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[1] [p6] On September 19th,
1925, the Council of the League of Nations adopted the following Resolution:
"The Council of the League of Nations, having been seized of the question of
the frontier between Turkey and Iraq by application of Article 3, paragraph
2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, decides, for the purpose of elucidating
certain points of law, to request the Permanent Court of International
Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:
"1) What is the character of the decision to be taken y the Council in
virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne -is it an
arbitral award, a recommendation or a simple mediation ? [p7]
"2) Must the decision be unanimous or may it be taken by a majority?
"May the representatives of the interested Parties take part in the vote ?
"The Permanent Court is requested to examine these questions, if possible,
in a extraordinary session.
"The Council requests the Governments of Great Britain and Turkey to be at
the disposal of the Court for the purpose of furnishing it with all relevant
documents or information. It has the honour to transmit to the Court the
Minutes of the meetings of the Соuncil at which the question of the frontier
between Turkey and Iraq has been examined.
"The Secretary-General is authorized to submit the present request to the
Court, together with all the relevant documents, to explain to the Court the
action taken by the Council in the matter, to give all assistance necessary
in the examination of the question, and, if necessary, to take steps to be
represented before the Court."
[2] In pursuance of this Resolution the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations submitted to the Court, on September 23rd, 1925, a Request for an
advisory opinion in the following terms:
"The Secretary-General of the League of Nations, "in pursuance of the
Council Resolution of September 19th, 1925, and in virtue of the
authorization given by the Council,
"has the honour to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice an
application requesting the Court, in accordance with Article 14 of the
Covenant, to give an advisory opinion to the Council on the questions which
are referred to the Court by the Resolution of September 19th, 1925.
"The Secretary-General will be prepared to furnish any assistance which the
Court may require in the examination of this matter, and will, if necessary,
arrange to be represented before the Court."
[3] In conformity with Article 73 of the Rules of Court, the Request was
communicated to the Members of the League of Nations, to the States
mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant and to Turkey. At the same time,
Members of the League were informed that, having regard to the nature of the
questions put, and their possible [p8] bearing on the interpretation of the
Covenant, the Court would no doubt be prepared favourably to receive an
application by any Member to be allowed to furnish information calculated to
throw light on the questions at issue. The notifications to Great Britain
and Turkey were further based on the principle laid down in the Rules of the
Court, in accordance with which a question referred to the Court for
advisory opinion is communicated to governments likely to be able to supply
information in regard to it.
[4] The Council of the League of Nations having requested the Court to
examine the questions set out above, if possible, in an extraordinary
session, and having informed the Court that it would be glad to receive the
opinion asked for by a date which would enable it to proceed with the
examination of the affair at its own next session commencing on December
7th, 1925, the President of the Court decided, by virtue of the powers
conferred upon him by Article 23 of the Court's Statute, to summon an
extraordinary session of the Court beginning on October 22nd, 1925.
[5] Following upon the notification above mentioned, the Turkish Minister
for Foreign Affairs sent to the Registrar of the Court the following
telegram dated October 8th:
[Translation.]
"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram September 26th
stop Turkish Government, whilst having greatest esteem and respect for the
International Court of Justice as it has stated on many occasions, is
convinced that the questions mentioned in Council of League of Nations'
Request dated September 19th and in regard to which Court's advisory opinion
is asked are of a distinctly political character and, in the Turkish
Government's opinion, cannot form the subject of a legal interpretation stop
Powers entrusted to Council in Mosul dispute under final Text of Article 3
Lausanne Treaty and previous declarations of the late Lord Curzon which led
to adoption by Turkey of that article exclude all possibility of an
arbitration stop Further the fact that Council has itself felt necessity of
asking Court for advisory opinion as to nature of powers possessed by it
under Article 3 above-mentioned, demonstrates correctness my Government's
views stop British representative having for his part declared before
Council that previous undertakings given by his Government in regard to this
point no longer hold good, the intention thus officially [p9] manifested
resolves the question in regard to which moreover no doubt could subsist
stop Feel my duty call Court's attention to the fact that my Government has
also clearly and adequately explained its views regarding Request submitted
by Council and latter's competence stop My Government also considers there
is no need for it to be represented at extraordinary session of Court; for
consideration of above-mentioned Request having already made known its
opinion on the subject stop Request you to inform Court of foregoing. ¬TEWFIK
ROUCHDY Minister Foreign Affairs Turkey."
[6] His Britannic Majesty's Government, for its part, filed with the
Registry on October 21st, a "Memorial" on "The question of the frontier
between Turkey and Iraq". The Court also heard the information furnished
orally by the representative of the British Government, the
Attorney-General, Sir Douglas Hogg, in the course of the hearings held on
October 26th and 27th.
[7] The two Governments directly concerned had furthermore sent to the Court
complete collections of the Acts and Documents relating to the Conferences
of Lausanne and Constantinople, and also collections of documents relating
to the so-called Mosul question. Lastly, the Turkish Government was good
enough, subject to the reservations made in the telegram set out above, to
reply to certain questions which the Court had already seen fit to put to it
before the hearings.
[8] In addition to the evidence produced by the interested Parties, the
Court has had before it the dossier sent by the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations together with the Council's Request, and also certain
additional documents and information which the Secretary-General was good
enough to furnish at the request of the Court [FN1].
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[FN1] See list in Annex.
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I.
[9] The Court must, in the first place, indicate the circumstances which
induced the Council of the League of Nations to ask for an advisory opinion
on the questions set out in the Request.
[10] During or as a result of the war of 1914-1918, the British Forces
occupied the Turkish vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, and at least [p10] a
large part of the vilayet of Mosul; Great Britain subsequently set up a
civil administration there. When, in 1920, the Supreme Council allotted the
mandates contemplated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, Great Britain received, amongst others, the mandate for
"Mesopotamia, including Mosul". (Declaration by Mr. Lloyd George in the
House of Commons, April 29th, 1920; see Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1920,
Vol. 128, pp. 1469-1470.)
[11] In the Peace Treaty, signed at Sévres on August 10th, 1920, the
frontiers of Turkey "with Mesopotamia" are laid down as follows:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'' (3) With Mesopotamia:
"Thence in a general easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the
northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul,
"a line to be fixed on the ground;
"thence eastwards to the point where it meets the frontier between Turkey
and Persia,
"the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, modified, however, so as to
pass south of Amadia."
[12] This Treaty, however, was never ratified.
[13] In consequence of the events which took place in Turkey in 1922, the
Powers entered into fresh negotiations with that country which were opened
at Lausanne on November 20th, 1922, and resulted in the signature on July
24th, 1923, of the Peace Treaty which came into effect on August 6th, 1924.
During these negotiations, the question, amongst others, of the frontier
between Turkey and Iraq (which name had been substituted for "Mesopotamia")
was reopened.
[14] Thus, on January 23rd, 1923, Lord Curzon said, at a plenary meeting of
the Territorial and Military Commission, that "among the matters requiring
to be laid down in the form of articles in the Treaty of Peace... was the
determination of the southern frontier of the Turkish Dominions in Asia",
i.e. between these Dominions and Syria and Iraq. The question was brought
before the Commission because private "exchange of views and notes" had "led
to no result".
[15] A discussion followed in the course of which H.E. Ismet Pasha, and
afterwards Lord Curzon, set out the views of their respective [p11]
Governments. As these views appeared irreconcilable, Lord Curzon eventually
proposed, on behalf of the British Government, to refer the question of the
frontier between Turkey and Iraq "to independent enquiry and decision" - by
the League of Nations - and declared that his Government would abide by the
result. Lord Curzon concluded by formally "inviting the Turkish Delegation
to accept this proposal".
[16] At the following meeting, however, Ismet Pasha stated that he could not
accept the proposal in question, adding that "the Delegation of the
Government of the Grand National Assembly could not allow the fate of a
great region like the vilayet of Mosul to be made dependent upon any
arbitration".
[17] Lord Curzon at once replied explaining what, in his view, if Turkey had
accepted his proposal, would have been the procedure adopted by the Council
of the League of Nations, a procedure to which Turkey had just refused to
submit. In this speech, upon which the two Governments directly concerned
place different constructions, Lord Curzon was at pains to demonstrate,
amongst other things, the perfectly equal treatment which Turkey would have
received before the Council. He added that if Turkey persisted in her
refusal he would be obliged on behalf of his Government "to act
independently" under Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
[18] Ismet Pasha, having repeated that he could not "concur in the proposal
to submit the solution of the Mosul question to arbitration", Lord Curzon
stated that he would "take without delay" the action which he had previously
indicated.
[19] Accordingly, on January 25th, 1923, he addressed to the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations a letter in which he requested
the latter to be good enough to place upon the agenda of the Council session
which was about to open in Paris "the case of the disputed frontier between
the Turkish Dominions in Asia Minor and the mandated territory of Iraq".
[20] The Secretary-General complied with this request and the Council
considered the matter at a sitting held on January 30th, 1923. On that
occasion, Lord Balfour made a statement on behalf of the British Government
to the effect that the proposal unsuccessfully made by Lord Curzon at
Lausanne, according to which "the League of Nations should be asked to use
its good offices to determine the frontier", would be renewed, and that only
in the event of the. [p12] failure of this further step, and in order to
avert "the dangers which failure might bring in its train", would the
British Government desire to "invoke Article 11 of the Covenant" in order
that the League might "take any action that might be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".
[21] Lord Balfour took this opportunity to explain that "if the contingency
of which he had spoken arose", Article 17 of the Covenant "would certainly
be one of the articles invoked", but that under the very terms of that
article Turkey would be received "as a Member of the League on complete and
absolute equality with all other Members".
[22] The Council contented itself with noting Lord Balfour's statement.
[23] On the following day, January 31st, the Commission on Territorial and
Military Questions of the Conference of Lausanne held another plenary
meeting. Lord Curzon merely stated on that occasion that "the decision of
this dispute" regarding Iraq had been "referred .. to the enquiry and
decision of the Council of the League of Nations".
[24] Some days later, on February 4th, 1923, a private meeting between the
principal delegates at the Conference took place in Lord Curzon's room. The
Allied Powers had, at this time, drawn up and communicated on January 29th
to the Turkish Delegation a draft peace treaty, dated January 31st; then, on
February 3rd, they had sent to the same Delegation a document setting out
what further concessions they were prepared to make. At the meeting of
January 31st, the Turkish Delegation had asked for eight days in which to
reply. The time allowed was, however, fixed to expire on February 4th.
[25] The draft treaty contained an article (No. 3) regarding the frontiers
with Syria and Iraq according to which the latter frontier was to consist of
"a line to be fixed in accordance with the decision to be given thereon by
the Council of the League of Nations".
[26] In its written reply to these proposals, which was made on the day
agreed upon, the Turkish Delegation expressed the opinion that, for the sole
purpose of preventing the Mosul question from constituting an obstacle to
the conclusion of peace, this question should be excluded from the programme
of the Conference in order that it might, within the period of one [p13]
year, be settled by common agreement between Great Britain and Turkey.
[27] At the private meeting held on February 4th, Lord Curzon stated, in
regard to this reply, that he was no longer able to consent to any
alteration of the wording of the Treaty in regard to Mosul, since the matter
had already been referred to the League of Nations and was now in the hands
of that Body. He was, however, prepared to suspend the result of his appeal
to the League for a period of one year. This would enable the two
Governments to examine the matter by direct and friendly discussion. Should,
however, the two Governments fail to reach a direct understanding, the
intervention of the League would be resorted to in the manner originally
proposed.
[28] According to notes taken by the British Secretary, but which do not
constitute an authoritative record, except in so far as the views expressed
on the British side are concerned, Ismet Pasha then stated that he "accepted
Lord Curzon's proposals regarding Mosul"; these proposals were embodied in a
draft declaration, the first paragraph of which was as follows:
"In regard to Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace, His Majesty's
Government declare their intention not to invite the Council of the League
of Nations to proceed to the determination of the frontier between Turkey
and Iraq until the expiration of a period of twelve months from the date of
ratification of the present Treaty.''
[29] On the other hand, according to information supplied to the Court by
the Turkish Government, Ismet Pasha's acceptance of Lord Curzon's proposals
only related to the maintenance of the status quo during the period allowed
for attempts to arrive at a friendly settlement.
[30] However that may be, as no agreement in regard to the Allies' proposals
as a whole could be reached at the private meeting of February 4th, the
meeting came to an end in face of this difficulty and the Conference of
Lausanne was interrupted for more than two months.
[31] When the Conference resumed its labours on April 23rd, 1923, it had
before it a letter from Ismet Pasha, dated March 8th, 1923, forwarding the
modifications proposed by the Turkish Government in the draft treaty handed
on January 29th by the Allied Delegations to the Turkish Delegation. This
letter mentioned, with [p14] reference to Mosul, the written Turkish reply
of February 4th; it also contained the following passages: "As regards Part
I (political clauses). there is no substantial modification. Territorial
questions are settled in accordance with the proposals of the Allied
Powers.'' The counter-proposals annexed to the letter of March 8th contained
the following provisions for the determination of the frontier between
Turkey and Iraq:
"The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly
arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain with-in twelve
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.
"In the event of no agreement being reached, the dispute shall be referred
to the Council of the League of Nations."
[32] On April 24th, the British Delegate, Sir Horace Rumbold, at a plenary
meeting, alluded to this proposal and to the declaration "of this kind"
which the British Government had been prepared to make at the time of the
suspension of negotiations on February 4th; he added, however, that that
declaration was dependent upon a reciprocal, undertaking that the status quo
would be preserved during the contemplated period of twelve months, and
that, provided a clause to that effect was inserted in the Turkish
amendment, the British Delegation would be prepared to accept that
amendment, subject to discussion with Ismet Pasha in regard to the exact
duration of the time allowed for the Turco-British negotiations.
[33] It was not, however, until the following June 26th that Sir Horace
Rumbold was able, with the assent of Ismet Pasha, to announce that the
British and Turkish Delegations had agreed ¬in the course of private
meetings and negotiations - to propose for adoption by the Conference the
following clause in regard to the frontier of Iraq:
"The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly
arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.
"In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments
within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of
the League of Nations.
"The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending
the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier [p15], no military
or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present
state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that
decision."
[34] On July nth, it was agreed that the period of nine months provided for
should begin to run not on the date of the coming into force of the Treaty,
but at the expiration of the time allowed for the evacuation of the
territories occupied by the Allies; and, on July 24th, the Treaty was
signed, its third article substantially embodying the clause set out above.
[35] The negotiations designed to fix by friendly arrangement the frontier
between Turkey and Iraq, began at Constantinople on May 19th, 1924, and
continued until June 9th of that year. They were unsuccessful, and Sir Percy
Cox, the British Delegate, when their failure was apparent, invited the
Turkish Delegate to agree upon the terms of a "joint declaration referring
the question to the League of Nations" under Article 3 of the Treaty of
Lausanne. H.E. Fethy Bey, the Turkish Delegate, did not, however, feel able
to comply with this invitation, "as the instructions of his Government did
not authorize him to discuss the terms of the proposed declaration".
Whereupon, Sir Percy Cox stated that, "failing a joint reference, His
Majesty's Government would itself refer the matter to the League of
Nations", though it hoped "that the Turkish Government would associate
itself with it in taking this step".
[36] It was in these circumstances that the British Government, on August
6th, 1924, sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a letter
asking that the following question should be placed on the agenda of the
next Council Meeting:
"Frontier of Iraq. -Article 3 (2) of the Treaty signed at Lausanne on July
24th, 1923."
[37] The Secretary-General complied with this request and informed the
Turkish Government of his action by a letter dated August 9th. In the same
letter, he reminded that Government of the communication addressed to the
League of Nations by the British Government on January 25th, 1923, and he
attached to his letter a copy of that communication, of the Minutes of the
Council Meeting of January 30th, 1923, and of Article 17 of the Covenant.
[38] In its reply, dated August 25th, the Turkish Government stated that it
agreed in principle to the inscription of the question on the agenda of the
Council.
[39] The latter decided on August 30th to send a telegram "inviting [p16]
the Turkish Government to be represented on a footing of equality at its
discussions" and informing that Government that consideration of the
question would be postponed until "the arrival of the Turkish
representatives."
[40] In these circumstances it was not until September 20th that the Council
was able to begin the examination of the question, Fethy Bey, the Turkish
representative, taking his seat at the Council table.
[41] As early as this meeting, the Parties used different expressions when
describing the role which the Council would have to play in the matter.
Whilst, according to Lord Parmoor, the British representative, the Council
was to "act as arbitrator", Fethy Bey merely referred to the submission of
the question to an "impartial examination" by the Council. At a subsequent
sitting on September 25th, the representatives of the Parties, at the
request of M. Branting, the Rapporteur, explained how they understood the
reference to the Council provided for in Article 3 of the Treaty of
Lausanne. Lord Parmoor stated that the British Government "regarded the
Treaty as placing the Council in the position of an arbitrator, whose
ultimate award must be accepted in advance by both Parties". Fethy Bey, on
the other hand, stated that the Turkish Government "recognized the full
powers of the Council as conferred upon it by Article 15 of the Covenant."
Whereupon the Rapporteur stated that the replies would seem "to show that
the Parties were both willing to recognize the Council's decision, one of
them through arbitration and the other under Article 15 of the Covenant".
Since, however, there was a difference of opinion as to the subject of the
dispute to be settled, he proposed that the discussion should be adjourned
in order to enable him "to consider, in consultation with the two Parties,
the preliminary question of the precise duties of the Council."
[42] The discussion was resumed on September 30th. M. Branting then read a
report in which he gave an account of conversations which he had had with
Lord Parmoor and Fethy Bey. The former had reminded him that "his Government
accepted in advance the Council's decision regarding the frontier between
Turkey and Iraq''. The latter, in reply to the question whether "he could,
on behalf ol his Government, now give an undertaking to accept the Council's
recommendation", had replied "that on this point there was no disagreement
between his Government and the British Government" On the basis of these
statements, the Rapporteur felt able to [p17] announce that "the doubts
which might have arisen in regard to the … rôle of the Council" had been
"removed" and suggested, in order that proceedings might be commenced, the
appointment of a Commission of Enquiry.
[43] The Council adopted this suggestion. In the Resolution passed to this
effect, the following passage appears:
"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the British and
Turkish Governments, who undertook on behalf of their respective
Governments, to accept in advance the decision of the Council on the
question referred to it" ...
[44] Lord Parmoor and Fethy Bey stated that they accepted this Resolution.
[45] The Members of the Commission of Enquiry were appointed on October
31st, 1924, and the Commission filed its report with the Secretariat of the
League of Nations on July 16th, 1925. The Council, therefore, had to
consider the conclusions of this report at the session held by it in
September 1925.
[46] In an introductory report, M. Unden, the Rapporteur, laid stress,
firstly, on the footing of equality on which the Parties were placed before
the Council, and, secondly, on the agreement as to the Council's role
recorded in the Resolution of September 30th, 1924. A discussion then
ensued, at the meetings of September 3rd and 4th, 1925, between the British
and Turkish representatives, Mr. Amery and H.E. Tewfik Rouchdy Bey, upon the
merits of the question of the frontier line between Turkey and Iraq. At the
conclusion of this discussion, the Rapporteur proposed, at a private meeting
at which the delegates of the Parties were present, that the Council "should
appoint a sub-committee to examine the question and make a report". The
Council decided accordingly and the President "reminded the Parties that
they had before the Council placed their cause solemnly in the hands of the
League of Nations, of which the Council formed part, and that they were
awaiting from the Council that justice which it would endeavour to grant
them".
[47] It was by the report of the Sub-Committee thus appointed, of the
proceedings of which no record, if any were kept, has been communicated to
the Court -, that the proposal to refer to the Court the questions to which
this advisory opinion is intended to reply, was, on [p18] September 19th,
1925, laid before the Council. The adoption of the Resolution by which the
Council decided in accordance with this proposal, was preceded by an
exchange of views between the British and Turkish representatives, in the
course of which Mr. Amery maintained that what was intended by Article 3,
paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne "was an arbitral decision given on
the broad merits of the case", whereas, according to Tewfik Rouchdy Bev.
"the only possible procedure" was "to reach a solution with the consent of
the Parties through the good offices of the Council", and not to resort "to
a decision given by the Council without their consent."
II.
[48] Before proceeding to examine the questions put to it by the Council,
the Court wishes to observe that it intends strictly to confine itself to
consideration of these questions, without in any way prejudging the merits
of the problem before the Council; nothing in the present opinion,
therefore, is to be interpreted as anticipating the solution of that
problem.
* * *
[49] The first question put to the Court regards the nature of the "decision
to be reached" by the Council under Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of
Lausanne. In order to be able to reply to it, that article must be analyzed,
with a view to discovering any factors which may determine the nature of the
decision. The explanatory phrase following the question indicates that the
nature of the functions to be undertaken by the Council must be defined,
having particular regard to the effect that its decision is intended to
produce in relation to the Parties, that is to say, whether it is designed
to be binding upon them, or whether, on the contrary, this is not the case.
[50] The mission which the Court has to fulfil is to interpret a treaty
provision - namely Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne - which
runs as follows:
"From the Mediterranean to the frontier of Persia, the frontier of Turkey is
laid down as follows: [p19]
(1) With Syria:
The frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of
October 20th, 1921;
(2) With Iraq:
The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly
arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine
months.
In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments
within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of
the League of Nations.
The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the
decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other
movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of
the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision."
[51] The Court must, therefore, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain
from the wording of this clause what the intention of the contracting
Parties was ; subsequently, it may consider whether - and if so, to what
extent - factors other than the wording of the Treaty must be taken into
account for this purpose.
[52] The Court is of opinion that in signing Article 3, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty of Lausanne, the intention of the Parties was, by means of recourse
to the Council, to insure a definitive and binding solution of the dispute
which might arise between them, namely, the final determination of the
frontier. The Court feels bound to adopt this interpretation for the
following reasons:
[53] Article 3, which forms part of the section of the Treaty devoted to
"Territorial Clauses", is intended to lay down the frontier of Turkey from
the Mediterranean to Persia. It draws a distinction between two different
sections of this frontier : (1) that separating Turkey from Syria, a
frontier already described in the Franco-Turkish Agreement of October 20th,
1921, the line of which is maintained; (2) that which is to separate Turkey
from Iraq, a frontier to be laid down in friendly arrangement between Turkey
and Great Britain within nine months, failing which the dispute is to be
referred to the Council of the League of Nations. Although [p20] one of the
sections of the frontier still remains to be determined, whilst the other is
already defined, it is clear that the object of this article is to establish
a continuous and definitive frontier. Not only are the terms used ("lay
down", fixer, determiner), only to be explained by an intention to establish
a situation which would be definitive, but, furthermore, the very nature of
a frontier and of any convention designed to establish frontiers between two
countries imports that a frontier must constitute a definite boundary line
throughout its length.
[54] It often happens that, at the time of signature of a treaty
establishing new frontiers, certain portions of these frontiers are not yet
determined and that the treaty provides certain measures for their
determination. In this way, Article 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which is
intended to lay down the frontier of Turkey from the Black Sea to the
Aegean, and which, as regards the greater part of the frontier line, gives
topographical indications, leaves the determination of a portion of the
Greco-Turkish frontier to the decision of the Boundary Commission set up
under Article 5. It is, however, natural that any article designed to fix a
frontier should, if possible, be so interpreted that the result of the
application of its provisions in their entirety should be the establishment
of a precise, complete and definitive frontier.
[55] These conclusions, which may be deduced from an examination of the
first sub¬paragraph of paragraph 2 of Article 3 alone, are confirmed by an
analysis of sub-paragraphs 2 and 3. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that in the
event of no agreement being reached between the two States concerned within
the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council. Although
these terms, taken by themselves, do not expressly indicate the nature of'
the action to be undertaken by the Council, there does not seem to be any
doubt that for the settlement of a dispute, only two alternatives present
themselves: agreement between the Parties, arrived at either directly or
through a third Party, or else decision by the intervention of a third
Party. Now, the successive application of these two methods is precisely
what is provided for under Article 3 and, for the reasons already set out
and drawn from the very nature of frontiers, it must be concluded that the
Parties, when signing that article, contemplated intervention by a third
Party - the Council - as a result of which a definitive solution would be
reached. [p21]
[56] Even if there were any possible doubt in regard to the meaning of the
first two sub¬paragraphs of paragraph 2 of the article, this would be
dissipated by the terms of the third sub¬paragraph. By this clause, the
British and Turkish Governments undertake that, pending the decision to be
reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall
take place which might modify in any way the present state of the
territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision. This,
therefore, is a temporary settlement, pending a definitive settlement. The
latter will be effected by the "decision to be reached", or, according to
the Protocol of July 24th, 1923, relating to the evacuation of the Turkish
territory occupied by the British, French and Italian forces, by the
"determination of the frontier". Again this decision may be either an
agreement between the Parties or, failing such agreement, the solution given
by the Council. Now a decision on which the final fate of the territories in
question depends can only be a decision laying down in a definitive manner
the frontier between Turkey and Iraq binding upon the two States. This
interpretation of the third sub-paragraph, which is indicated by the terms
therein employed, is entirely in accordance with the conclusions drawn from
the preceding sub¬paragraphs and from Article 3 as a whole.
[57] In the last place, it must be ascertained whether any other articles of
the Treaty of Lausanne are calculated to throw any light upon the scope of
Article 3. In this connection, special regard must be had to Article 16
which has been cited both by Turkey and by Great Britain in support of their
respective contentions. In the eyes of the Court, this article, under which
Turkey "renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the
territories situated outside the frontiers laid down (prévues) in the
present Treaty", seems rather to furnish an argument in favour of the
definitive character of the decision to be reached. The frontier of Iraq,
though still remaining to be determined in accordance with Article 3, is,
notwithstanding, a frontier laid down (prévue) by the Treaty, since there is
no doubt that the expression "laid down" (prévue) can include both frontiers
already defined and frontiers which have yet to be determined by the
application of methods prescribed in the Treaty. The fact that, in a treaty,
certain territories are indicated as ceded, or that rights and title to
these territories are renounced even though the frontiers of them are not
yet determined, has nothing exceptional about it. [p22] For instance, all
treaties of cession, in which provision is made for plebiscites, offer
examples of the same kind. The same also applies to treaties which entrust
the determination of certain frontiers to an international commission or to
the decision of a third Party. In such cases the renunciation of rights and
title is suspended until the frontier has been determined, but it will
become effective, in the absence of some other solution, in virtue of the
binding decision.
[58] The other articles in the Treaty of Lausanne which bestow powers on the
Council of the League of Nations, though they have been cited by the two
Governments concerned, can hardly have any bearing on the interpretation of
Article 3, from the point of view now under consideration, for they relate
to situations very different from that under contemplation in that article.
[59] Since the Court is of opinion that Article 3 is in itself sufficiently
clear to enable the nature of the "decision to be reached" by the Council
under the terms of that article to be determined, the question does not
arise whether consideration of the work done in preparation of the Treaty of
Lausanne (les travaux préparatoires) would also lead to the conclusions set
out above. Nevertheless, it may be well also to consider Article 3 and the
construction which the Court has placed upon it, in the light of the
negotiations at Lausanne, for the Turkish Government has cited certain facts
connected with those negotiations in support of its adverse opinion.
[60] In the discussion which took place before the Council on September
19th, 1925, Tewfik Rouchdy Bey drew attention to a passage in the speech
made by Lord Curzon at the meeting of January 23rd, 1923, in the course of
which he had said:
"I do not know what it (the Council) will do; but my point is that the
Turkish Delegation will be there just like ourselves, and when the two cases
have been stated you will get the most impartial examination which it is
possible to secure. Further, Article 5 of the Covenant provides that the
decision of the Council upon which the Turkish Government will be
represented, will have to be unanimous, so that no decision can be arrived
at without their consent."
[61] This passage, however, even if it is held that the preparatory work (travaux
préparatoires) can be taken into account, in the [p23] Court's opinion
cannot be used to interpret Article 3. It should in the first place be
observed that this passage forms part of a speech formulating a proposal
which was rejected by the Turkish Delegation ; but if the passage had at
that time been understood in the sense in which Tewfik Rouchdy Bey now
wishes to read it, this rejection is difficult to understand. And moreover,
at the time when Lord Curzon made his first proposal to the effect that,
failing agreement, the disputed question should be settled by the League of
Nations, Article 3 did not yet exist, even in draft form. Turkey at that
time had not accepted any obligation in regard to reference of the question
to the League of Nations, nor had she accepted any invitation under the
terms of Article 17 of the Covenant. By the adoption of Article 3 during the
second phase of the Lausanne Conference and five months after Lord Curzon's
speech, the legal position was fundamentally modified, and it is not
therefore possible to interpret this article by reference to statements
relating to the situation previously existing: more especially since,
neither in the drafts for Article 3, submitted on either side, nor in
correspondence or records of proceedings belonging to that period which have
been brought to the knowledge of the Court, was mention made -
notwithstanding its importance - of the question of the consent of the
Parties to the solution to be recommended by the Council. But assuming that
a study of the preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) led to the
conclusion that Article 3 should be interpreted as though it had been
adopted subject to the condition that the Council could not arrive at any
solution without the consent of the Parties, the action of the Council
would, in effect, be reduced to simple mediation. Now this conclusion, which
would eliminate the possibility of a definite decision capable, if
necessary, of replacing agreement between the Parties, would be incompatible
with the terms of Article 3, the interpretation of which - as indicated,
both from a grammatical and logical point of view as well as from that of
the role assigned to that article in the Peace Treaty - has been set out
above.
[62] Nor is it possible to argue against the interpretation adopted by the
Court on the ground that the first draft for Article 3, paragraph 2,
prepared by the Allies, expressly stated that the frontier line should be
"fixed in accordance with the decision to be given thereon by the Council of
the League of Nations", whereas the Turkish counter-proposal employed in its
second paragraph a [p24] less precise wording: "the dispute shall be
referred to the Council of the League of Nations", a wording that
corresponds to the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the article as
finally adopted, the terms of which had necessarily to be altered in
consequence of the insertion of the clause providing for an amicable
settlement. It should be pointed out that the Turkish counter-proposal in no
way excluded a definitive decision by the Council, and that in his letter of
March 8th, 1923, Ismet Pasha described the Turkish counter-proposals
regarding territorial questions as in conformity with the proposal of the
Allied Powers. It should also be observed that sub-paragraph 3 of the final
draft of Article 3, paragraph 2, in which reference is made to a "decision
to be reached", a "decision" on which will "depend" the "final fate" of
certain territories, appears in neither of the two drafts referred to. This
clause, the scope of which has already been considered when analyzing
Article 3, hardly admits of an interpretation which would deprive the
"decision to be reached" by the Council of its definitive character. For the
same reasons, it renders it impossible to deduce from the divergence between
the two drafts any arguments against the binding force of this decision:
[63] The facts subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne can
only concern the Court in so far as they are calculated to throw light on
the intention of the Parties at the time of the conclusion of that Treaty.
The question put to the Council seems to refer solely to the interpretation
of Article 3 of the Treaty; obligations which may have been assumed after
the conclusion of the Treaty, or facts which may have had some influence in
regard to the existence or nature of engagements entered into under the
Treaty, would therefore seem to be outside the scope of the question
submitted by the Council. Moreover, the Council, by keeping the questions
put to the Court exclusively within the domain of Article 3, appears itself
to adopt the standpoint that Article 3 is still at the present time
applicable in its entirety.
[64] In the Court's opinion, this view is well-founded; it considers that
the attitude adopted by the British and Turkish Governments after the
signature of the Treaty of Lausanne is only valuable in the present respect
as an indication of their views regarding the clauses in question. In this
connection the exchange of views which took place between the Parties at the
meetings held by the Council between September 20th and 30th, 1924
(inclusive), is of [p25] especial importance. But the statements made by the
Rapporteur, M. Branting, which were confirmed by the unanimous vote of all
members of the Council, including the British and Turkish representatives,
show that there was no disagreement between the Parties as regards their
obligation to accept as definitive and binding the decision or
recommendation to be made by the Council, with a view to fixing the
frontiers.
[65] For, it cannot be assumed that the representatives of the Parties would
have declared that they accepted the solutions to be given by the Council as
definitive, if, in their view, this constituted a new undertaking going
beyond the scope of the obligations entered into under Article 3 of the
Treaty. The fact that they have accepted beforehand the Council's decision
upon the question now before it may therefore be regarded as confirming the
interpretation which, in the Court's opinion, flows from the actual wording
of the article.
[66] In its telegram to the Court of October 8th, the Turkish Government
adduced as an argument in favour of the correctness of its contentions, the
fact that the Council itself had felt constrained to ask the Court for an
advisory opinion as to the nature of the powers derived by it from Article 3
of the Treaty of Lausanne. This argument appears to rest on the following
principle : if the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing
between several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the
minimum of obligations for the Parties should be adopted. This principle may
be admitted to be sound. In the present case, however, the argument is
valueless, because, in the Court's opinion, the wording of Article 3 is
clear. Moreover, the attitude of the Council in the matter is sufficiently
explained by a natural desire not to set aside the views of one of the
Parties as to the role of the Council, without previously obtaining the
Court's opinion upon this legal question.
[67] The same telegram states that "the British representative having for
his part declared before the Council that the previous undertakings given by
his Government in regard to this point no longer hold good, the intention
thus officially manifested resolves the question, in regard to which
moreover no doubt could subsist". The Court, however, cannot admit that the
declaration made by Mr. Amery at the Council meeting of September 19th, 1925
- which is no doubt the declaration referred to in the passage quoted –
[p26] bore the meaning which the Turkish Government endeavours to read into
it. For this declaration does not affect the rights and obligations
following from Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne ; it only refers to the
undertakings which Lord Parmoor and Mr. Amery himself had given during the
previous deliberations of the Council, and only contemplates the event that
Turkey - after the Court's opinion had been given ¬would persist in her
refusal to recognize any obligation to accept in advance the Council's
decision : it was only in this contingency that Mr. Amery reserved for Great
Britain the same liberty of action as was claimed by the Turkish Government.
***
[68] The Court, by an examination of the scope of Article 3, paragraph 2, of
the Treaty of Lausanne, has thus arrived at the conclusion that that clause
is designed to provide for a definitive settlement of the frontier. It will
now proceed more closely to consider, with reference to the explanatory
phrase appended to the first of the questions put, what the nature of this
decision may be.
[69] If the word "arbitration" is taken in a wide sense, characterized
simply by the binding force of the pronouncement made by a third Party to
whom the interested Parties have had recourse, it may well be said that the
decision in question is an "arbitral award".
[70] This term, on the other hand, would hardly be the right one, if the
intention were to convey a common and more limited conception of
arbitration, namely, that which has for its object the settlement of
differences between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of
respect for law (Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of
international disputes, dated October 18th, 1907, Article 37). It appears,
in fact, that according to the arguments put forward on both sides before
the Council, the settlement of the dispute in question depends, at all
events for the most part, on considerations not of a legal character;
moreover, it is impossible, properly speaking, to regard the Council, acting
in its capacity of an organ of the League of Nations, as will be hereinafter
described, as a tribunal of arbitrators.
[71] For this reason, the Court feels that it should not attach any
importance either to certain consequences which legal doctrine endeavours to
deduce from the idea of arbitration, or to certain [p27] rules of procedure
adopted by courts or arbitration themselves,, though both have been cited by
the British Government. It will rather seek the answer to the question
before it in considerations which seem peculiarly appropriate to the present
case.
[72] The Covenant of the League of Nations, while it in no way restricts the
liberty of the Parties to entrust any dispute whatever that may arise
between them to arbitration, refers in Article 13 to the more limited
conception of arbitration; and the Council, whose first duty is to dissipate
or settle political disputes, is never considered in the Covenant as
exercising the functions of arbitrator within the meaning of that article.
[73] Nevertheless, the Court holds that this fact does not prevent the
Council from being called upon, by the mutual consent of the Parties, to
give a definitive and binding decision in a particular dispute.
[74] Though it is true that the powers of the Council, in regard to the
settlement of disputes, are dealt with in Article 15 of the Covenant, and
that, under that article, the Council can only make recommendations, which,
even when made unanimously, do not of necessity settle the dispute, that
article only sets out the minimum obligations which are imposed upon States
and the minimum corresponding powers of the Council. There is nothing to
prevent the Parties from accepting obligations and from conferring on the
Council powers wider than those resulting from the strict terms of Article
15, and in particular from substituting, by an agreement entered into in
advance, for the Council's power to make a mere recommendation, the power to
give a decision which, by virtue of their previous consent, compulsorily
settles the dispute.
[75] Nor are precedents lacking of cases in which the Parties have
undertaken beforehand to accept a recommendation by the Council, and this,
in effect, is tantamount to entrusting it with the power of decision.
[76] Thus, in the Upper Silesian question, which, moreover, was alluded to
by the British representative at the Council meeting of September 19th,
1925, the Powers represented on the Supreme Council invited "the
recommendation" of the Council of the League of Nations "as to the line" to
be laid down (decision of August 12th, 1921, Official Journal of the League
of Nations, 2nd year, No. 9, page 982) and "solemnly" undertook "to accept
the solution [p28] recommended by the Council of the League of Nations"
(Note from M. Briand dated August 24th, 1921, op. cit., Nos. 10-12, p.
1221); the latter in its turn adopted (on October 12th, ibid.) "a
recommendation" which it transmitted to the President of the Supreme
Council.
[77] Similarly, in the Protocol of Venice of October 13th, 1921, concerning
the delimitation of the frontier between Hungary and Austria, the latter
Power undertook to accept "the decision recommended by the Council of the
League of Nations" (Treaty Series of the League of Nations, Vol. IX, p.
204).
[78] Since the object of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne
is, as has been shown above, to bring about a definitive and binding
settlement of the frontier, it follows that the decision which the Council
has to take under that article cannot be regarded as a mere recommendation
within the meaning of Article 15 of the Covenant. Such recommendation, in
fact, would not settle the dispute ; moreover, it might result in placing in
a position of inferior¬ity a State which was not in possession of the
territory which would be allotted to it by the frontier recommended; for, in
the event of the Council's recommendation being in its favour, this State
would not have an actual right to insist upon the cession of the territory
in question.
[79] But the fact that the "decision to be reached" by the Council under
Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne cannot be described as a recommendation
within the meaning of Article 15 of the Covenant, does not imply that the
applicability of the latter article in the present case is excluded. For the
various and more extensive powers conferred by the Parties in this case on
the Council merely complete the functions which it normally possesses under
Article 15. In agreeing to refer the dispute to the Council of the League of
Nations, the Parties certainly did not lose sight of the fact that the
powers of mediation and conciliation of the Council form an essential part
of the functions of that body. If such procedure fails, the Council will
make use of its power of decision. And, in actual fact, it would appear that
the Council's efforts to settle the dispute in question have hitherto been
made on these lines.
III.
[80] The second question put to the Court is whether the decision of the
Council of the League of Nations, to which the matter was [p29] referred,
under Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, must be unanimous
or may be taken by a majority, and whether the representatives of the
interested Parties may take part in the vote.
***
[81] In order to reply to this question it should be observed in the first
place that Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne refers to the
Council of the League of Nations, that is to say, to the Council with the
organization and functions conferred upon it by the Covenant. The dispute
has not been referred to one or more persons as such, but to the Council.
[82] Now the Council, in accordance with Article 4 of the Covenant and the
Resolution adopted by the Council on September 21st, 1922, which was
approved by the Assembly on the 25th of the same month, consists of
representatives appointed by four Great Powers, who are entitled to
permanent seats upon it, and by six other Members selected by the Assembly.
It may also include representatives of States invited to sit at the Council
table by reason of the interest which they may have in some question upon
its agenda; it is under this provision that in the present case the Council
itself has invited a representative of Turkey to sit with it.
[83] It is, therefore, composed of representatives of Members, that is to
say, of persons delegated by their respective Governments, from whom they
receive instructions and whose responsibility they engage.
[84] In a body constituted in this way, whose mission is to deal with any
matter "within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of
the world", observance of the rule of unanimity is naturally and even
necessarily indicated. . Only if the decisions of the Council have the
support of the unanimous consent of the Powers composing it, will they
possess the degree of authority which they must have : the very prestige of
the League might be imperilled if it were admitted, in the absence of an
express provision to that effect, that decisions on important questions
could be taken by a majority. Moreover, it is hardly conceivable that
resolutions on questions affecting the peace of the world could be adopted
against the will of those amongst the Members of the Council who, although
in a minority, would, by reason of their political position, have to bear
the larger share of the responsibilities and consequences ensuing therefrom.
[p30]
[85] Again, the rule of unanimity, which is also in accordance with the
unvarying tradition of all diplomatic meetings or conferences, is explicitly
laid down by Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant in the following terms:
"Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms
of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the
Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League
represented at the meeting."
[86] No exceptions to this principle are made other than those provided for
in the Covenant itself and in the Peace Treaties of which it constitutes the
first part. The Treaty of Lausanne is not one of these Treaties. As regards
the exceptions contained in the Covenant, it is clear that the present case
does not fall within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 5
(questions of procedure). In the absence therefore of an express provision
to the contrary in Article 3, paragraph" 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, the
rule of unanimity applies in regard to the question before the Council.
[87] The representative of the British Government has contended that the
clause in Article 5 of the Covenant only contemplates the exercise of the
powers granted in the Covenant itself. The Court cannot accept this view.
Article 5 states a general principle which only admits of exceptions which
are expressly provided for, and this principle, as has already been stated,
may be regarded as the rule natural to a body such as the Council of the
League of Nations. The fact that the present case concerns the exercise of a
power outside the normal province of the Council, clearly cannot be used as
an argument for the diminution of the safeguards with which, in the
Covenant, it was felt necessary to surround the Council's decisions.
[88] On the other hand, no one denies that the Council can undertake to give
decisions by a majority in specific cases, if express provision is made for
this power by treaty stipulations. That this is the case is confirmed by,
amongst other things, Articles 44 and 107 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which
have been cited on one side and the other in support of their respective
contentions. The Court therefore regards these articles as tending rather to
confirm the view which it has taken.
[89] In support of the contention that the decision may be taken by a [p31]
majority, the principle generally accepted in the case of arbitral
tribunals, in accordance with which such tribunals, as a rule, decide by a
majority, has also been invoked ; and it has been argued that the main
reason for the application of this principle is that it would often prove
impossible to obtain any decision if unanimity were required. The Court has
already explained why it cannot admit arguments and principles drawn from
the theory and practice of arbitration in the limited sense of the term. In
particular, it should be observed that though certain arguments used by the
representative of the British Government might be regarded as well-founded
in the case of arbitrators appointed ad hoc and not forming a permanent
body, they do not, on the other hand, apply in a case where the Parties have
had recourse to a body already constituted and having its own rules of
organization and procedure. Unless a contrary intention has been expressed,
the interested Parties are in such cases held to have accepted such rules.
***
[90] Unanimity, therefore, is required for the decision to be taken by the
Council of the League of Nations, in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of
the Treaty of Lausanne, with a view to the determination of the frontier
between Turkey and Iraq. The question has now to be considered whether the
representatives of the interested Parties may take part in the vote.
[91] In this connection, it should be observed that the very general rule
laid down in Article 5 of the Covenant does not specially contemplate the
case of an actual dispute which has been laid before the Council. On the
other hand, this contingency is dealt with in Article 15, paragraphs бand 7,
which, whilst making the limited binding effect of recommendations dependent
on unanimity, explicitly state that the Council's unanimous report need only
be agreed to by the Members thereof other than the representatives of the
Parties. The same principle is applied in the cases contemplated in
paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Covenant and in the first of the three
paragraphs which, in accordance with a Resolution of the Second Assembly,
are to be inserted between the first and second paragraphs of that article.
[92] It follows from the foregoing that, according to the Covenant itself,
in certain cases and more particularly in the case of the settlement of a
dispute, the rule of unanimity is applicable, subject [p32] to the
limitation that the votes cast by representatives of the interested Parties
do not affect the required unanimity.
[93] The Court is of opinion that it is this conception of the rule of
unanimity which must be applied in the dispute before the Council.
[94] It is hardly open to doubt that in no circumstances is it possible to
be satisfied with less than this conception of unanimity, for, if such
unanimity is necessary in order to endow a recommendation with the limited
effects contemplated in paragraph 6 of Article 15 of the Covenant, it must a
fortiori be so when a binding decision has to be taken.
[95] The question which arises, therefore, is solely whether such unanimity
is sufficient or whether the representatives of the Parties must also accept
the decision. The principle laid down by the Covenant in paragraphs 6 and 7
of Article 15, seems to meet the requirements of a case such as that now
before the Council, just as well as the circumstances contemplated in that
article. The well-known rule that no one can be judge in his own suit holds
good.
[96] From a practical standpoint, to require that the representatives of the
Parties should accept the Council's decision would be tantamount to giving
them a right of veto enabling them to prevent any decision being reached ;
this would hardly be in conformity with the intention manifested in Article
3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne.
[97] Lastly, it may perhaps be well to observe that since the Council
consists of representatives of States or Members, the legal position of the
representatives of the Parties upon the Council is not comparable to that of
national arbitrators upon courts of arbitration.
[98] The votes of the representatives of the Parties are not, therefore, to
be taken into account in ascertaining whether there is unanimity. But the
representatives will take part in the vote, for they form part of the
Council and, like the other representatives, they are entitled and are in
duty bound to take part in the deliberations of that body. The terms of
paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant and of the new clause to be
inserted in Article 16, clearly show that in the cases therein contemplated,
the representatives of the Parties may take part in the voting, and that it
is only for the purpose of determining whether unanimous agreement has been
reached that their votes are not counted. There is nothing to justify a
further derogation from the essential principles of unanimity and of the
equal rights of Members. [p33]
[99] FOR THESE REASONS,
The Court is of opinion,
(1) that the "decision to be taken" by the Council of the League of Nations
in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, will be
binding on the Parties and will constitute a definitive determination of the
frontier between Turkey and Iraq;
(2) that the "decision to be taken" must be taken by a unanimous vote, the
representatives of the Parties taking part in the voting, but their votes
not being counted in ascertaining whether there is unanimity.
[100] DONE in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-first day of November, one thousand
nine hundred and twenty-five, in two copies, one of which is to be placed in
the archives of the Court and the other to be forwarded to the Council of
the League of Nations.
(Signed) Max Huber,
President.
(Signed) Å. Hammarskjöld,
Registrar. [p34]
Annex.
Documents transmitted by the Secretary -General of the League of Nations in
accordance with the Council's Resolution of September 19th, 1925:
1 Memorandum on the action of the Council of the League of Nations in the
matter concerning the frontier of Irak: art. 3 (2) of the Treaty signed at
Lausanne on July 24th, 1923.
2 League of Nations Official Journal, IVth Year, No. 3, March 1923, English
and French editions. Minutes of the 23rd Session of the Council.
3 League of Nations Official Journal Vth Year, No. 10, October 1924, English
and French editions. Minutes of the 30th Session of the Council.
4 League of Nations, Official Journal, Vth Year, No. 11, 1st Part, November
1924, English and French editions. Minutes of the 31st Session of the
Council.
5 Extracts Nos. 30, 30 (a), 30 (b), 30 (c), 30(d) from the Official Journal
of the League of Nations (October 1925), English and French editions.
Minutes of the 35th Session of the Council.
6 Document С 384. 1924, VII, English and French editions. Letter, dated
August 6th, 1924, from the British Government to the Secretary-General of
the League of Nations.
7 League of Nations Document C. 400. M. 147, 1925, VII. Question of the
frontier between Turkey and Iraq. Report submitted to the Council by the
Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924.
8 Document C. 482. 1925, VII, English and French editions. Report, dated
September 1st, 1925, submitted by M. Undén to the Council of the League of
Nations.
9 Certified true copies of letters, dated August 9th and September 1st, 1924
(from the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the Turkish Minister
for Foreign Affairs), letter dated September 5th, 1924 (from the Turkish
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council of the League
of Nations), and minutes annexed to the said letter, dated August 9th, 1924.
Documents submitted by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations at the
request of the Court:
10 List of cases between States which have been dealt with by the Council.
11 Memorandum of certain treaty and other provisions concerning the
competence and procedure of the Council of the League of Nations.
Documents other than Memoranda and Legal Opinions presented by the
interested Governments:
12 ed Book, published by the Turkish Government on the Mosul question from
the signing of the Armistice of Moudros (October 30th, 1918) to March 1st,
1925. Transmitted by the Turkish Government.
13 Telegram, dated October 8th, 1925, from the Turkish Government defining
the position of that Government with regard to the questions put to the
Court.
14 Letter, dated November 4th, 1925, from the Turkish Chargé d'affaires at
The Hague to the Registrar of the Court.
15 Turco-Iraq frontier negotiations. Procés-verbaux of meetings held at
Constantinople between May 19th and June 5th, 1924. (Separate issue
transmitted by the British Government.)[p35]
16 Blue Book, published by the British Government, Treaty Series, No. 16,
1923, Cmd. 1929. Treaty of Peace -with Turkey and other instruments signed
at Lausanne on July 24th, 1923 .... and subsidiary documents forming part of
Turkish Peace Settlements. Transmitted by the British Government.
17 Blue Book published by the British Government, Turkey No. 1, 1923, Cmd.
1814 (Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923. Records of
proceedings and draft terms of Peace). Transmitted by the British
Government.
18 Recueil des Actes de la Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du Proche-Orient
(1922¬1923), published by the Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1923. Transmitted
by both the interested Governments.
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