



**THE TRIAL CHAMBER** (“Trial Chamber”) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“Special Court”) composed of Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge, Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe and Judge Pierre Boutet;

**SEIZED** of the Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment filed on 9 February 2004 (“Motion”) in the cases of **Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao**, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT pursuant to Rules 50(A) and 73(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court (“Rules”); the Responses thereto, filed by Defence for Gbao and Defence for Sesay on 19 February<sup>1</sup>; and the Prosecution Reply thereto filed on 24 February 2004<sup>2</sup>;

**NOTING** the Order for filing a Consolidated Reply, 23 February 2004;

**NOTING ALSO** the Decision on the Withdrawal of Counsel in the case of Morris Kallon on 27 February 2004;

**MINDFUL OF** the Motion filed by Morris Kallon entitled “Motion for Quashing of Consolidated Indictment” (“Kallon Motion”) on 10 February 2004; the Prosecution Response thereto filed on 13 February 2004;<sup>3</sup> and the Decision rendered by this Chamber on the Kallon Motion on 21 April 2004;<sup>4</sup>

**CONSIDERING** the Order to Submit Indication of Specific Changes to Indictments served on 26 February 2004; and also the Indication of Specific Changes to the Indictments filed by the Prosecution on 1 March 2004;

**CONSIDERING ALSO** the oral submissions on this matter in the course of the Status Conference held on 2 and 3 March, 2004;

<sup>1</sup> Augustine Gbao, Response to Prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Indictment, (“Gbao Response”); Issa Sesay, Defence Response to Prosecution’s Application to amend the Indictment (“Sesay Response”).

<sup>2</sup> SCSL-2004-15-PT, Consolidated Reply to Defence (Sesay and Gbao) Response to Prosecution “Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment”, 24 February 2004.

<sup>3</sup> *Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et al*, Prosecution Response to Defence “Motion for Quashing of Consolidated Indictment”, 13 February 2004.

<sup>4</sup> *Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et al*, SCSL-2004-15, Decision on the Defence Motion for Quashing of Consolidated Indictment”, 21 April 2004.

NOTING THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES, THIS IS OUR RULING ON THIS MOTION

RESUME OF THE FACTS

1. The facts of this motion briefly stated are that pursuant to the provisions of Rules 50(A) and 73(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecution is seeking our leave to amend the indictment against the RUF group of indictees, namely, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, all of who stand indicted and detained for war crimes, crimes against humanity and offences against international humanitarian law which fall within the jurisdiction of the Special Court pursuant to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Special Court.
2. The initial indictments, in which the 3 accused were arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty" were individual indictments that were approved by His Lordship, Judge Bankole Thompson on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March, 2003.
3. On 9 October 2003, the Prosecution made an application to the Chamber to seek a consolidation of all the indictments to 2 only instead of proceeding on the individual indictments. It sought to join the 3 RUF and the 3 AFRC indictees in one consolidated indictment, and the 3 CDF indictees in the other consolidated indictment.
4. After an exchange of lengthy written, followed by oral submissions by the Parties in an open Court hearing, the Chamber, in order to avoid a conflict in the conduct of the defence between the RUF and the AFRC group, instead decided to consolidate all the indictments into 3 sets; one consolidated indictment for the RUF group of indictees, namely Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, and the other for the AFRC group of indictees, namely, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu. Finally, one consolidated indictment was approved for the CDF group of indictees, namely, Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa.
5. The Motion before us now therefore, is in fact and in effect the 3<sup>rd</sup> in the series of indictments in their varied formulations and wordings which the Prosecution intends to file after we would have granted the amendment and this, before their trial which Prosecution knows is imminent.



6. In seeking these amendments, the Prosecution is relying on the provisions of Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in order to add one more and new count of forced marriage on the already consolidated indictment.
7. In making this application, the Prosecution argues that the amendment will not prejudice the rights of the accused in that it is timely, will not unduly delay the trial of the accused, and also that the amendment sought is in the interests of justice.
8. The defence team of Issa Sesay, and Augustine Gbao have replied to the Prosecution's submissions and object to all changes in the indictments except the spelling of names of places.
  - That the offence of forced marriage is not an offence against humanity
  - That an amendment will lead to a delay in the start of the trial and that it will prejudice the accused in conducting investigations thereby hamper his right to prepare his defence.

It is further submitted by the Defence of Issa Sesay that the Prosecution has advanced general and unsubstantiated reasons for seeking the amendment and to quote them, "such as that it serves the interests of justice".

#### SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

9. The facts as are borne out by the submissions of the Parties are as follows:-

##### *For the Prosecution*

10. The Prosecution seeks to add one new charge, namely "Crimes against humanity - other inhumane acts (forced marriage)". Additionally, the Prosecution seeks to make "corrections and/or modifications" to other counts which include the expansion of time periods, an additional location for all counts related to sexual violence crimes, and the change of spellings of certain place names.
11. The Prosecution alleges that the new count is based on the same factual allegations as the other counts related to sexual violence charges and will not require further disclosure. The Prosecution further stated that it did not bring the Motion prior to the joinder decision "in the interests of judicial economy" so that it could avoid filing motions in each case.




12. The Prosecution included a general two-page "Investigator's Statement" with the Motion. The investigator states that he has found that the crimes of sexual violence are not simply sexual slavery but are most appropriately characterised as "forced marriages". He states that new investigations have "clarified" the nature of the relationships.

*The Gbao Response:*

13. The Gbao Response objects to all new changes, except the change in spelling of place names. In relation to forced marriages, the Defence asserts that the Prosecution has not produced any new evidence to support the new count, and has failed to demonstrate why the count could not have been included in the original indictment. In relation to the new time periods, the Defence asserts that as the expansion of time periods are generally not based on new evidence, the Prosecution has failed to justify not bringing the change earlier. The Defence questions whether the Prosecution acted with due diligence in conducting investigations and analysis of evidence gathered. The Defence seeks clarification on whether any of the amendments are based on new evidence. The Defence envisions the need for filing preliminary motions based on the new charge and amendments, including it appears, a motion on defects in form of the indictment in relation to the vagueness of the concept of forced marriage. The Defence submits that the amendments will lead to a delay in the start of trial, will result in prejudice to the accused in conducting investigations into the case against him, and will hamper the right of the accused to prepare his defence.

*The Sesay Response:*

14. The Sesay Defence objects to all proposed changes except for the alternative spellings and the modifications of time periods in paragraph 23, which simply reflect the fact that Foday Sankoh is dead and Issa Sesay is in detention. The Sesay Defence shares the view of the Gbao Defence that it is unclear whether the new count results from new evidence or evidence already in the possession of the Prosecution; if it is the latter, the Sesay Defence complains that the Prosecution did not exercise due diligence in bringing the motion. The Sesay Defence also submit that it will file a preliminary motion on the new charge, thereby incurring a delay in the proceedings. The Sesay Defence adopts all the arguments submitted by the Defence for Kanu on the Request to

Amend the Indictment in the AFRC case<sup>5</sup> in relation to forced marriage not amounting to a crime against humanity and thereby violating the principle of legality, as well as the argument that the proposed crime is too vague to constitute “other inhumane acts”. The Sesay Response further contends that Sesay’s right to be informed promptly of the nature and the cause of the proceedings against him has been violated, particularly in instances where the time period has been expanded by one and a half years. It also submits that the Prosecution has made general and unsubstantiated reasons for seeking the amendments, such as that it “serve(s) the interests of justice”.

*The Reply:*

15. The Prosecution reiterates the arguments advanced in the Motion and clarify that all materials have been disclosed to the Defence and that the additional count is based on the “exact same factual context” as the other charges in relation to sexual violence and forced labour. The Prosecution argues that no further investigations should be required since the “bush wife phenomenon” is mentioned in numerous witness statements.
16. In addition, the Prosecution objects to the Sesay Defence adopting the arguments of another defence team.<sup>6</sup>

*Related Motion by Kallon:*

17. The Defence for Morris Kallon did not file a response to the Motion, but had, however, filed the Kallon Motion following the filing of the Consolidated Indictment on 10 February 2004, to quash that indictment. The issues raised in the Kallon Motion overlapped with some issues raised in relation to the Prosecution’s Motion to amend the Indictment. The Kallon Motion specifically alleged that when the Prosecution filed the Consolidated Indictment, it added new allegations against *all* accused. The “new allegations” include new locations and the extension of periods of time, which relate to about 20 paragraphs in the Indictment. The Kallon Defence averred that the changes made between the original Indictments and the Consolidated Indictments effectively

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<sup>5</sup> *Santigie Borbor Kanu*, Defence Response to Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, 17 February 2004.

<sup>6</sup> In relation to the submission that the Sesay Defence adopts all the arguments filed by the Kanu Defence in the Response to the Request to Amend the Indictment.

amounted to an amendment of the indictment, which was done without leave of the Trial Chamber.<sup>7</sup>

*Prosecution Response thereto:*

18. The Prosecution filed its Response to the Kallon Motion on 13 February 2004. The Prosecution submit that all of the changes to which Kallon objects are as a result of the “Bill of Particulars” filed in the Sesay case, upon the Trial Chamber’s order. The Prosecution maintains that the “further particularisation” provided in the Consolidated Indictment “in no way causes prejudice to the Accused, but rather provides additional particularisation to several counts in the Indictment and eliminates phrasing that was determined to be potentially ambiguous”. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber has already permitted it to include “additional events” in the Sesay Indictment without considering that to amount to an amendment. The Prosecution maintains that the Bill of Particulars were part of the record at the time the joinder motion was filed, apparently suggesting that if the Defence took issue with the inclusion of the Bill of Particulars then they should have raised that earlier
19. The Kallon Motion was, however, dismissed by this Chamber on 21 April 2004;<sup>8</sup>

**DELIBERATION**

20. After this overview of the facts, we would now proceed to examine the legal basis of the issues raised vis-à-vis the jurisprudence cited by the parties to support their arguments.

Rule 50 under which the application was brought reads as follows:

“(A) The Prosecutor may amend an indictment, without prior leave, at any time before its approval, but thereafter, until the initial appearance of the accused pursuant to Rule 61, only with leave of the Designated Judge who reviewed it, but in exceptional circumstances, by leave of another Judge. At or after such initial appearance, an amendment of an indictment may

<sup>7</sup> Similar arguments were raised by Fofana in “Response to the Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa” and by Norman in “Defence Response to Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa”, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-PT.

<sup>8</sup> *Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et al*, SCSL-2004-15, Decision on the Defence Motion for Quashing of Consolidated Indictment”, 21 April 2004.

only be made by leave granted by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 73. If leave to amend is granted, Rule 47 (G) and Rule 52 apply to the amended indictment.

(B) If the amended indictment includes new charges and the accused has already made his initial appearance in accordance with Rule 61, a further appearance shall be held as soon as practicable to enable the accused to enter a plea on the new charges.

(C) The Accused shall have a further period of fourteen days from the date of initial appearance on the new charges in which to file preliminary motions relating to the new charges.”

During the Plenary Meeting of the Judges of the Court in Freetown on the 11<sup>th</sup> of March, 2004, Rule 50 was amended to read as follows:

“Rule 50 Amendment of Indictment

(A) The Prosecutor may amend an indictment, without prior leave, at any time before its approval, but thereafter, until the initial appearance of the accused pursuant to Rule 61, only with leave of the Designated Judge who reviewed it but, in exceptional circumstances, by leave of another Judge. At or after such initial appearance, an amendment of an indictment may only be made by leave granted by a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 73. If leave to amend is granted, Rule 47(G) and Rule 52 apply to the amended indictment.

(B) If the amended indictment includes new charges and the accused has already made his initial appearance in accordance with Rule 61:

- (i) A further appearance shall be held as soon as practicable to enable the accused to enter a plea on the new charges;
- (ii) Within seven days from such appearance, the Prosecutor shall disclose all materials envisaged in Rule 66(A)(i) pertaining to the new charges;
- (iii) The accused shall have a further period of ten days from the date of such disclosure by the Prosecutor in which to file preliminary motions pursuant to Rule 72 and relating to the new charges.”

21. The other relevant provisions of the law are Articles 17(4)(a) and 17(4)(b) of the Statute of the Special Court which stipulate as follows:

Article 17(4):

“In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees in full equality:

- (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her;
- (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence;
- (c) To be tried without undue delay”

22. Furthermore, Article 9(2) of the International Convention for the Protection of Civil Rights stipulates as follows:

“Anyone who is arrested shall be informed at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him”.

Article 14(a), and 14(b) and 14(c) of the ICPCR are similar to and are reproduced in the relevant articles of Article 17 of the Statute.

23. The Chamber recalls that the provisions of Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court are textually the same as those of Rule 50(A), (B), (C) of The Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

24. It is important to note here that the power conferred on the Court to grant an amendment is discretionary and that it should be exercised judiciously and in the overall interests of justice.

*ANALYSIS*

25. We would like to observe here that what at times justifies applications to amend charges as in this case, stems from drafting imperatives of criminal law, where for every offence alleged and supported by the available evidence, there must be a separate and distinct count.

26. Following this practice, it is the traditional role and practice of the prosecution to bring as many counts in an indictment as possible and although it does impose on him the obligation to bring all the charges that are borne out by the evidence, nothing prevents or prohibits him either from preferring and bringing all the charges which he thinks are supported by the evidence at his

disposal, not only with a view to a proper determination of the case, but also and above all, to serve the overall interests of justice.

*EQUALITY OF ARMS*

27. The crucial consideration in this process, in our opinion, is one of timing. The question to be asked, is whether application for the amendment is brought at a stage in the proceedings where it would not prejudice the rights of the Defence to a fair and expeditious trial and furthermore, whether it is made in the overall interest of justice rather than its having the effect of giving an undue advantage to the prosecution, thereby putting in jeopardy, the doctrine of equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defence.
28. We recall here that in the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) took the view that "Equality of arms" obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put to a disadvantage when presenting its case. This Chamber in the Gbao case disposed of by His Lordship Judge Pierre Boutet took the same position.

*BURDEN OF PROOF*

29. We appreciate that the burden of proof that the Prosecution bears in every criminal trial is understandably very heavy. It commences with the detection and production of solid and convincing evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. The other important component of the burden of proof is the charge or charges which the Prosecution files in order to reflect the evidence it has at its disposal and can adduce in order to discharge the obligation of "proof beyond all reasonable doubt".
30. We would like to acknowledge here, the fact that this burden of proof is even more demanding in matters before the international criminal tribunals than it is in the municipal systems. The reason is that the protection of the rights of suspects and accused persons is not only often more clearly spelt out and entrenched in the statutes of those tribunals, but is also, in addition, reinforced by other international conventions and instruments that are conspicuously absent in municipal legislations.
31. To attain these objectives, we think that the Prosecution must and indeed, should be given the latitude, to resort to all means that the law permits to enable it to fully exercise its authority under

the Statute and under the general and accepted principles of law and practice in the domain under review, and this, with a view to giving it the opportunity to fully assume and discharge those prosecutorial functions.

**AUTONOMY OF THE PROSECUTOR**

32. The Statute of the Special Court in its Article 15(1) stipulates *inter alia* that the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Special Court: "He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other source."

33. Article 15(4), still of the Statute, *inter alia*, stipulates as follows:

" ...Given the nature of the crimes committed and the particular sensitivities of girls, young women and children victims of rape and sexual assault, abductions and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of the prosecutors and investigators experienced in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice."

34. These provisions underscore the necessity for international criminal justice to highlight the high profile nature of the emerging domain of gender offences with a view to bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice. In the light of the above, it is expected, and we hold the view, that the Prosecutor who is at the helm of the investigation process, should exercise vigilance, diligence and attention, bring before justice for trial, all those accused of having committed gender and other categories of offences within the competence of the Court without any "undue delay", as stipulated in Article 17(4)(c) of the Statute of the Court.

35. Our duty in situations of this nature where statutory interests are in conflict is to ensure a rigorous respect of the rights of each of the parties in the arena, so as to forestall a breach of one's or the other's rights.

**EXTENT OF THE AMENDMENT SOUGHT BY THE PROSECUTION**

36. The Prosecution in its submissions in this case explains that the purpose of this motion to amend the indictment is to enable it to add to it, "a new charge" of crimes against humanity - Other Inhumane Act (forced marriages), as a new count in the Consolidated Indictment. This count, the Prosecution explains, will become the 8<sup>th</sup> and the previous counts namely, 8 through 17, will continue sequentially from counts 9 through 18.

37. The Prosecution argues that the amendment is justified both in law and on the evidence and should be granted because:

- (a) It better reflects the full culpability of the Accused;
- (b) There has been no undue delay in bringing the amendment; and
- (c) The filing of the Amended indictment will not prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial.

38. The Prosecution further argues that all material has been disclosed to the Defence and that the "additional count" is based on the "exact same factual context" as the other charges in relation to sexual violence and forced labour and that no further investigations should be required since the "bush wife phenomenon" is mentioned in numerous witness statements.

39. The other components of the amendment include:

- (a) A modification of the date in the particulars of counts 3-5;
- (b) The modification of the time period in paragraph 71;
- (c) The modification of time periods in paragraph 23 to reflect the death of FODAY SANKOH;
- (d) The addition of new spellings

40. A careful examining of all the indictments that the Prosecution has preferred against this group of indictees from the onset of this process reveals the following:

The original individual indictments against the 3 accused persons which were approved on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March 2003 alleged sexual violence in counts 6-8. More precisely, count 6 charged each of them with Rape, Count 7 with sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, and finally, count 8 which alleges the crime of outrage against personal dignity.

41. These same charges and counts were textually reproduced in the same form in the Consolidated Indictments. In this motion for an amendment, the Prosecution maintains that the Counts are as they always have been from the original Individual Indictments to the Consolidated Indictment and that it is only seeking the leave of the Court to add a similar offence to those that have consistently, as we have observed, appeared all along in previous indictments.

42. It is in the light of the above that the Prosecution argues that the amendment is based on existing allegations in the current consolidated indictment as well as in the evidence already disclosed to the Defence and that consequently, granting the amendment will not result in an undue delay in trying the accused persons.

43. We would like in this regard, to refer to the case of the PROSECUTION VS KAREMERA ICTR-98-44-AR73 in which the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR held that in assessing whether a delay resulting from an amendment to an indictment will be “undue”, the tribunal must consider factors such as the diligence of the Prosecution in advancing the case and the timeliness of the request. In that case, the Appeals Chamber had this to say:


“Although amending an indictment frequently causes delay in a short term, the Appeals Chamber takes the view that this procedure can also have the overall effect of simplifying proceedings, by narrowing the scope of the allegations, by improving the Accused’s and the Tribunals understanding of the Prosecution’s case, or by averting possible challenges to the indictment or the evidence presented at the trial.”

44. In the case of THE PROSECUTION VS CASIMIR BIZIMUNGU & OTHERS CASE NO ICTR-99-50-AR50, 12 February 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR had this comment to make in disallowing the Prosecutions Appeal against a refusal by the Trial Chamber to grant a motion for an amendment of the indictment and I quote;

“...amendments that narrow the indictment and thereby increase the fairness and efficiency of proceedings should be encouraged and usually accepted...Had the Prosecution solely attempted to add particulars to its general allegations, such amendments might well have been allowable because of their positive impact on the fairness of the trial...” (at paragraphs 19-20)

45. The crucial consideration in this process, in our opinion, is one of timing and whether the application for the amendment is brought at the stage in the proceedings where it would not prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial and furthermore, whether it is made in the overall interests of justice rather than having the effect of giving an undue advantage to the prosecution, thereby putting in jeopardy, the doctrine of ‘equality of arms’ between the Prosecution and the Defence.

46. What, however, is desirable and should be ensured is for the Prosecution, in the exercise of its duties as a separate organ under the Statute, to enjoy at certain acceptable stages of the proceedings, a free hand in executing its duties and obligations to the Court and this, before the



heavy hammer of justice comes down to decide on whether it is still enduring with the weight of the irksome burden of proof that it carries all along, or whether it has discharged it and indeed, beyond any reasonable doubt. In making this observation however, we do not lose sight of the fact that the Prosecution in so acting, must do so within the confines of the law and by respecting, not only the legal protection accorded to the accused by the Statute, but also, the principle of a fair and expeditious trial within the context of course, of the doctrine of equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defence.

47. In this Motion, we find that the Prosecution, during the investigations that preceded the initial appearances of the accused persons, properly addressed their minds to gender offences and the necessity to gather the required evidence to have their perpetrators prosecuted. To ensure that this happens the Prosecution, during the investigations that preceded initial appearances, detected gender offences. In drawing up hereafter the initial individual indictments of the accused which were approved on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March, 2003, and on which initial appearances were based, the Prosecution ensured that these individual indictments contained a number of counts related to gender offences such as rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence and finally outrages against personal dignity.

48. Furthermore, in the consolidated indictment which was approved by the Trial Chamber following a motion filed to this effect, the Prosecution again included all these enumerated gender offences which featured in the initial individual indictments.

49. In the present motion, the Prosecution is seeking our leave to amend the already existing consolidated indictment on which the proceedings are now based, in order to add one count, and one count only, based on Forced Marriage. The question to be addressed in these circumstances is whether this additional count or offence as the case is, is new in terms of its being a complete novelty in the arsenal of all the counts that constitute the entire consolidated indictment.

50. Our immediate reflection on this issue that we have raised is that the count related to forced marriage which the prosecution is seeking our leave to add to the consolidated indictment is as much a sexual, indeed, a gender offence as those that were included in the initial individual indictments and that feature in the current consolidated indictment on which this application to amend is based.

51. We would like to say here that Forced Marriage is in fact what we would like to classify, as a 'kindred offence' to those that exist in the consolidated indictment in the view of the

commonality of the ingredients needed to prove offences of this nature. Given this consideration and the fact that material related to those gender offences that feature on the consolidated indictment has long been disclosed to the Defence, we are of the opinion that the amendment sought is not a novelty that should necessitate fresh investigations as the defence contends. This is only logical because granting it would neither occasion an “undue delay” of the trial of the accused, nor a breach of the statutory rights of the accused as provided for under the provisions of Article 17(4)(a) of the Statute and also because it would not consequently as well, either place the prosecution in an unduly advantageous position to the detriment of the defence, nor would it violate the principle of “equality of arms”.

52. In the particular context of this case, we accept the Prosecution’s argument that this application to amend, for the reasons that the offences sought to be added were disclosed to the accused and the Defence promptly, fulfils the criterion of timeliness having been filed even before the trial proceedings take off although we know that some applications for amendments could, and have in fact been accepted, at the depth of the trial for considerations based on the overall interest of justice.
53. In this regard, and to underscore the fulfillment of the criterion of timeliness, an examination of some municipal decisions which are in line with the philosophy of the evolving jurisprudence in international criminal justice as far as the amendment of charges is concerned and at what stage such applications could be entertained, are quite instructive and illuminating.
54. In the case of *AYANSHINA VS. POLICE* (1951), 12 WACA 260, the then West African Court of Appeal held that it was permissible to add a fresh count after a submission had been made that there was no case to answer on the original charge and before a ruling in favour of the submission had been given. In another case, *R. V KANO & ARISAH* (1951) 20 NLR, 32, a decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria which was upheld, still by the then West African Court of Appeal, it was held permissible to amend a charge after the final addresses and before judgment was delivered provided, as the Court observed, the “alteration could be made at that stage without injustice to the accused”. Indeed this decision is very reflective of the provisions of Section 148(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of Sierra Leone which provides in effect that such applications for amendments of charges ‘unless having regard to the merits of the case, the requested amendments cannot be made without injustice’.





55. It might be difficult today to accept the applicability of the scope of these decisions in International Criminal Tribunals but they serve to emphasise the variables of the concept of timeliness in introducing an amendment and the ideal timeliness and promptitude that characterized the Prosecution's action in this matter, and to underscore the flexibility of the exercise of the judicial discretion in granting or refusing a motion to amend while emphasising that the same essential ingredients would necessarily include an examination on a case to case basis and the respect at all times, for the overall interests of justice.

56. In light of the above, we would like in our reasoning in this matter, to refer to the case of THE PROSECUTOR V ALFRED MUSEMA, ICTR-96-13-T, 6 May 1999, where, like in the instant case, the application to amend consisted of adding only one count and to expand on the facts in the existing indictment. In the Musema case, the amendment was granted on the grounds that it was a mere technicality which the Trial Chamber considered would not, if granted, be prejudicial to the statutory rights of the Accused.

57. We are therefore of the opinion that the Prosecution has satisfied these criteria. We accordingly allow the Prosecution's motion to amend the Consolidated Indictment and order as follows:

- (i) That the inclusion in the Consolidated Indictment of a new count 8 of "Other Inhumane Act, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2.i of the Statute", as well as the other amendments requested by the Prosecution, is hereby granted in the form contained in the Proposed Amended Indictment filed as Annex 1 to the Motion on 9 February 2004;
- (ii) That these amendments shall go forward in compliance with the provisions of Rules 50(A) and (B)(i) of the Rules.

Done at Freetown this 6<sup>th</sup> day of May 2004

  
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 Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe

  
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 Judge Pierre Boutet



Judge Bankole Thompson appends a separate and dissenting opinion to the Decision of the Trial Chamber.



## DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BANKOLE THOMPSON:

### INTRODUCTION

1. My learned brothers, his Honour Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, and his Honour Judge Pierre Boutet have, by a majority, decided to grant leave to the Prosecution to amend the Consolidated Indictment against the Accused Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao. Unquestionably, this Decision was reached after very careful and constructive deliberations on their part. Despite their learned and erudite analyses of the issues germane to such an application, I respectfully disagree with their Decision, from four key perspectives, to wit, the philosophical, jurisprudential, pragmatic and interests of justice, to the extent to which they form part of the doctrinal foundations of judicial reasoning as the major tool available to judges in the judicial process. Hence, this Dissenting Opinion.
2. Let me begin by observing that this Motion confronts the Special Court with the delicate task faced by all International Criminal Tribunals of balancing “*the prosecutor’s obligations to prosecute the most serious international crimes which might require accommodating changes in prosecutorial strategy as well as amendments to indictments as a result of discovering new evidence, while guaranteeing the fairness of the trial proceedings and upholding the rights of the accused*”.<sup>1</sup> Predicated upon this premise as to the nature of the Court’s task as presented by this Motion, it cannot be denied that in determining whether to grant an amendment of an indictment that has been approved, the right of the accused person to a fair and expeditious trial, and the overall interests of justice become issues of paramount consideration in the equation.
3. With this key observation, let me respectfully indicate that the majority Decision fails to pay due regard or attach primacy to the right of the Accused persons herein to a fair and expeditious trial, for reasons I will articulate in the following paragraphs of this Opinion. But before doing so, let me say that I agree with and adopt *in extenso*, the characterisation of the parties’ written and oral submissions in respect of this Motion as recorded and reflected in the majority Decision of my learned brothers Judge Boutet and Judge Itoe.

### PHILOSOPHICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES

4. I have just asserted that my disagreement with the majority Decision is from four perspectives: philosophical, jurisprudential, pragmatic and the interests of justice. Let me now address the philosophical and jurisprudential together and say straightaway that from this dual perspective, it seems to me that the major issue to be addressed, preliminarily, is that of the relevant body of jurisprudence to be applied to applications of this nature. Where it is determined that such applicable body of jurisprudence is an issue free from doubt, then there can be no judicial dispute as to its applicability to the matter in hand. However, where the issue of the relevant body of jurisprudence is one fraught with controversy, then nothing must be judicially taken for granted.
5. The issue must then become one of very careful judicial inquiry as to what sources of law should provide guidance. It cannot be asserted with any degree of accuracy that there is, as at yet at the level of international criminal adjudication, a settled and authoritative *corpus* of jurisprudence applicable in granting amendments to indictments. To seek to apply whatever

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<sup>1</sup> See Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice, Procedure and Evidence, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003 para 6 – 66

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disparate, incoherent and inconclusive general principles that exist in the form of an evolving body of jurisprudence *without constructive adaptation* is a logical mistake that may well make us as Judges, victims of the fallacy of slippery precedents.

6. It does not take much legal research effort to discover that there are only a few general, principles of law deducible, at this point in time, from the existing evolving international criminal jurisprudence on the subject of amendment of indictments. Understandably, case-law authorities are sparse. For the purpose of this Opinion, a few key samples of such propositions will suffice. These include:

- (i) *The question as to whether an amendment of an indictment shall be granted is within the discretion of the tribunals;*
- (ii) *“no doubt, size can be taken into account in considering whether any injustice would be caused to the accused: but provided other relevant requirements are met, a court would be slow to deny the prosecution a right to amend on that ground only”<sup>2</sup>;*
- (iii) *“In general, an amendment to a confirmed existing indictment is sought for the following reasons: to add new charges to a confirmed Indictment, to expand and elaborate upon factual allegations adduced in support of existing confirmed counts or to make minor changes to the indictment”<sup>3</sup>;*
- (iv) *“The fundamental issue in relation to granting leave to amend an indictment is whether the amendment will prejudice the Accused unfairly.”<sup>4</sup>*

7. Suffice it further to say that all we have, at this stage, as working jurisprudential tools to determine the merits or otherwise of applications for amendment of indictments in the international criminal law sphere are the respective Rules of ICTY, ICTR, and this Court. Under the ICTY and ICTR systems, the relevant guide is Rule 50(C); under our system, it is Rule 50(A). In their present state, these rules are still untested, and undoubtedly since the ink is hardly dry on them, they have not yet been the subject of a consistent, coherent, and settled body of principles. However, the Court must still proceed to a determination of the merits of applications of this nature. One plausible approach is for this Court, through the technique of judicial development of the law, to interpret Rule 50(A) in the light of the autochthonous and unique juridical features and other related factors of this tribunal in the peculiar context of its own specific needs, mandates and realities as an adjudicating body of alleged offences of not only grave international import but also of crimes of equally grave dimensions under certain laws of Sierra Leone. *Such an approach seems justified by the consideration that in an era of international criminal adversarial litigation dominated by a tremendous accretion of prosecutorial discretion, judicial guarantees and safeguards of the rights of the accused must be given paramountcy by judges sworn to administer justice faithfully, conscientiously and impartially.*

<sup>2</sup> *Prosecutor v. Kovacevic*, Case No: IT-97-24-AR73, ICTY Decision Stating Reasons for Appeals Chamber Order of May 29, 1998, July 2 1998, paras. 20-37; also noted in Archbold, *supra* note 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka*, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, ICTR Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to file an Amended Indictment, June 21, 2000, para. 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sljivancanin*, Case No. IT-95-13/1-PT, ICTY Decision On Form of Consolidated Amended Indictment And On Prosecution Application to Amend, 23 January, 2004, para. 61.

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8. Predicated on this analysis, it seems to me that there is no judicial warrant for any evolving international jurisprudence on the subject of the amendment of indictments to be strictly patterned after general principles imported from the national law systems (where such principles as adumbrated by the courts lean heavily *in favorem procuratorem*), ***without very careful and constructive adaptation*** to the different prevailing legal culture in the international criminal law domain. I emphasize this point because to my mind the almost unregulated flexible approach to the question of amendment of the indictments implicit in the evolving international jurisprudence is more akin to, for example, the English and Sierra Leone national law approach to the issue. In those two jurisdictions, the general principle is as follows:

“Where, before trial or at any stage of a trial, it appears to the court that the indictment is defective, the court shall make such order for the amendment of the indictment as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case, unless having regard to the merits of the case, the required amendments cannot be made without injustice”.<sup>5</sup>

9. ***What kind of constructive adaptation is, therefore, necessary in respect of imported general principles from national law systems on the subject of amendment of indictments?*** Such a process should begin with the recognition, by way of methodology, of the variance in socio-legal norms and realities prevailing in the two legal domains. It may be predicated upon the doctrine that where an indictment alleging the commission of grave crimes against international law has been approved, there should be a presumption against amendment unless the circumstances of the case so dictate. In a less complex sense, it may be contended that such methodology is dictated, as this Chamber noted in a different context, by “logical necessity, common sense and due regard to the practical realities”.<sup>6</sup> In essence, the Special Court must design its own special principles to reflect its own special juridical character. This is the rationale behind its founding instruments. This reasoning therefore, becomes a useful starting-point, for the purposes of this Opinion, for a discussion of the factors based on judicial pragmatism compelling my divergence from the judicial pathway taken by my learned brothers Judges Itoe and Boutet.

## PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVES

10. To my mind, the question whether to grant an amendment to an indictment or not within the peculiar context of the seemingly overarching restricted mandate of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as an international criminal tribunal and the general principles relating thereto cannot, objectively, be considered in isolation from certain pragmatic influences, (which I prefer to characterise as secondary factors) ***ideally not in consonance with judicial orthodoxy***, dictated by the peculiarities and specifications of the Court, namely: its history, its uniqueness, its statutory mandate, its heavily constricted judicial life-span, the regime of budgetary and fiscal constraints to which it is subjected, its completion strategy, its recognition of the pressures for institutional accountability on its part vis-à-vis the international community and the population of Sierra Leone, and its functional legitimacy

<sup>5</sup> See Archbold. *Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice*, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 para 1-149. See also the Sierra Leone Criminal Procedure Act No. 32 of 1965, Section 148(1).

<sup>6</sup> *The Prosecution v. Issa Hassan Sesay* (Case No. SCSL-2003-05-PT), Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion for Defects In the Form of the Indictment, 13 October 2003 at para. 9.

and credibility. These are imponderable variables that cannot be completely ignored, or discounted in working out the final judicial equation of whether to grant the amendments sought. Cumulatively, they seem to militate against any further delay in starting the trials.

## INTERESTS OF JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES

11. I also dissent from my learned colleagues' Decision for these additional reasons. First, that of the protracted interval of eight (8) months between the Prosecutor's discovery of the evidence alleged to be in support of the proposed new count 8 of Other Inhumane Acts (forced marriage) and the filing of the Motion for amendment. On this issue, it is worth noting, by way of persuasive value, the observation of the English Court of Appeal in *R. v. Johal and Ram*<sup>7</sup>, to the effect that:

"The longer the interval between arraignment and amendment, the more likely it is that injustice will be caused and in every case in which amendment is sought, it is essential to consider with great care whether the accused person will be prejudiced thereby."

12. This evidence was available to the Prosecution in June 2003; it did not apply to have the new charge incorporated in the Indictment until February 2004. In my view, this shows the following:

- (i) lack of due professional diligence on the part of the Prosecution despite attempts to explain this away by claims of time-consumption in evaluating the evidence;
- (ii) a lapse in professional sensitivity to the rights of the Accused;
- (iii) that granting the amendment is very likely to occasion undue delay in giving effect to the right of the Accused persons, which concept is always a key function of the efficaciousness or otherwise of the right of the Accused to a fair and expeditious trial statutorily guaranteed under Article 17(2)(c) of the Court's Statute;
- (iv) granting the amendment sought, in the face of the eight (8) months intervening period of time between the discovery or availability of the evidence and the filing of the application for amendment of the indictment, amounts to a clear infringement of Article 17(4)(a) of the Court's Statute which enshrines the right of an accused to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against him.

13. It is also of significance that apart from the prejudicial effect of granting the amendments sought on the right of the Accused to a fair and expeditious trial as articulated in paragraph 12 above, there is a great likelihood of some adverse effects on, for example, victims and witnesses for both prosecution and defence. One such effect is the agony and trauma of having to wait much longer to testify and to see this allegedly unhappy episode in their lives given a closure.

14. For the foregoing several considerations and reasons, I am convinced that if there were a deserving contemporary instance to which I would unhesitatingly apply the maxim - *Justice Delayed is Justice Denied* - this would be it. Hence, my respectful dissent from the majority position.


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<sup>7</sup> 56 Cr. App. R. 348.

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15. Of course, I have no judicial reservations about amendments of an editorial nature. My dissent relates only to amendments of substance. I therefore deny and dismiss the Motion to the extent that it seeks the incorporation of a new count in the Consolidated Indictment ordered pursuant to the Joinder Decision of this Chamber.

Done at Freetown this 6<sup>th</sup> day of May 2004



Judge Bankole Thompson  
Presiding Judge,  
Trial Chamber



[Seal of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]