

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANTING
OF TARIFF PREFERENCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

AB-2004-1

Report of the Appellate Body

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants	5
	A. <i>Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant</i>	5
	1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause	5
	2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause	9
	B. <i>Arguments of India – Appellee</i>	15
	1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause	15
	2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause	18
	C. <i>Arguments of the Third Participants</i>	22
	1. Andean Community	22
	2. Costa Rica	24
	3. Panama.....	24
	4. Paraguay	26
	5. United States	27
III.	Issues Raised in This Appeal	29
IV.	The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause	30
	A. <i>The Panel's Analysis and the Arguments on Appeal</i>	30
	B. <i>Relevance of the Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause for the Allocation of the Burden of Proof</i>	33
	C. <i>Characterization of the Enabling Clause</i>	34
	1. Text of Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause	34
	2. Object and Purpose of the <i>WTO Agreement</i> and the Enabling Clause	36
	D. <i>Burden of Proof</i>	41
	1. Responsibility for Raising the Enabling Clause	42
	2. Whether India Raised the Enabling Clause Before the Panel.....	49
V.	Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause.....	52
	A. <i>Panel Findings</i>	54
	B. <i>Interpretation of the Term "Non-Discriminatory" in Footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause</i>	58
	C. <i>The Words "Developing Countries" in Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause</i>	70
	D. <i>Consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause</i>	71
VI.	Findings and Conclusions	76
Annex 1	Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS246/7	79
Annex 2	Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Document L/4903.....	81

TABLE OF CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT

Short Title	Full Case Title and Citation
<i>Argentina – Footwear (EC)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear</i> , WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 515
<i>Brazil – Aircraft</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft</i> , WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1161
<i>Brazil – Desiccated Coconut</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut</i> , WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, 167
<i>Canada – Autos</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry</i> , WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, 2995
<i>Canada – FIRA</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act</i> , L/5504, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140
<i>Canada – Ice Cream and Yoghurt</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt</i> , L/6568, adopted 5 December 1989, BISD 36S/68
<i>Chile – Price Band System</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products</i> , WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002
<i>EC – Bananas III</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas</i> , WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591
<i>EC – Hormones</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)</i> , WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135
<i>EC – Sardines</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines</i> , WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002
<i>EC – Tariff Preferences</i>	Panel Report, <i>European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries</i> , WT/DS246/R, circulated to Members 1 December 2003
<i>EEC – Dessert Apples</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples – Complaint by Chile</i> , L/6491, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/93
<i>Guatemala – Cement I</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico</i> , WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, DSR 1998:IX, 3767
<i>India – Quantitative Restrictions</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products</i> , WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 22 September 1999, DSR 1999:IV, 1763
<i>Japan – Agricultural Products I</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products</i> , L/6253, adopted 2 March 1988, BISD 35S/163
<i>Korea – Dairy</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products</i> , WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 3
<i>US – Carbon Steel</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany</i> , WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002

Short Title	Full Case Title and Citation
<i>US – Certain EC Products</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities</i> , WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 373
<i>US – Customs User Fee</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>United States – Customs User Fee</i> , L/6264, adopted 2 February 1988, BISD 35S/245
<i>US – FSC</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"</i> , WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III, 1619
<i>US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities</i> , WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002
<i>US – Gasoline</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline</i> , WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3
<i>US – Gasoline</i>	Panel Report, <i>United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline</i> , WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, 29
<i>US – Malt Beverages</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages</i> , DS23/R, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206
<i>US – MFN Footwear</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>United States – Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil</i> , DS18/R, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128
<i>US – Section 337</i>	GATT Panel Report, <i>United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930</i> , L/6439, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345
<i>US – Section 211 Appropriations Act</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998</i> , WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002
<i>US – Shrimp</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products</i> , WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755
<i>US – Wool Shirts and Blouses</i>	Appellate Body Report, <i>United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India</i> , WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323
<i>US – Wool Shirts and Blouses</i>	Panel Report, <i>United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India</i> , WT/DS33/R, adopted 23 May 1997, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, 343

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Description
1971 Waiver Decision	Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Document L/3545, 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24 (attached as Annex D-2 to the Panel Report)
1999 LDC Waiver	Waiver Decision on Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/304, 15 June 1999
Agreed Conclusions	Agreed Conclusions of the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences (attached as Annex D-4 to the Panel Report)
Charter of Algiers	Charter of Algiers, TD/38, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 on 24 October 1967
Drug Arrangements	Special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking, contained in the Regulation
DSU	<i>Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes</i>
Enabling Clause	Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203 (attached as Annex 2 to this Report)
GATT 1947	<i>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947</i>
GATT 1994	<i>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994</i>
General Arrangements	General arrangements described in Article 7 of the Regulation
General Principle Eight	General Principle Eight contained in the Final Act and Report adopted at the First Session of UNCTAD on 15 June 1964, at p. 20 (Exhibit EC-20 submitted by the European Communities to the Panel)
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
MFN	Most-favoured-nation
OECD Special Report	Report of the Special Group of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Trade with Developing Countries, TD/56, 29 January 1968
Regulation	Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, <i>Official Journal of the European Communities</i> , L Series, No. 346 (31 December 2001), p. 1 (Exhibit India-6 submitted by India to the Panel)
Resolution 21(II)	Resolution 21(II) of the Second Session of UNCTAD, entitled "Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Developing Countries" (attached as Annex D-3 to the Panel Report)
<i>SCM Agreement</i>	<i>Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures</i>
<i>SPS Agreement</i>	<i>Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures</i>
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
<i>Vienna Convention</i>	<i>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</i> , done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679
<i>Working Procedures</i>	<i>Working Procedures for Appellate Review</i> , WT/AB/WP/7, 1 May 2003
WTO	World Trade Organization
<i>WTO Agreement</i>	<i>Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization</i>

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
APPELLATE BODY

**European Communities – Conditions
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences
to Developing Countries**

European Communities, *Appellant*
India, *Appellee*

Bolivia, *Third Participant*
Brazil, *Third Participant*
Colombia, *Third Participant*
Costa Rica, *Third Participant*
Cuba, *Third Participant*
Ecuador, *Third Participant*
El Salvador, *Third Participant*
Guatemala, *Third Participant*
Honduras, *Third Participant*
Mauritius, *Third Participant*
Nicaragua, *Third Participant*
Pakistan, *Third Participant*
Panama, *Third Participant*
Paraguay, *Third Participant*
Peru, *Third Participant*
United States, *Third Participant*
Venezuela, *Third Participant*

AB-2004-1

Present:

Abi-Saab, Presiding Member
Baptista, Member
Sacerdoti, Member

I. Introduction

1. The European Communities appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, *European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries* (the "Panel Report").¹ The Panel was established to consider a complaint by India against the European Communities regarding the conditions under which the European Communities accords tariff preferences to developing countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 "applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004" (the "Regulation").²

¹WT/DS246/R, 1 December 2003.

²*Official Journal of the European Communities*, L Series, No. 346 (31 December 2001), p. 1 (Exhibit India-6 submitted by India to the Panel).

2. The Regulation provides for five preferential tariff "arrangements"³, namely:
- (a) general arrangements described in Article 7 of the Regulation (the "General Arrangements");
 - (b) special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights;
 - (c) special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment;
 - (d) special arrangements for least-developed countries; and
 - (e) special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking (the "Drug Arrangements").⁴

3. All the countries listed in Annex I to the Regulation are eligible to receive tariff preferences under the General Arrangements⁵, which provide, broadly, for suspension of Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed as "non-sensitive" and for reduction of Common Customs Tariff *ad valorem* duties on products listed as "sensitive".⁶ The General Arrangements are described in further detail in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of the Panel Report. The four other arrangements in the Regulation provide tariff preferences *in addition* to those granted under the General Arrangements.⁷ However, only some of the country beneficiaries of the General Arrangements are also beneficiaries of the other arrangements. Specifically, preferences under the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment are restricted to those countries that "are determined by the European Communities to comply with certain labour [or] environmental policy standards"⁸, respectively. Preferences under the special arrangements for least-developed countries are restricted to certain specified countries.⁹ Finally, preferences under the Drug Arrangements are provided only to 12 predetermined countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.¹⁰

³Regulation, Art. 1.2.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Panel Report, para. 2.4.

⁶Regulation, Arts. 7.1-7.2.

⁷*Ibid.*, Arts. 8-10. For example, these tariff preferences include further reductions in the duties imposed on certain "sensitive" products.

⁸Panel Report, para. 2.3. See Regulation, Arts. 14 and 21, and Annex I (Columns E and G).

⁹Regulation, Annex I (Column H).

¹⁰*Ibid.* (Column I); Panel Report, paras. 2.3 and 2.7.

4. India is a beneficiary of the General Arrangements but not of the Drug Arrangements, or of any of the other arrangements established by the Regulation. In its request for the establishment of a panel, India challenged the Drug Arrangements as well as the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the environment.¹¹ However, in a subsequent meeting with the Director-General regarding the composition of the Panel—and later in writing to the European Communities—India indicated its decision to limit its complaint to the Drug Arrangements, while reserving its right to bring additional complaints regarding the two "special incentive arrangements".¹² Accordingly, this dispute concerns only the Drug Arrangements.

5. The Panel summarized the effect of the Drug Arrangements as follows:

The result of the Regulation is that the tariff reductions accorded under the Drug Arrangements to the 12 beneficiary countries are greater than the tariff reductions granted under the General Arrangements to other developing countries. In respect of products that are included in the Drug Arrangements but not in the General Arrangements, the 12 beneficiary countries are granted *duty free* access to the European Communities' market, while all other developing countries must pay the *full duties applicable under the Common Customs Tariff*. In respect of products that are included in both the Drug Arrangements and the General Arrangements and that are deemed "sensitive" under column G of Annex IV to the Regulation with the exception for products of CN codes 0306 13, 1704 10 91 and 1704 10 99, the 12 beneficiary countries are granted *duty-free* access to the European Communities' market, while all other developing countries are entitled only to *reductions in the duties applicable under the Common Customs Tariff*.¹³ (original italics)

6. India requested the Panel to find that "the Drug Arrangements set out in Article 10"¹⁴ of the Regulation are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (the "GATT 1994") and are not justified by the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the "Enabling Clause").¹⁵ In the Panel Report, circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on 1 December 2003, the Panel concluded that:

¹¹Request for the establishment of a panel by India, WT/DS246/4, 9 December 2002, p. 2.

¹²Panel Report, para. 1.5.

¹³*Ibid.*, para. 2.8. See also, *ibid.*, para. 2.7.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, para. 3.1 (referring to India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 67).

¹⁵GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203 (attached as Annex 2 to this Report).

- (a) India has the burden of demonstrating that the European Communities' Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994;
- (b) India has demonstrated that the European Communities' Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994;
- (c) the European Communities has the burden of demonstrating that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause; [and]
- (d) the European Communities has failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause[.]¹⁶

The Panel also concluded that the European Communities had "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994".¹⁷ Finally, the Panel concluded, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (the "DSU"), that "because the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994 and not justified by Article 2(a) of the Enabling Clause or Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, the European Communities has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to India under GATT 1994."¹⁸

7. On 8 January 2004, the European Communities notified the Dispute Settlement Body of its intention to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Appeal¹⁹ pursuant to Rule 20 of the *Working Procedures for Appellate Review* (the "*Working Procedures*").²⁰ On 19 January 2004, the European Communities filed its appellant's submission.²¹ On 30 January 2004, Pakistan notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.²² On 2 February 2004, India filed its appellee's submission.²³ On the same day, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, and the United States each filed a third participant's submission, and Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela filed a joint third participant's submission as the Andean Community.²⁴ Also on 2 February 2004, Brazil notified its intention to make a statement at the oral

¹⁶Panel Report, para. 8.1(a)-(d).

¹⁷*Ibid.*, para. 8.1(e).

¹⁸*Ibid.*, para. 8.1(f).

¹⁹Notification of an appeal by the European Communities, WT/DS246/7, 8 January 2004 (attached as Annex 1 to this Report).

²⁰WT/AB/WP/7, 1 May 2003.

²¹Pursuant to Rule 21 of the *Working Procedures*.

²²Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the *Working Procedures*.

²³Pursuant to Rule 22 of the *Working Procedures*.

²⁴Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the *Working Procedures*.

hearing as a third participant, and Mauritius notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.²⁵ Finally, on 2 February 2004, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua jointly notified their intention to make a statement at the oral hearing as third participants.²⁶ On 4 February 2004, Cuba notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a third participant.²⁷ By letter dated 16 February 2004, Pakistan submitted a request to make a statement at the oral hearing.²⁸ No participant objected to Pakistan's request, which was authorized by the Division hearing the appeal on 18 February 2004.²⁹

8. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 19 February 2004. The participants and third participants presented oral arguments (with the exception of Cuba and Mauritius) and responded to questions posed by the Members of the Division hearing the appeal.

II. Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants

A. *Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant*

1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause

9. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and in assigning to the European Communities the burden of justifying the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause. Furthermore, the European Communities submits, the Panel erred in finding that Article I:1 applies to measures covered by the Enabling Clause. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's consequent finding that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and, because India made no claim with respect to the Enabling Clause, to refrain from assessing the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause.

10. According to the European Communities, the Panel's main reason for deciding that the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 was that the Enabling Clause does not provide "positive

²⁵Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the *Working Procedures*.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷Pursuant to Rule 24(4) of the *Working Procedures*.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Pursuant to Rule 27(3)(c) of the *Working Procedures*. The Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat advised Pakistan and the other participants in the appeal of the Division's decision by letter dated 18 February 2004.

rules establishing obligations in themselves".³⁰ In the European Communities' view, however, the fact that developed countries are not legally obliged to implement schemes pursuant to the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") does not mean that the Enabling Clause does not impose positive obligations, or that it is an exception to Article I:1. The European Communities argues that the Panel's reasoning suggests that, if a WTO provision applies only when a WTO Member takes a particular step that it is not obliged to take, that provision cannot create a positive obligation and must be an exception. According to the European Communities, this test is not consistent with Appellate Body decisions and "would lead to manifestly absurd results".³¹ For example, the European Communities contends, this test would mean that the following provisions do not impose positive rules establishing obligations in themselves, despite contrary reasoning in previous Appellate Body decisions: Article 27.4 of the *Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures* (the "SCM Agreement"); Article 3.3 of the *Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures* (the "SPS Agreement"); Article 2.4 of the *Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade*; and Article 6 of the *Agreement on Textiles and Clothing*.³² According to the European Communities, Articles VI and XIX of the GATT 1994 would also be rendered exceptions under the Panel's reasoning, contrary to well-established GATT and WTO panel practice.

11. The European Communities suggests that the Panel should have begun its analysis by examining the ordinary meaning of the word "notwithstanding" in the Enabling Clause. This ordinary meaning, in the view of the European Communities, does not compel the Panel's finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1. This is apparent from the dissenting opinion in the Panel Report and the Panel's own recognition that the definition of "notwithstanding" is not dispositive of this question. Therefore, the European Communities argues, in accordance with the basic rules of treaty interpretation in Article 31 of the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (the "Vienna Convention")³³, the Panel should have proceeded to examine the relevant "content"³⁴, context, and object and purpose of the Enabling Clause in order to identify the relationship between

³⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 32 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.35, itself quoting Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p. 16, DSR 1997:I, at 337).

³¹*Ibid.*, para. 34.

³²*Ibid.*, para. 35 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Brazil – Aircraft*, paras. 134-141; Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, paras. 97-104; Appellate Body Report, *EC – Sardines*, para. 275; and Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, pp. 12-17, DSR 1997:I, at 333-338).

³³Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.

³⁴European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 18 and 39, and heading 2.5.1.

the Enabling Clause and Article I:1. Instead, the European Communities observes, the Panel simply "assumed"³⁵ that the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1.

12. Turning to the content and context of the Enabling Clause, the European Communities submits that the Enabling Clause provides a comprehensive set of rules that positively regulate the substantive content of GSP schemes, to the exclusion of the rules in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Specifically, the European Communities emphasizes that the words "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause are distinct from and are intended to replace the most-favoured-nation ("MFN") obligation in Article I:1. The European Communities also argues that, according to the Panel's own reasoning, footnote 3 should be interpreted in the context of the Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (the "Agreed Conclusions")³⁶ and the submissions by developed countries to that committee. As such, the detailed obligations created by paragraph 2(a), footnote 3, and paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause go far beyond "mere 'anti-abuse' safeguards".³⁷ The European Communities contends that the Enabling Clause is unlike the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, which neither regulates the substantive content of measures adopted by Members, nor replaces the substantive rules from which Article XX derogates.

13. The European Communities relies in support of its argument on the position of the Enabling Clause within the GATT 1994 and the *Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization* (the "WTO Agreement"). Thus, the European Communities contends that if paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause were an exception to Article I:1, it would typically be found in Article I, or immediately after that Article. This is not the case, however. The Enabling Clause is a separate decision complementing Part IV of the GATT 1994, which is entitled "Trade and Development". In the view of the European Communities, Part IV of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause cannot be "mere 'exception[s]'" to the GATT 1994.³⁸ Rather, the European Communities argues, they constitute a "special regime" for developing countries to address inequalities among the WTO Membership.³⁹

14. The European Communities submits that its understanding of the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause is supported by the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause, in

³⁵European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 31.

³⁶Attached as Annex D-4 to the Panel Report.

³⁷European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 48.

³⁸*Ibid.*, para. 51.

³⁹*Ibid.*

accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation. The European Communities emphasizes that the Enabling Clause is "the most concrete, comprehensive and important application"⁴⁰ of the principle of special and differential treatment. In the view of the European Communities, special and differential treatment is "the most basic principle of the international law of development"⁴¹, and it constitutes *lex specialis* that applies to the exclusion of more general WTO rules on the same subject matter. In concluding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1, the Panel chose to "disregard"⁴² this principle. Moreover, the European Communities argues, characterizing special and differential treatment as an "exception" suggests that this principle "is *discriminatory* against the developed country Members".⁴³ In fact, special and differential treatment is designed to achieve effective equality among Members. Therefore, the European Communities contends that the Panel's reasoning undermines the principle of special and differential treatment and challenges its "legitimacy".⁴⁴ The European Communities also asserts that the Panel was "oblivious"⁴⁵ to certain elements of the drafting history of the Enabling Clause, which indicate that the Contracting Parties intended to strengthen the legal status of GSP schemes in the GATT by replacing the Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences (the "1971 Waiver Decision")⁴⁶ with the Enabling Clause.

15. The European Communities further contends that special and differential treatment is critical to achieving one of the fundamental objectives of the *WTO Agreement*, as identified in its Preamble: ensuring that developing countries "secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development".⁴⁷ Therefore, according to the European Communities, the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause clearly distinguish it from exceptions such as those found in Article XX(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, which generally allow Members to adopt "legitimate policy objectives"⁴⁸ that are *separate and distinct* from the objectives of the *WTO Agreement*. In the European Communities' view, the Appellate Body decision in *Brazil – Aircraft* confirms that the fact that a provision confers special and differential treatment is highly relevant in determining whether that provision constitutes an exception.

⁴⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 20.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, para. 21.

⁴²*Ibid.*, para. 23.

⁴³*Ibid.*, para. 26. (original italics)

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, para. 25.

⁴⁶GATT Document L/3545, 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24 (attached as Annex D-2 to the Panel Report).

⁴⁷European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 20 (quoting *WTO Agreement*, Preamble, second recital).

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, para. 52.

16. The European Communities notes the Panel's suggestion that absurd results would flow from characterizing the Enabling Clause as excluding the application of Article I:1 because it "would mean that GSP imports from different developing countries could be subject to different taxation levels in the importing country's domestic market."⁴⁹ According to the European Communities, the Panel confuses *tariff measures* covered by paragraph 2(a) with the *imported products* to which such measures apply. Finding that the Enabling Clause excludes the application of Article I:1 would mean only that Article I:1 does not apply to a *tariff measure* falling within paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause. It would not mean, as the Panel suggested, that Article I:1 does not apply with respect to *imported products* covered by such a *tariff measure*.

17. The European Communities submits that, as a result of the Panel's erroneous findings that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 and that the Enabling Clause does not prevent the continued application of Article I:1, the Panel found that the European Communities bears the burden of justifying the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause. According to the European Communities, the Enabling Clause imposes "positive obligations"⁵⁰ and is not an exception. As such, it is India that must, in the first instance, claim that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with the Enabling Clause and thereby bear the burden of demonstrating that inconsistency. According to the European Communities, India made no claim under the Enabling Clause. Consequently, the European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and to refrain from examining the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause.

2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause

18. The European Communities makes a "subsidiary" appeal, which would arise only if the Appellate Body were to find that the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, or that India made a valid claim under the Enabling Clause. Specifically, the European Communities claims "subsidiarily"⁵¹ that the Panel erred in finding that the Drug Arrangements are not "justified"⁵² under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and, therefore, requests the Appellate Body to reverse this finding.

19. According to the European Communities, this finding of the Panel was based on two erroneous legal interpretations. The first alleged error relates to the Panel's interpretation of the term

⁴⁹European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 56 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.46).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, para. 39.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, para. 67.

⁵²*Ibid.* (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.177).

"non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause as requiring GSP schemes to provide "identical" preferences to "all" developing countries without differentiation, except with regard to *a priori* import limitations as permissible safeguard measures. The second error alleged by the European Communities concerns the Panel's interpretation of the term "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause as meaning *all* developing countries, except with regard to *a priori* limitations.

20. The European Communities asserts that the Panel's interpretation of the word "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause is erroneous because the phrase "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory" in footnote 3 merely refers to the description of the GSP in the 1971 Waiver Decision and, of itself, does not impose any legal obligation on preference-granting countries.⁵³ Even assuming such obligations existed, the European Communities maintains, the Panel failed to take into account the context of footnote 3 and the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause. Properly interpreted, the European Communities argues, the word "non-discriminatory" allows a preference-granting country to accord differential tariff treatment in its GSP scheme to developing countries that have different development needs according to "objective criteria", provided that tariff differentiation is an "adequate" response to these differences.⁵⁴

21. The European Communities emphasizes that the immediate context for interpreting the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 includes the terms "generalized" and "non-reciprocal" in that same footnote. These three terms express "distinct requirement[s]"⁵⁵, according to the European Communities, and they must be interpreted so that each is compatible with the other two, without being rendered redundant.

22. According to the European Communities, the ordinary meaning of the word "generalized" and the negotiating history indicate that GSP schemes are not required to cover *all* developing countries. The word "generalized" in footnote 3 was intended to distinguish these preferences from "special" preferences, which were granted to selected developing countries for political, historical, or geographical reasons. The European Communities maintains that consultations in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") led to a compromise in the Agreed Conclusions such that developed countries would, "in general"⁵⁶, recognize as beneficiaries those countries that

⁵³European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

⁵⁴European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 4.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, para. 80.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, para. 87.

considered themselves as developing countries, although a developed country might decide to exclude a country *ab initio* on grounds it considered "compelling".⁵⁷

23. In contrast to the term "generalized", the European Communities argues, the word "non-discriminatory" relates to whether developed countries may grant different preferences to individual developing countries that have already been recognized as beneficiaries of a GSP scheme. The European Communities submits that the Panel's interpretation of "non-discriminatory", as requiring that identical preferences be granted to *all* developing countries, would render redundant the term "generalized".

24. Referring to the term "non-reciprocal" in footnote 3, the European Communities argues that reciprocity, in connection with inter-state relations, generally refers to an exchange of identical or similar benefits. In contrast to the word "unconditionally" found in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the European Communities argues, the word "non-reciprocal" was not intended to prevent developed countries from attaching all types of conditions to preferences granted under GSP schemes. Rather, in the European Communities' view, the word "non-reciprocal" only prohibits developed countries from imposing conditions of *reciprocity*. The European Communities contends that the Panel's interpretation of "non-discriminatory" precludes the imposition of *any* conditions on the granting of preferences, thereby rendering redundant the word "non-reciprocal" in footnote 3. In addition, the European Communities claims, the Panel's interpretation equates *conditional* preferences with *discriminatory* preferences. In fact, according to the European Communities, a preference is not rendered discriminatory by virtue of a condition being attached to it if the condition applies equally to, and is capable of being fulfilled by, all GSP beneficiaries "that are in the same situation".⁵⁸

25. The European Communities maintains that its interpretation of "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 does not render redundant paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause, as the Panel suggested. In the view of the European Communities, the scope of paragraph 2(a) differs from that of paragraph 2(d) in three respects. First, paragraph 2(a) applies to preferences granted by *developed* countries, whereas paragraph 2(d) includes preferences granted by *any* WTO Member. Secondly, paragraph 2(a) relates only to preferences under GSP schemes, whereas paragraph 2(d) relates to any measures imposed in favour of developing countries. Thirdly, paragraph 2(a) applies only to tariff measures, whereas paragraph 2(d) applies to any kind of "special treatment".⁵⁹ In addressing only the

⁵⁷European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 85 and 87.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, para. 120.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, para. 122 (quoting Enabling Clause, para. 2(d) (attached as Annex 2 to this Report)).

last of these differences, the European Communities argues, the Panel's reasoning was "manifestly flawed".⁶⁰

26. The European Communities points out that the Panel found that paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause allows developed countries to differentiate in their GSP schemes in only two ways, namely, in connection with least-developed countries and in the implementation of *a priori* limitations. According to the European Communities, the Panel arrived at this interpretation despite the absence of any such restriction in the text of paragraph 3(c) and despite the Panel's acceptance of the European Communities' argument that the "needs" described in paragraph 3(c) extend to individual or common needs of particular categories of developing countries. In fact, the European Communities argues, paragraph 3(c) lends contextual support to the European Communities' interpretation of the word "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3. The European Communities claims that the objective described in paragraph 3(c) is best achieved by allowing developed countries to design their GSP schemes so as to take into account the development needs of certain categories of developing countries.

27. The European Communities argues that the Panel's contrary interpretation of paragraph 3(c) stems from the Panel's concern that developed countries might abuse their discretion by distinguishing arbitrarily between developing countries. In the view of the European Communities, such policy concerns cannot replace the text of paragraph 3(c). Furthermore, the European Communities submits that this concern is unwarranted because the European Communities' interpretation of "non-discriminatory" would not allow a preference-granting country to distinguish between developing countries on the basis of political, historical, or geographical ties. Rather, a distinction would be allowed only if it: (i) pursued an "objective which is legitimate in the light of the objectives of the Enabling Clause" and the principle of special and differential treatment; and (ii) represented a "reasonable" and "proportionate" means of achieving that objective.⁶¹ In order to assess whether these criteria are met, panels need to analyze the relevant facts.

28. The European Communities contends that, because of the Panel's erroneous legal interpretations, the Panel made insufficient factual findings in order for the Appellate Body to complete the legal analysis regarding the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with footnote 3. Nevertheless, should the Appellate Body decide to complete this analysis, the European Communities requests the Appellate Body to find that the Drug Arrangements are consistent with the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 and, therefore, with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

⁶⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 125.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, para. 135.

29. The European Communities contends that, although tariff preferences may not be an "adequate" or "appropriate" response to other development problems, drug production and trafficking form major economic activities in the relevant countries, which activities cannot be eliminated without the provision of "alternative licit activities".⁶² Therefore, the European Communities claims that tariff preferences are an appropriate response to the drug problem, as recognized by the Members of the WTO—through the Preamble to the *Agreement on Agriculture* and the waiver for the United States' Andean Trade Preference Act⁶³—and the United Nations—through other instruments. Furthermore, the European Communities argues that the Drug Arrangements are non-discriminatory because the drug problem affects individual developing countries in different ways, and because beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements are designated according to the impact of the drug problem in those countries.

30. The European Communities distinguishes the "object and purpose" of the Enabling Clause from that of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Article I:1 focuses on providing equal conditions of competition for imports of like products from WTO Members, whereas the Enabling Clause embodies special and differential treatment for developing countries and, therefore, aims to provide unequal competitive opportunities to respond to the needs of such countries. The European Communities claims that, in the light of the objectives associated with special and differential treatment, providing additional preferences to countries with particular development needs is not discriminatory in the context of the Enabling Clause. However, the Panel failed to take into account these objectives. The European Communities contends that the Panel should have interpreted the objectives described in the Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* in a harmonious manner, instead of assuming that the objective of eliminating discrimination prevails over the objective of ensuring that developing countries secure a share of international trade commensurate with their development needs.

31. The European Communities contends that the Panel relied selectively and incorrectly on certain UNCTAD texts to support its findings. According to the European Communities, some of these documents do not assist in interpreting footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause.⁶⁴ In several cases, this is because they relate not to the issue of non-discrimination, but to the exclusion of certain

⁶²European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 144-145.

⁶³*Ibid.*, para. 148 (referring to Waiver Decision on the United States – Andean Trade Preference Act, GATT Document L/6991, 19 March 1992, BISD 39S/385; renewed 14 October 1996, WT/L/184).

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, paras. 159-160 (referring to Resolution 21(II) of the Second Session of UNCTAD, entitled "Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Developing Countries" (attached as Annex D-3 to the Panel Report) ("Resolution 21(II)") and paras. 182-183 (referring to the Recommendation contained in Annex A.II.1 to the Final Act and Report adopted at the First Session of UNCTAD on 15 June 1964, at p. 26).

developing countries *ab initio* from GSP schemes.⁶⁵ The European Communities contends that several other documents that the Panel relied on contain merely "expectations"⁶⁶ or "aim[s]"⁶⁷ of particular parties, rather than agreed statements of "legally binding" obligations.⁶⁸ Finally, the European Communities argues, the Agreed Conclusions do not purport to be an exhaustive regulation of GSP schemes. Therefore, in the European Communities' view, the allowance under the Agreed Conclusions for differentiation in favour of least-developed countries does not mean that the Agreed Conclusions prohibit all other forms of differentiation between developing countries.

32. The European Communities submits that the practice by developed countries of seeking waivers in order to provide more favourable treatment to a limited number of developing countries—as highlighted by the Panel—does not mean that such treatment may not otherwise be provided. According to the European Communities, the waivers mentioned by the Panel all relate to the restriction of preferences *ab initio* to particular countries in a particular region. The European Communities further points out that, in seeking these waivers, the preference-granting countries did not claim that the preferences were restricted to developing countries with development needs of a specific kind.

33. The European Communities contends that the Panel's interpretation of the term "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause is erroneous because it is entirely dependent on the Panel's erroneous interpretation of the word "non-discriminatory". In the European Communities' view, as the word "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause allows Members to differentiate between developing countries with different development needs, it follows for the same reasons that paragraph 2(a) does not require Members to grant the same preferences to *all* developing countries.

34. For these reasons, the European Communities requests the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and, in particular, with footnote 3 thereof.

⁶⁵European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 162-163 (referring to the Charter of Algiers, TD/38, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 on 24 October 1967 ("Charter of Algiers")) and paras. 179-181 (referring to General Principle Eight contained in the Final Act and Report adopted at the First Session of UNCTAD on 15 June 1964, at p. 20 (Exhibit EC-20 submitted by the European Communities to the Panel) ("General Principle Eight")).

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, para. 162 (referring to Charter of Algiers).

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, para. 165 (referring to the Report of the Special Group of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Trade with Developing Countries, TD/56, 29 January 1968 ("OECD Special Report")).

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, para. 180 (referring to General Principle Eight).

B. *Arguments of India – Appellee*

1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause

35. India argues that the Panel correctly found that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and requests the Appellate Body to uphold this finding. In addition, India submits that it made a claim against the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause and that, therefore, the Appellate Body should examine the consistency of the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause, even if it finds that the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1.

36. India contends that the Panel's test as to what is an "exception" is consistent with previous Appellate Body decisions. According to India, the Appellate Body drew an important distinction in *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses* between "positive rules establishing obligations in themselves" and "exceptions" to those obligations.⁶⁹ India states that an exception is an "affirmative defence"⁷⁰ and, accordingly, panels examine the consistency of a challenged measure with an exception only if the Member complained against invokes the exception to justify its measure. This leaves the Member with the choice of which exceptions to invoke and prevents exceptions being turned into rules. In other words, in India's view, a Member needs to comply with a provision that is an exception only when the Member invokes that exception to justify an inconsistency with another provision.

37. Applying this reasoning to the present dispute, India characterizes paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause as an "exception" to Article I:1, because it grants developed-country Members a "conditional right"⁷¹ to provide tariff preferences to developing-country Members under the conditions contained in paragraphs 2(a) and 3 of the Enabling Clause. India submits that these paragraphs impose conditions only on Members who invoke the Enabling Clause as a defence, whereas Article I:1 imposes obligations regardless of the defence invoked.

38. India argues, with reference to the *Vienna Convention*, that "subsequent practice"⁷² supports its interpretation. First, India maintains that all waivers for preferential tariff treatment for products from developing countries have permitted derogations from Article I without mentioning the Enabling

⁶⁹India's appellee's submission, para. 36 (quoting Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p. 16, DSR 1997:I, at 337).

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, para. 36.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, para. 39.

⁷²*Ibid.*, para. 42 (referring to *Vienna Convention*, Art. 31.3(b)).

Clause. Indeed, according to India, the fact that the European Communities requested a waiver⁷³ from its obligations *under Article I:1* in respect of the Drug Arrangements cannot be reconciled with the European Communities' position that the Enabling Clause excludes the application of Article I:1. Secondly, India refers to two GATT panels that examined, first, the consistency of a challenged measure under Article I:1, before proceeding to consider whether the measure was authorized under the Enabling Clause. India regards this as evidence of the "common understanding" of the Contracting Parties to the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947* (the "GATT 1947") regarding the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause.⁷⁴

39. India disputes the European Communities' contention that the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1 because the Enabling Clause constitutes *lex specialis*. India argues, with reference to a study by the International Law Commission and certain Appellate Body decisions⁷⁵, that the "*maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali*"⁷⁶ means not that a special rule necessarily excludes the application of a related general rule, but that the two rules apply cumulatively, and the special rule prevails over the general rule only to the extent of any conflict between the two rules. Thus, India maintains, developing-country Members have not waived their rights under Article I:1, which applies "cumulatively" with the Enabling Clause, except to the extent that these provisions are in conflict with each other.⁷⁷

40. India also contests the European Communities' reliance on the Appellate Body decisions in *Brazil – Aircraft* and *EC – Hormones*. India states that these appeals related to Article 27.2(a) of the *SCM Agreement* and Article 3.1 of the *SPS Agreement*, both of which provisions explicitly exclude other provisions. India argues that, in contrast, the Enabling Clause does not clearly exclude the application of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. In India's view, this supports India's contention that Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause apply "concurrently".⁷⁸

⁷³Council for Trade in Goods, Request for a WTO Waiver, "New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking", G/C/W/328, 24 October 2001 (Exhibit India-2(b) submitted by India to the Panel).

⁷⁴India's appellee's submission, para. 43 (referring to GATT Panel Report, *US – Customs User Fee*, 1988, BISD 35S/245, at 289-290; and GATT Panel Report, *US – MFN Footwear*, 1992, BISD 39S/128, at 153).

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, paras. 76-80 (referring to International Law Commission, *Study Group on Fragmentation: Koskenniemi*, p. 5, <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf>; Appellate Body Report, *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, para. 89; and Appellate Body Report, *Guatemala – Cement I*, para. 65).

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, para. 76.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, heading II.C.1.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, para. 51.

41. India claims that, even if the Appellate Body were to find that the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1, the Appellate Body should assess the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause because India did make a claim under the Enabling Clause. The European Communities' argument to the contrary, according to India, is "factually baseless".⁷⁹ India highlights that it originally requested the establishment of a panel "to examine whether [the Drug Arrangements] are consistent with Article I:1 ... and ... the Enabling Clause".⁸⁰ In addition, India maintains that, in its first and second written submissions to the Panel, it requested the Panel to find that the Drug Arrangements "are not justified [by] the Enabling Clause".⁸¹ Moreover, India states that the European Communities acknowledged in its first written submission to the Panel that the Enabling Clause forms part of India's claim⁸², and that the Panel confirmed India's inclusion of this claim in paragraph 7.61 of the Panel Report.

42. India submits that it does not follow from India's characterization of the Enabling Clause as an "exception"—which was a "procedural argument" regarding the allocation of the burden of proof—that India made no "substantive" claims under the Enabling Clause.⁸³ India maintains that, in response to questioning by the Panel, it "merely stated that the Enabling Clause is not a *material element* of India's *claim under Article I:1 of the GATT*."⁸⁴ Furthermore, India reiterated its request for the Panel to examine the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause at the second substantive meeting of the Panel and at the interim review stage. In addition, India maintains that the Panel would have had "competence"⁸⁵ to assess the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause even if the Panel had found that the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1.⁸⁶ In India's view, requiring India to resubmit its claims under the Enabling Clause to a new panel would be contrary to the "fundamental principle of good faith"⁸⁷ and the objectives of the dispute settlement

⁷⁹India's appellee's submission, para. 52.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, para. 54 (quoting request for the establishment of a panel by India, WT/DS246/4, 9 December 2002, p. 2). (italics added by India in its appellee's submission)

⁸¹*Ibid.*, para. 56 (quoting India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 67; and India's second written submission to the Panel, para. 164). (italics added by India in its appellee's submission)

⁸²*Ibid.*, para. 58 (referring to European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 57, 141, and 206).

⁸³*Ibid.*, para. 70.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, para. 64. (original italics)

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, heading II.B.3.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, paras. 70-71 (referring to Panel Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*; Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, footnote 71 to para. 109 and footnote 180 to para. 197; and DSU, Arts. 7.2 and 11).

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, para. 72 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *US – FSC*, para. 166).

system.⁸⁸ India asserts that the question of which party bears the burden of proof "does not affect the outcome of this dispute".⁸⁹

43. Finally, India emphasizes that the European Communities has not yet obtained a waiver from its obligations under Article I:1 with respect to the Drug Arrangements and that only the WTO Members can provide such a waiver.

44. For these reasons, India requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's finding that the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause

45. India requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are not justified under the Enabling Clause. In particular, India maintains that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause does not authorize the European Communities to differentiate between developing-country Members that are beneficiaries under the European Communities' GSP scheme.

46. At the outset, India submits that the present dispute focuses not on the European Communities' initial selection of particular developing countries as beneficiaries under its GSP scheme, but on the European Communities' treatment of developing countries already identified as beneficiaries under that scheme. Therefore, according to India, the Appellate Body is not required to examine legal issues arising from the initial selection of beneficiaries under the Enabling Clause. Rather, India urges the Appellate Body to find that the term "developing countries" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause includes at least those countries that are beneficiaries under a given GSP scheme, and that the words "products originating in developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) refer to products originating in any of those beneficiary countries.

47. India argues that its interpretation is reinforced by the nature of the MFN principle embodied in Article I:1 as "a fundamental norm of the rules-based multilateral trading system of the WTO".⁹⁰ India points to Appellate Body decisions as support for its view that "derogations" from Article I:1 exist only where provided for explicitly.⁹¹ India emphasizes that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause does *not* specifically state that developing countries waive their rights to MFN treatment. Moreover, the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause, as well as its drafting history, indicate that

⁸⁸India's appellee's submission, para. 74 (referring to DSU, Arts. 3.3-3.4 and 3.7).

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, para. 73.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, para. 1.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, paras. 93-94 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Canada – Autos*, para. 84; and Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bananas III*, paras. 190-191).

the developing countries did not agree to relinquish their MFN rights as between themselves in agreeing to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

48. India contends that the Drug Arrangements are not "non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" within the meaning of footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause. First, India relies on dictionary definitions to ascertain that the ordinary meaning of "non-discriminatory preferences" in footnote 3 is "preferential tariff treatment that is applied equally".⁹² Secondly, India finds "contextual guidance"⁹³ on the meaning of "non-discriminatory" in Articles I, XIII, and XVII of the GATT 1994. According to India, these provisions confirm that "non-discrimination" refers to the provision of "equal competitive opportunities" in relation to non-tariff measures and of "formally equal[] treatment" in relation to tariff measures.⁹⁴ In addition, in India's submission, the inclusion of the word "unjustifiable" before the word "discrimination" in the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 demonstrates that a Member's reasons for distinguishing between products of different origin are not relevant to whether such distinction constitutes discrimination.

49. Turning to the words "generalized" and "non-reciprocal" in footnote 3, India argues that the word "generalized" refers to the countries that should be included *ab initio* as beneficiaries under a GSP scheme, whereas the word "non-discriminatory" refers to the treatment of products originating in beneficiary countries. Even if "generalized" meant that all developing countries must be included *ab initio* as beneficiaries, in India's view, the "additional requirement"⁹⁵ imposed by the word "non-discriminatory" would still be relevant in addressing the separate question of how products from beneficiary countries should be treated. India contests the European Communities' argument that the Panel's interpretation of "non-discriminatory" renders redundant the word "non-reciprocal" in footnote 3. India suggests that reciprocity is a "principle of trade negotiations"⁹⁶, whereas "non-discriminatory" addresses the implementation of the results of such negotiations. India argues that Part IV of the GATT 1994 (entitled "Trade and Development") was added to the original GATT provisions because it is possible to comply with the principle of non-discrimination while insisting on non-reciprocity in negotiations.

⁹²India's appellee's submission, para. 106.

⁹³*Ibid.*, para. 115.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, paras. 118 and 120 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bananas III*, paras. 190-191). (See also, *ibid.*, paras. 170 and 180)

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, para. 148.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, para. 153.

50. India contends that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 must be interpreted in a harmonious manner so as to give effect to both provisions.⁹⁷ With this in mind, India submits that the Enabling Clause should be interpreted to authorize only those deviations from the MFN principle that are necessary in order for GSP schemes to operate. Thus, the Enabling Clause authorizes developed-country Members to exclude other developed countries from their GSP schemes, because Members could not grant any tariff preferences under these schemes if such exclusion was not authorized. However, in India's view, the Enabling Clause does not authorize tariff preferences that differentiate between developing countries, as tariff preferences under GSP schemes can be and are granted to developing countries without differentiation of this kind. According to India, a contrary interpretation would be inconsistent with the need to interpret paragraph 2(a) and Article I:1 so as to avoid conflict between the two provisions.

51. India derives support for its interpretation from several provisions of the Enabling Clause. In particular, India reads paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) together as identifying three categories of countries: the developed countries, the developing countries, and the least-developed countries. In India's view, under the Enabling Clause, the developed countries "relinquished" their MFN rights in respect of preferential tariff treatment in favour of developing and least-developed countries, whereas the developing countries "relinquished" their MFN rights only in respect of preferential treatment in favour of least-developed countries.⁹⁸ However, India sees nothing in the text of the Enabling Clause to indicate that developing countries have similarly relinquished their MFN rights in relation to preferential treatment accorded by developed countries to other developing countries. India suggests that the European Communities itself recognized this fact prior to this dispute.⁹⁹ India maintains that paragraph 2(d) was specifically inserted to allow differentiation of a kind that was not previously allowed under the 1971 Waiver Decision. India argues that the European Communities' current interpretation of "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 would render paragraph 2(d) redundant, contrary to the "principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation".¹⁰⁰

52. The opening words of paragraph 3(c) demonstrate, according to India, that paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause does not provide for derogations from obligations imposed under paragraph 2(a), (b), or (d). Further, unlike paragraphs 5 and 6, paragraph 3(c) does not refer to

⁹⁷India's appellee's submission, para. 83 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Korea – Dairy*, para. 81; Appellate Body Report, *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, para. 81; and International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections, *Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India)*, 1957, ICJ Reports, p. 142).

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 5.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, para. 6 (referring to "User's Guide to the European Union's Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences" (February 2003) (Exhibit India-1 submitted by India to the Panel)).

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, para. 132 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *US – Gasoline*, p. 23, DSR 1996:I, at 21).

"individual" or "particular" needs of developing countries. India argues that this shows that the "needs" intended by the drafters under paragraph 3(c) are the needs of "developing countries as a whole".¹⁰¹

53. India draws support for its reading of paragraph 2(a) from the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause. According to India, the purpose includes: facilitating "mutually acceptable arrangements"¹⁰² that were "unanimous[ly] agree[d]"¹⁰³ in UNCTAD; replacing "special preferences"¹⁰⁴ granted only to some developing countries with generalized preferences that do not differentiate between developing countries; and, promoting the trade of developing countries without raising barriers to or creating undue difficulties for the trade of other Members, as confirmed in paragraph 3(a). India points to several UNCTAD texts to confirm these purposes¹⁰⁵, arguing that the European Communities offers no such support for its contrary views. India regards differentiation between developing countries under a GSP scheme as inconsistent with paragraph 3(a) because it creates difficulties for the trade of other developing countries by "divert[ing] competitive opportunities"¹⁰⁶ from one country to another. In addition, India contends that linking GSP benefits to "the situation or policies"¹⁰⁷ of beneficiaries reduces the certainty and value of such benefits.

54. India contends that the European Communities' interpretation of paragraph 3(c) would mean that developed countries "would have *the obligation*"¹⁰⁸ to differentiate between developing countries according to their individual needs. This would have the "absurd consequence"¹⁰⁹ that a measure eliminating tariffs on products from *all* least-developed countries, without differentiating between those countries would be open to challenge under paragraph 3(c). Moreover, India argues that it would result not only in the European Communities' scheme, but in all GSP schemes being inconsistent with the Enabling Clause because they do not differentiate between developing countries based on their *individual* development needs. India also maintains that the European Communities' suggestion that its interpretation would best fulfil the objectives of paragraph 3(c) is inconsistent with

¹⁰¹India's appellee's submission, para. 124.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, paras. 95 and 190.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, para. 165.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, paras. 147 and 190.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, paras. 158-184 (referring to Agreed Conclusions; Resolution 21(II); Resolution 24(II) of the Second Session of UNCTAD; Charter of Algiers, paras. (a) and (d); and OECD Special Report, part II).

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, para. 192.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, para. 21.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, para. 14. (original italics)

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, para. 15.

the rule that treaty interpretation should be based on the text and not on policy considerations that are not reflected in the text.

55. For these reasons, India requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are not justified under the Enabling Clause.

C. *Arguments of the Third Participants*

1. Andean Community

56. The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (jointly, the "Andean Community") submit that the Panel erred in finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and in finding that Article I:1 applies concurrently with the Enabling Clause. The Andean Community also contends that, contrary to the Panel's finding, the Drug Arrangements are consistent with the Enabling Clause. Accordingly, the Andean Community supports the European Communities' contention that the Drug Arrangements are "fully WTO-compatible".¹¹⁰

57. The Andean Community argues that the Enabling Clause establishes "a self-standing regime"¹¹¹, meaning that Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 does not apply to GSP schemes.¹¹² According to the Andean Community, the ordinary meaning of the word "notwithstanding" in paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause confirms this interpretation, as do the context, and object and purpose of the Enabling Clause. In addition, the "history, ... practice and ... current role"¹¹³ of the Enabling Clause indicate that GSP schemes provide the "most concrete and relevant form"¹¹⁴ of special and differential treatment. This supports the concept of the Enabling Clause as a self-standing regime. According to the Andean Community, because measures falling within the Enabling Clause are to be judged solely under the Enabling Clause, India was required to make a claim under the Enabling Clause. As India did not do so, the Andean Community maintains, India's claim should be dismissed.

58. The Andean Community submits further that, even if the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1, this characterization is not determinative of which party bears the burden of proof. The Andean Community asserts that the Panel erred in assigning the burden. According to the Andean

¹¹⁰Andean Community's third participant's submission, para. 97.

¹¹¹See, for example, *ibid.*, paras. 8, 12, and 27.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, para. 9 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Brazil – Aircraft*, para. 139).

¹¹³*Ibid.*, para. 13.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, para. 21.

Community, under the Panel's allocation of the burden of proof, every GSP scheme would be open to challenge, with the burden falling on each preference-granting country to establish the consistency of its GSP scheme with the Enabling Clause. The Andean Community claims that the assigning of the burden of proof is "a fundamental initial decision upon which every further consideration is based", such that the Appellate Body "should reverse on this element alone".¹¹⁵

59. Regarding the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause, the Andean Community submits, first, that the Panel did not properly interpret the historical texts serving as context and preparatory work for the Enabling Clause. The Andean Community emphasizes the "aspirational tone"¹¹⁶ of these texts and argues that the Panel "mischaracterize[d]"¹¹⁷ certain texts as binding or reflecting "unanimous agreement".¹¹⁸ Secondly, turning to the interpretation of the term "non-discriminatory" in the Enabling Clause, the Andean Community contends that the Panel wrongly equated this concept with MFN treatment. The Andean Community further alleges that the Panel's allowance for *a priori* limitations under the Enabling Clause is contrary to the Panel's own interpretation of "non-discriminatory".

60. In the view of the Andean Community, "a prohibition of discrimination is a command not to treat equal situations differently, or different situations equally"¹¹⁹ and, accordingly, the word "non-discriminatory" in the Enabling Clause does not require that identical treatment be granted to all developing countries. The Andean Community suggests that differentiating between developing countries—taking into account their objectively different situations—does not constitute discrimination. The Andean Community argues that the "production and trafficking of illicit drugs have far-reaching, unparalleled and unquantifiable implications for the economic and social development"¹²⁰ of affected developing countries. By providing preferential access for "alternative products"¹²¹ and, thereby, seeking to reduce the importance of drugs as an economic activity, the European Communities responds to these countries' specific needs. The Andean Community asserts that this response is consistent with the requirements of the Enabling Clause.

¹¹⁵Andean Community's third participant's submission, para. 41.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, para. 50.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, para. 56. (original underlining)

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, para. 55.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, para. 64.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, para. 78.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, para. 87.

2. Costa Rica

61. Costa Rica submits that the Panel erred in finding that the Drug Arrangements are not justified under the Enabling Clause. Costa Rica asserts that the Panel based this finding on erroneous interpretations of the terms "non-discriminatory" and "developing countries" contained in footnote 3 and paragraph 2(a), respectively, of the Enabling Clause. Accordingly, Costa Rica supports the European Communities' request that the Appellate Body reverse this finding.

62. Costa Rica contends that, instead of relying on the ordinary meaning of these terms of the Enabling Clause in context, the Panel relied on other instruments that "cannot be properly considered context for the interpretation of the Enabling Clause".¹²² Costa Rica maintains that this led to the Panel's incorrect finding that "non-discriminatory" treatment under footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause is synonymous with identical or unconditional treatment. Costa Rica asserts that had the Panel interpreted the Enabling Clause in accordance with Article 31 of the *Vienna Convention*—in the light of the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause and the 1971 Waiver Decision—it would have found that "the 'non-discriminatory' standard prohibits developed countries from according tariff preferences that make an unjust or prejudicial distinction between different categories of developing countries."¹²³

63. In addition, according to Costa Rica, the Panel erred in concluding that the term "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause means *all* developing countries. In Costa Rica's view, in interpreting this term, the Panel relied on its incorrect interpretation of the term "non-discriminatory" and failed to examine paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause as relevant context. Moreover, Costa Rica is of the opinion that it is not appropriate to consider the *travaux préparatoires* as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the *Vienna Convention* in interpreting paragraph 2(a). However, even if this were appropriate, the drafting history of the 1971 Waiver Decision confirms that the term "developing countries" means less than all developing countries.

3. Panama

64. Panama submits that the Panel erred in finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Panama maintains that the Enabling Clause is "*per se* an autonomous rule"¹²⁴ that permits the granting of more favourable treatment to developing countries. Panama also contests the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are incompatible with the Enabling Clause.

¹²²Costa Rica's third participant's submission, para. 6.

¹²³*Ibid.*, para. 15.

¹²⁴Panama's third participant's submission, para. 4.

In particular, Panama argues that the Panel erred in interpreting the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause as requiring preference-granting countries to accord identical treatment to all developing countries. Panama therefore states that it is "completely in agreement with the arguments by the European Communities".¹²⁵

65. Panama is of the view that, if the Enabling Clause were an exception to Article I of the GATT 1994, it would be included as a waiver decision in the GATT 1994.¹²⁶ Because the Enabling Clause is not so included, Panama contends, it is an "independent" and "special" rule governing the differential and more favourable treatment accorded to developing countries under the schemes set out in paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause.¹²⁷ Panama submits that "the Enabling Clause creates a standalone mechanism that is linked to the general principle contained in GATT Article I:1"¹²⁸ and, as such, constitutes an "autonomous right"¹²⁹ of WTO Members.

66. Panama argues that the Enabling Clause is not an affirmative defence but, rather, "excludes the application of ... Article I:1".¹³⁰ As such, Panama claims, it was up to India to claim that the Drug Arrangements do not fall within the scope of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and are inconsistent with paragraph 3(c) thereof. Because India did not do so, Panama argues, the Appellate Body should refrain from assessing the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause.

67. According to Panama, "non-discrimination" does not mean equal treatment. Panama submits that the fact that the Drug Arrangements are not extended to all developing countries does not mean that they discriminate between developing countries. In addition, Panama maintains that the obligation imposed in paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause must be interpreted in order to allow some flexibility for preference-granting countries to provide preferential treatment that "effectively help[s] 'generalized' needs".¹³¹ In this respect, Panama claims, the Drug Arrangements satisfy the "requirement" in paragraph 3(c) because they respond to "specific growth needs".¹³²

¹²⁵Panama's third participant's submission, para. 1.

¹²⁶Paragraph 1(b)(iii) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the *WTO Agreement*.

¹²⁷Panama's third participant's submission, paras. 5-6.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, para. 10.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, para. 8.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, para. 17.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, para. 23.

¹³²*Ibid.*, para. 13.

4. Paraguay

68. Paraguay contends that the Panel was correct in finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. In addition, Paraguay agrees with the Panel's interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and the Panel's consequent finding that the Drug Arrangements are not justified by the Enabling Clause. Accordingly, Paraguay supports India's request that the Appellate Body uphold these findings.

69. According to Paraguay, where a Member's measure differentiates between other Members in a manner inconsistent with Article I:1 and does not fall within any specific exceptions such as the Enabling Clause or Article XX of the GATT 1994, the only way for that Member to impose its measure in accordance with its WTO obligations is to seek a waiver under Article IX of the *WTO Agreement*. Paraguay maintains that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 and that the European Communities has received no such waiver in respect of them.

70. Paraguay contests the European Communities' characterization of the Enabling Clause as a "different, parallel legal regime".¹³³ Paraguay maintains that Article I:1 forms the "primary basis" for WTO trade and that exceptions to Article I:1 must be founded on "properly established legal rules".¹³⁴ In Paraguay's view, the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 and is a part of the GATT 1994, and the GSP recognized in the Enabling Clause is "a permanent mechanism of the rules-based multilateral trading system".¹³⁵

71. Paraguay emphasizes that developing countries did not renounce their right to MFN treatment under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 in agreeing to the Enabling Clause. According to Paraguay, the Enabling Clause was adopted to replace the "special preferences"¹³⁶ provided by developed countries to certain developing countries, with a generalized system under which all developing countries would benefit. Paraguay argues that the only distinction that the WTO draws within the category of developing countries is in recognizing the category of least-developed countries, as explicitly stated in paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause. As such, in Paraguay's view, the "condition"¹³⁷ of non-discrimination in footnote 3 means that benefits granted to some developing countries must be granted

¹³³Paraguay's third participant's submission, para. 13.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, para. 12.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, para. 11.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, para. 27.

to all such countries. Therefore, Paraguay submits that tariff preferences pursuant to the Enabling Clause must apply to all developing countries.

5. United States

72. The United States contends that the Panel misconceived the relationship between the Enabling Clause and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. The United States also submits that the Panel erred in concluding that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause requires preference-granting countries to accord "identical" treatment to all beneficiaries and that, consequently, paragraph 2(a) covers only identical preferences extended to *all* developing countries. Accordingly, the United States supports the European Communities' request that the Appellate Body reverse the Panel's legal interpretation of the terms "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 and "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) and, consequently, reverse the Panel's finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1.

73. Beginning with the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause, the United States claims that the Panel failed to consider the entire text of the Enabling Clause and the context and object and purpose of the Enabling Clause and of the GATT 1994. The United States argues that the Panel "misconstru[ed]" the statement of the Appellate Body in *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses* and applied this statement "as a mechanical 'test'" without due regard to the term "notwithstanding" in the Enabling Clause.¹³⁸ The United States observes that the Panel examined the ordinary meaning of "notwithstanding" in paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause only after the Panel had concluded that the Enabling Clause is an "exception". In addition, in the view of the United States, the reasoning underlying the Panel's conclusion that the Enabling Clause is an exception "would result in ... inconsistencies and absurd results"¹³⁹ because several WTO obligations apply only if a Member chooses to take the action addressed in the relevant provision.

74. The United States submits that the Enabling Clause is part of the overall balance of rights and obligations in the covered agreements and, as such, is a "separate provision authorizing the types of treatment provided therein", "in spite of" the MFN obligation in Article I:1.¹⁴⁰ In other words, the United States maintains that, contrary to the finding of the Panel, the Enabling Clause *is* a "positive rule establishing obligations in itself".¹⁴¹ The United States emphasizes that several aspects of the Enabling Clause are unrelated to Article I:1 and that the Enabling Clause is incorporated into the

¹³⁸United States' third participant's submission, paras. 2-3.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, para. 5.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 10.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, para. 4.

GATT 1994. The United States also argues that, unlike Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Enabling Clause "*encourages*"¹⁴² developed-country Members to grant preferences to developing-country Members. In the view of the United States, "[p]lacing the burden on developed countries to defend actions they take to benefit developing countries ... would create a *disincentive* for developed countries" to take such action.¹⁴³

75. Turning to footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, the United States contests the Panel's "assum[ption]"¹⁴⁴ that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 imposes obligations on preference-granting countries. In the view of the United States, "[t]his footnote is simply a cross-reference to where the Generalized System of Preferences is described."¹⁴⁵ Because the Panel began its analysis "from a false premise", the United States suggests that the Panel's finding as to footnote 3 "should be rejected on that basis alone".¹⁴⁶ In any case, the United States contends, the Panel erroneously arrived at a "one size fits all"¹⁴⁷ obligation to grant "identical" tariff preferences to "all" developing countries. Furthermore, according to the United States, the fact that the Panel understood the Enabling Clause to allow *a priori* limitations demonstrates that the term "non-discriminatory" does not preclude *all* conditions. The United States asserts that the Panel focused not on the text, but on a policy concern—the prevention of "abuse"¹⁴⁸ by preference-granting countries. In the United States' view, the Panel's focus on this policy concern is inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the DSU and led to an incorrect interpretation of "non-discriminatory".

76. With respect to paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, the United States argues that the Panel wrongly interpreted this provision as imposing an obligation not to provide differentiated GSP benefits. In doing so, the United States submits, the Panel failed to recognize that the term "generalized" in footnote 3 ensures that the responses of preference-granting countries to the needs of developing countries do not result in tariff advantages accorded primarily to select countries.

77. Finally, the United States contends that the Panel's interpretation of "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) as referring to *all* developing countries is "completely dependent"¹⁴⁹ on its erroneous interpretation of "non-discriminatory". Moreover, the United States argues, the Enabling Clause

¹⁴²United States' third participant's submission, para. 8. (original italics)

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, para. 9. (original italics)

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, para. 11.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, para. 20 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.158).

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, para. 23.

refers only to "developing countries" or "the developing countries", and not to "*all* developing countries".¹⁵⁰

III. Issues Raised in This Appeal

78. The following issues are raised in this appeal:

- (a) Whether the Panel erred in concluding that the "special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking" (the "Drug Arrangements"), which are part of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 (the "Regulation")¹⁵¹, are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994* (the "GATT 1994")¹⁵², based on the Panel's findings that:
 - (i) the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the "Enabling Clause")¹⁵³ is an "exception"¹⁵⁴ to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
 - (ii) the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability"¹⁵⁵ of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994; and
 - (iii) the European Communities bears the burden of invoking the Enabling Clause and proving that the Drug Arrangements are consistent with that Clause¹⁵⁶; and
- (b) Whether the Panel erred in concluding that the European Communities failed to prove that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause¹⁵⁷, based on the Panel's findings that:

¹⁵⁰United States' third participant's submission, para. 24. (original italics)

¹⁵¹Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L Series, No. 346 (31 December 2001), p. 1 (Exhibit India-6 submitted by India to the Panel).

¹⁵²Panel Report, paras. 7.60 and 8.1(b).

¹⁵³GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203 (attached as Annex 2 to this Report).

¹⁵⁴Panel Report, para. 7.53.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, para. 8.1(d).

- (i) the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause requires that, pursuant to schemes under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), "identical tariff preferences"¹⁵⁸ be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except as regards the implementation of *a priori* limitations; and
- (ii) the term "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause means "all"¹⁵⁹ developing countries, except as regards the implementation of *a priori* limitations.

IV. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause

79. We begin our analysis of the European Communities' appeal by examining its claim that the Panel improperly characterized the relationship between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause, and thus improperly allocated the burden of proof in this dispute.

A. *The Panel's Analysis and the Arguments on Appeal*

80. The Panel observed that the participants disagree on whether the Enabling Clause constitutes a "positive rule setting out obligations", or an "exception" authorizing derogation from one or more such positive rules.¹⁶⁰ Based on its understanding of the Appellate Body's decision in *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, the Panel determined that the Enabling Clause, in and of itself, does not establish legal obligations but, instead, contains requirements that are "only subsidiary obligations, dependent on the decision of the Member to take [particular] measures".¹⁶¹ The Panel further concluded that the legal function of the Enabling Clause is to permit Members to derogate from Article I:1 "so as to enable developed countries, *inter alia*, to provide GSP to developing countries".¹⁶² As a result, the Panel found that the Enabling Clause is "in the nature of an exception" to Article I:1.¹⁶³

81. The Panel noted that the GATT 1994 includes several provisions in the nature of exceptions that serve to justify a measure's inconsistency with Article I:1, including Articles XX, XXI, and XXIV, and the Enabling Clause. According to the Panel, these exceptions reflect "legitimate

¹⁵⁸Panel Report, para. 7.161.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, para. 7.176.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, para. 7.32.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, para. 7.37.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, para. 7.38.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, para. 7.39.

objectives" that may be pursued by Members.¹⁶⁴ The Panel reasoned that, because a complaining party may not be able to discern the objectives of a given measure, particularly as they may not be apparent from the text of the measure itself, it is "sufficient" for a complaining party to demonstrate an inconsistency with Article I:1, without also establishing "violations" of any of the possible exception provisions.¹⁶⁵

82. With respect to the present dispute, the Panel found that India could make its case against the European Communities solely by establishing the inconsistency of the Drug Arrangements with Article I:1.¹⁶⁶ Having done so, according to the Panel, it would then be incumbent upon the European Communities to invoke the Enabling Clause as a defence and to demonstrate the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the requirements contained in that Clause.¹⁶⁷

83. The Panel also examined whether Article I:1 applies to a measure covered by the Enabling Clause. It looked first to the ordinary meaning of the term "notwithstanding", as used in paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause, and concluded on that basis that the Enabling Clause takes precedence over Article I "to the extent of conflict between the two provisions".¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the Panel declined to assume the exclusion of the applicability of a "basic GATT obligation" such as Article I:1 in the absence of a textual indication of Members' intent to that effect.¹⁶⁹ Thus, it also referred to World Trade Organization ("WTO") jurisprudence relating to other exception provisions, and concluded that the relationship between these exceptions and the obligations from which derogation is permitted is "one where both categories of provisions apply concurrently to the same measure, but where, in the case of conflict between these two categories of provisions, [the exception] prevails".¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, the Panel concluded, on the basis of both the ordinary meaning of the text of the provision and WTO case law, that Article I:1 applies to measures covered by the Enabling Clause and that the Enabling Clause prevails over Article I:1 "to the extent of the conflict between [them]".¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁴Panel Report, para. 7.40.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.42.

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, para. 7.44. Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties. (footnote omitted)

¹⁶⁹Panel Report, para. 7.44.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, para. 7.45.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*

84. Finally, the Panel referred to the European Communities' reliance on the Appellate Body's decisions in *Brazil – Aircraft* and *EC – Hormones* and distinguished those cases from the present dispute. The Panel stated that the relationship between the provisions at issue in those cases was "different" from the relationship it had found between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause.¹⁷² In particular, the Panel determined that, in the two earlier disputes, one provision "clearly exclude[d]" the application of the other.¹⁷³ In contrast, the Panel had already found that the Enabling Clause does not exclude the applicability of Article I:1. In these circumstances, the Panel suggested that the Enabling Clause constitutes an "affirmative defence", in relation to which the responding party bears the burden of proof if that party invokes the Enabling Clause to justify its challenged measure.¹⁷⁴

85. On appeal, the European Communities challenges the Panel's finding that the Enabling Clause is an "exception"¹⁷⁵ to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and that, therefore, the European Communities must invoke the Enabling Clause as an "affirmative defence"¹⁷⁶ to India's claim that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1. The European Communities submits that the Enabling Clause is part of a "special regime for developing countries"¹⁷⁷, which "encourages"¹⁷⁸, *inter alia*, the granting of tariff preferences by developed-country Members to developing countries. As a result, the Enabling Clause exists "side-by-side and on an equal level" with Article I:1, and applies to the *exclusion* thereof, rather than as an exception thereto.¹⁷⁹ The European Communities argues, therefore, that India is required to bring a claim under the Enabling Clause if it considers that the European Communities' GSP scheme has nullified or impaired India's rights.¹⁸⁰ The European Communities requests us to refrain from examining the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the requirements of the Enabling Clause because, according to the European Communities and as

¹⁷²Panel Report, paras. 7.48-7.50.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, para. 7.48. (See also, *ibid.*, paras. 7.47-7.50) The Panel was referring to Articles 3.1(a) and 27.2(b) of the *Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures* (the "SCM Agreement"), as interpreted in Appellate Body Report, *Brazil – Aircraft*, and Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the *Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures* (the "SPS Agreement"), as interpreted in Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*.

¹⁷⁴Panel Report, para. 7.49.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, para. 7.39.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, para. 7.42.

¹⁷⁷European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 51.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, para. 53.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, para. 15(2).

allegedly acknowledged by India before the Panel, India did not bring a claim under the Enabling Clause.¹⁸¹

86. India, by contrast, supports the Panel's understanding of the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause. India argues that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause qualifies as an "exception" because the conditions therein must be complied with only by Members adopting a measure pursuant to the authorization granted by that provision. This differs from the most-favoured nation ("MFN") obligation in Article I:1.¹⁸² Moreover, according to India, we are not precluded from addressing the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause because, contrary to the assertion of the European Communities, India did make a claim under that Clause before the Panel.¹⁸³ India submits that denying the Panel the "competence"¹⁸⁴ to evaluate this claim, even if the Enabling Clause is not regarded as an exception, would be inconsistent with the objectives of WTO dispute settlement, "namely to secure a 'prompt' and 'positive solution to a dispute', and 'achieve a satisfactory settlement of the matter' in accordance with rights and obligations under the covered agreements."¹⁸⁵ According to India, this is particularly so because the European Communities had been on notice throughout the Panel proceedings of India's position that the Drug Arrangements are not justified by the Enabling Clause.¹⁸⁶

B. *Relevance of the Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause for the Allocation of the Burden of Proof*

87. We begin our analysis of the relationship between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause, and the attendant implications for the allocation of the burden of proof in this dispute, by recalling the observation of the Appellate Body in *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*:

[I]t is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸¹European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 3, 13(2), and 66.

¹⁸²India's appellee's submission, paras. 36 and 39.

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, paras. 54-57.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*, para. 71 and heading II.B.3.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, para. 74 (quoting DSU, Arts. 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7). (footnotes omitted)

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, para. 73.

¹⁸⁷Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, at 335.

It is thus for the *complaining* party to raise a claim with respect to a particular obligation and to *prove* that the responding party is acting inconsistently with that obligation. It is for the *responding* party, if it so chooses, to raise a defence in response to an allegation of inconsistency and to *prove* that its challenged measure satisfies the conditions of that defence. Therefore, the question before us is whether India must raise a "claim" and prove that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with the Enabling Clause, or whether the European Communities must raise and prove, in "defence", that the Drug Arrangements are consistent with the Enabling Clause, in order to justify the alleged inconsistency of the Drug Arrangements with Article I:1.¹⁸⁸

88. We recall that the Appellate Body has addressed the allocation of the burden of proof in similar situations. In cases where one provision permits, in certain circumstances, behaviour that would otherwise be inconsistent with an obligation in another provision, and one of the two provisions refers to the other provision, the Appellate Body has found that the complaining party bears the burden of establishing that a challenged measure is inconsistent with the provision permitting particular behaviour *only* where one of the provisions suggests that the obligation is not applicable to the said measure.¹⁸⁹ Otherwise, the permissive provision has been characterized as an exception, or defence, and the onus of invoking it and proving the consistency of the measure with its requirements has been placed on the responding party.¹⁹⁰ However, this distinction may not always be evident or readily applicable.

C. *Characterization of the Enabling Clause*

1. Text of Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause

89. In considering whether the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, we look, first, to the text of the provisions at issue. Article I:1, which embodies the MFN principle, provides:

¹⁸⁸We are not concerned here with the situation where a complaining party brings a challenge solely under the provisions of the Enabling Clause, that is, without also claiming an inconsistency with Article I of the GATT 1994.

¹⁸⁹See Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, para. 104; Appellate Body Report, *Brazil – Aircraft*, paras. 139-141; and Appellate Body Report, *EC – Sardines*, para. 275.

¹⁹⁰See Appellate Body Report, *US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)*, paras. 131-133; and Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, p.16, DSR 1997:I, at 337.

Article I

General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment

1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

Article I:1 plainly imposes upon WTO Members the obligation to treat "like products ... equally, irrespective of their origin".¹⁹¹

90. We turn now to the Enabling Clause, which has become an integral part of the GATT 1994.¹⁹² Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause, which applies to all measures authorized by that Clause, provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties. (footnote omitted)

The ordinary meaning of the term "notwithstanding" is, as the Panel noted¹⁹³, "[i]n spite of, without regard to or prevention by".¹⁹⁴ By using the word "notwithstanding", paragraph 1 of the Enabling

¹⁹¹Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bananas III*, para. 190.

¹⁹²In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the participants and third participants agreed that the Enabling Clause is one of the "other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES" within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the *WTO Agreement*. That provision stipulates that:

1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") shall consist of:
 - ...
 - (b) the provisions of the legal instruments set forth below that have entered into force under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement:
 - ...
 - (iv) other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947[.]

¹⁹³See Panel Report, para. 7.44.

¹⁹⁴*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 1948.

Clause permits Members to provide "differential and more favourable treatment" to developing countries "in spite of" the MFN obligation of Article I:1. Such treatment would otherwise be inconsistent with Article I:1 because that treatment is not extended to all Members of the WTO "immediately and unconditionally".¹⁹⁵ Paragraph 1 thus excepts Members from complying with the obligation contained in Article I:1 for the purpose of providing differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, provided that such treatment is in accordance with the conditions set out in the Enabling Clause. As such, the Enabling Clause operates as an "exception" to Article I:1.

2. Object and Purpose of the *WTO Agreement* and the Enabling Clause

91. The European Communities' contention that the Enabling Clause is *not* in the nature of an exception appears to be founded on the European Communities' understanding of the object and purpose of the *Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization* (the "*WTO Agreement*") and the Enabling Clause. We, too, look to the object and purpose of the *WTO Agreement* and the Enabling Clause to clarify whether the Enabling Clause was intended to operate as an exception to Article I:1.

92. The Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* provides that Members recognize:

... that there is need for *positive efforts* designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development[.]¹⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

The Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences (the "1971 Waiver Decision")¹⁹⁷, which provided the initial authorization under the GATT for developed countries' GSP schemes and is explicitly referred to in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause¹⁹⁸, offers relevant guidance in discerning the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause. In the Preamble to the 1971 Waiver Decision, the Contracting Parties recognized:

¹⁹⁵GATT 1994, Art. I:1.

¹⁹⁶Second recital. We note that Article XXXVI:3 of the GATT 1994 similarly provides:

There is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that less-developed contracting parties secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.

¹⁹⁷GATT Document L/3545, 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24 (attached as Annex D-2 to the Panel Report).

¹⁹⁸Footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause states:

As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24).

... that a principal aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is promotion of the trade and export earnings of developing countries for the furtherance of their economic development;

[and recognized] further that individual and joint action is essential to further the development of the economies of developing countries[.]¹⁹⁹

We understand, therefore, that the Enabling Clause is among the "positive efforts" called for in the Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* to be taken by developed-country Members to enhance the "economic development" of developing-country Members.²⁰⁰

93. According to the European Communities, the Enabling Clause, as the "most concrete, comprehensive and important application of the principle of Special and Differential Treatment", serves "to achieve one of the fundamental objectives of the WTO Agreement".²⁰¹ In the view of the European Communities, provisions that are exceptions permit Members to adopt measures to pursue objectives that are "not ... among the WTO Agreement's own objectives"²⁰²; the Enabling Clause thus does not fall under the category of exceptions. Pointing to this alleged difference between the role of measures falling under the Enabling Clause and that of measures falling under exception provisions such as Article XX, the European Communities contends that the *WTO Agreement* does not "merely tolerate" measures under the Enabling Clause, but rather "encourages" developed-country Members to adopt such measures.²⁰³ According to the European Communities, to require preference-granting countries to invoke the Enabling Clause in order to justify or defend their GSP schemes cannot be reconciled with the intention of WTO Members to encourage these schemes.

94. We note, however, as did the Panel²⁰⁴, that WTO objectives may well be pursued through measures taken under provisions characterized as exceptions. The Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* identifies certain objectives that may be pursued by Members through measures that would have to be

¹⁹⁹First and second recitals. Similarly, Article XXXVI:1(d) of the GATT 1994 provides:

[I]ndividual and joint action is essential to further the development of the economies of less-developed contracting parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the standards of living in these countries[.]

²⁰⁰We discuss further the role of the Enabling Clause in the context of the covered agreements, *infra*, paras. 106-109.

²⁰¹European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 20.

²⁰²*Ibid.*, para. 52.

²⁰³*Ibid.*, para. 53.

²⁰⁴See Panel Report, para. 7.52.

justified under the "General Exceptions" of Article XX. For instance, one such objective is reflected in the recognition by Members that the expansion of trade must be accompanied by:

... the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, [with Members] seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development[.]²⁰⁵

95. As the Appellate Body observed in *US – Shrimp*, WTO Members retained Article XX(g) from the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947* (the "GATT 1947") without alteration after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, being "fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy".²⁰⁶ Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 permits Members, subject to certain conditions, to take measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". It is well-established that Article XX(g) is an *exception* in relation to which the responding party bears the burden of proof.²⁰⁷ Thus, by authorizing in Article XX(g) measures for environmental conservation, an important objective referred to in the Preamble to the *WTO Agreement*, Members implicitly recognized that the implementation of such measures would not be discouraged simply because Article XX(g) constitutes a defence to otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures. Likewise, characterizing the Enabling Clause as an exception, in our view, does not undermine the importance of the Enabling Clause within the overall framework of the covered agreements and as a "positive effort" to enhance economic development of developing-country Members. Nor does it "discourag[e]"²⁰⁸ developed countries from adopting measures in favour of developing countries under the Enabling Clause.

96. The European Communities acknowledges that requiring Members to pursue environmental measures through Article XX(g), an exception provision, may be logical because "the WTO Agreement is not an environmental agreement and ... it contains no positive regulation of environmental matters."²⁰⁹ Because the *WTO Agreement* "regulate[s] positively the use of trade

²⁰⁵*WTO Agreement*, Preamble, first recital.

²⁰⁶Appellate Body Report, *US – Shrimp*, para. 129.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, para. 157; Appellate Body Report, *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, pp. 15-16, DSR 1997:I, at 337 (referring to GATT Panel Report, *Canada – FIRA*, para. 5.20; GATT Panel Report, *US – Section 337*, para. 5.27; GATT Panel Report, *US – Malt Beverages*, paras. 5.43 and 5.52; and Panel Report, *US – Gasoline*, para. 6.20).

²⁰⁸United States' third participant's submission, para. 9.

²⁰⁹European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 54.

measures"²¹⁰, however, and the Enabling Clause "promotes" the use of trade measures to further the development of developing countries, the European Communities argues that Members should not be required to prove the consistency of their measures with the Enabling Clause.

97. We do not consider it relevant, for the purposes of determining whether a provision is or is not in the nature of an exception, that the provision governs "trade measures" rather than measures of a primarily "non-trade" nature. Indeed, in a previous appeal, the Appellate Body found that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994—a provision authorizing quantitative restrictions when taken in response to balance-of-payments difficulties—is a defence to be invoked by the responding party.²¹¹ The fact that a provision regulates the use of "trade measures", therefore, does not compel a finding that it is for the complaining party to establish inconsistency with that provision, rather than for the defending party to rely on it as a defence.

98. In sum, in our view, the characterization of the Enabling Clause as an exception in no way diminishes the right of Members to provide or to receive "differential and more favourable treatment". The status and relative importance of a given provision does not depend on whether it is characterized, for the purpose of allocating the burden of proof, as a claim to be proven by the complaining party, or as a defence to be established by the responding party. Whatever its characterization, a provision of the covered agreements must be interpreted in accordance with the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law", as required by Article 3.2 of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (the "DSU").²¹² Members' rights under the Enabling Clause are not curtailed by requiring preference-granting countries to establish in dispute settlement the consistency of their preferential measures with the conditions of the Enabling Clause. Nor does characterizing the Enabling Clause as an exception

²¹⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 54.

²¹¹Appellate Body Report, *India – Quantitative Restrictions*, paras. 134-136. We also note that GATT panels determined Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1947 to constitute an "exception", even though that provision addresses "trade measures", namely quantitative restrictions. (See GATT Panel Report, *Japan – Agricultural Products I*, para. 5.1.3.7; GATT Panel Report, *EEC – Dessert Apples*, para. 12.3; and GATT Panel Report, *Canada – Ice Cream and Yoghurt*, para. 59)

²¹²In this regard, we recall the Appellate Body's statement in *EC – Hormones* that:

... merely characterizing a treaty provision as an "exception" does not by itself justify a "stricter" or "narrower" interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation.

(Appellate Body Report, para. 104)

detract from its critical role in encouraging the granting of special and differential treatment to developing-country Members of the WTO.

99. In the light of the above, we *uphold* the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

100. We examine now the European Communities' appeal regarding the Panel's finding that the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.²¹³ The European Communities argues that the Enabling Clause exists "side-by-side and on an equal level" with Article I:1, and thus applies to the exclusion of that provision.²¹⁴ In our view, the European Communities misconstrues the relationship between the two provisions.

101. It is well settled that the MFN principle embodied in Article I:1 is a "cornerstone of the GATT" and "one of the pillars of the WTO trading system"²¹⁵, which has consistently served as a key basis and impetus for concessions in trade negotiations. However, we recognize that Members are entitled to adopt measures providing "differential and more favourable treatment" under the Enabling Clause. Therefore, challenges to such measures, brought under Article I:1, cannot succeed where such measures are in accordance with the terms of the Enabling Clause. In our view, this is so because the text of paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause ensures that, to the extent that there is a conflict between measures under the Enabling Clause and the MFN obligation in Article I:1, the Enabling Clause, as the more specific rule, prevails over Article I:1. In order to determine whether such a conflict exists, however, a dispute settlement panel should, as a first step, examine the consistency of a challenged measure with Article I:1, as the general rule. If the measure is considered at this stage to be inconsistent with Article I:1, the panel should then examine, as a second step, whether the measure is nevertheless justified by the Enabling Clause. It is only at this latter stage that a final determination of consistency with the Enabling Clause or inconsistency with Article I:1 can be made.

²¹³Panel Report, para. 7.53.

²¹⁴European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 22.

²¹⁵Appellate Body Report, *Canada – Autos*, para. 69. See also, Appellate Body Report, *US – Section 211 Appropriations Act*, para. 297, which reads:

Like the national treatment obligation, the obligation to provide most-favoured-nation treatment has long been one of the cornerstones of the world trading system. For more than fifty years, the obligation to provide most-favoured-nation treatment in Article I of the GATT 1994 has been both central and essential to assuring the success of a global rules-based system for trade in goods.

102. In other words, the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability"²¹⁶ of Article I:1 in the sense that, as a matter of procedure (or "order of examination", as the Panel stated²¹⁷), the challenged measure is submitted successively to the test of compatibility with the two provisions. But, as a matter of final determination—or *application* rather than *applicability*—it is clear that only one provision applies at a time. This is what the Panel itself found when, after stating that "as an exception provision, the Enabling Clause applies concurrently with Article I:1", it added "and *takes precedence* to the extent of the conflict between the two provisions."²¹⁸

103. It is with this understanding, therefore, that we *uphold* the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

D. *Burden of Proof*

104. We now examine the implications of the relationship between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause for the allocation of the burden of proof in this dispute. As a general rule, the burden of proof for an "exception" falls on the respondent, that is, as the Appellate Body stated in *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses*, on the party "assert[ing] the affirmative of a particular ... defence".²¹⁹ From this allocation of the burden of proof, it is normally for the respondent, first, to *raise* the defence and, second, to *prove* that the challenged measure meets the requirements of the defence provision.

105. We are therefore of the view that the European Communities must *prove* that the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions set out in the Enabling Clause. Consistent with the principle of *jura novit curia*²²⁰, it is not the responsibility of the European Communities to provide us with the

²¹⁶Panel Report, para. 7.53.

²¹⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.45.

²¹⁸*Ibid.* (emphasis added)

²¹⁹Appellate Body Report, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, at 335. (See also, Appellate Body Report, *US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)*, para. 133; and Appellate Body Report, *India – Quantitative Restrictions*, para. 136)

²²⁰The principle of *jura novit curia* has been articulated by the International Court of Justice as follows:

It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.

(International Court of Justice, Merits, *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*, 1986 ICJ Reports, p. 14, para. 29 (quoting International Court of Justice, Merits, *Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland)*, 1974 ICJ Reports, p. 9, para. 17))

legal interpretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling Clause²²¹; instead, the burden of the European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the Enabling Clause.

1. Responsibility for Raising the Enabling Clause

106. With respect to the legal responsibility for *raising* a defence as an issue in a dispute settlement proceeding, however, we regard the particular circumstances of this case as dictating a special approach, given the fundamental role of the Enabling Clause in the WTO system as well as its contents. The Enabling Clause authorizes developed-country Members to grant enhanced market access to products from developing countries beyond that granted to products from developed countries. Enhanced market access is intended to provide developing countries with increasing returns from their growing exports, which returns are critical for those countries' economic development. The Enabling Clause thus plays a vital role in promoting trade as a means of stimulating economic growth and development. In this respect, the Enabling Clause is not a typical "exception", or "defence", in the style of Article XX of the GATT 1994, or of other exception provisions identified by the Appellate Body in previous cases.

107. A brief review of the history of the Enabling Clause confirms its special status in the covered agreements. When the GATT 1947 entered into force, the Contracting Parties stated that one of its objectives was to "rais[e] standards of living".²²² However, this objective was to be achieved in countries at all stages of economic development through the *universally-applied* commitments embodied in the GATT provisions. In 1965, the Contracting Parties added Articles XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII to form Part IV of the GATT 1947, entitled "Trade and Development".²²³ Article XXXVI expressly recognized the "need for positive efforts" and "individual and joint action" so that developing countries would be able to share in the growth in international trade and further their economic development.²²⁴ Some of these "positive efforts" resulted in the Agreed Conclusions

²²¹Compare Appellate Body Report, *EC – Hormones*, para. 156, which states:

[N]othing in the DSU limits the faculty of a panel freely to use arguments submitted by any of the parties -- or to develop its own legal reasoning -- to support its own findings and conclusions on the matter under its consideration. A panel might well be unable to carry out an objective assessment of the matter, as mandated by Article 11 of the DSU, if in its reasoning it had to restrict itself solely to arguments presented by the parties to the dispute.

²²²GATT 1947, Preamble, first recital.

²²³*Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development*, BISD 13S/2 (1965).

²²⁴GATT 1947, Arts. XXXVI:3 and XXXVI:1(d).

of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") Special Committee on Preferences (the "Agreed Conclusions")²²⁵, which recognized that preferential tariff treatment accorded under a generalized scheme of preferences was key for developing countries "(a) to increase their export earnings; (b) to promote their industrialization; and (c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth."²²⁶ The Agreed Conclusions also made clear that the achievement of these objectives through the adoption of preferences by developed countries required a GATT waiver, in particular, with respect to the MFN obligation in Article I:1.²²⁷ Accordingly, the Contracting Parties adopted the 1971 Waiver Decision in order to waive the obligations of Article I of the GATT 1947 and thereby authorize the granting of tariff preferences to developing countries for a period of ten years.²²⁸

108. In 1979, the Enabling Clause expanded the authorization provided by the 1971 Waiver Decision to cover additional preferential measures and made the authorization a permanent feature of the GATT. In his report at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of negotiations, the then-Director General observed:

The Enabling Clause meets a fundamental concern of developing countries by introducing differential and more favourable treatment as an integral part of the GATT system, no longer requiring waivers from the GATT. It also provides the perspective against which the participation of developing countries in the trading system may be seen.²²⁹

Members reaffirmed the significance of the Enabling Clause in 1994 with the incorporation of the Enabling Clause into the GATT 1994.²³⁰ The relationship between trade and development, and in particular the role of the Enabling Clause, remain prominent on the agenda of the WTO, as recognized by the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001.²³¹

109. We thus understand that, between the entry into force of the GATT and the adoption of the Enabling Clause, the Contracting Parties determined that the MFN obligation failed to secure

²²⁵Attached as Annex D-4 to the Panel Report.

²²⁶Agreed Conclusions, para. I.2 (Panel Report, p. D-8).

²²⁷*Ibid.*, paras. IX.1 and IX.2(c) (Panel Report, pp. D-13–D-14).

²²⁸1971 Waiver Decision, para. (a) (Panel Report, p. D-4).

²²⁹European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 25 (quoting Report by the Director-General of GATT, in GATT, *The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations* (1979), Vol. I, p. 99).

²³⁰Para. 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A to the *WTO Agreement* incorporating the GATT 1994 into the *WTO Agreement*.

²³¹Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001, *Implementation-related Issues and Concerns*, WT/MIN(01)/17, paras. 12.1-12.2.

adequate market access for developing countries so as to stimulate their economic development. Overcoming this required recognition by the multilateral trading system that certain obligations, applied to all Contracting Parties, could impede rather than facilitate the objective of ensuring that developing countries secure a share in the growth of world trade. This recognition came through an authorization for GSP schemes in the 1971 Waiver Decision and then in the broader authorization for preferential treatment for developing countries in the Enabling Clause.²³²

110. In our view, the special status of the Enabling Clause in the WTO system has particular implications for WTO dispute settlement. As we have explained, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause enhances market access for developing countries as a means of improving their economic development by authorizing preferential treatment for those countries, "notwithstanding" the obligations of Article I. It is evident that a Member cannot implement a measure authorized by the Enabling Clause without according an "advantage" to a developing country's products over those of a developed country. It follows, therefore, that every measure undertaken pursuant to the Enabling Clause would necessarily be inconsistent with Article I, if assessed on that basis alone, but it would be exempted from compliance with Article I because it meets the requirements of the Enabling Clause. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that a complaining party challenging a measure taken pursuant to the Enabling Clause must allege more than mere inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, for to do only that would not convey the "legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".²³³ In other words, it is insufficient in WTO dispute settlement for a complainant to allege inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 if the complainant seeks also to argue that the measure is not justified under the Enabling Clause. This is especially so if the challenged measure, like that at issue here, is plainly taken pursuant to the Enabling Clause, as we discuss *infra*.²³⁴

111. Furthermore, the history and objective of the Enabling Clause lead us to agree with the European Communities²³⁵ that Members are *encouraged* to deviate from Article I in the pursuit of "differential and more favourable treatment" for developing countries. This deviation, however, is encouraged only to the extent that it complies with the series of requirements set out in the Enabling

²³²We recognize that an exemption for developing countries from certain GATT obligations also resulted from the 1954-1955 Review Session, where the Contracting Parties amended the GATT by adding Article XVIII for the benefit of developing countries facing balance-of-payments difficulties or seeking to nurture an infant industry. (See Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement: Quantitative Restrictions, GATT Document L/332/Rev.1 and Addenda, adopted 2, 4 and 5 March 1955, BISD, 3S/170, paras. 3, 35-36, 44, and 52)

²³³DSU, Art. 6.2. See also, Appellate Body Report, *Korea – Dairy*, paras. 120, 124, and 127.

²³⁴*Infra*, paras. 116-117.

²³⁵European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 53.

Clause, requirements that we find to be more extensive than more typical defences such as those found in Article XX.

112. Paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause identifies the four types of measures to which the authorization of paragraph 1 applies:

- (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences,³
- (b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
- (c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another
- (d) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.

³ As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24).

Measures that a Member claims are exempt from a finding of inconsistency with Article I by virtue of the Enabling Clause must fit within these sub-paragraphs, of which the most relevant for this case is paragraph 2(a), which provides for GSP schemes. As we discuss in greater detail *infra*²³⁶, this provision requires the preferential treatment to be "in accordance with" the GSP and further defines this obligation through each of the terms "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory". Paragraphs 2(b)-(d) impose different obligations to be satisfied by a Member taking a measure pursuant to those provisions. Paragraph 3 identifies three conditions that must also be satisfied by *any* measure under the Enabling Clause. Paragraph 4 sets forth procedural conditions for the introduction, modification, or withdrawal of a preferential measure for developing countries.

²³⁶ *Infra*, paras. 142-174.

Paragraphs 5 through 9 include obligations that are not necessarily related to measures providing "differential and more favourable treatment".²³⁷

113. In the light of the extensive requirements set forth in the Enabling Clause, we are of the view that, when a complaining party considers that a preference scheme of another Member does not meet one or more of those requirements, the specific provisions of the Enabling Clause with which the scheme allegedly falls afoul, form critical components of the "legal basis of the complaint"²³⁸ and, therefore, of the "matter" in dispute.²³⁹ Accordingly, a complaining party cannot, in good faith, ignore those provisions and must, in its request for the establishment of a panel, identify them and thereby "notif[y] the parties and third parties of the nature of [its] case".²⁴⁰ For the failure of such a complaining party to raise the relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause would place an unwarranted burden on the responding party. This due process consideration applies equally to the elaboration of a complaining party's case in its written submissions, which must "explicitly" articulate a claim so that the panel and all parties to a dispute "understand that a specific claim has been made, [are] aware of its dimensions, and have an adequate opportunity to address and respond to it".²⁴¹

114. Exposing preference schemes to open-ended challenges would be inconsistent, in our view, with the intention of Members, as reflected in the Enabling Clause, to "encourage"²⁴² the adoption of preferential treatment for developing countries and to provide a practical means of doing so within the legal framework of the covered agreements. Accordingly, although a responding party must defend the consistency of its preference scheme with the conditions of the Enabling Clause and must prove such consistency, a *complaining* party has to define the parameters within which the *responding* party must make that defence.

²³⁷See Enabling Clause (attached as Annex 2 to this Report).

²³⁸DSU, Art. 6.2, which provides:

The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of special terms of reference.

²³⁹Appellate Body Report, *US – Carbon Steel*, para. 125 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Guatemala – Cement I*, paras. 69-76).

²⁴⁰*Ibid.*, para. 126 (referring to Appellate Body Report, *Brazil – Desiccated Coconut*, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, at 186; and Appellate Body Report, *EC – Bananas III*, para. 142).

²⁴¹Appellate Body Report, *Chile – Price Band System*, para. 164.

²⁴²European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 53.

115. The responsibility of the complaining party in such an instance, however, should not be overstated. It is merely to *identify* those provisions of the Enabling Clause with which the scheme is allegedly inconsistent, without bearing the burden of *establishing* the facts necessary to support such inconsistency. That burden, as we concluded above²⁴³, remains on the responding party invoking the Enabling Clause as a defence.

116. We observe, moreover, that the measure challenged in this dispute is unmistakably a preferential tariff scheme, granted by a developed-country Member in favour of developing countries, and proclaiming to be in accordance with the GSP. The Drug Arrangements are found in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001, the title of which indicates the Regulation to be "applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004". The first recital in the Preamble to the Regulation provides:

Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries, in the framework of its scheme of generalised tariff preferences.

In its original proposal for the Regulation, the European Commission explained:

In 1994, the Commission adopted some guidelines on the *role of the GSP* for the ten-year period 1995 to 2004. A new regulation is required in order to implement *those guidelines* for the remainder of the period, i.e. the years 2002 to 2004. This memorandum is meant to explain the proposal for that new regulation.²⁴⁴ (footnote omitted; emphasis added)

In its amended proposal, adding Pakistan to the list of beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements, the European Commission further stated:

Since the *GSP drug regime* was extended to the countries of the Andean Community and to those of the Central American Common Market, it provided an important incentive to allow for the substitution of illicit crops, enhance exports in order to create jobs not linked to drug production and trafficking and foster diversification.

²⁴³*Supra*, para. 105.

²⁴⁴Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, para. 1 (attached to Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001/0131 (ACC), at p. 3) (Exhibit India-7 submitted by India to the Panel).

The problems which Pakistan is facing today, are similar. The *GSP drug regime* is therefore likely to stabilise its economic and social structures and thus consolidate the institutions that uphold the rule of law.²⁴⁵ (emphasis added)

117. It is therefore clear, on the face of the Regulation and from official, publicly-available explanatory documentation, that the Drug Arrangements challenged by India in this dispute are part of a preferential tariff scheme implemented by the European Communities pursuant to the authorization in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause. As such, India would have been well aware that the Drug Arrangements must comply with the requirements of the Enabling Clause, and that the European Communities was likely to invoke the Enabling Clause in response to a challenge of inconsistency with Article I:1. Indeed, India admitted as much before the Panel.²⁴⁶ India also must have believed that at least certain of those requirements were not being met and that, as a consequence, the inconsistency of the Drug Arrangements with Article I could not be justified. Accordingly, India, as the complaining party, should reasonably have articulated its claims of inconsistency with specific provisions of the Enabling Clause at the outset of this dispute as part of its responsibility to "engage in [dispute settlement] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute".²⁴⁷

118. In sum, although the burden of *justifying* the Drug Arrangements under the Enabling Clause falls on the European Communities, India was required to do more than simply allege inconsistency with Article I. India's claim of inconsistency with Article I with respect to the measure challenged here is inextricably linked with its argument that the Drug Arrangements do not satisfy the conditions in the Enabling Clause and that, therefore, they cannot be justified as a derogation from Article I. In the light of the above considerations, we are of the view that India was required to (i) identify, in its

²⁴⁵Explanatory Memorandum to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001/0131 (ACC), p. 2, fourth and fifth recitals (Exhibit India-7 submitted by India to the Panel).

²⁴⁶See, for example, India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 44, which states: "[S]ince the Drug Arrangements are part of the EC's GSP scheme, it may reasonably be assumed that the EC will invoke the Enabling Clause as a defence."

²⁴⁷DSU, Art. 3.10. See also, Appellate Body Report, *US – FSC*, para. 166, which reads:

Article 3.10 of the DSU commits Members of the WTO, if a dispute arises, to engage in dispute settlement procedures "in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute". This is another specific manifestation of the principle of good faith which, we have pointed out, is at once a general principle of law and a principle of general international law. This pervasive principle requires both complaining and responding Members to comply with the requirements of the DSU (and related requirements in other covered agreements) in good faith. By good faith compliance, complaining Members accord to the responding Members the full measure of protection and opportunity to defend, contemplated by the letter and spirit of the procedural rules. (footnote omitted)

request for the establishment of a panel, which obligations in the Enabling Clause the Drug Arrangements are alleged to have contravened, and (ii) make written submissions in support of this allegation. The requirement to make such an argument, however, does not mean that India must prove inconsistency with a provision of the Enabling Clause, because the ultimate burden of establishing the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause lies with the European Communities.²⁴⁸

2. Whether India Raised the Enabling Clause Before the Panel

119. We turn now to examine whether, in fact, India fulfilled these requirements and thereby sufficiently identified the scope of its claim before the Panel. In its request for consultations, India claimed that the Drug Arrangements and the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the environment "nullify or impair the benefits accruing to India under the most-favoured-nation provisions of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause."²⁴⁹ In its request for the establishment of a panel, India asked that a panel examine whether the aforementioned arrangements of the European Communities' GSP scheme "are consistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the requirements set out in paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause".²⁵⁰ The Panel's terms of reference, therefore, included India's allegations that certain aspects of the European Communities' GSP scheme were not "consistent" with, or did not "meet the requirements set out in", paragraphs 2(a), 3(a), and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸Compare Appellate Body Report, *US – Certain EC Products*, para. 114, which states:

On the basis of our review of the European Communities' submissions and statements to the Panel, we conclude that the European Communities *did not specifically claim* before the Panel that, by adopting the 3 March Measure, the United States acted inconsistently with Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. As the European Communities did not make a specific claim of inconsistency with Article 23.2(a), it *did not adduce any evidence or arguments* to demonstrate that the United States made a "determination as to the effect that a violation has occurred" in breach of Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. And, as the European Communities did not adduce any evidence or arguments in support of a claim of violation of Article 23.2(a) of the DSU, the European Communities could not have established, and *did not establish, a prima facie case* of violation of Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. (footnotes omitted; emphasis added)

²⁴⁹Request for consultations by India, WT/DS246/1, 12 March 2002, p. 1.

²⁵⁰Request for the establishment of a panel by India, WT/DS246/4, 9 December 2002, p. 2. In addition to the Drug Arrangements and the special incentives for the protection of labour rights and the environment, India also challenged the WTO-consistency of "any implementing rules and regulations, ... any amendments to any of the foregoing, and ... their application". (*Ibid.*)

²⁵¹Request for the establishment of a panel by India, WT/DS246/4, 9 December 2002, pp. 1-2. The Panel's terms of reference incorporated these allegations by reference to document WT/DS246/4. (Constitution of the panel established at the request of India, WT/DS246/5, 6 March 2003, para. 2)

120. In its written submissions before the Panel, India clearly invoked paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause as the basis for its allegation that the Drug Arrangements are not "justified" by the Enabling Clause.²⁵² For example, in its first written submission before the Panel, India stated:

The tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are beneficial to some developing countries and detrimental to others and consequently do not comply with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.²⁵³

121. India's second written submission before the Panel included a sub-heading entitled, "The EC has failed to demonstrate that under the Drug Arrangements it accords tariff treatment that is 'non-discriminatory' within the meaning of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".²⁵⁴ Under this sub-heading, India argued:

[P]aragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause was meant to ensure that benefits under the GSP are extended to *all* developing countries, as opposed to some developing countries. Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause does not envisage selectivity. Instead, it requires that preferential tariff treatment is accorded to all developing countries.²⁵⁵ (original italics)

India further argued that, even if the European Communities' interpretation of paragraph 2(a) were correct, the Drug Arrangements would not be "non-discriminatory", as required by footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a).²⁵⁶

122. We find that India acted in good faith, in its written submissions before the Panel, explaining why, in its view, the Drug Arrangements fail to meet certain requirements of the Enabling Clause, namely, those present in paragraph 2(a). Such an explanation, in our view, was sufficient to place the European Communities on notice as to the reasons underlying India's allegation that the Drug Arrangements are not justified by the relevant provision of the Enabling Clause. With such notice,

²⁵²India's first written submission to the Panel, heading IV.C. and para. 67; India's second written submission to the Panel, heading III.B. and para. 164. By the time of its first written submission to the Panel, India had indicated to the European Communities and to the Panel that this dispute was limited to the WTO-consistency of the Drug Arrangements, but that India reserved its right to challenge the special incentives for the protection of labour rights and the environment in a future dispute settlement proceeding. (See *supra*, para. 4; and Panel Report, para. 1.5) Both participants confirmed, in response to questioning at the oral hearing, that the measure at issue in this dispute was limited to the Drug Arrangements.

²⁵³India's first written submission to the Panel, para. 62.

²⁵⁴India's second written submission to the Panel, heading III.B.3.

²⁵⁵*Ibid.*, para. 95.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*, paras. 119-128.

the European Communities could be expected to defend its challenged measure under the Enabling Clause, in relation to which the European Communities ultimately bears the burden of justification.

123. In allocating the burden of proof, therefore, we conclude that India was required to raise the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1. Once India had identified, in its panel request and through argumentation in its written submissions, the relevant obligations of the Enabling Clause that it claims were not satisfied by the Drug Arrangements, the European Communities was then required to prove that the Drug Arrangements met those obligations, having chosen to rely on the Enabling Clause as a defence.

124. Finally, we observe that the European Communities' appeal of the Panel's conclusion that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is "based on" the European Communities' claim that the Panel erroneously found that (i) the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1; (ii) the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1; and (iii) the European Communities had the burden of proving the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with that Clause.²⁵⁷ As we have not reversed any of these findings of the Panel²⁵⁸, we do not need to review further and we *do not rule* on the Panel's conclusion that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.²⁵⁹

125. For these reasons, we *modify* the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that "the European Communities bears the burden of invoking the Enabling Clause and justifying its Drug Arrangements under that provision." We *find* that it was incumbent upon India to *raise* the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, but that the

²⁵⁷In its Notice of Appeal, the European Communities' reference to Article I:1 was limited to its decision to:

... seek[] review of the Panel's legal conclusion that [the Drug Arrangements] are inconsistent with Article I:1 ... This conclusion is based on the following erroneous legal findings:

- that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT;
- that the Enabling Clause does not exclude the applicability of Article I:1 of the GATT;
- that the EC had the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements were consistent with the Enabling Clause.

(Notification of an appeal by the European Communities, WT/DS246/7, 8 January 2004, p.1 (attached as Annex 1 to this Report))

²⁵⁸*Supra*, paras. 99, 103, and 123.

²⁵⁹Panel Report, paras. 7.60 and 8.1(b). The European Communities confirmed, in response to questioning at the oral hearing, that it is not appealing the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 7.60 of the Panel Report, that the tariff advantages under the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 because they are not accorded "unconditionally" to the like products originating in all other WTO Members.

European Communities bore the burden of *proving* that the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions of the Enabling Clause, in order to justify those Arrangements under that Clause. We *find*, further, that India sufficiently raised paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 before the Panel. We turn now to examine whether the European Communities met its burden of justifying the Drug Arrangements under that provision.

V. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause

126. The European Communities "appeals subsidiarily" the Panel's finding that the Drug Arrangements are not justified under paragraph 2(a), should we "conclude that the Enabling Clause is an exception to GATT Article I:1, or that India made a valid claim under the Enabling Clause".²⁶⁰ Having found that the Enabling Clause is in the nature of an exception to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, we proceed to examine the European Communities' appeal as it relates to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

127. The European Communities challenges three of the Panel's findings, namely that:

- (a) "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations"²⁶¹;
- (b) "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) [of the Enabling Clause] should be interpreted to mean *all* developing countries, with the exception that where developed countries are implementing a priori limitations, 'developing countries' may mean *less than all* developing countries"²⁶²; and, ultimately, that
- (c) the European Communities failed "to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".²⁶³

²⁶⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 67.

²⁶¹Panel Report, paras. 7.161 and 7.176.

²⁶²*Ibid.*, para. 7.174. (original italics; footnote omitted)

²⁶³*Ibid.*, para. 8.1(d).

128. Before addressing these specific issues, we will identify the precise scope of the appeal before us. In doing so, we note that both the European Communities and India agree that, in addressing paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, the Panel implicitly made findings on issues that were not before it. Thus, India submits that "[t]he issue before the Panel was not whether the EC could exclude from its GSP scheme countries claiming developing country status."²⁶⁴ In India's view, that issue did not arise "because India and all the countries enjoying tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are beneficiaries under the EC's GSP scheme."²⁶⁵ Also not before the Panel, according to India, was "whether the EC's mechanisms for the graduation of developing countries meet the requirements of the Enabling Clause."²⁶⁶ India emphasizes that it "did not submit any claims on these issues to the Panel because they are not relevant to the resolution of this dispute."²⁶⁷ In other words, according to India, the legal issues raised in this dispute "relate exclusively"²⁶⁸ to the treatment of those countries that a preference-granting country has included in its GSP scheme as beneficiaries. The European Communities echoes India's concern that the Panel read obligations into the Enabling Clause "in respect of issues which had not been raised by any of the parties and which [the Panel] did not have to address in order to resolve the dispute".²⁶⁹

129. Against this background, we understand India's claim before the Panel to have been limited to the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.²⁷⁰ In particular, India's challenge to the Drug Arrangements is based on its submission that the term "non-discriminatory" prevents preference-granting countries from according preferential tariff treatment to any beneficiary of their GSP schemes without granting identical preferential tariff treatment to all other beneficiaries. Therefore, in this Report, we do not rule on whether the Enabling Clause permits *ab initio* exclusions from GSP schemes of countries claiming developing country status, or the partial or total withdrawal of GSP benefits from certain developing countries under certain conditions.

²⁶⁴India's appellee's submission, para. 101.

²⁶⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶⁶India's opening statement at the oral hearing. By "graduation", we understand India to refer to the withdrawal of preferential tariff treatment with respect to specific products or designated developing countries on grounds of the degree of their development.

²⁶⁷India's opening statement at the oral hearing.

²⁶⁸India's appellee's submission, para. 103.

²⁶⁹European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 7.

²⁷⁰See *supra*, paras. 120-122.

130. We note, moreover, that the European Communities has *not* appealed the Panel's interpretation of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause.²⁷¹ Instead, the European Communities has invoked that provision solely as "contextual support" for its interpretation of "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3.²⁷² We also note that the Panel made no findings in this case as to whether the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with paragraph 3(a) or 3(c) of the Enabling Clause. Our mandate, pursuant to Article 17.6 of the DSU, is limited to "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". Therefore, in this appeal, we are not required to, and we shall not address, the issue of whether the Drug Arrangements are consistent with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause. This does not prevent us, of course, from examining those paragraphs as context for our interpretation of "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3.

131. With these considerations in mind, we turn to address the meaning of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3. In doing so, we consider it useful to begin our analysis by setting out briefly the relevant findings of the Panel.

A. *Panel Findings*

132. The Panel stated at the outset that "[t]he main issue disputed by the parties is whether the Drug Arrangements are consistent with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, particularly the requirement of 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 to this subparagraph."²⁷³ Paragraph 2(a) reads:

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:
 - (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences,³

³ As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24). (footnote 2 omitted)

²⁷¹The European Communities refers to the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.99 of the Panel Report, that paragraph 3(c) requires preference-granting countries to "provide product coverage and tariff cuts at levels in general no less than those offered and accepted in the Agreed Conclusions." The European Communities explains that "[s]ince this issue was not raised by India and is not directly relevant to the issues in dispute, ... the EC has not deemed [it necessary] to appeal it." (European Communities' appellant's submission, footnote 40 to para. 47)

²⁷²European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 126.

²⁷³Panel Report, para. 7.65.

133. The Panel went on to examine, not the language of those provisions, but the meaning of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, which reads:

3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:

...

(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.

The Panel explained that "[i]t is only possible to give a full meaning to paragraph 2(a) and footnote 3 after determining whether paragraph 3(c) allows differentiation among developing countries in 'respond[ing] positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries'." ²⁷⁴

134. Having found that the text of paragraph 3(c) "does not reveal whether the 'needs of developing countries' refers to the needs of *all* developing countries or to the needs of *individual* developing countries" ²⁷⁵, the Panel proceeded to examine "the drafting history in UNCTAD ... to identify the intention of the drafters on issues relating to the GSP arrangements." ²⁷⁶ The Panel concluded that paragraph 3(c) allows for differentiation among beneficiaries for the purposes of granting preferential treatment to least-developed countries and setting *a priori* import limitations for products originating in particularly competitive developing countries. The Panel asserted that "[n]o other differentiation among developing countries is permitted by paragraph 3(c)." ²⁷⁷

135. Having made these findings based on its review of what it considered the "context" and "preparatory work" ²⁷⁸ of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, the Panel turned to examine paragraph 2(a) and footnote 3 thereto. The Panel observed that the word "discriminate ... can have either a *neutral* meaning of making a distinction or a *negative* meaning carrying the connotation of a distinction that is unjust or prejudicial." ²⁷⁹ In order to determine the appropriate meaning of the

²⁷⁴Panel Report, para. 7.65 (quoting Enabling Clause, para. 3(c) (attached as Annex 2 to this Report)). In a footnote, the Panel explained further that "[t]he European Communities argue[d] that 'if the term "non-discriminatory" was interpreted as prohibiting any difference in treatment between developing countries, developed countries would be effectively precluded from responding positively to those needs, thus rendering [to] a nullity the requirement set forth in paragraph 3(c)'." (*Ibid.*, footnote 291 to para. 7.65 (quoting European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, para. 71))

²⁷⁵*Ibid.*, para. 7.78. (original italics)

²⁷⁶*Ibid.*, para. 7.80.

²⁷⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.116.

²⁷⁸*Ibid.*, para. 7.88.

²⁷⁹*Ibid.*, para. 7.126. (original italics)

term "non-discriminatory" as used in footnote 3, the Panel turned to the context of that term. According to the Panel, this context includes paragraphs 2(a), 2(d), and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, with the "most relevant elements of context" being Resolution 21(II) of the Second Session of UNCTAD ("Resolution 21(II)")²⁸⁰ and the Agreed Conclusions.²⁸¹ Based on its review of these documents, the Panel found that:

... the clear intention of the negotiators was to provide GSP equally to all developing countries and to eliminate all differentiation in preferential treatment to developing countries, with the exception of the implementation of a priori limitations in GSP schemes.²⁸²

136. The Panel concluded:

... that the requirement of non-discrimination, as a general principle formally set out in Resolution 21(II) and later carried over into the 1971 Waiver Decision and then into the Enabling Clause, obliges preference-giving countries to provide the GSP benefits to *all* developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations in GSP schemes.²⁸³ (original italics)

137. The Panel found further support for its conclusion in its previous analysis of paragraph 3(c)²⁸⁴ and in paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause, which provides:

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:

...

(d) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries. (footnote omitted)

The Panel stated that the term "non-discriminatory" cannot be interpreted "to permit preferential treatment to less than all developing countries without an explicit authorization".²⁸⁵ According to the Panel, "[s]uch explicit authorization is only provided for the benefit of the least-developed countries

²⁸⁰Resolution 21(II) of the Second Session of UNCTAD, entitled "Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Developing Countries" (attached as Annex D-3 to the Panel Report).

²⁸¹Panel Report, para. 7.128.

²⁸²*Ibid.*, para. 7.144.

²⁸³*Ibid.*

²⁸⁴*Ibid.*, paras. 7.148-7.149.

²⁸⁵*Ibid.*, para. 7.151.

in paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause and for the implementation of a priori limitations, as set out in the Agreed Conclusions."²⁸⁶

138. Turning to the "object and purpose" of the Enabling Clause, the Panel considered that "the objective of promoting the trade of developing countries and that of promoting trade liberalization generally"²⁸⁷ are relevant for the interpretation of the term "non-discriminatory". The Panel determined, however, that the latter "contributes more to guiding the interpretation of 'non-discriminatory', given its function of preventing abuse in providing GSP."²⁸⁸

139. The Panel found further support for its interpretation in an examination of the "overall practice" of preference-granting countries²⁸⁹, which, according to the Panel, "suggests that there was a common understanding of 'equal' treatment to all developing countries except for a priori measures, and that it was on this basis that the 1971 Waiver Decision was adopted."²⁹⁰

140. Based on its analysis described above, the Panel found that:

... the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 requires that *identical* tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to *all* developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations.²⁹¹ (emphasis added)

141. Regarding the measure at issue in this dispute, the Panel found that:

... the European Communities' Drug Arrangements, as a GSP scheme, do not provide identical tariff preferences to *all* developing countries and that the differentiation is neither for the purpose of special treatment to the least-developed countries, nor in the context of the implementation of a priori measures. Such differentiation is inconsistent with paragraph 2(a), particularly the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3[.]²⁹² (original italics)

Consequently, the Panel also found that "the European Communities has failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".²⁹³

²⁸⁶Panel Report, para. 7.151.

²⁸⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.158.

²⁸⁸*Ibid.*

²⁸⁹*Ibid.*, para. 7.159.

²⁹⁰*Ibid.*

²⁹¹*Ibid.*, para. 7.161.

²⁹²*Ibid.*, para. 7.177.

²⁹³*Ibid.*, para. 8.1(d).

B. *Interpretation of the Term "Non-Discriminatory" in Footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause*

142. We proceed to interpret the term "non-discriminatory" as it appears in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

143. We recall first that the Enabling Clause has become a part of the GATT 1994.²⁹⁴ Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause authorizes WTO Members to provide "differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other WTO Members". As explained above, such differential treatment is permitted "notwithstanding" the provisions of Article I of the GATT 1994. Paragraph 2(a) and footnote 3 thereto clarify that paragraph 1 applies to "[p]referential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences"²⁹⁵, "[a]s described in the [1971 Waiver Decision], relating to the establishment of 'generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries' ".²⁹⁶

144. The Preamble to the 1971 Waiver Decision in turn refers to "preferential tariff treatment" in the following terms:

Recalling that at the Second UNCTAD, unanimous agreement was reached in favour of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries in order to increase the export earnings, to promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of economic growth of these countries;

Considering that mutually acceptable arrangements have been drawn up in the UNCTAD concerning the establishment of generalized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal preferential tariff treatment in the markets of developed countries for products originating in developing countries[.]²⁹⁷ (original italics; underlining added)

145. Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause provides, therefore, that, to be justified under that provision, preferential tariff treatment must be "in accordance" with the GSP "as described" in the *Preamble* to the 1971 Waiver Decision. "Accordance" being defined in the dictionary as

²⁹⁴See *supra*, footnote 192.

²⁹⁵Enabling Clause, para. 2(a) (attached as Annex 2 to this Report).

²⁹⁶*Ibid.*, footnote 3 to para. 2(a).

²⁹⁷1971 Waiver Decision, third and fourth recitals.

"conformity"²⁹⁸, only preferential tariff treatment that is in conformity with the description "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" treatment can be justified under paragraph 2(a).

146. In the light of the above, we do not agree with European Communities' assertion²⁹⁹ that the Panel's interpretation of the word "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause is erroneous because the phrase "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory" in footnote 3 merely refers to the description of the GSP in the 1971 Waiver Decision and, of itself, does not impose any legal obligation on preference-granting countries. Nor do we agree with the United States that the Panel erred in "assum[ing]" that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 imposes obligations on preference-granting countries, and that, instead, footnote 3 "is simply a cross-reference to where the Generalized System of Preferences is described."³⁰⁰

147. We find support for our interpretation in the French version of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, requiring that the tariff preferences be accorded "*conformément au Système généralisé de préférences*". The term "in accordance" is thus "*conformément*" in the French version. In addition, the phrase "[a]s described in [the 1971 Waiver Decision]" in footnote 3 is stated as "*[t]el qu'il est défini dans la décision des PARTIES CONTRACTANTES en date du 25 juin 1971*". Similarly, the Spanish version uses the terms "*conformidad*" and "*[t]al como lo define la Decisión de las PARTES CONTRATANTES de 25 de junio de 1971*". In our view, the stronger, more obligatory language in both the French and Spanish texts—that is, using "as defined in" rather than "as described in"—lends support to our view that only preferential tariff treatment that is "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" is covered under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.³⁰¹

148. Having found that the qualification of the GSP as "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory" imposes obligations that must be fulfilled for preferential tariff treatment to be justified under paragraph 2(a), we turn to address the Panel's finding that:

²⁹⁸*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 15.

²⁹⁹European Communities' response to questioning at the oral hearing.

³⁰⁰United States' third participant's submission, para. 11.

³⁰¹We further note the existence of a 1999 WTO waiver allowing *developing* countries to grant special preferences to *least-developed* countries. (Waiver Decision on Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/304, 15 June 1999 (the "1999 LDC Waiver")) That waiver applies only to "preferential tariff treatment ... provided on a generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis". (*Ibid.*, para. 2) As such, for tariff preferences to be justified thereunder, there is a *requirement* that the treatment be accorded on a "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory *basis*." (emphasis added) We see no reason why *developed* countries would be permitted to provide preferential tariff treatment to developing countries under the Enabling Clause other than on a "non-discriminatory basis", when there is clearly a requirement for *developing* countries to provide such treatment to least-developed countries on a "non-discriminatory basis" under the 1999 LDC Waiver.

... the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 requires that *identical* tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to *all* developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations.³⁰² (emphasis added)

149. The European Communities maintains that "'non-discrimination' is not synonymous with formally equal treatment"³⁰³ and that "[t]reating differently situations which are objectively different is not discriminatory."³⁰⁴ The European Communities asserts that "[t]he objective of the Enabling Clause is different from that of Article I:1 of the GATT."³⁰⁵ In its view, the latter is concerned with "providing equal conditions of competition for imports of like products originating in all Members", whereas "the Enabling Clause is a form of Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries, which seeks the opposite result: to create unequal competitive opportunities in order to respond to the special needs of developing countries."³⁰⁶ The European Communities derives contextual support from paragraph 3(c), which states that the treatment provided under the Enabling Clause "shall ... be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries." The European Communities concludes that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 "does not prevent the preference-giving countries from differentiating between developing countries which have different development needs, where tariff differentiation constitutes an adequate response to such differences."³⁰⁷

150. India, in contrast, asserts that "non-discrimination in respect of tariff measures refers to formally equal[] treatment"³⁰⁸ and that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause requires that "preferential tariff treatment [be] applied equally" among developing countries.³⁰⁹ In support of its argument, India submits that an interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause that authorizes developed countries to provide "discriminatory tariff treatment *in favour of the developing countries* but not *between the developing countries* gives full effect to both Article I of the GATT and paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and minimises the conflict between them."³¹⁰ India emphasizes that, by consenting to the adoption of the Enabling Clause, developing countries did not

³⁰²Panel Report, para. 7.161.

³⁰³European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 71.

³⁰⁴*Ibid.*

³⁰⁵*Ibid.*, para. 152.

³⁰⁶*Ibid.*

³⁰⁷*Ibid.*, para. 188.

³⁰⁸India's appellee's submission, para. 120.

³⁰⁹*Ibid.*, para. 106.

³¹⁰*Ibid.*, para. 92. (original italics)

"relinquish[] their MFN rights [under Article I of the GATT 1994] as between themselves, thus permitting developed countries to discriminate between them."³¹¹

151. We examine now the ordinary meaning of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause. As we observed, footnote 3 requires that GSP schemes under the Enabling Clause be "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory". Before the Panel, the participants offered competing definitions of the word "discriminate". India suggested that this word means "'to make or constitute a difference in or between; distinguish' and 'to make a distinction in the treatment of different categories of peoples or things'."³¹² The European Communities, however, understood this word to mean "'to make a distinction in the treatment of different categories of people or things, esp. *unjustly* or *prejudicially* against people on grounds of race, colour, sex, social status, age, etc.'"³¹³

152. Both definitions can be considered as reflecting ordinary meanings of the term "discriminate"³¹⁴ and essentially exhaust the relevant ordinary meanings. The principal distinction between these definitions, as the Panel noted, is that India's conveys a "*neutral* meaning of making a distinction", whereas the European Communities' conveys a "*negative* meaning carrying the connotation of a distinction that is unjust or prejudicial."³¹⁵ Accordingly, the ordinary meanings of "discriminate" point in conflicting directions with respect to the propriety of according differential treatment. Under India's reading, any differential treatment of GSP beneficiaries would be prohibited, because such treatment necessarily makes a distinction between beneficiaries. In contrast, under the European Communities' reading, differential treatment of GSP beneficiaries would not be prohibited *per se*. Rather, distinctions would be impermissible only where the basis for such distinctions was improper. Given these divergent meanings, we do not regard the term "non-discriminatory", on its own, as determinative of the permissibility of a preference-granting country according different tariff preferences to different beneficiaries of its GSP scheme.

153. Nevertheless, at this stage of our analysis, we are able to discern some of the content of the "non-discrimination" obligation based on the ordinary meanings of that term. Whether the drawing of

³¹¹India's appellee's submission, para. 104.

³¹²Panel Report, para. 7.126 (quoting *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. 1, p. 689).

³¹³*Ibid.* (quoting *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. 1, p. 689). (italics added by the Panel)

³¹⁴See *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 697.

³¹⁵Panel Report, para. 7.126. (original italics)

distinctions is *per se* discriminatory, or whether it is discriminatory only if done on an improper basis, the ordinary meanings of "discriminate" converge in one important respect: they both suggest that distinguishing among similarly-situated beneficiaries is discriminatory. For example, India suggests that all beneficiaries of a particular Member's GSP scheme are similarly-situated, implicitly arguing that any differential treatment of such beneficiaries constitutes discrimination. The European Communities, however, appears to regard GSP beneficiaries as similarly-situated when they have "similar development needs".³¹⁶ Although the European Communities acknowledges that differentiating between similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries would be inconsistent with footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, it submits that there is no inconsistency in differentiating between GSP beneficiaries with "different development needs".³¹⁷ Thus, based on the ordinary meanings of "discriminate", India and the European Communities effectively appear to agree that, pursuant to the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3, similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries should not be treated differently.³¹⁸ The participants disagree only as to the basis for determining whether beneficiaries are similarly-situated.

154. Paragraph 2(a), on its face, does not explicitly authorize or prohibit the granting of different tariff preferences to different GSP beneficiaries. It is clear from the ordinary meanings of "non-discriminatory", however, that preference-granting countries must make available identical tariff preferences to all similarly-situated beneficiaries.

155. We continue our interpretive analysis by turning to the immediate context of the term "non-discriminatory". We note first that footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) stipulates that, in addition to being "non-discriminatory", tariff preferences provided under GSP schemes must be "generalized".

³¹⁶European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 175. (See also, *ibid.*, para. 186)

³¹⁷*Ibid.*, para. 188.

³¹⁸We note that the contrasting definitions proffered by the participants, as well as the convergence of those definitions on the fact that similarly-situated entities should not be treated differently, find reflection in the use of the term "discrimination" in general international law. In this respect, we note, as an example, the definitions of "discrimination" provided by the European Communities, in footnotes 56 and 57 of its appellant's submission:

⁵⁶... Mere differences of treatment do not necessarily constitute discrimination ... discrimination may in general be said to arise where those who are in all material respects the same are treated differently, or where those who are in material respects different are treated in the same way.

(quoting R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), *Oppenheim's International Law*, 9th ed. (Longman, 1992), Vol. I, p. 378)

⁵⁷... Discrimination occurs when in a legal system an inequality is introduced in the enjoyment of a certain right, or in a duty, while there is no sufficient connection between the inequality upon which the legal inequality is based, and the right or the duty in which this inequality is made.

(quoting E.W. Vierdag, *The Concept of Discrimination in International Law*, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 61)

According to the ordinary meaning of that term, tariff preferences provided under GSP schemes must be "generalized" in the sense that they "apply more generally; [or] become extended in application".³¹⁹ However, this ordinary meaning alone may not reflect the entire significance of the word "generalized" in the context of footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, particularly because that word resulted from lengthy negotiations leading to the GSP. In this regard, we note the Panel's finding that, by requiring tariff preferences under the GSP to be "generalized", developed and developing countries together sought to eliminate existing "special" preferences that were granted only to certain designated developing countries.³²⁰ Similarly, in response to our questioning at the oral hearing, the participants agreed that one of the objectives of the 1971 Waiver Decision and the Enabling Clause was to eliminate the fragmented system of special preferences³²¹ that were, in general, based on historical and political ties between developed countries and their former colonies.

156. It does not necessarily follow, however, that "non-discriminatory" should be interpreted to require that preference-granting countries provide "identical" tariff preferences under GSP schemes to "all" developing countries. In concluding otherwise, the Panel assumed that allowing tariff preferences such as the Drug Arrangements would necessarily "result [in] the collapse of the whole GSP system and a return back to special preferences favouring selected developing countries".³²² To us, this conclusion is unwarranted. We observe that the term "generalized" requires that the GSP schemes of preference-granting countries remain generally applicable.³²³ Moreover, unlike the Panel, we believe that the Enabling Clause sets out sufficient conditions on the granting of preferences to protect against such an outcome. As we discuss below³²⁴, provisions such as paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c)

³¹⁹*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 1082.

³²⁰Panel Report, paras. 7.135-7.137. The Panel also observed that statements by developed and developing countries indicated the aim of providing GSP schemes with a broad scope, encompassing the granting of preferences by *all* developed countries to *all* developing countries. (*Ibid.*, paras. 7.131-7.132)

³²¹See also European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 175.

³²²Panel Report, para. 7.102.

³²³The European Communities argues in this respect that the GATT Contracting Parties and the WTO Members have granted a number of waivers, as mentioned in the Panel Report, for tariff preferences that are "confined *ab initio* and permanently to a limited number of developing countries located in a certain geographical region". (European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 184-185 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.160)) See also, Panel Report, footnote 31 to para. 4.32 (referring to Waiver Decision on the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, GATT Document L/5779, 15 February 1985, BISD 31S/20, renewed 15 November 1995, WT/L/104; Waiver Decision on CARIBCAN, GATT Document L/6102, 28 November 1986, BISD 33S/97, renewed 14 October 1996, WT/L/185; Waiver Decision on the United States – Andean Trade Preference Act, GATT Document L/6991, 19 March 1992, BISD 39S/385, renewed 14 October 1996, WT/L/184; Waiver Decision on The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, GATT Document L/7604, 9 December 1994, BISD 41S/26, renewed 14 October 1996, WT/L/186; and Waiver Decision on European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN (01)/15, 14 November 2001.

³²⁴*Infra*, paras. 157-168.

of the Enabling Clause impose specific conditions on the granting of different tariff preferences among GSP beneficiaries.

157. As further context for the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3, we turn next to paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, which specifies that "differential and more favourable treatment" provided under the Enabling Clause:

... shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.

158. At the outset, we note that the use of the word "shall" in paragraph 3(c) suggests that paragraph 3(c) sets out an obligation for developed-country Members in providing preferential treatment under a GSP scheme to "respond positively" to the "needs of developing countries".³²⁵ Having said this, we turn to consider whether the "development, financial and trade needs of developing countries" to which preference-granting countries are required to respond when granting preferences must be understood to cover the "needs" of developing countries *collectively*.

159. The Panel found that "the only appropriate way [under paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause] of responding to the differing development needs of developing countries is for preference-giving countries to ensure that their [GSP] schemes have sufficient breadth of product coverage and depth of tariff cuts to respond positively to those differing needs."³²⁶ In reaching this conclusion, the Panel appears to have placed a great deal of significance on the fact that paragraph 3(c) does not refer to needs of "*individual*" developing countries.³²⁷ The Panel thus understood that paragraph 3(c) does not permit the granting of preferential tariff treatment exclusively to a sub-category of developing countries on the basis of needs that are common to or shared by only those developing countries. We see no basis for such a conclusion in the text of paragraph 3(c). Paragraph 3(c) refers generally to "the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries". The absence of an explicit requirement in the text of paragraph 3(c)³²⁸ to respond to the needs of "all" developing countries, or to

³²⁵We note that the European Communities agreed before the Panel that paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause sets forth a "requirement". (European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 71 and 149)

³²⁶Panel Report, para. 7.149. (See also, *ibid.*, paras. 7.95-7.97 and 7.105)

³²⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.78.

³²⁸The United States refers to Article 3.2 of the DSU to support its argument that "panels are barred from reading legal obligations into the Enabling Clause that are not found in the text." (United States' third participant's submission, para. 13)

the needs of "each and every"³²⁹ developing country, suggests to us that, in fact, that provision imposes no such obligation.³³⁰

160. Furthermore, as we understand it, the participants in this case agree that developing countries may have "development, financial and trade needs" that are subject to change and that certain development needs may be common to only a certain number of developing countries.³³¹ We see no reason to disagree. Indeed, paragraph 3(c) contemplates that "differential and more favourable treatment"³³² accorded by developed to developing countries may need to be "modified" in order to "respond positively" to the needs of developing countries. Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause supports this view by recording the expectation of "less-developed contracting parties" that their capacity to make contributions or concessions under the GATT will "improve with the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation". Moreover, the very purpose of the special and differential treatment permitted under the Enabling Clause is to foster economic development of developing countries. It is simply unrealistic to assume that such development will be in lockstep for all developing countries at once, now and for the future.

161. In addition, the Preamble to the *WTO Agreement*, which informs all the covered agreements including the GATT 1994 (and, hence, the Enabling Clause), explicitly recognizes the "need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development".³³³ The word "commensurate" in this phrase appears to leave open the possibility that developing countries may have different needs according to their levels of development and particular circumstances. The Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* further recognizes

³²⁹Panel Report, para. 7.105. (italics omitted)

³³⁰In this respect, we agree with the European Communities that paragraph 3(c) should "be interpreted in a manner which, while preserving its relevance, is both workable for developed countries and consistent with the requirements that the preferences be *non-discriminatory*." (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 138 (original italics))

³³¹The European Communities emphasized before the Panel that the "development, financial and trade needs of developing countries" referred to in paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause "[o]bviously ... may vary between different categories of developing countries, as well as over time." (European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, para. 71) That "needs of developing countries" may change over time was also acknowledged by India in response to our questioning at the oral hearing. In addition, we understand India not to disagree that developing countries may have different individual needs, given that it argues that paragraph 3(c) should be interpreted as requiring "GSP schemes [to] respond to the needs of developing countries as a whole and not their individual needs." (India's appellee's submission, para. 124)

³³²Enabling Clause, para. 1 (attached as Annex 2 to this Report).

³³³*WTO Agreement*, Preamble, second recital.

that Members' "respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development"³³⁴ may vary according to the different stages of development of different Members.

162. In sum, we read paragraph 3(c) as authorizing preference-granting countries to "respond positively" to "needs" that are *not* necessarily common or shared by all developing countries. Responding to the "needs of developing countries" may thus entail treating different developing-country beneficiaries differently.

163. However, paragraph 3(c) does not authorize *any* kind of response to *any* claimed need of developing countries. First, we observe that the types of needs to which a response is envisaged are limited to "development, financial and trade needs". In our view, a "need" cannot be characterized as one of the specified "needs of developing countries" in the sense of paragraph 3(c) based merely on an assertion to that effect by, for instance, a preference-granting country or a beneficiary country. Rather, when a claim of inconsistency with paragraph 3(c) is made, the existence of a "development, financial [or] trade need" must be assessed according to an *objective* standard. Broad-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the *WTO Agreement* or in multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations, could serve as such a standard.³³⁵

164. Secondly, paragraph 3(c) mandates that the response provided to the needs of developing countries be "positive". "Positive" is defined as "consisting in or characterized by constructive action or attitudes".³³⁶ This suggests that the response of a preference-granting country must be taken with a view to *improving* the development, financial or trade situation of a beneficiary country, based on the particular need at issue. As such, in our view, the expectation that developed countries will "respond positively" to the "needs of developing countries" suggests that a sufficient nexus should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment provided under the respective measure authorized by paragraph 2, and, on the other hand, the likelihood of alleviating the relevant "development, financial [or] trade need". In the context of a GSP scheme, the particular need at issue must, by its nature, be such that it can be effectively addressed through tariff preferences. Therefore, only if a preference-granting country acts in the "positive" manner suggested, in "respon[se]" to a

³³⁴*WTO Agreement*, Preamble, first recital.

³³⁵The European Communities argues that tariff preferences are an appropriate response to the drug problem. In support of its argument, the European Communities refers to the Preamble to the *Agreement on Agriculture* and the waiver for the United States' Andean Trade Preference Act. In addition, the European Communities finds support in several international conventions and resolutions that have recognized drug production and drug trafficking as entailing particular problems for developing countries. (See Panel Report, paras. 4.71-4.74; and European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 144-149)

³³⁶*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 2293.

widely-recognized "development, financial [or] trade need", can such action satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3(c).

165. Accordingly, we are of the view that, by requiring developed countries to "respond positively" to the "needs of developing countries", which are varied and not homogeneous, paragraph 3(c) indicates that a GSP scheme may be "non-discriminatory" even if "identical" tariff treatment is not accorded to "all" GSP beneficiaries. Moreover, paragraph 3(c) suggests that tariff preferences under GSP schemes may be "non-discriminatory" when the relevant tariff preferences are addressed to a particular "development, financial [or] trade need" and are made available to all beneficiaries that share that need.

166. India submits that developing countries should not be presumed to have waived their MFN rights under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 *vis-à-vis* other developing countries³³⁷, and we make no such presumption. In fact, we note that the Enabling Clause *specifically* allows developed countries to provide differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries "notwithstanding" the provisions of Article I.³³⁸ With this in mind, and given that paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause contemplates, in certain circumstances, differentiation among GSP beneficiaries, we cannot agree with India that the right to MFN treatment can be invoked by a GSP beneficiary *vis-à-vis* other GSP beneficiaries in the context of GSP schemes that meet the conditions set out in the Enabling Clause.

167. Finally, we note that, pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause, any "differential and more favourable treatment ... shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties." This requirement applies, *a fortiori*, to any preferential treatment granted to one GSP beneficiary that is not granted to another.³³⁹ Thus, although paragraph 2(a) does not prohibit *per se* the granting of different tariff preferences to different GSP beneficiaries³⁴⁰, and paragraph 3(c) even contemplates such differentiation under certain circumstances³⁴¹, paragraph 3(a) requires that any positive response of a preference-granting country to the varying needs of developing countries not impose unjustifiable burdens on other Members.

³³⁷India's appellee's submission, para. 94.

³³⁸Compare para. 1 of the Enabling Clause ("Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I") with para. (a) of the 1971 Waiver Decision ("the provisions of Article I shall be waived ... to the extent necessary").

³³⁹We note in this respect that the language contained in paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause is reflected in waivers referred to in *supra*, footnote 323.

³⁴⁰*Supra*, paras. 153-154.

³⁴¹*Supra*, paras. 162-165.

168. Having examined the context of paragraph 2(a), we turn next to examine the object and purpose of the *WTO Agreement*. We note first that paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause provides that "[t]he concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the [GATT 1994] should promote the basic objectives of the [GATT 1994], including those embodied in the Preamble". As we have observed, the Preamble to the *WTO Agreement* provides that there is "need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development".³⁴² Similarly, the Preamble to the 1971 Waiver Decision provides that "a principal aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is promotion of the trade and export earnings of developing countries for the furtherance of their economic development".³⁴³ These objectives are also reflected in paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, which states that the treatment provided under the Enabling Clause "shall ... be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries".

169. Although enhanced market access will contribute to responding to the needs of developing countries *collectively*, we have also recognized that the needs of developing countries may vary over time. We are of the view that the objective of improving developing countries' "share in the growth in international trade", and their "trade and export earnings", can be fulfilled by promoting preferential policies aimed at those interests that developing countries have in common, *as well as* at those interests shared by sub-categories of developing countries based on their particular needs. An interpretation of "non-discriminatory" that does not require the granting of "identical tariff preferences"³⁴⁴ allows not only for GSP schemes providing preferential market access to all beneficiaries, but also the possibility of additional preferences for developing countries with particular needs, provided that such additional preferences are not inconsistent with other provisions of the Enabling Clause, including the requirements that such preferences be "generalized" and "non-reciprocal". We therefore consider such an interpretation to be consistent with the object and purpose of the *WTO Agreement* and the Enabling Clause.

170. The Panel took the view, however, that the objective of "elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce"³⁴⁵, found in the Preamble to the GATT 1994, "contributes more

³⁴²*WTO Agreement*, Preamble, second recital.

³⁴³1971 Waiver Decision, Preamble, first recital.

³⁴⁴Panel Report, para. 7.161.

³⁴⁵*Ibid.*, para. 7.157 (quoting GATT 1994, Preamble, second recital).

to guiding the interpretation of 'non-discriminatory'"³⁴⁶ than does the objective of ensuring that developing countries "secure ... a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with their development needs."³⁴⁷ We fail to see on what basis the Panel drew this conclusion.

171. We next examine the relevance of paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause³⁴⁸ for the interpretation of "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3. The Panel characterized paragraph 2(d) as an "exception" to paragraph 2(a)³⁴⁹ and relied on paragraph 2(d) to support its view that paragraph 2(a) requires "formally identical treatment".³⁵⁰ In the Panel's view, if developed-country Members were entitled under paragraph 2(a) to differentiate between developing-country Members, then they would have been entitled under that paragraph alone to differentiate between developing and least-developed countries. Accordingly, "there would have been no need to include paragraph 2(d) in the Enabling Clause."³⁵¹

172. We do not agree with the Panel that paragraph 2(d) is an "exception" to paragraph 2(a), or that it is rendered redundant if paragraph 2(a) is interpreted as allowing developed countries to differentiate in their GSP schemes between developing countries. To begin with, we note that the terms of paragraph 2 do not expressly indicate that each of the four sub-paragraphs thereunder is mutually exclusive, or that any one is an exception to any other. Moreover, in our view, it is clear from several provisions of the Enabling Clause that the drafters wished to emphasize that least-developed countries form an identifiable sub-category of developing countries with "special economic difficulties and ... particular development, financial and trade needs".³⁵² When a developed-country Member grants tariff preferences in favour of developing countries under paragraph 2(a), as we have already found³⁵³, footnote 3 imposes a requirement that such preferences be "non-discriminatory". In the absence of paragraph 2(d), a Member granting preferential tariff treatment only to least-developed countries would therefore need to establish, under paragraph 2(a), that this preferential treatment did not "discriminate" against other developing countries contrary to footnote 3. The inclusion of paragraph 2(d), however, makes clear that developed countries may accord preferential treatment to

³⁴⁶Panel Report, paras. 7.157-7.158.

³⁴⁷*Ibid.*, para. 7.155 (referring to *WTO Agreement*, Preamble, second recital).

³⁴⁸Paragraph 2(d) deals with special treatment of least-developed countries "in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries".

³⁴⁹Panel Report, para. 7.147.

³⁵⁰*Ibid.*, para. 7.145.

³⁵¹*Ibid.*, para. 7.145.

³⁵²Enabling Clause, para. 6 (attached as Annex 2 to this Report). Similarly, paragraph 8 of the Enabling Clause refers to the "special economic situation and [the] development, financial and trade needs" of least-developed countries.

³⁵³*Supra*, paras. 145-148.

least-developed countries distinct from the preferences granted to other developing countries under paragraph 2(a). Thus, pursuant to paragraph 2(d), preference-granting countries need not establish that differentiating between developing and least-developed countries is "non-discriminatory". This demonstrates that paragraph 2(d) does have an effect that is different and independent from that of paragraph 2(a), even if the term "non-discriminatory" does not require the granting of "identical tariff preferences"³⁵⁴ to all GSP beneficiaries.

173. Having examined the text and context of footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, and the object and purpose of the *WTO Agreement* and the Enabling Clause, we conclude that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 does not prohibit developed-country Members from granting different tariffs to products originating in different GSP beneficiaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment meets the remaining conditions in the Enabling Clause. In granting such differential tariff treatment, however, preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the term "non-discriminatory", to ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the "development, financial and trade needs" to which the treatment in question is intended to respond.

174. For all of these reasons, we *reverse* the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.161 and 7.176 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations."³⁵⁵

C. *The Words "Developing Countries" in Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause*

175. In addition to the Panel's interpretation of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, the European Communities appeals the Panel's finding that "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) should be interpreted to mean *all* developing countries, [except as regards] *a priori* limitations".³⁵⁶ The Panel's interpretation of paragraph 2(a) is premised on its findings that (i) footnote 3 permits the granting of different tariff preferences to different GSP beneficiaries *only* for the purpose of *a priori* limitations³⁵⁷, and (ii) paragraph 3(c) permits the granting of different tariff preferences to different GSP beneficiaries *only* for the purposes of

³⁵⁴Panel Report, para. 7.161.

³⁵⁵Given our interpretation, which permits differentiation among GSP beneficiaries, it is not necessary for us to rule on whether *a priori* limitations are permitted under the Enabling Clause. (See also, *supra*, paras. 128-129)

³⁵⁶Panel Report, para. 7.174. (original italics) See also, European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 67.

³⁵⁷Panel Report, para. 7.170.

a priori limitations and preferential treatment in favour of least-developed countries.³⁵⁸ We have concluded, contrary to the Panel, that footnote 3 and paragraph 3(c) do *not* preclude the granting of differential tariffs to different sub-categories of GSP beneficiaries, subject to compliance with the remaining conditions of the Enabling Clause. We find, therefore, that the term "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) should not be read to mean "all" developing countries and, accordingly, that paragraph 2(a) does not prohibit preference-granting countries from according different tariff preferences to different sub-categories of GSP beneficiaries.

176. Accordingly, we also *reverse* the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.174 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) [of the Enabling Clause] should be interpreted to mean *all* developing countries, with the exception that where developed countries are implementing a priori limitations, 'developing countries' may mean *less than all* developing countries."

D. *Consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause*

177. We turn next to examine the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause.

178. We recall that, with respect to the Enabling Clause, the only challenge by India before the Panel related to paragraph 2(a) and, in particular, footnote 3 thereto.³⁵⁹ In response, the European Communities argued that it found contextual support for its interpretation of paragraph 2(a) in the requirement, contained in paragraph 3(c), to respond positively to the needs of developing countries.³⁶⁰ In rejecting the European Communities' interpretation of paragraph 2(a), the Panel did not determine whether the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph 3(c), but, rather, limited its discussion of paragraph 3(c) to the relevance of that provision as context for its interpretation of paragraph 2(a). Thus, the Panel made a finding of inconsistency only with respect to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.³⁶¹ The European Communities appeals this finding of inconsistency with paragraph 2(a).

179. Although paragraph 3(c) informs the interpretation of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a), as detailed above³⁶², paragraph 3(c) imposes requirements that are

³⁵⁸Panel Report, para. 7.171.

³⁵⁹*Supra*, paras. 120-122.

³⁶⁰See Panel Report, para. 7.123; European Communities' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 70-71 and 149; and European Communities' second written submission to the Panel, paras. 48-52.

³⁶¹Panel Report, para. 8.1(d).

³⁶²*Supra*, paras. 157-162.

separate and distinct from those of paragraph 2(a). We have already concluded that, where a developed-country Member provides additional tariff preferences under its GSP scheme to respond positively to widely-recognized "development, financial and trade needs" of developing countries within the meaning of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, this "positive response" would not, as such, fail to comply with the "non-discriminatory" requirement in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause³⁶³, even if such needs were not common or shared by all developing countries. We have also observed that paragraph 3(a) requires that any positive response of a preference-granting country to the varying needs of developing countries not impose unjustifiable burdens on other Members.³⁶⁴ With these considerations in mind, and recalling that the Panel made no finding in this case as to whether the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause³⁶⁵, we limit our analysis here to paragraph 2(a) and do not examine *per se* whether the Drug Arrangements are consistent with the obligation contained in paragraph 3(c) to "respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries" or with the obligation contained in paragraph 3(a) not to "raise barriers" or "create undue difficulties" for the trade of other Members.

180. We found above that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause does not prohibit the granting of different tariffs to products originating in different sub-categories of GSP beneficiaries, but that identical tariff treatment must be available to all GSP beneficiaries with the "development, financial [or] trade need" to which the differential treatment is intended to respond.³⁶⁶ The need alleged to be addressed by the European Communities' differential tariff treatment is the problem of illicit drug production and trafficking in certain GSP beneficiaries. In the context of this case, therefore, the Drug Arrangements may be found consistent with the "non-discriminatory" requirement in footnote 3 only if the European Communities proves, at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the Drug Arrangements are available to all GSP beneficiaries that are similarly affected by the drug problem.³⁶⁷ We do not believe this to be the case.

³⁶³*Supra*, para. 165.

³⁶⁴*Supra*, para. 167.

³⁶⁵See *supra*, para. 134.

³⁶⁶*Supra*, para. 165.

³⁶⁷According to the European Communities, "the Drug Arrangements are *non-discriminatory* because the designation of the beneficiary countries is based only and exclusively on their development needs. All the developing countries that are similarly affected by the drug problem have been included in the Drug Arrangements". (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 186 (original italics))

181. By their very terms, the Drug Arrangements are limited to the 12 developing countries designated as beneficiaries in Annex I to the Regulation.³⁶⁸ Specifically, Article 10.1 of the Regulation states:

Common Customs Tariff *ad valorem* duties on [covered products] which originate in a country that according to Column I of Annex I benefits from [the Drug Arrangements] shall be entirely suspended.

182. Articles 10 and 25 of the Regulation, which relate specifically to the Drug Arrangements, provide no mechanism under which additional beneficiaries may be added to the list of beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements as designated in Annex I. Nor does any of the other Articles of the Regulation point to the existence of such a mechanism with respect to the Drug Arrangements. Moreover, the European Communities acknowledged the absence of such a mechanism in response to our questioning at the oral hearing. This contrasts with the position under the "special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights" and the "special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment", which are described in Article 8 of the Regulation. The Regulation includes detailed provisions setting out the procedure and substantive criteria that apply to a request by a beneficiary under the general arrangements described in Article 7 of the Regulation (the "General Arrangements") to become a beneficiary under either of those special incentive arrangements.³⁶⁹

183. What is more, the Drug Arrangements themselves do *not* set out any clear prerequisites—or "objective criteria"³⁷⁰—that, if met, would allow for other developing countries "that are similarly affected by the drug problem"³⁷¹ to be *included* as beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements.³⁷² Indeed, the European Commission's own Explanatory Memorandum notes that "the benefits of the drug regime ... are given without *any* prerequisite."³⁷³ Similarly, the Regulation offers no criteria

³⁶⁸The 12 designated beneficiary countries are: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. (Regulation, Annex I (Column I))

³⁶⁹Regulation, Title III.

³⁷⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, paras. 4 and 139.

³⁷¹*Ibid.*, para. 186.

³⁷²In response to Question 4 posed by India at the First Panel Meeting, the European Communities confirmed that the Regulation does not set out objective criteria for designating beneficiary countries under the Drug Arrangements. The European Communities stated:

The criteria are not set out in the GSP Regulation. They are not contained in a public document.

(Panel Report, p. B-69, para. 5)

³⁷³Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, para. 35 (emphasis added) (attached to Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001/0131 (ACC), at p. 3) (Exhibit India-7 submitted by India to the Panel).

according to which a beneficiary could be *removed* specifically from the Drug Arrangements on the basis that it is no longer "similarly affected by the drug problem". Indeed, Article 25.3 expressly states that the evaluation of the effects of the Drug Arrangements described in Articles 25.1(b) and 25.2 "will be without prejudice to the continuation of the [Drug Arrangements] until 2004, and their possible extension thereafter." This implies that, even if the European Commission found that the Drug Arrangements were having no effect whatsoever on a beneficiary's "efforts in combating drug production and trafficking"³⁷⁴, or that a beneficiary was no longer suffering from the drug problem, beneficiary status would continue.³⁷⁵ Therefore, even if the Regulation allowed for the list of beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements to be modified, the Regulation itself gives no indication as to how the beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements were chosen or what kind of considerations would or could be used to determine the effect of the "drug problem" on a particular country. In addition, we note that the Regulation does not, for instance, provide any indication as to how the European Communities would assess whether the Drug Arrangements provide an "adequate and proportionate response"³⁷⁶ to the needs of developing countries suffering from the drug problem.

184. It is true that a country may be removed as a beneficiary under Annex I, either altogether or in respect of certain product sectors, for reasons that are not specific to the Drug Arrangements. Thus, Article 3 of the Regulation provides for the removal of a country from Annex I (and hence, from the General Arrangements and any other arrangements under which it is a beneficiary) if particular circumstances are met indicating that the country has reached a certain level of development. Article 12 provides for the removal of a country as a beneficiary under the General Arrangements and the Drug Arrangements with respect to a product sector where the country's level of development and competition has reached a certain threshold with respect to that sector. Neither Article 3 nor Article 12 appears to relate in any way to the degree to which the country is suffering from the "drug problem". Finally, Title V to the Regulation contains certain "Temporary Withdrawal and Safeguard Provisions" that are common to all the preferential arrangements under the Regulation. Although one reason for which the arrangements may be temporarily withdrawn is "shortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on money laundering"³⁷⁷, this reason applies equally to the General Arrangements, the Drug Arrangements, and the other special incentive arrangements. Moreover, as

³⁷⁴Regulation, Art. 25.1(b).

³⁷⁵In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the European Communities confirmed that, although the sixth recital to the Preamble of the Regulation provides that the Drug Arrangements "should be closely monitored", the list of beneficiaries will be unaffected by the monitoring described in Articles 25.1 and 25.2 of the Regulation.

³⁷⁶European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 133.

³⁷⁷Regulation, Art. 26.1(d).

the Panel appeared to recognize, this condition is not connected to the question of whether the beneficiary is a "seriously drug-affected country".³⁷⁸

185. We note, moreover, that the Drug Arrangements will be in effect until 31 December 2004.³⁷⁹ Until that time, other developing countries that are "similarly affected by the drug problem" can be included as beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements only through an amendment to the Regulation. The European Communities confirmed this understanding in response to questioning at the oral hearing.

186. Against this background, we fail to see how the Drug Arrangements can be distinguished from other schemes that the European Communities describes as "confined *ab initio* and permanently to a limited number of developing countries".³⁸⁰ As we understand it, the European Communities' position is that such schemes would be discriminatory, whereas the Drug Arrangements are not because "all developing countries are potentially beneficiaries" thereof.³⁸¹ In seeking a waiver from its obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 to implement the Drug Arrangements, the European Communities explicitly acknowledged, however, that "[b]ecause the special arrangements *are only available* to imports originating in [the 12 beneficiaries of the Drug Arrangements], a waiver ... appears necessary".³⁸² This statement appears to undermine the European Communities' argument that "all developing countries are potentially beneficiaries of the Drug Arrangements" and, therefore, that the Drug Arrangements are "non-discriminatory".³⁸³

187. We recall our conclusion that the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause requires that identical tariff treatment be available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries. We find that the measure at issue fails to meet this requirement for the following reasons. First, as the European Communities itself acknowledges, according benefits under the Drug Arrangements to countries other than the 12 identified beneficiaries would require an amendment to the Regulation.

³⁷⁸Panel Report, para. 7.216.

³⁷⁹Regulation, Arts. 1.1 and 41.2. We understand that the Regulation has been extended to 31 December 2005. (Council Regulation (EC) No. 2211/2003 of 15 December 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 and extending it to 31 December 2005, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L Series, No. 332 (19 December 2003), p. 1)

³⁸⁰European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 185.

³⁸¹*Ibid.*, para. 186.

³⁸²Council for Trade in Goods, Request for a WTO Waiver, *New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking*, G/C/W/328, 24 October 2001, p. 2. (emphasis added)

³⁸³European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 186.

Such a "closed list" of beneficiaries cannot ensure that the preferences under the Drug Arrangements are available to all GSP beneficiaries suffering from illicit drug production and trafficking.

188. Secondly, the Regulation contains no criteria or standards to provide a basis for distinguishing beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements from other GSP beneficiaries. Nor did the European Communities point to any such criteria or standards anywhere else, despite the Panel's request to do so.³⁸⁴ As such, the European Communities cannot justify the Regulation under paragraph 2(a), because it does not provide a basis for establishing whether or not a developing country qualifies for preferences under the Drug Arrangements. Thus, although the European Communities claims that the Drug Arrangements are available to all developing countries that are "similarly affected by the drug problem"³⁸⁵, because the Regulation does not define the criteria or standards that a developing country must meet to qualify for preferences under the Drug Arrangements, there is no basis to determine whether those criteria or standards are discriminatory or not.

189. For all these reasons, we find that the European Communities has failed to prove that the Drug Arrangements meet the requirement in footnote 3 that they be "non-discriminatory". Accordingly, we *uphold*, for different reasons, the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 8.1(d) of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".

VI. Findings and Conclusions

190. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:

- (a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
- (b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
- (c) modifies the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "bears the burden of invoking the Enabling Clause and justifying its Drug Arrangements" under that Clause, by finding that it was incumbent upon India to *raise* the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, but that the European Communities bore the burden of *proving* that

³⁸⁴See *supra*, footnote 372.

³⁸⁵European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 186.

the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions of the Enabling Clause, in order to justify those Arrangements under that Clause; and finds, further, that India sufficiently raised paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 before the Panel;

- (d) need not rule on the Panel's conclusion, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of the Panel Report, that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
- (e) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.161 and 7.176 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations";
- (f) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.174 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) [of the Enabling Clause] should be interpreted to mean *all* developing countries, with the exception that where developed countries are implementing a priori limitations, 'developing countries' may mean *less than all* developing countries"; and
- (g) upholds, for different reasons, the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 8.1(d) of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".

191. The Appellate Body therefore recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and not justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.

Signed in the original at Geneva this 18th day of March 2004 by:

Georges Abi-Saab
Presiding Member

Luiz Olavo Baptista
Member

Giorgio Sacerdoti
Member

ANNEX 1

**WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION**

WT/DS246/7
8 January 2004

(04-0070)

Original: English

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANTING OF
TARIFF PREFERENCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities
under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")

The following notification, dated 8 January 2004, from the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission, is being circulated to Members.

Pursuant to Article 16 of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* ("DSU") and Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the European Communities hereby notifies its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the report of the panel established in response to the request from India in the dispute *European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries* (WT/DS246R).

The European Communities seeks review of the Panel's legal conclusion that the Special Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking provided in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 (the "Drug Arrangements") are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the *General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994* (the "GATT"). This conclusion is based on the following erroneous legal findings:

- that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT;
- that the Enabling Clause does not exclude the applicability of Article I:1 of the GATT;
- that the EC had the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements were consistent with the Enabling Clause.

The above legal conclusion, and the related legal findings and interpretations are set out in paragraphs 7.31 to 7.60 and 8.1 (b) and (c) of the Panel report.

India did not make any claims under the Enabling Clause and, therefore, the Appellate Body should refrain from examining the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause. However, if the Appellate Body were to uphold the Panel's conclusion that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT, or if the Appellate Body were to decide that India made a valid claim under the Enabling Clause, the European Communities appeals subsidiarily the Panel's

legal conclusion that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause". That conclusion is based on the following erroneous legal findings:

- that "the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a) requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations"; and
- that the term "developing countries" in Paragraph 2(a) means all developing countries.

This legal conclusion and the related legal findings and interpretations are set out in paragraphs 7.61-7.177 and 8.1(d) of the Panel report.

Finally the EC seeks review of the Panel's legal conclusion that the European Communities has nullified or impaired benefits accrued to India under GATT 1994, which is set out in paragraph 8.1(f) of the Panel report

ANNEX 2

DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT RECIPROCITY AND FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

*Decision of 28 November 1979
(L/4903)*

Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES *decide* as follows:

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries¹, without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:²
 - (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences,³
 - (b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
 - (c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another
 - (d) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
 - (a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties;
 - (b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;

¹ The words "developing countries" as used in this text are to be understood to refer also to developing territories.

² It would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an *ad hoc* basis under the GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and more favourable treatment not falling within the scope of this paragraph.

³ As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24).

- (c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.

4. Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or withdrawal of the differential and more favourable treatment so provided shall:⁴

- (a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the information they may deem appropriate relating to such action;
- (b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any interested contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such contracting party, consult with all contracting parties concerned with respect to the matter with a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such contracting parties.

5. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs.

6. Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments made by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of their particular situation and problems.

7. The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the General Agreement should promote the basic objectives of the Agreement, including those embodied in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI. Less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed action under the provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would improve with the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation and they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the General Agreement.

8. Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed countries in making concessions and contributions in view of their special economic situation and their development, financial and trade needs.

9. The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the operation of these provisions, bearing in mind the need for individual and joint efforts by contracting parties to meet the development needs of developing countries and the objectives of the General Agreement.

⁴ Nothing in these provisions shall affect the rights of contracting parties under the General Agreement.