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SCSL-04-15-T
(27166-27174)

27166



SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

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TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge
Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson
Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr. Herman Von Hebel

Date: 30th June 2008

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
RECEIVED
COURT MANAGEMENT
01 JUL 2008
NAME: AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH
SIGN: [Signature]
TIME: 15:50

PROSECUTOR **Against** ISSA HASSAN SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO
(Case No. SCSL-04-15-T)

Public Document

**WRITTEN REASONED DECISION ON MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA TO
H.E. DR. AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH,
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE**

Office of the Prosecutor:

Peter Harrison
Joseph Kamara
Vincent Wagona
Charles Hardaway
Reginald Fynn

Defence Counsel for Issa Hassan Sesay:

Wayne Jordash
Sareta Ashraph

Defence Counsel for Morris Kallon:

Charles Taku
Kennedy Ogeto
Tanoo Mylvaganam

Court Appointed Counsel for Augustine Gbao:

John Cammegh
Scott Martin

TRIAL CHAMBER I ("Trial Chamber") of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Special Court") composed of Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge, Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson and Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet;

SEISED of the "Sesay Application for Issuance of A Subpoena to Ahmed Tejan Kabbah", filed publicly by Counsel for the First Accused, Issa Hassan Sesay, ("Counsel for Sesay") on the 28th of February, 2008 ("Sesay Application"), whereby Counsel for Sesay requests the Trial Chamber to issue a subpoena to H.E. Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Kabbah") compelling him to meet with Counsel for Sesay for a pre-testimony interview, and to appear as a witness in the RUF trial on behalf of the First Accused ("Application");

NOTING the Defence Addendum to Sesay Defence Application for the Issuance of A Subpoena to Former President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah", filed publicly on the 29th of February, 2008 ("Addendum to Sesay Application");

NOTING the "Prosecution Response to Sesay Application for Issuance of A Subpoena to Former President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah", filed publicly on the 4th of March, 2008 ("Response to Sesay Application"), opposing the Sesay Application;

NOTING the Defence Reply to the Prosecution Response to Sesay Application for Issuance of A Subpoena to Former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah", filed publicly on the 5th of March, 2008 ("Sesay Reply");

NOTING the oral ruling of the Chamber on the 13th of March 2008, in which it ordered that H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah appear at a pre-hearing interview and then in Court to testify for and on behalf of the Third Accused, if called as a defence witness, on Thursday the 24th of April, 2008, that the Registrar to Cause a Copy of the said Subpoena to be served upon H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and to transmit copies of this Order and the Subpoena to the responsible authorities of the Government of Sierra Leone;

NOTING that the Chamber indicated at that time that a reasoned written Decision on this matter would be forthcoming;

PURSUANT TO Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules");

ISSUES THE FOLLOWING DECISION:

I. SUBMISSIONS

1. In his Motion, Counsel for Sesay ("Applicant") requests the Chamber to issue, pursuant to Rule 54, a subpoena to Dr. Kabbah Former President of Sierra Leone to compel him to appear as a witness in the RUF trial on behalf of the First Accused, Issa Hassan Sesay and to meet with the Applicant in advance of his proposed testimony.¹

2. In response, the Prosecution submits that the Application should be denied and the Motion dismissed.²

3. The Defence submits that the evidence Dr. Kabbah could give would materially and substantially assist in proving Mr. Sesay's innocence in regard to Counts 15-18 of the Consolidated Indictment. It states further that this evidence is unique and could not be obtained from any other person.³

4. The Defence further submits that it has made repeated attempts to contact Dr. Kabbah since 2004 and while, in meetings held in 2007, the former President indicated a willingness to be interviewed through the then Chief of Protocol, Mr. Daramy, no such meeting has materialised. The Defence avers that Dr. Kabbah has not responded to any correspondence from the Defence since he left office in August 2007.⁴

5. The Prosecution in its response submits that although the question posed by the Application concerns whether a subpoena should be issued, which may be secondary to whether, at this point in the trial, such an Application should be heard on its merits.⁵

6. The Prosecution avers that Dr. Kabbah was not named in the list of witnesses produced by the Accused Sesay.⁶ It, therefore, submits that to add him as a witness, the Defence must pursuant to an earlier order, show good cause.⁷ It further contends that if the Defence seeks to add any witness

¹ Sesay Motion, para. 1.

² Prosecution Response to Sesay Motion, para. 31.

³ Application, para. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4. See Annex A to the Application detailing the repeated attempts by the Defence to contact Dr. Kabbah. See also Annexes B and C of the Addendum.

⁵ Response, para. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*




or to modify this list after the 16th of February 2007 it is only permissible to do so only upon good cause being shown.⁸

7. It is also the Prosecution's contention that other previous orders of the Trial Chamber require that the Defence provide a detailed summary of each witness' testimony and that the Defence may only withhold the names or any other identifying data to its witnesses until 42 days prior to their testimony at trial.⁹

8. The Prosecution submits further that in the CDF trial the Accused Norman had included Dr. Kabbah on his witness list.¹⁰

9. The Prosecution, likewise, raises the issue of timing of the Application. According to the Prosecution, in order for Dr. Kabbah to be a witness in the RUF case, the Trial Chamber would be required to: a) grant leave to add him to the witness list upon showing good cause; and b) grant an extension of time for the closing of the case for the First Accused or grant relief from the orders that the identity of a witness must be disclosed 42 days before they testify and that a witness must be placed on a list of upcoming witnesses at least 14 days before the witness testify.¹¹

10. The Prosecution further asserts that the facts set out in the Application show that over three years the First Accused attempted to communicate with Dr. Kabbah, and yet there is no explanation offered as to why he waited until 14 days before the Sesay Defence case is to end before bringing an application to the Trial Chamber. Hence, the Prosecution submits that such a delay cannot be justified in the circumstances of this case, in particular, the fact that the Prosecution closed its case over 18 months ago.¹²

11. In its reply, the Defence submits that the Prosecution's overall objections ought to be given little or no weight. The Defence further submits that the Prosecution is attempting to elevate procedural issues above the substantive merits of the application. The Defence also submits that the Prosecution's submission that the Trial Chamber ought to resolve the preliminary procedural issues of modifying Sesay Defence witness list; granting an extension of time for the closing of the case for

⁸ Prosecutor v. Sesay et al, SCSL-2004-15-T-659, "Scheduling Order Concerning the Preparation and the Commencement of the Defence Case," 30 October 2006, para. 1. This deadline was subsequently extended to 5 March 2007, pursuant to SCSL-04-15-T-705, "Decision and Order on Defence Application for an Adjournment of 16th February Deadline for Filing of Defence Material," 7 February 2007.

⁹ Response, para. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

4.

30th June 2008

the First Accused, Issa Hassan Sesay, or be asked to grant relief from the orders that the identity of a witness be disclosed 42 days before the witness testifies; and that a witness must be placed on a list of upcoming witnesses at least 14 days before the witness testifies, before considering the substantive merits of the motion, ought to be rejected.¹³

12. The Defence, in its reply, further submits that it ought to be trite law and obvious to any party that it would be highly improper (and possibly dangerous) to name and list as a defence witness any person who had not consented to this course of action, and that this clearly applies—and even more so in the case of a former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone who arguably had actively avoided attempts to obtain his cooperation to become a witness for the Sesay Defence. The Defence contends that not only would this have misled the Court and the parties but it would also have been impossible for the Sesay Defence to provide a *bona fide* summary of the testimony or place the person into a genuine witness list.¹⁴

13. In addition, the Defence states that the Prosecution had previously contested that (i) persons who have not indicated their willingness to testify would not be entitled to protection under the applicable protective measures Decision of November 2006 and also (ii) to meet the Rule 69 test of “exceptional circumstances” an applying party must establish “sufficient facts supporting the subjective fears of witnesses [and] must also provide evidence from other sources indicating an objective basis for assessing whether a threat to the witnesses’ security exists”. The Defence also argues that the Prosecution, in its response, has failed to explain how this test is properly satisfied in the case of a proposed witness who has refused to meet the Defence.¹⁵

14. The Defence, in its reply, urges the Chamber to reject the Prosecution’s argument that the Merits of the Application should not be considered on the grounds that the Trial Chamber had ordered the Defence case for the First Accused, Issa Hassan Sesay, to be closed on or before the Thursday, 13th of March, 2008 and that there had been a lack of due diligence on the part of the Defence.¹⁶

¹³ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

¹⁴ Reply, para. 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

15. The Chamber notes that the applicable statutory provision for granting subpoenas is Rule 54. The said Rule 54 prescribes the standard for issuance of a subpoena in these terms:

At the request of either party or of its own motion, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.

16. The Trial Chamber recalls further that in its seminal Decision on the issuance of a subpoena, by a 2-1 majority it laid down the legal standard in these terms: The applicant... must... show that the measure is necessary (the "necessity" requirement) and that it is for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial (the "purpose" requirement).¹⁷ Enunciating this standard, the Chamber relied upon the Decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in *Prosecutor v. Halilovic*¹⁸ and *Prosecutor v. Krstic*.¹⁹ In this regard, guidance was also sought from the Decision of the Trial Chamber in *Prosecutor v. Bagosora*²⁰ where that Chamber stated as follows:

First, the proposed injunction must be *necessary* in order for the requesting party to obtain the material sought. Further, the requested material must be *relevant* to the proceedings.²¹ Accordingly, with respect to subpoenas directed at individuals, the Defence must demonstrate that it has made "reasonable attempts to obtain the voluntary cooperation of the parties involved and has been unsuccessful", and the Defence "must have a reasonable belief that the prospective witness can materially assist in the preparation of its case."²²

17. Addressing the nature and scope of the Special Court's authority to issue a subpoena, under Rule 54, our Appeals Chamber had this to say:

The determination whether a subpoena should be issued is in the discretion of the Trial Chamber. This is emphasised in Rule 54 by the word "may", a Trial Chamber may issue a subpoena as may be necessary. There is nothing in this rule

¹⁷ *Ib id.*, para. 28.

¹⁸ *Prosecutor v. Halilovic*, "Decision on the Issuance of Subpoenas", 21st June 2004, paras. 6-7, 10 ("*Halilovic Appeals Decision*").

¹⁹ *Prosecutor v. Krstic*, "Decision on the Application for Subpoenas", 1st July 2003, paras. 10-11, ("*Krstic Appeals Decision*").

²⁰ *Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al.*, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Request for Subpoena of Major General Yaache and Cooperation of the Republic of Ghana, 23 June 2004, Trial Chamber ("*Bagosora Decision*"), para. 4.

²¹ *Prosecutor v. Delalic et al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision of the President on the Prosecutor's Motion for the Production of Notes Exchanged between Zejnil Delalic and Zdravko Mucic, 11 November 1996, para. 39.

²² See: *Bagosora Decision*, para. 4.

that makes it mandatory on the Trial Chamber to issue a subpoena. Consequently, in adjudicating an interlocutory appeal from a discretionary decision resulting in the refusal to issue a subpoena, appellate intervention will only be justified in limited circumstances when the Appellant can demonstrate a discernible error.²³

Instructively, the Appeals Chamber went on to say :

The Court will grant a subpoena if it is “necessary” to bring to court an unwilling, but important, witness. The phrase in Rule 54 “necessary for the purposes of...preparation or conduct of the trial” requires the applicant to show that it is necessary for purposes to issue a subpoena or other order so as to bring evidence to Court. That is satisfied if the applicant shows that the subpoena is likely to elicit evidence material to an issue in the case which cannot be obtained without judicial intervention. The key question is whether the effect that the subpoena will have is necessary to try the case fairly.²⁴

Continuing, the Chamber reasoned as follows:

It is incumbent on the party seeking to compel a reluctant witness to testify to satisfy the Chamber that a subpoena should be issued. The Trial Chamber is entitled to look carefully at the proposed evidence and may decline to issue a subpoena if the proposed evidence fails to address a sufficiently material issue. In doing so, the Trial Chamber does not conduct a “premature evaluation” of the probative value of the evidence, as suggested by the Appellant Fofana. Rather, the Trial Chamber assesses whether issuing a subpoena to compel a reluctant witness to testify may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial. With particular reference to the present case, the Trial Chamber correctly identified a series of factors that may be relevant to this inquiry: Whether the information will be of material assistance to the applicant’s case will depend largely upon the position held by the prospective witness in relation to the events in question, any relationship he may have or have had with the accused which is relevant to the charges, the opportunity which he may reasonably be thought to have had to observe those events or to learn of those events and any statements made by him to the applicant or to others in relation to those events.²⁵

In conclusion, the Chamber found thus:

It was correct for the Trial Chamber to look both at whether the information sought to be obtained through the subpoena was necessary, as part of the purpose requirement, and then to consider whether the subpoena was a necessary measure under the “necessity requirement”.²⁶

²³ *Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, Kondewa*, SCSL-04-16-T-688, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals against Trial Chamber Decision Refusing to Subpoena the President of Sierra Leone, 11 September 2006, para. 8 (“Appeals Chamber Subpoena Decision”).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 25.

III. DELIBERATIONS

18. Thus guided, this Chamber now proceeds to address the critical question for determination for the purposes of disposing of the instant application, namely, whether the Defence has fulfilled the prescribed legal standard to justify the exercise by the Chamber of its discretion to grant the orders sought. In this regard, the Chamber reiterates that an application for the issuance of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 54 must satisfy the Chamber that the evidence sought to be proffered meets the "legitimate forensic purpose" and "necessity" criteria as previously described.

19. Consistent with the Chamber's reasoning in its CDF Subpoena Decision that the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable basis for the belief that the information to be provided by the prospective witness is likely to be of material assistance to the applicant's case, or that there is at least a good chance that it would be of material assistance to the applicant's case, in relation to clearly identified issues relevant to the forthcoming trial, We find significantly that the proposed testimony is likely to be of material assistance to the defence of the First Accused. This findings is made in two major respects;

- (i), as shown by the First Accused, that the proposed testimony is likely to show that the First Accused was doing his best to protect the detained UNAMSIL peacekeepers, and to reinstate the stalled disarmament process, and (ii), that the former President can testify about issues integral to the defence of the First Accused and may show that the, First Accused, was not ordered to attack or coordinate attacks against the said UNAMSIL peacekeepers but acted alone.

20. Further, the Chamber wishes to emphasise that, as a matter of law, for the purposes of Rule 54, the statutory authority for the issuance of a subpoena, as an instrument of judicial compulsion backed by the threat and power of criminal sanctions for non-compliance, is to be used sparingly.²⁷ The Chamber also opines that convenience is not a sufficient justification for the issuance of a subpoena,²⁸ and that when the evidence sought to be proffered can be obtained through other means, it would be inappropriate to grant such an order.²⁹

21. Based on the foregoing principles of law and applying the same to the facts and circumstances in support of the instant application, especially the nature and purpose of the evidence

²⁷ H. ilovic Appeal Decision, para. 10.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 7. See also *Milosevic*, para.41.

sought to be adduced, the Chamber is satisfied that the Defence has met the prescribed legal standard for the issuance of a subpoena under Rule 54 thereby justifying the exercise by the Chamber of its discretion to grant the orders sought.

IV. DISPOSITION


22. Being thus satisfied, the Chamber pursuant to Rule 54 of the Rules,

23. **HEREBY GRANTS** the Application by Counsel for the First Accused for the issuance of a subpoena directed to H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, for a pre-testimony interview and for testimony at this trial.


ORDERS that H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah shall testify, if called as a defence witness, on Thursday the 15th of May, 2008.

Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe appends a Separate Concurring Opinion to this Decision.


Done at Freetown, Sierra Leone, this 30th day of June 2008.



Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet



Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga
Itoe
Presiding Judge
Trial Chamber I



Hon. Justice Bankole
Thompson

[Seal of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]



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TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge
Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson
Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel, Registrar

Date: 30th of June 2008

PROSECUTOR	Against	ISSA HASSAN SESAY MORRIS KALLON AUGUSTINE GBAO (Case No. SCSL-04-15-T)
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Public Document

A SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF HON. JUSTICE BENJAMIN MUTANGA ITOE ON THE CHAMBER'S UNANIMOUS WRITTEN REASONED DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA TO H.E. DR. AHMED TEJAN KABBAH, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

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
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Court Appointed Counsel for Augustine Gbao:

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A SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF HON. JUSTICE BENJAMIN
MUTANGA ITOE ON THE CHAMBER'S UNANIMOUS WRITTEN REASONED
DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA TO H.E. DR.
AHMED TEJAN KABBAH, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA
LEONE

1. This is not a Dissenting Opinion. It is a Separate Concurring Opinion which I append to Our Chamber's Unanimous Decision.
2. The facts of this Subpoena Motion are detailed in the Unanimous Decision of The Chamber. I will, therefore not need to go into them excepting where I consider it necessary.

THE OPINION

3. It is the practice in judicial proceedings that it is the responsibility of the Party seeking to rely on the evidence of a witness to establish its case to call the said witness. In normal and classical situations, those witnesses would appear to testify on the prompting or at the request of the party seeking to rely on his evidence.
4. The other extreme is where a witness, as is this case, and in a criminal proceeding, has been prompted and invited by the party seeking to rely on his evidence, and he either fails or refuses to appear to testify on his behalf. The course of action that is open to that party is, as we have seen it, to apply to The Chamber under Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for the issuance of a subpoena to compel him to appear and to testify.
5. I would like to reiterate here, that a subpoena is a due process compelling alternative, which The Chamber has recourse to as a last resort, and only after the traditional methods of securing the attendance of witnesses have been exhausted.
6. As the ultimate remedy, a subpoena is, by its nature and form, a coercive and compelling remedy. In the light of its grim and sinister characteristic, The Chamber should issue it very cautiously and only in extreme cases because non-compliance with this compelling process necessarily entails a punitive and criminal sanction.
7. The Prosecution in this motion is opposing the issuance of the said subpoena on the grounds that it did not fulfil the "Purpose" and "Necessity" requirements and that in any event, the requesting party has not shown how and why the evidence, if adduced,

would assist the Party's case and why the anticipated evidence could not be obtained without a subpoena.

8. As we opined and held in our Chamber Majority Decision in the Norman/Fofana Subpoena Motion,¹ the Applicant must show that the measure requested is necessary (the "Necessary" requirement) and that it is for the purposes (the "Purpose" requirement) of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.²
9. The Prosecution further touches on the issue of immunity of the President under Section 48(4), which was also canvassed by the Defence in the Motion. The Prosecution seeks the leave of The Chamber to address the issue. The Chamber, in reaction to this, is of the opinion that immunity of Ex-President Kabbah is not an issue in this Motion and that it would be superfluous to address it in this decision.
10. In making a determination on this Motion, I rely on and will apply the fundamental tenet in International Criminal Justice and Procedure which derives from universally accepted municipal legal norms, namely, the primacy accorded to the rights of the Accused and of the Defence, including the presumption of his innocence, in the course of Judicial proceedings, and even before they are instituted.
11. I say this because these statutory prescriptions oblige The Chamber to protect these guaranteed and sacred due process rights such as those enshrined not only in the provisions of Article 17 of the Statute of This Court in Our Rules, but also in the Statutes, Rules, and Instruments fixing and regulating the functioning of International Criminal Tribunals.



¹ *Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa*, SCSL04-14-T, Decision on Motions by Moinina Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman for the Issuance of a Subpoena *Ad Testificandum* to H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone 13 June 2006, para 38

² *Ibid.*

THE STATUTORY RIGHT IN THIS CASE

12. In this regard, Article 17(4)(e) provides that the Accused shall be entitled to examine, or have examined the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. (Emphasis added). In fact, the purport of this Motion is to move The Chamber to ensure that the 1st Accused Sesay, secures the attendance of a witness, namely, Ex-President Kabbah, to appear before This Chamber, and to testify on his behalf.
13. In the context of this case and on a controversial subject of this nature that keeps surfacing in International Criminal proceedings and jurisprudence, I would like to factor into the determination of this motion, in addition to those already propounded in the Unanimous Decision of This Chamber as well as in the jurisprudence of other International Criminal Tribunals, a test on which an application for the issuance of a subpoena should be grounded if it is to be granted.

THE "COMPELLING STATUTORY OR LEGAL PURPOSE" TEST

14. The test which I factor into this ongoing jurisprudential exploration is, whether the issuance of a subpoena should, amongst other criteria, be determined by whether it would or is destined to serve a "Compelling Statutory or Legal Purpose." This test finds its justification in the institutional, statutory, regulatory, or other mandatory legal and Human Rights prescriptions which define and are intended to protect the rights of the Accused, such as those enshrined in the provisions of Article 17 of our Statute and in the Statutes of other International Criminal Tribunals, as well as in other International Covenants and Human Rights Instruments.



15. I recall here, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in its Article 14(e) on the rights of an Accused in relation to this subject under review. It stipulates as follows:

“To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”³

16. The provisions of these Statutes and Instruments share a common characteristic of compelling or constraining a Chamber to act in accordance with, at times to the letter, and sometimes, without at all, or with a very limited latitude, option, or recourse to exercising a discretion or the inherent or residual powers that constitute the main source of the jurisdictional strength and force of the Courts in the exercise of their judicial functions.

17. Indeed, the provisions of Article 17(4)(e) of the Statute of this Court on which the merits of this motion are being decided, and even though it may not be contested that the discretion of The Chamber in this regard is not entirely fettered, is one of those “Compelling Statutory” provisions that I am alluding to in this discourse.

18. In order however, to base an application for the issuance of a subpoena against Ex-President Kabwah on the grounds of a “Compelling Statutory or Legal Purpose,” I am of the view that the following conditions should be fulfilled:

i) That the evidence is exclusively in the possession or within the reach of this witness, and cannot be obtained from other sources;

ii) That it is relevant to supporting his case on all or any of the counts of the Indictment;

iii) That all efforts to secure his attendance for the pre-testimony interview and for testimony in the Court have proved abortive despite several attempts to achieve this;

iv) That the evidence is of a nature to vindicate the Accused on any or on all the Counts of the Indictment;

³ OCHR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, Art. 14(e) [ICCPR].

v) That the witness is available in the jurisdiction and is able and capable of appearing before the Court to testify on these issues, and;

vi) That the issuance of the subpoena is not sought by the Accused with a view of either subjecting the witness to embarrassment, ridicule, or to expose his criminal conduct.

19. The situation and facts in this case are as I have indicated, distinguishable from the facts that were presented in the CDF case on the same issue.
20. In the CDF case, the 2nd Accused, Moinina Fofana, whose application was backed by the 1st Accused Late Samuel Hinga Norman, applied to The Chamber for the issuance of a subpoena against Ex-President Kabbah, the then Head of State of this Country and who, despite repeated contacts from the Accused Persons' representatives, was not responding positively to pleas from them to appear and testify on their behalf.
21. The Defence which the two Accused Persons raised all along was that President Kabbah was their CDF Boss and that they had been indicted for offences which they committed in the course of fighting against the rebel RUF/AFRC forces with a view to restoring his democratically elected Government that had been ousted by the rebel forces.
22. In this process, the two Accused Persons, who have introduced the Subpoena Motion, did not conceal their intentions. The objective of their application was for Ex-President Kabbah to appear in Court to testify on their behalf to the effect that they did not, as stipulated in the Agreement and in the Statute of this Court, bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed during the conflict to have warranted their prosecution.
23. A further allegation that they made in a veiled manner in their submissions was that Ex-President Kabbah himself, who was commanding and materially supporting and communicating with the leadership of the CDF which comprised the two Accused Persons/Applicants, bore the greatest responsibility for the crimes which they were alleged to have committed in the process and in the context of this symbolic politico military relationship.



24. In fact, in his Fofana submissions filed with the Motion on the 15th of December 2005, which were supported by Samuel Hinga Norman's, also filed on the 15th of December 2005, Moinina Fofana has this to say:

The Defence submits that Mr Kabbah is in a position to provide evidence relevant to the charges contained in the Prosecution's indictment against Mr Fofana and his co-defendants. It is submitted that, at times relevant to the indictment against Mr Fofana and his co-defendants. It is submitted that, at times relevant to the indictment, Mr Kabbah was commanding, materially supporting, and communicating with various members of the alleged CDF leadership, both from his exile in Conakry and later from his presidential offices in Freetown. As further indicated by the Prosecution's evidence, the Kamajors claimed to be fighting, in part, on behalf of Mr Kabbah with a view to affecting his restoration as the democratically-elected president of the nation. With respect to the question of who bears the greatest responsibility [citation omitted] for the alleged violations of the CDF during the conflict, the Defence submits that Mr Kabbah may himself be among such a group, or, at the very least, that he is in a position to give evidence regarding the relative culpability of the three accused persons. As noted in previous submissions, it is the Defence position that such assessments of comparative responsibility are absolutely crucial to the Article 1(I) issue [citation omitted][emphasis added].⁴

25. In its Majority Decision on the earlier motion, This Chamber had this to say on the arguments articulated on the allegation of Kabbah's "greatest responsibility":

Furthermore, even if it were to be demonstrated that President Kabbah is or could be said to be one of the persons who bear the greatest responsibility, this would not affect the allegation that the Second Accused could also be one of the persons who bears the greatest responsibility. In addition, it would not mean that the Second Accused would be absolved of any criminal responsibility that he would otherwise have. This evidence is not relevant for the purposes for which it is being sought at this stage. Thus, in The Chamber's opinion, Counsel for Fofana have failed to show that the proposed testimony would materially assist the case of the Second Accused [emphasis added].⁵

26. In effect, The Chamber, in its Majority Decision, confirmed in this analysis and concluded, that the application had failed to meet the "Purpose" requirement which is required to back it and to provide support for the issuance of a subpoena under the provisions of Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

⁴ *Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa*, SCSL-04-14-T, Fofana Motion for Issuance of a Subpoena *Ad Testificandum* to President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. 15 December 2005, para 13.

⁵ *Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa*, SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Motions by Moinina Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman for the Issuance of a Subpoena *Ad Testificandum* to H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone 13 June 2006, para 38.

27. Putting these facts in the context of Slobodan Milosević's bid to secure the attendance of Tony Blair and Gerard Shroeder, respectively, the former British Prime Minister and German Chancellor, to testify on the crimes for which he was indicted, his move was denied and dismissed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, applying a 2 prong test namely, the "Purpose" and the "Necessity" Requirements and this, on the grounds that the evidence sought to be solicited from them was not relevant to any of the facts in issue in the case, nor is it of a nature or material to disculpate the Accused from responsibility for the offences for which he is indicted. .
28. In the CDF case, it is our view, given the reasons which were sufficiently canvassed in the first "Kabbah Subpoena Decision," that Late Samuel Hinga Norman and Moinina Fofana in their submissions, failed to reach the threshold of establishing the "Purpose" and "Necessity" requirements to back the issuance by The Chamber, of a subpoena for President Kabbah to appear before it and to testify on their behalf.
29. In fact, the justification for refusing the Norman/Fofana application as We stated in Our Chamber Majority Decision, was that it was not clearly demonstrated in their submissions that its purpose, as stipulated in Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, was dictated by a necessity and for purposes of pursuing an investigation or for the preparation of a trial.
30. I do not have any doubt in my mind, nor am I wavery in my conclusion, that the real purpose for which the Fofana/Norman application was made was to vent their anger directly, and in Open Court, against the so-called witness, Kabbah, the sitting Head of State, for sacrificing them to Prosecution, notwithstanding their efforts and the casualties they incurred in the bloody struggle to reinstate him, and in the process, to ridicule him like Milosević sought to do with Blair and Shroeder.
31. In fact, it would appear, from their submissions, that the principal purpose which the Accused targeted to achieve was to subject Ex-President Kabbah to embarrassment, to ridicule him, and to expose the fact that his involvement and conduct in the conflict as the CDF Boss, like theirs, was also criminal.
32. In such a context, and with such intentions, they were certainly very much out of target in fulfilling the Purpose Requirement that is required under Rule 54 of the Rules as



their objective was far from meeting the standards set by the "Purpose" and "Necessity" requirements, or the "Compelling Statutory or Legal Purpose" that should have advanced and buttressed the case they were making.

13. There is, to my mind, an issue which should be addressed in the determination of this motion. It is that the Prosecution, just as the Defence in their submissions and citations of the passages and dicta in the earlier Kabbah subpoena case,⁶ have sought to refer diversely to the instant subpoena application and the earlier one which was disposed of in our Chamber Majority Decision.⁷
14. Even though the earlier motion was denied on the basis of the same criteria on which this one is granted, it is my finding that these two applications, even though identical in their subject matter and in the objective they seek to achieve, are distinguishable and that the verdict or stand adopted by This Chamber, in the earlier one, does not necessarily bind it to come to a similar conclusion based on similar reasons, in the later case given the configuration and divergences of the facts on which the two applications were made and canvassed.
15. In this regard and according to the Norman/Fofana application, President Kabbah who was then the sitting Head of State, was in a position to give evidence regarding the relative culpability of the two Accused for purposes of determining who bears the "greatest responsibility" for the crimes they were alleged to have committed.
16. The Chamber in the earlier case, and following a submission by the Prosecution in this regard, took the view that the facts on which the application was canvassed, provided no evidence that the information sought from President Kabbah, impacts on any issue that is relevant to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the Accused Persons, or to any of the charges in the Consolidated Indictment, and that in the absence of any such evidence, the mere desire expressed by the Norman/Fofana Defence Teams to

⁶ *Prosecutor v. Hinga, Fofana and Kondewa*, SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Motions by Moinina Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman for the Issuance of a Subpoena *Ad Testificandum* to H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 13 June, 2006.

⁷ *Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao*, SCSL-04-15-T, Written Reasoned Decision on Motion for Issuance of a Subpoena to H.E. Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 30th June, 2008.

examine President Kabbah does not constitute a legitimate forensic purpose on which applications for subpoenas may be granted by The Chamber.

37. On the contrary, and in relation to this Subpoena Application, the Sesay Defence Team submits that Ex-President Kabbah will give evidence that would assist the defence interests of the Accused Sesay with regards to the allegations against him in Counts 15-18 of the Indictment.
38. In examining this submission, I have been conscious and aware of the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Milosević case⁸ which we cited and relied on, *inter alia*, in determining the earlier Norman/Fofana case, and where we also held that it is not enough that the information requested may be helpful or convenient for one of the Parties; it must be of substantial or considerable assistance to the Accused in relation to a clearly identified issue that is relevant to the trial.
39. It is to be noted that in the instant Sesay Application, it is the Applicant's contention that the evidence of Ex-President Kabbah is relevant in confirming his Defence on Counts 15-18 which indict him for the killing, abduction, and mistreatment of UNAMSIL Peace Keepers.
40. It is noted from the Indictment on which Sesay and Others are charged, the Prosecution allegation that by Order of Foday Saybana Sankoh, from about May 2000, all activities of the RUF in the Republic of Sierra Leone shall be under the direction of the 1st Accused Issa Hassan Sesay.
41. Sesay alleges that the Ex-President Kabbah knows that he Sesay did not participate in the hostage taking which had been ordered by Sankoh. Rather, as he alleges, Ex-President Kabbah is able to provide evidence to the effect that it was only after the hostage taking episode that he intervened and made a decision to remove the troops to Kono to ensure their safety and that in so doing, he was acting unilaterally and against the orders of Foday Sankoh. Sesay says that in this regard, he intentionally misled

⁸ *The Prosecutor v. Milosević, IT-02-54-T*, Decision on Assigned Counsel Application for Interview and Testimony of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, 9 December 2005. In this decision, the "purpose" requirement is referred to as the "legal forensic purpose" requirement.

- Foday Sankoh concerning the whereabouts of the hostages so as to avoid receiving any instructions to the contrary from Foday Sankoh.
42. Sesay says that around January to April 2002, Foday Sankoh was in detention but was taken to Chchithram Hospital for medical attention and that President Kabbah originated the strategy to imprison Foday Sankoh so as to disable the RUF and create the conditions for the release of the detained UNAMSIL troops.
43. Furthermore, Sesay affirms that Ex-President Kabbah knows that the leadership of ECOWAS including the then President Kabbah, was responsible for Sesay taking over the leadership of the RUF.
44. To sum it up, the Sesay Defence concludes and submits that Ex-President Kabbah is uniquely placed to testify about these issues which are integral to Sesay's defence and which will show, contrary to what is pleaded in the Indictment, that he was not ordered to attack or coordinate attacks against UNAMSIL troops, but that he acted alone to protect and secure the detained UNAMSIL troops.
45. These factual enumerations and justifications are in my opinion, sufficiently convincing and explicit to justify a decision by The Chamber that the "Compelling Statutory or Legal Purpose," Test for the issuance of this subpoena has been met and that The Chamber can proceed to issuing it on the strength of this doctrine.

IMMUNITY OF PRESIDENT KABBAH

46. As I indicated earlier, both the Defence and the Prosecution raised the issue of the immunity of the then President Kabbah in the arguments that they have presented to support the positions they have taken.
47. Learned Counsel for Sesay, Mr Wayne Jordash, went into it in some detail. Learned Counsel for the Prosecution, Mr Peter Harrison, did not. He indicated that if he had the leave of The Chamber, he would.
48. The Chamber has, in its Unanimous Decision on this Motion, rightfully not addressed it. I will address it briefly because it is an issue that was neither settled by the Majority

Decision of the Chamber⁹ nor was it determined by the Appeals Chamber in its Decision of the 11th of September, 2006.

49). I also, at this point in time, address this issue in addition to that of the issuance of a subpoena under Rule 54 of the Rules because of the context of the Dissenting and Minority opinion of Hon. Justice Geoffrey Robertson in the Appeals Chamber Majority Decision on this issue.

ON THE IMMUNITY OF PRESIDENT KABBAH

50. On this issue Hon. Justice Robertson had this to say in his Minority Dissenting Opinion:

There is now such overwhelming authority that incumbent Heads of State are amenable to International Law that the very proposition that they have immunity from the process of International Criminal Courts must be viewed as the jurisprudential equivalent of the proposition that the Earth is flat.¹⁰

51. Hon. Justice Robertson cites Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter which he rightfully says, expressly rejected sovereign immunity for military and Political leaders. That section of the Charter reads:

The official position of the Defendants whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.¹¹

52. Hon. Justice Robertson also cites Principle 3 of the 1950 International Law Commission authorities who stated the following principle:

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under International Law acted as Head of State or responsible government official does not relieve him of responsibility under International Law.¹²

⁹ *Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, and Kondewa*, SCSL-2004-14-T, Decision on Motions by Moninia Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman for the Issuance of a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to H.E. Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 13th June, 2006

¹⁰ *Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, and Kondewa*, SCSL-2004-14-T, Hon. Justice Robertson's Dissent on Decision on Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber Decision Refusing to Subpoena The President of Sierra Leone, 11th September, 2006 at para. 41.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

53. Hon. Justice Robertson finally cites Article 6(2) of the Statute of this Court which virtually reproduces the provisions of the Nuremberg Charter. What I would observe, with Due Respect to Hon. Justice Robertson, is that those provisions offer no protection for Heads of States but only, and only so far as it concerns crimes committed by them that fall under the regime of International Law.
54. If Kabbah had committed crimes or were charged for crimes under International Law, War Crimes, or Crimes Against Humanity, I would not have, given provisions of Article 6(2) of the Statute of this Court which Hon. Justice Robertson is fully aware of, gone into the length I went in defending the applicability of the immunity thesis as I did in my Separate Concurring Opinion in that case.
55. The offence for which Kabbah would have been liable for refusing to attend our subpoena if we issued it, was contempt. Does Hon Justice Robertson in this context consider Contempt as a Crime against international Law? Is the offence of contempt a War Crime or a Crime Against Humanity?
56. I do not think Hon. Justice Robertson would characterize the ordinary offence of contempt as such because in any event, it is clear that it is not, even if it were committed and is prosecutable, according to Hon. Justice Robertson, in an International Criminal Jurisdiction.

THE INTERVENTIONIST THESIS AND PROPOSITION OF
HON. JUSTICE ROBERTSON


57. I note that Hon Justice Robertson faults This Chamber Majority Decision for not inviting the Applicants to specify the defence which President Kabbah's evidence was likely to be material and that it was only then that we should have decided whether the defence as specified was good law and whether it was likely that President Kabbah's evidence would assist.
58. To this criticism, I would, with Due Respect, like to draw Hon Justice Robertson's attention to the fact that for a Court to properly and fairly hold the balance and play

- noting but the role of a neutral empire, it should not, when it is not necessary, be interventionist in its approach to cure the defects in any Parties' Case or Submissions.
59. The Fofana/Norman Motions were fully, extensively and exhaustively canvassed in written submissions by all the Parties. The Applicants clearly, stated their position for the issuance of a Subpoena against Kabbah. In those written submissions. This was followed by oral submissions in Court on this very important motion, which was an exceptional application of the provisions of Rule 73(A) of the Rules. The Applicants, in that process, fully canvassed all arguments and even more, that were necessary to support their case for the issuance of a Subpoena.
60. In those circumstances, was the Chamber, is at the risk and peril of violating principle that for a Court to properly and fairly hold the balance, it should not, when it is not necessary, be interventionist in its approach to cure the defects in any Parties' Case or Submissions.
61. The Fofana/Norman Motions were fully and exhaustively canvassed in written submissions by all the Parties. The Applicants clearly stated their case for the issuance of a Subpoena against Kabbah. In those written submissions as well as in the oral submissions in Court, the Applicants fully canvassed all arguments necessary to support their case for the issuance of a Subpoena to Kabbah.
62. In those circumstances, was the Chamber again, at the risk and peril of violating the principle of equality of arms, have descended into the battle grounds of the Parties to rescue the case of one Party, the Applicants in this case, as Hon. Justice Robertson suggests, to the detriment of the Prosecution's case and that of President Kabbah who in those Proceedings, was represented by his Attorney General?
63. I do not think that Hon. Justice Robertson, sitting on appeal on a case where The Chamber behaved the way he is suggesting, in his Minority Dissent Opinion, would hesitate to fault The Chamber for unwarranted, unnecessary, and partial interferences with the due process.
64. It is a pleasure however to note with satisfaction, the fact that Hon Justice Roberson boldly wrestled with and addressed the Presidential Immunity issue, and to have his

thoughts in the records, not only of this Court, but also in those of International Criminal Justice.

15. This last Comment concludes the purport of this Separate Concurring Opinion.

Dated this 30th Day of June, 2008



Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge

