain the notice "Contains Business Confidential Information" at the top of the page.

5. Any BCI that is submitted in binary-encoded form shall be clearly marked with the statement “Business Confidential Information” on a label of the storage medium, and clearly marked with the statement “Business Confidential Information” in the binary-encoded files.

6. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a statement shall inform the Panel before making it that the statement will contain BCI, and the Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 4.

7. If a party or third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party contains information which should have been designated as BCI and objects to such submission without BCI designation, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the
Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties. The Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate. Similarly, if a party or third party considers that the other party or a third party submitted information designated as BCI which should not be so designated, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties, and the Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate.

8. Any person authorized to have access to BCI under the terms of these procedures shall store all documents containing BCI in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such information.

9. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.

10. Submissions containing BCI will be included in the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.
# ANNEX B

ARGUMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX B-1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

1 INTRODUCTION

1. On 14 May 2012, the Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA") initiated investigations with respect to the dumping of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe ("CSWP") originating in the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("TPKM"), India, Oman, Korea, Thailand, Turkey and the UAE and the subsidizing of certain CSWP from India, Oman and the UAE. On 13 July 2012, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("CITT") made a preliminary finding that there was reasonable indication that the dumping and subsidies of the subject goods had caused injury or retardation or were threatening to cause injury. Subsequently, the CBSA made a preliminary determination of dumping and subsidizing on 13 August 2012. Provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed on, among others, imports from TPKM, including the imports of those exporters whose margins of dumping were found to be zero or de minimis.

2. The CBSA issued its final determination of dumping and subsidizing on 9 November 2012. The CITT made its final injury determination on 11 December 2012, concluding that the dumping of certain CSWP originating in or exported from TPKM, India, Oman, Korea, Thailand and the UAE and the subsidizing of these goods from India were threatening to cause injury to the Canadian domestic industry. Definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed on imports from, among others, TPKM, including the imports of those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be zero or de minimis.

3. Canada initiated a normal value review on 7 January 2013, one month after the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duties. The CBSA issued a Notice of conclusion of the re-investigation on 7 May 2013.

4. In the present dispute, TPKM challenges the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain CSWP. TPKM submits that these measures violate Articles 1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, 9.3 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

5. In addition, TPKM also challenges Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of the Special Import Measures Act ("SIMA") and Section 37.1(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations ("SIMR"), as being as such inconsistent with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI of the GATT 1994 and article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.

2 CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CSWP ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, TPKM

2.1 Treatment of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping

6. TPKM submits that the treatment of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping by Canada in the present case amounts to a violation of Articles 1, 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as will be explained below.

2.1.1 Claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7. Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "[t]here shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis". The term "margin of dumping", as clarified by the Appellate Body, refers to the "individual" margin of dumping, as opposed to the "country-wide" margin of dumping. Therefore, Article 5.8 requires WTO Members to terminate anti-dumping investigations with respect to exporters that have an individual de minimis margin of dumping, regardless of the country-wide dumping margin.
8. In the present case, two of the three cooperating exporters from TPKM, i.e. Chung Hung Steel Corporation ("Chung Hung Steel") and Shin Yang Steel Co. Ltd. ("Shin Yang Steel"), received individual de minimis dumping margins of 0.005% and 0.4%, respectively, in CBSA’s final dumping determination. However, the CBSA did not terminate the investigation with respect to these two exporters, but rather continued the investigation and ultimately imposed definitive anti-dumping measures on all imports from TPKM on the basis that the final country-wide margin of dumping for TPKM was greater than de minimis, namely 8.9%.

9. TPKM submits that by failing to immediately terminate the investigation, leading to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures, with respect to exporters whose individual final margins of dumping were found to be de minimis, Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.1.2 Claim under Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

10. Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "[t]he authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer". As confirmed by previous case law, the rule to calculate an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer refers to a single margin of dumping. Thus, only one individual dumping margin for each exporter or producer must be determined and used throughout the investigation.

11. In the present case, although the CBSA calculated individual margins of dumping for each known exporter or producer, it used this information to calculate the weighted average margin of dumping for each country under investigation with the purpose of determining whether such country-wide margins of dumping were de minimis. TPKM submits that by calculating country-wide margins of dumping and by using those country-wide margins for the purpose of the de minimis test, Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement since that provision imposes the obligation to determine a single margin of dumping for each individual exporter or producer.

2.1.3 Claim under Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

12. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement authorizes the application of provisional measures upon meeting three conditions, one of which is that "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry". As pointed out by the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway), an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping cannot be treated as "dumping" for the purposes of injury analysis and the imposition of anti-dumping duties.

13. It follows that the CBSA could not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with respect to Shin Yang Steel, whose preliminary margin of dumping was found to be 0.5%, and thus was de minimis. By applying provisional anti-dumping duties without meeting the criteria provided for in Article 7.1(ii), Canada acted inconsistently with that provision.

2.1.4 Claims under Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

14. Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that when an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect to any product, such anti-dumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts and on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product "from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury". The Appellate Body clarified that the meaning of "sources" in Article 9.2 refers to the individual exporters or producers subject to the investigation and not to the country as a whole. Furthermore, a producer with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping" and thus his imports do not qualify as "sources found to be dumped".

15. Pursuant to Article 7.5, the relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures. Article 9.2 is a relevant provision within the meaning of Article 7.5 as it deals with the issue "connected with" the imposition of provisional measures, namely the collection of such measures, but which is not directly addressed by Article 7 itself.
16. In the present case, Canada was required to ensure that its provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties were to be collected only from sources "found to be dumped", i.e. exporters with an individual margin of dumping greater than de minimis (i.e. a margin of dumping of 2% or more). Canada, however, failed to do so.

17. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, by imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, Canada caused anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury.

2.1.5 Claims under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

18. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that "[i]n order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product". Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes a link between that Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, and provides that "[a]n anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement".

19. Since there is no dumping to "offset or prevent" in case of exporters with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping, TPKM submits that Canada acted inconsistently with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 when it imposed provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on all TPKM exporters, including Chung Hung Steel and Shin Yang Steel, whose individual margins of dumping were de minimis. As a consequence, Canada also violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement since it failed to apply its anti-dumping measures under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994.

2.2 Treatment of non-dumped imports in the injury and causation analyses

20. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it treated as "dumped imports" for the purposes of the injury and causation analyses imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.

21. Article 3.1 refers to the volume and effects of the "dumped imports". The subsequent paragraphs of Article 3 similarly refer to "dumped imports".

22. As confirmed by case law, imports from exporters whose dumping margins are de minimis cannot be considered as "dumped". Therefore, TPKM submits that by failing to exclude from the injury and causation analyses the imports of exporters for whom the CBSA determined in its final dumping determination a de minimis dumping margin, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.3 Treatment of factors other than dumped imports in the causation analysis

23. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require, as part of the causation analysis, that the investigating authorities carry out "an objective examination" on the basis of "positive evidence" of "known factors" other than the dumped imports and do not attribute to dumped imports injury caused by such other factors which are injuring the domestic industry at the same time.

24. In the present case, the CITT cross-cumulated the effects of dumping and subsidizing and failed to ensure that the injury caused by the effects of subsidies was not attributed to the alleged dumped imports. Furthermore, despite noting the very low capacity utilization rates of the domestic industry during the period of investigation and receiving submissions from interested parties that called attention to the "very bad economic conditions" affecting the Canadian domestic industry, the CITT failed to examine the injurious effects of overcapacity and distinguish such effects from those caused by the alleged dumped imports.
TPKM submits that by failing to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which at the same time were injuring the domestic industry, including the effects of subsidies and overcapacity, and by failing to ensure that the injuries caused by such other factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports, Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.4 The determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters"

TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters".

In the course of the investigation, the CBSA calculated individual dumping margins for the three cooperative TPKM exporters, i.e. Chung Hung Steel, Shin Yang Steel, and Yieh Phui Enterprise Co. Ltd. ("Yieh Phui"). For "all other exporters", a residual dumping margin of 54.2% was determined on the basis of facts available pursuant to a ministerial specification under SIMA. For these exporters, the normal values were determined by advancing the export prices by the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative exporter, i.e. 54.2%.

28. Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that in cases in which an interested party "refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information", determinations may be made "on the basis of the facts available". Annex II which is entitled "Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6" elaborates further on the recourse to "facts available". As clarified by case law, "the facts available" to be employed by the investigating authorities are expected to be "the best information available", which means information that is not simply correct or useful, but also "the most fitting or most appropriate", with "no better information available to be used in the particular circumstances".

TPKM submits that Canada's methodology for calculating the margin of dumping for the other exporters is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. First, the CBSA considered the failure to provide the information itself as being sufficient to justify the use of the highest dumping margin, thereby seeking to punish "other exporters" for having failed to co-operate. Second, by applying mechanistically the highest dumping margin established in the course of the investigation, the CBSA failed to evaluate and assess in a comparative manner the information that was on the record in order to identify which information was the "best information available, and in particular, ignored the information provided by the cooperating TPKM exporters. Finally, the highest dumping margin calculated on an individual transaction of one non-TPKM cooperating exporter from Oman is not the "best available information". Indeed, there is no logical relationship between the rate established for all other TPKM exporters, namely 54.2%, and the facts on the record concerning TPKM exports. The CBSA should have rather relied on the information pertaining to the cooperating producers from TPKM which was representative for the TPKM market as a whole.

In light of the foregoing, TPKM requests the Panel to conclude that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to use the "best information available" for the determination of the dumping margin and the determination of the anti-dumping duty rate of "all other exporters" as required by those provisions.

2.5 Treatment of New Product Types to be exported by cooperating exporters

TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 9.3, Article 6.8 and Annex II, as well as Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with regard to the treatment of new product types to be exported by cooperating exporters.

In the final dumping determination and the notice of conclusion of the re-investigation, the CBSA determined that for goods for which specific normal values have not been established, normal values will be based on the export price of the subject goods advanced by 54.2%.

As a preliminary remark, TPKM recalls that, in line with well-established case law, dumping and margins of dumping can be found to exist only for the product under investigation as a whole.
and not for a type, model, or category of that product. TPKM submits that Canada erred in treating separately, for the purposes of determining the applicable anti-dumping duty, the product types produced by each exporter during the investigation and the "new product types" of those exporters.

34. First, by imposing the residual anti-dumping duty of 54.2% on "new product types", the CBSA applied on "new product types" an anti-dumping duty which exceeds the margin of dumping that has been established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for each cooperating exporter and thus violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

35. Second, the CBSA erroneously resorted to "facts available" for determining the anti-dumping duty applicable to "new product types" even though the requirements laid down in Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were not met. Indeed, the TPKM cooperating exporters never refused access to, or otherwise did not provide the necessary information or significantly impeded the investigation. Therefore, Canada's use of facts available is clearly inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Furthermore, the information used by the CBSA, was not the "best information available" as required by Annex II.

36. Third, Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for new product types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology which is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

37. Finally, Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA ignored the individual margins of dumping previously established for the cooperating exporters and determined a separate margin of dumping of 54.2% with respect to new product types to be exported by those exporters, thereby calculating more than one dumping margin for each cooperative exporter.

2.6 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

38. TPKM submits that as a consequence of all the above-mentioned violations, the Panel should find that Canada also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

3 CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT ("SIMA") AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS ("SIMR")

3.1 Claims concerning Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA

3.1.1 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2) and 38(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

39. SIMA calls for a preliminary dumping determination with respect to all goods from a country with a country-wide margin of dumping of 2% or more, and thus also with respect to exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping. As discussed in Section 2.1.3 above, Article 7.1(ii) provides that provisional measures may be applied only if "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping". Since exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping", by mandating that an affirmative preliminary dumping determination be made every time the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more and by ignoring the fact that such determination cannot cover exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping, SIMA is inconsistent, as such, with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.1.2 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

40. The abovementioned Sections of SIMA, do not allow for a termination of the dumping investigation with respect to exporters for which a de minimis margin of dumping has been determined but require that a final dumping determination be made with respect to those exporters if the country-wide margin of dumping is found to be 2% or more. It follows that these
provisions are as such inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which requires the immediate termination of an investigation when the authorities determine that the individual margin of dumping is *de minimis*, i.e. less than 2%.

3.1.3 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

41. Furthermore, Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are also, as such, inconsistent with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because in mandating that affirmative preliminary and definitive dumping determinations be made for exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more, these provisions cause anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be "dumped" and "causing injury".

3.1.4 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

42. Finally, the imposition of anti-dumping duties on exporters with individual *de minimis* margins of dumping but whose country-wide margin of dumping is greater than *de minimis* is in violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which provide for the possibility to levy an anti-dumping duty only "in order to offset or prevent dumping" and therefore not with respect to imports from exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

3.2 Claims concerning Sections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR

43. TPKM submits that Sections 42(1), 42(6), 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent as such with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because these provisions result in an automatic inclusion in the category of "dumped imports", in the context of the injury analysis, of imports of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

44. Pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions, the imports of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping will always be included in the analysis of the volume of dumped imports and the analysis of the effects of dumped imports on prices contrary to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. They will be also taken into account in the analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and for the purpose of the causation analysis in violation of Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Lastly, the imports from exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping will be included in the analysis of the existence of a threat of material injury in violation of Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.3 Claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

45. Since, as explained above, Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR violate a number of provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it automatically follows that Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of the GATT 1994, and therefore, also violated Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.4 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

46. Since the relevant Sections of SIMA and SIMR provide for the imposition of anti-dumping measures even when the circumstances described in Article VI of the GATT 1994 are not met and following investigations that do not comply with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, these Sections are also inconsistent as such with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
4 CONCLUSIONS

47. TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to find that the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain CSWP from, among others, TPKM, are inconsistent with Articles 1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, 9.3 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The Panel should also find that, as a consequence of these violations, Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

48. Furthermore, TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to find that Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA as well as Section 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent as such with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. TPKM requests the Panel to also find that, as a consequence of these violations Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.

49. In light of the above, TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to recommend that the DSB request Canada to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
ANNEX B-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

1. In this second written submission, TPKM will address the arguments advanced by Canada in its first written submission, during the first substantive meeting with the Panel, and those provided in Canada’s responses to the Panel questions to the parties.

1 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A *DE MINIMIS* MARGIN OF DUMPING

1.1 Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

2. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to exporters whose final margins of dumping were *de minimis*. Contrary to Canada’s assertion, the ordinary meaning of the terms used in Article 5.8 and their context do not indicate that the termination of an investigation is required on a country basis. Instead, the ordinary meaning of the words "termination", "investigation", "dumping" and "margin of dumping" used in Article 5.8 actually confirms that the investigation needs to be terminated with respect to exporters/producers with an individual final *de minimis* margin of dumping.

3. Canada’s position is also not supported by the context of Article 5.8. First, the characteristics of investigation described in Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do not suggest that the requirement to terminate such an investigation concerns the imports of the product at issue from one or more countries and not from an individual exporter. While an investigation is product-specific, it results in a different level of duties being imposed on the different exporters/producers and in that sense is also exporter-specific. Second, the language used in the different sentences of Article 5.8 does not indicate that the termination in case of *de minimis* margin of dumping should be made on a country basis. Third, Canada’s arguments relating to the use of the term "*de minimis*" in Articles 3.3 and Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement distort the meaning of these provisions and simply do not stand.

4. Canada also takes issue with the panel and the Appellate Body’s findings in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* invoked by TPKM. Canada’s arguments must all be rejected. Indeed, the panel and the Appellate Body’s findings are legally sound and should be followed by the Panel in the present case. Furthermore, as the Appellate Body noted in *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)*, the panel’s failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues would undermine the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence.

1.2 Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

5. TPKM claims that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to determine a single individual margin of dumping for each exporter or producer by calculating an additional country-wide margin of dumping and using that margin for the purpose of the *de minimis* test required by Article 5.8.

1.3 Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

6. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it applied provisional anti-dumping measures in the absence of a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping. According to Canada, "*[n]othing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied to dumped imports from an exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping". This argument must be rejected. One of the conditions set out in Article 7.1 for the application of provisional measures is that the investigating authority has made a "preliminary affirmative determination" of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry (Article 7.1(ii)). The panel in *EC – Salmon (Norway)* explained that in case of imports from
exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping, there is "no legally cognizable dumping". Thus, Canada’s investigating authorities could not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with respect to the exporters with a *de minimis* dumping margin since such imports could not be treated as "dumped imports". Further, pursuant to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigation needs to be terminated with regard to producers/exporters with a *de minimis* dumping margin, and thus no definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. The consistent interpretation of the term "dumped" requires that the same reasoning applies in the context of Article 7.1(ii).

7. TPKM submits that the balance between the need to safeguard free trade and the application of provisional measures necessary to prevent injury during the investigation, enshrined in Article 7.1, requires that in case of imports from exporters with *de minimis* margin of dumping, while the investigation may continue, no measures should be applied during the remaining part of the investigation.

8. Canada refers to the Appellate Body's findings in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* and argues that "provisional measures could still have been applied until the final determination of dumping and the finding of injury were made". This is an incorrect reading of the Appellate Body Report in that case, which only held that where the issuance of the order establishing anti-dumping duties occurs after the final determination is made, the producers with a *de minimis* margin of dumping are excluded from the scope of the order. Finally, the Panel should dismiss the arguments put forward by the European Union and the United States in their responses to the Panel question No. 1.3 where both third parties erroneously refer to Article 7.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and focus on the issue of the amount of provisional duties.

1.4 Canada violated Article 7.5 and Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

9. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because in imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping, Canada caused anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury. Canada argues that the CBSA respected the requirements of Articles 7.5 and 9.2. While addressing the requirements imposed by Article 9.2, Canada observes that besides an exception for imports from exporters from which price undertakings have been accepted, Article 9.2 contains no further exception. This argument, however, does not stand. Indeed, since Article 9.2 requires an anti-dumping duty to be collected from all "sources found to be dumped" which does not cover producers with *de minimis* margins of dumping, no such exception is needed. TPKM notes that the phrase "sources found to be dumped" should be interpreted in the context of Article 9.2 which deals with the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Since Article 5.8 provides that the investigation needs to be immediately terminated in case of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping it is clear that no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on imports of such exporters and, thus, the phrase "sources found to be dumped" do not cover these exporters.

10. With regard to the application of provisional measures, some of the third parties argue that Articles 7.5 and 9.2 "do not necessarily preclude the application of provisional anti-dumping duties". TPKM submits that they erroneously focus on the issue of the "appropriate amounts" of provisional measures. What is relevant in the context of the imposition of provisional measures is that such measures can be collected only from "sources found to be dumped and causing injury". Exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping cannot be treated as "sources found to be dumped".

1.5 Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

11. TPKM submits that by imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with zero or *de minimis* margin of dumping, Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In its first written submission, Canada failed to rebut these arguments.
2 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

12. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it treated imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping as "dumped imports" in its injury and causation analyses. Canada relies on the Appellate Body's findings in US – Carbon Steel to argue that the term "dumping" is not limited to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold. This reference is inapposite since that case related to the applicability of the de minimis standard in Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement to sunset reviews. Moreover, previous panels and the Appellate Body have consistently found that "dumped imports" for the purpose of the injury analysis should be understood as imports attributable to producers or exporters with a margin of dumping greater than de minimis.

13. Canada also erroneously claims that all previous cases referred to in TPKM's first written submission concern companies with a zero and not de minimis margin of dumping and that none of those cases contain any analysis as to why imports with de minimis margin of dumping should be excluded from the injury analysis. This is factually incorrect. Indeed, in both EC – Salmon (Norway) and EC – Bed Linen, de minimis margins of dumping were found by the authorities and the panels in both cases reached the conclusion that imports of producers with zero or de minimis margin of dumping may not be considered as "dumped". Furthermore, as noted above, since there is "no legally cognizable dumping" in case of imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, such imports should not be treated as "dumped imports" for the purpose of injury analysis or, in fact, for any aspect of an anti-dumping investigation.

3 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS

14. TPKM claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which at the same time were causing injury to its domestic industry, in particular the effects of subsidies and overcapacity, and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by such other factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports.

15. TPKM submits that the effects of subsidies constitute an "other factor", known to the Canadian authorities, the effects of which should have been separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping in the causation analysis. Canada's assertion that there is no requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the Indian subsidization from the effects of the dumped imports would render inutile the words "through the effects of dumping" contained in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In TPKM's view, when the same goods are dumped and subsidized at the same time there may be effects of subsidization that are not directly reflected in the dumping margin. TPKM submits that without analysing the relationship between different subsidy programs and dumping in India, Canada could not have assumed that there is no need to distinguish between the effects of dumping and the effects of subsidization.

16. With respect to overcapacity, Canada argues that the CITT was not obliged to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of overcapacity, since low capacity utilization rates are not a cause of injury but merely an injury indicator. TPKM considers that "low capacity utilization rates" and "overcapacity" are two distinct concepts. While overcapacity can be the cause of injury, it is not in itself an injury indicator. Therefore, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 3.5, "overcapacity" must be properly separated and distinguished from the injury caused by the dumped imports. Since the CITT failed to do so, it violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

4 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"

17. TPKM submits that Canada's determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for all other exporters is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. TPKM submits that the use of the highest dumping margin seeks to punish TPKM other exporters from failing to cooperate. Canada argues that "the CBSA's ministerial specification cannot be considered punitive" because it was based on verified facts and on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate in the investigation.
TPKM submits that, while a determination based on Article 6.8 must be based on "facts" and non-cooperation may be one of the procedural circumstances that may be taken into account when selecting facts available, the investigating authority cannot choose whichever factual element it wishes on the sole basis that the exporter did not cooperate. The two cases referred by Canada, namely EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips and US – Carbon Steel (India) support TPKM’s position. In the present case, the CBSA mechanistically applied the rule laid down in the SIMA Handbook which calls for the use of the highest margin of dumping and thus used the worst possible information, thereby acting such as to punish all other exporters from failing to cooperate.

18. TPKM also submits that the CBSA failed to make any comparative and evaluative assessment of the facts on the record. TPKM notes in particular that Canada has expressly confirmed that there is no evidence on the record showing any such assessment in order to select the "best" information available when determining the rate applicable to all other TPKM exporters.

19. TPKM further submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7 because there is no "logical relationship" between the rate established for all other TPKM exporters and the facts on the record concerning TPKM exports. In particular, Canada ignored the data concerning TPKM cooperating exporters which were representative of the TPKM market as a whole. Canada argues that TPKM’s argument "lacks support in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it ignores the procedural character of the obligations under Annex II, paragraph 7" and that "[these] obligations do not guarantee a specific outcome". However, TPKM does not challenge the outcome per se, namely, the 54.2% margin of dumping, but the methodology followed by the CBSA, which determines the rate for all other TPKM exporters on the basis of facts that are totally unrelated to them.

5 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

5.1 Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

20. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new product types of cooperating exporters that exceed their margin of dumping as established under Article 2.

21. Canada’s argument that TPKM’s claim is based on speculation is entirely misplaced. Indeed, TPKM does not argue that its exporters are prevented from making a refund request pursuant to Article 9.3.2 or that Canada has failed to refund duties paid by importers. What is at issue is the fact that the anti-dumping duty applied on imports of new product types for cooperating exporters is based on the residual duty rate. This is inconsistent with Article 9.3. Therefore, in order to succeed with this claim which is based on Article 9.3 and does not involve Article 9.3.2, TPKM is not required to provide any evidence that imports of new product types have been subject to an initial duty assessment. Canada’s further argument that it is only in the context of the duty refund procedure that the obligation in Article 9.3 must be complied with, must also be rejected. This position is not correct and not supported by the case-law referred to by Canada. In fact, Canada’s position leads to the absurd outcome that every fully cooperating exporter with new product models to be imported into Canada must be subject to the residual duty rate – even those exporters with a zero margin of dumping.

22. Finally, Canada’s argument that "when an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund", is misleading. In fact, the application of the residual duty rate on imports of new product types has effectively prevented purchase of such new product types by Canadian importers.

23. In conclusion, Article 9.3 is relevant not only in the context of the refund mechanism under Article 9.3.2. The "margin of dumping as established under Article 2" referred to in Article 9.3 also refers to the margin of dumping which is established during the original investigation. By using a prospective normal value for new product types based on the "all others rate" instead of the individual rate determined for the relevant exporters, Canada therefore violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.2 Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

TPKM also submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it resorted to facts available for the calculation of the normal value with respect to imports of new product types to be exported by the cooperating exporters. Canada should not have resorted to "facts available" because the conditions laid down in Article 6.8 were not fulfilled. Canada claims that "[w]ithout an ability to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models, thereby creating a significant gap in the anti-dumping disciplines." However, the CBSA did possess the "necessary information", each TPKM cooperating exporter fully cooperated in the investigation and, on the basis of the information provided by each of them, the CBSA calculated a dumping margin of respectively 0.005% for Chung Hung Steel, 0.4% for Shin Yang Steel and of 4.7% for Yieh Phui. Canada manifestly fails to take into account that under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, dumping and dumping margin are determined and imposed with respect to the product under investigation as a whole. Therefore, if the anti-dumping duty is calculated by reference to prospective normal values, the relevant "normal values" cannot be higher than those that have been determined for the purposes of determining the dumping margin for that product.

The determination regarding the normal value for new product types is also manifestly inconsistent with Annex II, paragraph 7. TPKM notes that the Appellate Body emphasised that "investigating authorities should not arrive at a "less favourable" outcome simply because an interested party fails to furnish requested information if, in fact, the interested party has "cooperated" with the investigating authorities, within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement." Since the two TPKM exporters fully cooperated during the investigation, the anti-dumping duty determined for new product types could not be based on facts available leading to a result which is less favourable to them. Furthermore, it appears that the information used was not the "best" information available, nor could it be considered as the "most fitting" information. Canada failed to address these arguments.

5.3 Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

TPKM claims that Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for new product types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology which is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada argues that TPKM has failed to prove that a violation occurred because TPKM "has not referred to a single shipment of a new product model by one of its exporters that was subject to the treatment that [TPKM] alleges violates Article 2.2." Canada misses the point, because it is the calculation of the normal value which is at issue. Second, Canada submits that the investigating authority is not in a position to determine model-specific normal values for the new product types when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated and therefore, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits the CBSA to use facts available. Since the conditions to resort to "facts available" were not fulfilled, the CBSA could only apply the methodologies provided for in Article 2.2. By failing to do so, Canada acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

5.4 Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that Canada did not calculate one dumping margin for each cooperating exporter but another additional dumping margin with respect to new product types.

6 CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE VI OF THE GATT 1994

TPKM claims that all the above-mentioned violations resulted in a consequential violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Since Canada failed to rebut any of TPKM's claims, the Panel should conclude that it has also acted inconsistently with the above two provisions.
7 CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT ("SIMA") AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS ("SIMR")

7.1 Claims concerning Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA

29. TPKM claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because they provide for a de minimis test to be carried out on a country-wide basis instead of an exporter-specific basis.

30. First, TPKM submits that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsections 35(1), 35(2) and 38(1) are as such inconsistent with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they mandate that an "affirmative preliminary dumping determination" be made for exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more. One of the conditions spelled out in Article 7.1(ii) is that the investigating authority makes a "preliminary affirmative determination" of dumping. By mandating that such affirmative preliminary determination be made every time the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more and by ignoring the fact that such determination cannot cover exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping, the relevant provisions of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Contrary to what Canada argues, the fact that investigation is not terminated with respect to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping does not imply that the investigating authority can impose provisional measures on imports from such exporters. TPKM also fails to see how the findings of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice support Canada's position that an investigating authority is permitted to apply provisional measures on dumped imports until definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed. In fact, paragraph 219 of the Appellate Body Report, referred to by Canada, does not even address the issue of the imposition of provisional measures.

31. Second, Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada argues that even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, SIMA could not be found to violate as such Article 5.8 because Subsection 43(1) of SIMA confers discretion to the CITT to terminate an investigation regarding the dumped imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping by excluding that exporter from the injury finding. TPKM disagrees. First, the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not indicate that the CITT enjoys discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Canada also did not provide any evidence which would confirm that the CITT enjoys the alleged discretion. Second, even if the Panel were to conclude that the SIMA text confers some discretion - quod non - this would be still inconsistent with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as Article 5.8 clearly requires an immediate termination of the investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping and does not allow for any discretion. It follows that to the extent SIMA grants any discretion for the CITT to act otherwise it is as such inconsistent with Article 5.8. Finally, TPKM notes that the alleged discretion cannot render the relevant provisions of SIMA consistent with Article 5.8. Indeed, excluding an exporter from an injury finding is not equal to terminating the investigation with respect to such exporter. Furthermore, even assuming – for the sake of argument – that SIMA provides for discretion to terminate investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, such discretion would be provided only to the CITT, while pursuant to Article 5.8, the investigation should have already been terminated by the CBSA.

32. Third, TPKM submits that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are as such inconsistent with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because these provisions require affirmative preliminary and definitive dumping determinations be made and anti-dumping duties collected for exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, even from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury. Canada asserts that "anti-dumping duties are to be collected on imports from all individual exporters and producers found to be dumped and causing injury, including on imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping". This is incorrect, since the term "dumped" used in Article 9.2 requires a dumping margin that is more than de minimis. Canada also refers to Subsection 43(1) of SIMA and the alleged discretion of the CITT to exclude exporters with de minimis margins of dumping from an injury finding. As explained above, this Subsection does not provide for any discretion.
33. Finally, TPKM maintains that the SIMA provisions requiring anti-dumping duties to be imposed on exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping amount to an as such violation of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which only allows the levying of anti-dumping duties “in order to offset or prevent dumping”. Canada failed to rebut TPKM’s claims in that regard.

7.2 Claims concerning Subsections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR and any implementing or related measures

34. TPKM claims that Subsections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR, as well as any implementing or related measures, are as such inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they result in the automatic inclusion in the category of "dumped imports", in the context of the injury analysis, of the imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Canada essentially repeats its previous arguments made in the context of the claims concerning anti-dumping measure at issue and fails to rebut TPKM’s claims.

7.3 Claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

35. TPKM submits that since Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has acted inconsistently with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.4 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

36. Since Canada failed to rebut any of TPKM’s claims concerning as such violations, it is clear that Canada has also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
1 INTRODUCTION

1. The present proceedings concern provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe. These measures, and the investigation that led to their imposition, are deeply flawed and violate several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. Moreover, the underlying Canadian legislation, namely the Special Import Measures Act (or SIMA) and the Special Import Measures Regulations (or SIMR), is inconsistent as such with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994 and the Marrakesh Agreement.

2. The economic impact of Canada's measures on our steel industry has been devastating as the value of our exports of the product at issue to Canada suffered a 75% drop – from 16 million US Dollars to 4 million between 2011 and 2013.

2 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

3. Canada puts forward a distorted interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to respond to the arguments raised by us. First, with regard to the claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Canada argues that the requirement to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country and not to an individual exporter. This interpretation of Article 5.8 is incorrect and goes against findings of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. Canada erroneously argues that the Appellate Body in that case overlooked Articles 3.3 and 9.4 in its interpretation of Article 5.8 in the context of other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.3 deals with situations "where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations", which explains the reference to the margin of dumping from "each country". Article 9.4 addresses the calculation criteria for the margin of dumping of non-sampled exporters where sampling is used by the investigating authorities. Contrary to what Canada argues, there is no conflict between the requirement to terminate the investigation for individual exporters with de minimis margins of dumping and the obligation to disregard such de minimis margins of dumping in the calculations under Article 9.4. We submit that the Panel in the present case should follow the interpretation adopted by the Appellate Body in previous cases dealing with similar issues, in order not to undermine the coherence and the predictability of the WTO legal system.

4. Canada argues that it did not violate Article 6.10 because it had already determined an individual margin of dumping for each exporter and because the additional determination of a country-wide margin of dumping is irrelevant. Canada disregards that Article 6.10 requires a single company-specific margin of dumping to be established for each exporter. The establishment of a second country-wide margin for each exporter for the purpose of the application of the de minimis test is inconsistent with Article 6.10.

5. Canada argues that nothing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied to dumped imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. This argument must be rejected, since an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping cannot be treated as "dumping". The fact that the investigating authority may continue the investigation until it makes a final dumping determination does not mean that it can disregard the requirements of Article 7.1 and apply a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports from exporters with a provisional de minimis margin of dumping.
6. Canada further argues that it did not violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 in applying provisional measures and imposing definitive measures on exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. This contention is in contradiction with the Appellate Body's finding that a producer with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping" and thus his imports do not qualify as "sources found to be dumped". Finally, Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because the possibility to levy an anti-dumping duty only applies "in order to offset or prevent dumping" and therefore does not apply to imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. As a consequence, Canada also violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

7. We submit that by failing to exclude from the category of "dumped imports" the imports of the exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada claims that nothing in these provisions suggests that "dumped imports" should exclude imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. This goes against a number of previous reports of panels and the Appellate Body, according to which the term "dumped imports" refers to imports of producers with a margin of dumping above de minimis. Canada claims that all previous cases referred to by our concern companies with a zero and not de minimis margin of dumping. This is factually incorrect, since in EC – Salmon (Norway), the EC calculated a de minimis margin of dumping of 0.8% for one company and, likewise, in EC – Bed Linen, the EC found de minimis margins for four Pakistani exporters. In both cases the panels reached the conclusion that imports of producers with zero or de minimis margin of dumping may not be considered as "dumped".

4 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS

8. We claim that Canada failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports, such as the effects of the subsidies and overcapacity, which at the same time were causing injury to the domestic industry. Concerning the effects of subsidies, Canada argues that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require that the effects of the subsidies be separated from the effects of the dumping. We argue that subsidised imports constitute another factor, the effects of which should have been distinguished from the effects of dumping in the causation analysis.

9. With regard to overcapacity, Canada argues that low capacity utilization rates cannot be said to cause injury and thus do not have to be examined in the causation analysis. We maintain that although the low capacity utilization rate is one of the injury factors under Article 3.4, the overcapacity which was present at the beginning of the investigation period was a known factor that the Tribunal failed to examine in the context of its non-attribution analysis. As a consequence, the Canadian authorities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

5 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"

10. Canada's methodology for calculating the margin of dumping for "all other exporters" is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada's automatic use of the highest dumping margin found for an individual transaction from another market to determine the duty applicable for all other exporters seeks to punish all other exporters on the sole basis that they were either unknown or failed to provide information. By applying mechanistically the rule in the SIMA Handbook – which requires the investigating authorities to apply the highest margin of dumping found for one transaction of a cooperating exporter – Canada failed to evaluate in a comparative manner the information that was on the record. Canada failed to explain how the highest dumping margin of a single transaction in the investigation was appropriate for establishing the "all others rate". Nor did Canada provide any evidence that it has made a careful evaluation of the facts available.

11. We submit that there is no logical relationship between the residual rate established for our exporters, namely 54.2%, and the facts on the record. The Appellate Body clarified that the term "best information" means that information has to be the "most appropriate information" available. The data provided by cooperating exporters from us, which was representative for our exports as a
whole, would clearly be the "most fitting" information available in the present case, but was nonetheless ignored.

12. Finally, contrary to Canada's contention, we did not argue that Canada violated Annex II and Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it should have reached another or any specific outcome. We simply submit that any outcome must be based on methodologies that comply with the rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. All the evidence on the record demonstrates that there was no assessment of the facts before the investigating authorities and thus we have made a *prima facie* case that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

6 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

13. Canada argued that, to the extent an importer can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values, the applied anti-dumping duties are consistent with Article 9.3. Under Canada's approach, there would be no limitation as to how the prospective normal values must be determined. This would lead to the absurd situation where Members having a prospective system could use whichever prospective normal value they wish as long as they have a refund system. We consider that "the margin of dumping as established under Article 2" referred to in the chapeau of Article 9.3 relates to the margin of dumping which has been established during the original investigation. In a prospective normal value system, the normal value calculated for the purposes of determining the dumping margin during the original investigation constitutes the relevant benchmark for the determination of the anti-dumping duty. By using a prospective normal value for new models based on the "all others rate" instead of a prospective value based on the individual rate determined for the relevant exporters, Canada violated the chapeau of Article 9.3.

14. As to our claim under Article 6.8, Canada erroneously argues that without being able to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models. Our cooperating exporters provided relevant information and data for all the models they exported during the investigation period and Canada could have therefore used such information to determine relevant prospective normal values for new models.

15. We do not take issue with the Canadian system of prospective normal values but with the way Canada has determined the anti-dumping duty applicable to new product types of our cooperating exporters. As a result, all exporters, including those with *de minimis* or even zero dumping margins are subject to the residual duty of 54.2% if they decide to export new product types. In practice, this leads to a chilling effect whereby the exporters are effectively prevented from exporting any new product types. This can never be remedied by the availability of a refund mechanism.

7 CLAIMS OF "AS SUCH" VIOLATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA AND SIMR

16. Canada did not develop any arguments in order to rebut our claims that certain provisions of SIMA and SIMR are as such inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 and essentially repeats the arguments used with regard to our challenge of the anti-dumping measures at issue. Concerning Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Canada argues that Subsection 43(1) of SIMA grants the Canadian International Trade Tribunal discretion to terminate an investigation regarding the dumped imports from an exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping by excluding that exporter from its injury finding. We disagree as the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not indicate that the Tribunal enjoys discretion to terminate investigation with regard to exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping. Moreover, Article 5.8 provides for a positive obligation to immediately terminate an investigation with respect to exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping and does not allow for any type of discretion. Canada did not provide any proof that the Tribunal has exercised its alleged discretion at least once in the past, let alone in the present case. Since Canada failed to rebut any of our claims, it is clear that it has also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. It also follows that since Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has acted inconsistently with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Closing statement of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu

17. Our position is that exporters with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping are not considered as "dumping" under the Anti-Dumping Agreement as confirmed by previous panels as well as the Appellate Body. It is imports with a dumping margin of 2% or more that are "dumped imports" and only such imports can cause injury to domestic industry. Furthermore, if the investigating authorities have determined that subsidies cause injury at the same time as dumped imports, they must review that known factor to ensure that particular injury would not be wrongfully attributed to dumped imports. The same applies to the pre-existing overcapacity in the concerned industry. With regard to the determination of the "all others rate", we submit that the investigating authorities are required to look into the information available on the record and to use the most appropriate one. The investigating authorities cannot resort to the worst information available. We further maintain that individual margins of dumping determined for cooperating exporters must be applied also to new models. Finally, we respectfully ask the Panel to look into the relevant Canadian laws and regulations and to decide whether they are written in such a manner that is as such inconsistent with several provisions of WTO law.
ANNEX B-4
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE PANEL

Opening Statement of TPKM

1 INTRODUCTION

1. This oral statement focuses on addressing some of Canada's newly developed arguments and providing clarifications regarding issues that are particularly relevant to our case. Canada's selective reading of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not only legally erroneous, it also ignores the realities of the investigation process and leads to absurd and unreasonable consequences. In each section, we will ask the Panel to examine the practical consequences of Canada's interpretation and show that its outcomes are manifestly unreasonable.

2 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

2. Canada repeats all of its previous arguments contending that the margin of dumping for the Article 5.8 de minimis test ought to be determined on a country-wide basis and not an individual basis. In doing so, Canada fails to provide any "cogent reasons" to depart from the Appellate Body's ruling in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. The ordinary meaning of the relevant terms of Article 5.8 as well as the broader context of Article 5 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement confirm that the investigation must be terminated with respect to individual exporters. Furthermore, Canada erroneously argues that our interpretation of Article 5.8 would result in an inconsistent treatment of new exporters under Article 9.5. In making this argument, Canada assumes incorrectly that Article 9.5 does not allow for the application of the de minimis standard under Article 5.8, when in fact, Article 9.5 is silent on this issue. In any event, Article 9.5 deals with a different stage of anti-dumping proceedings which is not at issue in the present dispute. Contrary to what Canada argues, our interpretation of Article 5.8 would also not render Article 9.4 inutile. Article 9.4 is not limited to a distinct phase in the anti-dumping proceedings and refers to the determination of the duty rate and not the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Thus, there is no conflict between the requirement to terminate the investigation for individual exporters with de minimis margins of dumping under Article 5.8 and the obligation to disregard such margins in the calculations carried out under Article 9.4. Finally, Canada's position under Article 5.8, if held to be WTO-consistent, would result in a fundamentally unfair outcome that companies that have always traded at fair market price are still made subject to anti-dumping measures.

3. With respect to the claim under Article 6.10, Canada ignores the established case law that requires a single margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter for the purposes of the de minimis test. Thus, the fact that Canada calculated individual margins of dumping is irrelevant, if it used another margin, namely the country-based margin of dumping, for the determination and imposition of anti-dumping duties.

4. Canada submits two new arguments with respect to our claim under Article 7.1(ii). First, it argues that Article 7.1(ii), when read together with the chapeau of Article 7.1, Article 7.1(i) and Article 5, must refer to a determination of alleged dumping for the investigation as a whole. This argument is taken out of context as Article 7.1 relates to the initiation of the investigation while Article 7.1(ii) deals with the preliminary determination of dumping and injury. Furthermore, the term "determination of dumping" is inherently exporter-specific. Therefore, in order to apply provisional measures, the investigating authority needs to reach a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with regard to each individual exporter.

5. Canada's second argument that an investigating authority satisfies Article 7.1(ii) by merely making a preliminary affirmative determination that the export price is less than the normal value is equally erroneous. As confirmed by case law, imports of exporters with a de minimis margin of
dumping should not be treated as "dumped" because "no legally cognizable dumping" can be found with regard to such exporters. In this regard, the terms "dumping" and "dumping margin" when read in the context of the provision governing the imposition of anti-dumping duties necessarily refer to dumping which exceeds the statutory \textit{de minimis} threshold of Article 5.8. We also note that Article 7.1 is designed to strike a balance between the need to safeguard free trade and the application of provisional measures "to prevent injury being caused during the investigation". The conditions to impose provisional measures are also stricter than those for imposing definitive measures. Accordingly, if no definitive measures can be imposed on imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping, \textit{a fortiori} no anti-dumping duties may be applied at the provisional stage on imports of such exporters.

6. Similarly, for claims under \textbf{Articles 7.5 and 9.2}, Canada continues to base its interpretation of the phrase "from all sources found to be dumped" in Article 9.2, on the definition of dumping under Article 2.1. This argument must be rejected, since Article 9.2 deals with the imposition of anti-dumping duties and Article 5.8 provides that the investigation needs to be immediately terminated in case of imports with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping and thus no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. Finally, Canada's argument pertaining to "appropriate amounts" is irrelevant to this claim.

\textbf{3 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES}

7. Similar to the argument made in relation to Article 7.1(ii) and Article 9.2, Canada once again relies on the definition of dumping under Article 2.1 to argue that imports dumped at a margin below \textit{de minimis} are still "dumped imports" in the context of \textbf{Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7}. As we have explained, imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping do not constitute "dumped imports" as in those cases there is "no legally cognizable dumping". In other words, \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping are too "insignificant" to warrant any action. It follows that both imports with \textit{de minimis} and zero margins of dumping should be excluded from the injury and causation analysis.

\textbf{4 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS}

8. Canada's repeated arguments that it was not required to consider the effects of the subsidies and overcapacity as factors other than the dumped imports in the non-attribution analysis should be rejected. With regard to \textit{overcapacity}, Canada insists that the "low capacity utilization" is not a factor or cause of injury but merely an injury indicator. However, "low capacity utilization rates" and "overcapacity" are two distinct concepts, and overcapacity can be the cause of injury but is not in itself an injury indicator. In the present case, Canada failed to examine the overcapacity present at the beginning of the investigation period and thus acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The fact that the CITT made a determination only about a threat of injury and not actual injury does not waive the obligation under Article 3.5.

9. Regarding the "\textit{effects of subsidies}", Canada distorts the Appellate Body's findings in \textit{Japan – DRAMS (Korea)} to argue that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require that the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping. The Appellate Body merely stated that the SCM Agreement does not require the examination of the subsidies as distinguished from the effects of \textit{the subsidised imports}. In failing to properly assess and distinguish the effects of subsidies from the effects of dumping, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

\textbf{5 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"}

10. With regard to the claim under Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, Canada's repeated assertions are directly contradicted by the facts of the record. First, Canada's argument that the methodology employed by the CBSA was not "mechanistic" because the SIMA Handbook indicates that the CBSA, as a general practice, considers whether it is necessary to disregard anomalous or aberrant transactions when selecting facts for the ministerial specification is inapposite. Second, Canada's argument that the CBSA analysed all the information on the record is irrelevant. Third, Canada's attempt to explain that the CBSA did not base its determination solely on the
procedural circumstances of the investigation, and that it selected verified facts and took into account the totality of information is also unsupported by any evidence and entirely unconvincing. It is clear from the record that the normal value was determined by using the highest dumping margin according to the rule laid down in the SIMA Handbook.

11. Canada's further argument that the CBSA could have used the worse information from the petitioners' complaint actually asks the Panel to lower the standard required by Article 6.8 to use the "best information available". The all others rate determined in the present case, was a margin from a country that was found to have provided subsidies to its industry and fails to bear any "logical relationship" with the information concerning our cooperating exporters, which was representative of our market as a whole.

12. Finally, while the investigating authority should enjoy a certain degree of discretion with respect to the determination of the all others rate, it cannot choose whatever fact it wishes. To be clear, we are not asking the Panel to reach a specific outcome or decide on the specific information the CBSA should have used to make its all others rate determination. Rather, we are asking the Panel to conclude that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II since the methodology followed by the CBSA to determine the duty rate for our all other exporters does not comply with the requirements laid down in those provisions.

6 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

13. What is at issue with regard to our claim under Article 9.3 is not whether Canada has refunded our exporters, but the fact that the anti-dumping duties applied on imports of new product types for cooperating exporters are based on the residual duty rate. Under Canada's approach, there would be no limitation as to how the prospective normal values must be determined. Canada's interpretation of Article 9.3 would lead to the absurd results where Members having a prospective system could use whichever prospective normal value they wish as long as they have a refund system. In our view, Article 9.3 mandates that the dumping margin from the original investigation constitutes the relevant benchmark when applying the prospective normal value for the anti-dumping duty.

14. As to our claim under Article 6.8, our position remains that Canada could not resort to "facts available" as the conditions laid down in Article 6.8 were not fulfilled. Canada erroneously asserts that its prospective application of facts available to new product models is necessary as otherwise it would lack information essential to the assessment of duties on such products. In that regard, it is essential to underline that dumping and margin of dumping are determined in relation to the product as a whole and not on a model per model basis. In the present case, Canada did possess the "necessary information" as our cooperating exporters provided all relevant information for the purposes of determining the company specific dumping margin for the product as a whole.

7 CLAIMS OF "AS SUCH" VIOLATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA AND SIMR

15. Canada has failed to respond to our as such claims, and even its Article 5.8 arguments are repetitive at best. Contrary to Canada's contention, we have made a prima facie case that the challenged Sections of SIMA are, as such, WTO-inconsistent since they only require terminating an investigation if the country-wide margin of dumping is de minimis. Neither the text nor any evidence provided by Canada supports its assertion that Subsection 43(1) of SIMA grants the CITT discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Article 5.8 bestows a positive obligation to terminate investigations with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. To the extent that SIMA grants any discretion for the CITT to act otherwise, it would lead to a violation of Article 5.8. Furthermore, any discretion provided by Subsection 43(1) to the CITT would, in any event, not ensure the consistency with Article 5.8 as it would not guarantee an "immediate termination" which should happen already at the CBSA level.
Closing statement of TPKM

16. With regard to the termination of investigation for exporters with *de minimis* dumping margins, Canada has failed to provide any cogent reasons for the Panel to deviate from the well-established case-law. Article 5.8 also makes clear that not all "dumping" warrants legal action, and thus imports with *de minimis* margins of dumping need to be disregarded for the purpose of the injury analysis and the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that overcapacity and the effects of subsidies in India were known factors that should have been taken into account by the Canadian authorities. With respect to the "all others rate", it is clear that Canada had not engaged in a comparative and evaluative assessment of the relevant facts, and the highest dumping margin applied from another country did not bear any "logical relationship" with the information of our exporters. Canada's use of the residual duty rate for the new product types of cooperating exporters is all the more inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as that rate was significantly higher than the margin of dumping calculated for each cooperating exporter in the original investigation. Finally, Canada has failed to rebut our *prima facie* case of *as such* violations.
ANNEX C

ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1: Executive summary of the first written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2: Executive summary of the second written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3: Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4: Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This dispute concerns anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe (CSWP) from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei). Chinese Taipei claims that the investigation that led to the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, the measures themselves, and certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR) are inconsistent with the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).

2. Canada demonstrates that the investigation and the application of anti-dumping measures on CSWP from Chinese Taipei, as well as the relevant provisions of SIMA and the SIMR, are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED BY CANADA ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, CHINESE TAIPEI

A. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Articles 1, 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

1. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

3. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to immediately terminate the CSWP investigation with respect to Chinese Taipei exporters whose margins of dumping were de minimis.

4. Canada demonstrates that the ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping", which are essential to the interpretation of Article 5.8, is consistent with the termination of an investigation being required on a country basis. Canada also shows that the context within which these terms are found clearly establishes that the termination of an investigation with respect to a country is what is required by the second sentence of Article 5.8 when the country based margin of dumping is de minimis. As a result, interpreting Article 5.8 to require the termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter is inconsistent with the very terms of Article 5.8 when considered in their context.

5. Chinese Taipei relies on the panel and Appellate Body decisions in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice to support its position that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that an investigation be terminated with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. These decisions are undermined by four significant flaws.

6. First, the panel and the Appellate Body relied too heavily on the references to individual margins of dumping in the Anti-Dumping Agreement when interpreting the reference to the margin of dumping contained in Article 5.8. Second, the panel and the Appellate Body failed to properly consider the scope of the investigation described in Article 5 and the context in which the termination of an investigation is required under Article 5.8. Third, the panel and the Appellate Body ignored that requiring exporter-specific termination contradicts Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Finally, the panel and the Appellate Body's flawed analysis led them to improperly read words into Article 5.8. Reading in the words "in respect of the individual exporter..."
or producer for which a zero or de minimis margin is established" means that an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping is excluded from an investigation that nonetheless continues.

7. Had the panel and the Appellate Body conducted a proper analysis of Article 5.8, giving its terms their ordinary meaning within their context, they could only have come to the conclusion that an investigation is terminated as a whole, and, consequently, that the reference to the de minimis margin of dumping in that provision pertains to a country.

2. The CBSA's Determination of an Individual Margin of Dumping for Each Chinese Taipei Exporter Did Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

8. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA failed to determine only one individual margin of dumping for each exporter by calculating a country-based margin of dumping and using that margin for the purpose of conducting the de minimis test required by Article 5.8.

9. Article 6.10 requires that "[t]he authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation". In this investigation, the CBSA determined an individual margin of dumping for each cooperating Chinese Taipei exporter as evidenced in the CBSA's Final Dumping Determination filed by Chinese Taipei. The additional determination by the CBSA of a country-based margin of dumping is simply irrelevant under Article 6.10. The CBSA therefore did not violate Article 6.10.

3. The CBSA's Application of Provisional Measures on Dumped Imports from a Chinese Taipei Exporter with a de Minimis Margin of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

10. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA applied provisional measures on CSWP imports from one Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping in the absence of a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping.

11. Chinese Taipei's claim must fail because the CBSA satisfied the requirements of Article 7.1(ii) when applying provisional measures on a Chinese Taipei exporter found to have a de minimis margin of dumping in the CBSA's preliminary determination of dumping. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has confirmed that the termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping does not need to occur before the issuance of the order establishing the definitive anti-dumping duties. Therefore, regardless of the proper interpretation to be given to Article 5.8, the CBSA cannot be found to have violated Article 7.1(ii) when it applied provisional measures on one Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping.

4. The CBSA's Application of Provisional Measures and Imposition of Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Dumped Imports from Chinese Taipei Exporters Did Not Violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

12. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in applying provisional measures and imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on CSWP imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, the CBSA caused duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury.

13. Canada demonstrates that, having complied with the three conditions set out in Article 7.1, the CBSA rightfully applied provisional measures on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. Even accepting Chinese Taipei's interpretation of Article 5.8, the CBSA could still apply provisional measures on imports from that Chinese Taipei exporter until the time when definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed. Given that Chinese Taipei's country-based margin of dumping was not de minimis, Canada, in compliance with Article 9.2, rightfully imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on all dumped imports from Chinese Taipei exporters.
14. For the aforementioned reasons, the CBSA's application of provisional measures and imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties to offset dumping did not violate Articles 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2. Consequently, Canada did not violate Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

B. The CITT's Treatment of Dumped Imports in its Injury Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

15. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CITT treated imports from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping as dumped imports for the purposes of its injury analysis. Canada demonstrates that none of these provisions confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the *de minimis* threshold and, therefore, that the CITT's treatment of dumped imports, including those from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping, did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

16. There is no distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above *de minimis* and those dumped at a margin below *de minimis* – both are "dumped". It is only imports with a zero margin that should be considered as not dumped.

17. Canada demonstrates that the CITT's approach in the CSWP injury inquiry is consistent with the Appellate Body's analysis in *US – Carbon Steel*. In that case, which was decided under the *Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures* (SCM Agreement), the Appellate Body noted that the definition of injury in footnote 45 to the SCM Agreement makes no reference to the amount of subsidy involved. Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a footnote with an identical definition of injury. Therefore, the Anti-Dumping Agreement similarly does not confine the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the *de minimis* threshold.

18. Canada also demonstrates that the decisions referred to by Chinese Taipei in its first written submission, to support its position that imports from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping should not have been included by the CITT in its injury analysis, concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. In each case, the panel concluded that the imports at issue were "non-dumped" and therefore should not have been included in the injury analysis. To the extent that these panels referred to *de minimis* margins, these references should properly be considered as *obiter dicta*.

19. Furthermore, no analysis was conducted in any of the decisions as to why imports with *de minimis* margins should be excluded. Whereas it is logical to exclude imports that are not dumped, nothing in the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement supports an exclusion of imports that are dumped, irrespective of their margin of dumping.

20. Chinese Taipei has failed to establish that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when the CITT included "dumped imports", including those from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping, in its injury analysis.

C. The CITT's Non-Attribution Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Subsidies

21. Chinese Taipei argues that by failing to separate and distinguish the effects caused by the subsidies from the effects caused by the dumping Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

22. Canada demonstrates that, pursuant to the Appellate Body decision in *Japan – DRAMs (Korea)*, the CITT acted consistently with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the CSWP inquiry by determining whether the dumped imports caused or threatened to cause injury to the domestic industry. The Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require an additional analysis as to whether the dumping, as opposed to the dumped imports, caused or threatened to cause injury. Given that there was no requirement to assess the effects of the dumping *per se*, there cannot be
a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidization from the effects of the dumping.

23. Second, contrary to Chinese Taipei's argument, the Appellate Body decision in US – Carbon Steel (India) is not relevant to this case. In that decision, the Appellate Body held that the SCM Agreement only allows the cumulation of subsidized imports; it does not allow the cumulation of dumped but non-subsidized imports. In the CSWP investigation, there were no imports that were subsidized but not dumped. The CITT, consistent with Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, cumulated the effects of imports from India with those from Chinese Taipei and four other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was irrelevant to the CITT's decision to cumulate the effects of all dumped imports.

2. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Overcapacity

24. Canada submits that low capacity utilization rates (which Chinese Taipei refers to as overcapacity) are not a cause of injury and therefore do not result in effects that must be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumped imports. Low capacity utilization rates are merely an indicator of injury and were treated as such by the CITT in its injury analysis.

25. As an indicator and not a cause of injury, there was no need for the CITT to separate and distinguish the effects of the low utilization rates from the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

D. The CBSA's Use of Facts Available to Determine the Dumping Margin and Duty Rate for "All Other Exporters" Did Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

26. Chinese Taipei claims that the ministerial specification used by the CBSA to determine the margin of dumping and the anti-dumping duty rate for "all other exporters" violated Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Its arguments under these provisions, however, mischaracterize relevant facts and applicable law.

27. First, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available effectively punished non-cooperating exporters. While Canada agrees that an investigating authority is prohibited from using facts available to punish non-cooperating parties, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that an investigating authority is permitted to draw inferences, including adverse inferences, based on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's argument, the case law recognizes that where an interested party withholds necessary information, an unbiased and objective investigating authority may take this procedural circumstance into account and use facts on the record in a manner which, as contemplated in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, may be less favourable, i.e. adverse, to that party than if it had cooperated. In this context, and contrary to Chinese Taipei's argument, the CBSA's ministerial specification cannot be considered punitive.

28. Second, Chinese Taipei argues the CBSA's use of facts available was not based on a comparative evaluation that took into account all of the information on the record. This allegation is factually incorrect. In particular, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the record of the CSWP investigation establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA engaged in a systematic evaluation of all of the facts on the record pursuant to which it determined the appropriate basis for establishing the normal values for non-cooperating exporters. Indeed, the CBSA's conduct in the CSWP investigation can be distinguished from instances where an investigating authority was found to have contravened Article 6.8 and Annex II by simply using facts that were included in petitioner applications without further scrutiny, by corroborating the appropriateness of the selected facts in an arbitrary manner, or by making determinations that are devoid of any factual foundation.

29. Third, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available was contrary to the "best information available" requirement on the basis that there was no "logical relationship" between the rates established for "all other" Chinese Taipei exporters and the facts on the record.
concerning Chinese Taipei exports. While Canada agrees that the information selected in the application of facts available must have a “logical relationship” to the missing information from the record, Chinese Taipei fails to establish that the CBSA did not meet this requirement. Indeed, the methodology described above ensured that the CBSA used facts that reasonably replaced the information missing from the record. It also ensured that the procedural circumstances of the investigation were taken into account, as well as the need to encourage cooperation and prevent anti-dumping duty circumvention.

30. Moreover, to the extent Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA should have relied on the information provided by the cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters, Canada submits such an argument lacks support in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it ignores the procedural character of the obligations under Annex II, paragraph 7. Those obligations do not guarantee a specific outcome to non-cooperating interested parties.

31. For these reasons, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims with respect to the treatment of “all other exporters” must fail.

E. The CBSA’s Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate Articles 9.3 and 6.8, Annex II, and Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

32. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA’s prospective application of the ministerial specification to new product types (“new product models”) exported by cooperating exporters would violate Articles 9.3 and 6.8, Annex II, and Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. These claims, however, are premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada’s prospective duty assessment system, rely on misinterpretations of the relevant legal obligations, and ignore the practical need to apply facts available to product models that have not been investigated.

1. The CBSA’s Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Anti-Dumping Duties for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

33. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new models of subject goods from cooperating exporters in excess of their margin of dumping.

34. Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 is flawed, as it is premised on speculation. Article 9.3.2 conditions the availability of a refund on (i) an importer of subject goods paying anti-dumping duties; and (ii) that importer requesting a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exporter from Chinese Taipei has shipped a new model of subject goods to Canada that has been subject to the “all other exporters” rate determined by ministerial specification. Therefore, no Chinese Taipei exports of new models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request, as contemplated under Article 9.3.2. In this sense, not only is Chinese Taipei’s claim premature, it does not even amount to a prima facie case of a violation.

35. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly claims that the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 is limited to the “margin of dumping” established in the original investigation. Chinese Taipei’s theory is directly contradicted by the relevant jurisprudence on the liability for payment and collection of anti-dumping duties in prospective normal value systems, which indicates that the margin of dumping during duty assessment is not limited by the margin of dumping established for a particular exporter during the original investigation.

36. Moreover, Chinese Taipei’s claim that the application of the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters ignores that under a prospective duty system the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. Under Canada’s prospective duty system, anti-dumping duties are assessed and collected on the basis of a comparison between normal values determined during an investigation or re-investigation and export prices determined during the enforcement
period. When an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values.

2. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available with Respect to New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

37. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by resorting to facts available to determine normal values for new models of subject goods shipped by cooperating exporters. However, Chinese Taipei's claim is internally inconsistent and illogical.

38. Chinese Taipei initially argues that the CBSA lacked the legal authority to rely on facts available with respect to new models of subject goods. However, it then criticizes the CBSA for its selection of certain available facts. In so doing, Chinese Taipei implicitly concedes that resorting to facts available was appropriate under these circumstances.

39. This makes sense, as not being able to do so would prevent an investigating authority from establishing normal values for new models of subject goods that could not have been investigated during the initial investigation. Without an ability to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models, thereby creating a significant gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.

40. Finally, when claiming that the CBSA's application of the ministerial specification contravenes paragraph 7 of Annex II, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize the variety of review procedures under Canada's trade remedies regime that fairly accommodate exporters and importers of new product models of subject goods.

3. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

41. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA's application of the ministerial specification to establish normal values for new models of subject goods contravenes Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

42. Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the obligations under Article 2.2 presuppose that an investigating authority has the information necessary to calculate normal values. "New" product models are those shipped after an initial investigation. As a result, an investigating authority is not in a position to determine model-specific normal values for those products when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated. Chinese Taipei ignores this, and does not explain how the CBSA could properly apply one of the Article 2.2 methodologies to new models of subject goods exported to Canada after the original CSWP investigation.

43. In the absence of the required information, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits the CBSA to use facts available from the original investigation to determine a normal value for new product models. The use of facts available would cease, and individual normal values would be calculated in accordance with one of the methodologies set out under Article 2.2, when cooperating exporters or importers of new models of subject imports seek a re-investigation or a re-determination.

4. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

44. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA determined "two different dumping margins" for the same cooperating exporter, one during the original investigation and another, for new product models, during the duty enforcement phase. Chinese Taipei claims that in so doing the CBSA violated the general rule under Article 6.10 that an investigating authority shall determine "an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation".
45. Chinese Taipei’s claim is flawed, as it is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the term "margin of dumping" and a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada’s prospective duty assessment system. Chinese Taipei fails to take into account that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, "margins of dumping" are not specific to a particular product model or export transaction, but instead are determined for all export transactions from a particular exporter or producer, pertaining to products within the same defined scope over a designated period of time. Hence, a "margin of dumping", by definition, cannot be based on transactions pertaining only to specific product models.

46. By failing to acknowledge that the general rule under Article 6.10 has limited relevance after the conclusion of an anti-dumping investigation, Chinese Taipei also appears to fundamentally misunderstand the basic operation of Canada’s duty assessment system. Under the Canadian system, the margin of dumping for a particular exporter calculated during the investigation phase has no relevance to duty assessment. After an investigation is complete, the CBSA compares the relevant normal value to an individual export transaction to determine the appropriate amount of the anti-dumping duty to be collected, if any. The calculation of an anti-dumping duty on this basis does not constitute a determination of a "margin of dumping". This is the case regardless of whether the normal value for a particular product model was established during the investigation or is established by ministerial specification during the enforcement phase.

F. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish That Canada Violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

47. Chinese Taipei also makes the consequential claims that Canada violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. As established above, however, the determinations of dumping and injury by the CBSA and the CITT did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. As a result, Chinese Taipei’s claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 must fail.

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS

A. Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA Are Not Inconsistent with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

48. Chinese Taipei claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, essentially because SIMA provides for a *de minimis* margin of dumping test to be carried out on a country basis, and not on an exporter-specific basis.

49. Canada demonstrates that SIMA is not inconsistent with Articles 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2, and, consequently, with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. In conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, SIMA requires the termination of an investigation with respect to a country in certain situations, including when the margin of dumping of that country is *de minimis*. Unless the investigation is terminated as a whole, dumped imports are subject to the application of provisional measures and the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties if injury is found, irrespective of an individual exporter’s margin of dumping. However, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA confers discretion to the CITT to exclude an exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping from an injury finding.

B. Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR Are Not Inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

50. Chinese Taipei submits that Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are, as such, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they result in the automatic inclusion in the category of dumped imports, in the context of the injury analysis, of the imports of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.
51. According to Subsection 2(1) of SIMA, dumped "in relation to any goods, means that the normal value of the goods exceeds the export price thereof". Therefore, the term "dumped goods" as used in SIMA covers goods of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. This is consistent with the definition of dumping outlined in Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which does not distinguish between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and those dumped at a margin below de minimis – both are "dumped".

52. The Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel, when dealing with the meaning of subsidization under the SCM Agreement, stated that "[n]one of the provisions in the SCM Agreement that uses the term 'subsidization' confines the meaning of 'subsidization' to subsidization at a rate equal to or in excess of 1 percent ad valorem, or to any other de minimis threshold". Similarly, none of the references to dumping in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold. Therefore, there is nothing in these provisions that requires the exclusion of imports with a de minimis margin of dumping from dumped imports when an investigating authority conducts an injury analysis.

53. Thus, Chinese Taipei has failed to demonstrate that Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR, as well as any implementing or related measures, are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

C. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish that SIMA and the SIMR Are Inconsistent with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

54. As Canada demonstrates above, Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are not inconsistent, as such, with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei’s claim under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must fail.

D. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish that SIMA and the SIMR Are Inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

55. As Canada demonstrates above, Subsections 2(1), Section 30.1, Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei’s claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

56. For the foregoing reasons, Canada respectfully requests that the Panel reject Chinese Taipei’s claims.
ANNEX C-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this second written submission, Canada responds to the submissions of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) at the first meeting of the Panel and in response to the Panel’s questions. These submissions failed to prove that the Carbon Steel Welded Pipe (CSWP) investigation, the anti-dumping measures imposed as a result of the investigation, and the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) are inconsistent with Canada’s WTO obligations.

2. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has put forward a number of arguments based on a misunderstanding of the Canadian system, a misapprehension of key factual elements of the CSWP investigation, and flawed interpretations of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).

3. For the reasons that follow, in addition to the reasons in Canada’s prior submissions, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED BY CANADA ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, CHINESE TAIPEI

A. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Articles 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

1. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

4. Chinese Taipei claims that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to terminate the CSWP investigation with respect to Chinese Taipei exporters with de minimis margins of dumping.

5. The Appellate Body has recognized that a panel can depart from prior reasoning on a legal question if there are "cogent reasons" to do so. In the present dispute, there are cogent reasons to depart from the interpretation in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice that Article 5.8 requires termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter.

6. The Panel must interpret Article 5.8 in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping", and in accordance with the context of those terms, which altogether establish that the requirement for termination of an investigation must be on a country basis. Article 5.8 establishes the requirements for termination of the investigation as a whole, which is set out in Article 5 as being conducted in relation to a product of a country of export, not an individual exporter. The greater context of Articles 9.4 and 3.3 confirms that the de minimis margin of dumping referred to in Article 5.8 is country based.

7. Furthermore, the interpretation in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice requiring exporter-specific termination is irreconcilable with the text of Article 9.4. Article 9.4 pertains to the application of Anti-Dumping duties in the separate and distinct phase of duty assessment occurring after the original investigation. Any assessment of duties done in accordance with Article 9.4, where de minimis margins would be disregarded, must necessarily be done following the definitive determination of dumping, injury, and causation made under Articles 2 and 3. If an investigation had been terminated with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, there would
be no need to disregard these margins of dumping when assessing definitive Anti-Dumping duties. The interpretation that termination for a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping under Article 5.8 pertains to an individual exporter therefore renders part of Article 9.4 inutile, contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation.

8. Finally, Chinese Taipei’s interpretation would result in inconsistent treatment between an exporter found to be dumping at a \textit{de minimis} margin during the original investigation and a new exporter found to be dumping at a \textit{de minimis} margin during the duty assessment phase in a review under Article 9.5. The latter exporter could not be subject to termination under Article 5.8, as the investigation would have already been completed. Definitive anti-dumping duties could thus be imposed on that exporter, while definitive duties could not be imposed on an exporter dumping at a \textit{de minimis} margin during the original investigation.

9. By contrast, there are no contradictions, inconsistencies, or redundancies in the Anti-Dumping Agreement if termination under Article 5.8 pertains to a country with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping.

2. **The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures on Dumped Imports from a Chinese Taipei Exporter with a \textit{de Minimis} Margin of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

10. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA should not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping against an exporter with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping, and thus was not permitted to apply provisional measures against that exporter.

11. This claim must fail because the CBSA satisfied all the criteria of Article 7.1 in applying provisional measures. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an investigating authority to make a \textit{singular} determination that relates to the investigation as a whole, per Article 7.1(i), that will be affirmative if dumping has been preliminarily found to be occurring and causing consequent injury, per Article 7.1(ii). The same is true with respect to the determination that provisional measures are necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation under Article 7.1(iii), which is determined with respect to the domestic industry of the country, not with respect to individual exporters.

12. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for Chinese Taipei’s assertion that exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping are not considered as “dumping”, neither in terms of the definition of dumping nor the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. A product is considered to be dumped, per Article 2.1, if it is imported into a country at an export price less than its normal value. The definition of dumping has the same meaning in all provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and does not distinguish between goods being dumped at a margin above \textit{de minimis} or below \textit{de minimis}.

13. In the CSWP investigation, an investigation was initiated, preliminary affirmative determinations of dumping and consequent injury were made, and, given that provisional measures were considered necessary to prevent injury during the investigation, provisional duties were applied on dumped imports from Chinese Taipei exporters in an amount not greater than their margins of dumping. As a result, all the requirements of Article 7.1 were satisfied and the CBSA therefore did not violate Article 7.1(ii).

3. **The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures and Imposition of Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Dumped Imports from Chinese Taipei Exporters Did Not Violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

14. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA collected duties from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury by applying provisional measures and imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on CSWP imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping.
15. Chinese Taipei's position is irreconcilable with the definition of dumping and the meaning of the term "appropriate amounts". The appropriate amount means the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price, which is consistent with the definition of dumping referring to a product introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value in that country. There is no exception or threshold for a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping in this definition or in Article 9.2. Therefore, the CBSA's application of duties in the appropriate amounts on all exporters that were found to be dumping did not violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2.

4. The CBSA's Determination of an Individual Margin of Dumping for Each Chinese Taipei Exporter Did Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

16. Chinese Taipei alleges that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by calculating a country-based margin of dumping in addition to the individual margins of dumping calculated for each exporter. It argues that Article 6.10 requires the calculation of a single margin of dumping and that the country based margin of dumping constitutes a second margin of dumping for each exporter.

17. Chinese Taipei's argument must be rejected. The calculation of a country based margin of dumping does not constitute the establishment of a second margin of dumping for an individual exporter. Article 6.10 simply requires that an investigating authority determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter, which was done by the CBSA in the CSWP case.

B. The CITT's Treatment of Dumped Imports in Its Injury Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

18. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's claim, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal's (CITT) inclusion of all dumped imports in its injury analysis, including those from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping, was consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Nothing in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, or 3.7 the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the \textit{de minimis} threshold.

19. The definition of dumping clearly does not provide for a distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above \textit{de minimis} and those dumped at a margin below \textit{de minimis} –both are "dumped". Furthermore, the references to the term "dumped" in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 are in no way qualified by any reference to \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping. It is therefore only imports with a zero margin that should be considered as not dumped. This was the approach taken by the CITT in its injury analysis in the CSWP investigation. The Appellate Body decision in \textit{US – Carbon Steel} is directly relevant to this issue and supports Canada's position.

C. The CITT's Non-Attribution Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Subsidies

20. Chinese Taipei criticizes the CITT for having failed, in its CSWP injury analysis, to separate and distinguish the effects of subsidies granted to Indian exporters.

21. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "[i]t must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement". It also provides that "[t]he authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports." These obligations are referred to as the causal link and non-attribution requirements. Pursuant to the non-attribution requirement, an investigating authority must ensure that it separates and distinguishes the effects of other known factors of injury from the effects of the dumped imports.
22. Subsidies provided to exporters of dumped imports are not a factor other than the dumped imports which can at the same time injure the domestic industry because subsidies provided to exporters of dumped imports can only injure the domestic industry through the dumped imports. Therefore, a non-attribution analysis cannot be based on a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of the dumped imports. A non-attribution analysis concerning subsidies could only be based on a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of dumping. In turn, the only reason to conduct a non-attribution analysis of that nature under the Anti-Dumping Agreement would be if the required causal link were between dumping and injury. However, this is not the case. In an injury analysis conducted in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in line with the Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea), the central issue is whether the dumped imports are causing or are threatening to cause injury to a domestic industry. The required causal link is thus between dumped imports and injury, not between dumping and injury.

23. Given that there is no requirement that the effects of the dumping be found to cause injury under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, there can be no requirement under the Agreement that, when goods are both dumped and subsidized, the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumping.

24. In the CSWP inquiry, the CITT cumulated the effects of imports from India with those from Chinese Taipei and four other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was not relevant to the CITT's injury analysis under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. There was no requirement to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies provided by India.

2. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Excess Capacity

25. Chinese Taipei argues that, in the CSWP inquiry, excess capacity was a known factor of injury that the CITT was required to examine in the context of its non-attribution analysis.

26. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the effects of other known factors of injury be separated and distinguished from the effects of dumped imports. As a general rule, excess capacity or low capacity utilization in a domestic industry is an indicator of injury, not a factor or cause of injury to that industry.

27. Even assuming that excess capacity may be a cause of injury in certain cases, Chinese Taipei has not demonstrated that it was a known cause of injury in the CSWP inquiry that the CITT had to examine in its threat of injury analysis.

28. First, contrary to Chinese Taipei's assertion, the CITT did not consider that there was excess capacity in the domestic CSWP industry constituting a cause of injury.

29. Second, the only evidence to which Chinese Taipei refers to support its position that excess capacity as a cause of injury was brought to the CITT’s attention is a submission by Knightsbridge filed during the CITT’s preliminary injury inquiry. Knightsbridge did not refer to any evidence to support its statement that “[w]e are all operating at less than 50% of where we were at”. Its ambiguous statement does not appear consistent with the data on capacity utilization in the CITT’s pre-hearing staff report. Moreover, that statement does not indicate that excess capacity was a cause of injury in the CSWP investigation. Knightsbridge does not refer to excess capacity but rather to a decline in the utilization of capacity, an indicator of injury listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

30. Third, the CITT did not find that the subject imports had caused injury to the domestic industry. Therefore, it was not required to examine other possible factors that could have caused injury. The CITT found that the subject imports threatened to cause material injury to the domestic industry in the future. In assessing threat of injury, the CITT considered two other possible factors or causes of injury. Chinese Taipei does not refer to any evidence on the record of

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1 While Chinese Taipei uses the term “overcapacity” in its submissions, Canada will use the term “excess capacity” henceforth.

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the CITT indicating that the alleged excess capacity was a known factor that threatened to cause injury in the future, at the same time as the dumped imports.

D. The CBSA's Treatment of "All Other Exporters" Did Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. Chinese Taipei Misrepresents the Process by Which the CBSA Selected Information for the Ministerial Specification in the CSWP Investigation

31. According to Chinese Taipei, the process by which the CBSA applied facts available was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA's methodology was inconsistent with the disciplines on facts available because it was "mechanistic", "automatic", and, ultimately, "punitive". It also alleges that the CBSA used the "worst information available" and outright failed to assess facts on the record of the investigation.

32. These arguments are directly contradicted by information on the record of the investigation, which indicates that the CBSA complied with the procedural obligations disciplining the use of facts available. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's characterization, the methodology employed by the CBSA was not "mechanistic" as it included an assessment of all export transactions from the period of investigation. The record to the investigation makes it clear that the CBSA conducted a systematic assessment of all the information submitted by all interested parties in the CSWP investigation, including by Chinese Taipei exporters.

33. Moreover, it cannot be said that the CBSA based its determination solely on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. Chinese Taipei's argument on this point ignores the process by which the CBSA selected available facts and improperly equates the use of adverse inferences with "punitive" conduct. In this respect, the CBSA's selection of reliable and representative facts in the CSWP investigation is also distinguishable from violations of the disciplines on facts available in other WTO proceedings, particularly Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice and China – GOES.

34. Finally, the proposition that the CBSA used the "worst information available" to arrive at the worst possible result for "all other exporters" is unsubstantiated and irreconcilable with the facts on the record in the CSWP investigation. In particular, the CBSA's use of information from the application by the domestic industry could have led to a margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters" higher than that prescribed in the ministerial specification.

2. Chinese Taipei Ignores an Investigating Authority’s Necessary Flexibility in the Application of Facts Available

35. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has repeatedly implied that the CBSA was obligated to base its determination on information from Chinese Taipei exporters. Chinese Taipei suggests that the CBSA's failure to do so reflected a lack of objectivity. This argument, however, ignores the flexibility inherent to an investigating authority's discretion when applying facts available.

36. As noted in Canada's first written submission, the disciplines under Annex II are procedural in nature and do not guarantee specific outcomes to non-cooperating parties. Where an exporter fails to participate in an investigation, or otherwise withholds certain information, an investigating authority necessarily has flexibility in determining the appropriate information to serve as a proxy.

37. This flexibility is encompassed within the "reasonable replacement" standard articulated by the Appellate Body for determining the appropriateness of an investigating authority's selection of particular "facts". Flexibility is also necessary so that an investigating authority can establish a residual duty rate that achieves the policy objectives outlined by the panel in China – Autos (US).

38. Furthermore, in addition to being inconsistent with the procedural obligations under Annex II, a finding that the CBSA was required to use specific information would be contrary to Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The role of the Panel in this dispute is to determine whether the establishment of the "all other exporters" rate by the CBSA was consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is not to decide what information the CBSA should have used to establish that rate.
E. The CBSA's Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CBSA's Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

39. Chinese Taipei continues to argue that the CBSA violated the *chapeau* of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by prospectively assigning a duty rate based on the ministerial specification to new product models in the CSWP investigation. This argument, however, is predicated on a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of Article 9.3.

40. Chinese Taipei ignores that Members that employ prospective normal value systems, as is the case in Canada, comply with Article 9.3 by refunding excess duties collected, in accordance with Article 9.3.2. Under Article 9.3.2, a refund for overpayment of duties is available if: 1) an importer of subject goods actually pays anti-dumping duties; and 2) that importer requests a refund for overpayment that is duly supported by evidence. In the present dispute, because no evidence on the record indicates that Chinese Taipei exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request, the CBSA cannot be said to have violated Article 9.3.2 or the general obligation under Article 9.3. It is in this sense that Chinese Taipei's claim is premature, and must be rejected on the basis that Chinese Taipei has not established a *prima facie* case of violation.

41. A related point pertains to the intermediate nature of the initial collection of duties under prospective duty assessment systems. By claiming that applying the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters, Chinese Taipei ignores that the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. When an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a re-determination to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values, and that any duties collected in excess of the appropriate amount are refunded.

42. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly argues that the margin of dumping from the original investigation sets an upper limit on duty assessment. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's claim, the panel decisions in *Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties* and *EC – Salmon (Norway)* indicate that an investigating authority is not required to assess anti-dumping duties by reference to the margin of dumping established during the original investigation.

43. Finally, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a specific methodology according to which duties for new product models must be assessed. In Canada's view, this silence permits investigating authorities a measure of flexibility with respect to the treatment of those models for duty assessment purposes. The CBSA's use of facts available to establish normal values for new product models should be viewed in line with that flexibility. Following Chinese Taipei's position on what the CBSA "should" have done would not only ignore this flexibility, it would also be inconsistent with the Panel's role in adjudicating this dispute, as set out under Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2. The CBSA's Prospective Application of Facts Available to New Product Models Is Both Necessary and Reasonable

44. Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA is prohibited from applying facts available when assessing duties on new product models from cooperating exporters, yet it ignores that information pertaining to those models is necessary in order to determine their normal values.

45. This is because different models of subject goods can have different characteristics. The normal value of one model cannot be assumed to be applicable to another for which there is no pricing information. In this respect, information pertaining to product models that were not investigated should be viewed as necessary.

46. Under Canada's prospective duty assessment system, anti-dumping duties are assessed based on a comparison between model-specific normal values and transaction-specific export prices. As "new" product models are those that have not been subject to an investigation or...
re-investigation, the CBSA would not have pricing or cost information for those models to establish their normal values. Thus, at the time of duty assessment, the CBSA would be prevented from establishing normal values for uninvestigated models if it were not able to rely on facts available, i.e., information pertaining to different exporters or product models. In turn, this lack of information would prevent the CBSA from being able to assess duties on new product models, which would create a gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.

47. Therefore, to the extent that any exporter from Chinese Taipei does not provide information pertaining to new product models, it would be appropriate for the CBSA to apply facts available, following the parameters of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in order to establish the normal values of those models.

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS

A. SIMA Is Not Inconsistent "As Such" with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with Respect to the Treatment of Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping

48. Chinese Taipei claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA are, as such, inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, when read together, they require that an affirmative dumping determination be made with respect to all goods of a country, including those of exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, if that country's margin of dumping is two percent or more. Chinese Taipei further claims that the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not provide the CITT with discretion to terminate an investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping.

49. Canada has demonstrated that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require the termination of an investigation with respect to an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. Even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, SIMA could not be found to violate, as such, Article 5.8. Canada acknowledges that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA do not grant the CBSA discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. However, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides the CITT with the discretion necessary to exclude such exporters from an injury finding and therefore to terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters.

50. It is well settled that, as a general rule, the burden rests upon the complaining party to establish the inconsistency of the measure it challenges with a particular provision of a WTO covered agreement. When a measure is challenged "as such", the starting point for an analysis must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of a measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure "as such" can be assessed on that basis alone. To warrant a finding of an "as such" violation, the measure must be determinative in precluding WTO consistent action.

51. The CITT's discretion to exclude exporters, including exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, is clear on the face of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA. The CITT's discretion to grant exclusions from an affirmative injury or threat of injury finding is well established in Canadian law. In its statement of reasons in the CSWP inquiry, the CITT stated that "[t]he Tribunal has discretionary authority under subsection 43(1) of SIMA to grant exclusions from its findings". The CITT referred to Federal Court of Appeal of Canada and NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel decisions confirming its discretion to grant product and producer exclusions. The CITT's discretion is illustrated by the fact that it granted two product exclusions in its CSWP inquiry. The CITT used its discretion in deciding not to grant the producer exclusion requested. By addressing the request on its merits, the CITT implicitly confirmed that it had the discretion under Subsection 43(1) of SIMA to grant producer exclusions.
B. SIMA and the SIMR Are Not Inconsistent "As Such" with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement

Canada responded to these claims in its first written submission. Given that Chinese Taipei has not presented additional arguments in support of its claims related to these provisions, Canada will not address these claims further in this submission.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Canada respectfully requests that the Panel reject Chinese Taipei’s claims.
ANNEX C-3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT OF CANADA
AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This dispute concerns anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (or Chinese Taipei). Chinese Taipei claims that the investigation that led to the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, the measures themselves, and certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (or SIMA) are inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. Canada demonstrates that the investigation and the application of anti-dumping measures on Welded Pipe from Chinese Taipei, as well as the relevant provisions of SIMA, are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

II. THE CBSA'S TREATMENT OF CHINESE TAIPEI EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

A. The Termination of an Investigation Pertains to a Country and Is Only Required When the Country-Based Margin of Dumping Is de Minimis

2. The fundamental question raised by Chinese Taipei's claim is whether the requirement in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country or to an individual exporter. Canada submits that termination of an investigation is required when a country-based margin of dumping is de minimis, not when an individual exporter has a de minimis margin of dumping.

3. A treaty must be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose". The ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping" is consistent with the termination of an investigation being required on a country basis.

4. Canada has demonstrated that the context in which these terms are used confirms that an investigation of dumped imports from a country must be terminated only when that country's overall margin of dumping is de minimis. According to Article 5, an investigating authority initiates and conducts only one investigation – for a country. The investigating authority does not conduct as many investigations as there are exporters. Consequently, the requirement to terminate an investigation must pertain to a country, not to an individual exporter. All of the situations in Article 5.8 pertain to country-based termination. In all situations, it is the investigation as a whole that must be terminated. An interpretation of Article 5.8 requiring termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would render part of Article 9.4 redundant. In addition, the specific reference in Article 3.3 to the phrase de minimis strongly implies that the type of margin of dumping is the same in both Article 3.3 and Article 5.8 – a margin of dumping with respect to a country.

5. As a result, termination of an investigation with respect to an entire country is what is required under the second sentence of Article 5.8 when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis. Even if the Panel agreed with Chinese Taipei's interpretation of Article 5.8, SIMA would nevertheless be consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. When making an injury finding, the CITT has the discretion to exclude any exporter whose margin of dumping is less than two percent.
B. The CBSA Did Not Violate Articles 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

6. Chinese Taipei also makes three related claims of violations of other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that are premised on Article 5.8 requiring an exporter-specific termination. These claims must be rejected. First, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 6.10, which requires an investigating authority to determine an individual margin of dumping for each exporter. However, Chinese Taipei admits that the CBSA determined an individual margin of dumping for each exporter. The CBSA's additional determination of Chinese Taipei's country-based margin of dumping is simply irrelevant under Article 6.10. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's claim of a violation "as applied" is without merit.

7. Second, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) both "as applied" and "as such". Article 7.1(ii) requires that preliminary affirmative determinations of dumping and injury must be made in order for provisional duties to be applied. In terms of the "as applied" claim, it is sufficient to point out that the CBSA made a preliminary dumping determination before applying provisional measures on dumped imports. This is shown by Chinese Taipei's own evidence. Accordingly, the CBSA complied with the requirements under Article 7.1(ii). In response to the "as such" claim, nothing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied on dumped imports from an exporter whose provisionally estimated margin of dumping is de minimis.

8. Third, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2, both "as applied" and "as such", because the CBSA collected duties on dumped imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. Article 9.2 requires that anti-dumping duties be collected on imports from all individual exporters with the sole exception of exporters from which price undertakings have been accepted. In the Welded Pipe investigation, the CBSA imposed provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on all imports from Chinese Taipei exporters that had an export price less than their normal value. That is, it imposed duties on all dumped goods, including the dumped imports from any exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. This is what SIMA requires and it is consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's "as applied" and "as such" claims of violation under Articles 7.5 and 9.2 must fail.

III. THE CBSA'S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS" DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

9. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA's use of facts available to determine the dumping margin and the anti-dumping duty rate for "all other exporters" violated Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei's arguments must fail as they mischaracterize relevant facts and applicable law.

10. First, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available effectively punished non-cooperating exporters. However, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that an investigating authority has discretion to draw inferences, including adverse inferences, based on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. These inferences must have a reasonable connection to the information available, but the express terms of Annex II clearly indicate that they may lead to a less favourable outcome for the non-cooperating party. In the Welded Pipe investigation, the CBSA's use of facts available cannot be considered punitive: it was based not only on verified facts gathered during the investigation, but also on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate. Indeed, if the CBSA's approach were deemed punitive, exporters and foreign producers that have injuriously dumped could actually benefit from a lack of cooperation.

11. Second, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available was not based on a comparative evaluation that took into account all of the information on the record. This is factually incorrect. The record of the Welded Pipe investigation establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA engaged in a systematic evaluation of all of the information on the record, following which it determined how it would establish normal values for non-cooperating exporters.
12. Third, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA failed to select facts for "all other" Chinese Taipei exporters that were logically related to facts on the record concerning Chinese Taipei exports. Yet, the methodology employed by the CBSA ensured that it used facts from the investigation that reasonably replaced information that was missing from the record. It also ensured that the procedural circumstances of the investigation were taken into account, as well as the need to encourage cooperation and prevent anti-dumping duty circumvention. For these reasons, Chinese Taipei's claims under Article 6.8 and Annex II must fail.

IV. THE CBSA'S PROSPECTIVE TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT MODELS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

A. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Anti-Dumping Duties for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

13. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new models of subject goods in excess of their margin of dumping. Its claim, however, fails to address the relationship between Article 9.3 and Article 9.3.2. Article 9.3.2 sets two primary conditions for the availability of a refund: first, an importer of subject goods must have paid anti-dumping duties; and second, an importer must have requested a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Here, Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request. In this sense, not only is Chinese Taipei's claim premature, it does not even amount to a prima facie case of a violation.

14. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly claims that the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 is limited to the "margin of dumping" established in the original investigation. Canada draws the Panel's attention to Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and EC – Salmon (Norway), which contradict Chinese Taipei's argument.

15. Chinese Taipei further claims that applying the ministerial specification to new product models will necessarily result in duties that exceed an exporter's margin of dumping established in the original investigation. However, this claim ignores that under a prospective duty system, the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. The Appellate Body recognized this in US – Continued Zeroing. Under the Canadian duty assessment system, an importer can request updated normal values through a re-determination or a re-investigation. Any retroactive update of the normal values can result in a refund if the updated normal values are lower than they were before the update.

B. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available with Respect to New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

16. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by resorting to facts available to determine normal values for new product models. Chinese Taipei initially argues that the CBSA lacked the legal authority to rely on facts available with respect to new product models. However, it then criticizes the CBSA for its selection of certain available facts. In so doing, Chinese Taipei implicitly concedes that resorting to facts available was appropriate under these circumstances. This is logical and reasonable, as not being able to rely on facts available would prevent an investigating authority from establishing normal values for new models of subject goods that could not have been investigated during the initial investigation.

C. The CBSA'S Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 2.2 or 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

17. Canada demonstrates that the claims of violation under Articles 2.2 and 6.10 with respect to new product models are without merit. With respect to Article 2.2, "new" product models are those shipped after an initial investigation. As a result, an investigating authority is not in a position to
determine model-specific normal values for those products when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated.

18. Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 by calculating "two different dumping margins" for the same cooperating exporter fails to take into account that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, "margins of dumping" are not specific to a particular product model or export transaction. Rather, "margins of dumping" are determined for all export transactions from a particular exporter or producer. Thus, contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, a "margin of dumping" by definition cannot be based on only transactions pertaining to specific product models. In making this claim, Chinese Taipei’s also appears to fundamentally misunderstand the operation of Canada’s duty assessment system under which anti-dumping duties are assessed on a transaction-specific basis.

V. THE CITT’S TREATMENT OF DUMPED IMPORTS IN ITS INJURY ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, AND 3.7 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

19. Nothing in the provisions cited by Chinese Taipei confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of a de minimis threshold. There is no distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and those dumped at a margin below de minimis – both are "dumped". It is only imports for which the margin of dumping is zero that should be considered as not dumped. The CITT's approach in its injury analysis in the Welded Pipe investigation is consistent with the Appellate Body's analysis in US – Carbon Steel.

20. On this issue, all of the decisions referred to by Chinese Taipei in its first written submission concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. In each case, the panel concluded that the imports at issue were "non-dumped" and therefore should not have been included in the injury analysis. Thus, to the extent that these panels referred to de minimis margins of dumping, these references should be considered as obiter dicta.

21. Furthermore, as outlined above, an investigation need not be terminated with respect to imports from an individual exporter for which a de minimis margin of dumping has been calculated. Therefore, the CITT's treatment of dumped imports, including those from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Similarly, the relevant provisions of SIMA that require the CITT to include imports from de minimis exporters in its injury analysis are not "as such" inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

VI. THE CITT'S NON-ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

22. Chinese Taipei argues that that by failing to separate and distinguish the effects caused by the subsidies from the effects caused by the dumping, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) demonstrates that when the same goods are both dumped and subsidized, an investigating authority is not required to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of the dumping of the goods. Hence, the CITT was not required to ensure that injury caused by the subsidizing was not attributed to the dumping. This is because the focus of an injury analysis is on the effects of the dumped imports, not on the effects of dumping or subsidizing.

23. Second, Chinese Taipei inappropriately relies on the Appellate Body decision in US – Carbon Steel (India) to support its position that the CITT should have separated the effects of the subsidies from those of the dumping. That decision essentially deals with cumulation rather than non-attribution. In the Welded Pipe inquiry, the effects of dumped imports from Chinese Taipei, India, and four other subject countries were cumulated by the CITT, consistent with Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was irrelevant to the CITT’s decision to cumulate the effects of all dumped imports. Therefore, the CITT was not required to examine the effects of subsidies and ensure that any injury caused by such subsidies was not attributed to the dumped imports.
24. Chinese Taipei also claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CITT failed to examine overcapacity and to separate and distinguish the effects caused by overcapacity from the effects caused by dumped imports. Declines in utilization rates, just as declines in sales and profits, are indicators of whether the domestic industry has suffered injury. They do not cause injury. Thus, the CITT did not violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by not separating and distinguishing the effects of low utilization rates, or overcapacity, from the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.

VII. CONCLUSION

25. For the reasons presented, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei's claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.
ANNEX C-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT OF CANADA
AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has put forward a number of arguments based on a misunderstanding of the Canadian system, a misapprehension of key factual elements of the Welded Pipe investigation, and flawed interpretations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994, and corresponding jurisprudence.

II. THE CBSA'S TREATMENT OF CHINESE TAIPEI EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(II), 7.5, AND 9.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

2. Chinese Taipei argues that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that an investigation be terminated with respect to individual exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. This argument, however, cannot be reconciled with the text of the Agreement.

3. Article 5.8 contemplates the termination of an investigation where the margin of dumping is de minimis, or where the volume of dumped imports or the injury is negligible. The first sentence of Article 5.8 explicitly states that it is the investigation as a whole that must be terminated when there is insufficient evidence of dumping. In this context, it is clear in the second sentence that "immediate termination" when the margin of dumping is de minimis also refers to the investigation as a whole. The volume, the injury, and the margin of dumping are all used in the singular, in reference to a single investigation, where each of these terms pertains to a country.

4. Moreover, Article 9.4 would be rendered inutile under Chinese Taipei's interpretation. The Appellate Body has stated that Article 9.4 relates to the application of duties in "a separate and distinct phase of an anti-dumping action that necessarily occurs after the determination of dumping, injury, and causation". Therefore, any of the rules contained in Article 9.4 must only be applicable after the completion of the investigation, meaning after any termination under Article 5.8 would have already taken place.

5. In addition, Chinese Taipei's position on exporter-specific termination results in inconsistent treatment under Article 9.5. Under Chinese Taipei's interpretation of Article 5.8, an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would be subject to termination if it had exported during the original period of investigation, yet it would be subject to the application of anti-dumping duties if it had only begun exporting in the duty assessment phase. This inconsistency does not exist if termination under Article 5.8 for a de minimis margin of dumping pertains to a country.

6. Chinese Taipei further argues that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) in applying provisional measures against exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping because dumping at a de minimis margin cannot be considered "dumping". However, there is no "statutory threshold for the margin of dumping", as Chinese Taipei has argued, and no justification for altering the definition of what constitutes dumping. Canada satisfied the requirement under Article 7.1(ii) that a single preliminary determination of dumping be made, in relation to the entire investigation.

7. Moreover, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's application of anti-dumping duties violates Articles 7.5 and 9.2 because the phrase "all sources found to be dumped" does not include exporters dumping at a de minimis margin. Chinese Taipei thereby proposes reading in an exception for a de minimis threshold where none is found in the text of the Agreement. Duties collected on imports from "all sources found to be dumped" includes imports dumped at a de minimis margin of dumping.

8. Chinese Taipei also argues that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 because it calculated a country-based margin of dumping for all Chinese Taipei exporters and used this in applying the
de minimis test. Article 6.10 does not preclude calculations other than determining an individual margin of dumping for each exporter from being performed. The calculation of a country-based margin of dumping, in addition to being required under Article 5.8, is also required under Article 3.3.

III. THE CITT’S TREATMENT OF DUMPED IMPORTS IN ITS INJURY ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, AND 3.7 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

9. Nothing in the wording of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, or 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of a de minimis threshold. The use of the term "dumped" in these provisions is in no way qualified by any reference to a de minimis margin of dumping. Only imports with a zero margin are properly considered as not dumped.

10. The facts of the present dispute can be distinguished from those in the panel decisions cited by Chinese Taipei, all of which concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. Therefore, all of the statements referring to de minimis margins in these decisions should be considered obiter dicta. Furthermore, contrary to Chinese Taipei's assertion, the Appellate Body has never ruled on whether imports of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping are to be excluded from an injury analysis. Indeed, the CITT's injury analysis in the Welded Pipe investigation is consistent with the Appellate Body's analysis in US – Carbon Steel.

IV. THE CITT’S NON-ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

11. Chinese Taipei argues that the effects of subsidies should have been separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping in the CITT's causation analysis. This argument improperly relies on the assumption that the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an analysis of the effects of the dumping, as opposed to the effects of the dumped imports. The Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMS (Korea) shows that this assumption is false.

12. Given that there is no requirement that the effects of the dumping be found to be causing injury under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, there can be no requirement under the Agreement, when goods are both dumped and subsidized, that the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumping. Moreover, there can be no requirement that the effects of the subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumped imports, either. Therefore, the fact that certain dumped imports are also subsidized is not relevant to an injury analysis conducted pursuant to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

13. In the Welded Pipe inquiry, the CITT cumulated the effects of imports from Chinese Taipei and five other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from one of these countries, India, were also subsidized was not relevant to the CITT’s injury analysis under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. There was no requirement to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies provided by India.

14. There is also no basis to Chinese Taipei’s claims that overcapacity, or excess capacity, was an “other” factor that the CITT was required to examine in its non-attribution analysis. As a general rule, excess capacity or low capacity utilization in a domestic industry is an indicator of injury, not a factor or cause of injury to that industry. However, even assuming that excess capacity may be a cause of injury in certain cases, Chinese Taipei has not demonstrated that it was a known cause of injury in the Welded Pipe inquiry that the CITT had to examine in its threat of injury analysis.

V. THE CBSA’S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR “ALL OTHER EXPORTERS” DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

15. Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price in one transaction from a non-Chinese Taipei exporter punishes Chinese Taipei exporters for failing to cooperate.
16. This argument must fail. Chinese Taipei omits key aspects of the jurisprudence, resulting in a fundamental misrepresentation of the current state of the law. The tenuous nature of Chinese Taipei’s argument is further highlighted by the repeated assertion that the CBSA selected the “worst information”, which is both misleading and factually incorrect.

17. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA failed to make any comparative and evaluative assessment of the facts on the record, despite the CBSA’s analysis of all of the information filed by interested parties. Chinese Taipei ignores that the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel (India) rejected the need for a formalistic approach, recognizing that the form and extent of the evaluation of “facts available” may differ based on the particular circumstances of a given case.

18. Chinese Taipei also argues that the CBSA’s application of facts available lacked a “logical relationship” to Chinese Taipei exports. Yet, Chinese Taipei has not clearly indicated what constitutes a “logical relationship” in the context of the selection of facts available nor adequately explained how the CBSA failed to meet such a standard. Indeed, the “logical relationship” in the Welded Pipe investigation is evidenced by the selection of information pertaining to actual sales transactions concerning the same product during the same period of time.

19. More fundamentally, by arguing that the CBSA was obligated to base its determination on information from Chinese Taipei exporters, Chinese Taipei seeks to impose on Canada a substantive obligation not contemplated under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In so doing, Chinese Taipei ignores the flexibility inherent in an investigating authority’s discretion when applying facts available.

VI. THE CBSA’S PROSPECTIVE TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT MODELS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

20. Chinese Taipei claims that the duties imposed by the CBSA would necessarily exceed the margin of dumping from the original investigation and thus contravene the general rule under Article 9.3. Its claim, however, fails to address the relationship between Article 9.3 and Article 9.3.2. Article 9.3.2 sets two primary conditions for the availability of a refund: first, an importer of subject goods must have paid anti-dumping duties; and second, an importer must have requested a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request.

21. Chinese Taipei’s claim also ignores that, in a prospective normal value system, the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. Under the Canadian system, the re-determination mechanism allows an importer to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values and guarantees that any excess duties collected are refunded. Moreover, the re-investigation mechanism allows an exporter to receive normal values for new product models in advance of their shipment.

22. Chinese Taipei also continues to incorrectly argue that the margin of dumping from the original investigation sets an upper limit on duty assessment. The Panel Reports in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and EC – Salmon (Norway) directly contradict Chinese Taipei’s argument.

23. Moreover, by arguing that an investigating authority is required to apply the margin of dumping calculated during the original investigation, Chinese Taipei improperly suggests that there is a particular methodology for assessing duties on new product models in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the Agreement contains no such rule. Consistent with the CBSA’s approach, this lacuna permits an investigating authority a measure of flexibility with respect to the treatment of new models for duty assessment purposes.

24. Chinese Taipei further argues that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 by relying on facts available to prospectively establish normal values for new product models. However, Chinese Taipei ignores that, without being able to rely on facts available, the CBSA would simply be unable to establish normal values for uninvestigated models, which would prevent the CBSA from being able to assess duties on new product models and would create a gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.
25. With respect to the CBSA's selection of available facts, the lack of information about uninvestigated product models requires caution to ensure that any dumping is fully offset. An initial duty rate based on a ministerial specification is therefore appropriate. However, the available review mechanisms ensure that uninvestigated products receive model-specific normal values and corresponding duty assessments.

26. Chinese Taipei also argues that the CBSA violated Article 2.2 because using facts available to establish a normal value cannot be consistent with any of the methodologies under Article 2.2 since the conditions for resorting to facts available were not fulfilled. However, Canada has already demonstrated that it is necessary and consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the CBSA to resort to facts available to prospectively establish normal values for new product models.

27. Chinese Taipei further claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 to the extent the Panel considers that the CBSA determined a separate margin of dumping for new product models from cooperating exporters. In its first written submission, however, Canada demonstrated that the CBSA's prospective treatment of new product models during duty assessment would not result in the determination of a second margin of dumping.

VII. SIMA IS NOT INCONSISTENT "AS SUCH" WITH ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING

28. Chinese Taipei claims that SIMA is inconsistent "as such" with Article 5.8. It argues that SIMA provides for termination of an investigation only where a country-based margin of dumping is de minimis.

29. Even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides the CITT with the discretion necessary to exclude an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping from an injury finding and therefore to terminate the investigation with respect to that exporter.

30. In order to establish an "as such" violation, Chinese Taipei must demonstrate that Canada's conduct will necessarily be inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's argument, the CITT's discretion to act inconsistently with Article 5.8 does not support the existence of an "as such" violation, as the CITT also has the discretion to act consistently with Article 5.8.

31. The CITT's discretion to exclude exporters, including exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, from an injury finding is clear on the face of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA. This discretion is well established in Canadian law. No definitive anti-dumping duties would be imposed on imports from such an excluded exporter. The exclusion of the exporter from the injury finding would constitute immediate termination as described by the Appellate Body.

VIII. CONCLUSION

32. For the reasons presented, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei's claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.
ANNEX D

ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>D-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Norway</td>
<td>D-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>D-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States</td>
<td>D-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D-1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL

1. Brazil's participation in this dispute focused, initially, in three main aspects of the case: (I) the treatment given to individual exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping; (II) the treatment of non-dumped imports in the injury and causation analyses; and (III) the treatment of other factors besides the dumped imports in the causation analysis.

2. Regarding the first aspect (I), Brazil argued that the investigation should have been terminated with respect to the exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be *de minimis*. The combined interpretation of the articles mentioned by TPKM, as supported by the jurisprudence, leads to the conclusion that during an investigation the competent authority should take into account individual margins of dumping for each exporter or producer, whenever it is possible for the authority to determine them.

3. In the answers to the panel's questions, Brazil further clarified that the second sentence of Article 5.8 refers essentially to a final determination of dumping. Thus, the termination of an investigation related to an individual producer with a *de minimis* margin of dumping will, in general, occur after the final determination. A termination prior to the final determination will depend on the information provided by the individual exporter, which may convince the investigating authority about the inexistence or a *de minimis* margin of dumping even before the final determination.

4. It is important to underscore that the investigating authority cannot rely on a country-wide margin of dumping when the individual margins are determined. An individual exporter found not to be dumping must not be subject to additional Anti-Dumping Duties.

5. As the Appellate Body has already clarified in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, "the term 'margin of dumping' in Article 5.8 refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping".

6. Brazil also made a point related to the fact that Canada did not violate Article 6.10 of the ADA. The obligation contained in this Article is that the investigating authority must "determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer". The individual margins were determined, but Canada failed to use it properly, as it did not terminate the investigation concerning those exporters within a *de minimis* margin. The mere fact that the CBSA calculated a country-based margin of dumping does not in itself violate Article 6.10, and such calculation may be used for other purposes in the ADA, such as in Article 3.3(a).

7. In Brazil's answers to the Panel's questions concerning the matter of the termination of an investigation concerning individual exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping two additional issues were raised: the redundancy of Article 9.4 of the ADA and the application of provisional antidumping duties on exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

8. Concerning the first item, Brazil is of the opinion that there is no redundancy in Article 9.4. Brazil argued that Canada's statement that "[t]he application of duties contemplated in Article 9.4 takes place during the period of duty assessment after an investigation is completed" is not correct, and that the method of calculating duties foreseen in Article 9.4 may also be applied to the determination of provisional duties, according to Article 7.5 of the ADA.

9. Additionally, Brazil presented an understanding to the panel that Articles 7.1 (ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the ADA preclude the application of antidumping duties on exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping, regardless of whether the determination is preliminary or final, if the investigating authority is clearly satisfied with the determination of the *de minimis* margin of dumping. In Brazil's case, in general, the decision concerning the termination of the investigation

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1 *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, para. 216.
concerning the producer with a de minimis margin would only take place after the final determination. However, as already stated, that may not be the case in other countries.

10. In view of the above, since Brazil agrees that the investigation should have been terminated with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be de minimis, it acknowledges that provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties could not have been imposed on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.

11. Concerning the treatment of non-dumped imports for the purposes of the injury and causation analysis (II), Brazil agreed with TPKM that the term "dumped imports" does not legally include imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. As TPKM argued in its FWS, the DSB has already addressed this issue on different occasions. The Panel in EC – Salmon\(^2\) stressed that:

"We consider that imports attributable to a producer or exporter for which a de minimis margin of dumping is calculated may not be treated as "dumped" for purposes of the injury analysis in that investigation. (...) In our view, a finding of de minimis dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer or exporter in question. If there is no legally cognizable dumping by a particular producer or exporter, as a result of a finding of de minimis margins, then it seems inescapable to us that imports attributable to such producer or exporter may not be treated as 'dumped' imports for any aspect of that investigation".

12. In addition, Brazil argued that the Panel in EC – Fasteners\(^3\) noted that "the consideration of 'dumped imports' for purposes of making an injury determination consistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement entails the consideration of only those imports for which a margin of dumping greater than de minimis is established in the course of the investigation".

13. Therefore, Brazil reaffirms its understanding that imports of producers with a de minimis margin should not have been considered in the injury and causation analyses.

14. The last point Brazil made during the proceedings is related to the treatment of other factors besides the dumped imports in the causation analysis (III). TPKM claimed that Canada had violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA, as it failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which were at the same time injuring the domestic injury and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by such factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports, Brazil presented an opinion that the legal standard brought forth by TPKM may not be entirely accurate.

15. To better understand the factual situation and the disciplines that should have been applied to it, it must be taken into account that the Canadian investigating authority did not reach an affirmative determination of material injury, as stated in CITT’s Finding and Reasons, Injury Inquiry (Exhibit TPKM-14):

"153. In summary, the Tribunal acknowledges that the domestic industry, as a whole, sustained some injury during certain periods of the POI. The domestic industry lost certain market opportunities due to the presence of the subject goods in the Canadian market; however, the Tribunal is of the view that the resulting impact on the domestic industry has not been sufficiently adverse to constitute material injury.

154. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Tribunal finds that the dumping and subsidizing of the subject goods has not caused injury to the domestic industry." (emphasis added)

\(^2\) EC – Salmon, para. 7.625.
\(^3\) EC – Fasteners, para. 7.354.
16. In view of the above, Canada decided to apply anti-dumping duties based on a threat of material injury to its industry, as authorized by Article VI.1 of GATT. In Brazil's opinion, if there was not an actual damage to the domestic industry, it is not possible to call for the analysis of the "other factors" mentioned in Article 3.5.

17. According to the opinion presented in Brazil's TPS, the legal standard that should guide the causation assessment in the present case should be that foreseen in Article 3.7, which also makes reference to the obligation of an investigating authority to take into consideration "other factors" that might contribute to a threat of damage to the domestic industry, such as those enshrined in subheadings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Article 3.7.

18. Brazil upheld, nevertheless, that the Panel has the authority to settle that the factors mentioned by TPKM should have been taken into account, for the roster of other factors in the subheadings of Article 3.7 appears to be merely illustrative, given the use of the expression "inter alia".
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1 INTRODUCTION

1. The European Union intervenes in this case because of its systemic interest in the correct and consistent interpretation and application of the covered agreements and other relevant documents, and the multilateral nature of the obligations contained therein, in particular the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2 OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

2.1 THE TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

2. According to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, investigations shall be terminated when the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*. *De minimis* is defined in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a threshold for the margin of dumping of less than 2%.

3. The European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has already clarified that the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 refers to "individual" margins of dumping of the exporters, as opposed to a "country-wide" margin of dumping.

4. Pursuant to Article 5.8, the investigating authority is required to "immediately" terminate the investigation with respect to those *de minimis* producers and exclude them from the scope of the application of antidumping duties imposed following that investigation.

5. In addition, the Appellate Body held that dumping is the result of the pricing behaviour of individual exporters or foreign producers and noted that other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also make it clear that "dumping" and "margins of dumping" relate to the exporter or foreign producer.

6. With regard to the temporal dimension of the determination envisaged in the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Union considers that "determine" refers to the final or definitive determinations made by the authorities of a WTO Member.

7. The issuance of the order that establishes anti-dumping duties—or the decision not to issue an order—is the ultimate step of the "investigation" contemplated in Article 5.8; in most cases, an investigation is "terminated" with the issuance of an order or a decision not to issue an order. This ultimate step necessarily follows the final determination.

8. Articles 6.8 and 6.14 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement appear to envisage that the authorities of a Member may reach "preliminary or final determinations, [whether] affirmative or negative". However, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mention examples of preliminary negative determinations. By contrast, it refers to preliminary affirmative determinations, namely in Article 7 governing the application of provisional measures.

9. The Article 5.8 provides for two situations where an investigating authority is to immediately terminate an investigation: in case the authority makes a negative determination of dumping (first sentence) or in case it determines that the dumping margin is *de minimis* or the volume of imports is negligible (second sentence).

10. The first sentence of Article 5.8 requires the application of the domestic industry to be rejected, and the investigation to be terminated promptly, as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. The negative determination of dumping mentioned in this provision
appears to be final or definitive in character in respect of any individual exporters concerned by it, even if the investigation may continue in respect of other exporters of the subject product.

11. Similarly, the second sentence of Article 5.8 requires immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. Again, the determinations mentioned in this provision cannot be deemed preliminary, since they do not stand to be confirmed or modified in the course of the investigation.

12. According to Canada, this was the case in the Welded Pipe investigation. In its final determination of dumping, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), found that Turkey’s country-based margin of dumping was *de minimis* and terminated the investigation against Turkey.

13. On the other hand, "a preliminary affirmative determination [...] of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry" as required by Article 7.1 (ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the application of provisional measures, stands to be confirmed or modified by the final determination reached as a result of the investigation.

14. Pursuant to Article 7.2, where provisional measures take the form of a provisional duty, their amount must not exceed the provisionally estimated margin of dumping.

15. Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that the authorities shall, during the course of an investigation, satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based.

16. Therefore, an investigating authority will only be in a position to determine that a margin of dumping is *de minimis* once it has sufficient evidence before it to confirm the information supplied by interested parties in that regard. The immediate termination required by the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement can only take place at the stage where a final determination is reached, which in the practice of certain Members may coincide with the closing of the investigation. While the second sentence of Article 5.8 does not distinguish between preliminary and final, the determination in this provision can only be understood as definitive or final in the sense that only when the authorities of a Member are finally satisfied that a margin of dumping is *de minimis* are they under the obligation to immediately terminate the investigation in respect of the exporter.

17. Canada seeks to reverse in the present case the understanding that the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 refers to "individual" margins of dumping of the exporters and provides several reasons for that purpose.

18. For instance, Canada asserts that the exclusion of zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping from the weighted average margin of dumping or weighted average normal value mentioned in Article 9.4 confirms that an investigation is only terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is *de minimis*.

19. The European Union fails to see why the termination of the investigation in respect of individual exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping, as required by the second sentence of Article 5.8, would render part of Article 9.4 redundant. As already mentioned, the termination of the investigation in respect of individual exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping can only take place following a final determination. That final determination is only made once the investigation is deemed completed in respect of the individual exporters found to have a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

20. In addition, the European Union notes that Article 9.4 also obliges the authorities concerned to disregard zero margins of dumping. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 5.8, the authorities may have determined even earlier in the course of the investigation that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping in so far as certain exporters are concerned. Moreover, nothing in the language of Article 9.4 confirms that an investigation is terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is *de minimis*. 

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21. As Canada seeks to reverse previous Appellate Body findings with respect to previously decided legal issues, the European Union recalls that panels are expected, even in practice “obliged” to follow previous Appellate Body reports. The European Union notes that the Appellate Body already addressed the relevance of previous panel and Appellate Body reports. In particular, the Appellate Body clarified the role of its previous reports and indicated how panels should act in cases where the same legal issues arise.

22. The European Union fully agrees with the relevant statements of the Appellate Body in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) without reservation. In this respect, the final sentence of paragraph 160 of the report refers to “an adjudicatory body”, which covers the situation in which the Appellate Body might be called upon to resolve the same legal issue that it has already resolved.

23. The European Union notes that the Appellate Body refers to "cogent reasons" as the basis for a change in view. While the reference to "cogent reasons" is not treaty language, it is indicative of the fact that for reasons related to security and predictability there is a high threshold for departing from the case law clarifying a certain legal issue. For instance, in China – Rare Earths the respondent unsuccessfully sought to reverse the Appellate Body's findings in China – Raw Materials, according to which a proper interpretation of Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol did not make available to China the exceptions in Article XX of the GATT 1994.

24. The European Union notes that paragraph 161 of the Appellate Body Report in US - Stainless Steel (Mexico) addresses the hierarchical relationship between panels and the Appellate Body. It concludes that the relevance of clarification provided by the Appellate Body on issues of legal interpretation is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a specific case. There is no express reference to "cogent reasons". Finally, in paragraph 162 of the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) the Appellate Body states that it was deeply concerned about the panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues.

25. In other words, WTO panels must –in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU– make an objective assessment of the matter before them, including an objective assessment of conformity with the relevant covered agreements. For this purpose, panels must correctly apply the law; in the context of this dispute this also means that the Panel should follow the rulings of the Appellate Body where the Appellate Body has previously interpreted the same legal questions. Otherwise, the task of providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, as enshrined in Article 3.2 of the DSU, would be put in serious danger.

2.2 THE TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS AND OF FACTORS OTHER THAN THE DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

26. The European Union understands that the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) found that it was not possible to isolate the effects caused by the dumping from the effects caused by the subsidising, and thus did not consider the fact that the imports from India were also subsidised as irrelevant. However, Canada maintains that it was irrelevant to the CITT's decision that the imports from India were also subsidized.

27. The European Union notes that "cross-cumulation" is not treaty language but rather language used by panels and the Appellate Body in describing a situation of the kind at issue in the present case.

28. While acknowledging the differences between the specificities of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, the European Union recalls that in the context of Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement the Appellate Body has found that the respective article does not authorize investigating authorities to assess cumulatively the effects of imports that are not subject to simultaneous countervailing duty investigations with the effects of imports that are subject to countervailing duty investigations.

29. The European Union understands the difficulties an investigating authority is facing when isolating the effects of dumping from subsidization. However, according to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigating authority must demonstrate that the dumped imports, "through the effects of dumping", are causing injury to the domestic industry within the meaning...
of that Agreement. The European Union is of the view that, as long as the prices are found to be dumped, subsidisation causing the dumping is irrelevant for the injury and causation analysis under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

30. In the view of the European Union, such subsidisation should not be considered under non-attribution analysis as an "other factor" of injury causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports, (i.e. it should not be considered as another factor that must be separated from or must not be attributed to the effects of dumped imports in the sense of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). In EU – Footwear (China), the complainant argued that the surge in dumped imports was caused by a variety of factors such as the abolition of preferential tariff treatment and quotas. The panel clearly found that one is not required to investigate the reasons as to why dumping is taking place.

31. Also, in the view of the European Union, such subsidisation is not relevant for demonstrating the causal relationship between dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry, as the injury caused to the domestic industry by dumped imports that result from subsidisation is still directly attributable to dumping. To be relevant, subsidisation would have to drive down the export price without increasing the dumping margin.

32. Finally, the European Union also recalls that the SCM Agreement provides for the possibility of the imposition of countervailing duties if the respective conditions are met.

2.3 DUMPING DETERMINATION AND DETERMINATION OF DUTY RATE FOR ALL OTHER EXPORTERS

33. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters". TPKM argues that the CBSA has failed to evaluate and assess in a comparative manner the information that was on the record, in particular information provided by the three cooperating TPKM exporters.

34. Canada responds that the CBSA's use of facts available to determine the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters" did not violate Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

35. Canada confirms that, for the exporters that failed to provide sufficient information, despite being explicitly cautioned against non-cooperation, the CBSA established normal values on the basis of facts available. However, Canada argues that CBSA's approach was based on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate in the investigation. If that approach were deemed punitive, exporters could actually benefit from a lack of cooperation. Moreover, Canada maintains that CBSA's use of facts available was comparative and took into account all of the information on the record.

36. The European Union agrees that an investigating authority is not prohibited, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, from using an inference that may be "adverse to the interests" of non-cooperating exporters.

37. Although Appellate Body and panel reports have emphasised that the purpose of the facts available mechanism "is not to punish non-cooperation by interested parties", but rather to "ensure that the failure of an interested party to provide necessary information does not hinder an agency's investigation", this does not preclude an investigating authority from taking account of facts that are detrimental to the interests of non-cooperating parties. The final sentence of Annex II, paragraph 7, explicitly envisages the possibility that "if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate."

38. The CBSA gave notice to all known foreign exporters of CSWP to Canada of the consequences of failing to provide information. To the extent that the facts selected for establishing normal values are not devoid of factual foundation and can contribute to arriving at an accurate determination for those exporters that chose not to cooperate, the European Union
considers that the selection of unfavourable facts is not inconsistent with a Member's obligations under Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.4 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES

39. With respect to the treatment of new product types to be exported by cooperating producers, TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 9.3, 6.8 and Annex II, as well as Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, as a consequence, Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

40. According to TPKM, Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the anti-dumping duties imposed on "new product types" exceed the margin of dumping established for each cooperating exporter. Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II because it resorted to "facts available" in a case where the TPKM cooperating exporters have not refused to provide the necessary information.

41. Canada contests all the claims put forward by TPKM in respect of CBSA's treatment of new product models. Canada asserts that TPKM fundamentally misunderstands the operation of Canada's prospective duty assessment system and ignores the practical need to apply facts available to product models that were not exported during the original period of investigation.

42. Because the CBSA has no information pertaining to product models that were not exported during the initial period of investigation, it establishes their normal values on the basis of facts available, pursuant to a ministerial specification. Nevertheless, under Canada's prospective normal value system, exporters and importers have concrete options for obtaining specific normal values for new product models.

43. Canada points out that when an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values. TPKM's claim that the application of the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters ignores that under a prospective duty system the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment.

44. The European Union understands that Canada operates a prospective duty assessment system, which is explicitly authorised under Article 9.3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is in the nature of such a system that anti-dumping duties assessed on a prospective basis are subject to final assessment, so that the importer of the product is entitled to obtain, upon request, a prompt refund of any such duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping.

45. Provided that all the obligations in Article 9.3.2 are complied with, the European Union regards the operation of a prospective duty assessment system, and its application to new types or models of products subject to an anti-dumping investigation, as being consistent with the basic requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

46. As regards the level of the duty that may be collected at the time of initial assessment, the European Union is of the opinion that such level should not be excessive, in the sense that it should comply with the conditions laid down in Article 9.2.

47. In addition, Annex II, paragraph 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement suggests that the investigating authority should not be unduly strict in examining and deciding on the relevance of information already provided by cooperating exporters, in view of establishing prospective normal values for new types or models of the subject product.

2.5 AS SUCH CLAIMS

48. TPKM alleges that certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR) are inconsistent as such with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
Canada differentiates between mandatory and discretionary acts, considering that an as such violation of an obligation in a covered agreement cannot occur when a Member has the discretion necessary to act consistently with that obligation.

In this context, the European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has stated that the "mandatory/discretionary distinction" is an analytical tool which may vary from case to case and such a distinction should not be applied in a mechanistic fashion.

The European Union also notes that the Appellate Body has considered that "as such" challenges to a Member's legislation are "serious challenges", particularly as Members are presumed to have enacted their laws in good faith.

With regard to the type of evidence that is required to be considered in order to establish the content and meaning of municipal law, the Appellate Body has clarified that, in some cases, the text of the relevant legislation may suffice, while in other cases evidence beyond the text of the measure at issue may be required, related to the consistent application of the measure, pronouncements of domestic courts, and the writings of recognized scholars.

Finally, the Appellate Body has found that the starting point for an analysis when a measure is challenged "as such" must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of the measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure as such can be assessed on that basis alone.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The European Union hopes that its contribution in the present case will be helpful to the Panel in objectively assessing the matter before it and in developing the respective legal interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
ANNEX D-3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NORWAY

I. ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: THE DETERMINATION OF DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING IS PRODUCER-SPECIFIC RATHER THAN COUNTRY-WIDE

1. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (hereinafter “TPKM”) submits that Canada ignored the individual margins of dumping calculated for each exporter. Instead, it relied on the country-wide margins of dumping in order to determine whether the margins of dumping were de minimis. Accordingly, Canada did not terminate the investigation with respect to individual exporters whose definitive margins of dumping were found to be de minimis if the corresponding country-wide margin of dumping was 2% or more. TPKM further submits that this entails a violation of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2. Canada submits that the obligation contained in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country rather than the individual producer. The termination of an investigation is thus only required when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis, according to Canada.

3. Norway respectfully disagrees with the position that the requirement to immediately terminate an investigation pertains to a country rather than the individual producer. Norway holds that the determination of de minimis dumping is by nature producer-specific. The wording of Article 5.8, as well as the context and the consistency with the other Articles of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, clearly leads to this conclusion. Accordingly, as TPKM points out, the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice reached this very same conclusion on this exact question.

4. The panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, found that the term "margin of dumping" in the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers to "the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping". The panel found evidence for this in Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which stipulates that "the authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation". The exception to this rule also provides for the calculation of individual margins of dumping, and does not envisage the calculation of a country-wide margin. The panel then went on to examine the rest of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to see whether there were any provisions that would contradict this finding. Upon completing this analysis, the panel ultimately concluded that "whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter."

5. The Appellate Body not only confirmed this finding and expressly agreed with the Panel’s reasoning, but also added that this conclusion was indeed in line with the use of the term “margins of dumping” in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the finding by the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel that this term referred to the individual margin of dumping of an producer.

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1 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 53.
2 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 54.
3 First Written Submission of Canada, para. 46.
5 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.137.
6 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140.
6. Norway would like to underline that both the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice pointed out that although there is a single investigation (and not as many investigations as there are exporters), Article 5.8 simply requires the termination of the investigation in respect of the individual exporter or producer for which a zero or de minimis margin is established.\(^8\) Hence, contrary to what Canada argues, the ordinary meaning of the terms "investigation" and "termination", as well as the context provided by the rest of Article 5 in general and Article 5.8 in particular, do not imply that termination of an investigation is required on a country-wide basis.\(^9\) Rather, the ordinary meaning of these terms and the context of the rest of Article 5 and Article 5.8 provide support for the producer-specific interpretation, as laid down by previous panels and the Appellate Body.

7. As for the immediate context of Article 5.8, the panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice found it relevant that the second sentence of the paragraph stipulates that negligibility, the other basis upon which immediate termination is required, is to be determined in respect of the volume of dumped imports “from a particular country”.\(^10\) Thus, while the Anti-Dumping Agreement expressly stipulates that the negligibility test is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is made with regard to the margin of dumping. The panel concluded that this context further confirmed their view that the reference to the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 is a reference to the individual margin of dumping which is to be determined on an exporter-specific basis. The Appellate Body confirmed the panel's reasoning on this point.\(^11\) Clearly, Canada's assertion that the panel and Appellate Body’s findings with regards to Article 5.8 are undermined because they failed to properly consider the context of Article 5 in general and Article 5.8 in particular is flawed.\(^12\) As set out above, this context was indeed a part of the analysis.

8. Canada further argues that the context of Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes it clear that Article 5.8 requires that an investigation need only be terminated when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis.\(^13\) As Norway understands it, Canada argues that as Article 9.4 refers to the disregarding of zero and de minimis margins of dumping, this means that the investigation is not terminated with respect to these individual exporters. Therefore, this exclusion of de minimis dumping margins confirms that an investigation is only terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is de minimis. Norway disagrees with this line of reasoning.

9. Article 9.4 contains special rules for the imposition of anti-dumping duties where the authorities have resorted to sampling of exporters. For the non-sampled producers, the anti-dumping duty imposed may not exceed the weighted-average dumping margin established for the sampled producers, with the exception of any de minimis dumping margins. In Norway's view, this reference to the formula for calculation of anti-dumping duties when sampling is involved cannot be read as a reference to when an investigation is to be considered terminated in accordance with Article 5.8. There is nothing in the wording of Article 9.4 that suggests such a reading and it is indeed a completely different question.

10. Contrary to what Canada argues, an interpretation of Article 5.8 supporting termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would not make parts of Article 9.4 redundant and therefore be at odds with the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Quite the opposite – such an interpretation would be in line with the system of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Where dumping margins are established as de minimis or zero, the investigation is to be terminated with respect to these individual producers, in line with Article 5.8, as established by the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice.\(^14\) Hence, these margins of dumping should not be used as a basis for calculating anti-dumping duties when sampling is involved either. A different interpretation could lead to a situation where anti-dumping duties are not calculated for the individual producers with zero or de minimis margins of dumping, while these dumping margins could be used in the calculation of

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\(^8\) Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140, and Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 218.

\(^9\) First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 52, 63, 72 and 91.

\(^10\) Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.141.

\(^11\) First Written Submission of Canada, para. 88.

\(^12\) First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 76-81.

\(^13\) Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140, and Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 218.
duties for non-sampled producers. This would clearly be at odds with the system of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

11. Accordingly, it is Norway's view that the context of Article 9.4 does not support an interpretation where the obligation in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation where the margin of dumping is *de minimis* pertains to a country. On the contrary, it supports the interpretation where this duty pertains to the individual producer. The consistency of the system, and the numerous references in Article 9.4 to the individual exporters and producers, clearly lead to this conclusion.

12. Canada further argues that Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides relevant context for interpreting the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8.\(^{15}\) Once again, the Appellate Body has previously addressed this issue and concluded that "Article 3.3 does not provide useful context for interpreting the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8."\(^{16}\) Norway cannot see that Canada offers any new arguments that would render a different result. Furthermore, Canada's assertion that the Appellate Body in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* endorsed the panel's analysis under Article 5.8 without referring to the panel's alleged ignorance of Article 3.3, is clearly flawed.\(^{17}\) As evidenced by the Appellate Body analysis recited above, the Appellate Body expressly considered Article 3.3 in coming to its conclusion regarding Article 5.8. Canada's submission that the Appellate Body's finding is undermined due to this "flaw" thus clearly has no basis in reality.

13. Norway thus agrees with TPKM that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires WTO Members to terminate anti-dumping investigations with respect to individual exporters that have a *de minimis* margin of dumping. Where all investigated exporters are found to have *de minimis* margins of dumping, this individual producer-specific determination will be extended to a country-wide basis.\(^{18}\) However, this does not change the producer-specific nature of the determination, but rather follows as a logical consequence of this fact.

**II. THE ROLE OF PREVIOUS REPORTS**

14. As the question discussed above regarding Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has largely been addressed by previous panels and the Appellate Body, Norway would like to emphasise the role of previous reports in the WTO dispute settlement system. The very basis of the system is that reports are binding only on the parties to the dispute. The Appellate Body has however underlined "that adopted panel and Appellate Body reports create legitimate expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. Following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, it is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same. This is also in line with a key objective of the dispute settlement system to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system."\(^{19}\) Norway would add that by following previous Appellate Body reports, panels also contribute to ensuring fewer disputes and preserve both the system and the systemic function of the Appellate Body.

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\(^{15}\) First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 82-83.
\(^{17}\) First Written Submission of Canada, para. 87.
\(^{18}\) Panel Report, *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, para. 7.143.
ANNEX D-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

I. ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE AD AGREEMENT: TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A
DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

1. TPKM has set out in considerable detail how Canada violated Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement because it failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be de minimis within the meaning of that provision.1 The UAE shares the analysis provided by TPKM in its submission as it is justified by the language of the AD Agreement and confirmed by previous Panels and the Appellate Body. Indeed, article 5.8 of the AD Agreement reads as follows. The Export price is intrinsically firm-specific and not country-wide margin.

2. The UAE considers relevant in this respect that the fourth sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement supports the view that the de minimis standard is to be applied on a firm-specific basis and not country wide basis. That sentence is drafted in such manner that the term "volume" refers to a country wide basis unlike the term "de minimis dumping margin" expressly involves firm-specific basis. The drafters of the AD Agreement expressly utilized different stipulations in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement. The UAE believes that the construction and the express language of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement leave no discretion to the investigating authority other than as stated by Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement that there "shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis".

3. The UAE agrees with TPKM that previous panels have reached and confirmed TPKM assertions that there shall be immediate termination of the AD investigation with respect to exporters that have an individual de minimis margin of dumping.2

4. Additionally, the UAE considers that the examination of other provisions of the AD Agreement provides that whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter.3 Therefore, the UAE agrees with TPKM that the term margin of dumping in the AD Agreement is company-specific rather than country-wide.

II. ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 AND 3.7 OF THE AD AGREEMENT: TREATMENT OF
NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION DETERMINATIONS

5. TPKM contends that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement because it treated as "dumped imports" for the purposes of injury and causation analyses imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.4

6. The UAE agrees with TPKM’s arguments and analysis that by failing to exclude from the "dumped imports" the imports of exporters for which a de minimis dumping margin had been determined, the investigating authority acts inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement.5

7. The UAE considers that there is nothing in Article 3 of the AD Agreement that provides for an investigating authority to include imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping in the injury and causation determinations of dumped imports. Indeed, the UAE agrees with TPKM that the term dumped imports refers to all imports attributable to exporters for which a margin of dumping greater than de minimis has been calculated and not imports of exporters for which a de minimis dumping margin had been determined.

1 First Written Submission of TPKM, paras. 43-56.
2 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 52.
3 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 47.
4 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 108.
5 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 133.
8. In light of the text of the AD Agreement in respect of the term "dumped imports" and in accordance with the relevant Dispute Settlement Body's jurisprudence, the UAE considers that the term "dumped imports" does not enable an investigating authority under any conditions to include imports that are found non dumped in the determinations of injury and causality of "dumped imports" under Article 3 of the AD Agreement.

9. The UAE considers that Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement states a general and overarching principle that leaves no discretion for the investigating authority to have a different interpretation of the strict and clear meaning of this article. A different approach by including non-dumped imports in the injury and causation determinations does not meet the meaning of Article 3 of the AD Agreement nor corresponds to a determination made by an objective authority based on positive evidence. Neither reflects the intention of the drafters of the AD Agreement. The UAE considers that the language of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement using the term "dumped imports" would have no purpose if the determination of injury and causation includes non-dumped imports.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this submission, the United States will provide comments on certain legal issues involving the interpretation and application of Articles 5.8 and 6.8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("AD Agreement").

II. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE AD AGREEMENT

2. The United States, while taking no position on the merits of the factual allegations made by both parties, agrees with The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("TPKM") that a proper interpretation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires that the investigating authority terminate an investigation with respect to an exporter or producer for which an individual margin of dumping is determined as zero or de minimis.

3. The term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement refers to the margin of dumping for an individual exporter or producer, rather than the margin of dumping with respect to a country. Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement refers to the "margin of dumping" as "established with respect to the selected exporters or producers." Nothing in the text of Article 5.8 suggests that the term "margin of dumping" should be interpreted differently in Article 5.8 than in Article 9.4.

4. The text of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides additional contextual support for the view that an investigating authority must exclude individual exporters or producers from the antidumping measure if their individual "margin of dumping" is zero or de minimis. The fourth sentence of Article 5.8 states that the investigating authority's analysis of negligible imports is normally done on a country-wide basis. In the absence of similar language in Article 5.8 suggesting that the dumping analysis is to be done on a country-wide basis, the immediate context within Article 5.8 supports the conclusion that margin of dumping is to be determined on an individual, producer-or exporter-specific basis. The Appellate Body has supported this interpretation of Article 5.8.

5. Following that interpretation, the United States agrees with TPKM that an investigating authority acts inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement when it fails to terminate the investigation for exporters or producers which are found to have zero or de minimis margins, and instead relies on the results of the country-wide margin as a basis for including exporters with de minimis margins within the scope of the definitive antidumping measure. Once a zero or de minimis margin has been determined for a particular producer or exporter, the obligation under Article 5.8 for a "termination in cases" necessarily entails that the investigating authority cannot subject such an individual exporter or producer to an antidumping order.

6. Canada thus acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement to the extent that it calculated zero or de minimis margins of dumping for individual exporters, failed to terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters, and then issued a final dumping order covering those exporters.

III. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE AD AGREEMENT

7. Article 6.8 permits investigating authorities to apply the facts available in cases where an interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, information that is necessary to the investigation within a reasonable period of time, or significantly impedes the investigation. Annex II further reflects that an investigating authority's ability to rely on facts less favorable to the interests of a non-cooperating interested party is inherent in the authority's role in conducting
an investigation in accordance with the AD Agreement. At the same time, the investigating authority must provide a sufficient basis for any application of the facts available.

8. To the extent that TPKM is alleging that CBSA has insufficiently explained the basis for its application of the facts available, the sufficiency of an investigating authority's explanations is dealt with under the procedural obligations under Article 12 of the AD Agreement, and not Article 6.8.

9. Accordingly, the Panel in this dispute should assess in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II whether the other exporters refused access to, or otherwise did not provide information that was necessary to the investigation within a reasonable period, or significantly impeded the investigation by CBSA. The Panel also should assess whether CBSA provided a sufficient basis for its application of the facts available to the "all other exporters."

IV. AS SUCH CLAIMS REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA

10. In this dispute, the United States does not take a position on whether Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and (2), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of the SIMA and Section 37(1) of the SIMR are, as such, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8 and 7.1(ii) of the AD Agreement. The Panel will need to assess whether the facts substantiate each party's assertions as to whether the SIMA and SIMR measures "require" certain action or provide "discretion" to Canada's investigating authority to take different action. To prevail on its claims, TPKM will need to demonstrate that SIMA and SIMR "requires" that Canada act in a WTO-inconsistent manner or precludes WTO-consistent action.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD-PARTY ORAL STATEMENT AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL WITH THE PARTIES

V. INTRODUCTION

11. The United States appreciates the opportunity to provide our views as a third party in this dispute. In our third-party submission, we presented views on a number of the issues pertaining to TPKM's claims regarding the interpretation and application of Articles 5.8 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement. The United States will focus its remarks in our oral statement on two matters related to these claims pertaining to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, which were not addressed in the U.S. third-party submission.

VI. THE OBLIGATION OF PANELS TO FOLLOW PRIOR APPELLATE BODY FINDINGS

12. Before addressing those issues, the United States first would like to respond to certain statements made by two third parties regarding the role of Appellate Body reports in the dispute settlement system. The United States notes with concern that the European Union ("EU") and Norway have asserted that panels are obligated to follow prior Appellate Body findings. The United States understands these assertions to be without foundation and fundamentally incorrect, and this proposition as inconsistent with the text of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement").

13. The text of the DSU and WTO Agreement establish that in the WTO, adopted panel or Appellate Body legal findings are not "authoritative interpretations". To be sure, to the extent a panel finds prior Appellate Body or panel reasoning to be persuasive, a panel may rely on that reasoning in conducting its own objective assessment of the matter. However, there is no provision in the DSU that grants a panel the authority not to assess objectively the legal issues in dispute, including by applying customary rules of interpretation to the text of the covered agreements, nor does the DSU require, or permit, a panel to follow –without any examination– prior Appellate Body findings.

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1 EU's Third Party Submission, para. 10; Norway's Third Party Submission, para. 13.
VII. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE AD AGREEMENT

14. Turning to TPKM's claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, the United States views those claims as lacking in legal merit. The United States finds no support in the text of the AD Agreement for TPKM's argument that Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement required Canada to examine "the effects of subsidies" applicable to the dumped imports as an "other known factor" that is somehow separate from the effects of the dumped imports.\(^2\) An investigating authority is not required to assess the effects of any subsidies on dumped imports separately from the effects of the dumped imports themselves under Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Consequently, this Panel should not find that Canada acted inconsistently under Article 3.5 to the AD Agreement to the extent that the Canada Border Services Agency did not examine the effects of India's alleged subsidies as an "other known factor" injuring the domestic industry.

\(^2\) TPKM's First Written Submission, paras. 135, 145.
CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

REPORT OF THE PANEL

Addendum

This addendum contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document WT/DS482/R.
# LIST OF ANNEXES

## ANNEX A

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX B

ARGUMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4 Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX C

ARGUMENTS OF CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX D

ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>D-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Norway</td>
<td>D-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>D-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States</td>
<td>D-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX A

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures on Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX A-1

CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU (WT/DS482)

WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL (AS AMENDED)

Adopted on 12 August 2015

1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working Procedures shall apply.

General

2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter “party”) from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted to the Panel by another Member which the submitting Member has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.

3. The parties and third parties shall treat business confidential information in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Business Confidential Information adopted by the Panel.

4. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter “third parties”), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it. The Panel shall open its substantive meetings with the parties to the public, in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Panel after consulting with the parties.

5. Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.

Submissions

6. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a written submission in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

7. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If Chinese Taipei requests such a ruling, Canada shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission. If Canada requests such a ruling, Chinese Taipei shall submit its response to the request prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
8. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.

9. Where the original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO working language of the submission at the same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing, no later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the submission which contains the translation in question. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the grounds of objection and an alternative translation.

10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exhibit on its cover page. For example, exhibits submitted by the complaining Member could indicate "Name of Complaining Member–1", "Name of Complaining Member–2", etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was "Name of Complaining Member -5", the first exhibit in connection with the next submission thus would be "Name of Complaining Member-6".

Questions

11. The Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, including prior to each substantive meeting.

Substantive meetings

12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each meeting with the Panel and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

   a. The Panel shall invite Chinese Taipei to make an opening statement to present its case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its point of view. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. on the first working day following the meeting.

   b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

   c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

   d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with Chinese Taipei presenting its statement first.
14. The second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:

a. The Panel shall ask Canada if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If so, the Panel shall invite Canada to present its opening statement, followed by Chinese Taipei. If Canada chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Panel shall invite Chinese Taipei to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to the other party’s written questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement first, presenting its closing statement first.

Third parties

15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.

16. Each third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no later than 5.00 p.m. the previous working day.

17. The third-party session shall be conducted as follows:

a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.

b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order. Third parties present at the third-party session and intending to present their views orally at that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third-parties with provisional written versions of their statements before they take the floor. Third parties shall make available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00 p.m. of the first working day following the session.

c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any matter raised in the third parties’ submissions or statements. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall then have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.

**Descriptive part**

18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, which shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel’s examination of the case.

19. Each party shall submit executive summaries of the facts and arguments as presented to the Panel in its written submissions, other than responses to questions, and its oral statements, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each executive summary of a written submission shall be limited to no more than 10 pages, and each summary submitted by each party of both opening and closing statements presented at a substantive meeting shall be limited to no more than 5 pages. The Panel will not summarize in the descriptive part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties’ responses to questions.

20. Each third party shall submit an executive summary of its arguments as presented in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive summary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed 6 pages.

21. The Panel reserves the right to request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts and arguments presented by a party or a third party in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be specified in the timetable.

**Interim review**

22. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.

23. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit written comments on the other party’s written request for review, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on the other party’s written request for review.

24. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.

**Service of documents**

25. The following procedures regarding service of documents shall apply:

   a. Each party and third party shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the DS Registry (office No. 2047).

   b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. Exhibits may be filed in 2 copies on CD-ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
c. Each party and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format, either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided by e-mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to xxxxxx@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.

d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time it provides each document to the Panel.

e. Each party and third party shall file its documents with the DS Registry and serve copies on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates established by the Panel. A party or third party may submit its documents to another party or third party in electronic format only, subject to the recipient party or third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary is notified.

f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the interim report and the final report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the record of the dispute.

26. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with the parties.
ANNEX A-2

CANADA – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU (WT/DS482)

ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES ON BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Adopted on 15 September 2015

The following procedures apply to any business confidential information (BCI) submitted in the course of the Panel proceedings in DS482.

1. For the purposes of these Panel proceedings, BCI is any information that has been designated as such by the party submitting the information and that was previously treated as confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 by the Canadian investigating authorities in the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this dispute. However, these procedures do not apply to any information that is available in the public domain. In addition, these procedures do not apply to any BCI if the person who provided the information in the course of the aforementioned investigation agrees in writing to make the information publicly available.

2. As required by Article 18.2 of the DSU, a party or third party having access to BCI submitted in these Panel proceedings shall treat it as confidential and shall not disclose that information other than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these procedures. Any information submitted as BCI under these procedures shall only be used for the purposes of this dispute and for no other purpose. Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees and/or outside advisors comply with these working procedures to protect BCI. An outside advisor is not permitted access to BCI if that advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in the production, sale, export, or import of the products that were the subject of the investigation at issue in this dispute, or an officer or employee of an association of such enterprises. All third party access to BCI shall be subject to the terms of these working procedures.

3. No person may have access to BCI except a member of the Secretariat or the Panel, an employee of a party or third party under the terms specified in these procedures or an outside advisor to a party or third party for the purposes of this dispute.

4. The party submitting BCI shall mark the cover and/or first page of the document containing BCI, and each page of the document, to indicate the presence of such information. The specific information in question shall be placed between double brackets, as follows: \([\text{xx,xxx.xx}]\). The first page or cover of the document shall state “Contains Business Confidential Information”, and each page of the document shall contain the notice “Contains Business Confidential Information” at the top of the page.

5. Any BCI that is submitted in binary-encoded form shall be clearly marked with the statement “Business Confidential Information” on a label of the storage medium, and clearly marked with the statement “Business Confidential Information” in the binary-encoded files.

6. In the case of an oral statement containing BCI, the party or third party making such a statement shall inform the Panel before making it that the statement will contain BCI, and the Panel will ensure that only persons authorized to have access to BCI pursuant to these procedures are in the room to hear that statement. The written versions of such oral statements submitted to the Panel shall be marked as provided for in paragraph 4.

7. If a party or third party considers that information submitted by the other party or a third party contains information which should have been designated as BCI and objects to such submission without BCI designation, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the
Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties. The Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate. Similarly, if a party or third party considers that the other party or a third party submitted information designated as BCI which should not be so designated, it shall forthwith bring this objection to the attention of the Panel, the other party, and, where relevant, the third parties, and the Panel shall deal with the objection as appropriate.

8. Any person authorized to have access to BCI under the terms of these procedures shall store all documents containing BCI in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access to such information.

9. The Panel will not disclose BCI, in its report or in any other way, to persons not authorized under these procedures to have access to BCI. The Panel may, however, make statements of conclusion drawn from such information. Before the Panel circulates its final report to the Members, the Panel will give each party an opportunity to review the report to ensure that it does not contain any information that the party has designated as BCI.

10. Submissions containing BCI will be included in the record forwarded to the Appellate Body in the event of an appeal of the Panel's Report.
## ANNEX B

ARGUMENTS OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1: Executive summary of the first written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2: Executive summary of the second written submission of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3: Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4: Integrated executive summary of the statements of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>B-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 INTRODUCTION

1. On 14 May 2012, the Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA") initiated investigations with respect to the dumping of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe ("CSWP") originating in the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("TPKM"), India, Oman, Korea, Thailand, Turkey and the UAE and the subsidizing of certain CSWP from India, Oman and the UAE. On 13 July 2012, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("CITT") made a preliminary finding that there was reasonable indication that the dumping and subsidies of the subject goods had caused injury or retardation or were threatening to cause injury. Subsequently, the CBSA made a preliminary determination of dumping and subsidizing on 13 August 2012. Provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed on, among others, imports from TPKM, including the imports of those exporters whose margins of dumping were found to be zero or de minimis.

2. The CBSA issued its final determination of dumping and subsidizing on 9 November 2012. The CITT made its final injury determination on 11 December 2012, concluding that the dumping of certain CSWP originating in or exported from TPKM, India, Oman, Korea, Thailand and the UAE and the subsidizing of these goods from India were threatening to cause injury to the Canadian domestic industry. Definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed on imports from, among others, TPKM, including the imports of those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be zero or de minimis.

3. Canada initiated a normal value review on 7 January 2013, one month after the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duties. The CBSA issued a Notice of conclusion of the re-investigation on 7 May 2013.

4. In the present dispute, TPKM challenges the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain CSWP. TPKM submits that these measures violate Articles 1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5. 9.2, 9.3 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

5. In addition, TPKM also challenges Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of the Special Import Measures Act ("SIMA") and Section 37.1(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations ("SIMR"), as being as such inconsistent with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI of the GATT 1994 and article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.

2 CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CSWP ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, TPKM

2.1 Treatment of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping

6. TPKM submits that the treatment of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping by Canada in the present case amounts to a violation of Articles 1, 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 as will be explained below.

2.1.1 Claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

7. Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "[t]he law shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis". The term "margin of dumping", as clarified by the Appellate Body, refers to the "individual" margin of dumping, as opposed to the "country-wide" margin of dumping. Therefore, Article 5.8 requires WTO Members to terminate anti-dumping investigations with respect to exporters that have an individual de minimis margin of dumping, regardless of the country-wide dumping margin.
8. In the present case, two of the three cooperating exporters from TPKM, i.e. Chung Hung Steel Corporation (“Chung Hung Steel”) and Shin Yang Steel Co. Ltd. (“Shin Yang Steel”), received individual *de minimis* dumping margins of 0.005% and 0.4%, respectively, in CBSA’s final dumping determination. However, the CBSA did not terminate the investigation with respect to these two exporters, but rather continued the investigation and ultimately imposed definitive anti-dumping measures on all imports from TPKM on the basis that the final country-wide margin of dumping for TPKM was greater than *de minimis*, namely 8.9%.

9. TPKM submits that by failing to immediately terminate the investigation, leading to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures, with respect to exporters whose individual final margins of dumping were found to be *de minimis*, Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

**2.1.2 Claim under Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

10. Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that “[t]he authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer”. As confirmed by previous case law, the rule to calculate an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer refers to a single margin of dumping. Thus, only one individual dumping margin for each exporter or producer must be determined and used throughout the investigation.

11. In the present case, although the CBSA calculated individual margins of dumping for each known exporter or producer, it used this information to calculate the weighted average margin of dumping for each country under investigation with the purpose of determining whether such country-wide margins of dumping were *de minimis*. TPKM submits that by calculating country-wide margins of dumping and by using those country-wide margins for the purpose of the *de minimis* test, Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement since that provision imposes the obligation to determine a single margin of dumping for each individual exporter or producer.

**2.1.3 Claim under Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

12. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement authorizes the application of provisional measures upon meeting three conditions, one of which is that "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry". As pointed out by the panel in *EC – Salmon (Norway)*, an exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping cannot be treated as "dumping" for the purposes of injury analysis and the imposition of anti-dumping duties.

13. It follows that the CBSA could not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with respect to Shin Yang Steel, whose preliminary margin of dumping was found to be 0.5%, and thus was *de minimis*. By applying provisional anti-dumping duties without meeting the criteria provided for in Article 7.1(ii), Canada acted inconsistently with that provision.

**2.1.4 Claims under Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

14. Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that when an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect to any product, such anti-dumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts and on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product "from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury". The Appellate Body clarified that the meaning of "sources" in Article 9.2 refers to the individual exporters or producers subject to the investigation and not to the country as a whole. Furthermore, a producer with a zero or *de minimis* margin of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping" and thus his imports do not qualify as "sources found to be dumped".

15. Pursuant to Article 7.5, the relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures. Article 9.2 is a relevant provision within the meaning of Article 7.5 as it deals with the issue "connected with" the imposition of provisional measures, namely the collection of such measures, but which is not directly addressed by Article 7 itself.
16. In the present case, Canada was required to ensure that its provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties were to be collected only from sources "found to be dumped", i.e. exporters with an individual margin of dumping greater than de minimis (i.e. a margin of dumping of 2% or more). Canada, however, failed to do so.

17. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, by imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, Canada caused anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury.

2.1.5 Claims under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

18. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that "[i]n order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product". Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes a link between that Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, and provides that "[a]n anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement".

19. Since there is no dumping to "offset or prevent" in case of exporters with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping, TPKM submits that Canada acted inconsistently with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 when it imposed provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on all TPKM exporters, including Chung Hung Steel and Shin Yang Steel, whose individual margins of dumping were de minimis. As a consequence, Canada also violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement since it failed to apply its anti-dumping measures under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994.

2.2 Treatment of non-dumped imports in the injury and causation analyses

20. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it treated as "dumped imports" for the purposes of the injury and causation analyses imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.

21. Article 3.1 refers to the volume and effects of the "dumped imports". The subsequent paragraphs of Article 3 similarly refer to "dumped imports".

22. As confirmed by case law, imports from exporters whose dumping margins are de minimis cannot be considered as "dumped". Therefore, TPKM submits that by failing to exclude from the injury and causation analyses the imports of exporters for whom the CBSA determined in its final dumping determination a de minimis dumping margin, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.3 Treatment of factors other than dumped imports in the causation analysis

23. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require, as part of the causation analysis, that the investigating authorities carry out "an objective examination" on the basis of "positive evidence" of "known factors" other than the dumped imports and do not attribute to dumped imports injury caused by such other factors which are injuring the domestic industry at the same time.

24. In the present case, the CITT cross-cumulated the effects of dumping and subsidizing and failed to ensure that the injury caused by the effects of subsidies was not attributed to the alleged dumped imports. Furthermore, despite noting the very low capacity utilization rates of the domestic industry during the period of investigation and receiving submissions from interested parties that called attention to the "very bad economic conditions" affecting the Canadian domestic industry, the CITT failed to examine the injurious effects of overcapacity and distinguish such effects from those caused by the alleged dumped imports.
TPKM submits that by failing to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which at the same time were injuring the domestic industry, including the effects of subsidies and overcapacity, and by failing to ensure that the injuries caused by such other factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports, Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.4 The determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters"

TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters".

In the course of the investigation, the CBSA calculated individual dumping margins for the three cooperative TPKM exporters, i.e. Chung Hung Steel, Shin Yang Steel, and Yieh Phui Enterprise Co. Ltd. ("Yieh Phui"). For "all other exporters", a residual dumping margin of 54.2% was determined on the basis of facts available pursuant to a ministerial specification under SIMA. For these exporters, the normal values were determined by advancing the export prices by the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price on an individual transaction for a cooperative exporter, i.e. 54.2%.

Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that in cases in which an interested party "refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information", determinations may be made "on the basis of the facts available". Annex II which is entitled "Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6" elaborates further on the recourse to "facts available". As clarified by case law, "the facts available" to be employed by the investigating authorities are expected to be "the best information available", which means information that is not simply correct or useful, but also "the most fitting or most appropriate", with "no better information available to be used in the particular circumstances".

TPKM submits that Canada's methodology for calculating the margin of dumping for the other exporters is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. First, the CBSA considered the failure to provide the information itself as being sufficient to justify the use of the highest dumping margin, thereby seeking to punish "other exporters" for having failed to co-operate. Second, by applying mechanistically the highest dumping margin established in the course of the investigation, the CBSA failed to evaluate and assess in a comparative manner the information that was on the record in order to identify which information was the "best information available, and in particular, ignored the information provided by the cooperating TPKM exporters. Finally, the highest dumping margin calculated on an individual transaction of one non-TPKM cooperating exporter from Oman is not the "best available information". Indeed, there is no logical relationship between the rate established for all other TPKM exporters, namely 54.2%, and the facts on the record concerning TPKM exports. The CBSA should have rather relied on the information pertaining to the cooperating producers from TPKM which was representative for the TPKM market as a whole.

In light of the foregoing, TPKM requests the Panel to conclude that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to use the "best information available" for the determination of the dumping margin and the determination of the anti-dumping duty rate of "all other exporters" as required by those provisions.

2.5 Treatment of New Product Types to be exported by cooperating exporters

TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 9.3, Article 6.8 and Annex II, as well as Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with regard to the treatment of new product types to be exported by cooperating exporters.

In the final dumping determination and the notice of conclusion of the re-investigation, the CBSA determined that for goods for which specific normal values have not been established, normal values will be based on the export price of the subject goods advanced by 54.2%.

As a preliminary remark, TPKM recalls that, in line with well-established case law, dumping and margins of dumping can be found to exist only for the product under investigation as a whole.
and not for a type, model, or category of that product. TPKM submits that Canada erred in treating separately, for the purposes of determining the applicable anti-dumping duty, the product types produced by each exporter during the investigation and the "new product types" of those exporters.

34. First, by imposing the residual anti-dumping duty of 54.2% on "new product types", the CBSA applied on "new product types" an anti-dumping duty which exceeds the margin of dumping that has been established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for each cooperating exporter and thus violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

35. Second, the CBSA erroneously resorted to "facts available" for determining the anti-dumping duty applicable to "new product types" even though the requirements laid down in Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were not met. Indeed, the TPKM cooperating exporters never refused access to, or otherwise did not provide the necessary information or significantly impeded the investigation. Therefore, Canada's use of facts available is clearly inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Furthermore, the information used by the CBSA, was not the "best information available" as required by Annex II.

36. Third, Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for new product types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology which is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

37. Finally, Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA ignored the individual margins of dumping previously established for the cooperating exporters and determined a separate margin of dumping of 54.2% with respect to new product types to be exported by those exporters, thereby calculating more than one dumping margin for each cooperative exporter.

2.6 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

38. TPKM submits that as a consequence of all the above-mentioned violations, the Panel should find that Canada also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

3 CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT ("SIMA") AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS ("SIMR")

3.1 Claims concerning Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA

3.1.1 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2) and 38(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

39. SIMA calls for a preliminary dumping determination with respect to all goods from a country with a country-wide margin of dumping of 2% or more, and thus also with respect to exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping. As discussed in Section 2.1.3 above, Article 7.1(ii) provides that provisional measures may be applied only if "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping". Since exporters with individual de minimis margins of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping", by mandating that an affirmative preliminary dumping determination be made every time the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more and by ignoring the fact that such determination cannot cover exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping, SIMA is inconsistent, as such, with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3.1.2 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

40. The abovementioned Sections of SIMA, do not allow for a termination of the dumping investigation with respect to exporters for which a de minimis margin of dumping has been determined but require that a final dumping determination be made with respect to those exporters if the country-wide margin of dumping is found to be 2% or more. It follows that these
provisions are as such inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which requires the immediate termination of an investigation when the authorities determine that the individual margin of dumping is \textit{de minimis}, i.e. less than 2%.

**3.1.3 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

41. Furthermore, Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are also, as such, inconsistent with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because in mandating that affirmative preliminary and definitive dumping determinations be made for exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is 2\% or more, these provisions cause anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be "dumped" and "causing injury".

**3.1.4 Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994**

42. Finally, the imposition of anti-dumping duties on exporters with individual \textit{de minimis} margins of dumping but whose country-wide margin of dumping is greater than \textit{de minimis} is in violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which provide for the possibility to levy an anti-dumping duty only "in order to offset or prevent dumping" and therefore not with respect to imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping.

**3.2 Claims concerning Sections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR**

43. TPKM submits that Sections 42(1), 42(6), 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent as such with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because these provisions result in an automatic inclusion in the category of "dumped imports", in the context of the injury analysis, of imports of exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping.

44. Pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions, the imports of exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping will always be included in the analysis of the volume of dumped imports and the analysis of the effects of dumped imports on prices contrary to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. They will be also taken into account in the analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and for the purpose of the causation analysis in violation of Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Lastly, the imports from exporters with a \textit{de minimis} margin of dumping will be included in the analysis of the existence of a threat of material injury in violation of Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

**3.3 Claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement**

45. Since, as explained above, Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Section 37.1(1) of SIMR violate a number of provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it automatically follows that Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of the GATT 1994, and therefore, also violated Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

**3.4 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994**

46. Since the relevant Sections of SIMA and SIMR provide for the imposition of anti-dumping measures even when the circumstances described in Article VI of the GATT 1994 are not met and following investigations that do not comply with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, these Sections are also inconsistent as such with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
4 CONCLUSIONS

47. TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to find that the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain CSWP from, among others, TPKM, are inconsistent with Articles 1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, 9.3 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The Panel should also find that, as a consequence of these violations, Canada acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

48. Furthermore, TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to find that Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA as well as Section 37.1(1) of SIMR are inconsistent as such with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. TPKM requests the Panel to also find that, as a consequence of these violations Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 1 and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.

49. In light of the above, TPKM respectfully requests the Panel to recommend that the DSB request Canada to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
ANNEX B-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

1. In this second written submission, TPKM will address the arguments advanced by Canada in its first written submission, during the first substantive meeting with the Panel, and those provided in Canada’s responses to the Panel questions to the parties.

1 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A _DE MINIMIS_ MARGIN OF DUMPING

1.1 Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

2. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to exporters whose final margins of dumping were _de minimis_. Contrary to Canada’s assertion, the ordinary meaning of the terms used in Article 5.8 and their context do not indicate that the termination of an investigation is required on a country basis. Instead, the ordinary meaning of the words "termination", "investigation", "dumping" and "margin of dumping" used in Article 5.8 actually confirms that the investigation needs to be terminated with respect to exporters/producers with an individual final _de minimis_ margin of dumping.

3. Canada’s position is also not supported by the context of Article 5.8. First, the characteristics of investigation described in Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do not suggest that the requirement to terminate such an investigation concerns the imports of the product at issue from one or more countries and not from an individual exporter. While an investigation is product-specific, it results in a different level of duties being imposed on the different exporters/producers and in that sense is also exporter-specific. Second, the language used in the different sentences of Article 5.8 does not indicate that the termination in case of _de minimis_ margin of dumping should be made on a country basis. Third, Canada’s arguments relating to the use of the term "_de minimis_" in Articles 3.3 and Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement distort the meaning of these provisions and simply do not stand.

4. Canada also takes issue with the panel and the Appellate Body’s findings in _Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice_ invoked by TPKM. Canada’s arguments must all be rejected. Indeed, the panel and the Appellate Body’s findings are legally sound and should be followed by the Panel in the present case. Furthermore, as the Appellate Body noted in _US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)_, the panel’s failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues would undermine the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence.

1.2 Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

5. TPKM claims that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to determine a single individual margin of dumping for each exporter or producer by calculating an additional country-wide margin of dumping and using that margin for the purpose of the _de minimis_ test required by Article 5.8.

1.3 Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

6. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it applied provisional anti-dumping measures in the absence of a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping. According to Canada, "[n]othing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied to dumped imports from an exporter with a _de minimis_ margin of dumping". This argument must be rejected. One of the conditions set out in Article 7.1 for the application of provisional measures is that the investigating authority has made a "preliminary affirmative determination" of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry (Article 7.1(ii)). The panel in _EC – Salmon (Norway)_ explained that in case of imports from
exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, there is "no legally cognizable dumping". Thus, Canada's investigating authorities could not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with respect to the exporters with a de minimis dumping margin since such imports could not be treated as "dumped imports". Further, pursuant to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigation needs to be terminated with regard to producers/exporters with a de minimis dumping margin, and thus no definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. The consistent interpretation of the term "dumped" requires that the same reasoning applies in the context of Article 7.1(ii).

7. TPKM submits that the balance between the need to safeguard free trade and the application of provisional measures necessary to prevent injury during the investigation, enshrined in Article 7.1, requires that in case of imports from exporters with de minimis margin of dumping, while the investigation may continue, no measures should be applied during the remaining part of the investigation.

8. Canada refers to the Appellate Body's findings in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice and argues that "provisional measures could still have been applied until the final determination of dumping and the finding of injury were made". This is an incorrect reading of the Appellate Body Report in that case, which only held that where the issuance of the order establishing anti-dumping duties occurs after the final determination is made, the producers with a de minimis margin of dumping are excluded from the scope of the order. Finally, the Panel should dismiss the arguments put forward by the European Union and the United States in their responses to the Panel question No. 1.3 where both third parties erroneously refer to Article 7.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and focus on the issue of the amount of provisional duties.

1.4 Canada violated Article 7.5 and Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

9. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because in imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, Canada caused anti-dumping duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury. Canada argues that the CBSA respected the requirements of Articles 7.5 and 9.2. While addressing the requirements imposed by Article 9.2, Canada observes that besides an exception for imports from exporters from which price undertakings have been accepted, Article 9.2 contains no further exception. This argument, however, does not stand. Indeed, since Article 9.2 requires an anti-dumping duty to be collected from all "sources found to be dumped" which does not cover producers with de minimis margins of dumping, no such exception is needed. TPKM notes that the phrase "sources found to be dumped" should be interpreted in the context of Article 9.2 which deals with the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Since Article 5.8 provides that the investigation needs to be immediately terminated in case of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping it is clear that no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on imports of such exporters and, thus, the phrase "sources found to be dumped" do not cover these exporters.

10. With regard to the application of provisional measures, some of the third parties argue that Articles 7.5 and 9.2 "do not necessarily preclude the application of provisional anti-dumping duties". TPKM submits that they erroneously focus on the issue of the "appropriate amounts" of provisional measures. What is relevant in the context of the imposition of provisional measures is that such measures can be collected only from "sources found to be dumped and causing injury". Exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping cannot be treated as "sources found to be dumped".

1.5 Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

11. TPKM submits that by imposing provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from exporters with zero or de minimis margin of dumping, Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In its first written submission, Canada failed to rebut these arguments.
2 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

12. TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it treated imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping as "dumped imports" in its injury and causation analyses. Canada relies on the Appellate Body's findings in US – Carbon Steel to argue that the term "dumping" is not limited to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold. This reference is inapposite since that case related to the applicability of the de minimis standard in Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement to sunset reviews. Moreover, previous panels and the Appellate Body have consistently found that "dumped imports" for the purpose of the injury analysis should be understood as imports attributable to producers or exporters with a margin of dumping greater than de minimis.

13. Canada also erroneously claims that all previous cases referred to in TPKM's first written submission concern companies with a zero and not de minimis margin of dumping and that none of those cases contain any analysis as to why imports with de minimis margin of dumping should be excluded from the injury analysis. This is factually incorrect. Indeed, in both EC – Salmon (Norway) and EC – Bed Linen, de minimis margins of dumping were found by the authorities and the panels in both cases reached the conclusion that imports of producers with zero or de minimis margin of dumping may not be considered as "dumped". Furthermore, as noted above, since there is "no legally cognizable dumping" in case of imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, such imports should not be treated as "dumped imports" for the purpose of injury analysis or, in fact, for any aspect of an anti-dumping investigation.

3 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS

14. TPKM claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which at the same time were causing injury to its domestic industry, in particular the effects of subsidies and overcapacity, and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by such other factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports.

15. TPKM submits that the effects of subsidies constitute an "other factor", known to the Canadian authorities, the effects of which should have been separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping in the causation analysis. Canada's assertion that there is no requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the Indian subsidization from the effects of the dumped imports would render inutile the words "through the effects of dumping" contained in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In TPKM's view, when the same goods are dumped and subsidized at the same time there may be effects of subsidization that are not directly reflected in the dumping margin. TPKM submits that without analysing the relationship between different subsidy programs and dumping in India, Canada could not have assumed that there is no need to distinguish between the effects of dumping and the effects of subsidization.

16. With respect to overcapacity, Canada argues that the CITT was not obliged to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of overcapacity, since low capacity utilization rates are not a cause of injury but merely an injury indicator. TPKM considers that "low capacity utilization rates" and "overcapacity" are two distinct concepts. While overcapacity can be the cause of injury, it is not in itself an injury indicator. Therefore, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 3.5, "overcapacity" must be properly separated and distinguished from the injury caused by the dumped imports. Since the CITT failed to do so, it violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

4 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"

17. TPKM submits that Canada's determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for all other exporters is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. TPKM submits that the use of the highest dumping margin seeks to punish TPKM other exporters from failing to cooperate. Canada argues that "the CBSA's ministerial specification cannot be considered punitive" because it was based on verified facts and on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate in the investigation.
TPKM submits that, while a determination based on Article 6.8 must be based on "facts" and non-cooperation may be one of the procedural circumstances that may be taken into account when selecting facts available, the investigating authority cannot choose whichever factual element it wishes on the sole basis that the exporter did not cooperate. The two cases referred by Canada, namely EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips and US – Carbon Steel (India) support TPKM’s position. In the present case, the CBSA mechanistically applied the rule laid down in the SIMA Handbook which calls for the use of the highest margin of dumping and thus used the worst possible information, thereby acting such as to punish all other exporters from failing to cooperate.

18. TPKM also submits that the CBSA failed to make any comparative and evaluative assessment of the facts on the record. TPKM notes in particular that Canada has expressly confirmed that there is no evidence on the record showing any such assessment in order to select the "best" information available when determining the rate applicable to all other TPKM exporters.

19. TPKM further submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7 because there is no "logical relationship" between the rate established for all other TPKM exporters and the facts on the record concerning TPKM exports. In particular, Canada ignored the data concerning TPKM cooperating exporters which were representative of the TPKM market as a whole. Canada argues that TPKM's argument "lacks support in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it ignores the procedural character of the obligations under Annex II, paragraph 7" and that "[these] obligations do not guarantee a specific outcome". However, TPKM does not challenge the outcome per se, namely, the 54.2% margin of dumping, but the methodology followed by the CBSA, which determines the rate for all other TPKM exporters on the basis of facts that are totally unrelated to them.

5 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

5.1 Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

20. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new product types of cooperating exporters that exceed their margin of dumping as established under Article 2.

21. Canada's argument that TPKM's claim is based on speculation is entirely misplaced. Indeed, TPKM does not argue that its exporters are prevented from making a refund request pursuant to Article 9.3.2 or that Canada has failed to refund duties paid by importers. What is at issue is the fact that the anti-dumping duty applied on imports of new product types for cooperating exporters is based on the residual duty rate. This is inconsistent with Article 9.3. Therefore, in order to succeed with this claim which is based on Article 9.3 and does not involve Article 9.3.2, TPKM is not required to provide any evidence that imports of new product types have been subject to an initial duty assessment. Canada's further argument that it is only in the context of the duty refund procedure that the obligation in Article 9.3 must be complied with, must also be rejected. This position is not correct and not supported by the case-law referred to by Canada. In fact, Canada's position leads to the absurd outcome that every fully cooperating exporter with new product models to be imported into Canada must be subject to the residual duty rate – even those exporters with a zero margin of dumping.

22. Finally, Canada's argument that "when an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund", is misleading. In fact, the application of the residual duty rate on imports of new product types has effectively prevented purchase of such new product types by Canadian importers.

23. In conclusion, Article 9.3 is relevant not only in the context of the refund mechanism under Article 9.3.2. The "margin of dumping as established under Article 2" referred to in Article 9.3 also refers to the margin of dumping which is established during the original investigation. By using a prospective normal value for new product types based on the "all others rate" instead of the individual rate determined for the relevant exporters, Canada therefore violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.2 Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

24. TPKM also submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it resorted to facts available for the calculation of the normal value with respect to imports of new product types to be exported by the cooperating exporters. Canada should not have resorted to "facts available" because the conditions laid down in Article 6.8 were not fulfilled. Canada claims that "[w]ithout an ability to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models, thereby creating a significant gap in the anti-dumping disciplines." However the CBSA did possess the "necessary information", each TPKM cooperating exporter fully cooperated in the investigation and, on the basis of the information provided by each of them, the CBSA calculated a dumping margin of respectively 0.005% for Chung Hung Steel, 0.4% for Shin Yang Steel and of 4.7% for Yieh Phui. Canada manifestly fails to take into account that under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, dumping and dumping margin are determined and imposed with respect to the product under investigation as a whole. Therefore, if the anti-dumping duty is calculated by reference to prospective normal values, the relevant "normal values" cannot be higher than those that have been determined for the purposes of determining the dumping margin for that product.

25. The determination regarding the normal value for new product types is also manifestly inconsistent with Annex II, paragraph 7. TPKM notes that the Appellate Body emphasised that "investigating authorities should not arrive at a "less favourable" outcome simply because an interested party fails to furnish requested information if, in fact, the interested party has "cooperated" with the investigating authorities, within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement." Since the two TPKM exporters fully cooperated during the investigation, the anti-dumping duty determined for new product types could not be based on facts available leading to a result which is less favourable to them. Furthermore, it appears that the information used was not the "best" information available, nor could it be considered as the "most fitting" information. Canada failed to address these arguments.

5.3 Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

26. TPKM claims that Canada violated Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it calculated normal values for new product types of cooperating exporters on the basis of a methodology which is not foreseen in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada argues that TPKM has failed to prove that a violation occurred because TPKM "has not referred to a single shipment of a new product model by one of its exporters that was subject to the treatment that [TPKM] alleges violates Article 2.2." Canada misses the point, because it is the calculation of the normal value which is at issue. Second, Canada submits that the investigating authority is not in a position to determine model-specific normal values for the new product types when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated and therefore, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits the CBSA to use facts available. Since the conditions to resort to "facts available" were not fulfilled, the CBSA could only apply the methodologies provided for in Article 2.2. By failing to do so, Canada acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

5.4 Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

27. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that Canada did not calculate one dumping margin for each cooperating exporter but another additional dumping margin with respect to new product types.

6 CLAIME UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE VI OF THE GATT 1994

28. TPKM claims that all the above-mentioned violations resulted in a consequential violation of Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Since Canada failed to rebut any of TPKM's claims, the Panel should conclude that it has also acted inconsistently with the above two provisions.
7 CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT ("SIMA") AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS ("SIMR")

7.1 Claims concerning Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA

29. TPKM claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1) and 35(2), 38(1) and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because they provide for a de minimis test to be carried out on a country-wide basis instead of an exporter-specific basis.

30. First, TPKM submits that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsections 35(1), 35(2) and 38(1) are as such inconsistent with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they mandate that an "affirmative preliminary dumping determination" be made for exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping when the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more. One of the conditions spelled out in Article 7.1(ii) is that the investigating authority makes a "preliminary affirmative determination" of dumping. By mandating that such affirmative preliminary determination be made every time the country-wide margin of dumping is 2% or more and by ignoring the fact that such determination cannot cover exporters with an individual de minimis margin of dumping, the relevant provisions of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Contrary to what Canada argues, the fact that investigation is not terminated with respect to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping does not imply that the investigating authority can impose provisional measures on imports from such exporters. TPKM also fails to see how the findings of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice – support Canada’s position that an investigating authority is permitted to apply provisional measures on dumped imports until definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed. In fact, paragraph 219 of the Appellate Body Report, referred to by Canada, does not even address the issue of the imposition of provisional measures.

31. Second, Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent as such with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada argues that even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, SIMA could not be found to violate as such Article 5.8 because Subsection 43(1) of SIMA confers discretion to the CITT to terminate an investigation regarding the dumped imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping by excluding that exporter from the injury finding. TPKM disagrees. First, the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not indicate that the CITT enjoys discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Canada also did not provide any evidence which would confirm that the CITT enjoys the alleged discretion. Second, even if the Panel were to conclude that the SIMA text confers some discretion – quod non - this would be still inconsistent with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as Article 5.8 clearly requires an immediate termination of the investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping and does not allow for any discretion. It follows that to the extent SIMA grants any discretion for the CITT to act otherwise it is as such inconsistent with Article 5.8. Finally, TPKM notes that the alleged discretion cannot render the relevant provisions of SIMA consistent with Article 5.8. Indeed, excluding an exporter from an injury finding is not equal to terminating the investigation with respect to such exporter. Furthermore, even assuming – for the sake of argument – that SIMA provides for discretion to terminate investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, such discretion would be provided only to the CITT, while pursuant to Article 5.8, the investigation should have already been terminated by the CBSA.

32. Third, TPKM submits that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are as such inconsistent with Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because these provisions require affirmative preliminary and definitive dumping determinations be made and anti-dumping duties collected for exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, even from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury. Canada asserts that "anti-dumping duties are to be collected on imports from all individual exporters and producers found to be dumped and causing injury, including on imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping". This is incorrect, since the term "dumped" used in Article 9.2 requires a dumping margin that is more than de minimis. Canada also refers to Subsection 43(1) of SIMA and the alleged discretion of the CITT to exclude exporters with de minimis margins of dumping from an injury finding. As explained above, this Subsection does not provide for any discretion.
33. Finally, TPKM maintains that the SIMA provisions requiring anti-dumping duties to be imposed on exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping amount to an as such violation of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which only allows the levying of anti-dumping duties “in order to offset or prevent dumping”. Canada failed to rebut TPKM’s claims in that regard.

7.2 Claims concerning Subsections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR and any implementing or related measures

34. TPKM claims that Subsections 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of SIMR, as well as any implementing or related measures, are as such inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they result in the automatic inclusion in the category of “dumped imports”, in the context of the injury analysis, of the imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Canada essentially repeats its previous arguments made in the context of the claims concerning anti-dumping measure at issue and fails to rebut TPKM’s claims.

7.3 Claims under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

35. TPKM submits that since Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has acted inconsistently with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

7.4 Claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

36. Since Canada failed to rebut any of TPKM’s claims concerning as such violations, it is clear that Canada has also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
1 INTRODUCTION

1. The present proceedings concern provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe. These measures, and the investigation that led to their imposition, are deeply flawed and violate several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. Moreover, the underlying Canadian legislation, namely the Special Import Measures Act (or SIMA) and the Special Import Measures Regulations (or SIMR), is inconsistent as such with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994 and the Marrakesh Agreement.

2. The economic impact of Canada's measures on our steel industry has been devastating as the value of our exports of the product at issue to Canada suffered a 75% drop – from 16 million US Dollars to 4 million between 2011 and 2013.

2 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

3. Canada puts forward a distorted interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to respond to the arguments raised by us. First, with regard to the claim under Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Canada argues that the requirement to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country and not to an individual exporter. This interpretation of Article 5.8 is incorrect and goes against findings of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. Canada erroneously argues that the Appellate Body in that case overlooked Articles 3.3 and 9.4 in its interpretation of Article 5.8 in the context of other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 3.3 deals with situations "where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations", which explains the reference to the margin of dumping from "each country". Article 9.4 addresses the calculation criteria for the margin of dumping of non-sampled exporters where sampling is used by the investigating authorities. Contrary to what Canada argues, there is no conflict between the requirement to terminate the investigation for individual exporters with de minimis margins of dumping and the obligation to disregard such de minimis margins of dumping in the calculations under Article 9.4. We submit that the Panel in the present case should follow the interpretation adopted by the Appellate Body in previous cases dealing with similar issues, in order not to undermine the coherence and the predictability of the WTO legal system.

4. Canada argues that it did not violate Article 6.10 because it had already determined an individual margin of dumping for each exporter and because the additional determination of a country-wide margin of dumping is irrelevant. Canada disregards that Article 6.10 requires a single company-specific margin of dumping to be established for each exporter. The establishment of a second country-wide margin for each exporter for the purpose of the application of the de minimis test is inconsistent with Article 6.10.

5. Canada argues that nothing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied to dumped imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. This argument must be rejected, since an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping cannot be treated as "dumping". The fact that the investigating authority may continue the investigation until it makes a final dumping determination does not mean that it can disregard the requirements of Article 7.1 and apply a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports from exporters with a provisional de minimis margin of dumping.
6. Canada further argues that it did not violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 in applying provisional measures and imposing definitive measures on exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping. This contention is in contradiction with the Appellate Body's finding that a producer with a zero or *de minimis* margin of dumping cannot be considered as "dumping" and thus his imports do not qualify as "sources found to be dumped". Finally, Canada violated Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because the possibility to levy an anti-dumping duty only applies "in order to offset or prevent dumping" and therefore does not apply to imports from exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping. As a consequence, Canada also violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

3 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

7. We submit that by failing to exclude from the category of "dumped imports" the imports of the exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping, Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada claims that nothing in these provisions suggests that "dumped imports" should exclude imports from exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping. This goes against a number of previous reports of panels and the Appellate Body, according to which the term "dumped imports" refers to imports of producers with a margin of dumping above *de minimis*. Canada claims that all previous cases referred to by our concern companies with a zero and not *de minimis* margin of dumping. This is factually incorrect, since in EC – Salmon (Norway), the EC calculated a *de minimis* margin of dumping of 0.8% for one company and, likewise, in EC – Bed Linen, the EC found *de minimis* margins for four Pakistani exporters. In both cases the panels reached the conclusion that imports of producers with zero or *de minimis* margin of dumping may not be considered as "dumped".

4 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS

8. We claim that Canada failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports, such as the effects of the subsidies and overcapacity, which at the same time were causing injury to the domestic industry. Concerning the effects of subsidies, Canada argues that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require that the effects of the subsidies be separated from the effects of the dumping. We argue that subsidised imports constitute another factor, the effects of which should have been distinguished from the effects of dumping in the causation analysis.

9. With regard to overcapacity, Canada argues that low capacity utilization rates cannot be said to cause injury and thus do not have to be examined in the causation analysis. We maintain that although the low capacity utilization rate is one of the injury factors under Article 3.4, the overcapacity which was present at the beginning of the investigation period was a known factor that the Tribunal failed to examine in the context of its non-attribution analysis. As a consequence, the Canadian authorities violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

5 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"

10. Canada's methodology for calculating the margin of dumping for "all other exporters" is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Canada's automatic use of the highest dumping margin found for an individual transaction from another market to determine the duty applicable for all other exporters seeks to punish all other exporters on the sole basis that they were either unknown or failed to provide information. By applying mechanistically the rule in the SIMA Handbook – which requires the investigating authorities to apply the highest margin of dumping found for one transaction of a cooperating exporter – Canada failed to evaluate in a comparative manner the information that was on the record. Canada failed to explain how the highest dumping margin of a single transaction in the investigation was appropriate for establishing the "all others rate". Nor did Canada provide any evidence that it has made a careful evaluation of the facts available.

11. We submit that there is no logical relationship between the residual rate established for our exporters, namely 54.2%, and the facts on the record. The Appellate Body clarified that the term "best information" means that information has to be the "most appropriate information" available. The data provided by cooperating exporters from us, which was representative for our exports as a
whole, would clearly be the "most fitting" information available in the present case, but was nonetheless ignored.

12. Finally, contrary to Canada's contention, we did not argue that Canada violated Annex II and Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it should have reached another or any specific outcome. We simply submit that any outcome must be based on methodologies that comply with the rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. All the evidence on the record demonstrates that there was no assessment of the facts before the investigating authorities and thus we have made a prima facie case that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

6 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

13. Canada argued that, to the extent an importer can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values, the applied anti-dumping duties are consistent with Article 9.3. Under Canada's approach, there would be no limitation as to how the prospective normal values must be determined. This would lead to the absurd situation where Members having a prospective system could use whichever prospective normal value they wish as long as they have a refund system. We consider that "the margin of dumping as established under Article 2" referred to in the chapeau of Article 9.3 relates to the margin of dumping which has been established during the original investigation. In a prospective normal value system, the normal value calculated for the purposes of determining the dumping margin during the original investigation constitutes the relevant benchmark for the determination of the anti-dumping duty. By using a prospective normal value for new models based on the "all others rate" instead of a prospective value based on the individual rate determined for the relevant exporters, Canada violated the chapeau of Article 9.3.

14. As to our claim under Article 6.8, Canada erroneously argues that without being able to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models. Our cooperating exporters provided relevant information and data for all the models they exported during the investigation period and Canada could have therefore used such information to determine relevant prospective normal values for new models.

15. We do not take issue with the Canadian system of prospective normal values but with the way Canada has determined the anti-dumping duty applicable to new product types of our cooperating exporters. As a result, all exporters, including those with de minimis or even zero dumping margins are subject to the residual duty of 54.2% if they decide to export new product types. In practice, this leads to a chilling effect whereby the exporters are effectively prevented from exporting any new product types. This can never be remedied by the availability of a refund mechanism.

7 CLAIMS OF "AS SUCH" VIOLATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA AND SIMR

16. Canada did not develop any arguments in order to rebut our claims that certain provisions of SIMA and SIMR are as such inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 and essentially repeats the arguments used with regard to our challenge of the anti-dumping measures at issue. Concerning Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Canada argues that Subsection 43(1) of SIMA grants the Canadian International Trade Tribunal discretion to terminate an investigation regarding the dumped imports from an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping by excluding that exporter from its injury finding. We disagree as the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not indicate that the Tribunal enjoys discretion to terminate investigation with regard to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Moreover, Article 5.8 provides for a positive obligation to immediately terminate an investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping and does not allow for any type of discretion. Canada did not provide any proof that the Tribunal has exercised its alleged discretion at least once in the past, let alone in the present case. Since Canada failed to rebut any of our claims, it is clear that it has also acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. It also follows that since Canada failed to ensure the conformity of its laws with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has acted inconsistently with Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Closing statement of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu

17. Our position is that exporters with a zero or de minimis margin of dumping are not considered as "dumping" under the Anti-Dumping Agreement as confirmed by previous panels as well as the Appellate Body. It is imports with a dumping margin of 2% or more that are "dumped imports" and only such imports can cause injury to domestic industry. Furthermore, if the investigating authorities have determined that subsidies cause injury at the same time as dumped imports, they must review that known factor to ensure that particular injury would not be wrongfully attributed to dumped imports. The same applies to the pre-existing overcapacity in the concerned industry. With regard to the determination of the "all others rate", we submit that the investigating authorities are required to look into the information available on the record and to use the most appropriate one. The investigating authorities cannot resort to the worst information available. We further maintain that individual margins of dumping determined for cooperating exporters must be applied also to new models. Finally, we respectfully ask the Panel to look into the relevant Canadian laws and regulations and to decide whether they are written in such a manner that is as such inconsistent with several provisions of WTO law.
1 INTRODUCTION

1. This oral statement focuses on addressing some of Canada's newly developed arguments and providing clarifications regarding issues that are particularly relevant to our case. Canada's selective reading of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not only legally erroneous, it also ignores the realities of the investigation process and leads to absurd and unreasonable consequences. In each section, we will ask the Panel to examine the practical consequences of Canada's interpretation and show that its outcomes are manifestly unreasonable.

2 TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

2. Canada repeats all of its previous arguments contending that the margin of dumping for the Article 5.8 *de minimis* test ought to be determined on a country-wide basis and not an individual basis. In doing so, Canada fails to provide any "cogent reasons" to depart from the Appellate Body's ruling in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. The ordinary meaning of the relevant terms of Article 5.8 as well as the broader context of Article 5 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement confirm that the investigation must be terminated with respect to individual exporters. Furthermore, Canada erroneously argues that our interpretation of Article 5.8 would result in an inconsistent treatment of new exporters under Article 9.5. In making this argument, Canada assumes incorrectly that Article 9.5 does not allow for the application of the *de minimis* standard under Article 5.8, when in fact, Article 9.5 is silent on this issue. In any event, Article 9.5 deals with a different stage of anti-dumping proceedings which is not at issue in the present dispute. Contrary to what Canada argues, our interpretation of Article 5.8 would also not render Article 9.4 inutile. Article 9.4 is not limited to a distinct phase in the anti-dumping proceedings and refers to the determination of the duty rate and not the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Thus, there is no conflict between the requirement to terminate the investigation for individual exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping under Article 5.8 and the obligation to disregard such margins in the calculations carried out under Article 9.4. Finally, Canada's position under Article 5.8, if held to be WTO-consistent, would result in a fundamentally unfair outcome that companies that have always traded at fair market price are still made subject to anti-dumping measures.

3. With respect to the claim under Article 6.10, Canada ignores the established case law that requires a single margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter for the purposes of the *de minimis* test. Thus, the fact that Canada calculated individual margins of dumping is irrelevant, if it used another margin, namely the country-based margin of dumping, for the determination and imposition of anti-dumping duties.

4. Canada submits two new arguments with respect to our claim under Article 7.1(ii). First, it argues that Article 7.1(ii), when read together with the chapeau of Article 7.1, Article 7.1(i) and Article 5, must refer to a determination of alleged dumping for the investigation as a whole. This argument is taken out of context as Article 7.1 relates to the initiation of the investigation while Article 7.1(ii) deals with the preliminary determination of dumping and injury. Furthermore, the term "determination of dumping" is inherently exporter-specific. Therefore, in order to apply provisional measures, the investigating authority needs to reach a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping with regard to each individual exporter.

5. Canada's second argument that an investigating authority satisfies Article 7.1(ii) by merely making a preliminary affirmative determination that the export price is less than the normal value is equally erroneous. As confirmed by case law, imports of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of
dumping should not be treated as "dumped" because "no legally cognizable dumping" can be found with regard to such exporters. In this regard, the terms "dumping" and "dumping margin" when read in the context of the provision governing the imposition of anti-dumping duties necessarily refer to dumping which exceeds the statutory de minimis threshold of Article 5.8. We also note that Article 7.1 is designed to strike a balance between the need to safeguard free trade and the application of provisional measures "to prevent injury being caused during the investigation". The conditions to impose provisional measures are also stricter than those for imposing definitive measures. Accordingly, if no definitive measures can be imposed on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, a fortiori no anti-dumping duties may be applied at the provisional stage on imports of such exporters.

6. Similarly, for claims under Articles 7.5 and 9.2, Canada continues to base its interpretation of the phrase "from all sources found to be dumped" in Article 9.2, on the definition of dumping under Article 2.1. This argument must be rejected, since Article 9.2 deals with the imposition of anti-dumping duties and Article 5.8 provides that the investigation needs to be immediately terminated in case of imports with a de minimis margin of dumping and thus no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. Finally, Canada's argument pertaining to "appropriate amounts" is irrelevant to this claim.

3 TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

7. Similar to the argument made in relation to Article 7.1(ii) and Article 9.2, Canada once again relies on the definition of dumping under Article 2.1 to argue that imports dumped at a margin below de minimis are still "dumped imports" in the context of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. As we have explained, imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping do not constitute "dumped imports" as in those cases there is "no legally cognizable dumping". In other words, de minimis margins of dumping are too "insignificant" to warrant any action. It follows that both imports with de minimis and zero margins of dumping should be excluded from the injury and causation analysis.

4 TREATMENT OF FACTORS OTHER THAN DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE CAUSATION ANALYSIS

8. Canada's repeated arguments that it was not required to consider the effects of the subsidies and overcapacity as factors other than the dumped imports in the non-attribution analysis should be rejected. With regard to overcapacity, Canada insists that the "low capacity utilization" is not a factor or cause of injury but merely an injury indicator. However, "low capacity utilization rates" and "overcapacity" are two distinct concepts, and overcapacity can be the cause of injury but is not in itself an injury indicator. In the present case, Canada failed to examine the overcapacity present at the beginning of the investigation period and thus acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The fact that the CITT made a determination only about a threat of injury and not actual injury does not waive the obligation under Article 3.5.

9. Regarding the "effects of subsidies", Canada distorts the Appellate Body's findings in Japan – DRAMS (Korea) to argue that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require that the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping. The Appellate Body merely stated that the SCM Agreement does not require the examination of the subsidies as distinguished from the effects of subsidised imports. In failing to properly assess and distinguish the effects of subsidies from the effects of dumping, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

5 THE DETERMINATION OF THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS"

10. With regard to the claim under Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, Canada's repeated assertions are directly contradicted by the facts of the record. First, Canada's argument that the methodology employed by the CBSA was not "mechanistic" because the SIMA Handbook indicates that the CBSA, as a general practice, considers whether it is necessary to disregard anomalous or aberrant transactions when selecting facts for the ministerial specification is inapposite. Second, Canada's argument that the CBSA analysed all the information on the record is irrelevant. Third, Canada's attempt to explain that the CBSA did not base its determination solely on the
procedural circumstances of the investigation, and that it selected verified facts and took into account the totality of information is also unsupported by any evidence and entirely unconvincing. It is clear from the record that the normal value was determined by using the highest dumping margin according to the rule laid down in the SIMA Handbook.

11. Canada's further argument that the CBSA could have used the worse information from the petitioners' complaint actually asks the Panel to lower the standard required by Article 6.8 to use the "best information available". The all others rate determined in the present case, was a margin from a country that was found to have provided subsidies to its industry and fails to bear any "logical relationship" with the information concerning our cooperating exporters, which was representative of our market as a whole.

12. Finally, while the investigating authority should enjoy a certain degree of discretion with respect to the determination of the all others rate, it cannot choose whatever fact it wishes. To be clear, we are not asking the Panel to reach a specific outcome or decide on the specific information the CBSA should have used to make its all others rate determination. Rather, we are asking the Panel to conclude that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II since the methodology followed by the CBSA to determine the duty rate for our all other exporters does not comply with the requirements laid down in those provisions.

6 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES TO BE EXPORTED BY COOPERATING EXPORTERS

13. What is at issue with regard to our claim under Article 9.3 is not whether Canada has refunded our exporters, but the fact that the anti-dumping duties applied on imports of new product types for cooperating exporters are based on the residual duty rate. Under Canada's approach, there would be no limitation as to how the prospective normal values must be determined. Canada's interpretation of Article 9.3 would lead to the absurd results where Members having a prospective system could use whichever prospective normal value they wish as long as they have a refund system. In our view, Article 9.3 mandates that the dumping margin from the original investigation constitutes the relevant benchmark when applying the prospective normal value for the anti-dumping duty.

14. As to our claim under Article 6.8, our position remains that Canada could not resort to "facts available" as the conditions laid down in Article 6.8 were not fulfilled. Canada erroneously asserts that its prospective application of facts available to new product models is necessary as otherwise it would lack information essential to the assessment of duties on such products. In that regard, it is essential to underline that dumping and margin of dumping are determined in relation to the product as a whole and not on a model per model basis. In the present case, Canada did possess the "necessary information" as our cooperating exporters provided all relevant information for the purposes of determining the company specific dumping margin for the product as a whole.

7 CLAIMS OF "AS SUCH" VIOLATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA AND SIMR

15. Canada has failed to respond to our as such claims, and even its Article 5.8 arguments are repetitive at best. Contrary to Canada's contention, we have made a prima facie case that the challenged Sections of SIMA are, as such, WTO-inconsistent since they only require terminating an investigation if the country-wide margin of dumping is de minimis. Neither the text nor any evidence provided by Canada supports its assertion that Subsection 43(1) of SIMA grants the CITT discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. Article 5.8 bestows a positive obligation to terminate investigations with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. To the extent that SIMA grants any discretion for the CITT to act otherwise, it would lead to a violation of Article 5.8. Furthermore, any discretion provided by Subsection 43(1) to the CITT would, in any event, not ensure the consistency with Article 5.8 as it would not guarantee an "immediate termination" which should happen already at the CBSA level.
Closing statement of TPKM

16. With regard to the termination of investigation for exporters with de minimis dumping margins, Canada has failed to provide any cogent reasons for the Panel to deviate from the well-established case-law. Article 5.8 also makes clear that not all "dumping" warrants legal action, and thus imports with de minimis margins of dumping need to be disregarded for the purpose of the injury analysis and the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that overcapacity and the effects of subsidies in India were known factors that should have been taken into account by the Canadian authorities. With respect to the "all others rate", it is clear that Canada had not engaged in a comparative and evaluative assessment of the relevant facts, and the highest dumping margin applied from another country did not bear any "logical relationship" with the information of our exporters. Canada's use of the residual duty rate for the new product types of cooperating exporters is all the more inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as that rate was significantly higher than the margin of dumping calculated for each cooperating exporter in the original investigation. Finally, Canada has failed to rebut our prima facie case of as such violations.
## ANNEX C

**ARGUMENTS OF CANADA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1 Executive summary of the first written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2 Executive summary of the second written submission of Canada</td>
<td>C-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the first meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4 Executive summary of the statement of Canada at the second meeting of the Panel</td>
<td>C-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This dispute concerns anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe (CSWP) from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei). Chinese Taipei claims that the investigation that led to the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, the measures themselves, and certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR) are inconsistent with the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).

2. Canada demonstrates that the investigation and the application of anti-dumping measures on CSWP from Chinese Taipei, as well as the relevant provisions of SIMA and the SIMR, are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED BY CANADA ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, CHINESE TAIPEI

A. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Articles 1, 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

1. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

3. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to immediately terminate the CSWP investigation with respect to Chinese Taipei exporters whose margins of dumping were de minimis.

4. Canada demonstrates that the ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping", which are essential to the interpretation of Article 5.8, is consistent with the termination of an investigation being required on a country basis. Canada also shows that the context within which these terms are found clearly establishes that the termination of an investigation with respect to a country is what is required by the second sentence of Article 5.8 when the country based margin of dumping is de minimis. As a result, interpreting Article 5.8 to require the termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter is inconsistent with the very terms of Article 5.8 when considered in their context.

5. Chinese Taipei relies on the panel and Appellate Body decisions in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice to support its position that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that an investigation be terminated with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. These decisions are undermined by four significant flaws.

6. First, the panel and the Appellate Body relied too heavily on the references to individual margins of dumping in the Anti-Dumping Agreement when interpreting the reference to the margin of dumping contained in Article 5.8. Second, the panel and the Appellate Body failed to properly consider the scope of the investigation described in Article 5 and the context in which the termination of an investigation is required under Article 5.8. Third, the panel and the Appellate Body ignored that requiring exporter-specific termination contradicts Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Finally, the panel and the Appellate Body's flawed analysis led them to improperly read words into Article 5.8. Reading in the words "in respect of the individual exporter
or producer for which a zero or de minimis margin is established” means that an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping is excluded from an investigation that nonetheless continues.

7. Had the panel and the Appellate Body conducted a proper analysis of Article 5.8, giving its terms their ordinary meaning within their context, they could only have come to the conclusion that an investigation is terminated as a whole, and, consequently, that the reference to the de minimis margin of dumping in that provision pertains to a country.

2. The CBSA’s Determination of an Individual Margin ofDumping for Each Chinese Taipei Exporter Did Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

8. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA failed to determine only one individual margin of dumping for each exporter by calculating a country-based margin of dumping and using that margin for the purpose of conducting the de minimis test required by Article 5.8.

9. Article 6.10 requires that “[t]he authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation”. In this investigation, the CBSA determined an individual margin of dumping for each cooperating Chinese Taipei exporter as evidenced in the CBSA’s Final Dumping Determination filed by Chinese Taipei. The additional determination by the CBSA of a country-based margin of dumping is simply irrelevant under Article 6.10. The CBSA therefore did not violate Article 6.10.

3. The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures on Dumped Imports from a Chinese Taipei Exporter with a de Minimis Margin of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

10. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA applied provisional measures on CSWP imports from one Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping in the absence of a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping.

11. Chinese Taipei’s claim must fail because the CBSA satisfied the requirements of Article 7.1(ii) when applying provisional measures on a Chinese Taipei exporter found to have a de minimis margin of dumping in the CBSA’s preliminary determination of dumping. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has confirmed that the termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping does not need to occur before the issuance of the order establishing the definitive anti-dumping duties. Therefore, regardless of the proper interpretation to be given to Article 5.8, the CBSA cannot be found to have violated Article 7.1(ii) when it applied provisional measures on one Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping.

4. The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures and Imposition of Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Dumped Imports from Chinese Taipei Exporters Did Not Violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

12. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in applying provisional measures and imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on CSWP imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, the CBSA caused duties to be collected from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury.

13. Canada demonstrates that, having complied with the three conditions set out in Article 7.1, the CBSA rightfully applied provisional measures on imports from a Chinese Taipei exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. Even accepting Chinese Taipei’s interpretation of Article 5.8, the CBSA could still apply provisional measures on imports from that Chinese Taipei exporter until the time when definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed. Given that Chinese Taipei’s country-based margin of dumping was not de minimis, Canada, in compliance with Article 9.2, rightfully imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on all dumped imports from Chinese Taipei exporters.
14. For the aforementioned reasons, the CBSA's application of provisional measures and imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties to offset dumping did not violate Articles 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2. Consequently, Canada did not violate Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

B. The CITT’s Treatment of Dumped Imports in its Injury Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

15. Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CITT treated imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping as dumped imports for the purposes of its injury analysis. Canada demonstrates that none of these provisions confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold and, therefore, that the CITT’s treatment of dumped imports, including those from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

16. There is no distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and those dumped at a margin below de minimis – both are "dumped". It is only imports with a zero margin that should be considered as not dumped.

17. Canada demonstrates that the CITT’s approach in the CSWP injury inquiry is consistent with the Appellate Body’s analysis in US – Carbon Steel. In that case, which was decided under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), the Appellate Body noted that the definition of injury in footnote 45 to the SCM Agreement makes no reference to the amount of subsidy involved. Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a footnote with an identical definition of injury. Therefore, the Anti-Dumping Agreement similarly does not confine the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold.

18. Canada also demonstrates that the decisions referred to by Chinese Taipei in its first written submission, to support its position that imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping should not have been included by the CITT in its injury analysis, concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. In each case, the panel concluded that the imports at issue were “non-dumped” and therefore should not have been included in the injury analysis. To the extent that these panels referred to de minimis margins, these references should properly be considered as obiter dicta.

19. Furthermore, no analysis was conducted in any of the decisions as to why imports with de minimis margins should be excluded. Whereas it is logical to exclude imports that are not dumped, nothing in the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement supports an exclusion of imports that are dumped, irrespective of their margin of dumping.

20. Chinese Taipei has failed to establish that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when the CITT included “dumped imports”, including those from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, in its injury analysis.

C. The CITT’s Non-Attribution Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Subsidies

21. Chinese Taipei argues that by failing to separate and distinguish the effects caused by the subsidies from the effects caused by the dumping Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

22. Canada demonstrates that, pursuant to the Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea), the CITT acted consistently with Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the CSWP inquiry by determining whether the dumped imports caused or threatened to cause injury to the domestic industry. The Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require an additional analysis as to whether the dumping, as opposed to the dumped imports, caused or threatened to cause injury. Given that there was no requirement to assess the effects of the dumping per se, there cannot be
a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidization from the effects of the dumping.

23. Second, contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, the Appellate Body decision in US – Carbon Steel (India) is not relevant to this case. In that decision, the Appellate Body held that the SCM Agreement only allows the cumulation of subsidized imports; it does not allow the cumulation of dumped but non-subsidized imports. In the CSWP investigation, there were no imports that were subsidized but not dumped. The CITT, consistent with Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, cumulated the effects of imports from India with those from Chinese Taipei and four other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was irrelevant to the CITT’s decision to cumulate the effects of all dumped imports.

2. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Overcapacity

24. Canada submits that low capacity utilization rates (which Chinese Taipei refers to as overcapacity) are not a cause of injury and therefore do not result in effects that must be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumped imports. Low capacity utilization rates are merely an indicator of injury and were treated as such by the CITT in its injury analysis.

25. As an indicator and not a cause of injury, there was no need for the CITT to separate and distinguish the effects of the low utilization rates from the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry pursuant to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

D. The CBSA’s Use of Facts Available to Determine the Dumping Margin and Duty Rate for “All Other Exporters” Did Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

26. Chinese Taipei claims that the ministerial specification used by the CBSA to determine the margin of dumping and the anti-dumping duty rate for “all other exporters” violated Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Its arguments under these provisions, however, mischaracterize relevant facts and applicable law.

27. First, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA’s use of facts available effectively punished non-cooperating exporters. While Canada agrees that an investigating authority is prohibited from using facts available to punish non-cooperating parties, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that an investigating authority is permitted to draw inferences, including adverse inferences, based on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. Contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, the case law recognizes that where an interested party withholds necessary information, an unbiased and objective investigating authority may take this procedural circumstance into account and use facts on the record in a manner which, as contemplated in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, may be less favourable, i.e. adverse, to that party than if it had cooperated. In this context, and contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, the CBSA’s ministerial specification cannot be considered punitive.

28. Second, Chinese Taipei argues the CBSA’s use of facts available was not based on a comparative evaluation that took into account all of the information on the record. This allegation is factually incorrect. In particular, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the record of the CSWP investigation establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA engaged in a systematic evaluation of all of the facts on the record pursuant to which it determined the appropriate basis for establishing the normal values for non-cooperating exporters. Indeed, the CBSA’s conduct in the CSWP investigation can be distinguished from instances where an investigating authority was found to have contravened Article 6.8 and Annex II by simply using facts that were included in petitioner applications without further scrutiny, by corroborating the appropriateness of the selected facts in an arbitrary manner, or by making determinations that are devoid of any factual foundation.

29. Third, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA’s use of facts available was contrary to the “best information available” requirement on the basis that there was no “logical relationship” between the rates established for “all other” Chinese Taipei exporters and the facts on the record.
concerning Chinese Taipei exports. While Canada agrees that the information selected in the application of facts available must have a "logical relationship" to the missing information from the record, Chinese Taipei fails to establish that the CBSA did not meet this requirement. Indeed, the methodology described above ensured that the CBSA used facts that reasonably replaced the information missing from the record. It also ensured that the procedural circumstances of the investigation were taken into account, as well as the need to encourage cooperation and prevent anti-dumping duty circumvention.

30. Moreover, to the extent Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA should have relied on the information provided by the cooperating Chinese Taipei exporters, Canada submits such an argument lacks support in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it ignores the procedural character of the obligations under Annex II, paragraph 7. Those obligations do not guarantee a specific outcome to non-cooperating interested parties.

31. For these reasons, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims with respect to the treatment of "all other exporters" must fail.

E. The CBSA’s Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate Articles 9.3 and 6.8, Annex II, and Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

32. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA’s prospective application of the ministerial specification to new product types ("new product models") exported by cooperating exporters would violate Articles 9.3 and 6.8, Annex II, and Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. These claims, however, are premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada’s prospective duty assessment system, rely on misinterpretations of the relevant legal obligations, and ignore the practical need to apply facts available to product models that have not been investigated.

1. The CBSA’s Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Anti-Dumping Duties for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

33. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new models of subject goods from cooperating exporters in excess of their margin of dumping.

34. Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 is flawed, as it is premised on speculation. Article 9.3.2 conditions the availability of a refund on (i) an importer of subject goods paying anti-dumping duties; and (ii) that importer requesting a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exporter from Chinese Taipei has shipped a new model of subject goods to Canada that has been subject to the "all other exporters" rate determined by ministerial specification. Therefore, no Chinese Taipei exports of new models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request, as contemplated under Article 9.3.2. In this sense, not only is Chinese Taipei’s claim premature, it does not even amount to a prima facie case of a violation.

35. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly claims that the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 is limited to the "margin of dumping" established in the original investigation. Chinese Taipei’s theory is directly contradicted by the relevant jurisprudence on the liability for payment and collection of anti-dumping duties in prospective normal value systems, which indicates that the margin of dumping during duty assessment is not limited by the margin of dumping established for a particular exporter during the original investigation.

36. Moreover, Chinese Taipei’s claim that the application of the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters ignores that under a prospective duty system the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. Under Canada’s prospective duty system, anti-dumping duties are assessed and collected on the basis of a comparison between normal values determined during an investigation or re-investigation and export prices determined during the enforcement
period. When an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values.

2. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available with Respect to New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

37. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by resorting to facts available to determine normal values for new models of subject goods shipped by cooperating exporters. However, Chinese Taipei's claim is internally inconsistent and illogical.

38. Chinese Taipei initially argues that the CBSA lacked the legal authority to rely on facts available with respect to new models of subject goods. However, it then criticizes the CBSA for its selection of certain available facts. In so doing, Chinese Taipei implicitly concedes that resorting to facts available was appropriate under these circumstances.

39. This makes sense, as not being able to do so would prevent an investigating authority from establishing normal values for new models of subject goods that could not have been investigated during the initial investigation. Without an ability to apply facts available, anti-dumping duties could never be levied on new models, thereby creating a significant gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.

40. Finally, when claiming that the CBSA's application of the ministerial specification contravenes paragraph 7 of Annex II, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize the variety of review procedures under Canada's trade remedies regime that fairly accommodate exporters and importers of new product models of subject goods.

3. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

41. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA's application of the ministerial specification to establish normal values for new models of subject goods contravenes Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

42. Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the obligations under Article 2.2 presuppose that an investigating authority has the information necessary to calculate normal values. "New" product models are those shipped after an initial investigation. As a result, an investigating authority is not in a position to determine model-specific normal values for those products when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated. Chinese Taipei ignores this, and does not explain how the CBSA could properly apply one of the Article 2.2 methodologies to new models of subject goods exported to Canada after the original CSWP investigation.

43. In the absence of the required information, Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits the CBSA to use facts available from the original investigation to determine a normal value for new product models. The use of facts available would cease, and individual normal values would be calculated in accordance with one of the methodologies set out under Article 2.2, when cooperating exporters or importers of new models of subject imports seek a re-investigation or a re-determination.

4. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

44. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA determined "two different dumping margins" for the same cooperating exporter, one during the original investigation and another, for new product models, during the duty enforcement phase. Chinese Taipei claims that in so doing the CBSA violated the general rule under Article 6.10 that an investigating authority shall determine "an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation".
45. Chinese Taipei’s claim is flawed, as it is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the term “margin of dumping” and a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada’s prospective duty assessment system. Chinese Taipei fails to take into account that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, “margins of dumping” are not specific to a particular product model or export transaction, but instead are determined for all export transactions from a particular exporter or producer, pertaining to products within the same defined scope over a designated period of time. Hence, a “margin of dumping”, by definition, cannot be based on transactions pertaining only to specific product models.

46. By failing to acknowledge that the general rule under Article 6.10 has limited relevance after the conclusion of an anti-dumping investigation, Chinese Taipei also appears to fundamentally misunderstand the basic operation of Canada’s duty assessment system. Under the Canadian system, the margin of dumping for a particular exporter calculated during the investigation phase has no relevance to duty assessment. After an investigation is complete, the CBSA compares the relevant normal value to an individual export transaction to determine the appropriate amount of the anti-dumping duty to be collected, if any. The calculation of an anti-dumping duty on this basis does not constitute a determination of a “margin of dumping”. This is the case regardless of whether the normal value for a particular product model was established during the investigation or is established by ministerial specification during the enforcement phase.

F. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish That Canada Violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

47. Chinese Taipei also makes the consequential claims that Canada violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. As established above, however, the determinations of dumping and injury by the CBSA and the CITT did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. As a result, Chinese Taipei’s claims under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 must fail.

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS

A. Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA Are Not Inconsistent with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

48. Chinese Taipei claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), and 41(1) of SIMA are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, essentially because SIMA provides for a de minimis margin of dumping test to be carried out on a country basis, and not on an exporter-specific basis.

49. Canada demonstrates that SIMA is not inconsistent with Articles 5.8, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2, and, consequently, with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. In conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, SIMA requires the termination of an investigation with respect to a country in certain situations, including when the margin of dumping of that country is de minimis. Unless the investigation is terminated as a whole, dumped imports are subject to the application of provisional measures and the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties if injury is found, irrespective of an individual exporter’s margin of dumping. However, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA confers discretion to the CITT to exclude an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping from an injury finding.

B. Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR Are Not Inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

50. Chinese Taipei submits that Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are, as such, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because they result in the automatic inclusion in the category of dumped imports, in the context of the injury analysis, of the imports of exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.
51. According to Subsection 2(1) of SIMA, dumped "in relation to any goods, means that the normal value of the goods exceeds the export price thereof". Therefore, the term "dumped goods" as used in SIMA covers goods of exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping. This is consistent with the definition of dumping outlined in Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which does not distinguish between imports that are dumped at a margin above *de minimis* and those dumped at a margin below *de minimis* – both are "dumped".

52. The Appellate Body in *US – Carbon Steel*, when dealing with the meaning of subsidization under the SCM Agreement, stated that "[n]one of the provisions in the SCM Agreement that uses the term 'subsidization' confines the meaning of 'subsidization' to subsidization at a rate equal to or in excess of 1 percent ad valorem, or to any other *de minimis* threshold". Similarly, none of the references to dumping in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the *de minimis* threshold. Therefore, there is nothing in these provisions that requires the exclusion of imports with a *de minimis* margin of dumping from dumped imports when an investigating authority conducts an injury analysis.

53. Thus, Chinese Taipei has failed to demonstrate that Subsections 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR, as well as any implementing or related measures, are inconsistent, as such, with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

C. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish that SIMA and the SIMR Are Inconsistent with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

54. As Canada demonstrates above, Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are not inconsistent, as such, with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's claim under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must fail.

D. Chinese Taipei Has Failed to Establish that SIMA and the SIMR Are Inconsistent with Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994

55. As Canada demonstrates above, Subsections 2(1), Section 30.1, Subsections 35(1), 35(2), 38(1), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6) and 43(1) of SIMA and Subsection 37.1(1) of the SIMR are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

56. For the foregoing reasons, Canada respectfully requests that the Panel reject Chinese Taipei's claims.
ANNEX C-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this second written submission, Canada responds to the submissions of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) at the first meeting of the Panel and in response to the Panel’s questions. These submissions failed to prove that the Carbon Steel Welded Pipe (CSWP) investigation, the anti-dumping measures imposed as a result of the investigation, and the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) are inconsistent with Canada’s WTO obligations.

2. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has put forward a number of arguments based on a misunderstanding of the Canadian system, a misapprehension of key factual elements of the CSWP investigation, and flawed interpretations of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).

3. For the reasons that follow, in addition to the reasons in Canada’s prior submissions, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.

II. CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONAL AND DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED BY CANADA ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE ORIGINATING IN, AMONG OTHERS, CHINESE TAIPEI

A. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Articles 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

1. The CBSA’s Treatment of Chinese Taipei Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

4. Chinese Taipei claims that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) violated Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to terminate the CSWP investigation with respect to Chinese Taipei exporters with de minimis margins of dumping.

5. The Appellate Body has recognized that a panel can depart from prior reasoning on a legal question if there are "cogent reasons" to do so. In the present dispute, there are cogent reasons to depart from the interpretation in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice that Article 5.8 requires termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter.

6. The Panel must interpret Article 5.8 in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping", and in accordance with the context of those terms, which altogether establish that the requirement for termination of an investigation must be on a country basis. Article 5.8 establishes the requirements for termination of the investigation as a whole, which is set out in Article 5 as being conducted in relation to a product of a country of export, not an individual exporter. The greater context of Articles 9.4 and 3.3 confirms that the de minimis margin of dumping referred to in Article 5.8 is country based.

7. Furthermore, the interpretation in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice requiring exporter-specific termination is irreconcilable with the text of Article 9.4. Article 9.4 pertains to the application of Anti-Dumping duties in the separate and distinct phase of duty assessment occurring after the original investigation. Any assessment of duties done in accordance with Article 9.4, where de minimis margins would be disregarded, must necessarily be done following the definitive determination of dumping, injury, and causation made under Articles 2 and 3. If an investigation had been terminated with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, there would
be no need to disregard these margins of dumping when assessing definitive Anti-Dumping duties. The interpretation that termination for a *de minimis* margin of dumping under Article 5.8 pertains to an individual exporter therefore renders part of Article 9.4 inutile, contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation.

8. Finally, Chinese Taipei’s interpretation would result in inconsistent treatment between an exporter found to be dumping at a *de minimis* margin during the original investigation and a new exporter found to be dumping at a *de minimis* margin during the duty assessment phase in a review under Article 9.5. The latter exporter could not be subject to termination under Article 5.8, as the investigation would have already been completed. Definitive anti-dumping duties could thus be imposed on that exporter, while definitive duties could not be imposed on an exporter dumping at a *de minimis* margin during the original investigation.

9. By contrast, there are no contradictions, inconsistencies, or redundancies in the Anti-Dumping Agreement if termination under Article 5.8 pertains to a country with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

2. The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures on Dumped Imports from a Chinese Taipei Exporter with a *de Minimis* Margin of Dumping Did Not Violate Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

10. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA should not have reached a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping against an exporter with a *de minimis* margin of dumping, and thus was not permitted to apply provisional measures against that exporter.

11. This claim must fail because the CBSA satisfied all the criteria of Article 7.1 in applying provisional measures. Article 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an investigating authority to make a *singular* determination that relates to the investigation as a whole, per Article 7.1(i), that will be affirmative if dumping has been preliminarily found to be occurring and causing consequent injury, per Article 7.1(ii). The same is true with respect to the determination that provisional measures are necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation under Article 7.1(iii), which is determined with respect to the domestic industry of the country, not with respect to individual exporters.

12. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for Chinese Taipei’s assertion that exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping are not considered as “dumping”, neither in terms of the definition of dumping nor the object and purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. A product is considered to be dumped, per Article 2.1, if it is imported into a country at an export price less than its normal value. The definition of dumping has the same meaning in all provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and does not distinguish between goods being dumped at a margin above *de minimis* or below *de minimis*.

13. In the CSWP investigation, an investigation was initiated, preliminary affirmative determinations of dumping and consequent injury were made, and, given that provisional measures were considered necessary to prevent injury during the investigation, provisional duties were applied on dumped imports from Chinese Taipei exporters in an amount not greater than their margins of dumping. As a result, all the requirements of Article 7.1 were satisfied and the CBSA therefore did not violate Article 7.1(ii).

3. The CBSA’s Application of Provisional Measures and Imposition of Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Dumped Imports from Chinese Taipei Exporters Did Not Violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

14. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CBSA collected duties from sources found not to be dumped and causing injury by applying provisional measures and imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on CSWP imports from Chinese Taipei exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping.
15. Chinese Taipei's position is irreconcilable with the definition of dumping and the meaning of the term "appropriate amounts". The appropriate amount means the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price, which is consistent with the definition of dumping referring to a product introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value in that country. There is no exception or threshold for a de minimis margin of dumping in this definition or in Article 9.2. Therefore, the CBSA's application of duties in the appropriate amounts on all exporters that were found to be dumping did not violate Articles 7.5 and 9.2.

4. The CBSA's Determination of an Individual Margin of Dumping for Each Chinese Taipei Exporter Did Not Violate Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

16. Chinese Taipei alleges that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by calculating a country-based margin of dumping in addition to the individual margins of dumping calculated for each exporter. It argues that Article 6.10 requires the calculation of a single margin of dumping and that the country based margin of dumping constitutes a second margin of dumping for each exporter.

17. Chinese Taipei's argument must be rejected. The calculation of a country based margin of dumping does not constitute the establishment of a second margin of dumping for an individual exporter. Article 6.10 simply requires that an investigating authority determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter, which was done by the CBSA in the CSWP case.

B. The CITT's Treatment of Dumped Imports in Its Injury Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

18. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's claim, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal's (CITT) inclusion of all dumped imports in its injury analysis, including those from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping, was consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Nothing in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, or 3.7 the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of the de minimis threshold.

19. The definition of dumping clearly does not provide for a distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and those dumped at a margin below de minimis –both are "dumped". Furthermore, the references to the term "dumped" in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 are in no way qualified by any reference to de minimis margins of dumping. It is therefore only imports with a zero margin that should be considered as not dumped. This was the approach taken by the CITT in its injury analysis in the CSWP investigation. The Appellate Body decision in US – Carbon Steel is directly relevant to this issue and supports Canada's position.

C. The CITT's Non-Attribution Analysis Did Not Violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Subsidies

20. Chinese Taipei criticizes the CITT for having failed, in its CSWP injury analysis, to separate and distinguish the effects of subsidies granted to Indian exporters.

21. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "[i]t must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement". It also provides that "[t]he authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports." These obligations are referred to as the causal link and non-attribution requirements. Pursuant to the non-attribution requirement, an investigating authority must ensure that it separates and distinguishes the effects of other known factors of injury from the effects of the dumped imports.
22. Subsidies provided to exporters of dumped imports are not a factor other than the dumped imports which can at the same time injure the domestic industry because subsidies provided to exporters of dumped imports can only injure the domestic industry through the dumped imports. Therefore, a non-attribution analysis cannot be based on a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of the dumped imports. A non-attribution analysis concerning subsidies could only be based on a requirement to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of dumping. In turn, the only reason to conduct a non-attribution analysis of that nature under the Anti-Dumping Agreement would be if the required causal link were between dumping and injury. However, this is not the case. In an injury analysis conducted in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in line with the Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea), the central issue is whether the dumped imports are causing or are threatening to cause injury to a domestic industry. The required causal link is thus between dumped imports and injury, not between dumping and injury.

23. Given that there is no requirement that the effects of the dumping be found to cause injury under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, there can be no requirement under the Agreement that, when goods are both dumped and subsidized, the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumping.

24. In the CSWP inquiry, the CITT cumulated the effects of imports from India with those from Chinese Taipei and four other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was not relevant to the CITT’s injury analysis under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. There was no requirement to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies provided by India.

2. The CITT Was Not Obligated to Examine and to Separate and Distinguish the Effects of Excess Capacity

25. Chinese Taipei argues that, in the CSWP inquiry, excess capacity\(^{1}\) was a known factor of injury that the CITT was required to examine in the context of its non-attribution analysis.

26. Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the effects of other known factors of injury be separated and distinguished from the effects of dumped imports. As a general rule, excess capacity or low capacity utilization in a domestic industry is an indicator of injury, not a factor or cause of injury to that industry.

27. Even assuming that excess capacity may be a cause of injury in certain cases, Chinese Taipei has not demonstrated that it was a known cause of injury in the CSWP inquiry that the CITT had to examine in its threat of injury analysis.

28. First, contrary to Chinese Taipei’s assertion, the CITT did not consider that there was excess capacity in the domestic CSWP industry constituting a cause of injury.

29. Second, the only evidence to which Chinese Taipei refers to support its position that excess capacity as a cause of injury was brought to the CITT’s attention is a submission by Knightsbridge filed during the CITT’s preliminary injury inquiry. Knightsbridge did not refer to any evidence to support its statement that "[w]e are all operating at less than 50% of where we were at". Its ambiguous statement does not appear consistent with the data on capacity utilization in the CITT’s pre-hearing staff report. Moreover, that statement does not indicate that excess capacity was a cause of injury in the CSWP investigation. Knightsbridge does not refer to excess capacity but rather to a decline in the utilization of capacity, an indicator of injury listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

30. Third, the CITT did not find that the subject imports had caused injury to the domestic industry. Therefore, it was not required to examine other possible factors that could have caused injury. The CITT found that the subject imports threatened to cause material injury to the domestic industry in the future. In assessing threat of injury, the CITT considered two other possible factors or causes of injury. Chinese Taipei does not refer to any evidence on the record of

\(^{1}\) While Chinese Taipei uses the term “overcapacity” in its submissions, Canada will use the term “excess capacity” henceforth.
the CITT indicating that the alleged excess capacity was a known factor that threatened to cause injury in the future, at the same time as the dumped imports.

D. The CBSA’s Treatment of "All Other Exporters" Did Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. Chinese Taipei Misrepresents the Process by Which the CBSA Selected Information for the Ministerial Specification in the CSWP Investigation

31. According to Chinese Taipei, the process by which the CBSA applied facts available was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA’s methodology was inconsistent with the disciplines on facts available because it was "mechanistic", "automatic", and, ultimately, "punitive". It also alleges that the CBSA used the "worst information available" and outright failed to assess facts on the record of the investigation.

32. These arguments are directly contradicted by information on the record of the investigation, which indicates that the CBSA complied with the procedural obligations disciplining the use of facts available. Contrary to Chinese Taipei’s characterization, the methodology employed by the CBSA was not "mechanistic" as it included an assessment of all export transactions from the period of investigation. The record to the investigation makes it clear that the CBSA conducted a systematic assessment of all the information submitted by all interested parties in the CSWP investigation, including by Chinese Taipei exporters.

33. Moreover, it cannot be said that the CBSA based its determination solely on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. Chinese Taipei’s argument on this point ignores the process by which the CBSA selected available facts and improperly equates the use of adverse inferences with "punitive" conduct. In this respect, the CBSA’s selection of reliable and representative facts in the CSWP investigation is also distinguishable from violations of the disciplines on facts available in other WTO proceedings, particularly Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice and China – GOES.

34. Finally, the proposition that the CBSA used the "worst information available" to arrive at the worst possible result for "all other exporters" is unsubstantiated and irreconcilable with the facts on the record in the CSWP investigation. In particular, the CBSA’s use of information from the application by the domestic industry could have led to a margin of dumping and duty rate for "all other exporters" higher than that prescribed in the ministerial specification.

2. Chinese Taipei Ignores an Investigating Authority’s Necessary Flexibility in the Application of Facts Available

35. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has repeatedly implied that the CBSA was obligated to base its determination on information from Chinese Taipei exporters. Chinese Taipei suggests that the CBSA’s failure to do so reflected a lack of objectivity. This argument, however, ignores the flexibility inherent to an investigating authority’s discretion when applying facts available.

36. As noted in Canada’s first written submission, the disciplines under Annex II are procedural in nature and do not guarantee specific outcomes to non-cooperating parties. Where an exporter fails to participate in an investigation, or otherwise withholds certain information, an investigating authority necessarily has flexibility in determining the appropriate information to serve as a proxy.

37. This flexibility is encompassed within the "reasonable replacement" standard articulated by the Appellate Body for determining the appropriateness of an investigating authority’s selection of particular "facts". Flexibility is also necessary so that an investigating authority can establish a residual duty rate that achieves the policy objectives outlined by the panel in China – Autos (US).

38. Furthermore, in addition to being inconsistent with the procedural obligations under Annex II, a finding that the CBSA was required to use specific information would be contrary to Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The role of the Panel in this dispute is to determine whether the establishment of the "all other exporters" rate by the CBSA was consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is not to decide what information the CBSA should have used to establish that rate.
E. The CBSA's Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement

1. The CBSA's Prospective Treatment of New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

39. Chinese Taipei continues to argue that the CBSA violated the *chapeau* of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by prospectively assigning a duty rate based on the ministerial specification to new product models in the CSWP investigation. This argument, however, is predicated on a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of Article 9.3.

40. Chinese Taipei ignores that Members that employ prospective normal value systems, as is the case in Canada, comply with Article 9.3 by refunding excess duties collected, in accordance with Article 9.3.2. Under Article 9.3.2, a refund for overpayment of duties is available if: 1) an importer of subject goods actually pays anti-dumping duties; and 2) that importer requests a refund for overpayment that is duly supported by evidence. In the present dispute, because no evidence on the record indicates that Chinese Taipei exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request, the CBSA cannot be said to have violated Article 9.3.2 or the general obligation under Article 9.3. It is in this sense that Chinese Taipei's claim is premature, and must be rejected on the basis that Chinese Taipei has not established a *prima facie* case of violation.

41. A related point pertains to the intermediate nature of the initial collection of duties under prospective duty assessment systems. By claiming that applying the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters, Chinese Taipei ignores that the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. When an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a re-determination to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values, and that any duties collected in excess of the appropriate amount are refunded.

42. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly argues that the margin of dumping from the original investigation sets an upper limit on duty assessment. Contrary to Chinese Taipei's claim, the panel decisions in *Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties* and *EC – Salmon (Norway)* indicate that an investigating authority is not required to assess anti-dumping duties by reference to the margin of dumping established during the original investigation.

43. Finally, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prescribe a specific methodology according to which duties for new product models must be assessed. In Canada's view, this silence permits investigating authorities a measure of flexibility with respect to the treatment of those models for duty assessment purposes. The CBSA's use of facts available to establish normal values for new product models should be viewed in line with that flexibility. Following Chinese Taipei's position on what the CBSA "should" have done would not only ignore this flexibility, it would also be inconsistent with the Panel's role in adjudicating this dispute, as set out under Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2. The CBSA's Prospective Application of Facts Available to New Product Models Is Both Necessary and Reasonable

44. Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA is prohibited from applying facts available when assessing duties on new product models from cooperating exporters, yet it ignores that information pertaining to those models is necessary in order to determine their normal values.

45. This is because different models of subject goods can have different characteristics. The normal value of one model cannot be assumed to be applicable to another for which there is no pricing information. In this respect, information pertaining to product models that were not investigated should be viewed as necessary.

46. Under Canada's prospective duty assessment system, anti-dumping duties are assessed based on a comparison between model-specific normal values and transaction-specific export prices. As "new" product models are those that have not been subject to an investigation or
re-investigation, the CBSA would not have pricing or cost information for those models to establish their normal values. Thus, at the time of duty assessment, the CBSA would be prevented from establishing normal values for uninvestigated models if it were not able to rely on facts available, i.e. information pertaining to different exporters or product models. In turn, this lack of information would prevent the CBSA from being able to assess duties on new product models, which would create a gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.

47. Therefore, to the extent that any exporter from Chinese Taipei does not provide information pertaining to new product models, it would be appropriate for the CBSA to apply facts available, following the parameters of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in order to establish the normal values of those models.

III. CLAIMS CONCERNING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT AND OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES REGULATIONS

A. SIMA Is Not Inconsistent "As Such" with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with Respect to the Treatment of Exporters with de Minimis Margins of Dumping

48. Chinese Taipei claims that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1, and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA are, as such, inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, when read together, they require that an affirmative dumping determination be made with respect to all goods of a country, including those of exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, if that country's margin of dumping is two percent or more. Chinese Taipei further claims that the text of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA does not provide the CITT with discretion to terminate an investigation with respect to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping.

49. Canada has demonstrated that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not require the termination of an investigation with respect to an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. Even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, SIMA could not be found to violate, as such, Article 5.8. Canada acknowledges that Subsection 2(1), Section 30.1 and Subsection 41(1) of SIMA do not grant the CBSA discretion to terminate an investigation with regard to exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. However, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides the CITT with the discretion necessary to exclude such exporters from an injury finding and therefore to terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters.

50. It is well settled that, as a general rule, the burden rests upon the complaining party to establish the inconsistency of the measure it challenges with a particular provision of a WTO covered agreement. When a measure is challenged "as such", the starting point for an analysis must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of a measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure "as such" can be assessed on that basis alone. To warrant a finding of an "as such" violation, the measure must be determinative in precluding WTO consistent action.

51. The CITT's discretion to exclude exporters, including exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, is clear on the face of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA. The CITT's discretion to grant exclusions from an affirmative injury or threat of injury finding is well established in Canadian law. In its statement of reasons in the CSWP inquiry, the CITT stated that "[t]he Tribunal has discretionary authority under subsection 43(1) of SIMA to grant exclusions from its findings". The CITT referred to Federal Court of Appeal of Canada and NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel decisions confirming its discretion to grant product and producer exclusions. The CITT's discretion is illustrated by the fact that it granted two product exclusions in its CSWP inquiry. The CITT used its discretion in deciding not to grant the producer exclusion requested. By addressing the request on its merits, the CITT implicitly confirmed that it had the discretion under Subsection 43(1) of SIMA to grant producer exclusions.
B. SIMA and the SIMR Are Not Inconsistent "As Such" with Articles 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 7.1(ii), 7.5, 9.2, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement

52. Canada responded to these claims in its first written submission. Given that Chinese Taipei has not presented additional arguments in support of its claims related to these provisions, Canada will not address these claims further in this submission.

IV. CONCLUSION

53. For the reasons outlined above, Canada respectfully requests that the Panel reject Chinese Taipei's claims.
ANNEX C-3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT OF CANADA
AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This dispute concerns anti-dumping measures imposed by Canada on imports of certain Carbon Steel Welded Pipe from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (or Chinese Taipei). Chinese Taipei claims that the investigation that led to the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, the measures themselves, and certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (or SIMA) are inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. Canada demonstrates that the investigation and the application of anti-dumping measures on Welded Pipe from Chinese Taipei, as well as the relevant provisions of SIMA, are not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

II. THE CBSA’S TREATMENT OF CHINESE TAIPEI EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

A. The Termination of an Investigation Pertains to a Country and Is Only Required When the Country-Based Margin of Dumping Is de Minimis

2. The fundamental question raised by Chinese Taipei’s claim is whether the requirement in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country or to an individual exporter. Canada submits that termination of an investigation is required when a country-based margin of dumping is de minimis, not when an individual exporter has a de minimis margin of dumping.

3. A treaty must be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose". The ordinary meaning of the terms "termination", "investigation", and "margin of dumping" is consistent with the termination of an investigation being required on a country basis.

4. Canada has demonstrated that the context in which these terms are used confirms that an investigation of dumped imports from a country must be terminated only when that country’s overall margin of dumping is de minimis. According to Article 5, an investigating authority initiates and conducts only one investigation – for a country. The investigating authority does not conduct as many investigations as there are exporters. Consequently, the requirement to terminate an investigation must pertain to a country, not to an individual exporter. All of the situations in Article 5.8 pertain to country-based termination. In all situations, it is the investigation as a whole that must be terminated. An interpretation of Article 5.8 requiring termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would render part of Article 9.4 redundant. In addition, the specific reference in Article 3.3 to the phrase de minimis strongly implies that the type of margin of dumping is the same in both Article 3.3 and Article 5.8 – a margin of dumping with respect to a country.

5. As a result, termination of an investigation with respect to an entire country is what is required under the second sentence of Article 5.8 when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis. Even if the Panel agreed with Chinese Taipei’s interpretation of Article 5.8, SIMA would nevertheless be consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. When making an injury finding, the CITT has the discretion to exclude any exporter whose margin of dumping is less than two percent.
B. The CBSA Did Not Violate Articles 6.10, 7.1(ii), 7.5, and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

6. Chinese Taipei also makes three related claims of violations of other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that are premised on Article 5.8 requiring an exporter-specific termination. These claims must be rejected. First, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 6.10, which requires an investigating authority to determine an individual margin of dumping for each exporter. However, Chinese Taipei admits that the CBSA determined an individual margin of dumping for each exporter. The CBSA's additional determination of Chinese Taipei's country-based margin of dumping is simply irrelevant under Article 6.10. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's claim of a violation "as applied" is without merit.

7. Second, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) both "as applied" and "as such". Article 7.1(ii) requires that preliminary affirmative determinations of dumping and injury must be made in order for provisional duties to be applied. In terms of the "as applied" claim, it is sufficient to point out that the CBSA made a preliminary dumping determination before applying provisional measures on dumped imports. This is shown by Chinese Taipei's own evidence. Accordingly, the CBSA complied with the requirements under Article 7.1(ii). In response to the "as such" claim, nothing in Article 7.1(ii) suggests that provisional measures cannot be applied on dumped imports from an exporter whose provisionally estimated margin of dumping is de minimis.

8. Third, Chinese Taipei claims that Canada violated Articles 7.5 and 9.2, both "as applied" and "as such", because the CBSA collected duties on dumped imports from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping. Article 9.2 requires that anti-dumping duties be collected on imports from all individual exporters with the sole exception of exporters from which price undertakings have been accepted. In the Welded Pipe investigation, the CBSA imposed provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties on all imports from Chinese Taipei exporters that had an export price less than their normal value. That is, it imposed duties on all dumped goods, including the dumped imports from any exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping. This is what SIMA requires and it is consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, Chinese Taipei's "as applied" and "as such" claims of violation under Articles 7.5 and 9.2 must fail.

III. THE CBSA'S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS" DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

9. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA's use of facts available to determine the dumping margin and the anti-dumping duty rate for "all other exporters" violated Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Chinese Taipei's arguments must fail as they mischaracterize relevant facts and applicable law.

10. First, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available effectively punished non-cooperating exporters. However, Chinese Taipei fails to recognize that an investigating authority has discretion to draw inferences, including adverse inferences, based on the procedural circumstances of the investigation. These inferences must have a reasonable connection to the information available, but the express terms of Annex II clearly indicate that they may lead to a less favourable outcome for the non-cooperating party. In the Welded Pipe investigation, the CBSA's use of facts available cannot be considered punitive: it was based not only on verified facts gathered during the investigation, but also on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate. Indeed, if the CBSA's approach were deemed punitive, exporters and foreign producers that have injuriously dumped could actually benefit from a lack of cooperation.

11. Second, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of facts available was not based on a comparative evaluation that took into account all of the information on the record. This is factually incorrect. The record of the Welded Pipe investigation establishes either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that the CBSA engaged in a systematic evaluation of all of the information on the record, following which it determined how it would establish normal values for non-cooperating exporters.
12. Third, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA failed to select facts for "all other" Chinese Taipei exporters that were logically related to facts on the record concerning Chinese Taipei exports. Yet, the methodology employed by the CBSA ensured that it used facts from the investigation that reasonably replaced information that was missing from the record. It also ensured that the procedural circumstances of the investigation were taken into account, as well as the need to encourage cooperation and prevent anti-dumping duty circumvention. For these reasons, Chinese Taipei's claims under Article 6.8 and Annex II must fail.

IV. THE CBSA'S PROSPECTIVE TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT MODELS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

A. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Anti-Dumping Duties for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

13. Chinese Taipei claims that the CBSA violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it imposed anti-dumping duties on new models of subject goods in excess of their margin of dumping. Its claim, however, fails to address the relationship between Article 9.3 and Article 9.3.2. Article 9.3.2 sets two primary conditions for the availability of a refund: first, an importer of subject goods must have paid anti-dumping duties; and second, an importer must have requested a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Here, Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request. In this sense, not only is Chinese Taipei's claim premature, it does not even amount to a prima facie case of a violation.

14. Chinese Taipei also incorrectly claims that the ceiling for anti-dumping duties under Article 9.3 is limited to the "margin of dumping" established in the original investigation. Canada draws the Panel's attention to Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and EC – Salmon (Norway), which contradict Chinese Taipei's argument.

15. Chinese Taipei further claims that applying the ministerial specification to new product models will necessarily result in duties that exceed an exporter's margin of dumping established in the original investigation. However, this claim ignores that under a prospective duty system, the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. The Appellate Body recognized this in US – Continued Zeroing. Under the Canadian duty assessment system, an importer can request updated normal values through a re-determination or a re-investigation. Any retroactive update of the normal values can result in a refund if the updated normal values are lower than they were before the update.

B. The CBSA's Prospective Use of Facts Available with Respect to New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

16. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by resorting to facts available to determine normal values for new product models. Chinese Taipei initially argues that the CBSA lacked the legal authority to rely on facts available with respect to new product models. However, it then criticizes the CBSA for its selection of certain available facts. In so doing, Chinese Taipei implicitly concedes that resorting to facts available was appropriate under these circumstances. This is logical and reasonable, as not being able to rely on facts available would prevent an investigating authority from establishing normal values for new models of subject goods that could not have been investigated during the initial investigation.

C. The CBSA'S Prospective Use of Facts Available in the Calculation of Normal Values for New Product Models Would Not Violate Article 2.2 or 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

17. Canada demonstrates that the claims of violation under Articles 2.2 and 6.10 with respect to new product models are without merit. With respect to Article 2.2, "new" product models are those shipped after an initial investigation. As a result, an investigating authority is not in a position to
determine model-specific normal values for those products when they are imported as they have yet to be investigated.

18. Chinese Taipei’s claim that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 by calculating "two different dumping margins" for the same cooperating exporter fails to take into account that, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, "margins of dumping" are not specific to a particular product model or export transaction. Rather, "margins of dumping" are determined for all export transactions from a particular exporter or producer. Thus, contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, a "margin of dumping" by definition cannot be based on only transactions pertaining to specific product models. In making this claim, Chinese Taipei’s also appears to fundamentally misunderstand the operation of Canada’s duty assessment system under which anti-dumping duties are assessed on a transaction-specific basis.

V. THE CITT’S TREATMENT OF DUMPED IMPORTS IN ITS INJURY ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, AND 3.7 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

19. Nothing in the provisions cited by Chinese Taipei confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of a de minimis threshold. There is no distinction to be drawn between imports that are dumped at a margin above de minimis and those dumped at a margin below de minimis – both are "dumped". It is only imports for which the margin of dumping is zero that should be considered as not dumped. The CITT's approach in its injury analysis in the Welded Pipe investigation is consistent with the Appellate Body's analysis in US – Carbon Steel.

20. On this issue, all of the decisions referred to by Chinese Taipei in its first written submission concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. In each case, the panel concluded that the imports at issue were "non-dumped" and therefore should not have been included in the injury analysis. Thus, to the extent that these panels referred to de minimis margins of dumping, these references should be considered as obiter dicta.

21. Furthermore, as outlined above, an investigation need not be terminated with respect to imports from an individual exporter for which a de minimis margin of dumping has been calculated. Therefore, the CITT’s treatment of dumped imports, including those from exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, did not violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Similarly, the relevant provisions of SIMA that require the CITT to include imports from de minimis exporters in its injury analysis are not “as such” inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

VI. THE CITT’S NON-ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

22. Chinese Taipei argues that that by failing to separate and distinguish the effects caused by the subsidies from the effects caused by the dumping, Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) demonstrates that when the same goods are both dumped and subsidized, an investigating authority is not required to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies from the effects of the dumping of the goods. Hence, the CITT was not required to ensure that injury caused by the subsidizing was not attributed to the dumping. This is because the focus of an injury analysis is on the effects of the dumped imports, not on the effects of dumping or subsidizing.

23. Second, Chinese Taipei inappropriately relies on the Appellate Body decision in US – Carbon Steel (India) to support its position that the CITT should have separated the effects of the subsidies from those of the dumping. That decision essentially deals with cumulation rather than non-attribute. In the Welded Pipe inquiry, the effects of dumped imports from Chinese Taipei, India, and other subject countries were cumulated by the CITT, consistent with Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The fact that the imports from India were also subsidized was irrelevant to the CITT’s decision to cumulate the effects of all dumped imports. Therefore, the CITT was not required to examine the effects of subsidies and ensure that any injury caused by such subsidies was not attributed to the dumped imports.
24. Chinese Taipei also claims that Canada violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the CITT failed to examine overcapacity and to separate and distinguish the effects caused by overcapacity from the effects caused by dumped imports. Declines in utilization rates, just as declines in sales and profits, are indicators of whether the domestic industry has suffered injury. They do not cause injury. Thus, the CITT did not violate Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by not separating and distinguishing the effects of low utilization rates, or overcapacity, from the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.

VII. CONCLUSION

25. For the reasons presented, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.
ANNEX C-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT OF CANADA
AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE PANEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its submissions, Chinese Taipei has put forward a number of arguments based on a misunderstanding of the Canadian system, a misapprehension of key factual elements of the Welded Pipe investigation, and flawed interpretations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994, and corresponding jurisprudence.

II. THE CBSA'S TREATMENT OF CHINESE TAIPEI EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 5.8, 6.10, 7.1(II), 7.5, AND 9.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

2. Chinese Taipei argues that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that an investigation be terminated with respect to individual exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. This argument, however, cannot be reconciled with the text of the Agreement.

3. Article 5.8 contemplates the termination of an investigation where the margin of dumping is de minimis, or where the volume of dumped imports or the injury is negligible. The first sentence of Article 5.8 explicitly states that it is the investigation as a whole that must be terminated when there is insufficient evidence of dumping. In this context, it is clear in the second sentence that "immediate termination" when the margin of dumping is de minimis also refers to the investigation as a whole. The volume, the injury, and the margin of dumping are all used in the singular, in reference to a single investigation, where each of these terms pertains to a country.

4. Moreover, Article 9.4 would be rendered inutile under Chinese Taipei's interpretation. The Appellate Body has stated that Article 9.4 relates to the application of duties in "a separate and distinct phase of an anti-dumping action that necessarily occurs after the determination of dumping, injury, and causation". Therefore, any of the rules contained in Article 9.4 must only be applicable after the completion of the investigation, meaning after any termination under Article 5.8 would have already taken place.

5. In addition, Chinese Taipei's position on exporter-specific termination results in inconsistent treatment under Article 9.5. Under Chinese Taipei's interpretation of Article 5.8, an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would be subject to termination if it had exported during the original period of investigation, yet it would be subject to the application of anti-dumping duties if it had only begun exporting in the duty assessment phase. This inconsistency does not exist if termination under Article 5.8 for a de minimis margin of dumping pertains to a country.

6. Chinese Taipei further argues that Canada violated Article 7.1(ii) in applying provisional measures against exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping because dumping at a de minimis margin cannot be considered "dumping". However, there is no "statutory threshold for the margin of dumping", as Chinese Taipei has argued, and no justification for altering the definition of what constitutes dumping. Canada satisfied the requirement under Article 7.1(ii) that a single preliminary determination of dumping be made, in relation to the entire investigation.

7. Moreover, Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's application of anti-dumping duties violates Articles 7.5 and 9.2 because the phrase "all sources found to be dumped" does not include exporters dumping at a de minimis margin. Chinese Taipei thereby proposes reading in an exception for a de minimis threshold where none is found in the text of the Agreement. Duties collected on imports from "all sources found to be dumped" includes imports dumped at a de minimis margin of dumping.

8. Chinese Taipei also argues that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 because it calculated a country-based margin of dumping for all Chinese Taipei exporters and used this in applying the
The "de minimis" test. Article 6.10 does not preclude calculations other than determining an individual margin of dumping for each exporter from being performed. The calculation of a country-based margin of dumping, in addition to being required under Article 5.8, is also required under Article 3.3.

III. THE CITT’S TREATMENT OF DUMPED IMPORTS IN ITS INJURY ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, AND 3.7 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

9. Nothing in the wording of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, or 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement confines the meaning of "dumping" to dumping at a rate equal to or in excess of a "de minimis" threshold. The use of the term "dumped" in these provisions is in no way qualified by any reference to a "de minimis" margin of dumping. Only imports with a zero margin are properly considered as not dumped.

10. The facts of the present dispute can be distinguished from those in the panel decisions cited by Chinese Taipei, all of which concerned companies for which the margin of dumping or definitive anti-dumping duty was zero. Therefore, all of the statements referring to "de minimis" margins in these decisions should be considered obiter dicta. Furthermore, contrary to Chinese Taipei's assertion, the Appellate Body has never ruled on whether imports of exporters with a "de minimis" margin of dumping are to be excluded from an injury analysis. Indeed, the CITT's injury analysis in the Welded Pipe investigation is consistent with the Appellate Body's analysis in US – Carbon Steel.

IV. THE CITT’S NON-ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

11. Chinese Taipei argues that the effects of subsidies should have been separated and distinguished from the effects of dumping in the CITT's causation analysis. This argument improperly relies on the assumption that the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires an analysis of the effects of the dumping, as opposed to the effects of the dumped imports. The Appellate Body decision in Japan – DRAMS (Korea) shows that this assumption is false.

12. Given that there is no requirement that the effects of the dumping be found to be causing injury under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, there can be no requirement under the Agreement, when goods are both dumped and subsidized, that the effects of subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumping. Moreover, there can be no requirement that the effects of the subsidies be separated and distinguished from the effects of the dumped imports, either. Therefore, the fact that certain dumped imports are also subsidized is not relevant to an injury analysis conducted pursuant to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

13. In the Welded Pipe inquiry, the CITT cumulated the effects of imports from Chinese Taipei and five other subject countries because the imports from all of these countries were dumped. The fact that the imports from one of these countries, India, were also subsidized was not relevant to the CITT's injury analysis under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. There was no requirement to examine and to separate and distinguish the effects of the subsidies provided by India.

14. There is also no basis to Chinese Taipei's claims that overcapacity, or excess capacity, was an "other" factor that the CITT was required to examine in its non-attribution analysis. As a general rule, excess capacity or low capacity utilization in a domestic industry is an indicator of injury, not a factor or cause of injury to that industry. However, even assuming that excess capacity may be a cause of injury in certain cases, Chinese Taipei has not demonstrated that it was a known cause of injury in the Welded Pipe inquiry that the CITT had to examine in its threat of injury analysis.

V. THE CBSA’S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE DUMPING MARGIN AND DUTY RATE FOR "ALL OTHER EXPORTERS" DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

15. Chinese Taipei argues that the CBSA's use of the highest amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price in one transaction from a non-Chinese Taipei exporter punishes Chinese Taipei exporters for failing to cooperate.
16. This argument must fail. Chinese Taipei omits key aspects of the jurisprudence, resulting in a fundamental misrepresentation of the current state of the law. The tenuous nature of Chinese Taipei's argument is further highlighted by the repeated assertion that the CBSA selected the "worst information", which is both misleading and factually incorrect.

17. Chinese Taipei also claims that the CBSA failed to make any comparative and evaluative assessment of the facts on the record, despite the CBSA's analysis of all of the information filed by interested parties. Chinese Taipei ignores that the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel (India) rejected the need for a formalistic approach, recognizing that the form and extent of the evaluation of "facts available" may differ based on the particular circumstances of a given case.

18. Chinese Taipei also argue that the CBSA's application of facts available lacked a "logical relationship" to Chinese Taipei exports. Yet, Chinese Taipei has not clearly indicated what constitutes a "logical relationship" in the context of the selection of facts available nor adequately explained how the CBSA failed to meet such a standard. Indeed, the "logical relationship" in the Welded Pipe investigation is evidenced by the selection of information pertaining to actual sales transactions concerning the same product during the same period of time.

19. More fundamentally, by arguing that the CBSA was obligated to base its determination on information from Chinese Taipei exporters, Chinese Taipei seeks to impose on Canada a substantive obligation not contemplated under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In so doing, Chinese Taipei ignores the flexibility inherent in an investigating authority's discretion when applying facts available.

VI. THE CBSA'S PROSPECTIVE TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT MODELS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

20. Chinese Taipei claims that the duties imposed by the CBSA would necessarily exceed the margin of dumping from the original investigation and thus contravene the general rule under Article 9.3. Its claim, however, fails to address the relationship between Article 9.3 and Article 9.3.2. Article 9.3.2 sets two primary conditions for the availability of a refund: first, an importer of subject goods must have paid anti-dumping duties; and second, an importer must have requested a refund for overpayment with respect to those duties. Chinese Taipei has provided no evidence that any exports of new product models have been subject to an initial duty assessment, let alone an assessment that has been subject to a refund request.

21. Chinese Taipei's claim also ignores that, in a prospective normal value system, the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment. Under the Canadian system, the re-determination mechanism allows an importer to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values and guarantees that any excess duties collected are refunded. Moreover, the re-investigation mechanism allows an exporter to receive normal values for new product models in advance of their shipment.

22. Chinese Taipei also continues to incorrectly argue that the margin of dumping from the original investigation sets an upper limit on duty assessment. The Panel Reports in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and EC – Salmon (Norway) directly contradict Chinese Taipei's argument.

23. Moreover, by arguing that an investigating authority is required to apply the margin of dumping calculated during the original investigation, Chinese Taipei improperly suggests that there is a particular methodology for assessing duties on new product models in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the Agreement contains no such rule. Consistent with the CBSA's approach, this lacuna permits an investigating authority a measure of flexibility with respect to the treatment of new models for duty assessment purposes.

24. Chinese Taipei further argues that the CBSA violated Article 6.8 by relying on facts available to prospectively establish normal values for new product models. However, Chinese Taipei ignores that, without being able to rely on facts available, the CBSA would simply be unable to establish normal values for uninvestigated models, which would prevent the CBSA from being able to assess duties on new product models and would create a gap in the anti-dumping disciplines.
25. With respect to the CBSA’s selection of available facts, the lack of information about uninvestigated product models requires caution to ensure that any dumping is fully offset. An initial duty rate based on a ministerial specification is therefore appropriate. However, the available review mechanisms ensure that uninvestigated products receive model-specific normal values and corresponding duty assessments.

26. Chinese Taipei also argues that the CBSA violated Article 2.2 because using facts available to establish a normal value cannot be consistent with any of the methodologies under Article 2.2 since the conditions for resorting to facts available were not fulfilled. However, Canada has already demonstrated that it is necessary and consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the CBSA to resort to facts available to prospectively establish normal values for new product models.

27. Chinese Taipei further claims that the CBSA violated Article 6.10 to the extent the Panel considers that the CBSA determined a separate margin of dumping for new product models from cooperating exporters. In its first written submission, however, Canada demonstrated that the CBSA’s prospective treatment of new product models during duty assessment would not result in the determination of a second margin of dumping.

VII. SIMA IS NOT INCONSISTENT "AS SUCH" WITH ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING

28. Chinese Taipei claims that SIMA is inconsistent "as such" with Article 5.8. It argues that SIMA provides for termination of an investigation only where a country-based margin of dumping is de minimis.

29. Even if Article 5.8 were to be interpreted as requiring exporter-specific termination, Subsection 43(1) of SIMA provides the CITT with the discretion necessary to exclude an exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping from an injury finding and therefore to terminate the investigation with respect to that exporter.

30. In order to establish an "as such" violation, Chinese Taipei must demonstrate that Canada’s conduct will necessarily be inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Contrary to Chinese Taipei’s argument, the CITT’s discretion to act inconsistently with Article 5.8 does not support the existence of an "as such" violation, as the CITT also has the discretion to act consistently with Article 5.8.

31. The CITT’s discretion to exclude exporters, including exporters with de minimis margins of dumping, from an injury finding is clear on the face of Subsection 43(1) of SIMA. This discretion is well established in Canadian law. No definitive anti-dumping duties would be imposed on imports from such an excluded exporter. The exclusion of the exporter from the injury finding would constitute immediate termination as described by the Appellate Body.

VIII. CONCLUSION

32. For the reasons presented, Canada submits that Chinese Taipei’s claims have no merit and should be rejected by this Panel.
## ANNEX D

ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-2 Executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>D-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Norway</td>
<td>D-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>D-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D-5 Executive summary of the arguments of the United States</td>
<td>D-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL

1. Brazil’s participation in this dispute focused, initially, in three main aspects of the case: (I) the treatment given to individual exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping; (II) the treatment of non-dumped imports in the injury and causation analyses; and (III) the treatment of other factors besides the dumped imports in the causation analysis.

2. Regarding the first aspect (I), Brazil argued that the investigation should have been terminated with respect to the exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be *de minimis*. The combined interpretation of the articles mentioned by TPKM, as supported by the jurisprudence, leads to the conclusion that during an investigation the competent authority should take into account individual margins of dumping for each exporter or producer, whenever it is possible for the authority to determine them.

3. In the answers to the panel's questions, Brazil further clarified that the second sentence of Article 5.8 refers essentially to a final determination of dumping. Thus, the termination of an investigation related to an individual producer with a *de minimis* margin of dumping will, in general, occur after the final determination. A termination prior to the final determination will depend on the information provided by the individual exporter, which may convince the investigating authority about the inexistence or a *de minimis* margin of dumping even before the final determination.

4. It is important to underscore that the investigating authority cannot rely on a country-wide margin of dumping when the individual margins are determined. An individual exporter found not to be dumping must not be subject to additional Anti-Dumping Duties.

5. As the Appellate Body has already clarified in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, “the term ‘margin of dumping’ in Article 5.8 refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping”\(^1\).

6. Brazil also made a point related to the fact that Canada did not violate Article 6.10 of the ADA. The obligation contained in this Article is that the investigating authority must "determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer". The individual margins were determined, but Canada failed to use it properly, as it did not terminate the investigation concerning those exporters within a *de minimis* margin. The mere fact that the CBSA calculated a country-based margin of dumping does not in itself violates Article 6.10, and such calculation may be used for other purposes in the ADA, such as in Article 3.3(a).

7. In Brazil's answers to the Panel's questions concerning the matter of the termination of an investigation concerning individual exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping two additional issues were raised: the redundancy of Article 9.4 of the ADA and the application of provisional antidumping duties on exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

8. Concerning the first item, Brazil is of the opinion that there is no redundancy in Article 9.4. Brazil argued that Canada's statement that "[t]he application of duties contemplated in Article 9.4 takes place during the period of duty assessment after an investigation is completed" is not correct, and that the method of calculating duties foreseen in Article 9.4 may also be applied to the determination of provisional duties, according to Article 7.5 of the ADA.

9. Additionally, Brazil presented an understanding to the panel that Articles 7.1 (ii), 7.5 and 9.2 of the ADA preclude the application of antidumping duties on exporters with a *de minimis* margin of dumping, regardless of whether the determination is preliminary or final, if the investigating authority is clearly satisfied with the determination of the *de minimis* margin of dumping. In Brazil's case, in general, the decision concerning the termination of the investigation

\[^1\] *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice*, para. 216.
concerning the producer with a de minimis margin would only take place after the final determination. However, as already stated, that may not be the case in other countries.

10. In view of the above, since Brazil agrees that the investigation should have been terminated with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be de minimis, it acknowledges that provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties could not have been imposed on imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.

11. Concerning the treatment of non-dumped imports for the purposes of the injury and causation analysis (II), Brazil agreed with TPKM that the term "dumped imports" does not legally include imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping. As TPKM argued in its FWS, the DSB has already addressed this issue on different occasions. The Panel in EC – Salmon 2 stressed that:

"We consider that imports attributable to a producer or exporter for which a de minimis margin of dumping is calculated may not be treated as "dumped" for purposes of the injury analysis in that investigation. (...) In our view, a finding of de minimis dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer or exporter in question. If there is no legally cognizable dumping by a particular producer or exporter, as a result of a finding of de minimis margins, then it seems inescapable to us that imports attributable to such producer or exporter may not be treated as 'dumped' imports for any aspect of that investigation."

12. In addition, Brazil argued that the Panel in EC – Fasteners 3 noted that "the consideration of 'dumped imports' for purposes of making an injury determination consistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement entails the consideration of only those imports for which a margin of dumping greater than de minimis is established in the course of the investigation."

13. Therefore, Brazil reaffirms its understanding that imports of producers with a de minimis margin should not have been considered in the injury and causation analyses.

14. The last point Brazil made during the proceedings is related to the treatment of other factors besides the dumped imports in the causation analysis (III). TPKM claimed that Canada had violated Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA, as it failed to examine all known factors other than the alleged dumped imports which were at the same time injuring the domestic injury and failed to ensure that the injuries caused by such factors were not attributed to the alleged dumped imports, Brazil presented an opinion that the legal standard brought forth by TPKM may not be entirely accurate.

15. To better understand the factual situation and the disciplines that should have been applied to it, it must be taken into account that the Canadian investigating authority did not reach an affirmative determination of material injury, as stated in CITT’s Finding and Reasons, Injury Inquiry (Exhibit TPKM-14):

"153. In summary, the Tribunal acknowledges that the domestic industry, as a whole, sustained some injury during certain periods of the POI. The domestic industry lost certain market opportunities due to the presence of the subject goods in the Canadian market; however, the Tribunal is of the view that the resulting impact on the domestic industry has not been sufficiently adverse to constitute material injury.

154. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Tribunal finds that the dumping and subsidizing of the subject goods has not caused injury to the domestic industry." (emphasis added)

2 EC – Salmon, para. 7.625.
3 EC – Fasteners, para. 7.354.
16. In view of the above, Canada decided to apply anti-dumping duties based on a threat of material injury to its industry, as authorized by Article VI.1 of GATT. In Brazil's opinion, if there was not an actual damage to the domestic industry, it is not possible to call for the analysis of the "other factors" mentioned in Article 3.5.

17. According to the opinion presented in Brazil's TPS, the legal standard that should guide the causation assessment in the present case should be that foreseen in Article 3.7, which also makes reference to the obligation of an investigating authority to take into consideration "other factors" that might contribute to a threat of damage to the domestic industry, such as those enshrined in subheadings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Article 3.7.

18. Brazil upheld, nevertheless, that the Panel has the authority to settle that the factors mentioned by TPKM should have been taken into account, for the roster of other factors in the subheadings of Article 3.7 appears to be merely illustrative, given the use of the expression "inter alia".
1 INTRODUCTION

1. The European Union intervenes in this case because of its systemic interest in the correct and consistent interpretation and application of the covered agreements and other relevant documents, and the multilateral nature of the obligations contained therein, in particular the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2 OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

2.1 THE TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A *DE MINIMIS* MARGIN OF DUMPING

2. According to Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, investigations shall be terminated when the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*. *De minimis* is defined in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a threshold for the margin of dumping of less than 2%.

3. The European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has already clarified that the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 refers to "individual" margins of dumping of the exporters, as opposed to a "country-wide" margin of dumping.

4. Pursuant to Article 5.8, the investigating authority is required to "immediately" terminate the investigation with respect to those *de minimis* producers and exclude them from the scope of the application of antidumping duties imposed following that investigation.

5. In addition, the Appellate Body held that dumping is the result of the pricing behaviour of individual exporters or foreign producers and noted that other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also make it clear that "dumping" and "margins of dumping" relate to the exporter or foreign producer.

6. With regard to the temporal dimension of the determination envisaged in the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Union considers that "determine" refers to the final or definitive determinations made by the authorities of a WTO Member.

7. The issuance of the order that establishes anti-dumping duties – or the decision not to issue an order – is the ultimate step of the "investigation" contemplated in Article 5.8; in most cases, an investigation is "terminated" with the issuance of an order or a decision not to issue an order. This ultimate step necessarily follows the final determination.

8. Articles 6.8 and 6.14 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement appear to envisage that the authorities of a Member may reach "preliminary or final determinations, [whether] affirmative or negative". However, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not mention examples of preliminary negative determinations. By contrast, it refers to preliminary affirmative determinations, namely in Article 7 governing the application of provisional measures.

9. The Article 5.8 provides for two situations where an investigating authority is to immediately terminate an investigation: in case the authority makes a negative determination of dumping (first sentence) or in case it determines that the dumping margin is *de minimis* or the volume of imports is negligible (second sentence).

10. The first sentence of Article 5.8 requires the application of the domestic industry to be rejected, and the investigation to be terminated promptly, as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. The negative determination of dumping mentioned in this provision
appears to be final or definitive in character in respect of any individual exporters concerned by it, even if the investigation may continue in respect of other exporters of the subject product.

11. Similarly, the second sentence of Article 5.8 requires immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is *de minimis*, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. Again, the determinations mentioned in this provision cannot be deemed preliminary, since they do not stand to be confirmed or modified in the course of the investigation.

12. According to Canada, this was the case in the Welded Pipe investigation. In its final determination of dumping, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), found that Turkey’s country-based margin of dumping was *de minimis* and terminated the investigation against Turkey.

13. On the other hand, "a preliminary affirmative determination [...] of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry" as required by Article 7.1 (ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the application of provisional measures, stands to be confirmed or modified by the final determination reached as a result of the investigation.

14. Pursuant to Article 7.2, where provisional measures take the form of a provisional duty, their amount must not exceed the provisionally estimated margin of dumping.

15. Article 6.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that the authorities shall, during the course of an investigation, satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based.

16. Therefore, an investigating authority will only be in a position to determine that a margin of dumping is *de minimis* once it has sufficient evidence before it to confirm the information supplied by interested parties in that regard. The immediate termination required by the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement can only take place at the stage where a final determination is reached, which in the practice of certain Members may coincide with the closing of the investigation. While the second sentence of Article 5.8 does not distinguish between preliminary and final, the determination in this provision can only be understood as definitive or final in the sense that only when the authorities of a Member are finally satisfied that a margin of dumping is *de minimis* are they under the obligation to immediately terminate the investigation in respect of the exporter.

17. Canada seeks to reverse in the present case the understanding that the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 refers to "individual" margins of dumping of the exporters and provides several reasons for that purpose.

18. For instance, Canada asserts that the exclusion of zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping from the weighted average margin of dumping or weighted average normal value mentioned in Article 9.4 confirms that an investigation is only terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is *de minimis*.

19. The European Union fails to see why the termination of the investigation in respect of individual exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping, as required by the second sentence of Article 5.8, would render part of Article 9.4 redundant. As already mentioned, the termination of the investigation in respect of individual exporters with *de minimis* margins of dumping can only take place following a final determination. That final determination is only made once the investigation is deemed completed in respect of the individual exporters found to have a *de minimis* margin of dumping.

20. In addition, the European Union notes that Article 9.4 also obliges the authorities concerned to disregard zero margins of dumping. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 5.8, the authorities may have determined even earlier in the course of the investigation that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping in so far as certain exporters are concerned. Moreover, nothing in the language of Article 9.4 confirms that an investigation is terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is *de minimis*. 
21. As Canada seeks to reverse previous Appellate Body findings with respect to previously decided legal issues, the European Union recalls that panels are expected, even in practice “obliged” to follow previous Appellate Body reports. The European Union notes that the Appellate Body already addressed the relevance of previous panel and Appellate Body reports. In particular, the Appellate Body clarified the role of its previous reports and indicated how panels should act in cases where the same legal issues arise.

22. The European Union fully agrees with the relevant statements of the Appellate Body in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) without reservation. In this respect, the final sentence of paragraph 160 of the report refers to “an adjudicatory body”, which covers the situation in which the Appellate Body might be called upon to resolve the same legal issue that it has already resolved.

23. The European Union notes that the Appellate Body refers to "cogent reasons" as the basis for a change in view. While the reference to "cogent reasons" is not treaty language, it is indicative of the fact that for reasons related to security and predictability there is a high threshold for departing from the case law clarifying a certain legal issue. For instance, in China – Rare Earths the respondent unsuccessfully sought to reverse the Appellate Body's findings in China – Raw Materials, according to which a proper interpretation of Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol did not make available to China the exceptions in Article XX of the GATT 1994.

24. The European Union notes that paragraph 161 of the Appellate Body Report in US - Stainless Steel (Mexico) addresses the hierarchical relationship between panels and the Appellate Body. It concludes that the relevance of clarification provided by the Appellate Body on issues of legal interpretation is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a specific case. There is no express reference to "cogent reasons". Finally, in paragraph 162 of the Appellate Body Report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) the Appellate Body states that it was deeply concerned about the panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues.

25. In other words, WTO panels must –in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU– make an objective assessment of the matter before them, including an objective assessment of conformity with the relevant covered agreements. For this purpose, panels must correctly apply the law; in the context of this dispute this also means that the Panel should follow the rulings of the Appellate Body where the Appellate Body has previously interpreted the same legal questions. Otherwise, the task of providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, as enshrined in Article 3.2 of the DSU, would be put in serious danger.

2.2 THE TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS AND OF FACTORS OTHER THAN THE DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION ANALYSES

26. The European Union understands that the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) found that it was not possible to isolate the effects caused by the dumping from the effects caused by the subsidising, and thus did not consider the fact that the imports from India were also subsidised as irrelevant. However, Canada maintains that it was irrelevant to the CITT’s decision that the imports from India were also subsidized.

27. The European Union notes that "cross-cumulation" is not treaty language but rather language used by panels and the Appellate Body in describing a situation of the kind at issue in the present case.

28. While acknowledging the differences between the specificities of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, the European Union recalls that in the context of Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement the Appellate Body has found that the respective article does not authorize investigating authorities to assess cumulatively the effects of imports that are not subject to simultaneous countervailing duty investigations with the effects of imports that are subject to countervailing duty investigations.

29. The European Union understands the difficulties an investigating authority is facing when isolating the effects of dumping from subsidization. However, according to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an investigating authority must demonstrate that the dumped imports, "through the effects of dumping", are causing injury to the domestic industry within the meaning
of that Agreement. The European Union is of the view that, as long as the prices are found to be dumped, subsidisation causing the dumping is irrelevant for the injury and causation analysis under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

30. In the view of the European Union, such subsidisation should not be considered under non-attribution analysis as an “other factor” of injury causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports, (i.e. it should not be considered as another factor that must be separated from or must not be attributed to the effects of dumped imports in the sense of Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). In EU – Footwear (China), the complainant argued that the surge in dumped imports was caused by a variety of factors such as the abolition of preferential tariff treatment and quotas. The panel clearly found that one is not required to investigate the reasons as to why dumping is taking place.

31. Also, in the view of the European Union, such subsidisation is not relevant for demonstrating the causal relationship between dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry, as the injury caused to the domestic industry by dumped imports that result from subsidisation is still directly attributable to dumping. To be relevant, subsidisation would have to drive down the export price without increasing the dumping margin.

32. Finally, the European Union also recalls that the SCM Agreement provides for the possibility of the imposition of countervailing duties if the respective conditions are met.

2.3 DUMPING DETERMINATION AND DETERMINATION OF DUTY RATE FOR ALL OTHER EXPORTERS

33. TPKM submits that Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its determination of the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters". TPKM argues that the CBSA has failed to evaluate and assess in a comparative manner the information that was on the record, in particular information provided by the three cooperating TPKM exporters.

34. Canada responds that the CBSA's use of facts available to determine the dumping margin and duty rate for "all other exporters" did not violate Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

35. Canada confirms that, for the exporters that failed to provide sufficient information, despite being explicitly cautioned against non-cooperation, the CBSA established normal values on the basis of facts available. However, Canada argues that CBSA's approach was based on reasonable inferences concerning exporters that decided not to participate in the investigation. If that approach were deemed punitive, exporters could actually benefit from a lack of cooperation. Moreover, Canada maintains that CBSA's use of facts available was comparative and took into account all of the information on the record.

36. The European Union agrees that an investigating authority is not prohibited, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, from using an inference that may be "adverse to the interests" of non-cooperating exporters.

37. Although Appellate Body and panel reports have emphasised that the purpose of the facts available mechanism "is not to punish non-cooperation by interested parties", but rather to "ensure that the failure of an interested party to provide necessary information does not hinder an agency's investigation", this does not preclude an investigating authority from taking account of facts that are detrimental to the interests of non-cooperating parties. The final sentence of Annex II, paragraph 7, explicitly envisages the possibility that "if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate."

38. The CBSA gave notice to all known foreign exporters of CSWP to Canada of the consequences of failing to provide information. To the extent that the facts selected for establishing normal values are not devoid of factual foundation and can contribute to arriving at an accurate determination for those exporters that chose not to cooperate, the European Union
considers that the selection of unfavourable facts is not inconsistent with a Member's obligations under Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2.4 TREATMENT OF NEW PRODUCT TYPES

39. With respect to the treatment of new product types to be exported by cooperating producers, TPKM submits that Canada violated Articles 9.3, 6.8 and Annex II, as well as Articles 2.2 and 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, as a consequence, Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.

40. According to TPKM, Canada violated Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the anti-dumping duties imposed on "new product types" exceed the margin of dumping established for each cooperating exporter. Canada violated Article 6.8 and Annex II because it resorted to "facts available" in a case where the TPKM cooperating exporters have not refused to provide the necessary information.

41. Canada contests all the claims put forward by TPKM in respect of CBSA's treatment of new product models. Canada asserts that TPKM fundamentally misunderstands the operation of Canada's prospective duty assessment system and ignores the practical need to apply facts available to product models that were not exported during the original period of investigation.

42. Because the CBSA has no information pertaining to product models that were not exported during the initial period of investigation, it establishes their normal values on the basis of facts available, pursuant to a ministerial specification. Nevertheless, under Canada's prospective normal value system, exporters and importers have concrete options for obtaining specific normal values for new product models.

43. Canada points out that when an importer believes that anti-dumping duties were improperly collected it can apply for a refund to ensure that final duty assessment is based on accurate normal values. TPKM's claim that the application of the ministerial specification to new models will necessarily result in duties that exceed the margin of dumping for cooperating exporters ignores that under a prospective duty system the initial collection of anti-dumping duties is not the final stage of duty assessment.

44. The European Union understands that Canada operates a prospective duty assessment system, which is explicitly authorised under Article 9.3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is in the nature of such a system that anti-dumping duties assessed on a prospective basis are subject to final assessment, so that the importer of the product is entitled to obtain, upon request, a prompt refund of any such duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping.

45. Provided that all the obligations in Article 9.3.2 are complied with, the European Union regards the operation of a prospective duty assessment system, and its application to new types or models of products subject to an anti-dumping investigation, as being consistent with the basic requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

46. As regards the level of the duty that may be collected at the time of initial assessment, the European Union is of the opinion that such level should not be excessive, in the sense that it should comply with the conditions laid down in Article 9.2.

47. In addition, Annex II, paragraph 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement suggests that the investigating authority should not be unduly strict in examining and deciding on the relevance of information already provided by cooperating exporters, in view of establishing prospective normal values for new types or models of the subject product.

2.5 AS SUCH CLAIMS

48. TPKM alleges that certain provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR) are inconsistent as such with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
49. Canada differentiates between mandatory and discretionary acts, considering that an as such violation of an obligation in a covered agreement cannot occur when a Member has the discretion necessary to act consistently with that obligation.

50. In this context, the European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has stated that the "mandatory/discretionary distinction" is an analytical tool which may vary from case to case and such a distinction should not be applied in a mechanistic fashion.

51. The European Union also notes that the Appellate Body has considered that "as such" challenges to a Member's legislation are "serious challenges", particularly as Members are presumed to have enacted their laws in good faith.

52. With regard to the type of evidence that is required to be considered in order to establish the content and meaning of municipal law, the Appellate Body has clarified that, in some cases, the text of the relevant legislation may suffice, while in other cases evidence beyond the text of the measure at issue may be required, related to the consistent application of the measure, pronouncements of domestic courts, and the writings of recognized scholars.

53. Finally, the Appellate Body has found that the starting point for an analysis when a measure is challenged "as such" must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of the measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure as such can be assessed on that basis alone.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The European Union hopes that its contribution in the present case will be helpful to the Panel in objectively assessing the matter before it and in developing the respective legal interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
ANNEX D-3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF NORWAY

I. ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: THE DETERMINATION OF DE MINIMIS MARGINS OF DUMPING IS PRODUCER-SPECIFIC RATHER THAN COUNTRY-WIDE

1. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (hereinafter “TPKM”) submits that Canada ignored the individual margins of dumping calculated for each exporter. Instead, it relied on the country-wide margins of dumping in order to determine whether the margins of dumping were de minimis. Accordingly, Canada did not terminate the investigation with respect to individual exporters whose definitive margins of dumping were found to be de minimis if the corresponding country-wide margin of dumping was 2% or more. TPKM further submits that this entails a violation of Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

2. Canada submits that the obligation contained in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation when the margin of dumping is de minimis pertains to a country rather than the individual producer. The termination of an investigation is thus only required when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis, according to Canada.

3. Norway respectfully disagrees with the position that the requirement to immediately terminate an investigation pertains to a country rather than the individual producer. Norway holds that the determination of de minimis dumping is by nature producer-specific. The wording of Article 5.8, as well as the context and the consistency with the other Articles of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, clearly leads to this conclusion. Accordingly, as TPKM points out, the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice reached this very same conclusion on this exact question.

4. The panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, found that the term "margin of dumping" in the Anti-Dumping Agreement refers to "the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping". The panel found evidence for this in Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which stipulates that "the authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation". The exception to this rule also provides for the calculation of individual margins of dumping, and does not envisage the calculation of a country-wide margin. The panel then went on to examine the rest of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to see whether there were any provisions that would contradict this finding. Upon completing this analysis, the panel ultimately concluded that "whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter.”

5. The Appellate Body not only confirmed this finding and expressly agreed with the Panel’s reasoning, but also added that this conclusion was indeed in line with the use of the term “margins of dumping” in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the finding by the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel that this term referred to the individual margin of dumping of an producer.

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1 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 53.
2 First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 54.
3 First Written Submission of Canada, para. 46.
5 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.137.
6 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140.
6. Norway would like to underline that both the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice pointed out that although there is a single investigation (and not as many investigations as there are exporters), Article 5.8 simply requires the termination of the investigation in respect of the individual exporter or producer for which a zero or de minimis margin is established. Hence, contrary to what Canada argues, the ordinary meaning of the terms "investigation" and "termination", as well as the context provided by the rest of Article 5 in general and Article 5.8 in particular, do not imply that termination of an investigation is required on a country-wide basis. Rather, the ordinary meaning of these terms and the context of the rest of Article 5 and Article 5.8 provide support for the producer-specific interpretation, as laid down by previous panels and the Appellate Body.

7. As for the immediate context of Article 5.8, the panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice found it relevant that the second sentence of the paragraph stipulates that negligibility, the other basis upon which immediate termination is required, is to be determined in respect of the volume of dumped imports “from a particular country”. Thus, while the Anti-Dumping Agreement expressly stipulates that the negligibility test is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is made with regard to the margin of dumping. The panel concluded that this context further confirmed their view that the reference to the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 is a reference to the individual margin of dumping which is to be determined on an exporter-specific basis. The Appellate Body confirmed the panel's reasoning on this point. Clearly, Canada's assertion that the panel and Appellate Body’s findings with regards to Article 5.8 are undermined because they failed to properly consider the context of Article 5 in general and Article 5.8 in particular is flawed. As set out above, this context was indeed a part of the analysis.

8. Canada further argues that the context of Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes it clear that Article 5.8 requires that an investigation need only be terminated when the country-based margin of dumping is de minimis. As Norway understands it, Canada argues that as Article 9.4 refers to the disregarding of zero and de minimis margins of dumping, this means that the investigation is not terminated with respect to these individual exporters. Therefore, this exclusion of de minimis dumping margins confirms that an investigation is only terminated pursuant to Article 5.8 when the margin of dumping of a country is de minimis. Norway disagrees with this line of reasoning.

9. Article 9.4 contains special rules for the imposition of anti-dumping duties where the authorities have resorted to sampling of exporters. For the non-sampled producers, the anti-dumping duty imposed may not exceed the weighted-average dumping margin established for the sampled producers, with the exception of any de minimis dumping margins. In Norway’s view, this reference to the formula for calculation of anti-dumping duties when sampling is involved cannot be read as a reference to when an investigation is to be considered terminated in accordance with Article 5.8. There is nothing in the wording of Article 9.4 that suggests such a reading and it is indeed a completely different question.

10. Contrary to what Canada argues, an interpretation of Article 5.8 supporting termination of an investigation with respect to an individual exporter with a de minimis margin of dumping would not make parts of Article 9.4 redundant and therefore be at odds with the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Quite the opposite – such an interpretation would be in line with the system of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Where dumping margins are established as de minimis or zero, the investigation is to be terminated with respect to these individual producers, in line with Article 5.8, as established by the panel and the Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice. Hence, these margins of dumping should not be used as a basis for calculating anti-dumping duties when sampling is involved either. A different interpretation could lead to a situation where anti-dumping duties are not calculated for the individual producers with zero or de minimis margins of dumping, while these dumping margins could be used in the calculation of

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8 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140, and Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 218.
9 First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 52, 63, 72 and 91.
10 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.141.
11 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 217.
12 First Written Submission of Canada, para. 88.
13 First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 76-81.
14 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.140, and Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 218.
duties for non-sampled producers. This would clearly be at odds with the system of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

11. Accordingly, it is Norway's view that the context of Article 9.4 does not support an interpretation where the obligation in Article 5.8 to terminate an investigation where the margin of dumping is *de minimis* pertains to a country. On the contrary, it supports the interpretation where this duty pertains to the individual producer. The consistency of the system, and the numerous references in Article 9.4 to the individual exporters and producers, clearly lead to this conclusion.

12. Canada further argues that Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides relevant context for interpreting the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8. Once again, the Appellate Body has previously addressed this issue and concluded that "Article 3.3 does not provide useful context for interpreting the term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8". Norway cannot see that Canada offers any new arguments that would render a different result. Furthermore, Canada's assertion that the Appellate Body in *Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice* endorsed the panel's analysis under Article 5.8 without referring to the panel's alleged ignorance of Article 3.3, is clearly flawed. As evidenced by the Appellate Body analysis recited above, the Appellate Body expressly considered Article 3.3 in coming to its conclusion regarding Article 5.8. Canada's submission that the Appellate Body's finding is undermined due to this "flaw" thus clearly has no basis in reality.

13. Norway thus agrees with TPKM that Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires WTO Members to terminate anti-dumping investigations with respect to individual exporters that have a *de minimis* margin of dumping. Where all investigated exporters are found to have *de minimis* margins of dumping, this individual producer-specific determination will be extended to a country-wide basis. However, this does not change the producer-specific nature of the determination, but rather follows as a logical consequence of this fact.

II. THE ROLE OF PREVIOUS REPORTS

14. As the question discussed above regarding Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has largely been addressed by previous panels and the Appellate Body, Norway would like to emphasise the role of previous reports in the WTO dispute settlement system. The very basis of the system is that reports are binding only on the parties to the dispute. The Appellate Body has however underlined "that adopted panel and Appellate Body reports create legitimate expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. Following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, it is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same. This is also in line with a key objective of the dispute settlement system to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system." Norway would add that by following previous Appellate Body reports, panels also contribute to ensuring fewer disputes and preserve both the system and the systemic function of the Appellate Body.

15 First Written Submission of Canada, paras. 82-83.
17 First Written Submission of Canada, para. 87.
ANNEX D-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

I. ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE AD AGREEMENT: TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS WITH A DE MINIMIS MARGIN OF DUMPING

1. TPKM has set out in considerable detail how Canada violated Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement because it failed to immediately terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters whose final margins of dumping were found to be de minimis within the meaning of that provision.\(^1\) The UAE shares the analysis provided by TPKM in its submission as it is justified by the language of the AD Agreement and confirmed by previous Panels and the Appellate Body. Indeed, article 5.8 of the AD Agreement reads as follows. The Export price is intrinsically firm-specific and not country-wide margin.

2. The UAE considers relevant in this respect that the fourth sentence of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement supports the view that the de minimis standard is to be applied on a firm-specific basis and not country wide basis. That sentence is drafted in such manner that the term “volume” refers to a country wide basis unlike the term “de minimis dumping margin” expressly involves firm-specific basis. The drafters of the AD Agreement expressly utilized different stipulations in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement. The UAE believes that the construction and the express language of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement leave no discretion to the investigating authority other than as stated by Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement that there “shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis”.

3. The UAE agrees with TPKM that previous panels have reached and confirmed TPKM assertions that there shall be immediate termination of the AD investigation with respect to exporters that have an individual de minimis margin of dumping.\(^2\)

4. Additionally, the UAE considers that the examination of other provisions of the AD Agreement provides that whenever the Agreement refers to the determination of a margin of dumping, it refers to the margin of dumping determined for the individual exporter.\(^3\) Therefore, the UAE agrees with TPKM that the term margin of dumping in the AD Agreement is company-specific rather than country-wide.

II. ARTICLES 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 AND 3.7 OF THE AD AGREEMENT: TREATMENT OF NON-DUMPED IMPORTS IN THE INJURY AND CAUSATION DETERMINATIONS

5. TPKM contends that Canada violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement because it treated as “dumped imports” for the purposes of injury and causation analyses imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping.\(^4\)

6. The UAE agrees with TPKM’s arguments and analysis that by failing to exclude from the “dumped imports” the imports of exporters for which a de minimis dumping margin had been determined, the investigating authority acts inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement.\(^5\)

7. The UAE considers that there is nothing in Article 3 of the AD Agreement that provides for an investigating authority to include imports from exporters with a de minimis margin of dumping in the injury and causation determinations of dumped imports. Indeed, the UAE agrees with TPKM that the term dumped imports refers to all imports attributable to exporters for which a margin of dumping greater than de minimis has been calculated and not imports of exporters for which a de minimis dumping margin had been determined.

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\(^1\) First Written Submission of TPKM, paras. 43-56.
\(^2\) First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 52.
\(^3\) First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 47.
\(^4\) First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 108.
\(^5\) First Written Submission of TPKM, para. 133.
8. In light of the text of the AD Agreement in respect of the term "dumped imports" and in accordance with the relevant Dispute Settlement Body’s jurisprudence, the UAE considers that the term "dumped imports" does not enable an investigating authority under any conditions to include imports that are found non dumped in the determinations of injury and causality of "dumped imports" under Article 3 of the AD Agreement.

9. The UAE considers that Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement states a general and overarching principle that leaves no discretion for the investigating authority to have a different interpretation of the strict and clear meaning of this article. A different approach by including non-dumped imports in the injury and causation determinations does not meet the meaning of Article 3 of the AD Agreement nor corresponds to a determination made by an objective authority based on positive evidence. Neither reflects the intention of the drafters of the AD Agreement. The UAE considers that the language of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement using the term "dumped imports" would have no purpose if the determination of injury and causation includes non-dumped imports.
**ANNEX D-5**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In this submission, the United States will provide comments on certain legal issues involving the interpretation and application of Articles 5.8 and 6.8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("AD Agreement").

**II. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLE 5.8 OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

2. The United States, while taking no position on the merits of the factual allegations made by both parties, agrees with The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("TPKM") that a proper interpretation of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement requires that the investigating authority terminate an investigation with respect to an exporter or producer for which an individual margin of dumping is determined as zero or *de minimis*.

3. The term "margin of dumping" in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement refers to the margin of dumping for an individual exporter or producer, rather than the margin of dumping with respect to a country. Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement refers to the "margin of dumping" as "established with respect to the selected exporters or producers." Nothing in the text of Article 5.8 suggests that the term "margin of dumping" should be interpreted differently in Article 5.8 than in Article 9.4.

4. The text of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides additional contextual support for the view that an investigating authority must exclude individual exporters or producers from the antidumping measure if their individual "margin of dumping" is zero or *de minimis*. The fourth sentence of Article 5.8 states that the investigating authority's analysis of negligible imports is normally done on a country-wide basis. In the absence of similar language in Article 5.8 suggesting that the dumping analysis is to be done on a country-wide basis, the immediate context within Article 5.8 supports the conclusion that margin of dumping is to be determined on an individual, producer- or exporter-specific basis. The Appellate Body has supported this interpretation of Article 5.8.

5. Following that interpretation, the United States agrees with TPKM that an investigating authority acts inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement when it fails to terminate the investigation for exporters or producers which are found to have zero or *de minimis* margins, and instead relies on the results of the country-wide margin as a basis for including exporters with *de minimis* margins within the scope of the definitive antidumping measure. Once a zero or *de minimis* margin has been determined for a particular producer or exporter, the obligation under Article 5.8 for a "termination in cases" necessarily entails that the investigating authority cannot subject such an individual exporter or producer to an antidumping order.

6. Canada thus acted inconsistently with Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement to the extent that it calculated zero or *de minimis* margins of dumping for individual exporters, failed to terminate the investigation with respect to those exporters, and then issued a final dumping order covering those exporters.

**III. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLE 6.8 AND ANNEX II OF THE AD AGREEMENT**

7. Article 6.8 permits investigating authorities to apply the facts available in cases where an interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, information that is necessary to the investigation within a reasonable period of time, or significantly impedes the investigation. Annex II further reflects that an investigating authority's ability to rely on facts less favorable to the interests of a non-cooperating interested party is inherent in the authority's role in conducting...
an investigation in accordance with the AD Agreement. At the same time, the investigating authority must provide a sufficient basis for any application of the facts available.

8. To the extent that TPKM is alleging that CBSA has insufficiently explained the basis for its application of the facts available, the sufficiency of an investigating authority's explanations is dealt with under the procedural obligations under Article 12 of the AD Agreement, and not Article 6.8.

9. Accordingly, the Panel in this dispute should assess in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II whether the other exporters refused access to, or otherwise did not provide information that was necessary to the investigation within a reasonable period, or significantly impeded the investigation by CBSA. The Panel also should assess whether CBSA provided a sufficient basis for its application of the facts available to the "all other exporters."

IV. AS SUCH CLAIMS REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIMA

10. In this dispute, the United States does not take a position on whether Sections 2(1), 30.1, 35(1) and (2), 41(1), 42(1), 42(6), and 43(1) of the SIMA and Section 37(1) of the SIMR are, as such, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8 and 7.1(ii) of the AD Agreement. The Panel will need to assess whether the facts substantiate each party's assertions as to whether the SIMA and SIMR measures "require" certain action or provide "discretion" to Canada's investigating authority to take different action. To prevail on its claims, TPKM will need to demonstrate that SIMA and SIMR "requires" that Canada act in a WTO-inconsistent manner or precludes WTO-consistent action.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. THIRD-PARTY ORAL STATEMENT AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL WITH THE PARTIES

V. INTRODUCTION

11. The United States appreciates the opportunity to provide our views as a third party in this dispute. In our third-party submission, we presented views on a number of the issues pertaining to TPKM’s claims regarding the interpretation and application of Articles 5.8 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement. The United States will focus its remarks in our oral statement on two matters related to these claims pertaining to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, which were not addressed in the U.S. third-party submission.

VI. THE OBLIGATION OF PANELS TO FOLLOW PRIOR APPELLATE BODY FINDINGS

12. Before addressing those issues, the United States first would like to respond to certain statements made by two third parties regarding the role of Appellate Body reports in the dispute settlement system. The United States notes with concern that the European Union ("EU") and Norway have asserted that panels are obligated to follow prior Appellate Body findings.\(^1\) The United States understands these assertions to be without foundation and fundamentally incorrect, and this proposition as inconsistent with the text of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement").

13. The text of the DSU and WTO Agreement establish that in the WTO, adopted panel or Appellate Body legal findings are not "authoritative interpretations". To be sure, to the extent a panel finds prior Appellate Body or panel reasoning to be persuasive, a panel may rely on that reasoning in conducting its own objective assessment of the matter. However, there is no provision in the DSU that grants a panel the authority not to assess objectively the legal issues in dispute, including by applying customary rules of interpretation to the text of the covered agreements, nor does the DSU require, or permit, a panel to follow –without any examination– prior Appellate Body findings.

\(^1\) EU’s Third Party Submission, para. 10; Norway’s Third Party Submission, para. 13.
VII. CLAIMS REGARDING ARTICLES 3.1 AND 3.5 OF THE AD AGREEMENT

14. Turning to TPKM's claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, the United States views those claims as lacking in legal merit. The United States finds no support in the text of the AD Agreement for TPKM's argument that Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement required Canada to examine "the effects of subsidies" applicable to the dumped imports as an "other known factor" that is somehow separate from the effects of the dumped imports. An investigating authority is not required to assess the effects of any subsidies on dumped imports separately from the effects of the dumped imports themselves under Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Consequently, this Panel should not find that Canada acted inconsistently under Article 3.5 to the AD Agreement to the extent that the Canada Border Services Agency did not examine the effects of India's alleged subsidies as an "other known factor" injuring the domestic industry.

2 TPKM's First Written Submission, paras. 135, 145.