50,000+ decisions · 50+ institutions
|
|
International Case Law Database 50,000+ decisions · 50+ institutions |
|||
| Follow @worldcourts |
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
|
Judgment |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
4 November 1948 |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
|
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC
OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES. |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
Judgment |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
|
[p48413] Thursday, 4 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) [p48414] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All of the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. CLERK OF THE COURT: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES. AGAINST ARAKI, Sadao, DOHIHARA, Kenji, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, HATA, Shunroku, HIMANUMA, Kiichiro, HIROTA, Koki, HOSHINO, Kaoki, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, KAYA, Okinori, KIDO, Koichi, KIKURA, Heitaro, KOISO, Kuniaki, MATSUI, Iwane, MATSUOKA, Yosuke, MINAMI, Jiro, MUTO, Akira, MAGANO, Osami, OKA, Takasumi, OKAWA, Shumei, OSHIMA, Hiroshi, SATO, Kenryo, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, SHIRATORI, Toshio, SUZUKI, Teiichi- TOGO. Shigenori, TOJO, Hideki, OMEZU, Yoshijiro JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL [p48415] FOR THE FAR EAST. THE PRESIDENT: I will now read the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The title and formal parts will not be read. PART A - CHAPTER I Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal The Tribunal was established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st of December, 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July, 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of September 1945, and the Moscow Conference of the 26th of December, 1945. The Cairo Declaration was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It reads as follows: "The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising. "The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan [p48416] shall be stripped or all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. "With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan." The Declaration of Potsdam (Annex No. A-1) was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and later adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its principal relevant provisions are: "Japan shall be given on opportunity to end this war. "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and [p48417] misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. "We do not intend that the Japanese people shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners." The Instrument of Surrender (Annex No. A-2) was signed on behalf of the Emperor and Government of Japan and on behalf of the nine Allied Powers. It contains inter alia the following proclamation, undertaking, and order: "We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated. "We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors, to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action [p48418] may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to the Declaration. "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender. We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority." By the Moscow Conference (Annex No. A-3) it was agreed by and between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the concurrence of China that: "The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto." Acting on this authority on the 19th day of January, 1946, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by Special Proclamation established the Tribunal for "the trial of those persons charged [p48419] individually or as member of organizations or in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace." (Annex No. A-4) The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were by the Proclamation declared to be those set forth in the Charter of the Tribunal approved by the Supreme Commander on the same day. Before the opening of the Trial the Charter was amended in several respects. (A copy of the Charter as amended will be found in Annex No. A-5). On the 15th day of February, 1946, the Supreme Commander issued an Order appointing the nine members of the Tribunal nominated respectively by each of the Allied Powers. This Order also provides that "the responsibilities, powers, and duties of the Members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof. . ." By one of the amendments to the Charter the maximum number of members was increased from nine to eleven to permit the appointment of members nominated by India and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. By subsequent Orders the present members from the United States and France were appointed to succeed the original appointees who resigned and the members from India and the Philippines were appointed. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 (c) of the Charter each of the accused before the opening of [p48420] the Trial appointed counsel of his own choice to represent him; each accused being represented by American and Japanese counsel. On the 29th of April, 1946, an indictment, which had previously been served on the accused in conformity with the rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal, was lodged with the Tribunal. The Indictment (Annex No. A-6) is long, containing fifty-five counts charging twenty- eight accused with Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity during the period from the 1st of January, 1928, to the 2nd of September, 1945. [p48421] It may be summarized as follows: In Count 1 all accused are charged with conspiring as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices between 1st January 1928 and 2nd September 1945 to have Japan, either alone or with other countries, wage wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose her purpose of securing the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighboring islands. Count 2 charges all accused with conspiring throughout the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang (Kanchuria), and Jehol." Count 3 charges all accused with conspiracy over the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of China. Count 4 charges all accused with conspiring to have Japan, alone or with other countries, wage aggressive war against the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, the Netherlands, China, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to secure the complete domination of East Asia and the Pacific Indian Oceans and their [p48422] adjoining countries and neighboring islands. Count 5 charges all accused with conspiring with Germany and Italy to have Japan, Germany and Italy mutually assist each other in aggressive warfare against any country which might oppose them for the purpose of having these three nations acquire complete domination of the entire world, each having special domination in its own sphere, Japan's sphere to cover East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Counts 6 to 17 charge all accused except SHIRATORI with having planned and prepared aggressive war against named countries. Counts 18 to 26 charge all accused with initiating aggressive war against named countries. Counts 27 to 36 charge all accused with waging aggressive war against named countries. Count 37 charges certain accused with conspiring to murder members of the armed forces and civilians of the United States, the Philippines, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands and Thailand by initiating unlawful hostilities against those countries in breach of the Hague Convention No. III of 18th October 1907. Count 38 charges the same accused with conspiring to murder the soldiers and civilians by initiating hostilities in violation of the agreement between the United [p48423] States and Japan of 30th November 1908, the Treaty between Britain, France, Japan and the United States of 13th December 1921, the Pact of Paris of 27th August 1928, and the Treaty of Unity between Thailand and Japan of 12th June 1940. Counts 39 to 43 charge the same accused with the commission on 7th and 8th December 1941 of murder at Pearl Harbour (Count 39) Kohta Behru (Count 40) Hong Kong (Count 41) on board H. M. S. Petrel at Shanghai (Count 42) and at Davao (Count 43). Count 44 charges all accused with conspiring to murder on a wholesale scale prisoners of war and civilians in Japan's power. Counts 45 to 50 charge certain accused with the murder of disarmed soldiers and civilians at Nanking (Count 45) Canton (Count 46) Hankow (Count 47) Changsha (Count 48) Hengyang (Count 49) and Kweilin and Liuchow. (Count 50). Count 51 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of Mongolia and the Soviet Union in the Khalkin-Gol River area in 1939. Count 52 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in July and August 1938. Counts 53 and 54 charge all the accused except [p48424] OKAWA and SHIRATORI with having conspired to order, authorize or permit the various Japanese Theatre Commanders, the officials of the War Ministry and local camp and labour unit officials frequently and habitually to commit breaches of the laws and customs of war against the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian internees of complaining powers and to have the Government of Japan abstain from taking adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war. Count 55 charges the same accused with having recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war. There are five appendices to the Indictment: Appendix A summarizes the principal matters and events upon which the counts are based. Appendix B is a list of Treaty Articles. Appendix C specifies the assurances Japan is alleged to have broken. Appendix D contains the laws and customs of war alleged to have been infringed. Appendix E is a partial statement of the facts with respect to the alleged individual responsibility of the accused. These appendices are included in Annex A-6. [p48425] During the course of the Trial two of the accused, MATSUOKA and NAGANO, died and the accused OKAWA was declared unfit to stand his trial and unable to defend himself. MATSUOKA and NAGANO were therefore discharged from the Indictment. Further proceedings upon the Indictment against OKAWA at this Trial were suspended. On the 3rd and 4th of May the Indictment was read in open court in the presence of all the accused, the Tribunal when adjourning till the 6th to receive the pleas of the accused. On the latter date pleas of "not guilty" were entered by all the accused now before the Tribunal. The Tribunal then fixed the 3rd of June following as the date for the commencement of the presentation of evidence by the Prosecution. In the interval the Defence presented motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and decide the charges contained in the Indictment. On the 17th of May, 1946, after argument, judgment was delivered dismissing all the said motions "for reasons to be given later." These reasons will be given in dealing with the law of the case in Chapter II of this part of the judgment. The Prosecution opened its case on the 3rd of June, 1945, and closed its case on the 24th of January 1947. The presentation of evidence for the Defence opened on the 24th of February, 1947, and closed on the [p48426] 12th of January 1948, an adjournment having been granted from the 19th of June to the 4th of August 1947, to permit defense counsel to co-orginate their work in the presentation of evidence common to all the accused. Prosecution evidence in rebuttal and defense evidence in reply were permitted; the reception of evidence terminating on the 10th of February 1948. In all 4335 exhibits were admitted in evidence, 419 witnesses testified in court, 779 witnesses gave evidence in depositions and affidavits, and the transcript of the proceedings covers 48,412 pages. Closing arguments and summations of prosecution and defense counsel opened on the 11th of February and closed on the 16th of April 1948. Having regard to Article 12 of the Charter, which requires "an expeditious hearing of the issues" and the taking of "strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay", the length of the present trial requires some explanation and comment. In order to avoid unnecessary delay which would have been incurred by adopting the ordinary method of translation by interrupting from time to time evidence, addresses and other matters which could be prepared in advance of delivery, an elaborate public address system was installed. Through this system whenever possible a simultaneous [p48427] translation into English or Japanese was given and in addition when circumstances required from or into Chinese, Russian, and French. Without such aids the trial might well have occupied a very much longer period. Cross-examination and extempore argument on objections and other incidental proceedings had, however, to be translated in the ordinary way as they proceeded. Article 13(a) of the Charter provides that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall . . . admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. . ." The application of this rule to the mass of documents and oral evidence offered inevitably resulted in a great expenditure of time. Moreover, the charges in the Indictment directly involved an inquiry into the history of Japan during seventeen years, the years between 1928 and 1945. In addition our inquiry has extended to a less detailed study of the earlier history of Japan, for without that the subsequent actions of Japan and her leaders could not be understood and assessed. The period covered by the charges was one of intense activity in Japanese internal and external affairs. Internally, the Constitution promulgated during the Meiji Restoration was the subject of a major struggle [p48428] between the military and the civilian persons who operated it. The military elements ultimately gained a predominance which enabled them to dictate, not only in matters of peace or war, but also in the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs. In the struggle between the civilian and the military elements in the Government, the Diet, the elected representatives of the people, early ceased to be of account. The battle between the civilians and the military was fought on the civilian side by the professional civil servants, who almost exclusively filled the civilian ministerial posts in the Cabinet and the advisory posts around the Emperor. The struggle between the military and the civil servants was protracted one. Many incidents marked the ebb and flow of the battle, and there was seldom agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence as to any incident. Both the facts and the meaning of each incident were the subject of controversy and the topic towards which a wealth of evidence was directed. Internally, also, the period covered by the Indictment saw the completion of the conversion of Japan into a modern industrialized state, and the growth of the demand for the territory of other nations as an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, a source [p48429] from which she might draw raw materials for her manufacturing plants, and a market for her manufactured goods. Externally the period saw the efforts of Japan to satisfy that demand. In this sphere also the occurrence and meaning of events was contested by the Defence, often to the extent of contesting the seemingly incontestable. The parts played by twenty-five accused in these events had to be investigated, and again every foot of the way was fought. The extensive field of time and place involved in the issues placed before the Tribunal and the controversy waged over every event, important or unimportant, have prevented the trial from being "expeditious," as required by the Charter. In addition, the need to have every word spoken in Court translated from English into Japanese, or vice versa, has at least doubled the length of the proceedings. Translations cannot be made from the one language into the other with the speed and certainty which can be attained in translating one Western speech into another. Literal translation from Japanese into English or the reverse is often impossible. To a large extent nothing but a paraphrase can be achieved, and experts in both languages will often differ as to the correct paraphrase. [p48430] In the result the interpreters in Court often had difficulty as to the rendering they should announce, and the Tribunal was compelled to set up a Language Arbitration Board to settle matters of disputed interpretation. To these delays was added a tendency for counsel and witnesses to be prolix and irrelevant. This last tendency at first was controlled only with difficulty as on many occasions the over-elaborate or irrelevant question or answer was in Japanese and the mischief done, the needless time taken, before the Tribunal was given the translation in English and objection could be taken to it. At length it became necessary to impose special rules to prevent this waste of time. The principal rules to this end were the prior filing of a written deposition of the intended witness and a limitation of cross-examination to matters within the scope of the evidence in chief. Neither these nor any other of the rules imposed by the Tribunal were applied with rigidity. Indulgences were granted from time to time, having regard to the paramount need for the Tribunal to do justice to the accused and to possess itself of all facts relevant and material to the issues. [p48431] Much of the evidence tendered, especially by the Defence, was rejected, principally because it had too little or no probative value or because it was not helpful as being not at all or only very remotely relevant or because it was needlessly cumulative of similar evidence already received. Much time was taken up in argument upon the admissibility of evidence but even so the proceedings would have been enormously prolonged had the Tribunal received all evidence prepared for tendering. Still longer would have been the trial without these controls, as without them much more irrelevant or immaterial evidence than was in fact tendered would have been prepared for presentation. Much of the evidence was given viva voce or at least by the witness being sworn and acknowledging his deposition which, to the extent that it was ruled upon as admissible, was then read by Counsel. The witnesses were cross-examined, often by a number of Counsel representing different interests, and then re-examined. When it was not desired to cross-examine the witness, in most cases his sworn deposition was tendered and read without the attendance of the witness. A large part of the evidence which was presented has been a source of disappointment to the Tribunal. An [p48432] explanation of events is unconvincing unless the witness will squarely meet his difficulties and persuade the Court that the inference, which would normally arise from the undoubted occurrence of these events, should on this occasion be rejected. In the experience of this Tribunal most of the witnesses for the Defence have not attempted to face up to their difficulties. They have met them with prolix equivocations and evasions, which only arouse distrust. Most of the final submissions of Counsel for the Defense have been based on the hypothesis that the Tribunal would accept the evidence tendered in defence as reliable. It could not have been otherwise, for counsel could not anticipate which witnesses the Tribunal was prepared to accept as witnesses of credit, and which witnesses it would reject. In large part these submissions have failed because the argument was based on evidence of witnesses whom the Tribunal was not prepared to accept as reliable because of their lack of candour. Apart from this testimony of witnesses a great many documents were tendered and received in evidence. These were diverse in nature and from many sources including the German Foreign Office. The Tribunal was handicapped by the absence of many originals of important Japanese official records of the Army and Navy, [p48433} Foreign Office, Cabinet the other policy-making-organs of the Japanese Government. In some cases what purported to be copies were tendered and received for what value they might be found to have. The absence of official records was attributed to burning during bombing raids on Japan and to deliberate destruction by the Fighting Services of their records after the surrender. It seems strange that documents of such importance as those of the Foreign Office, the Cabinet secretariat and other important departments should not have been removed to places of safety when bombings commenced or were imminent. If it should prove that they were, not thus destroyed but were withheld from this Tribunal then a marked disservice will have been done to the cause of international justice. We have perforce to rely upon that which was made available to us, relating it by way of check to such other evidence as was received by us. Although handicapped in our search for facts by the absence of these documents we have been able to obtain a good deal of relevant information from other sources. Included in this other evidence of a non-official or at least of only a semi-official nature were the diary of the accused KIDO and the Saionji-Harada Memoirs. KIDO's voluminous diary dirty is a contemporary [p48434] record covering the period from 1930 to 1945 of the transactions of KIDO with important personages in his position as secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, State Minister and later as confidential adviser of the Emperor while holding the Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Having regard to these circumstances we regard it as a document of importance. Another document or series of documents of importance are the Saionji-Harada Memoirs. These have been the subject of severe criticism by the Defence, not unnaturally, as they contain passages the Defence consider embarrassing. We are of opinion the criticisms are not well founded and have attached more importance to these records than the Defence desired us to do. The special position of Prince Saionji as the last of the Genro provoked full and candid disclosure to him through his secretary Haradra. Harada's long period of service to the Genro in this special task of obtaining information from the very highest functionaries of the Government and the Army and Navy is a test of his reliability and discretion. Had he been unreliable and irresponsible, as the Defence suggest, this would soon have been discovered by Prince Saionji, having regard to his own frequent associations with the important personages from whom Harada received his information, [p48435] and Harada would not have continued in that office. As to the authenticity of the Saionji-Harada documents presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is satisfied that these are the original memoranda as dictated by Harada and edited by Saionji. To the extent to which they are relevant the Tribunal considers them helpful and reliable contemporary evidence of the matters recorded. PART A - CHAPTER II THE LAW (a) JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL In our opinion the law of the Charter is decisive and binding on the Tribunal. This is a special tribunal set up by the Supreme Commander under authority conferred on him by the Allied Powers. It derives its jurisdiction from the Charter. In this trial its members have no jurisdiction except such as is to be found in the Charter. The Order of the Supreme Commander, which appointed the members of the Tribunal, states: "The responsibilities, powers, and duties of the members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof..." In the result, the members of the Tribunal, being otherwise wholly without power in respect to the trial of the accused, have been empowered by the documents, which constituted the Tribunal and appointed them as [p48436] members, to try the accused but subject always to the duty and responsibility of applying to the trial the law set forth in the Charter. The foregoing expression of opinion is not to be taken as supporting the view, if such view be held, that the Allied Powers or any victor nations have the right under international law in providing for the trial and punishment of war criminals to enact or promulgate laws or vest in their tribunals powers in conflict with recognised international law or rules or principles thereof. In the exercise of their right to create tribunals for such a purpose and in conferring powers upon such tribunals belligerent powers any act only within the limits of international law. The substantial grounds of the defence challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and adjudicate upon the charges contained in the Indictment are the following: (1) The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to include in the Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable "Crimes against Peace" (Article 5(a); (2) Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy does not enlarge the [p48436a] morning of war crimes nor constitute war crime; (3) War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under international law; (4) The provisions of the Charter are "ex post facto" legislation and therefore illegal; (5) The Instrument of Surrender which provides that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes as recognized by international law at the date of the Declaration (26 July, 1945) would be the only crimes prosecuted; (6) Killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constitute violations of the rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not murder; (7) Several of the accused being prisoners of war are triable by martial as provided by the Geneva Convention 1929 and not by this Tribunal. [p48437] Since the law of the Charter is decisive and binding upon it this Tribunal is formally bound to reject the first four of the above seven contentions advanced for the Defence but in view of the great importance of the questions of law involved the Tribunal will record its opinion on these questions. After this Tribunal had in May 1946 dismissed the defence motions and upheld the validity of its Charter and its Jurisdiction thereunder, stating that the reasons for this decision would be given later, the International military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg delivered its verdicts on the first of October 1946. That Tribunal expressed inter alia the following opinions: "The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of Power on the part of the victorious nations but is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation. "The question is what was the legal effect of this pact (Pact of Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed the pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it. After the signing of the pact any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the [p48438] opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. "The principle of international law which under certain circumstances protects the representative of a state cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings. "The maxim 'nullum crimen sine lege' is not a limitation of sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. "The Charter specifically provides . . . ‘the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from [p48439] responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.’ This provision is in conformity with the laws of all nations. . . The true test which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was in fact possible." With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached this Tribunal is in complete accord. They embody complete answers to the first four of the grounds urged by the defence as set forth above. In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters of this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters anew in somewhat different language to open the door to controversy by way of conflicting interpretations of the two statements of opinions. The fifth ground of the Defence challenge to the Tribunal's jurisdiction is that under the Instrument of Surrender and the Declaration of Potsdam the only crimes for which it was contemplated that proceedings would be taken, being the only war crimes recognized by international law at the date of the [p48440] Declaration of Potsdam, are Conventional was Crimes as mentioned in Article 5(b) if the Charter. Aggressive war was a crime at international law long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam, and there is no ground for the limited interpretation of the Charter which the defence seek to give it. A special argument was advanced that in any event the Japanese Government, when they agreed to accept the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, did not in fact understand that those Japanese who were alleged to be responsible for the war would be prosecuted. There is no basis in fact for this argument. It has been established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that before the signature of the Instrument of Surrender the point in question had been considered by the Japanese Government and the then members of the Government, who advised the acceptance of the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, anticipated that those alleged to be responsible for the war would be put on trial. As early as the 10th of August 1945, three weeks before the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, the Emperor said to the accused KIDO, “I could not bear the sight . . . of those responsible for the war being [p48441] punished . . . but I think now is the time to bear the unbearable." The sixth contention for the Defence, namely, that relating to the charges which allege the commission of murder will be discussed at a later point. The seventh of these contentions is made on behalf of the four accused who surrendered as prisoners of war: ITAGAKI, KIMURA, MUTO and SATO. The submission made on their behalf is that they, being former members of the armed forces of Japan and prisoners of war, are triable as such by court martial under the articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to prisoners of war, particularly Articles 60 and 63, and not by a tribunal constituted otherwise than under that Convention. This very point was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the Yamashita case. The late Chief Justice Stone, delivering the judgment for the majority of the Court said: "We think it clear from the context of these recited provisions that Part 3 and Article 63, which it contains, apply only to Judicial proceedings directed against a prisoner of war for offences committed while a prisoner of war. Section V gives no indication that this part was designated to deal with offences other than those referred to in Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3." With that [p48442] conclusion and the reasoning by which it is reached the Tribunal respectfully agrees. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal wholly fails. (b) RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES AGAINST PRISONERS Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are in the power of the Government which captures them. This was not always the case. For the last two centuries, however, this position has been recognized and the customary law to this effect was formally embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners of war and of civilian internees (all of whom we will refer to as "prisoners") rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by conventions are to be prevented by the Government having responsibility for the prisoner. In the discharge of those duties to prisoners, governments must have resort to persons. Indeed, the [p48443] governments responsible, in this sense, are those persons who direct and control the functions of government. In this case and in the above regard we are concerned with the members of the Japanese Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the first case by those persons who constitute the government. In the multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern government there is of necessity an elaborate system of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case of the duty of governments to prisoners held by them in time of war those persons who constitute the government have the principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners, even though they delegate the duties of maintenance and protection to others. In general the responsibility for prisoners held by Japan may be stated to have rested upon: (1) Members of the government; (2) military or naval officers in command of formations having prisoners in their possession; (3) Officials in those departments which were concerned with the well-being of prisoners; (4) Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct and immediate control of [p48444] prisoners. It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill treatment of prisoners if; (1) They fail to establish such a system. (2) If having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and efficient working. Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he neglects to do so he is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application. An Army Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders in this respect as he would in respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance. Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war crimes be committed unless: (1) They had knowledge that such crimes [p48445] were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future or (2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge. If such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not excused for inaction if his office required or permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not enough for the exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he accepted assurances from others more directly associated with the control of the prisoners if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of reports of such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should have been put upon further enquiry as to whether those assurances were true or untrue. That crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters to be considered in imputing knowledge. A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal organs of the government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved from responsibility if, having knowledge of the commission [p48446] of the crimes in the sense already discussed, and omitting or falling to secure the taking of measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, he elects to continue as a member of the Cabinet. This is the position even though the department of which he has the charge is not directly concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill treatment of prisoners, is powerless to prevent future ill treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet thereby continuing to participate in its collective responsibility for protection of prisoners he willingly assumes responsibility for any ill treatment in the future. Army or Navy Commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent ill treatment of prisoners. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. If crimes are committed against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurrence of which they had, or should have had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be shown that within the units under his command conventional war crimes have been committed of which he knew or should have known, a commander who takes no adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of such crimes in the future will be responsible for such future crimes. [p48447] Departmental officials having knowledge of ill treatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason of their failure to resign; but if their functions included the administration of the system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should have had knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future then they are responsible for such future crimes. (c) THE INDICTMENT Under the heading of "Crimes Against Peace" the Charter names five separate crimes. These are planning, preparation, initiation and waging aggressive war or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances; to these four is added the further crime of participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. The indictment was based upon the Charter and all the above crimes were charged in addition to further charges founded upon other provisions of the Charter. A conspiracy to wage aggressive or unlawful war arises when two or more persons enter into an agreement to commit that crime. Thereafter, in furtherance of the conspiracy, follows planning and preparing for such war. Those who participate at this stage may be [p48448] either original conspirators or later adherents. If the latter adopt the purpose of the conspiracy and plan and prepare for its fulfillment they become conspirators. For this reason, as all the accused are charged with the conspiracies, we do not consider it necessary in respect of those we may find guilty of conspiracy to enter convictions also for planning and preparing. In other words, although we do not question the validity of the charges we do not think it necessary in respect of any defendants who may be found guilty of conspiracy to take into consideration nor to enter convictions upon counts 6 to 17 inclusive. A similar position arises in connection with the counts of initiating and waging aggressive war. Although initiating aggressive war in some circumstances may have another meaning, in the Indictment before us it is given the meaning of commencing the hostilities. In this sense it involves the actual waging of the aggressive war. After such a war has been initiated or has been commenced by some offenders others may participate in such circumstances as to become guilty of waging the war. This consideration, however, affords no reason for registering convictions on the counts of initiating as well as of waging aggressive war. We propose therefore to abstain from consideration of [p48449] counts 18 to 26 inclusive. Counts 37 and 38 charge conspiracy to murder. Article 5, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Charter, deal with Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. In sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 occurs this passage: "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan." A similar provision appeared in the Nuremberg Charter although there it was an independent paragraph and was not, as in our Charter incorporated in sub-paragraph (c). The context of this provision clearly relates it exclusively to sub-paragraph (a), Crimes against Peace, as that is the only category in which a "common plan or conspiracy" is stated to be a crime. It has no application to Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as conspiracies to commit such crimes are not made criminal by the Charter of the Tribunal. The Prosecution did not challenge this view but submitted that the counts were sustainable under Article 5(a) of the Charter. It was argued that the waging of aggressive war was unlawful and involved unlawful killing which is murder. From this it was submitted [p48450] further that a conspiracy to wage war unlawfully was a conspiracy also to commit murder. The crimes triable by this Tribunal are those set out in the Charter. Article 5(a) states that a conspiracy to commit the crimes therein specified is itself a crime. The crimes, other than conspiracy, specified in Article 5(a) are "planning, preparation, initiating or waging" of a war of aggression. There is no specification of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder by the waging of aggressive war or otherwise. We hold therefore that we have no jurisdiction to deal with charges of conspiracy to commit murder as contained in counts 37 and 38 and decline to entertain these charges. In all there are 55 counts in the Indictment charged against the 25 defendants. In many of the counts each of the accused is charged and in the remainder ten or more are charged. In respect to Crimes against Peace alone there are for consideration no less than 756 separate charges. This situation springs from the adoption by the Prosecution of the common practice of charging all matters upon which guilt is indicated by the evidence it proposes to adduce even though some of the charges are cumulative or alternative. The foregoing consideration of the substance [p48451] of the charges shows that this reduction of the counts for Crimes against Peace upon which a verdict need be given can be made without avoidance of the duty of the Tribunal and without injustice to defendants. Counts 44 and 53 charge conspiracies to commit crimes in breach of the laws of war. For reasons already discussed we hold that the Charter does not confer any jurisdiction in respect of a conspiracy to commit any crime other than a crime against peace. There is no specification of the crime of conspiracy to commit conventional war crimes. This position is accepted by the Prosecution and no conviction is sought under these counts. These counts, accordingly, will be disregarded. In so far as the opinion expressed above with regard to counts 37, 38, 44 and 53 may appear to be in conflict with the judgment of the Tribunal of the 17th May 1946, whereby the motions going to the Tribunal's jurisdiction were dismissed, it is sufficient to say that the point was not raised at the hearing on the motions. At a much later date, after the Nuremberg judgment had been delivered, this matter was raised by counsel for one of the accused. On this topic the Tribunal concurs in the view of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Accordingly, upon those counts, it accepts the admission of the Prosecution which is favorable to the defendants. [p48452] Counts 39 to 52 inclusive (omitting count 44 already discussed) contain charges of murder. In all these counts the charge in effect is that killing resulted from the unlawful waging of war at the places and upon the dates set out. In some of the counts the date is that upon which hostilities commenced at the place named, in others the date is that upon which the place was attacked in the course of an alleged illegal war already proceeding. In all cases the killing is alleged as arising from the unlawful waging of war, unlawful in respect that there had been no declaration of war prior to the killings (counts 39 to 43, 51 and 52) or unlawful because the wars in the course of which the killings occurred were commenced in violation of certain specified Treaty Articles (counts 45 to 50). If, in any case, the finding be that the war was not unlawful then the charge of murder will fall with the charge of waging unlawful war. If, on the other hand, the war, in any particular case, is held to have been unlawful, then this involves unlawful killings not only upon the dates and at the places stated in these counts but at all places in the theater of war and at all times throughout the period of the war. No good purpose is to be served, in our view, in dealing with these parts of the offences by way of counts for murder [p48453] when the whole offence of waging those wars unlawfully is put in issue upon the counts charging the waging of such wars. The foregoing observations relate to all the counts enumerated, i.e., counts 39 to 52 (omitting 44). Counts 45 to 50 are stated obscurely. They charge murder at different places upon the dates mentioned by unlawfully ordering, causing and permitting Japanese armed forces to attack those places and to slaughter the inhabitants thereby unlawfully killing civilians and disarmed soldiers. From the language of these counts it is not quite clear whether it is intended to found the unlawful killings upon the unlawfulness of the attack or upon subsequent breaches of the laws of war or upon both. If the first is intended then the Position is the same as in the earlier counts in this group. If breaches of the laws of war are founded upon then that is cumulative with the charges in counts 54 and 55. For these reasons only and without finding it necessary to express any opinion upon the validity of the charges of murder in such circumstances we have decided that it is unnecessary to determine counts 39 to 43 inclusive and counts 45 to 52 inclusive. [p48454] PART A -- CHAPTER III A SUMMARY Chapter III of Part A of the Judgment will not be read. It contains a statement of the rights which Japan acquired in China prior to 1930, together with a statement of Japan's obligations to other powers, so far as relevant to the Indictment. The principal obligations fall under the following descriptions and are witnessed by the documents listed under each description. 1. Obligations to preserve the territorial and administrative independence of China. United States Declaration of 1901 Identic Notes of 1908 Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920. 2. Obligations to preserve for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of China, the so-called "Open Door Policy." United States Declaration of 1900 to 1901 Identic Notes of 1908 Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. 3. Obligations to suppress the manufacture, traffic in, and use of opium and analogous drugs. Opium Convention of 1912 [p48455] League of Nations of 1925 Opium Convention of 1931. 4. Obligations to respect the territory of powers interested in the Pacific. Four-Power Treaty of 1921 Notes to Netherlands and Portugal of 1926 Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920. 5. Obligations to keep inviolate the territory of neutral powers. Hague Convention V of 1907. 6. Obligations to solve disputes between nations by diplomatic means, or mediation, or arbitration. Identic Notes of 1908 Four-Power Treaty of 1921 Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 Hague Convention of 1907 Pact of Paris of 1928. 7. Obligations designed to ensure the pacific settlement of international disputes. Hague Convention of 1899 Hague Convention of 1907 Pact of Paris of 1928. 8. Obligation to give previous warning before commencing hostilities. [p48456] Hague Convention III of 1907. 9. Obligations relative to humane conduct in warfare. Hague Convention IV of 1907 Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 Geneva P.O.W. Convention of 1929. Many of these obligations are general. They relate to no single political or geographical unit. On the other hand, the rights which Japan had required by virtue of the documents considered in this Chapter were largely rights in relation to China. Japan's foothold in China at the beginning of the China war will be fully described in the forefront of the Chapter of the Judgment relating to China. (The following text of Chapter III, Part A, is copied into the record as follows:) OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY JAPAN. EVENTS PRIOR TO 1 JANUARY 1928. Before 1 January 1928, the beginning of the period covered by the Indictment, certain events had transpired and Japan had acquired certain rights and assumed certain obligations; an appreciation of these is necessary in order to understand and judge the actions of the accused. [p48457] SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-5. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was concluded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, whereby China ceded to Japan full sovereignty over the Liaotung Peninsula. However, Russia, Germany and France brought diplomatic pressure to bear upon Japan, thereby forcing her to renounce that cession. In 1896 Russia concluded an agreement with China authorizing Russia to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria and operate it for a period of eighty years, with certain rights of administration in the railway zone. This grant was extended by another agreement between Russia and China in 1898, whereby Russia was authorized to connect the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin with Port Arthur and was granted a lease for a period of twenty-five years of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula with the right to levy tariffs in the leased territory. FIRST PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE The principal powers of the world assembled at The Hague for the first peace conference in 1899. This conference resulted in the conclusion of three conventions and one declaration. The contribution of this first peace conference consisted less in the addition of new rules to the existing body of international law than in a restatement [p48458] in more precise form of the rules of customary law and practice already recognized as established. The same observation applies to the second peace conference at The Hague in 1907, as well as to the conventions adopted at Geneva on 6 July 1906 and 27 July 1929. The first convention, that is to say, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Annex No. B-1), was signed on 29 July 1899 and was ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, together with twenty other powers, and was thereafter adhered to by seventeen additional powers; so that a total of forty-four of the leading powers acceded to the convention. The convention was, therefore, binding upon Japan before the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War on 10 February 1904 and at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, except in so far as it may have been superseded by the first convention later adopted at The Hague on 18 October 1907. By ratifying the first convention concluded at The Hague on 29 July 1899, Japan agreed to use her best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international disputes and, as far as circumstances would allow, to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers before resorting to [p48459] force of arms. THE BOXER TROUBLES OF 1899-1901. The so-called Boxer Troubles in China of 1899-1901 were settled on 7 September 1901 by the signing of the Final Protocol at Peking. (Annex No. B-2). That protocol was signed by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, as well as Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium and Italy. By this protocol China agreed to reserve the section of Peking occupied by foreign legations exclusively for such legations and to permit the maintenance of guards by the powers to protect the legations there. She also conceded the right of the powers to occupy certain points for the maintenance of open communications between Peking and the sea, these points being named in the agreement. By signing the protocol, Japan agreed, along with the other signatory powers, to withdraw all troops from the province of Chihli before 22 September following, except those stationed at the points mentioned under the agreement. RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR Following the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, which she concluded on 30 January 1902, Japan began negotiations with Russia in July 1903 concerning [p48460] the maintenance of the Open Door Policy in China. These negotiations did not proceed as desired by the Japanese government; and Japan, disregarding the provisions of the Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed by her at The Hague on 29 July 1899, attacked Russia in February 1904. In the fighting that raged in Manchuria, Japan expended the lives of 100,000 Japanese soldiers and 2 billion gold yen. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on 5 September 1905. TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH The Treaty of Portsmouth signed on 5 September 1905, terminated the Russo- Japanese War and was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. (Annex No. B-3). By ratifying this treaty, Japan and Russia agreed to abstain from taking any military measures on the Russo-Korean frontier which might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory. However, Russia acknowledged the paramount interests of Japan in Korea. Russia also transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, her lease upon Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, together with all her rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming a part of the lease, as well as all public-works and [p48461] properties in the territory affected by the lease. This transfer was made upon the express engagement that Japan as well as Russia would evacuate and turn over to the administration of China completely and exclusively all of Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease, and that Japan would perfectly respect the property rights of Russian subjects in the leased territory. In addition, Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, the railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, together with all its branches and all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto. This transfer was upon the engagement that Japan, as well as Russia, would exploit their respective railways exclusively for commercial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes. Japan and Russia agreed to obtain the consent of China to these transfers and not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria. Russia ceded to Japan that part of the Island of Sakhalin south of the 50th degree of north latitude, as well as all adjacent islands below that boundary. This cession was upon the engagement that Japan as well as Russia would not construct on the Island of [p48462] Sakhalin or adjacent islands any fortifications or similar military works and would maintain free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tatary. In the protocol annexed to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia and Japan as between themselves reserved the right to maintain railway guards not to exceed fifteen men per kilometer along their respective railways in Manchuria. TREATY OF PEKING By the Treaty of Peking of 1905, China approved the transfer by Russia to Japan of her rights and property in Manchuria, but she did not approve the provision for maintenance of railway guards. By an additional agreement executed by Japan and China on 22 December 1905, which was made an annex to the Treaty, Japan agreed in view of the "earnest desire" expressed by the Chinese Government to withdraw her railway guards as soon as possible, or when Russia agreed to do so, or at any rate when tranquility should be re-established in Manchuria. SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY Japan organized the South Manchurian Railway Company in August 1906 as a corporation with its shareholders limited to the Japanese Government and its nationals. The company was organized as a successor [p48463] of the former Chinese Eastern Railway Company in the area traversed by the railroad from Changchun to Port Arthur. It was authorized to, and did, administer the railways and enterprises appertaining thereto, which had been acquired from Russia, together with any new railroads and enterprises established in Manchuria by Japan. In addition, it was vested with certain administrative functions of government in the leased territory and in the railway zone. In short, it was created as an agency of the Japanese Government to administer the interests of that government in Manchuria. Contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the charter of this company provided that the commander of the Japanese Army in the leased territory should have power to issue orders and directives to the company in connection with military affairs and in case of military necessity to issue orders involving the business affairs of the company. OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA The Open Door Policy in China was first enunciated during the so-called Boxer Troubles of 1899-1901 by the Government of the United States of America in the following language: "The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about [p48464] permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." The other powers concerned, including Japan, assented to the policy thus announced; and this policy became the basis of the so-called Open Door Policy toward China. For more than twenty years thereafter, the Open Door Policy thus made rested upon the informal commitments by the various powers; but it was destined to be crystalized into treaty form with the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington in 1922. JAPANESE-AMERICAN IDENTIC NOTES OF 1908 Japan recognized this Open Door Policy in China and in the region of the Pacific Ocean when her government exchanged Identic Notes on the subject with the government of the United States of America on 30 November 1908. (Annex No. B-4). The provisions of these notes were duly binding upon Japan and the United States of America at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. By this exchange of notes, the two powers agreed: (1) That the policy of their governments for [p48465] encouragement of free and peaceful commerce on the Pacific Ocean was uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the Pacific region and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China; (2) That they would reciprocally respect the territorial possessions of each other in that region; (3) That they were determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire; and, (4) That should any event occur threatening the status quo they would communicate with each other as to what measures they might take. ANNEXATION OF KOREA Japan annexed Korea in 1910, thereby indirectly increasing Japanese rights in China, since Korean settlers in Manchuria thereby became subjects of the Japanese Empire. The number of Koreans in Manchuria by 1 January 1928 amounted to approximately 800 thousand people. [p48466] CONFLICTING CLAIMS BY CHINA AND JAPAN As was to be expected, the exercise by Japan of extra-territorial rights in China, in connection with the operation of the South Manchurian Railway and the enjoyment of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, gave rise to constant friction between her and China. Japan claimed that she had succeeded to all the rights and privileges granted to Russia by China in the Treaty of 1896, as enlarged by the Treaty of 1898; that one of those rights was absolute and exclusive administration within the railway zone; and that within that zone she had broad administrative powers, such as control of police, taxation, education and public utilities. China denied this interpretation of the treaties. Japan also claimed the right to maintain railway guards in the railway zone, which right also China denied. The controversies which arose regarding the Japanese railway guards were not limited to their presence and activities within the railway zone. These guards were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried on maneuvers outside the railway areas. These acts were particularly obnoxious to the Chinese, both officials and private persons alike, and were regarded as unjustifiable in law and provocative of unfortunate incidents. In addition, Japan claimed the [p48467] right to maintain consular police in Manchuria. Such police were attached to the Japanese consulates and branch consulates in all Japanese consular districts in such cities as Harbin, Tsitsihar, and Manchouli, as well as in the so-called Chientao district, in which lived large numbers of Koreans. This right was claimed as a corollary to the right of extra-territoriality. TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, SINO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1915 In 1915 Japan presented to China the notorious "Twenty-one Demands." The resulting Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 provided that Japanese subjects would be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and engage in business and manufacture of any kind. This was an important and unusual right enjoyed in China by the subjects of no other nation, outside the treaty ports, and was later to be so interpreted by Japan as to include most of Manchuria in the term "South Manchuria." The treaty further provided that Japanese subjects in South Manchuria might lease by negotiation the land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade, manufacturing and agricultural enterprises. An exchange of notes between the two governments, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, defined the expression, "lease by negotiation." According to the Chinese version this definition implied [p48468] a long-term lease of not more than thirty years with the right of conditional renewal; but according to the Japanese version, it implied a long-term lease of not more than thirty years with the right of unconditional renewal. In addition to the foregoing, the treaty provided for the extension of the term of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory (Liaotung Peninsula) to ninety-nine years, and for prolongation of the period of Japanese possession of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to ninety-nine years. The Chinese consistently claimed that the treaty was without "fundamental validity." At the Paris Conference in 1919, China demanded the abrogation of the treaty on the ground that it had been concluded "under coercion of the Japanese ultimatum threatening war." At the Washington Conference in 1921-2, the Chinese delegation raised the question "as to the equity and justice of the treaty and its fundamental validity." Again in March 1923, shortly before the expiration of the original twenty-five year lease of the Kwantung territory, China communicated to Japan a further request for the abrogation of the treaty and stated that "the Treaties and Notes of 1915 have been consistently [p48469] condemned by public opinion in China." Since the Chinese maintained that the agreements of 1915 lacked "fundamental validity," they declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria, except in so far as circumstances made it expedient so to do. The Japanese complained bitterly of the consequent violations by the Chinese of what they claimed were their treaty rights. ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1917-20 The first World War gave Japan another opportunity to strengthen her position upon the continent of Asia. The Russian Revolution broke out in 1917. In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF PEKING, 1925 Russo-Japanese relations were eventually stabilized for a time by the conclusion of the Convention Embodying Basic Rules for Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was signed at Peking on 20 January 1925. The convention [p48470] was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. (Annex No. B-5). By concluding this convention, the parties solemnly affirmed: (1) That it was their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a state to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental service for them, and all organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endanger the order and security in any part of the other's territories; (2) That neither contracting party would permit the presence in the territories under its jurisdiction (a) of organizations or groups pretending to be the government for any part of the territories of the other party, or (b) of alien subjects of citizens who might be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organizations or groups; and, (3) That the subjects or citizens of each party would have the liberty to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other and enjoy constant and complete protection of their lives and Property as well as the right and liberty to engage in commerce, navigation, industries and other peaceful [p48471] pursuits while in such territories. TREATY OF PEACE, 1919 World War I came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Versailles on 28 June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers as one party and Germany as the other party. (Annex No. B-6). With the deposit of instruments of ratification by Germany on 10 January 1920, the treaty came into force. The Allied and Associated Powers consisted of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 22 other powers, among which were included China, Portugal and Thailand. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers were described in the treaty as the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. This treaty was ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, except the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Netherlands. The Versailles Treaty contains, among other things: (1) The Covenant of the League of Nations, which is Part I consisting of Articles 1 to 26 inclusive; (2) The renunciation by Germany in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions, which is Article 119; (3) The mandate provisions for [p48472] government of the former German possessions so renounced, which is Article 22; (4) The declaration prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, which is Article 171; and (5) The ratification of the Opium Conventions signed at The Hague on 23 January 1912, together with provisions for general supervision by the League over agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, which are Articles 295 and 23 respectively. Japan was bound by all the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, except in so far as she may have been released from her obligations thereunder by virtue of the notice given by her government on 27 March 1933 of her intention to withdraw from the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Covenant. Such withdrawal did not become effective before 27 March 1935 and did not affect the remaining provisions of the treaty. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS By ratifying the Versailles Treaty, Japan ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations and became a member of the League. Twenty-eight other Powers also became members of the League by ratifying the treaty, including among them all the powers bringing [p48473] the Indictment except the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Netherlands. However, the Netherlands and twelve other powers, who had not signed the treaty, originally acceded to the Covenant; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics later became a member. At one time or another sixty-three nations have been members of the League after acceding to the Covenant. Under the terms of the Covenant, Japan agreed, among other things: (1) That maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and that she would cooperate in such reduction by interchange of full and frank information respecting armaments; (2) That she would respect and preserve the territorial integrity and then existing political independence of all members of the League. (3) That in case of dispute with another member of the League, she would submit the matter to the Council of the League or to arbitration and would not resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Council; (4) That if she resorted to war, contrary to the Covenant, she would ipso facto be deemed to have [p48474] committed an act of war against all members of the League; and (5) That all international agreements made by the members of the League would have no effect until registered with the Secretariat of the League. With respect to colonies and territories, which as a consequence of the war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the vanquished nations, and were not then able to govern themselves, Japan agreed: (1) That the well being and development of the inhabitants thereof formed a sacred trust; (2) That those colonies and territories should be placed under the tutelage of advanced nations to be administered under a mandate on behalf of the League; (3) That the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases should be prohibited in the mandated territories; and, (4) That equal opportunities for trade and commerce of other members of the League with the mandated territories should be secured. MANDATE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS Germany renounced in favor of the powers described in the Versailles Treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely; the United States [p48475] of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions. Although the United States of America did not ratify that treaty, all her rights respecting these former German possessions were confirmed in a treaty between the United States of America and Germany, which was signed on 25 August 1921. The said four powers: the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan agreed on 17 December 1920 to confer upon Japan, under the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a mandate to administer the groups of the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator in accordance with certain additional provisions. Some of those provisions were: (1) That Japan should see that the slave trade was prohibited and that no forced labor was permitted in the Mandated Islands; and, (2) That no military or naval bases would be established and no fortifications would be erected in the Islands. Japan accepted this mandate, took possession of the Islands and proceeded to administer the mandate, and thereby became bound, and was bound at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, to the terms of the mandate contained in the Covenant of the League and the [p48476] Agreement of 17 December 1920. MANDATE CONVENTION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1922. Since the United States had not agreed to this mandate of Japan over the former German Islands, but possessed an interest therein, Japan and the United States of America began negotiations regarding the subject in Washington in 1922. A convention was agreed upon and signed by both powers on 11 February 1922. (Annex No. B-7). Ratifications were exchanged on 13 July 1922; and thereby Japan, as well as the United States, was bound by this convention at all times mentioned in the Indictment. After reciting the terms of the mandate as granted by the said Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the convention provided, among other things: (1) That the United States of America would have the benefits of Articles III, IV and V of that Mandate Agreement, notwithstanding that she was not a member of the League; (2) That American property rights in the Islands would be respected; (3) That existing treaties between Japan and the United States would apply to the Islands; and, (4) That Japan would furnish the United States [p48477] a duplicate of the annual report of her administration of the mandate to be made to the League. In a note delivered to the Government of the United States by the Government of Japan on the day of exchange of ratifications of the Convention, Japan assured the United States that the usual comity would be extended to the nationals and vessels of the United States visiting the harbors and waters of those Islands. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE A number of treaties and agreements were entered into at the Washington Conference in the winter of 1921 and spring of 1922. This conference was essentially a Disarmament Conference, aimed to promote the responsibility of peace in the world, not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament, but also by solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. FOUR-POWER TREATY OF 1921 The Four-Power Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean was one of the treaties entered into at the Washington Conference. (Annex No. B-8). This treaty was signed on 13 December 1921 and was duly ratified by [p48478] Japan and the other powers signatory thereto, and was binding on Japan at all times mentioned in the Indictment. In that treaty, Japan agreed, among other things: (1) That she would respect the rights of the other powers in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean; and (2) That if a controversy should arise out of any Pacific question involving their rights, which could not be settled by diplomacy and was likely to affect the harmonious accord then existing between the signatory powers, she would invite the contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject would be referred for consideration and adjustment. The day this treaty was signed, the contracting powers entered into a Joint Declaration to the effect that it was their intent and understanding that the treaty applied to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean. (Annex No. B-8-a). At the Washington Conference, the powers signatory to this treaty concluded a supplementary treaty on 6 February 1922 (Annex No. B-8-b) in which it was provided as follows: "The term 'insular possessions and insular [p48479] dominions' used in the foresaid Treaty (the Four-Power Treaty) shall, in its application to Japan, include only the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin, Formosa and the Pescadores and the Islands under the Mandate of Japan." FOUR-POWER ASSURANCES TO THE NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL Having concluded the Four-Power Treaty on 13 December 1921, the powers signatory, including Japan, being anxious to forestall any conclusions to the contrary, each sent identical notes to the Government of the Netherlands (Annex No. B-8-c) and to the Government of Portugal (Annex No. B-8-d) assuring those governments that they would respect the rights of the Netherlands and Portugal in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. WASHINGTON NAVAL LIMITATIONS TREATY Another of the interrelated treaties signed during the Washington Conference was the Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armament. (Annex No. B-9). This treaty was signed on 6 February 1922 by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and later was ratified by each of them. The treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment prior to 31 December 1936 when she became no longer bound by virtue of the [p48480] notice to terminate the treaty given by her on 29 December 1934. It is stated in the Preamble to that Treaty: that "desiring to contribute to the maintenance of peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament," the signatory powers had entered into the treaty. However, as an inducement to the signing of this treaty, certain collateral matters were agreed upon and those agreements were included in the treaty. The United States, the British Empire and Japan agreed that the status quo at the time of the signing of the treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified as follows: (1) The insular possessions which the United States then held or might thereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands; (2) Hongkong and the insular Possessions which the British Empire then held or might thereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand; (3) The following insular possessions [p48481] of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to-wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan might thereafter acquire. The treaty specified that the maintenance of the status quo implied that no new fortifications or naval bases would be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures would be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase would be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions named. The signatory powers agreed that they would retain only the capital ships named in the treaty. The United States of America gave up its commanding lead in battleship construction; and both the United States and the British Empire agreed to scrap certain battleships named in the treaty. Maximum limits in total capital ship replacement tonnage were set for each signatory power, which they agreed not to exceed. A similar limitation was placed on aircraft carriers. Guns to be carried by capital ships were not to exceed 16 inches, and those carried by aircraft carriers were not to exceed 8 inches in caliber, and no vessels of [p48482] war of any of the signatory powers thereafter to be laid down, other than capital ships, was to carry guns in excess of 8 inches in caliber. NINE-POWER TREATY One further treaty signed at the Washington Conference which cannot be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity, nine of the powers at the conference entered into a treaty, which taken together with the other treaties concluded at the conference, was designed to accomplish that object. This treaty was signed on 6 February 1922 and later ratified by the following powers: The United States of America, the British Empire, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. (Annex No. B-10). This treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. By concluding this treaty, Japan, as well as the other signatory powers, agreed among other things [p48483] as follows: (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To use her influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States. (5) To refrain from entering into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding with any power or powers, which would infringe or impair the foregoing principles; (6) To refrain from seeking, or supporting her nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of her interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of [p48484] China any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or any local authority in any public enterprise or which would be calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity; (7) To refrain from supporting her nationals in any agreement among themselves designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of China; (8) To respect the neutrality of China; and (9) To enter into full and frank communication with the other contracting powers whenever any situation should arise which in the opinion of any one of them involved the application of the stipulations of the treaty. Thus the powers agreed in formal and solemn treaty to enforce the Open Door Policy in China. Japan not only agreed to, signed and ratified this treaty, but her Plenipotentiary at the Washington Conference declared that Japan was enthusiastically in accord with the principles therein laid down. He used the following words: "No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to [p48485] work out her own great national destiny." OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1912 Another important agreement entered into by Japan, which is relevant to the issues, and which particularly applies to Japan's relations with China, is the Convention and Final Protocol for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs, which was signed on 23 January 1912 at the International Opium Conference at The Hague. (Annex No. B-11). This Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. Forty-six other powers also signed and ratified the Convention, and six additional powers later adhered to it. Being resolved to pursue progressive suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, and cocaine, as well as drugs prepared or derived from these substances giving rise or which might give rise to analogous abuse, the powers concluded the Convention. Japan, together with the other contracting powers, agreed: (1) That she would take measures for the gradual and efficacious suppression of the manufacture, traffic in, and use of these drugs; [p48486] (2) That she would prohibit the exportation of these drugs to the countries which prohibited the importation of them; and that she would limit and control the exportation of the drugs to countries, which limited the entry of them to their territories; (3) That she would take measures to prevent the smuggling of these drugs into China or into her leased territories, settlements and concessions in China; (4) That she would take measures for the suppression, pari passu with the Chinese Government, of the traffic in and abuse of these drugs in her leased territories, settlements and concessions in China; and, (5) That she would cooperate in the enforcement of the pharmacy laws promulgated by the Chinese Government for the regulation of the sale and distribution of these drugs by applying them to her nationals in China. [p48487] SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE OF THE LEAGUE The Second Opium Conference of the League of Nations further implemented and reinforced the Opium Convention of 1912 by the signing of a Convention on 19 February 1925 (Annex No. B-12), which represented a comprehensive effort on behalf of the Signatory Powers to suppress the contraband trade in and abuse of opium, cocaine, morphine, and other harmful drugs. This Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing this Indictment, except the United States of America, the Philippines and China. The Convention was also definitely acceded to by forty-six additional Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers had provided in Article 295 of the Versailles Treaty that the ratification of that Treaty would be deemed to be ratification of the Opium Convention of 23 January 1912. The Covenant of the League of Nations, which is found in Part I of the Versailles Treaty, provided in Article 23 thereof that the Members of the League would thereafter entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. The Second Opium Conference was in response to these obligations; and the Convention of 19 February 1925 provided for the organization and [p48488] functioning of a Permanent Central Board of the League for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs. In addition, Japan, as well as the other signatory Powers, agreed among other things to the following: (1) That she would enact laws to ensure effective control of the production, distribution and export of opium and limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use of opium and the other drugs named in the Convention; and (2) That she would send annually to the Central Board of the League as complete and accurate statistics as possible relative to the preceding year showing: production, manufacture, stocks, consumption, confiscations, imports and exports, government consumption, etc., of the drugs named in the Convention. The Privy Council of Japan decided on 2 November 1938 to terminate further co- operation with this Central Board of the League. The reason assigned for this action was that the League had authorized its [p48489] Members to invoke sanctions against Japan under the Covenent in an effort to terminate what the League had denounced as Japan's aggressive war against China. Notice of this decision was communicated to the Secretary General of the League on the same day. OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1931 A third Convention, which is known as the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs was signed at Geneva on 13 July 1931. (Annex No. B-13). This Convention was signed and ratified, or acceded to, by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, as well as fifty-nine additional Powers. This Convention was supplementary to and intended to make more effective the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1925 mentioned above. Japan, together with the other Contracting Powers, agreed: (1) That she would furnish annually, for each of the drugs covered by the Convention in respect to each of her territories to which the Convention applied, an estimate, which was to be forwarded to the Central Board of the League, showing the quantity of the [p48490] drugs necessary for medical and scientific use and for export authorized under the Conventions; (2) That she would not allow to be manufactured in any such territory in any one year a quantity of any of the drugs greater than the quantity set forth in such estimate; and, (3) That no import into, or export from, the territories of any of the Contracting Powers of any of the drugs would take place, except in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. LAWS OF BELLIGERENCY The law governing the entrance of States into, as well as their conduct while in, belligerency received further restatement during the two decades immediately preceding the period covered by the Indictment and during the years of 1928 and 1929. In 1907, the second Peace Conference at The Hague produced thirteen Conventions and one Declaration, all signed on 18 October 1907. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) condemning aggressive war was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928. Then on 27 July 1929 two important Conventions were signed at Geneva, namely: the Convention Relative to the [p48491] Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field. These Agreements not only impose direct treaty obligations upon the Contracting Powers, but also delineate more precisely the customary law. The effectiveness of some of the Conventions signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907 as direct treaty obligations was considerably impaired by the incorporation of a so-called "general participation clause" in them, providing that the Convention would be binding only if all the Belligerents were parties to it. The effect of this clause is, in strict law, to deprive some of the Conventions of their binding force as direct treaty obligations, either from the very beginning of a war or in the course of it as soon as a non-signatory Power, however insignificant, joins the ranks of the Belligerents. Although the obligation to observe the provisions of the Convention as a binding treaty may be swept away by operation of the "general participation clause", or otherwise, the Convention remains as good evidence of the customary law of nations, to be considered by the Tribunal along with all other available evidence in determining the customary law to be applied in any given situation. [p48492] FIRST HAGUE CONVENTION The First Convention agreed upon by the Conference at The Hague in 1907 was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. (Annex No. B-14). The Convention was signed by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, and ratified by, or on behalf of, all of them, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand. Twenty-one other Powers also signed and ratified the Convention, and five additional Powers later acceded to it. The Powers bringing the Indictment, who did not ratify this Convention, remained bound, in so far as their relations with Japan were concerned, by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at The Hague on 29 July 1899; since that Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of these Powers. Neither of the Conventions mentioned under this title contained a "general participation clause"; they were, therefore, binding upon Japan as direct treaty obligations at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, Japan, as well as the other Contracting Powers, among other things agreed: (1) That, in order to obviate as far as possible recourse to force in her re- [p48493] lations with other States, she would use her best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences; and, (2) That in case of serious disagreement or dispute, before in appeal to arms, she would have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers. KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT The Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris, which was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928, condemned aggressive war and restated the law evidenced by the First Hague Convention of 13 October 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. (Annex No. B-15). The Treaty was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and the Netherlands. Japan ratified the Treaty on 24 July 1929, and China adhered to the Treaty on 8 May 1929. The Netherlands adhered to the Treaty on 12 July 1929, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered on 27 September 1928. [p48494] Therefore, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment had definitely acceded to the Treaty by 24 July 1929; in addition, eight other Powers had signed and ratified the Treaty; and forty-five additional Powers, at one time or another, adhered to it. The Treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. The Contracting Powers, including Japan, declared that they condemn recourses to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. The Contracting Powers then agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which might arise among them, would never be sought except by pacific means. Prior to ratification of the Pact, some of the Signatory Powers made declarations reserving the right to wage war in self-defense, including the right to judge for themselves whether a situation requires such action. Any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to force, is necessarily limited to the right of self- defense. The right of self-defense involves the right of the State threatened [p48495] with impending attack to judge for itself in the first instance whether it is justified in resorting to force. Under the most liberal interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the right of self-defense does not confer upon the State resorting to war the authority to make a final determination upon the justification for its action. Any other interpretation would nullify the Pact; and this Tribunal does not believe that the Powers in concluding the Pact intended to make an empty gesture. THIRD HAGUE CONVENTION The Third Convention concluded by the Powers in Conference at The Hague in 1907 was the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. (Annex No. B-16). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except China; but China adhered to the Convention in 1910. A total of twenty-five Powers signed and ratified the Convention, including Portugal and Thailand, and six Powers later adhered to it. This Convention does not contain a "general participation clause". It provides that it shall take effect in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers, it was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in [p48496] the Indictment. By ratifying this Convention, Japan agreed, among other things: That hostilities between her and any other Contracting Powers must not commence without previous and explicit warning; in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. FIFTH HAGUE CONVENTION The Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 was the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Person's in war on Land. (Annex No. B-17). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and China. However, China adhered to the Convention in 1910. A total of twenty-five Powers signed and ratified the Convention, including Thailand and Portugal; and three Powers later adhered to it. Great Britain and sixteen other Powers, who signed the Convention, have not ratified it. This is one of the Hague Conventions which contains a "general participation clause"; although it ceased to be applicable in the recent war as a direct treaty obligation of Japan upon the entry of Great Britain into the war on. 8 December 1941, it [p48497] remained as good evidence of the customary law of nations to be considered along with all other available evidence in determining the customary law to be applied in any given situation, to which the principles stated in the Convention might be applicable. By this Convention Japan agreed, among other things: (1) That the territory of neutral Powers is inviolable; (2) That Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power; and, (3) That a neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the Belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. FOURTH HAGUE CONVENTION The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 is the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. (Annex No. B-18). Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were annexed to and [p48498] made a part of this Convention. (Annex No. B-19). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except China. Nineteen additional Powers, including Thailand and Portugal, also signed and ratified this Convention; and two other Powers later adhered to it. This is another of the Hague Conventions which contains a "general participation clause". What we have said respecting this clause applies equally well here. As stated in the Preamble to this Convention, the Contracting Powers were animated by the desire, even in the extreme case, to serve the interests of humanity and the needs of civilization by diminishing the evils of war and adopted the Convention and the Regulations thereunder which were intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for Belligerents. Realising that it was not possible at the time to concert regulations covering all circumstances that might arise in practice, the Powers declared that they did not intend that unforeseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders; and that until a more complete coda should be issued, they declared that in cases not included in the Regulations [p48499] the inhabitants and belligerents remained under the protection and principles of the laws of nations as they resulted from the usages of civilized peoples, the laws of humanity, and the dictate of the public conscience. By this Convention Japan agreed, among other things: (1) That prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them; that they must be humanely treated; and all their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property; (2) That in case of capture of any of the armed forces of a Belligerent, whether they consisted of combatants or non-combatants, they would be treated as prisoners of war; (3) That although she might utilize the labor of prisoners of war, officers excepted, the task would not be excessive and would not be connected with the operation of war; and that she would pay to the prisoners compensation for [p48500] all work done by them; (4) That as regards board, lodging, and clothing, in the absence of a special agreement between the Belligerents; she would treat prisoners of war on the same footing as the troops who captured them; (5) That prisoners of war in her power would be subject to the laws governing her own army and entitled to the benefits thereof; (6) That she would institute at the commencement of hostilities an inquiry office. That it would be the function of this office to reply to all inquiries about the prisoners and to keep up to date an individual return for each prisoner of war in which would be recorded all necessary vital statistics and other useful information pertaining to such prisoner. (7) That relief societies for prisoners of war would receive every facility from her for the efficient performance of their humane task and their agents would be admitted to places of internment for [p48501] the purpose of administering relief, etc; (8) That it was forbidden: (a) to employ poison or poisoned weapons; (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile Nation or Army; (c) To kill or wound an enemy, who having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; (d) To declare that no quarter will be given; (e) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or of the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention; or (f) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; (9) That in sieges and bombardments all necessary steps would be taken by her to spare buildings dedicated to religion, art, science and charitable purposes, historic monuments and hospitals and places where the sick and wounded [p48502] are collected; (10) That the pillage of a town or other place, even when taken by assault was prohibited: and, (11) That family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice would be respected by her during war. GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTION The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929. (Annex No. B-20). Forty-seven Powers signed the Convention; and thirty-four Powers either ratified it or adhered to it. Excepting Australia, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, each of the Powers bringing the Indictment. Japan sent plenipotentiaries, who participated in the Conference and signed the Convention; but Japan did not formally ratify the Convention before the opening of hostilities on 7 December 1941. However, early in 1942 the United States, Great Britain and other Powers informed Japan that they proposed to abide by the Convention and sought assurances from Japan as to [p48503] her attitude towards the Convention; Japan, acting through her Foreign Minister, who was the accused TOGO, declared and assured the Powers concerned that, while she was not formally bound by the Convention, she would apply the Convention, "mutatis mutandis" toward American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war. Under this assurance Japan was bound to comply with the Convention save where its provisions could not be literally complied with owing to special conditions known to the parties to exist at the time the assurance was given, in which case Japan was obliged to apply the nearest possible equivalent to literal compliance. The effect of this assurance will be more fully considered at a later point in this judgment. This Convention is the "mere complete code of the laws of war" contemplated by the Powers signatory to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War concluded on 18 October 1907; and the Convention provides by its terms that it will be considered to be Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to that Hague Convention. The Convention does not contain a "general participation clause"; but it does contain a provision that it shall remain in force as between the Belligerents who are parties to it even though one of the Belligerents is not a Contracting Power: [p48504] The Convention provides, among other things: (1) That prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured them; that they must be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity; that they have the right to have their person and honor respected; that women shall be treated with all regard to their sex; and that all prisoners of war must be maintained by the detaining powers; (2) That prisoners of war shall be evacuated as quickly as possible to depots removed from the zone of combat; but that the evacuation, if on foot, shall only be effected by stages of 20 kilometers a day, unless the necessity of reaching water and food requires longer stages; (3) That prisoners of war may be interned; but they may not be confined or imprisoned, except as an indispensible measure of safety or sanitation; that if captured in unhealthful regions or climates, they will be transported to a more favorable region; that all sanitary measures will be taken to insure cleanliness and healthfulness of camps; that medical inspections shall be arranged at least once a month to ensure the general health of the prisoners; that collective [p48505] disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited; that the food ration shall be equal in quantity and quality to that of troops in base camp; that prisoners shall be furnished facilities together with a sufficiency of portable water for preparing additional food for themselves; that they shall be furnished clothing, linen and footwear as well as work clothes for those who labor; and that every camp shall have an infirmary, where prisoners of war shall receive every kind of attention needed; (4) That although prisoners of war are required to salute all officers of the detaining power, officers who are prisoners are bound to salute only officers of a higher or equal rank of that power; (5) That belligerents may utilize the labor of able prisoners of war, officers excepted, and provided that noncommissioned officers are used only for supervisory work; that no prisoner may be employed at labors for which he is physically unfit; that the length of the day's work shall not be excessive, and every prisoner shall be allowed a rest of twenty-four consecutive hours each week; that prisoners shall not be used at unhealthful or dangerous work, and labor detachments must be conducted similar to prisoner of war camps, particularly with regard to sanitary condi- [p48506] tions, food, medical attention, etc.; that prisoners must be paid wages for their labor; and that the labor of prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with war operations, particularly the manufacture and transportation of munitions or the transportation of material for combat units; (6) That prisoners of war must be allowed to receive parcels by mail intended to supply them with food and clothing; and that relief societies for prisoners of war shall receive from the detaining power every facility for the efficient performance of their humane tasks; (7) That prisoners of war have the right to make requests and register complaints regarding the conditions of their captivity; that in every place where there are prisoners of war they have the right to appoint agents to represent them directly with the military authorities of the detaining powers; and that such agent shall not be transferred without giving him time to inform his successors about affairs under consideration; (8) That although prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armies of the detaining power, punishments other than those provided for the same acts for soldiers of [p48507] the armies of the detaining power may not be imposed upon them; and that corporal punishment, imprisonment in quarters without daylight, and in general any form of cruelty, is forbidden, as well as collective punishment for individual acts or omissions; (9) That escaped prisoners of war who are retaken shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment; and that the comrades who assisted his escape may incur only disciplinary punishment; (10) That at the opening of judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war, the detaining power shall advise the representative of the protecting power thereof at least before the opening of the trial; that no prisoner shall be sentenced without having an opportunity to defend himself, and shall not be required to admit himself guilty of the act charged; that the representative of the protecting power shall be entitled to attend the trial; that no sentence shall be pronounced against a prisoner except by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of trial of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power, that the sentence pronounced shall be immediately communicated to the protecting power; and that in the case of death sentences, the sentence must not be executed before the expiration of three months [p48508] after such communication; (11) That belligerents are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of rank or number, seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war, after having brought them to a condition where they can be transported; (12) That belligerents shall see that prisoners of war dying in captivity are honorably buried and that their graves bear all due information and are respected and maintained; (13) That upon outbreak of hostilities each belligerent shall institute a prisoner of war information bureau, which shall prepare and preserve an individual return upon each prisoner showing certain vital information prescribed, and which shall furnish such information as soon as possible to the interested power. Japan also assured the belligerents that she would apply this convention to civilian internees and that in applying the Convention she would take into consideration the national and racial manners and customs of prisoners of war and civilian internees under reciprocal conditions when supplying clothing and provisions to them. [p48509] GENEVA RED CROSS CONVENTION The Geneva Red Cross Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field was also signed on 27 July 1929. (Annex No. B-21). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment as well as thirty-two other powers. It was binding upon Japan and her subjects at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, as a direct treaty obligation. The Convention contains a provision to the effect that it must be respected by the contracting powers under all circumstances; and if in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall remain in force between the belligerents who are parties to it. By signing and ratifying the Convention, Japan as well as the other signatory powers, agreed, among other things: (1) That officers, soldiers and other persons officially attached to the armies, who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances; and that they shall be humanely treated and cared for without distinction of nationality by the belligerent in whose power they are; (2) That after every engagement, the [p48510] belligerent who remains in possession of the field of battle shall search for the wounded and dead and protect them from robbery and ill-treatment; and that those wounded and sick who fall into the power of the enemy shall become prisoners of war to whom the general rules of international law respecting prisoners of war shall be applicable; (3) That all personnel charged exclusively with the removal, transportation and treatment of the wounded and sick, including administration personnel of sanitary formations and establishments and chaplains, shall be respected and protected, and when they fall into the hands of the enemy they shall not be treated as prisoners of war, and shall not be detained, but will be returned as soon as possible to their own army along with their arms and equipment. (4) That mobile sanitary formations, and fixed sanitary establishments shall be respected and protected; and if they fall into the hands of the enemy they shall not be deprived of their buildings, transport and other equipment which may be needed for the treatment of the sick and wounded; (5) That only those personnel, formations and establishments entitled to respect and protection under the Convention shall display the distinctive [p48511] emblem of the Geneva Convention; and, (6) That it is the duty of commanders in chief of belligerent armies to provide for the details of execution of the provisions of the Convention, as well as unforeseen cases conformable to the general principles of the Convention. TENTH HAGUE CONVENTION The Tenth Convention agreed upon at the Conference at the Hague and signed on 18 October 1907 was the Convention for the Adaption to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 6 July 1906. (Annex No. B-22). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand. The Convention was signed and ratified by twenty-seven powers and later five other powers adhered to it. The indicting powers who did not ratify this Convention and also Japan are parties to the Convention which was signed at the Hague on 29 July 1899; and, therefore, as between them, they are bound by the Convention of 1899, which contains most of the provisions found in the later Convention of 1907. This, also, is one of the Hague Conventions, which contains a "general participation clause," and, [p48512] therefore, it ceased to be applicable upon Japan as a direct treaty obligation when a non-signatory power joined the ranks of the belligerents. What we have said regarding this clause applies equally well here. The Convention provides, among other things: (1) That after every engagement the belligerents shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded, and protect them and the dead from pillage and ill treatment; those falling into the power of the enemy shall become prisoners of war; the detaining power shall send to their country as soon as possible a description of those picked up by him, and shall treat the sick and wounded and bury the dead; (2) That hospital ships shall be respected and cannot be captured; but these ships may not be used for military purposes and shall be distinguished by markings and flags displaying the emblem of the Geneva Convention; and that the distinguishing markings prescribed for hospital ships shall not be used for protecting any ships other than those entitled to protection under the Convention. [p48512(a)] JAPAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS Thus for many years prior to the year 1930, Japan had claimed a place among the civilized communities of the world and had voluntarily incurred the above obligations designed to further the cause of peace, to outlaw aggressive war, and to mitigate the horrors of war. It is against that background of rights and obligations that the actings of the accused must be viewed and judged. PART B -- CHAPTER IV THE MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN AND PREPARATION FOR WAR INTRODUCTORY In dealing with the period of Japanese history with which this Indictment is mainly concerned it is necessary to consider in the first place the domestic history of Japan during the same period. In the years from 1928 onwards Japanese armed forces invaded in succession the territories of many of Japan's neighbors. The Tribunal must deal with the history of these attacks and with the exploitation by Japan of the resources of the territories she occupied, but its most important task is to assess the responsibility of individuals for these attacks, in so far as they were illegal. This responsibility cannot be measured simply by studying Japanese activities abroad. Indeed the answers to the [p48513] questions, "Why did these things happen?" and "Who were responsible for their occurrence?" will often only be found if the contemporaneous history of Japanese domestic politics is known. Moreover, if we embarked in the first place on a study of Japanese activities abroad, we should find it impossible to comprehend these activities fully, while we were engaged in the study; for the timing of these activities, and the manner and extent of their development were often dictated, not alone by the situation abroad, but by the situation at home. It is for these reasons that we now consider in the first place the political developments in Japan which largely controlled and explain her actions overseas. The outstanding feature of the period under review is the gradual rise of the military and their supporters to such a predominance in the government of Japan that no other organ of government, neither the elected representatives of the people, nor the civilian ministers in the Cabinet, nor the civilian advisers of the Emperor in the Privy Council and in his entourage, latterly imposed any effective check on the ambitions of the military. The supremacy of the influence of the military and their supporters in Japanese civilian administration and foreign affairs [p48514] as well as in purely military concerns was not achieved at once nor without the occurrence of events which threatened its accomplishment, but it was ultimately achieved. The varying fortunes of the protagonists in the political struggle which culminated in the supremacy of the military will be found to provide the explanation of many of the events abroad. Japanese warlike adventures and the preparations therefor ebbed and flowed with the varying fortunes of the political struggle in the Japanese homeland. THE "PRINCIPLES" OF KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU The reputed date of the foundation of the Empire of Japan is 660 B.C. Japanese historians ascribe to that date an Imperial Rescript said to have been issued by the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenno. In this document occur two classic phrases upon which there gradually accumulated a mass of mystical thought and interpretation. The first is "Hakko Ichiu" which meant the bringing together of the corners of the world under one roof, or the making of the world one family. This was the alleged ideal of the foundation of the Empire; and in its traditional context meant no more than a universal principle of humanity, which was destined ultimately to pervade the whole universe. The second Principle of conduct was the principle of "Kodo," a [p48515] contraction for an ancient phrase which meant literally, "The oneness of the Imperial Way." The way to the realization of Hakko Ichiu was through the benign rule of the Emperor; and therefore the "way of the Emperor" -- the "Imperial" or the "Kingly way" -- was a concept of virtue, and a maxim of conduct. Hakko Ichiu was the moral goal, and loyalty to the Emperor was the road which led to it. These two ideas were again associated with the Imperial dynasty after the Meiji Restoration. That Emperor proclaimed them in an Imperial Rescript issued in 1871. They then represented a constitutional rallying-point, and an appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people. THE ADVOCACY OF THESE "PRINCIPLES" BY OKAWA In the decade before 1930, those Japanese who urged territorial expansion did so in the name of these two ideas. Again and again throughout the years that followed measures of military aggression were advocated in the names of Hakko Ichiu and Kodo which eventually became symbols for world domination through military force. In 1924 a book was published by a Dr. Okawa who was originally one of the accused but who became mentally unstable in the course of the trial. He [p48516] stated that since Japan was the first state to be created, it was therefore Japan's divine mission to rule all nations. He advocated the Japanese occupation of Siberia and the South Sea Islands. In 1925 and thereafter, he predicted a war between East and West, in which Japan would be the champion of the East. He said, in 1926, that Japan should endeavor to fulfil that sublime mission by developing a strong spirit of nationalism. He had organized a patriotic society which advocated the liberation of the colored races and the moral unification of the world. He had often, at the invitation of the Army General Staff, lectured to them along these lines. THE RISE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE TANAKA CABINET In April 1927 when Tanaka took office as Prime Minister, the expansionists gained their first victory. The new Cabinet was committed to a policy of peaceful penetration into that portion of China called Manchuria. But, whereas Tanaka proposed to establish Japanese hegemony over Manchuria through negotiation with its separatist leaders, elements within the Kwantung Army were impatient of this policy. The Kwantung Army was the Japanese unit maintained in Manchuria under the Portsmouth Treaty for the protection of Japanese interests including the South Manchurian Railway. In June 1928 [p48517] certain members of the Kwantung Army murdered Marshal Chang Tso-lin, with whom Tanaka was negotiating. Marshal Chang Tso-lin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armies in Manchuria. Tanaka's efforts to discipline the Army officers responsible for this murder were successfully resisted by the Army General Staff, which had the War Minister's support. The Army had defied the government, and resistance among the Chinese had been greatly stimulated. The government had been gravely weakened by the alienation of the Army's supporters. In April 1929 Okawa launched a public campaign designed to take the Manchurian question out of the government's hands. The Army General Staff, encouraged by Okawa's success, soon began to cooperate with him. Competent propagandists were sent to ventilate the question in the various parts of Japan. In the face of this opposition and of continued disorders in Manchuria, the Tanaka Cabinet resigned on 1 July 1929. EXPANSIONIST PROPAGANDA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE HAMAGUCHI CABINET When Hamaguchi became Prime Minister in succession to Tanaka, Baron Shidehara returned to the Foreign Ministry. In the governments before Tanaka had [p48518] taken office, Shidehara had been the foremost proponent of the liberal policy of friendly international relationships. His return to power constituted a threat to the Army's program of expansion through military force. In the face of this challenge, Okawa continued his propaganda campaign with the assistance of members of the Army General Staff. He maintained that Manchuria must be separated from China and placed under Japanese control. Thus would be ended the domination of the white races over Asia and in its place would be created a land founded upon the principle of the "kingly way;" Japan would assume the leadership of the peoples of Asia, and would drive out the white races. Thus, as early as the year 1930, Kodo had come to mean Japanese, domination of Asia, and a possible war with the West. The military authorities had not been slow in following Okawa's lead. Military officers had launched a formidable campaign to spread the doctrine that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline; and that Japan should expand into it, develop it economically and industrially, and defend it against the Soviet Union. In June 1930, Colonel ITAGAKI, then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, favored the establishment, through military force, of a new state in Manchuria. He repeated after Okawa that such a development would be in accordance with the [p48519] "kingly way," and would lead to the liberation of the Asiatic peoples. HASHIMOTO AND THE MARCH INCIDENT OF 1931 Throughout the year 1930 the Hamaguchi Cabinet followed a policy of retrenchment which sharpened the antagonism of the military faction. Smaller budgets were voted for the Army and Navy. The standing Army was reduced in size. The Treaty for Naval Disarmament was ratified in the face of strong opposition. Among young naval officers and in the patriotic societies there was considerable indignation. In November 1930 the Prime Minister was mortally wounded by an assassin, but the Cabinet carried on under the liberal leadership of Baron Shidehara. Liberalism had therefore become the chief target of the Army's resentment, and in January 1931 a plot was hatched to overthrow it. This was the so-called "March Incident" and was a conspiracy engineered by Okawa and Lieutenant-Colonel HASHIMOTO to create an insurrection which would justify the proclamation of martial law, and would lead to the installation of a military Cabinet. It had the support of the Army General Staff. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Lieutenant-General KOISO, abetted the conspirators. It failed because Ugaki, who had been selected as the new [p48520] Prime Minister, refused to countenance the scheme. HASHIMOTO had returned to Japan from Turkey in January 1930, imbued with a knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, the methods of European dictatorships. In September 1930 he had formed among his fellow senior officers of the Army General Staff a society designed ultimately to achieve a national reorganization, if necessary, by force. The abortive March Incident of 1931 was the result of this work. HASHIHOTO's work was complementary to Okawa's. In his hands the "way of the Emperor" became also the way of military dictatorship. He confessed to Okawa that the Diet, which had aroused the Army's indignation, should be crushed. Okawa himself had told Ugaki that the ready-made political parties must be swept away, and the Imperial dignity uplifted under military rule. This would be the work of the "Showa restoration." "Showa" is the name given to the reign of the present Emperor. Under the Japanese constitution the War and Navy Ministers enjoyed direct access to the Emperor upon a footing of equality with the Premier. The Chiefs of Staff also were directly responsible to the Emperor; so there was historical warrant for the claim that the way of Kodo was the Army's way. [p48521] Although the March Incident of 1931 failed, it had set the precedent for later developments. The Army had aroused great public resentment against the advocates of disarmament and liberalism. One such malcontent had assassinated the liberal Premier, Hamaguchi. In some quarters the naval and military reduction program was regarded as an unwarranted interference by the Cabinet with the affairs of the armed forces. The militarists had in a measure succeeded in diverting to their own ends the patriotic sentiment of loyalty to the Emperor. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48522] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: THE WAKATSUKI CABINET AND THE MUKDEN INCIDENT Under Wakatsuki, who on 14 April 1931, succeeded Hamaguchi as Premier, Cabinet and Army pursued antithetical policies. While Shidehara, who remained Foreign Minister, laboured wholeheartedly to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian issue, the Army actively fomented trouble, which culminated in the attack at Mukden on 18 September 1931. This was the beginning of what came to be known as the Mukden Incident which eventually led to the establishment of the separate government of Manchukuo. This will be dealt with at a later point. During the five intervening months resistance to the Cabinet's policy of armament reduction and budgetary economies increased. HASHIMOTO and his group of army officers, known as the "Cherry Society" and designed to bring about the rational reorganisation, continued to advocate the occupation of Manchuria by force. The Black Dragon Society, pledged to nationalism and an anti-Soviet policy, began to hold mass meetings. Okawa continued his campaign for popular support. The army, he said, was completely out of control; and it would only be a [p48523] matter of time before the Cabinet acquiesced in its wishes. Yosuke Matsuoka, who, like Okawa, was an official of the South Manchurian Railway Company, published a book in support of the familiar theme that Manchuria was, both strategically and economically, the lifeline of Japan. Okawa, with HASHIMOTO and his Cherry Society, instigated the Mukder Incident. The Army General Staff approved the scheme, which was commended to them by Colonel DOHIHARA. DOHIHARA and Colonel ITAGAKI, both members of the Kwantung Army Staff, each played important parts in the planning and in the execution of the attack. Lieutenant General MINAMI, Vice-Chief of the Army Staff under the Tanaka Cabinet had become War Minister in Wakatsuki's Cabinet. Unlike his predecessor, Ugaki, he took the Army's part against that of the liberal Cabinet in which he held office. On 4 August 1931, he talked to his senior officers of the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchuria and Mongolia; spoke disapprovingly of those who advocated measures of disarmament; and urged them to carry out their training conscientiously, so that they might serve to perfection the cause of the Emperor. Lieutenant General KOISO, who, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, had been privy to the [p48524] planning of the March Incident of 1931, still occupied that position. War Minister MINAMI, though he took the Army's part, and favored the Army's scheme for the conquest of Manchuria, was disposed to pay some deference to the views of the Cabinet and the Emperor. The Wakatsuki Cabinet had continued the policy of seeking reductions in the budgets for the armed forces; and, by 4th September, 1931, War Minister MINAMI and Finance Minister Inoue had reached substantial agreement in this regard. MINAMI was immediately subjected to strong criticism by KOISO for agreeing to this step; and, as a result, the agreement reached between MINAMI and Inoue was rendered nugatory. By 14 September 1931 the Army's schemes in Mongolia and Manchuria were known in Tokyo. On that day MINAMI was warned by the Emperor that these schemes must be stopped. This message he conveyed to a meeting of Army leaders and others in Tokyo. It was thereupon decided to abandon the plot. MINAMI also despatched a letter to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army ordering him to abandon the plot. This letter was not delivered until the Incident at Mukden had occurred. The messenger who was despatched to Mukden to deliver this important letter was General Tatekawa; and, as will appear in our discussion of the [p48525] Mukden Incident, he seems to have intentionally delayed presenting this letter until after the incident had occurred. On 19 September 1931, the day after the Mukden Incident occurred, it was reported to the Cabinet by MINAMI, who characterised it as an act of righteous self-defence. CONSOLIDATION OF THE ARMY'S POWER DURING THE PERIOD OF THE WAKATSUKI CABIKET Wakatsuki gave immediate instructions that the situation must not be enlarged; and expressed concern at the Army's failure to carry out thoroughly the policy of the government. Five days later, on 24 September 1931 the Cabinet passed a formal resolution denying that Japan had any territorial aims in Manchuria. The Army was indignant that the Emperor should have been induced to support the Cabinet's Manchurian policy; and almost daily MINAMI reported Army advances made in violation of his own assurances to the Premier. On 22 September 1931 he proposed a plan to send the Korean Army to Manchuria, but was rebuked by the Premier for the action taken. On 30 September 1931, MINAMI demanded the despatch of further troops, but the Premier again refused. One week after the Cabinet's [p48526] resolution was passed the Chief of the Army Staff warned Wakatsuki that the Kwantung Army might be compelled to advance further into the Yangtze area; and that it would brook no outside interference with its prerogatives. During October 1931 a new conspiracy was planned by HASHIMOTO and his Cherry Society. He had confessed his part in the Mukden Incident, which, he said, was aimed, not only at the establishment in Manchuria of a new country founded on "the Kingly Way," but also at resolving the political situation in Japan. The October plot was designed to accomplish this latter aim. It was planned to destroy the political party system with a military coup d'etat, and to establish a Cabinet in sympathy with Army policy. The plot was exposed, and the scheme was then abandoned upon MINAMI's orders. But, during October and November 1931, military activity continued in Manchuria in direct violation of Cabinet policy. Rumors were circulated that, if the Cabinet continued to withhold cooperation, the Kwantung Army would declare its independence; and, in the face of this threat, the resistance of the moderate elements among the liberalists was broken. On 9 December 1931 the War Minister reported to the Privy Council on the Manchurian situation. [p48527] Opposition to the Army's activities was now confined to the deleterious influence which they might exert upon Japanese relations with the Western Powers. MINAMI agreed that the conflict between Japanese official assurances and Army actions was unfortunate; but issued a sharp warning that there must be no interference by outsiders in matters of Army discipline. Three days later, on 12 December 1931, Wakatsuki resigned, after admitting his Cabinet's inability to control the Army. The Manchurian Incident, he said, had continued to expand and spread in spite of the Cabinet's decision to prevent it. After abandoning the prospect of forming a coalition Cabinet which could control the Army, he had decided reluctantly that Shidehara's policy must be abandoned. As the Foreign Minister would not yield, he had been compelled to tender his Cabinet's resignation. The Army had achieved its goal of a war of conquest in Manchuria, and had shown itself to be more powerful than the Japanese Cabinet. THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA DURING THE PERIOD OF INUKAI' S CABINET It was now the turn of the Seiyukai party, which had been in opposition, to attempt to control the Army. When Inukai was given the Imperial Mandate, he was [p48528] instructed that the Emperor did not desire Japanese politics to be wholly controlled by the Army. His party contained a strong pro-military faction, led by Mori, who became Chief Cabinet Secretary under the new government. But Inukai adopted immediately a policy of curtailing the activities of the Kwantung Army, and of negotiating with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek a gradual Army withdrawal from Manchuria. General Abe had been nominated for the post of War Minister in the new government; but many young Army officers had opposed this appointment upon the ground that Abe had no knowledge of, or sympathy for, their feelings. At their insistence Inukai had appointed Lieutenant General ARAKI as War Minister, believing that he would be able to control the Army. General Honjo, commanding the Kwantung Army, which was already planning to create in Manchuria a new state under Japanese control, despatched Colonel ITAGAKI as his emissary to Tokyo, and received the support of War Minister ARAKI. Inukai opened secret negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which, however, came to the knowledge of Mori and the military faction. Mori warned Inukai's son of the Army's indignation; and the negotiations, though promising well, were perforce abandoned [p48529] by the Premier. An Imperial Conference was held in late December 1931, two weeks after the Cabinet had taken office; and immediately afterwards a new offensive in Manchuria was planned by ARAKI, the War Ministry and the Army General Staff. Inukai was refused an Imperial Rescript sanctioning the withdrawal from Manchuria; and Colonel ITAGAKI threw out hints of the Kwantung Army's plan to install a puppet ruler and to take over the administration of the new state. The new Premier's plan to control the Army had been frustrated in a matter of weeks. A new offensive in Manchuria began as the Army had planned, while in Tokyo War Councillor MINAMI advised the Emperor that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline, and that new state must be founded there. On 18 February 1932, the independence of Manchukuo was declared; on 9 March 1932, the first organic law was promulgated; and three days later the new state requested international recognition. One month afterwards, on 11 April 1932, the Inukai Cabinet, which had now accepted this fait accompli, discussed plans for the Japanese guidance of Manchukuo. THE ATTACK ON PARTY, GONVERNMENT AND ASSASSINATION OF INUKAI During the first quarter of 1932 HASHIMOTO and [p48530] Okawa were each preparing the way for the national reorganization or renovation which would rid Japan of democratic politics. On 17 January 1932, HASHIMOTO had published a newspaper article advocating the reform of the Japanese parliamentary system. He propounded the theme that democratic government was incompatible with the principles upon which the Empire was founded. It was, he said, necessary to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties, and to destroy them for the sake of constructing a cheerful new Japan. Okawa was forming a new society, named after Jimmu Tenro, the legendary founder of the Empire and the legendary enunciator of "Kodo" and "Hakko Ichiu." The objects of the new society were to further the spirit of the Empire, to develop nationalism, and to inspire the Japanese to the leadership of East Asia; to crush the existing political parties and to achieve the realisation of a government constructed on nationalist lines; and so to plan the control of Japanese industrial development as to encourage expansion of the national power abroad. Though the Inukai Cabinet had yielded on the question of Manchuria, the liberal elements within it still resisted the type of national renovation which Okawa and HASHIMOTO advocated. Inukai favoured a [p48531] reduction in the Army budget, and was opposed to the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan. Through his son he received repeated warnings from Mori that his opposition to the military faction was endangering his life. The cleavage between the militarists and those who still believed in Cabinet control affected both the Cabinet and the Army itself. The pro-military group was led by War Minister ARAKI and had become known as the "Kodo faction" -- the supporters of the "principle" of "the Imperial Way." On May 1932 Inukai delivered a speech in which he extolled democracy and condemned fascism. A week later he was assassinated in his official residence. HASHIMOTO was a party to the plot, which was carried out by naval officers. Prince Konoye, Baron Harada and others discussed the situation which had arisen. KIDO, Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, Lieutenant General KOISO, Vice- Minister of War, and Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI of the Military Affairs Bureau were present. It was agreed that Inukai's assassination was directly attributable to his championship of party government. SUZUKI considered that similar acts of violence would occur if new Cabinets were organised under political leadership, and he therefore favoured the formation of a coalition government. [p48532] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET The Saito Cabinet, which took office on 26 May 1932, attempted to achieve a compromise in the conflict between Cabinet and Army. The Cabinet would control the military; and would affect general economies including a reduction in the army budget. On the other hand, the Cabinet accepted the Army policy in Manchukuo; and determined upon the promotion, under Japanese domination, of the economic and industrial development of that country. Lieutenant General ARAKI was still War Minister; and Lieutenant General KOISO, who had become War Vice-Minister in February 1932, retained that position. It was inevitable that the new Cabinet policy in regard to Manchukuo should cause a deterioration in Japanese relations with the Western Powers. But the Army, unfettered by opposition within the Cabinet, was also preparing for war with the U.S.S.R., and for a further struggle with the central government of China. As early as December 1931 it had been planned to include in the new state the Chinese province of Jahol; and in August 1932 it was declared that this area formed part of Manchukuo. In the same month KOISO vacated his post in Tokyo to become Chief of [p48533] Staff of the Kwantung Army. A month earlier, in July 1932, the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow had reported that the greatest stress must be laid upon preparation for war with the Soviet Union, as such a war was inevitable. He saw in the restraints of the League, in Chinese resistance, and in the attitude of the United States, further obstacles to the accomplishment of Japan's great task in Asia. War with China and with the U.S.S.R. he believed to be a foregone conclusion, and with the United States a possibility for which Japan must be ready. [p48534] Recognition of Manchukuo by Japan had been withheld for six months; but in September 1932 it was decided by the Privy Council that the international repercussions which this step would cause need not be feared. With the Council's approval, an agreement was concluded between Japan and the puppet regime which the Kwantung army had installed. It was considered to be an appropriate measure in ensuring the extension of Japanese interests on the Continent. Under its provisions the new state guaranteed all Japanese rights and interests, and undertook to provide every possible establishment which the Kwantung army might require. Japan undertook, at Manchukuoan expense, the defence of, and maintenance of order in, that country. The key positions in both central and local governments were reserved for Japanese; and all appointments were made subject to the approval of the Commander of the Kwantung army. In pursuance of this agreement, KOISO, as Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung army, drew up a plan for the economic "co-existence and co-prosperity" of Japan and Manchukuo. The two countries would form one economic bloc, and industries would be developed in the most suitable places. The army would control ideological movements, and would not in the meantime permit political [p48535] parties to exist. It would not hesitate to wield military power when necessary. Soon after the Saito Cabinet had taken office, War Minister ARAKI had announced that, in view of the establishment of Manchukuo, the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements previously made by Japan could no longer be considered binding upon her. The League of Nations in 1931 appointed the Lytton Commission to investigate the circumstances of Japan's intervention in Manchuria. After the report of the Lytton Commission had been received, the League had voiced strong disapprobation of Japanese activities in Manchuria, and in fostering new incidents elsewhere in China. In view of this opposition to her plans, the Saito Cabinet decided, on 17 March 1933, to give notice of Japan's intention to withdraw from the League of Nations; and, ten days later, that action was taken. Simultaneously steps were taken to exclude foreigners from Japan's mandated Pacific islands. Preparations for war in the Pacific could therefore be made in breach of treaty obligations, and freed from foreign surveillance. Meanwhile military preparations upon the continent were aimed directly at the Soviet Union. In April 1933, Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Military Affairs [p48536] Bureau characterised the U.S.S.R. as the absolute enemy, because, as he said, she aimed to destroy the national structure of Japan. THE PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR: ARAKI DISCLOSES THE ARMY'S PLANS The publicists heralded the events of this period as the foundation of Japan's "new order". HASHIMOTO took some of the credit, both for the conquest of Manchuria, and for secession from the League. It was, he said, in port the result of the schemes which he had devised upon his return from Europe in January 1930. Okawa said that the Japanese-Manchukuoan Agreement had laid the legal foundation for the co-existence and co-prosperity of the two countries. The spirit of patriotism, he said, had been suddenly awakened in the hearts of the Japanese people. Democracy and Communism had been swept away, and in Japan the nationalistic tendency had reached an unprecedented climax. Okawa also welcomed Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, which, in his view represented the old order of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Japan, he said, had at one stroke overcome her dependence upon Britain and America; and had succeeded in exhibiting a new spirit in her diplomacy. In June 1933 War Minister ARAKI made a speech [p48537] of the utmost significance. In form it was an emotional appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people, exhorting them to support the Army in a time of crisis. But in it was clearly revealed a settled intention to achieve the armed conquest of East Asia, which ARAKI identified with the traditional goal of Hakko Ichiu. In fostering a sentiment for war, he drew liberally upon the political philosophy which Okawa and HASHIMOTO had popularised. Japan, said ARAKI, was eternal, and was destined to expand. The true spirit of the Japanese race lay in finding order amid chaos, and in realising an ideal world, a paradise in East Asia. Herein lay the distinction between the new order and the old; for, said ARAKI, under the leadership of the League of Nations, the whole world had opposed the fulfillment of Japan's holy mission. This, therefore, was the critical period for Japan. Recent events had shown that it was necessary to prepare for a nationwide general mobilisation. Upon this interpretation of the international situation ARAKI based his appeal for popular support. He told his audience that the foundation of Manchukuo was a revelation from heaven, which had re-awakened the national spirit of the Japanese people. If the zeal [p48538] which the Mukdan Incident had engendered was sustained, the new order would be achieved. A revival of the national spirit would resolve the international difficulties which beset Japan; for the issue of wars depended ultimately upon the spiritual power of the people. The path for the people to follow, said ARAKI, was the "way of the Emperor", and the Army of Japan was the Emperor's Army. It would therefore fight against anyone who opposed it in its task of spreading the "Imperial Way". ARAKI also discussed the term "national defence", which was later to become the basic principle of Japanese preparations for war. It was, he said, not limited to the defence of Japan itself, but included also the defence of the "way of the country", which was Kodo. He therefore showed clearly that by "national defence" was meant the conquest of other countries through force of arms. In his writings of the same period ARAKI disclosed the Army's designs upon Mongolia, and reaffirmed once more his country's determination to crush any country which turned against the "Imperial Way". PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET: AND THE AMAU STATEMENT In the months which followed, ARAKI's policy gained both popular support and Cabinet recognition. [p48539] By September 1933 an intense antipathy for the arms limitation treaties had been built up through the efforts of the military leaders. There was a universal demand for the revision, in Japan's favour, of existing naval ratios; and any Cabinet which resisted this popular clamour would have had to face an outraged public. Notice was given of Japan's intention to abrogate the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments. Meanwhile the Saito Cabinet had made ARAKI's principle of national defence the over-riding consideration in its Manchukuoan policy. By December 1933 this policy was settled. The economies of the two countries would be integrated, and their military expenses would be shared. Manchukuoan foreign policy would be modelled upon that of Japan. The "national defence power" of the two countries would be increased to overcome the international crisis which before long Japan might encounter. The "open-door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty would be observed only in so far as they did not conflict with the requirements of "national defence." In December 1933 the Kwantung Army was making operational and other preparations for the day upon which Japan would open hostilities against the Soviet Union. In the space of two years the "friendship" [p48540] policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara had been completely discarded. In April 1934 a new policy in respect of East Asia was formulated in the "Amau statement." This unofficial declaration, released to the press by a Foreign Office spokesman, caused international alarm, and was quickly disclaimed by the Saito government. It was however, wholly consistent with the Cabinet decisions of 1933, and repeated, in less inflammatory language, much the same policy which War Minister ARAKI had ennunciated ten months earlier. It was stated that, as Japan had a special position in China, her views might not agree on all points with those of other nations. It was this divergence of opinion which had necessitated Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Although she desired friendly relations with other countries, Japan would act on her own responsibility in keeping peace and order in East Asia. This responsibility was one which she could not evade; nor could she share it with countries other than China herself. Therefore any attempt by China to avail herself of foreign support in resisting Japan would be opposed. [p48541] THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HIROTA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO AND OKADA CABINETS On 14 September 1933, in this atmosphere of increasing international tension, HIROTA had become foreign Minister of Japan. While Cabinet and Army were planning and preparing for the new order, he attempted to allay the misgivings of the Western Powers, and to minimise the aggressive nature of his country's national policy. In February 1934 he assured the United States of his firm belief that no problem existed between that country and Japan which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution. On 25 April 1934, one week after the Amau statement had been published, HIROTA sought to discount its significance. He advised Hull, the American Secretary of State, that the declaration had been made without his approval, and that it had created a false impression. He gave a categorical assurance that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China in derogation of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. Yet his government had already decided to subordinate the "open-door" provisions of that very treaty to the needs of Japanese preparation for war in Manchukuo. [p48542] Again in April and May 1934, similar assurances were given by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The Ambassador did, however, admit that his government claimed a special interest in preserving peace and order in China; but, in response to Hull's direct questioning, he denied that this phrase signified an over- lordship in the Orient, or even an intention to secure preferential trade rights as rapidly as possible. By July 1934 no assurances could conceal the fact that a petroleum monopoly was being set up in Manchukuo; and Hull protested against the exclusion of American concerns in violation of Japanese treaty obligations. In August 1934, after Okada had succeeded Saito as Premier, Foreign Minister HIROTA advised Hull that Manchukuo was an independent state, and that Japan had no responsibility in the matter. Although Manchukuo was under the control of the Kwantung Army, and although the development of the petroleum monopoly was a direct result of the Saito Cabinet's "national defence" policy, further communications from the United States failed to elicit any acknowledgment of Japanese responsibility. The disparity between HIROTA's professions and his country's actions was made even more apparent in December 1934. In that month the Manchurian Affairs [p48543] Bureau was created as an organ of the Japanese government to coordinate its policy in regard to Manchukuo. ARMY EXPANSION AND GOVERMENTAL ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS ON THE CONTINENT IN 1935 While HIROTA denied that Japan's intentions were aggressive, the Army accelerated its preparations for war. In 1935 it took the initiative in preparing for military expansion on the continent of Asia; while the Okada Cabinet, which had taken office on 8 July 1934, gave its support to the Army's economic planning in Manchukuo. Simultaneously with the creating of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau in December 1934, General MINAMI was appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo. Major-General ITAGAKI became his Vice-Chief-of-Staff. With ITAGAKI's support, MINAMI made plans to foster the establishment of autonomous governments in Inner Mongolia and in the five provinces of North China. This would inflict a serious loss upon the national government of China, and would at the same time create buffer states between Manchukuo on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other. During May 1935 the North China Army under [p48544] Lieutenant-General UMEZU made a pretext to issue a virtual ultimatum to the Chinese forces in that area; and MINAMI mobilised the Kwantung Army to back up UMEZU's demands. Some units moved into the demilitarised zone of North China; and in June 1935 the Chinese capitulated, moving their armies and administration from the Tientsin area. As KIDO observed in Tokyo, this step against China was based upon the plans of ITAGAKI and others that the military, not the diplomats, should take the lead in dealing with China, as they had done in the case of Manchukuo. During the same period the Kwantung Army manufactured an incident at Changpeh and Major-General DOHIHARA took charge of the intrigue with prospective puppet rulers, the aim being the formation of new autonomous governments. The Foreign Ministry took no hand in these developments, but HIROTA received full advice of their progress from the Peiping Embassy. On 2 October 1935, he was told that the Army intended to establish a virtually autonomous state for the sake of including North China in the Japanese-Manchukuoan economic bloc, and of promoting national defence. He was also told that the Army's Inner Mongolian scheme was making steady progress, and that DOHIHARA was no doubt engaged in promoting it. [p48545] According to defence witness Kawabe the Changpeh Incident was settled on 27 June 1935, by the conclusion of the Ching-DOHIHARA agreement. The Army was now in control of local regimes in half of Inner Mongolia, and in substantial portions of the five provinces of North China. Meanwhile, on 3 July 1935, the Privy Council, in the presence of Foreign Minister HIROTA, had met to consider closer economic cooperation with Manchukuo. The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council reported that, while measures of military diplomacy in Manchukuo were well advanced, no system had yet been devised to coordinate measures in the economic field. Therefore they recommended the conclusion of a pact to establish a Joint Economic Committee, which would provide the necessary machinery. The Privy Council approved the measure, after HIROTA had given an assurance that Japan would always be able to rely upon a preponderance of votes in the Committee; and the new agreement was signed on 15 July 1935. THE COORDINATION OF HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH ARMY PLANNING During the last three months before the Okada Cabinet fell, Army policy and foreign policy under HIROTA were completely coordinated. In December 1935 [p48546] General MINAMI sent troops to aid the local goverment in Inner Mongolia in taking over from the Chinese the remaining portion of that area. General Tada, who on 1 August 1935, had succeeded UMEZU as Commander of the North China Army, made plans to place the railways in that area under his control, so that he might use them to achieve his military objectives. During that month also the Kwantung Army communicated to the War Ministry its propaganda plan, which would be carried out in conformity with its military activity in North China. As soon as the advance into China proper should take place, a campaign would be launched to convince the whole world of the lawfulness of the Japanese cause. An attempt would also be made, by means of anti-Kuomintang and anti-Communist agitation to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the central authorities. This slogan of "anti-Communism" had been chosen by DOHIHARA, ITAGAKI and others, when the autonomous movement was first launched in 1935. On 21 January 1936 HIROTA despatched to the Japanese Ambassador in China a precis of the plan which the Army had drawn up for dealing with North China. The Ambassador was instructed that the intention was gradually to build up self- government in the five provinces of North China. The Foreign Ministry was [p48547] determined to give support and guidance to the new political organisation and thus to expand and strengthen its functions. No measures would be taken which the world might understand as indicating a Japanese intention to set up in North China an independent government similar to that of Manchukuo. The various military organisations would be told to keep closely in touch with the Foreign Office and the Navy in carrying out the plans. A provisional organisation to handle the problems of self-government would be established under the Commander of the North China Army. With this reconciliation between Foreign Ministry and Army the first period of military preparation was complete. The resources of Manchukuo were in course of development. The standing strength of the Army had risen from 250,000 men at the beginning of 1930 to 400,000 at the beginning of 1936. In the second period military planning would involve the whole nation in a general mobilisation for war. THE INCREASING POWER OF THE ARMY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE OKADA CABINET Keisuke Okada, who was Prime Minister of Japan from 8 July 1934 to 8 March 1936, has testified that, during his tenure of office and that of his predecessor Saito, the power of the Army was increasing. Both [p48548] Cabinets, said Okada, had incurred the Army's resentment because it recognised in them an influence opposed to the Army's policy of using force in connection with the expansion of Japanese influence in Asia. The power and the ruthlessness of "activist" circles within the Army had been evinced in July 1935, when the Inspector-General of Military Education had been forced to resign. In protest against this action, Lieutenant-General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, had been assassinated in his office by an Army officer of field grade. Although Okada, as Prime Minister had felt very strongly about this incident, he had been powerless to investigate the crime. The Army had conducted its own investigation, and had permitted no interference by Premier or Cabinet. In consequence of this incident, and because he feared further trouble from the militarists, General Hayashi had tendered his resignation as Minister of War; and had been succeeded in that office by General Kawashima, whom all the generals agreed to try to protect. It was realised by the members of the Cabinet that, in accepting the appointment, Kawashima ran a considerable risk. [p48549] THE 26 FEBRUARY 1936 INCIDENT, AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE OKADA CABINET Subsequent events proved that these fears were not without warrant; for, on 26 February 1936, Army resentment against the Okada Cabinet culminated in the attempted assassination of Okada himself by a group of young Army officers. Twenty-two officers and some fourteen hundred men, revolting against the government and seizing its principal administrative offices, terrorised Tokyo for three and a half days. During this period the government was carried on by the Minister of Home Affairs while the Premier war besieged in his residence. The Finance Minister, Takahashi, and Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, were assassinated by the terrorists. Ten days later Okada, being unable to control the military, tendered the resignation of his Cabinet. OKADA'S POLICY AND DOWNFALL SHOW THE EXTREME NATURE OF THE ARMY'S DEMANDE During Okada's period of office many steps had been taken to place the Japanese nation in a state of preparation for war. HIROTA, as Foreign Minister, and Nagano, as Japanese delegate to the London Naval [p48550] Conference, played a major part in the policy which led Japan, in December 1934, to declare her intention of abrogating the Washington Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armaments, and to secede from the London Naval Conference in December of the following year. In the Mandated Islands during the same period, air bases and storage facilities were under construction at various points, and elaborate precautions were being taken to prevent foreign travellers from entering the area. During the year 1935 also, a strict censorship of news had been instituted under the immediate supervision of the Home Ministry; and newspapers had become little more than vehicles for the dissemination of government-approved propaganda. The police had exerted a large measure of censorship and control over all media of expression of public opinion. In August 1935 the War Ministry had issued regulations designed to investigate the conditions of military training in schools and universities, contribute to its developments and to ensure that the potential military value of the qualifications of graduating students was assessed. Despite repeated pretests from the United States, an oil monopoly had been established in Manchuria by the Japanese; and machinery for the exploitation of the natural resources of that country had been provided. [p48551] Since October 1935 at the latest the Army had taken an active and independent part in Japanese, foreign policy; for in that month the defendant OSHIMA, then Military Attache in Berlin, had begun negotiations for a Japanese-German Pact, and had expressed to Von Ribbentrop the desire of the Japanese Army General Staff for a general treaty between the two countries. Notwithstanding all of these developments, and although the Kwantung Army had proceeded steadily towards the realisation of its aims in Manchuria and North China, the extremists were not satisfied. The Army regarded the Okada Cabinet as one formed by the Navy in an effort to control the militarists. It did not consider that it was receiving proper support for its policies in North China. By means of assassination and insurrection, the extremists within the Army had cleared from their path, first the more moderate influences within the War Ministry itself, and then the Cabinet, which, though it had provided no substantial resistance to pressure from the militarists, still represented a less violent policy. On 27 February 1936, the very day after the Army insurrection had begun in Tokyo, the Japanese consulate in Amoy, China, let it be known that the purpose of the insurrection was to replace the divided Cabinet by a military Cabinet. They said that the [p48552] young military group intended to take the whole of China at one stroke and to prepare for an immediate war against the Soviet Union so that Japan might be the only power in Asia. This was the Army's design; and these were the circumstances in which HIROTA's government took office on 9 March 1936. As SHIRATORI had suggested to a friend in November 1935, if neither diplomats nor political parties could suppress the militarists, it was better to support their policy and to endeavour to carry it out. HITORA AND HIS CABINET When the new Cabinet took office on 9 March 1936 all of Okada's ministers were replaced with the sole significant exception of HIROTA himself. He had become Foreign Minister on 14 September 1933 during Saito's premiership, and had held that office for thirty months. As Japanese encroachment upon the continent of Asia continued, he had been required to deal with an increasing volume of protests from other powers whose interests were affected, and particularly from the United States. Although Japanese usurpation of sovereignty upon the continent and the wide- spread violations of the "open door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty had not been rectified, he had contrived to retain in a measure the confidence of the Western Powers. Now, in the moment of [p48553] the Army's ascendancy, when other Cabinet Ministers relinquished office, HIROTA became Prime Minister of Japan. Nagano, who had led the Japanese delegation which seceded from the London Naval Conference in December 1935, became his Navy Minister. Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had commanded the North China Army until 1 August 1935, became Vice-Minister of War. Vice-Admiral SHIMADA remained Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff. Arita replaced HIROTA at the Foreign Ministry; and Baron HIRANUMA, Vice-President of the Privy Council since October 1926, attained the Presidency of that institution. Under this Cabinet the Army's scheme for a new order in East Asia became the settled policy of the Japanese government. THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING SERVICE MINISTERS TO BE CHOSEN FROM GENERAL OFFICERS UPON THE ACTIVE LIST Two months after the formation of the new Cabinet, a measure was taken which established more securely the power of the Army over successive governments. On 18 May 1936 the new government promulgated an ordinance reviving an old rule that the Navy and War Ministers must be officers on the active list of the rank of Lieutenant-General or above. As events were soon to [p48554] prove, this placed in the hands of the military authorities a weapon which could make or break governments without recourse to the methods of intimidation which had led Okada to resign. THE BASIC OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL POLICY WAS DECIDED ON 11 AUGUST 1936 On 11 August 1936, at a conference of Five Ministers attended by Prime Minister HIROTA, Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister Terauchi, Navy Minister Nagano, and Finance Minister Baba, the fundamentals of Japan's national policy were decided. In this statement were set out in the utmost clarity the principles which were to guide Japan, both in her relationships with other nations and in completing her internal preparations for war. We may consider first the contents of the decision itself, and then the process which led to its adoption. THE PRINCIPLES DECIDED UPON The fundamental principle of national policy was to be the strengthening of Japan, both internally and externally, so that the Japanese Empire would "develop into the stabilisation power, nominal and virtual, in East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind throughout the world." The next sentence left no room for [p48555] doubt as to the nature of the development contemplated. The establishment of the national policy would consist "in securing a steady footing of (the Japanese) empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic still and national defence." The second part of the statement was devoted to considering the situations which this policy would entail, and the steps which would be taken to meet them. [p48556] In the first place, it was realised that the policy would lead to difficulties with other powers having interests in the Orient. Therefore, Japan would "exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers" and would follow her own policy based on the "co- existence and co-prosperity" principles. This policy was to find more concrete definition a year later in the Five-year Programme of Important Industries. It was then said that industries requisite for national defence would be pushed forward to the Continent as much as possible "according to the principle of right work in the right place," and that Japan "should pick out the most important resources, should ingeniously take the initiative in economic exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources." Such a policy was in open conflict with the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. The second principle laid down in August, 1936, was implicit in the first. "In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safeguard its development so as to acquire the position of the real stabilisation power in East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament." This statement also was to receive concrete definition in the Army's plans of 1937. [p48557] The third principle made clear the relation of the first two to practical policies. Japan "should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the North, in order to realise a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defence of both Japan and Manchuria." Japan "should also be prepared for Britain and America, attempting at the same time an economic development by the close cooperation of Japan, China and Manchuria." Nevertheless, in achieving her objects, Japan "should always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Power." The same note of caution was sounded in the fourth and final principle. "For the furtherance of our plan to achieve the social and economic development of our Empire toward the South Seas, especially in the outer South Seas Islands Areas, we should take a gradual and peaceful measure, always avoiding to stimulate other nations, and try to fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchuria." THE MEASURE OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DEMANDED BY THE 1936 DECISION In the final portion of the 1936 policy statement, the balance of military and diplomatic function was worked out. Defence armament would be completed. The measure of military strength would be that necessary [p48558] "to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish and employ in the Far East;" and especial attention would be paid to the completion of military strength in Korea and Manchuria so that Japan might "strike a hit at the very outset of the war upon the Russians." Naval armaments would be strengthened to an extent sufficient to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy. Japan's diplomatic policy would be "to try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner," and the military authorities were charged with the duty of assisting the activities of the diplomatic organ, so that it might act fully and advantageously. Lastly, internal policy would be determined in accordance with the basic plan. Steps would be taken to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's will to tide over Japan's extraordinary emergency. Measures would be taken to secure their livelihoods, to develop their physical strength, and to "foster sound and healthy minds and ideas." Japanese diplomacy would be revitalised; and her systems of overseas information and publicity would be completed. Drastic progress would be made in air and sea transportation. Administrative and economic agencies would be [p48559] created to advance and further trade and industry essential to the national policy. The establishment of a programme for self-sufficiency in important resources and materials would be expedited. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AIMS EXPRESSED IN THE 1936 POLICY DECISION The statement of basic national policy which the Five Ministers adopted on 11 August 1936 expressed Japan's determination, not only to achieve the domination of East Asis, but also to extend her influence southwards. This expansion to the south would, if possible, be achieved peacefully; but the threat of military strength would be used to ensure diplomatic victories. It was recognised that Japan's designs upon the continent would lead to an almost certain collision with the U.S.S.R., and would also lead inevitable to disputes with other nations having interests in the Orient. Among such powers must be numbered all the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and most notably Great Britain and the United States. It is apparent that Japan's determination to substitute her own principles of "co-existence and co-prosperity" for the "existing military rule policy of the powers" meant merely that the rulers of Japan were bent upon the economic and industrial exploitation of Manchuria and [p48560] the rest of China in violation of Japan's obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. It was frankly acknowledged that this policy could succeed only if backed by a vast plan of mobilisation for war. It was agreed that the goal of naval expansion should be a force large enough to secure to Japan the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy; and that the goal of military expansion must be the creation of a fighting machine strong enough to inflict a crushing blow upon the strongest force which the Soviet Union could deploy upon its Eastern borders. It was recognised that these objectives in turn demanded the institution of a comprehensive programme for industrial development and self-sufficiency; and that every phase of the lives of the Japanese people must be so directed and controlled as best to prepare them to play their parts in a period of expected national emergency. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY DECISION This basic national policy decision, which proved to be the cornerstone in the whole edifice of Japanese preparations for war, originated not with HIROTA's Cabinet as a whole, but in the War and Navy Ministries. On 30 June 1936, War Minister Terauchi [p48561] and Navy Minister Negano agreed in conference upon a draft proposal which corresponded in every material respect with the statement finally adopted by the Conference of Five Ministers on 11 August 1936. There were certain differences in emphasis; and in these cases the blunter wording of the two service ministers served to show more clearly the intentions of the policy-makers. Where the final draft spoke vaguely of securing a steady footing in Asia and developing in the South Seas, the service ministers had stated categorically that Japan's guiding principle must be to realize the spirit of the "Imparial way" by following a consistent policy of overseas expansion. Upon the same day, 30 June 1936, Terauchi and Nagano laid their plan before HIROTA, Arita and Baba, their colleagues in the Five Ministers Conference. Finance Minister Baba, agreeing that the military rule policy of the Powers should be ousted from the continent of Asia, thought fit to remark that it was essential for Japan herself not to practice a militaristic despotism. Foreign Minister Arita laid stress upon the need, in existing international circumstances, for retaining the good will of Great Britain and the United States; but had otherwise no objections to the draft proposal, the sentiment of [p48562] which he found to be in keeping with his own concept of Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister HIROTA said that he had no fault to find with the proposal; and the meeting adjourned leaving it to the Army or Navy to draw up a detailed plan. The Five Ministers met again on 7 August 1936, and approved the plan in its final form. Four days later, on 11 August 1936, these decisions were reiterated and embodied in an official statement signed by each of the five ministers concerned. THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT It may here be noted that, several months before the Five Ministers Conference of June and August 1936, another Army design of major importance had been adopted by HIROTA's government. In October 1935, informal discussions for a Japanese- German alliance had been instituted by OSHIMA, the Military Attache in Berlin, with the approval of the Army General Staff. In the spring of 1936, after HIROTA had become Prime Minister, Ambassador Mushakoji had returned to Berlin; and thenceforward had himself conducted the negotiations. After protracted discussions between von Ribbentrop and Mushakoji, the Anti-Comintern Pact was initialed by them in Berlin on 23 October 1936. On 25 November 1936 the treaty was [p48563] ratified by the Japanese Privy Council. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR UNDER HIROTA The transactions of the HIROTA Cabinet, both before and after the redefinition of the basic national policy, accorded closely with the principles set out in that decision. Great strides were being made in consolidating Japanese control of Manchuria and North China. While the Kwantung Army exercised control in Manchuria itself, in Japan the civil authorities were working towards the establishment of a nominally independent satellite state whose national policy Japan would dictate and whose natural resources Japan would be free to exploit. The Japanese-Manchukuoan Treaty, signed on 10 June 1936, marked the virtual attainment of this aim. Two days later Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, advised a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the impression had been created that Japan sought absolute economic domination, first of East Asia, and then of such other areas as she thought fit. This, said Hull, would in the end mean political and military domination as well. On 11 August 1936, at the very conference [p48564] which settled the fundamentals of Japanese national policy, the "Second Administrative Policy towards North China" was also approved. Its main purpose was to set up an anti-communistic, pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian area in which Japan would secure materials necessary for her programme of preparations for war, and in which she would also improve transportation facilities in case of war with the Soviet Union. While the Army on the continent was securing new sources of materials and new avenues of industrial expansion, steps were being taken to develop a new war- supporting economy in Japan. The assassination of Finance minister Takahashi during the February 1936 Army insurrection, and the subsequent formation of HIROTA's Cabinet, marked a turning-point in the financial policy of the Japanese Government. The nation now embarked upon a series of financial measures emphasizing state control of the national economy for political purposes. The new policy was designed to accommodate a sweeping programme of industrial expansion. From this time onwards the government issue of National Loan Bonds was steadily increased to make provision for enormous budget outlays; and little consideration was paid to the principles of sound financing. In January 1937 the transactions involving [p48565] foreign exchange were made subject to government licence, and expenditure of foreign assets was virtually confined to the purchase of commodities essential to the war-supporting industries. On 29 May 1936, a law was passed for the express purpose of establishing the production of automobiles "in order to adjust the national defence and the nation's industry." Prior to this date the automobile industry was virtually non-existent, nor was it an economically sound proposition. Yet its development under strict governmental control was now fostered with the aid of state subsides and sweeping tax exemptions. Japan's merchant shipping fleet was also being rapidly increased under government subsidy. The third "scrap and build" programme was inaugurated during HIROTA's term of office. Together with the programme of the previous year, it produced 100,000 new gross tons of shipping, giving Japan at the end of 1936 the most modern merchant fleet, in proportion to size, of any nation in the world. We will recess now until 1:30 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) [p48566} AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: (Continuing) PLANS FOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN TIME OF WAR On 20 May 1936, the War Ministry produced that portion of its General Mobilization Plan which dealt with intelligence and propaganda activities before the outbreak of war and during its initial phases. The plan provided that, if war became imminent, an Intelligence Bureau would be created to give effect to the Government's policy of publicity and propaganda. The scope of the activities of this bureau, and the methods of its functioning, were set out in minute detail. Its task would be to guide and to control every form of communication to the public, and to utilize every medium of public expression to promote the policy approved by the government. [p48567] NAVAL PREPARATIONS While HIROTA was Prime Minister, the Navy was not less active than the Army in promoting the national mobilization for war. The two service ministers had acted in conjunction in preparing their statement of basic national policy, and in supporting it before the Conference of Five Ministers. It was, indeed, the Navy Minister, Admiral Nagano, who sponsored the new statement of policy before the conference; and it appears from his remarks that the concrete plan, as finally approved on 11 August 1936, was drafted to the Navy Ministry. This was the year of the Navy's emancipation from all obligation to limit her naval armaments; for the Washington Treaty expired on 31 December 1936. With Japan's earlier expansionist schemes the Japanese Navy had had little direct concern. Now for the first time it was assigned a major role, namely, that of securing the command of the Western Pacific Ocean against the United States fleet. The policy of naval expansion to which Japan thus committed herself had commanded a grating volume of support since the year 1930. It is therefore appropriate to the topic of preparations for war to review at this point the steps by which Japan had abandoned the system of [p48568] limitation of naval armaments through international agreement. JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATIES FOR NAVAL DISARMAMENT The United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy were parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments signed at Washington on 6 February 1922. Articles IV and VII of that treaty had declared respectively the total tonnage of capital ships and of aircraft carriers which might be maintained by each of the signatory powers, the limitation being based upon the defensive needs of the power concerned. In both cases the upper limit for Japan was 60 per centum of that permitted to the United States or Great Britain. A limitation had also been placed upon the calibre of the guns which might be mounted on these and other classes of vessels -- 16" in the case of capital ships and 8" in the case of aircraft carriers. The treaty was not to expire before 31 December 1936, and was to remain in force until the expiration of two years from the giving of notice by one of the contracting powers of intention to terminate it. All the signatory powers were to meet within one year from the giving of such notice. The United States, Great Britain and Japan, [p48569] together with India and the British dominions, were also parties to the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament signed at London on 22 April 1930. This treaty had not abrogated the Treaty of Washington, but had provided for a further reduction and limitation within the framework of the older treaty. Provision had been made for limitation of the permissible displacement of aircraft carriers and submarines, and of the calibre of the weapons carried by them. Detailed tables had also been provided, setting out the total tonnage of surface vessels, other than capital ships and aircraft carriers, which might be maintained by each of the signatory powers --the limit for Japan being approximately 70 per centum of that permitted for the United States or Great Britain. The third important provision had been that each signatory should communicate to the other signatories certain information upon the laying down and upon the completion of each vessel of war. In addition, the agreement had involved the scrapping of certain capital ships, and this provision had been manifestly favorable to Japan. The provisions as to aircraft carriers were to remain in force for the same period as the Treaty of Washington; but in other respects the treaty was definitely to expire on 31 December 1936. A new conference [p48570] was to be held between the signatory powers during the year 1935. In evaluating the advantages which the London Treaty offered to Japan, weight must be given to the views of Takarabe, the Navy Minister during 1930. It had, he said, been considered essential for the Navy to have 70 per centum of the strength maintained by the probable potential enemy, and Japan had attempted to maintain this ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference. Finally this aim had been abandoned, and Japan had acceded to a ratio of 60 per centum. She had, however, attained her two other major aims, namely 70 per centum in strength of cruisers with 8" guns, and her present strength in submarines. At the London Conference every effort had been made to gain the third major aim, namely 70 per centum in total tonnage; and this aim had succeeded. While it was indeed true that the ratio of Japanese to United States cruisers with 8" guns would, under the provisions of the London Treaty, fall from 70 per centum to 60 per centum, there were compensations in the increased ratio of less formidable ships allotted to Japan, Above all, said Takarabe, the treaty was a bid for friendly relations with the United States, and had saved Japan the possible predicament of an armament [p48571] race with that country. The Prime Minister, Hamaguchi, had echoed this sentiment, admitting that some aspects of the agreement were not entirely satisfactory, but pointing out that Japan would in any case be free to build again after 1936. Although Prime Minister Hamaguchi, his Navy Minister and his Cabinet had championed the treaty, it had not been ratified without considerable opposition. Thirteen stormy sessions of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council had debated the question between 18 August and 26 September 1930. An open rift had developed between Cabinet and Privy Council; and also, it appeared, between Cabinet and the Naval General Staff, of which Nagano was then Vice-Chief. Hamaguchi, when taxed with disregarding the advice of his service chiefs, had answered pacifically that the views of the military had been considered, but that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. As the discussions had progressed it had become more apparent that there was a line of cleavage between those who placed reliance upon friendly international relations, and those who advocated armaments sufficient to confront the United States or any other power intervening in Sino-Japanese affairs with a Japanese preponderance of strength at the scene of conflict. The latter view had been well [p48572] represented by one Councillor who had said that the military system was characteristic of Japan; that the United States would attempt to drive Japanese influence out of China and Mongolia; and that military strength must therefore be supplemented. Japan's importance in the world, two Councillors had said, lay in her military power alone. On 1 October 1930, the London Treaty had been ratified by the Privy Council, Hamaguchi and Takarabe expressing the views attributed to them above. Great public interest, speculation and unrest had been aroused. HIRANUMA, as Vice- President of the Privy Council, had attended every meeting. THE PERIOD OF GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE NAVAL TREATIES The minority, which had in 1930 opposed the ratification of the London Treaty, in time became a majority; and under the two "navy" Cabinets of Saito and Okada, opposition to the treaty restrictions had gathered strength. On 15 September 1933, while Saito was Premier, Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington a growing dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed by the London Treaty. Ever since its ratification, he said, and especially during the preceding twelve months, [p48573] Japanese naval leaders had insisted that Japan must demand parity, or at least a great increase in relative tonnage at the Conference to be held in 1935. They had built up a feeling of resentment and contempt for anything connected with the treaty. The assassinations of Hamaguchi and Inukai and the intimidation of other statesmen were due in part to their defense of it. The retirement of Takarabe and other senior naval officers had been attributed to the support which they had given to the treaty. Grew emphasized that public opinion in Japan was now bitterly opposed to any form of limitation of armament, and that the new policy of the United States in building towards the treaty limits had served only to incite the feeling aroused. Japanese naval leaders now faced the dilemma of entering with unequal resources upon a naval armament race, or of braving the public opinion which they themselves had fostered. At this juncture the Saito Cabinet had held office for eighteen months. ARAKI, War Minister in this and the preceding Cabinet, had dealt cautiously with the question, conceding that the Washington and London Treaties had saved public money, and had prevented competitive rearmament and the development of new weapons. He had, nevertheless, made it clear [p48574] that Japan considered the provisions of these treaties outmoded, and that she would demand a change in ratios at the next conference. The day before Grew's report was written, HIROTA became Foreign Minister of Japan, and a Supreme War Councillor. Just over a year later, on 17 September 1934, HIROTA informed Grew that Japan had definitely decided to give notice before 31 December 1934 of her intention to terminate the Washington Treaty. In the interval the Amau statement had been made and Saito's Cabinet had been replaced by that of Okada. THE POLICY OF THE COMMON UPPER LIMIT, 1934 The London Treaty, 1930, had provided for a meeting of signatories in 1935 to frame a new treaty. In July or August 1933, Vice-Admiral Takahashi, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff under Prime Minister Saito, had said frankly, "We are going to the Conference in 1935 with a demand for parity. If our demand is rejected, we shall return home." In October 1934 when Japanese representatives met British and American delegates at London for preliminary discussions, this was the stand they adopted. They were convinced, they said, that a common upper [p48575] limit, within which all powers might build, but which no power might exceed, was the only way in which to secure equality of security. They would favor a limit fixed by agreement at as low a level as possible. In particular, they would favor total abolition or a radical reduction in the strength of aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers with 8" guns. These vessels they regarded as being peculiarly offensive in nature. Submarines, on the other hand, they regarded as essentially defensive weapons, owing to their comparative unseaworthiness and relatively short range. If the provision of the London Treaty prohibiting their use in attacking merchant vessels could be made universal, the offensive character of submarines would, they thought, be ended. This proposal was designed to enhance Japan's naval power in comparison with that of the United States. In 1933 the United States had inaugurated a new naval policy, building towards, but still keeping considerably below, the limit prescribed by the Washington and London Treaties. The proposal for a general reduction to a relatively low common upper limit would have required the leading naval powers, having navies larger than the limit fixed, to scrap or sink many ships. Therefore, the practical effect [p48576] of the Japanese proposal would have been the sacrifice of a portion of the American fleet, and of the whole of the results achieved by its building program, with no corresponding sacrifice on the part of Japan. Again, it has already been noted that, under the provisions of the London Treaty, Japan had successfully claimed an increased ratio in total displacement at some expense to her proportionate strength of cruisers with 8" guns. The provisions of the Washington Treaty still operated to keep her comparative strength in capital ships and aircraft carriers at the lower level. Therefore, the three types of naval vessels, the total abolition of which Japan was disposed to recommend, were those in which she was proportionately weakest. Finally, it was apparent that since 1930 Japan had revised her views concerning the role of submarines. One Privy Councillor, vehemently opposing the ratification of the treaty, had then said that what the United States feared most was submarines; and that, as long as Japan possessed submarines, she had nothing to fear from the United States. Navy Minister Takarabe had made a special point of his government's success in retaining its submarine strength at the existing level. This had constituted one of the three [p48576-a] great principles of Japan's naval policy. In October 1934 while the London discussions were in progress, the Japanese government had issued an official statement for the guidance of public opinion. It was there stated that Japan's experience with the League had shown that a just claim was not always recognized at an international conference. As the maintenance of Japan's naval strength was the basis of the peace of East Asia, her future depended upon the fortunes of her navy. Therefore the people must be put upon their guard against foreign propaganda. Even if the Japanese claim should not be accepted, and no agreement should be reached, this would not necessarily mean the beginning of a naval construction race; and even should such a race ensue, the authorities were confident that Japan's position could be maintained by independent measures. The preliminary discussions had terminated on 19 December 1934 without achieving any measure of agreement. On the same day the Japanese Privy Council had unanimously approved the government's decision to abrogate the Washington Treaty, and on 29 December 1934 had given to the United States notice of Japan's intention so to do. An unsuccessful attempt had previously been made to persuade Great Britain to [p48576-b] join in this step, so that Japan might avoid the embarrassment of unilateral action. [p48577] WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE 1935 On 7 December 1935, a naval conference, called in pursuance of the Washington and London Treaties, and attended by the delegates from the five powers signatory to the Washington Treaty, had opened in London. The United States delegation had proposed an all-round quantitative reduction of 20 per centum in each category of naval vessels upon the basis of existing ratios, and had also been prepared to discuss qualitative limitations, particularly limitations in the calibre of weapons. The chief Japanese delegate, Nagano, had in reply reiterated that public opinion in Japan no longer supported the Washington Treaty, and had reaffirmed his country's insistence upon the common upper limit. The American delegation had pointed out that over-all parity would mean overwhelming Japanese superiority in the Pacific, while the existing treaty system provided equality of security for all signatory nations. Therefore the Japanese demands, if persisted in, could lead only to competitive naval construction. The Japanese delegation had made no substantial attempt to answer these objections, saying merely that, in their country's view, while the United States Navy was superior in strength, it menaced Japan's very [p48578] existence. Despite an American suggestion that the provisions of the Washington Treaty should endure until a new agreement could be reached, and despite British attempts to reach an agreement on qualitative limitations, Japan had insisted that the parity issue must first be determined. Accordingly, on 15 January 1936, the principle of the common upper limit had been discussed in plenary session. As no other delegation had offered any support for the proposal, the Japanese delegation had formally withdrawn from the Conference. Thus in 1934 and 1935, when Okada was Premier and HIROTA his Foreign Minister, the way had been cleared for naval rearmament. In August 1936, the Conference of Five Ministers had decided upon the creation of a navy sufficiently strong to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States fleet; and, in so doing, had confirmed American fears that the abandonment of the existing treaty system could lead only to competitive naval rearmament. NAVAL EXPANSION UNDER HIROTA In December 1936, the month of the expiry of the Washington Treaty, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau was able to report -- in a speech which was not for publication -- that the armaments and materials of [p48579] the Japanese Navy were making rapid progress from day to day. Vice-Admiral Toyoda warned his audience that the new construction programme would involve heavy capital expenditure. Appropriations for this purpose should not, he said, be grudged, although detailed accounts would not be furnished. It would be unprofitable for Japan to let other powers know too early the future building policy of her Navy. The new programme, which HIROTA's Cabinet had instituted, bore fruit in the following year; for in 1937 the increase in Japanese naval construction figures was the greatest for any year between 1931 and 1945. But, to secure command of the Western Pacific, the Navy needed bases as well as fighting ships. Japan's Mandated South Seas Islands -- the Mariannas, the Marshalls and the Carolines -- which covered the whole area of the central western Pacific, became, on 20 January 1937, subject to naval administration. THE HISTORY OF THE MANDATED ISLANDS Under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Japan received under Mandate from the League of Nations these three widely-scattered island groups, which she administered through the agency of the South Seas government with headquarters at Palau. [p48580] Under the provisions of the League Covenant there was imposed upon the mandatory the duty of preventing the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases; and by virtue of a treaty signed at Washington on 11 February 1922 relating to Pacific possessions, Japan had undertaken this same obligation in relation to the United States. The Japanese Mandated Islands were served by the Nippon Yushen Kaisha Steamship Company, which, from the year 1933 onwards, had followed a policy of excluding foreigners from its service to the islands. On 28 March 1933, when the "navy" Cabinet of Saito was in power, this company had advised its Honolulu office that bookings should be refused to foreigners, and that persistent applicants would be given passage only after approval had been secured from the proper authorities in Japan. THE FORTIFICATION OF MANDATED ISLANDS BEFORE 1936 There are indications that the building of naval installations in the mandated islands area was begun in 1932 or 1933, and that these beginnings were contemporaneous with the new policy of exclusion of foreigners. By 1935 at the latest, an airstrip and a naval air base were under construction upon the island [p48581] of Saipan in the Mariannas. This island, the largest of the Mariana group, is situated approximately 200 miles northward from the American island of Guam. During the latter half of 1935, steps were taken to intensify the restrictions placed on foreign travel in the South Seas Islands. The Japanese steamship company on 14 October 1935 again advised its Honolulu branch that every effort was being made not to accept passengers for voyages into this area. In any exceptional case full details concerning the intended passenger should be furnished to the South Seas Islands government, which would reach a decision only after consultation with the Foreign and Navy Ministries. Experience had indicated that in most cases the application would be refused. Twice more in October and November 1935 these instructions were repeated. It was stipulated that all problems concerning the South Seas line should be handled only by Japanese, and that correspondence should be written only in Japanese. Refusal of bookings would be attributed to poor standards of accommodation and irregularity in sailing times. Approval in any given case would rest with the Navy Minister and with Foreign Minister HIROTA. [p48582] SECRECY IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS MAINTAINED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE HIROTA CABINET In June 1936, when HIROTA's government was three months old, the American Secretary of State advised Grew that grave suspicions were entertained as to harbour developments or fortifications in the Mandated Islands. It was pointed out that Japanese vessels had been permitted to visit closed ports in Alaska; and the American Ambassador was instructed to seek permission for a United States destroyer to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands. Grew made the request, as on his own initiative, to HIROTA himself. The Prime Minister professed to be well-disposed, but to have no knowledge of the question. It was later indicated to Grew that a decision rested with the Overseas Affairs and Navy Ministries. No permission was forthcoming, although Japan and the United States had, in 1922, agreed to extend to each other the usual comity in visiting the harbours and waters of their respective mandated islands. On 28 July 1936, the Japanese steamship company again advised its Honolulu branch that passengers should not be accepted for travel on the South Seas line. Further communications dated 8 April 1937 and 13 March [p48582a] 1939 show that the restrictions imposed were not relaxed in subsequent years. These facts, taken together, show that, both before and after the national policy decision of 11 August 1936, Japan was making preparations for war in the South Seas area, in breach of her obligations as a mandatory. The Foreign and Navy Ministries were throughout concerned to divert attention from these developments; and in these efforts HIROTA had a full share, both as Foreign Minister and as Premier. [p48583] NAVAL OFFICERS AS ADMINISTRATORS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS On 20 January 1937, while HIROTA's government was still in office, the Privy Council approved a measure permitting naval officers in active service to be appointed as administrative officials of the South Seas government without loss of seniority in the service. HIROTA himself and Navy Minister Nagano were among those who attended the Council meeting over which HIRANUMA presided. In the privacy of the Council meeting the true nature of Japan's interest in the mandated islands was declared. The reasons given for the measure were that the South Seas islands had come to hold an important position in the defence of the Empire; and that, in view of the international situation and of the many installations in the islands concerned with navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation and communications, special attention must be paid to the convenience and military circumstances of the Navy. POSITIONS OF ACCUSED UNDER HIROTA It has been seen that the period of HIROTA's premiership, which lasted from 9 March 1936 to 1 February 1937, was one of active planning and preparations for war, which originated with the War and Navy Ministries, and which involved the other principal departments of [p48584] government in the execution of the long-range planning. Among the most important office-holders at this time was Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who became, on 23 March 1936, Vice-Minister of War. This office he retained during the Premierships of HIROTA, Hayashi and Konoye until 30 May 1938. Under HIROTA, he held, in addition, many subsidiary appointments, which might serve as an index of the Army's interests at that time. He was a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau, and of the Information Bureau. He was a member of the commission appointed to investigate the affairs of the automobile industry, and a member of the Council for Educational Reform. He was in charge of the War Ministry's affairs in the Imperial Diet. KIMURA, appointed Major-General on 1 August 1936, was Chief of the Control Section of the Mobilization Plans Bureau. On 20 May 1936 his Bureau had produced the mobilization plan for control of public opinion in time of war or emergency. Lieutenant-Colonel MUTO was a staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau until 19 June 1936; and Colonel SUZUKI was attached to that office until 1 August 1936. ITAGAKI, who was appointed Lieutenant-General on 28 April 1936, had been Vice- Chief-of-Staff of the [p48585] Kwantung Army since 10 December 1934. From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937, he was that Army's Chief-of-Staff, and, in addition, a Member of the Japanese- Manchukuoan Joint Economic Commit too. He was therefore intimately connected with the progress, during HIROTA's term of office, of Japanese military and economic preparations in Manchuria and in the provinces of North China. HOSHINO who, since 1 July 1934, had been a section chief in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo, became, on 9 June 1936, the Vice-Chief of that Ministry. Vice-Admiral SHIMADA was Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff from 2 December 1935 to 1 December 1937, during which period the Navy had contributed to the national policy decision of August 1936, had achieved control of the mandated islands, and had instituted a new policy of naval expansion. Captain OKA was, until 1 December 1936, a member of the Naval General Staff, and an observer in the Navy Ministry. During HIROTA's term of office, KAYA was in charge of the affairs of the Finance Ministry in the Diet, and was also a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. On 2 February 1937, when Hayashi replaced HIROTA, KAYA became Vice-Minister of Finance. HASHIMOTO AND THE GREATER JAPAN YOUNG MEN'S SOCIETY [p48586] In August 1936, a few days after the basis of Japan's national policy had been decided, Colonel HASHIMOTO was placed on the Reserve List. He embarked immediately upon the task of founding a new society, the aims of which he expounded in speeches and in phaphlets during the latter half of 1936. HASHIMOTO based his doctrines upon the two traditional precepts of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu. For, said HASHIMOTO, the first step in unifying the world was to unify the people of Japan itself directly under the Emperor. To achieve the renovation the blood and enthusiasm of young men were required; and it was the purpose of the Greater Japan Young Men's Society to supply this need. Young men would become the framework of the New Japan, and would unite the entire strength, moral and physical, of the Japanese race in the spirit of Kodo or loyalty to the Emperor. It has been seen that in the period under review the history of the Army was one of defiance of the civil power. Statesmen and governments had been removed by intimidation, assassination and insurrection when their policies were in conflict with those of the Army. Now in 1936, with HIROTA as Premier, the Army had established a settled ascendancy over a Cabinet in office. HASHIMOTO had taken this process a further step, building for a [p48587] day when there would be one party only, the Army party; and when the rulers of the Army would no longer be encumbered by the forms of democratic government. The immediate goal of totalitarianism was symbolised in the idea of Kodo; the ultimate goal of world domination in the idea of Hakko Ichiu. And here may be reviewed the steps which had already been taken to prepare the minds of the Japanese people for war and for military rule. THE HISTORY OF MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES As early as 1886, military training and lectures had been instituted in the elementary, secondary and normal schools of Japan; and after the Japanese-Chinese War of 1896 regular Army officers had conducted the training. After the 1914-18, little attention was paid to the matter for some years; but from 1922 onwards the War Ministry detailed officers to supervise the teaching. During 1925 and thereafter the War and Education Ministries worked in conjunction to ensure that male students received training. On 23 April 1925, it was ordained that military officers of active service status should be stationed in schools. They would, by agreement between the War and Education Ministries, be posted to teacher's training institutions, to all types of public [p48588] and governmental schools, and, upon request, to private schools. They would be under the supervision and orders of the school authorities; but they themselves remained the servants of the War Ministry, which was given the right to inspect the actual conditions of training in the schools. A year later, in September 1926, the War Ministry organised an inspectorate which was required to furnish reports upon the work being carried out. In April 1926 the Education Ministry created a new teaching organization designed to cater for youths of seventeen to twenty-one years of age, who had received no formal schooling. The course, which was of four years duration, included subjects of general and vocational value; but one half of the total hours of instruction were specifically set aside for military training. In the month of their foundation, provision was made by the War Ministry for inspection of the military drills carried out at these youth schools. By the year 1927, military training was compulsory throughout the whole school system; and from 1925 to 1930, the amount of school time devoted to this type of instruction was steadily increased. In the universities, classes in military subjects were obligatory from the year 1925; though the obligation was not, at first, strictly enforced. [p48589] Actual military training remained upon a voluntary basis; but, as university students who attended both classes and parades were subsequently exempted from two out of three years of compulsory military service, there was a strong inducement to secure attendance. Shortly before the Mukden Incident occurred students were taught that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline, upon the control of which depended the establishment of a stable economic order. With the outbreak of war in Manchuria lingering opposition to the military training programme was lost in the new spirit of ultra-nationalism which the military teaching inspired. From 1931 onwards the military instructors, though nominally subordinate to the school and university authorities, achieved an increasing measure of independence and domination. After the military operations in Manchuria had subsided, time devoted to military subjects decreased a little; but it received a new impetus in 1936, when HIROTA's government was in power. The training consisted of drilling, physical culture and war games. The textbooks used in the schools dealt with Japanese military history, and were designed to foster enthusiasm for the fighting services among the students. THE HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP AND THE DISSEMINATION OF PROPAGANDA [p48590] Freedom of the press had always been limited in Japan. The enforcement of censorship under existing laws was a task for the Police Bureau, which was controlled by the Home Ministry. The police enforced the censorship laws in connection with every form of public expression; and they were particularly concerned to control expressions of opinion which were in conflict with governmental policy. All material for speeches and public entertainment was subject to their approval. Any material which was in their opinion objectionable was suppressed; any individual or society which disobeyed their ruling was punished under the provisions of the Preservation of Peace Law of 1925. There was, in addition, a security police organization, created in 1928 to watch over subversive elements of the extreme right and left. From 1931 onwards these "High Police" kept watch on everybody who opposed the policy of the government in power, and on every public expression of opinion. Enforcement of censorship became accentuated before the outbreak of war in Manchuria, and during the same period government-inspired propaganda was disseminated through the newspapers. Beginning in 1930, authors, speakers, and editorial writers were united in a concerted effort to prepare public opinion for war in Manchuria, and, by the end of that year, steps were being taken to suppress all who [p48591] opposed this policy. From 1931 onwards the Army had exercised an unofficial censorship of its own. Any writer or publisher, whose work was deemed by the Army to be unsatisfactory, received personal visits from Army representatives, who advised him that he had incurred the Army's disfavour. Such threats and warnings were also issued by the various patriotic societies, whose activities have been mentioned in connection with the war in Manchuria. After the Manchurian war, the government and the Army launched an organised campaign to justify Japan's position on the continent, and to stifle criticism at home. Material dealing with military matters could be printed only after it had been approved by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry. From 1935 onwards the press was completely under the domination of that Ministry. At the instigation of the Army, and in contemplation of the outbreak of war, the Information Bureau was established by the HIROTA government during 1936. Its task was to coordinate, on behalf of all Ministries, the control of information and the dissemination of propaganda. It provided the government with a ready means for carrying out the 11 August 1936 national policy decision to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's determination to tide over "Japan's" [p48592] extraordinary "emergency." HASHIMOTO'S POLICY IN 1936 HASHIMOTO, while engaged in founding his Greater Japan Young Men's Society, was, in all his writings and utterances, preparing Japanese public opinion for war. He advocated, in terms less guarded than those the Five Ministers had used, expansion in the south, and especially in the Netherlands East Indies. He recognized in the British Navy the chief obstacles to his plan; and warned Japan that great resolution would be needed. He extolled the superior qualities of the Japanese race, whose mission it would be to end the tyrannical rule and the oppression of the white race. Later in 1936, HASHIMOTO published the declaration, which embodied the aims of his new society. In this document, he said that Japan should increase her armaments to the amount absolutely necessary for conquering other countries of different principles that tried to hinder her from achieving the "Imperial Way." The essence of rearmament, he added, should be the realization of an invincible air force. [p48593] THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF JANUARY 1937 Meanwhile the program of economic and military expansion to which the HIROTA government was now committed had met with a mixed reception, and a struggle had developed between the militarists and their remaining opponents. The Cabinet had incurred, on the one hand, the opposition of the Seiyukai party, which accused it of bureaucratic tendencies, and of undue pandering to the military; and, on the other hand, that of the Army faction, which would now tolerate the expression of no viewpoint other than its own. On 20 January 1937 a mass meeting of the Seiyukai party published a declaration criticizing the diplomatic and administrative policies of the HIROTA government. They expressed their intention of strengthening parliamentary institutions, and of subjecting all government measures to careful scrutiny. In particular they attacked the militarists, in whom they recognized the qualities of self-complacency and of a superiority complex. They declared that the military wished to interfere in every sphere of state function and said that if this evil were permitted to grow the people's will would be thwarted, constitutional government would become nominal, and the tyranny of a small group would [p48594] be introduced. This challenge the Army authorities took up immediately in a statement no less extravagant in its terms than those which HASHIMOTO had used. The twin themes of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu formed the basis of their policy. The political parties were accused of making it their sole business to attack the military authorities, without reflecting upon their own conduct. It was said that their policy could not satisfy the Japanese people, since it would confine them to the islands of Japan. It would mean that Japan could not become the stabilizing force in East Asia. It would be the end of the program of wholesale administrative reform. The statement recommended the abolition of the present state of Parliament, and a return to a form of constitutional government which would clarify the national polity, develop industry, complete national defence, stabilize living conditions, and steadily dispose of important questions. In short, the Army recognized that everything it had achieved under HIROTA was now at stake. [p48595] THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET AND THE REFUSAL OF THE ARMY TO PERMIT UGAKI TO FORM ONE Two days later, on 22 January 1937, the War Minister, Terauchi, resigned from the HIROTA Cabinet saying that the views of some Cabinet members differed fundamentally from those of the Army. In the circumstances he believed it to be absolutely impossible to enforce military discipline, the completion of national defence, and the all-out administrative reform to which he had devoted his utmost efforts since taking office. The terms of the War Minister's resignation implied clearly that no other general would accept that portfolio in the HIROTA Cabinet; and no time was spent in looking for one. On 24 January 1937, the Imperial Mandate to form a new Cabinet was offered to General Ugaki, who was ultimately forced to decline it. Before doing so he spent at least four days in a determined, but fruitless, attempt to find a War Minister. By long-established practice the nomination of a new War Minister rested with a triumvirate composed of the outgoing War Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Inspector-General of Military Education. On 25 January 1937 Ugaki called upon General Terauchi, the outgoing War Minister, to nominate his successor. Terauchi told Ugaki that the Army would not [p48596] dare to prevent the formation of a Cabinet by him; but asked him to reconsider his own position in relation to the maintenance and control of the Army. The next day General Sugiyama, Inspector-General of Military Education called upon Ugaki, and after outlining the position in the Army, again tried to dissuade him from attempting the formation of a Cabinet. That afternoon the Triumvirate met, and submitted the names of three generals, each of whom declined appointment as War Minister. The Triumvirate thereupon decided that the other eligible generals would also refuse the position, and Terauchi advised Ugaki accordingly. All this was reported to ex-soldiers' associations by Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, who explained that, as General Ugaki did not command the Army's confidence, it was considered that no one was able, as War Minister in a Ugaki Cabinet, to bear the heavy responsibility of controlling the Army. Two days later Ugaki had still not given up hope. On 27 January 1937 UMEZU gave a talk commenting upon the deadlock, and expressing the hope that Ugaki would decline the mandate peacefully. This, of necessity Ugaki did; and the Imperial Mandate was thereupon given to General Hayashi. The HIROTA Cabinet resigned on 1 February 1937, and Hayashi took office the following [p48597] day. The protest of the Seiyukai party on 20 January 1937 against the increasing control of the military men over aspects of the government of Japan was almost the last serious attempt made by a political party in Japan to arrest this pernicious process. It had done no good. It had merely formed the occasion for a demonstration by the military of the fact that without their willing cooperation a cabinet could not continue to exist, nor could a new cabinet be formed. It had demonstrated also that the military now felt strong enough to refuse to cooperate in the government of Japan except with a cabinet which was agreeable to them. THE COMPOSITION OF THE HAYASHI AND FIRST KONOYE CABINETS After emerging victoriously from this trial of strength, the Army proceeded steadily with its industrial planning. Hayashi's term of four months as Prime Minister is remarkable for nothing but the steady fruition of the plans the Army had made in 1936. HIROTA himself went out of office; but Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had upheld the Army's standpoint during the Ugaki crisis, remained Vice-Minister of War. KAYA, who under HIROTA had been in charge of the affairs [p48598] of the Finance Ministry in the Diet, now became Vice-Minister of Finance. Vice- Admiral SHIMADA remained as Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. Some remnants of the liberalist faction must have remained in positions of influence; for, on 17 March 1937, HASHIMOTO returned to his attack upon politicians. There were in the Imperial Diet, he said, liberalists who stood for the maintenance of the status quo, and who were busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This he characterized as a subtle trick to spread anti-military thought among the people, and to obstruct the military movement for political renovation. From the point of view of national defense, it was, he said, the duty of the military to mix in polities. Prime Minister Hayashi had, in July 1935 himself been out of favor with the Army; and had then felt obliged to tender his resignation as War Minister. Four months after the crisis which had brought his Cabinet to power, he relinquished office and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Prince Konoye. Again there was no perceptible pause or change in the progress of the Army's planning. UMEZU and SHIMADA again retained their offices HIROTA returned to power as Foreign Minister, the position he had held under Saito and [p48599] Okada until he himself had become Prime Minister. KAYA became Finance Minister, and thus achieved the topmost position of all in the busy field of economic and industrial planning, and of financial controls. Baron HIRANUMA, under both Hayashi and Konoye, continued to preside over the Privy Council. NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR NORTH CHINA UNDER HAYASHI On 20 February 1937, three weeks after taking office, the Hayashi Cabinet approved a new basic policy for North China, which reiterated and supplemented the Five Ministers' decision of 11 August 1936. It was now declared that Japan's principal aims in administering North China were to establish it as an anti-Soviet buffer state, and to provide a source of materials, particularly for munition industries. Again during the Hayashi Cabinet's tenure of office, on 16 April 1937, Japanese policy in North China was restated. The new plan, which merely added emphasis to the old, declared that economic infiltration would be achieved by encouraging the investment of both Japanese and Chinese private capital. The availability of such vital mineral resources as iron and coal would thereby be secured. The establishment of communications, sources of electricity, and other industrial aids would [p48600] speedily be completed. Strict precautions would, however, be taken not to arouse unnecessarily the suspicions of foreign powers. THE ARMY'S PART IN THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MANCHURIA UNDER HIROTA AND HAYASHI In January 1937 the Kwantung Army drew up a five-year plan for the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo. Ever since the beginning of the war in Manchuria, this Army had steadily been taking control of the public utilities and the financial organs of that country. During the five years from 1931 to 1936 the work of prospecting for raw materials, creating industrial plants and improving the communications system, had gone ahead hand in hand with purely military measures. During 1935 the Japanese-Manchukuoan Joint Economic Committee had been established; and in November of that year the integration of the currencies of the two countries had been achieved through the establishment of the yen bloc. On 10 June 1936, a new treaty had been signed which gave to Japanese subjects all the rights of native citizens in Manchukuo. Special laws were to be passed for their protection. They were given immunity from the local jurisdiction and certain taxation exemptions. [p48601] The number of Japanese settlers, many of whom were also potential soldiers, increased rapidly, and was then in excess of 390,000. Natives were dispossessed of their holdings to provide good land for the newcomers at nominal purchase prices. In December 1936 the Industrial Bank of Manchukuo had been created to provide easy financing for preferred industries in accordance with Japanese Cabinet policy. Over all of these developments the military authorities in Japan had exercised control through the agency of the Kwantung Army. Under the terms of the treaty of 10 June 1936, all legislation affecting Japanese subjects required the Kwantung Army Commander's approval; and, in addition, he exercised through his subordinates complete control over the internal administration of the country. From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937 Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army; and, as the occupant of that position, he was also a member of the Joint Economic Committee. It was his avowed policy to realize in Manchukuo the political and economic conditions required by Japan, to integrate the military planning and preparations of the two countries, and at the same time to promote the prosperity of Manchukuo itself. He exercised in the name of General [p48602] Ueda, the Kwantung Army Commander, full powers over the country's internal affairs. The position of Director of the Board of General Affairs of Manchukuo was also held by a Japanese. His was the key position in the shaping of internal policies. All appointments were made by his direction, subject to the approval of ITAGAKI as Army Chief of Staff. HOSHINO, who had then had six months' experience as Manchukuoan Vice-Minister of Finance, became Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National Affairs Board on 16 December 1936. He was regarded in Japan as an economic expert, and it was his task to promote the economic development of Manchukuo. In carrying out this duty he maintained a constant liaison with the Commander of the Kwantung Army. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR MANCHUKUO Army planning in 1936 and 1937 was aimed directly at securing and developing the fruits of the Manchurian Incident. The five-year plan was designed to replace haphazard development with a concrete coordinated program. HOSHINO took part in its formulation, working with the representatives of the Finance and other Ministries of Manchukuo. ITAGAKI also took part in the work; and the right of final decision rested with General Ueda, the Commander of the Kwantung Army. On [p48603] 17 February 1937 the Manchukuoan government issued an official report, announcing that, with the inauguration of the new program that country was entering upon a period of epoch-making constructive activity. So closely did the Manchukuoan plan resemble those which the Army was preparing for Japan itself, that both may be considered as a single program of industrial and economic development. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES 29 MAY 1937 On 29 May 1937, while the Hayashi government was in power, the first major step was taken towards the achievement of the goals set in the basic policy decision of 11 August 1936. On that date the Army issued a document entitled "The Essentials of a Five-Year Programme of Important Industries.” This plan was designed systematically to promote the activities of important industries generally by 1941, so that by that year Japan, Manchukuo and North China might constitute a single sphere, self-sufficient in important materials. Thus would Japan's position of leadership in East Asia be secured. Thirteen industries were selected for priority during this five-year period -- munitions, aircraft, automobiles, engineering machinery, iron and steel, [p48604] liquid fuel, coal, general machinery, aluminum, magnesium, electric power and railway rolling-stock. The basis of their selection was their importance in time of war. Separate plans were to be prepared by the Army for the aircraft and munitions industries within the framework of this general program. No radical change would be made in the existing capitalistic system of production; but the progress of the scheme would be secured by financial and price controls, direction of labor at the expense of less important industries, and control of foreign purchases. At the end of the five-year period, progress would be reviewed. THE DECISION TO EXPLOIT THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENT The Five-Year Plan for important Industries stated specifically that the industries selected for expansion would be located both in Japan itself and in Manchukuo, which would be regarded for that purpose as a single sphere. Furthermore, Japan would "ingeniously" (as it was translated) take the initiative in North China, and would make efforts to exploit its natural resources. The five-year plan for Manchukuo had already shown the use which could be made of the resources of that country. Munitions industries for the production [p48605] of weapons of war, aircraft, automobiles and rolling-stock would be firmly established. Basic major industries, including those of iron, coal, liquid fuel and electric power would be developed. Efforts would be made to increase the quantities of those agricultural products needed as military stores. Railways and harbors would be provided with the facilities necessary for the industrial developments contemplated. The object of the whole plan would be to open up those Manchurian resources which might be required in time of war; to establish a firm foundation for that country's industrial development; and so to order that development as to create self-sufficiency in Manchukuo, while supplying to Japan those materials which she lacked. THE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AND FOR THE PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS When on 4 June 1937 Konoye replaced Hayashi as Prime Minister there was no break in the continuity of Army planning. On 10 June 1937 the Army produced a tentative draft of its program for putting into operation the Five-Year Plan for Important Industries. This program followed faithfully the aim of securing self-sufficiency in important material resources by 1941. Each of the [p48606] thirteen nominated industries was separately considered; but certain basic principles were common to the plan for each. Rigorous measures would be adopted to place each industry under the control and constant supervision of the government. Special juridical persons would be created, and systems of licensing would be adopted, as aids to the enforcement of governmental control. Production would be ensured through tax exemptions, through subsidies, and through governmental guarantees of operating losses. Three weeks later, on 23 June 1937, the War Office produced a third plan entitled "Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials." Whereas the first two plans had dealt generally with the development of the war-supporting industries, the third was concerned with the Army's own role in this program of large-scale expansion. It was designed to coordinate military expansion and control with the achievement of self-sufficiency in the industries necessary to war potential. Certain industries, such as the munitions industry, fell primarily within the orbit of this plan. Others, more remotely connected with the Army's immediate needs, such as the supply of electric power, belonged more appropriately to the sphere of the major industries plan. Yet others, such [p48607] as the automobile, aircraft and machine tool industries, were equally within the orbit of each plan. But all phases of the planning were indisseverably connected. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 1936 DECISIONS AND THE 1937 PLANS In these three plans, produced by the Army in May and June 1937, were embodied the principles which the Five Ministers had laid down in the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. The fundamental aim was, in each case, the establishment of a steady footing on the Asiatic continent, and the domination of East Asia through military power. The Plan for Important Industries, issued on 29 May 1937, and designed to achieve economic self-sufficiency, had as its object a "long-stride development, ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia." The more detailed program which the Army issued on 10 June 1937 had the same end in view. Self-sufficiency was to be achieved by 1941 "in order to be prepared for the epochal development" of Japan's destiny, which would "be attained in spite of all difficulties. In the third plan, which dealt with war materials, these aims were reiterated and amplified. Not only would there be a "speedy epoch-making expansion of war industries by 1941, but also the operation of [p48608] Japan's economy would be made to develop rationally by unifying the handling of affairs by military administration." Special attention would be paid to a speedy conversion from a peacetime to a wartime basis. During the period in which these War Ministry plans were prepared and published, Lieutenant-General UMEZU was Vice-Minister of War. He had taken office on 23 March 1936, two weeks after HIROTA had become Premier, and three months before the important Five Ministers' conferences of that year. He had played an important part in the Army's refusal to countenance Ugaki as HIROTA's successor. He remained as War Vice-Minister under both Hayashi and Konoye until 30 May 1938. THE PLANS SIGNIFIED THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION The Army's 1937 planning was not directed wholly or principally towards the conquest of China. The defence witness Okada maintained that the plans were drawn up in emulation of the Soviet Five-Year plans, and were intended to ensure that Japan's strength compared favorably with that of the Soviet Union. He said that Japan's position was such that she had to take measures to cope with the phenomenal expansion of that country's national and military power. Nevertheless, the planning was not, as Okada [p48609] maintained, defensive in nature. Both in the plans relating to major industries and in that dealing with the production of war materials, the goal set was the achievement of "national defence power"; and this was to be accompanied by the perfection of Japanese armaments. Ever since June 1933, when war Minister ARAKI had defined the term, "national defence" had signified expansion on the Asiatic continent through force of arms; and in the 1937 plans themselves was expressed unequivocally the Army's intention to achieve that result. There is, however, no doubt that the Army regarded the Soviet Union as the inevitable enemy of her Asiatic policy. The Military Attache in Moscow had said so in July 1932: Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Army General Staff had repeated it in April 1933. The Kwantung Army had carried out consistently preparations for such a war, and had tested its strength against the Russians in border engagements. "Anticommunism" had been the slogan of Japanese encroachment upon North China and Inner Mongolia. In the basic policy decision of 11 August 1936 the Five Ministers had determined that the measure of military expansion would be that necessary to deal with all the forces which the Soviet Union could mobilize upon her Eastern [p48610] borders. The Anti-Comintern Pact of October 1936 had paved the way for such a conflict. On 9 June 1937, before the last of the three Army plans had been produced, there was new proof that the Army intended to initiate a war against the Soviet Union. Lieutenant-General TOJO, who had, on 1 March 1937, succeeded ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, considered that this aim should be deferred and advised the Army General Staff accordingly. Taking into consideration the prevailing situation in China and the state of military preparations against the Soviet Union, he was convinced that Japan should first, if her military power permitted it, attack the Chinese national government's forces, which the Japanese regarded as a menace to the Kwantung Army's rear. A month later, when the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, it became apparent that the Army did consider her military power sufficient to permit the taking of such a step. THE ARMY'S PLANS WERE DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS But the Army's 1937 planning was not exclusively directed against the Soviet Union; for it had long been recognized that, in achieving the conquest of East Asia, Japan would earn the enmity of the Western Powers. Nor [p48611] were her interests confined to the continent of Asia. In 1924 and 1925 Okawa had advocated the occupation of the islands of the East Indies, and had predicted a war between East and West in which Japan would emerge as the champion of the East. In July 1929 he had looked forward to the liberation of the Asiatic peoples, through the expulsion of the white races. Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933 had been heralded by Okawa as emancipation from Anglo-Saxon supremacy; and, in June 1933, ARAKI had told the Japanese people that the whole world, under League leadership, was opposed to the fulfilment of their country's destiny. He had spoken of the critical period ahead, and ever afterwards this had been a theme of the publicists and planners. By September 1933 Japanese public opinion was bitterly opposed to any form of limitation of armaments through international agreement. In December of the same year the Saito Cabinet had decided that Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty would not be permitted to stand in the way of her aims upon the continent. In 1934 and 1935 Foreign Minister HIROTA had set the precedent for mollifying Western resentment with reassuring statements, while proceeding steadily to encroach upon established Western interests in [p48612] Manchukuo. This was the policy adopted by the Five Ministers on 11 August 1936. The military rule of the Western Powers would be excluded from the continent; Japan would develop in the South Seas by gradual and peaceful measures, but would at the same time strive to maintain amicable relations with the powers. Nevertheless, it had not been assumed that the policy of soft replies could do more than delay an open breach with the Western Powers. The Five Ministers had decided that naval armament must be strengthened sufficiently to secure command of the Western Pacific Ocean against the United States. During the same period EASHIMOTO had openly advocated expansion to the south and especially into the Netherlands East Indies. He had seen in the British Navy the chief obstacle to this scheme and had called for further rearmament, the essence of which would be the creation of an invincible air force. This aim received Army recognition in the War Materials Plan of 23 June 1937, which provided for huge increases in the numbers of military and naval aircraft and designated 1942 as the first year in which required wartime capacity would be achieved. A week later, on 1 July 1937, HASHIMOTO [p48613] published another article in which he warned the Japanese people that the powers were making desperate efforts to enlarge their air forces. He once more extolled the need for an invincible air force, which might not only be used against the U.S.S.R., but which would also serve as the mainstay of Japanese armaments. The Army plans of May and June 1937 were similar to the national policy decision of 1936; and the keynote of the planning was that the goal of overseas expansion would be attained in spite of all difficulties. While it was not intended prematurely to provoke the Western powers to war, it was clearly recognized that they constituted such a difficulty. The Army, in its five-year plans, was making timely provision for the day when such difficulties could be resolved only by resort to war. Meanwhile the Navy, unencumbered either by treaty restrictions or by participation in the Army's continental schemes, was assiduously preparing for war in the Pacific. NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS DURING 1937 The year 1937 saw a large and abrupt increase in every aspect of Japanese naval strength and naval construction figures. Three heavy cruisers and one new [p48614] aircraft carrier were commissioned -- the first new cruisers since 1932 and the first new carrier since 1933. The strength of naval manning rose during the year by more than 25 per centum. Construction was begun upon a new capital ship of unprecedented dimensions and firepower. The total displacement of heavy cruisers, after being for some years relatively static, rose by 25,500 tons. Apart from destroyer strength, which had also been greatly augmented, the most marked increases were in those very classes of vessels which the Japanese delegates to the London Naval Conference had labeled as peculiarly offensive weapons. Throughout this period Vice-Admiral SHIMADA was Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. He had taken office under the Okada Cabinet on 2 December 1935, a few days before the London Naval Conference had opened. He held office continuously under three Navy Ministers during the premierships of HIROTA, Hayashi and Konoye until 30 November 1937. During this period Japan had withdrawn from the international agreements for naval disarmament; had planned to create a Navy which would rival the United States Pacific fleet; and had embarked upon a rapid but extensive program of naval construction. During this period also the Navy had been given charge of Japan's mandated South Seas Islands and had, [p48615] under cover of secrecy and in breach of treaty obligations, set about their fortification and equipment as naval bases. Construction of a naval air base on Saipan in the Marianas had been in progress at least since 1935. During 1937 ten-inch guns were imported and stored, and work was commenced under naval direction upon the installation of underground fuel tanks. In 1937 or earlier the work was extended to the Carolines, for in this year an airstrip was being made on Peleliu in the Palau group, and a thousand miles to the eastward military installations were in the course of construction upon the islands of the Truk atoll. THE REFUSAL TO AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL LIMITATION OF NAVAL GUN CALIBRE Even after Japan's withdrawal from the London Naval Conference on 15 January 1936, the Western powers had not abandoned hope of mitigating the evils of a naval rearmament race. The United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had, on 25 March 1936, concluded a new treaty which renewed or preserved in modified form certain of the provisions of the two expiring treaties. The limitation of the calibre of guns mounted on capital ships was, under the provisions of the new treaty, to be reduced from 16" to 14", provided that a general agreement [p48616] to this effect was reached with nonsignatory powers before 1 April 1937. Although it was within Japan's power to make this provision effective, a British request that she do so drew a specific refusal from Hayashi's Foreign Minister. On 4 June 1937, the day of the formation of Komoye's first Cabinet, the United States, expressing her earnest desire that the limitation should be carried into effect, made a direct appeal to Japan to give the requisite undertaking. It was explained that Japan's answer would determine whether 14" or 16" guns would be mounted upon United States capital ships then under construction. Two weeks later, on 18 June 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA conveyed Japan's refusal to Ambassador Grew and reiterated his country's adherence to the views which the Japanese delegation had expressed in London. Thus, during the very months in which the Army was producing its large-scale plans for military preparation, new proof was given of Japan's intention to proceed steadily with those warlike preparations, which were directed primarily against the Western powers. {48,617] SATO ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ARMY'S 1937 PLANS The evidence thus far considered establishes clearly the purposes towards which Japanese preparations for war and Japanese Army planning were directed in 1937. Striking corroboration is afforded by a very full newspaper report of a public address made on 11 March 1942 by Major-General SATO, then Chief of a Section of the Military Affairs Bureau, as an Army Day Commemoration Lecture. Although characterized by the defence as mere wartime propaganda the accuracy of the report was not contested. "In 1936," said SATO, "our army formulated a national defence plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments and productive power in order to secure and develop the results of the Manchurian Incident. As the expansion of armaments and rearmament by the European powers were to be completed by 1941 or 1942, we anticipated an international crisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it necessary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period 1937 to 1942, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941." [p48618] There will be occasion again to refer to this speech, for in it SATO reviewed the constancy with which the Army's ultimate purpose was kept in view, and the measure in which its efforts were attended by success. But first must be considered the new machinery which was provided to coordinate and direct Japanese governmental policy and planning during the expected period of economic and industrial expansion. THE EFFECT OF THE 1937 PLANS UPON THE INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM OF JAPAN The Army, in its 1937 five-year plans, subordinated all other considerations to that of attaining “national defence power." A rapid expansion of the war-supporting industries would be achieved; and that expansion would be so planned and guided that the utmost attention would be paid to ease of conversion from a peacetime to a wartime basis. These aims in turn demanded a unification of industrial control under military supervision; but it was recognized that, without the cooperation of the industrialists, such a system would be fruitless. Accordingly, the Army, in its War Materials Plan of 23 June 1937, aimed to combine the establishment of a new industrial hierarchy, responsible to governmental and Army control, with the maintenance of good [p48619] conditions for both the industrialist and his employees. Hours of work would not be lengthened. New machinery and technique would replace outmoded methods of production. Due regard would be paid to the danger of permitting the industrialist to sustain capital or operating losses. These precautions being taken, an increased measure of control would facilitate the achievement of the military goals of expansion and convertibility. The specific measures by which it was planned to increase control over industry were all devoted to creating larger industrial units. Guidance would be given to industrial mergers and to the incorporation of enterprises; and a special institution to exercise general control over them would gradually be established. Organic production blocs would be formed linking together groups of inter-dependent producers. Unions of small manufacturers would be organized from a military point of view so that their full productive capacities might be harnessed for wartime purposes. The 1937 plans did not constitute an altogether new departure in industrial policy, for the first steps had long before been taken. In 1929 a rationalization committee of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry had been formed; and in the following year [p48620] there was created a bureau, which took normal steps to simplify production processes and to eliminate waste. The Major Industries Control Law, passed in 1931, had been the first step towards a planned and controlled economy. Its effect was to increase the power of the great manufacturing interests, compelling smaller operators to group themselves together for self-protection. This tendency of small operators to form guilds or unions had received legislative encouragement in 1931 and again in 1932. In 1936 more sweeping measures had been taken. An amendment to the Major Industries Control Law had enforced the formation of cartels in heavily capitalized industries. By legalizing agreements, made between producer and manufacturer, the formation of monopolies was encouraged. It the same time a similar development had been instituted among small manufacturers by granting increased banking facilities to guilds. The 1937 plans were, nevertheless, a landmark. For the first time the planning was on a comprehensive, long-term scale; and for the first time its objects were directly related and subordinated to the requirements of the Army. [p48621] THE CABINET PLANNING BOARD On 14 May 1937, during Hayashi's premiership and immediately prior to the production of the Army's five-year plans, the Cabinet Planning Board was established. It replaced the Investigation Bureau which had in the past examined matters of national policy. The new board, like its predecessor, was a subdivision of the Cabinet itself, charged with the primary task of facilitating decisions on matters of national policy. Its staff of a hundred and fifty included technical experts, and senior cabinet officials were appointed as its councillors. The Imperial Ordinance creating the Board provided that it should, under the Premier's direction, make recommendations and give pertinent advice in regard to important national policies and their application. Its regular function would be to advise the Prime Minister so that adjustments might be made and conflicts avoided between the various ministries. The other duties of the Board, which are listed in the Ordinance, indicate the major role it was to play during the period of economic and industrial expansion. It would investigate the policies proposed to the Cabinet by its members and would make appropriate recommendations concerning them. It would evaluate the [p48622] relative importance of the plans proposed by individual departments of government, with a view to their integration and coordination. Its decisions upon these matters would not be made public, but would be tendered in the form of advice to the Prime Minister. It would also make recommendations concerning budget estimates. A description of the manner of its functioning was given by the defendant HOSHINO, who, in July 1940, became President of the Board. It made its plans in collaboration with the other government departments, which submitted estimates of their requirements for the coming year. Its major task was to plan the economy of Japan proper; but this necessarily entailed a knowledge of industrial development in those parts of the continent which were under Japanese control, and particularly in Manchukuo. Hence, in the Board's estimates, plans for Manchukuo were included by agreement with the responsible Japanese officials in that country. Above all, it was the Board's duty to see that each ministry should get, as nearly as possible, what it wanted. On 10 June 1937, a few days after the first Konoye Cabinet had taken office, Foreign Minister HIROTA received the additional appointment of President of the Planning Board. We will recess now for fifteen minutes. [p48623] (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48624] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: THE EFFECT OF THE CHINA WAR UPON THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS While Hayashi's government was in power, and before the Army's five-year plans had even been completed, major steps had been taken towards putting into practice the new policy of industrial expansion. During March 1937 a five-year plan was inaugurated to increase the indigenous production of finished steel. In April 1937 the fourth period of Japan's "scrap and build" shipping replacement programme came into force. Since 1932, Japan had, by provision of subsidies, built approximately forty-eight fast cargo ships, giving her the highest proportion of tonnage, less than five years old, in the world. The new programme provided for subsidised construction of passenger and passenger-cargo liners with minimum specifications for tonnage and speed. The subsidy rate amounted in some cases to one-half of the building cost. On 1 May 1937 legislative authority had been obtained for the Army's plans in Manchukuo. On that date there was enacted a Manchukuoan law, which gave to the state complete control of all industries, the products of which were deemed to be vital to preparation [p48625] for war. The planning for Japan itself was not so far advanced. When, on 7 July 1937, the incident at Lukouchiao occurred, consideration of the five-year plans was for a time deferred. In the months which followed the immediate requirements of the war in China absorbed the attention of the Japanese government. The Army's first plan, outlining the programme for important industries, had been submitted for approval to the first Konoye Cabinet. A brief summary of the Army's detailed programme for putting that plan into action reached President HIROTA of the Planning Board on 13 July 1937, six days after the fighting had begun. The third plan, dealing with the production of munitions, aircraft and other war materials, was produced only two weeks before the war commenced. This third plan was temporarily abandoned because it was inadequate to meet the Army's needs: and the plans for important industries were altered to ensure production of the greatest possible amount of supplies for military consumption. Under the stimulus of a national emergency, industrial expansion was, between July 1937 and December 1938, developed piecemeal in greater measure than had been planned. [p48626] But, although during this period the Planning Board was required to deal with first things first, the original aim of large-scale planning for war was never lost to sight. Early in 1938 the mobilisation plan was reinstated as an annual measure limited to that year only. The National General Mobilisation Law, passed in February of that year, made it possible for the Japanese government to take far-reaching steps in preparation for war, without first submitting them to the Diet for approval. In June 1938 concern was expressed in governmental circles lest Japan's financial difficulties should imperil the success of the five-year plans. In January 1939 the Planning Board issued a new and comprehensive programme based upon the experience gained in the intervening eighteen months of war, and setting new targets for the coming years. Basically, this plan, which received the approval of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, was the original programme propounded by the War Ministry in its 1937 planning. THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT WAS INSTIGATED BY THE ARMY The incident at Lukouchiao was the culmination of the Army's scheme for bringing North China under Japanese rule. In May 1935 KIDO had noted the [p48627] determination of elements within the Kwantung Army that the military should take the lead in dealing with North China, as they had done in the case of Manchukuo. In December of that year the Kwantung Army had despatched to the War Ministry a propaganda plan made in contemplation of that Army's advance into China proper. In the following month HIROTA, as Foreign Minister in the Okada Cabinet, had established the policy of diplomatic cooperation with the soldiery in carrying out the Army's plans for North China. The opening battle of this phase of the war in China, like the Mukden Incident, which had led to the conquest of Manchuria, was planned, instigated and carried out upon the initiative of the Army itself. Less than a month before the fighting began, Lieutenant-General TOJO had placed the issue of peace or war squarely before the Army General Staff. As Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army he believed that the moment was propitious for an offensive against the Chinese government's forces; and that such a campaign should precede the initiation of a war with the Soviet Union. Whether or not Japanese military strength warranted the taking of such a step was a question of larger strategy to be decided by the General Staff. The decision was a momentous one, for the [p48628] long-range economic and military planning, upon which the War Ministry was even then engaged, took no account of an immediate embroilment in China. All the factors in this complex situation must have been known to Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had for the fifteen previous months occupied the position of Vice-Minister of War. The manner in which the first outbreak of fighting was permitted to assume the proportions of a full-scale offensive shows that the Army General Staff had made its election in favour of a war with China. On the night of 7 July 1937, Japanese garrison troops at Lukouchiao held an unusual manoeuvre; and, alleging that a Japanese soldier was missing, demanded entry into the City of Wanping to conduct a search. Fighting broke out while the Japanese complaint was still under negotiation; and, on the afternoon of 8 July 1937, the Japanese issued an ultimatum for the surrender of the City. In the battle which ensued, the Japanese forces sustained substantial casualties; and, on 10 July 1937, a truce was agreed to upon the proposal of the Japanese commander. The incident might then have been regarded as closed; but that was not the Japanese intention. Within twenty-four hours of the initial conflict, large [p48629] units of the Kwantung Army began to converge upon the scene of the fighting. Reinforcements having reached North China, new demands were made for the withdrawal of Chinese forces. On 13 July 1937, the Army General Staff decided that, if Chinese troops were sent to North China, resolute steps would be taken to meet the situation. In default of compliance with the new Japanese demands, fighting was resumed at Lukouchiao upon the following day. THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET ADOPTS THE ARMY POLICY OF WAR WITH CHINA Although the Army had chosen the time and place for the attack, war with China was a foreseen consequence of Japanese national policy. In February 1936, while Hayashi was Prime Minister, it had been decided to establish North China as an anti- Soviet buffer state, and to include it in the Japanese-Manchukuoan economic bloc. Now, in the months which followed the first onset at Lukouchiao, government and Army worked together, in the words approved by the Five Ministers on 11 August 1936, to achieve "a steady footing on the Asiatic continent", and "to become the stabilization power in East Asia". When the first news of fighting was received, the Cabinet had resolved to seek a local settlement [p48630] of the matter; but had not countermanded orders for the movement of further troops to the area. Two days later, on 11 July 1936, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA and KAYA were members, reconsidered the situation which had arisen. Afterwards there was issued an official statement to the effect that the Japanese government, though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, intended to take all necessary measures for despatching troops to that region. Mobilisation within Japan itself was postponed; but units of the Kwantung Army were permitted to continue their advance. Simultaneously steps were taken to send to North China new diplomats and consular officials, who now once more came under the control of Foreign Minister HIROTA. A new Chinese offer to submit the quarrel to negotiation and an American tender of good offices, both of which followed the resumption of fighting, were alike unheeded. Although direct negotiation continued, preparations for an Army mobilisation within Japan went forward uninterruptedly after 17 July 1937, and received specific governmental sanction. On 26 July 1937, a new Japanese ultimatum led to fighting at Beiping; and on the following day Prime Minister Konoye revealed in the Diet his government's determination to achieve the "new order" in Asia. He [p48631] protested, as other government spokesmen had protested before the conquest of Manchuria, that Japan did not covet Chinese territory. He said, in the language of the advocates of the Greater East Asia Sphere, that all Japan looked for was cooperation and mutual assistance -- a contribution from China to Far Eastern culture and prosperity. He added, more significantly, that he did not consider it sufficient to settle locally existing problems with China. Japan, he declared, must go a step further, and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations. It was then clear that the Cabinet had reached the same conclusion as the Army General Staff; and that Japan was irrevocably committed to the conquest of China. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND THE CONQUEST OF CHINA It is important to note that this decision was not merely in furtherance of the basic national policy; but that it also added an element which was lacking in the decision of the previous year. The Five Ministers, with HIROTA at their head, had decided that Japan would at all costs expend upon the Asiatic continent. They had realised that this process of expansion would make enemies of the Western Powers, and [p48632] would render war with the Soviet Union almost inescapable. They had recognised that nothing short of mobilisation for war on a national scale over a period of years would enable Japan to meet the consequences of her expansionist programme. But they had not determined at what stage in the programme of preparations it would be expedient to make a new major onslaught upon Chinese territory. TOJO had assumed the conquest of China would be a minor affair, incidental to the coming trial of strength with the Soviet Union; and later events showed that the Japanese Cabinet also had underrated Chinese powers of resistance. In September 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA was still speaking in terms of a quick punitive blow against the nationalist armies. Furthermore, the whole area of North China was included in the plans for war-supporting economic and industrial development, and was therefore necessary to the success of the national mobilisation itself. The essence of the decision which Konoye's government made was that the dangers of prematurely intensified international hostility did not outweigh the advantages already enumerated. The very circumstances in which this fighting in China broke but show that the conquest of China was regarded as ancillary [p48633] to the programme of preparation for a greater struggle. THE RELATION OF THE FIGHTING IN CHINA TO THE "PRINCIPLES" OF KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU This was, in later years, the view taken by the foremost Japanese publicists, who related the progress made upon the Asiatic continent to the earlier planning of the "new order", and to the principles of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu. SHIRATORI, in a book published in December 1940, said that the classic phrase of Hakko Ichiu had been adopted as a national slogan to represent this movement, the ultimate object of which would be the establishment of a "new order" in East Asia. The conflict, both in Manchuria and in China, had represented the spirit of the "Imperial Way", and was directed against the democratic viewpoint. He added that the war between Germany and the Western Powers might be said to have arisen from essentially the same conflict. Yosuke Matsuoka, when Foreign Minister in 1941, gave a similar description of his country's development. He denied, as Konoye and other statesmen had consistently denied, that Japan had desired to acquire new territories or to exploit other countries. He said that the Manchurian Incident was an exultation of the national spirit, which had, in a way, been [p48634] caused through the oppression of Japan's peaceful development by America and the European Powers. He told his audience that Japanese diplomacy must play an important part in spreading the great spirit of Hakko Ichiu throughout the world. In executing her national policy, Japan would need to remember that she was a divine country which must go forward in accordance with the divine will. This, and no material constraint, had been the reason for the "China Incident". HASHIMOTO, who published a new book in the same month as SHIRATORI, was even more explicit. He said that the "China Incident" might well be called the opening battle for the construction of a "new world order"; and that the achievement of that order was incompatible with any compromise with Great Britain and the United States. The China War he described as "a grand revelation of national polity". He urged then, in December 1940, as he had urged in August 1936, that the whole force of the nation should be united in the principle of Kodo, which would make possible the achievement of the goal of world domination or Hakko Ichiu. The crisis of the European War would, he said, be turned into a golden opportunity, enabling Japan to lead the world to a "new world order". [p48635] HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT During the latter months of 1937 the war in China increased steadily both in scale and in intensity. Foreign policy statements were made in accordance with the Kwantung Army's plan for conducting, simultaneously with the advance into China, a propaganda campaign to convince the whole world of the lawfulness of Japan's actions. On 1 September 1937, Horinouchi, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a radio address, in which he insisted that Japan had no wish to acquire Chinese territory; and that she desired merely the realisation of conditions permitting genuine cooperation between the two countries. Four days later, on 5 September 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA developed the same theme in reviewing foreign policy in the Diet. He said that the basic policy of the Japanese government was aimed at stabilising relations between Japan, China and Manchukuo for their common prosperity and well-being. China, ignoring Japan's true motives, had mobilised vast armies, which Japan could not do otherwise than counter by force of arms. In self-defence and in the cause of rightcousness, Japan was deterwined to deal a decisive [p48636] blow to China, so that that country might reflect upon the error of its ways, and so that the Chinese armies might lose their will to fight. A month later, however, on 6 October 1937, the League of Nations decided that Japan's military operations against China were out of all proportion to the incident which had occasioned the conflict; and could be justified, neither under existing treaty rights, nor upon the ground of self-defence. Meanwhile HIROTA followed the principle laid down in the national policy decision, which stipulated that Japan, while attempting to maintain amicable relations with the Western Powers, would let nothing stand in the way of her schemes for expansion upon the Asiatic continent. On 29 July 1937, two days after Konoye had stated his cabinet's policy towards China, HIROTA advised the budget committee that he did not expect interference from third powers in regard to the China dispute. He assured the committee that, if any such proposal should emanate from a third power, the government would not hesitate to give a firm refusal. On 10 August 1937, Ambassador Grow conveyed to HIROTA a new tender of good offices by the United States; and only then did HIROTA acknowledge Secretary [p48637] Hull's first pronouncement of 16 July 1937. In the reply, delivered to Hull on 13 August 1937, it was stated that, while the Japanese cabinet concurred in the principles which Hull had enunciated, for the maintenance of world peace, it believed that the object of those principles could be obtained in the Far East only by giving consideration to the particular circumstances of that region. On 25 September 1937, HIROTA replied in similar terms to an invitation to participate in the work of the League of Nations Advisory Committee, which was then investigating the situation in China. He said that the Japanese Cabinet was convinced that an equitable and practical solution of their difficulties could be found only by China and Japan themselves. The resolution of the League Assemby on 6 October 1937, showed the extent of the international resentment which Japanese activities in China had aroused. It was then resolved that the member states would refrain from taking any action which might weaken China's position, and that each should consider what steps it might take to offer her positive aid. It was also agreed that, pursuant to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, a conference of the powers signatory to that treaty should be hold [p48638] to consider the situation of difficulty which had arisen in China. The United States expressed general concurrence in these findings and resolutions. [p48639] THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND VIOLATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS AS PART OF THE PATTERN OF PREPARATIONS FOR WAR During October 1937, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA, KAYA, and KIDO were now members, refused an invitation to attend the Nine-Power Conference, which was to be held in Brussels. The Cabinet, in conveying this decision, alleged that Japanese action in China was of a defensive nature, and expressed great resentment at the unfriendly findings and resolutions of the League Assembly. In the cabinet's view, the solution of the conflict lay in Chinese realisation of the need for cooperation with Japan; and only by comprehending this need could other nations contribute effectively towards the stabilisation of the Far East. Whatever justification Japan might plead for her actions in China, her refusal frankly to discuss the situation was inconsistent with her obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. It was, however, wholly consistent with earlier pronouncements; for violation and repudiation of treaty obligations had long formed part of the general scheme of preparations for war. Japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933 had been precipitated by just such an adverse finding [p48640] on that occasion in relation to the Manchurian Incident. In giving notice to the League of her intention to withdraw, Japan had changed that body with failure to grasp the realities of the Far Eastern situation, thus detracting from the stabilisation of East Asia. Her spokesmen had said that Japan could no longer cooperate with an organisation, the majority of the members of which "had attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of ensuring peace." During the same year, the Navy Minister in the Saito Cabinet had been invited to expound the Japanese attitude toward the naval limitation treaties. In doing so, he stressed Japan's dissatisfaction with the existing ratios, and said that, if changes in the international situation should occur, "there is no reason why a nation should remain forever content with a treaty which it had once signed. Only out of regard for the welfare of humanity, we signed the London Naval Treaty, but we did not do it unconditionally. As regards the Washington Agreement, it was signed twelve years ago and in our opinion is no longer adequate to guarantee the security of this empire, as the international situation has thoroughly altered in that period of time." [p48641] When preliminary discussions for a naval disarmament conference were hold in London in 1934, the Okada Cabinet issued a statement for the guidance of public opinion at home. "Japan," they said, "who resigned from the League of Nations with regard to the Manchurian Incident, experienced the fact that a just claim is not always recognized at an international conference." Japan, it was added, would have nothing to fear, even though the agreement should not be concluded. In the following year, 1935, non-recognition of her "just claims" caused Japan to abandon the system of limitation of armament by international agreement. In 1937, the first year after the treaties expired, the Japanese programme of naval preparations for war took definite shape. During December 1934, Sir John Simon had pointed out to Matsudaira, the Japanese delegate to the preliminary naval conference, that Great Britain, as a party to the Nine-Power Treaty, had rights and obligations in respect of China; and had asked what the Japanese policy was to be in regard to the independence of that country. No satisfactory or clear-cut reply was received. But in the 1936 policy decision and in the Army's 1937 five-year planning, the position was clarified. Japan would secure a steady footing of her Empire on the continent, [p48642] and would "ingeniously" exploit the resources of North China. The war in China was a consequence of that policy. INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN MANCHUKUO AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT During the latter half of 1937, many facets of Japanese policy and planning were exemplified in the measures concerning Manchukuo. Steps were taken to develop the resources of that country and to promote the establishment of heavy industries. These measures were in general accordance with the Army's five-year planning, and involved the creation of larger industrial units, responsive to governmental control. This policy in turn gave rise to further violations of the rights of the Western Powers under the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. While Japan exercised complete control over the development of Manchukuoan industry, some deference was still paid to the fiction that the two countries were entirely independent of each other; for, by this device, Japan might disclaim responsibility for the broken treaty obligations of which the Western Powers complained. On 3 August 1937, the two governments concluded an agreement to establish, under their dual control, a joint stock company. Its objects were to promote Japanese immigration into Manchukuo, and to develop the [p48643] lands of that country. On 22 October 1937, three days before Foreign Minister HIROTA ceased to hold the additional appointment of President of the Planning Board, the Cabinet met to consider new industrial measures for Manchukuo. Finance Minister KAYA and Education Minister KIDO were then among its members. The Cabinet was agreed that the situation in which Japan found herself demanded, in particular, the urgent expansion of heavy industries; and that, to achieve this result in Manchukuo, new measures of industrial control were necessary. It was decided that the two governments, acting in conjunction, should promote a new national policy company, which would establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo. Special attention would be given to the use of substitutes as raw materials. The Manchukuoan government would supply half the capital required; and the remainder would be subscribed privately. The management of the new venture would be entrusted to the most suitable Japanese civilian; and the products of the new enterprise would be treated in Japan as though they were not of foreign origin. In Manchukuo itself, HOSHINO, who had held in succession the positions of Vice- Minister of Finance and Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National [p48644] Affairs Board, became, on 1 July 1937, the head of that board. As Chief of General Affairs of Manchukuo, all industries were under his control; and, as a Manchukuoan member of the Joint Economic Committee, his was the vote which enabled Japan to carry all decisions. HOSHINO used there large powers to place Japanese in charge of all industries, and to exclude the people of Manchuria from business enterprises. On 1 December 1937, pursuant to an agreement made in the previous month, Japan released her extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. This measure, which had been contemplated in the Japanese-Manchukuoan Treaty of 10 June 1936, was used by the Japanese-dominated Manchukuoan government as a device for insisting that all foreign firms in that country be subjected to its jurisdiction. An immediate protest was made to Japan by the United States concerning this action, which constituted a violation of the rights secured by the "open door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT On 25 October 1937, the Planning Board was reorganized; and thereafter, HIROTA, whose office as President was abolished, was free to devote his whole attention to the conduct of foreign affairs. But, prior [p48645] to that date and immediately following the outbreak of war in China, measures were taken to promote within Japan itself the development of the war-supporting industries, and to make the Japanese economy subservient to the needs of war. Though the war in China undoubtedly prompted the measures taken, and determined their relative priorities, they were of that long-range character which the Army had planned. An assured supply of oil and petroleum was the most crucial need of all, for Japan was itself able to supply only 10 per centum of normal civiliar needs. By building up a steadily increasing reserve of oil and oil products substantial provision had been made for such a contingency as a short war in China; but the Army, in its 1937 planning, had decided, in the interests of self-sufficiency, to develop a synthetic industry under government subsidy. New national policy companies were to be created to promote the production of synthetic petroleum. During August 1937, the month after hostilities were renewed in China, legislation was passed giving effect to these long-range plans. It was decided to advance the production of synthetic petroleum, using coal as the raw material. New national policy companies, under governmental guidance and control, were [p48646] established to develop and finance the industry; and provision was made for a system of licensing, tax exemptions and governmental subsidies. Japan was also poor in indigenous supplies of iron, and was therefore deficient in iron and steel industries. Since 1933, the industry had been under governmental control, and in the decade before 1937, local production had been trebled, but, in March 1937, while Hayashi's Cabinet was in office, new plans had been made setting increased production goals. On 12 August 1937, a new law was passed, giving effect to the Army's plans for the iron and steel industries, and designed to double local production within a five-year period. To encourage the production of these and other strategic materials, large subsidies were paid; and special encouragement was given to those industrialists who manufactured parts essential to the growing shipbuilding industry. In its detailed plan of 10 June 1937, the Army had also stipulated that the government should strive completely to equip all railways, harbours and roads. On 1 October 1937, legislation was passed for the creation of a new and heavily capitalised national policy company, which would develop and control all transportation facilities within Japan. [p48647] But, even at this stage in the China War, long-range industrial preparations were not confined to measures affecting the specific industries and utilities most vital to the war effort. As in Manchukuo, so in Japan itself, effect was given to the Army's plan for regimenting heavy industry into larger units, more susceptible of governmental control. The Major Industries Control Law, passed in August 1937, encouraged the formation by industrial groups of new associations or cartels, which were given wide powers of self-government. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTROLLED ECONOMY The Army, which had planned these things in its detailed programme of 10 June 1937, had also foreseen that they must be achieved in conjunction with a planned and regulated economy, which would require far-reaching measures of trade and financial control. The measures requisite to achieve this end had been set out at length and in detail; and had ended with this exordium: "The success or failure of this programme is doubtless solely dependent upon the government's consistent and firm guidance under the national policy. The government should support various industries with all possible means from the standpoint of strengthening the nation's power, and it is especially of vital necessity that measures for financial aid should be [p48648] taken by the government." The estimated amount of government assistance required for the war-supporting industries rose from 57 million yen in the remaining months of 1937 to 338 million yen in 1941. Much of the responsibility for the success of economic and industrial preparations for war therefore rested with Finance Minister KAYA. [p48649] In August 1937, the month most productive of industrial legislation, special measures were passed to stimulate the production of gold as a means of acquiring foreign exchange; and the government took power to control the disposition of all gold reserves. In this same month a first measure of import licensing was taken; and in the following month a more comprehensive measure was passed to adjust the balance of trade. Under this law of September 1937, passed as a temporary expedient but never repealed, the government assumed complete control of imports, their selection, distribution and utilisation. These powers the Planning Board exercised through government-controlled export and import associations, one to each essential industry. Restrictive legislation of this type was not entirely new, for Japan's exports had seldom been sufficient to pay for her imports; and on these she was dependent for her economic livelihood and position as an industrial nation. The rising tide of her programme of industrialisation, and the virtual extinction of her foreign credit since the time of the Manchurian Incident, had led to the adoption of a succession of measures for trade and financial control. Laws relating to foreign exchange control were passed [p48650] in 1932 and 1933. The Foreign Exchange Control Law, passed in March 1933, had given the cabinet wide powers to control and canalise all foreign exchange transactions. These powers, however, had not been completely invoked until January 1937, when all exchange transactions involving more than thirty thousand yen per month were made subject to government license. By December 1937, the position had so far deteriorated that the exemption level stood at one hundred yen per month. Under the Temporary Fund adjustment Law of 10 September 1937, complete authority over Japan's finances was centralised in the Bank of Japan, and made subject to the overriding discretion of Finance Minister KAYA. ARMY PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE USSR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT Although the drastic financial controls imposed in 1937 were occasioned in part by the large subsidies paid in that year to encourage the development of the war- supporting industries, these were small in comparison with the demands made upon the national exchequer by appropriations for the Army and Navy. Ordinarily the budget of each Ministry was [p48651] comprised of a general account and a special account; but in 1937 a third account was set up to meet expenditure directly entailed by the war in China. This "War Expenditure Account," although originally a temporary measure occasioned by the emergency in China, was never closed. Total expenditure upon the Army alone rose from rather more than 500 million yen in 1936 to nearly 2,750 million yen in 1937. This large expenditure had made possible an enormous increase in Japanese military strength. The League's Advisory Committee, in its report of 6 October 1937, found that Japan had not ceased to intensify her action; and that she was employing larger and larger forces, and more and more powerful armaments. The standing strength of the Army rose from 450,000 men on 1 January 1937, to 950,000 men on 1 January 1938. The Army, which had initiated the hostilities in North China, in part, upon Lieutenant-General TOJO's advice, still regarded them as a preliminary to the coming struggle with the U.S.S.R. While the fighting raged in China, TOJO, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, made other plans in preparation for an attack upon the Soviet Union; and, in December 1937, he transmitted them to Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War. In the following month TOJO [p48652] suggested to UMEZU, and obtained, the passage of a regulation which increased the strength of the Kwantung Army; and, on 24 January 1938, General Ueda, then in command of that army, advised War Minister Sugiyama of the contribution which North China should make to the preparation for "the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia." THE CHINA WAR LED JAPAN TO ADOPT THE ARMY'S SCHEME FOR A NATION-WIDE MOBILSATION More important than the purely military preparations of 1937, was the degree in which the Army had achieved the realization of its broader scheme to mobilise the entire strength of the Japanese nation for war. By electing to renew the war in China the Army had undertaken a new commitment, the magnitude of which it had not fully realised. It had thereby interrupted the smooth progress of its long-range planning for the Japanese nation. But, on the other hand, in the first six months of war, the Army had seen its major schemes adopted by government and nation with a readiness scarcely possible of attainment in time of peace. Already the basic steps to secure a planned and regimented war-supporting economy had been taken [p48653] both in Manchukuo and in Japan itself. Even the Navy, whose armaments were steadily increasing, had been brought to play an active part in the Army's all- embracing purpose. In August 1937, when the Army attacked Shanghai, it was supported by a force of some thirty naval vessels, despatched to the scene by order of the Cabinet. Later in the same month, the Navy proclaimed a blockade of the China coast, with the object of preventing supplies from reaching Chinese troops. In December 1937, a new step was taken to bring Chinese territory within the "co- prosperity sphere." In that month the Japanese established at Peiping, a new provisional Chinese government, one of the avowed purposes of which was to exploit the industries of the area it governed. A publicity organisation, created for the purpose of bolstering the new regime, was placed under the control of the Japanese military forces in North China. The Kwantung Army expected from this occupied area a contribution towards its preparations for war with the Soviet Union. SATO ON NATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT Major-General SATO, when Chief of a Section of the Military Affairs Bureau in March 1942, had [p48654] occasion to survey broadly the developments with which we had been dealing. In a speech, to which reference has already been made, he corroborated the conclusions which other evidence has established. SATO pointed out that the Lukouchiao Incident, which revived the war in China, occurred during the first year of the Five-Year Plan for the Expansion of Productive Fower. "What worried us most," he said, "was the fear that this incident might cause the breakdown of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five-Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident would not end in a war of attrition on our side. Accordingly, generally speaking, we spent 40 per cent of our budget on the Chinese Incident and 60 per cent on armament expansion. In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20 per cent on the Chinese Incident and 80 per cent on the expansion of armaments. As a result, the air force and mechanised units have bean greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese Army has been increased to more than three times what it was before the Chinese Incident. I believe that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China affair, must have perfected and expanded it fighting power. Of course, productive [p48655] power of the munition industry has been expanded seven or eight fold at a rough estimate." This was a topic on which SATO could claim to speak with some authority, for from 24 June 1937 to 29 July 1938, he had been first an investigator, and then Secretary, of the Planning Board. During the same period he had served as a special member of the China Affair General Mobilisation Business Affairs Committee, and as a section staff member of the War Ministry's Bureau of Military Affairs. He had been released from his staff appointments in December 1938. In March 1941, he had assumed such important posts as Commissioner dealing with the affairs of the war Ministry in the Diet; secretary of the Liaison Committee of the Asia Developmant Board; and Secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Board. These and similar appointments he still held at the time he made this speech. THE CABINET ADVISORY COUNCIL, IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, AND THE WAR EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT During this same period steps were taken which tended to increase the Army's influence over the cabinet, and to make effective its long-range planning. On 15 October 1937 there was created, as a temporary measure, a Cabinet Advisory Council, whose task it was [p48656] to render expert advice upon matters arising out of the "China Incident." The twelve members of this body, who were each accorded the privileges of a Minister of State, would represent the three principal aspects of the national mobilisation for war. Businessmen would join with military men and politicians in advising the cabinet, and in participating in the Cabinet's deliberations. Matsuoka and General ARAKI were appointed as Cabinet Councillors on the day of the Council's inception. As Japan became more deeply embroiled in the war with China, members of Konoye's Cabinet discussed the setting up of Imperial General Headquarters. This was an organisation which functioned only in time of war or serious incident; and there was some debate as to whether the undeclared and unacknowledged war then being fought in China warranted its institution. On 3 November 1937 War Minister Sugiyama and Education Minister KIDO discussed the question in relation to the saving of the situation which then existed. On 19 November 1937, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA, KAYA, and KIDO were then members gave consideration to the matter; and, on the following day, Imperial General Headquarters was established. It was a composite body, representative of the [p48657] Army and Navy Ministries and General Staffs. The Army and Navy Sections met separately in their own General Staff Offices; but, once or twice a week, joint sessions were held at the Imperial Palace. These joint meetings were concerned with questions of tactics and strategy. Questions of administrative policy were matters for the Cabinet to decide with the assistance of its Advisory Council; but Imperial General Headquarters was charged with the direction of military operations. This was a sphere in which secrecy was held to be essential and in which the Cabinet was to have no part. Imperial General Headquarters was responsible only to the Emperor; and its staff members, while acting in that capacity, were under the direct control, not of the War and Navy Ministers, but of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff. There is little evidence to indicate the importance of the part played by Imperial General Headquarters in the events of subsequent years. It was a poorly coordinated body, which tended to resolve itself into the Army and Navy Sections of which it was composed. But, by its very establishment, the armed force were given the opportunity to make important decisions on military matters without the approval, or even the [p48658] knowledge, of the Cabinet of the day. More important still was the power over Japan's finances; which the Army gained through the institution of the War Expenditure Account. Disbursements from that account might be made upon the authorisation of the War, Navy, or Finance Minister; and, in the years which followed, such disbursements were made, not only upon the authorisation of KAYA and his successors in the Finance Ministry, but also upon those of War Ministers ITAGAKI, HATA, and TOJO, and of Navy Minister SHIMADA. THE CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA AND THE USE OF CENSORSHIP AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT As the Five Ministers had acknowledged in their national policy decision of 11 August 1936, their plans depended, in the last resort, upon the Japanese people's will to achieve its' "destiny," They had then decided that internal policies must be made to subserve the national plan of expansion; and that, therefore, steps would be taken "to lead and unify public opinion at home, and to strengthen the will of the people to tide over the extraordinary emergency of our country." On 20 May 1936, before that decision was made, the Army had issued a mobilisation plan which [p48659] described in detail the measures required to direct and control public opinion at the outbreak of war. Each ministry would establish its own intelligence and propaganda organs in every part of Japan. In the same year, a Bureau of Information had been created to centralise and coordinate the dissemination of propaganda by the various departments of government. In September 1937, two months after the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, this body was reconstituted as a bureau of the Cabinet itself. Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, became, on 25 September 1937, a member of the new Cabinet Information Bureau, upon which devolved the task of carrying out the Army's mobilisation plan for information and propaganda. A more immediate result of the outbreak of war was the intensification of existing measures of censorship. The High Police, who watched over the activities of all who criticised the policy of the Japanese Government, now permitted no one to express opposition to the war in China. It became one of the principal functions of the Home Ministry to suppress such criticism; and the regular police force, which was under that ministry's control, saw that this policy was enforced. Anyone who spoke publicly and in a [p48660] critical vein of the Cabinet's policy was detained and interrogated. Persons found to have opposed it were arrested and imprisoned. Nowhere was the control of public opinion better exemplified than in the schools and universities of Japan. Professors and teachers were expected to cooperate whole- heartedly in propagating the policy of the Cabinet. Expressions of thought in favour of the ideals of peace, or in opposition to the policy of preparations for war, were rigorously suppressed. When, on 22 October 1937, KIDO became Minister of Education, he lent himself immediately to the enforcement of these measures of control. Teachers, whose attitude towards the national policy appeared to be critical, were either dismissed or forced to resign. Often they were arrested and charged under the Public Peace Law upon suspicion of being opposed to the political structure of the Empire of Japan. The facility with which these oppressive measures were carried out affords an indication of the success which had attended the efforts of soldiers, statesmen and publicists to prepare Japanese public opinion for war. The dismissal or forced resignation of these teachers raised no domestic issue at the time, for the general public looked upon them as isolated [p48661] sympathisers with liberalism. THE USE MADE OF EDUCATION TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT Even before the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, the Army, through its military instructors, had taken control of military teaching and training in the schools; and, after the fighting recommended in China, this control became so absolute that the military instructors dictated the manner in which the schools should be conducted. The Education Ministry well understood that teaching must subserve the government's aims; for, in May 1937 it issued to teachers, students and the public at large, a book entitled "The Fundamentals of National Polity". In this year also the Educational Council was established to study and investigate the Japanese school system. It was to pursue its studies without regard to changes of Cabinet and to consider the manner in which the national qualities of the Japanese people might be enhanced. Although it was not created for the specific purpose of promoting military training and teaching in schools, that became its task when the China far broke out. The Educational Council's recommendations for [p48662] comprehensive changes in school curricula and in teaching methods did not become effective until 1940; but in 1937 the Council adopted as its fundamental aim the promotion of the cause of service to the country. With KIDO's appointment as Education Minister on 22 October 1937, the reorganisation of the Japanese school system began to take effect. After 1937 teaching was designed to promote the warlike feeling of the nation. In the subjects of the ordinary school course, as well as in those periods set aside for purely military training, the spirit of Kodo, or ultra-nationalism, was instilled into school children. They were taught that Japan was strong, and that she must show to the world her special characteristics. In universities as well as in schools military training and academic teaching were both used to inculcate a spirit of militarism, until the idea of regarding Japan as supreme had permeated the whole nation. War was represented as glorious, productive, and necessary to Japan's future. KIDO AVERTS A CABINET CRISIS IN NOVEMBER 1937 Luring the latter half of 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA had striven unsuccessfully to gain German support for the conquest of China, representing that conflict, both to his own people and to the Germans, [p48663] as a struggle against Communism. Although, on 6 November 1937, the Privy Council had ratified a new treaty admitting Italy as third partner in the Anti-Comintern alliance, German disapproval of Japan's activities in China remained undiminished. Germany had important interests in China and considered the Kuomintang as a potential ally in her anti-Soviet policy. She had therefore elected to ignore the existence of hostilities and to regard herself as not bound by the rules of strict neutrality because neither China nor Japan had declared war. In November 1937, the Konoye Cabinet was oppressed by problems arising out of the lengthening war in China. In spite of huge expenditure in materials and manpower, the war continued to assume greater proportions, and there was now no prospect of a speedy victory. The acute strain placed upon the nation's economy was giving rise to grove financial difficulties. The Mine-Power Conference, then meeting at Brussels, served only as a reminder that Japan was friendless among the nations. On 3 November 1937 War Minister Sugiyama and Education Minister KIDO discussed the manner in which the situation might be saved. [p48664] The Japanese Army was, like the Germans, preoccupied with the coming war against the Soviet Union. So great did the embarrassment of the China War become, that the Army General staff sought German intervention to bring the fighting to a close. Major- General OSHIMA, military attache in Berlin, was instructed to use his influence to this end, When, on 15 November 1937, Prime Minister Konoye told KIDO that he was thinking of tendering his Cabinet's resignation, KIDO was quick to see the repercussions which this development might entail. He thought that it would affect adversely financial and other circles, and that the rate of exchange would fall. This, in turn, would prejudice the outcome of the war in China. KIDO considered that an unsettled political situation at home and the changing of the war in China into a defensive operation were each possible results of a Cabinet resignation. He saw that, in either event, the unfriendly attitude of foreign countries, which, he acknowledged, "had finally turned serious", would be strengthened. Such a development should be avoided at all costs. On 16 November 1937, KIDO urged these views upon Konoye, and asked him to retain his office; and this for the present Konoye agreed to do. Four days [p48665] later, by establishing Imperial General Headquarters, the Cabinet displayed a new resolution in the prosecution of the China War. HIROTA STRENGTHENS THE CABINET'S RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE THE CONQUEST OF CHINA But, in this same month of November 1937, there was an opportunity, had the Cabinet so desired, of bringing the war in China to an end. So unsatisfactory had Japan's position become, that even the Army General Staff had abandoned hope of a speedy victory. Under pressure of German disapproval, and through German intermediaries, Foreign Minister HIROTA presented, on 5 November 1937, the first of three peace offers to the Chinese. The negotiations thus begun continued through December 1937 and into January 1938; but HIROTA's vague and changing demands provided no basis for a concrete agreement. While the negotiations were proceeding, the Japanese continued their offensive in China with vigour. By January the Cabinet had strengthened its opposition to any compromise peace. On 11 January 1938, an Imperial Conference, called to determine the disposition of the "China Incident", decided that, if the Kuomintang would not yield to Japan's demands, it must be crushed, or merged into a new, central regime. [p48666] To the last of Japan's three peace offers the Chinese returned a conciliatory answer, asking that the Japanese proposal be stated more specifically. HIROTA, at whose instigation the proposals had been put forward in a very indefinite form, and who now feared that the Chinese might gain support from Great Britain and the United States, reacted angrily. On 14 January 1938, he told the German intermediaries that China was beaten, and must give a speedy reply. He emphasized that Japan would not permit the matter to because the subject of international discussion or mediation. The Germans, in reporting to their own government, made it clear that, in their opinion, Japan was not acting with candour. On this same day, 14 January 1938, it was decided at a Cabinet Conference which Konoye, HIROTA and KIDO attended, that Japan would have no further dealings with the national government and would negotiate only with a new Chinese Government, the establishment of which was expected. This was not an empty expectation, for already, on 1 January 1938, the Japanese had inaugurated with some ceremony a new local government at Nanking. In an official statement, issued on 16 January 1938, the Japanese Cabinet reiterated its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity [p48667] of China, but this, now, had reference to a Chinese Government of Japan's creating. The same statement promised respect for the rights and interests of other powers in that country. On 22 January 1938, both Konoye and HIROTA echoed these assurances in the Diet, while reaffirming once more that the Japanese Cabinet held fast to the principles set forth in the 1936 national policy decision. "It is scarcely necessary for me to say", said Prime Minister Konoye on this occasion, "that Japan's immutable national policy aims at building the edifice of permanent peace for East Asia on the unshakable foundation of close cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and to contribute thereby to the cause of world peace." He added that the end of the conflict was still far ahead; and that Japan's mission as the stabilizing force of East Asia was greater than ever. Five days later the real design of exploitation and armed domination was once more revealed. On 27 January 1938, the Cabinet decided that the Japanese-sponsored Nanking regime should form the nucleus of a Central China Provisional Government. It was to be "a highly pro-Japanese regime", which would gradually free itself from dependence upon [p48668] Great Britain and the United States. Its naval and air forces would be included in Japan's defence plan. It would "smoothly amalgamate" with the existing puppet government of North China. On 26 January 1938, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, being now convinced that Japan would conquer China, urged his Cabinet to accept the fait accompli. Ambassador TOGO in Berlin had offered to the Germans the additional allurement of economic participation in the new China which Japan was building, after this date Germany withdrew her support of China, and her opposition to Japan's designs upon that country. On 20 February 1938, Chancellor Hitler took the long-delayed steps of announcing German recognition of the state of Manchukuo, and his own preference for a Japanese victory in China. In the space of two months, and in the face of the Premier's despondency, KIDO and HIROTA had succeeded in committing Japan once more to the pursuit of that "steady footing in the Eastern continent", which was to be achieved in spite of all difficulties. THE ARMY CQNTINUES TO PLAN AND FREE ARE FOR THE, EXPECTED WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. In the opening months of 1938, while the Cabinet formed a new resolve to complete the conquest [p48669] of China, the Army continued to make preparations for war with the soviet Union. In December 1937, Lieutenant-General TOJO, as Chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, had communicated to UMEZU, the War Vice-Minister, a plan for meteorological installations in Inner Mongolia in preparation for a war with the U.S.S.R. On 12 January 1938, TOJO urged upon Lieutenant-General UMEZU the need for the speedy completion of this work, which he considered to be of vital importance in regard both to the "China Incident" and to anti-Soviet strategy. At the same time he referred to UMEZU, for decision, the question of extending the enlistment of soldiers serving with units in Manchukuo; and, on 29 January 1938, UMEZU informed him that such action would be taken. On 11 February 1938, TOJO sent to UMEZU the Kwantung Army's plan for the erection of anti-Soviet fortifications during the years 1938 and 1939. The Army did not, however, confine its attention to purely military planning and preparation. The leaders of the Kwantung Army, standing upon the fringe of the fighting in China, regarded that conflict, and every other aspect of Japan's domestic and foreign policies, as so many factors to be considered in relation to the approaching struggle with the Soviet Union. [p48670] While TOJO and UMEZU settled the detailed military planning, General Ueda, then in command of the Kwantung Army, addressed his attention to a question of broader strategy. On 24 January 1938, he communicated to War Minister Sugiyama, his views upon the manner in which North China should be developed so that its people might best be made "to contribute to the preparation for the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia." Measures taken during the same period for the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo and of the occupied provinces of North China were closely related to the Kwantung Army's planning. Until 20 December 1937, the promotion of all heavy industries in Manchukuo had been governed by the South Manchurian Railway Company -- the first of the great "national policy" companies. Under Matsuoka, it continued after that date to play an important part in the Kwantung Army's preparations for war, cooperating not only in the enforcement of domestic policies, but also in the Army's operational and other preparations for war with the Soviet Union. But the South Manchurian Railway Company could not meet the additional strain of financing strategic developments in North China; and, on 20 December 1937, a new holding company was created by Manchukuoan [p48671] Ordinance. In this new "Manchurian Industry Development Corporation", set up pursuant to an agreement between the Japanese and Manchukuoan governments, was centered the control of industries in Manchukuo. The Manchukuoan General Affairs Board, under HOSHINO, assisted in drafting the laws which governed it, and which placed it under governmental supervision. The new corporation was established early in 1938. After February 1938, when Manchukuo was accorded German recognition, the Army made plans to foster closer relations between that state and Germany. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, and a treaty of amity was signed. On 15 May 1938 TOJO expressed to the Army General Staff the Kwantung Army's wish that Manchukuo should, as soon as possible, become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. On 24 May 1938 UMEZU replied to the effect that the Japanese Cabinet would offer no objections, but desired to preserve the fiction of Manchukuoan independence. It was thought bost that the Manchukuoan government should take the first step, acting as if of its own volition, and requesting Japanese assistance. [p48672} THE CONSOLIDATION OF JAPANESE POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES in CHINA Meanwhile, in the areas of China which the Japanese had subdued, Japan's "new order" was in process of building. After the fall of Nanking in December 1937 various Japanese-controlled local governments were set up; and, on 28 March 1938, a new government for Central China was established upon the Manchukuoan pattern. The nominally independent "Renovation Government of the Republic of China" was bound by its constitution to exploit the resources of the areas it governed, and to promote their industrial development. It would also take anti-Communist measures, but would strive to maintain friendly foreign relations. As in the case of North China, a new propaganda society was formed to support the puppet government. The official "Tokyo Gazette" proclaimed the inauguration of a new phase in Japanese relations with China, significant because it marked the progress made towards the goal of Hakko Ichiu. It was declared that the ideal of "the whole world as one family" had always constituted the basis of Japan's domestic and foreign policies; and that it explained the policy now adopted [p48673] towards China. The article followed closely the tenor of the policy statements which Konoye and HIROTA had made before the Diet. Japan's first aim had been to deal China "a punishing blow", in the hope that she would abandon her anti-Japanese attitude. In January 1938 the Japanese Cabinet had expressed its irrevocable determination to have no further dealings with the Kuomintang, and to assist in development new governments in North and Central China. The ultimate purpose of Japan's present action, the article continued, was to eliminate all those causes of friction which imperiled the peace and security of East Asia. Thus would the countries of the Far East be enabled to enjoy among themselves "the ideals of co-existence and common prosperity." In this manner Japan acquired a new field for the production of war materials and the expansion of war-supporting industries. On 8 April 1938, a new Japanese-financed company was promoted to develop and exploit the iron ore deposits of the Yangtse Valley. On 30 April 1938, the two new "national policy" companies were created to serve the same purpose in China as similar companies had done in Manchukuo. [p48674] The North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were established to promote the development of heavy industries in the subjugated areas of China. Half the capital of each company was subscribed by the Japanese government; and Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, was appointed as a member of the organizing committee of each. Konoye considered that the work of these two companies was vital, both to Japan's military operations, and to her political activities, upon the continent. We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until 0930, Friday, 5 November 1948.) [p48675] Friday, 5 November 1943 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appemances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) [p48676] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that, they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Judgment of the Tribunal: HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN 1938 WAS FOUNDED ON THE FIVE MINISTERS' DECISION OF AUGUST 1936 These developments in China reflected the policy of Foreign Minister HIROTA, who adhered steadfastly to the goal of the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. While the Army was obsessed with the prospect of a coming war with the Soviet Union, and looked to Germany as an ally, HIROTA took a broader and more cautious view. He aimed at the achievement of expansion on the continent and, at the same time at the completion of Japan's preparations for whatever conflicts that expansion might ultimately entail. On 29 May 1938 HIROTA left the Foreign Ministry; but at some earlier date he laid down the principle which would govern German and Italian participation in the economic development of North China. The prime and [p48677] unchanging goal was the establishment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia; and relations, both with the Axis and with the Western powers, would be governed, not by professions made or pledges given, but solely by the criterion of expediency. Ambassador TOGO in Berlin was instructed to solicit German assistance. He would propose that, in return for German recognition of Japan's special position in East Asia, Japan would endeavor to place Germany in a position not inferior to that occupied by other countries. Where possible, German interests would be preferred to those of other powers. In principle, Germany and Japan would occupy equal positions in the Chinese market -- though, in certain respects, a special position might accrue to Japan as the power actually responsible for the maintenance of the Chinese currency system. Nevertheless, in setting up any import and export control system, Germany's interests would certainly be preferred to those of any third power. HIROTA, therefore, did not intend to respect the treaty rights of the Western powers, or to honor his assurances that they would be preserved. He was, however, careful to warn his subordinates that Germany and Italy could not be allowed a preferred position, equal or even inferior to that occupied by Japan, if [p48678] the preference given should threaten to out off entirely the future participation of Great Britain and the United States in the economic development of China. Therefore the modes prescribed for German participation were virtually limited to those most advantageous to Japan herself -- namely, the supply of capital, and of machinery upon credit, with provision for a sharing in the management of particular enterprises. DETERIORATION OF JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN POWERS AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT Despite this policy of duplicity, Foreign Minister HIROTA did not achieve the secondary aim of maintaining amicable relations with the western powers. In the latter months of 1937 Japanese statesmen had continued to deny that their country harbored any designs upon Chinese territory. The Cabinet had given repeated assurances that foreigners and foreign property would be protected, and that foreign treaty rights would be preserved. But, so great had been the discrepancy between these professions and the nature of Japan's activities upon the Asiatic continent that the rift between Japan and the Western powers had become perceptibly greater. Nevertheless, efforts had still been made to allay Western suspicion and resentment and to discount the significance of Japan's association with the Axis. [p48679] In December 1937 it was proclaimed in the "Tokyo Gazette" that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not directed against any particular nation. The Cabinet complained that the pact had been misconstrued and subjected to unfair criticism. During this period the conduct of the Japanese armies in China had served only to magnify Japan's estrangement from the West. In spite of frequent protests and renewed assurances, attacks continued to be made upon British and American citizens and property in China. So little did the Army value friendship with the Western powers that, in December 1937, an unprovoked attack was made upon their naval forces. A United States gunboat upon the River Yangtse was fired upon and sunk. Attacks were made upon a British gunboat and on British merchant ships. These acts of provocation were carried out by local military commanders and notably by Colonel HASHIMOTO, in pursuance of definite orders to attack all vessels proceeding in the vicinity of Nanking, regardless of their nationality. In their policy speeches, made before the Diet on 22 January 1938, both Konoye and HIROTA again stressed Japan's desire to cultivate friendly relations with the Western powers; and HIROTA gave yet another categorical assurance that the rights and interests of those powers [p48680] in China would be respected to the fullest extent. Yet, during the first six months of 1938, in spite of continued representations made to HIROTA by the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, units of the Japanese Army committed frequent and wanton violations of American rights and interests in China. This display of hostility cost Japan heavily, for on 11 June 1938 the United States placed a moral embargo upon the export to Japan of aircraft and other weapons of war. HIROTA had been more astute than the military leaders. He had seen the value of Western assistance during the period of Japan's preparation for war; and he had therefore striven to gain it through false assurances and false professions of friendship. But, at the same time, Japan was making ready for war in the Pacific; and in the promotion of this aspect of his country's warlike preparations, HIROTA was playing a prominent part. NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS DURING 1938 Under the veil of secrecy maintained by the Foreign and Navy Ministries, Japan continued during 1938 to prepare for war in the Pacific, by fortifying and provisioning as air and naval bases her mandated [p48681] South Seas Islands. Until 1937 these preparations had been virtually confined to the islands of the Marianas and western Carolines; but in that year, under naval supervision, construction activity was extended eastward across the Pacific to the Truk atoll. In 1938 work begin among the islands of the Marshall group, which, lying in mid-Pacific, constituted Japan's most advanced base for war with the Western Powers. From this time onward the task of constructing and fortifying airstrips in the Marshalls was pushed ahead with considerable urgency. The work, now proceeding secretly, and in breach of treaty obligation, throughout the whole of the widely- scattered mandated islands area, was consistent with no other purpose than preparation for a war in the Pacific, waged against some or all of the Western Powers. In view of Japan's withdrawal from international agreements for naval disarmament, the United States had in 1936 embarked upon an extensive program of naval construction. Although in 1938 Japan maintained her own huge program launched in the previous year, her naval construction rate was soon outmatched by that of the United States. From 1939 onwards American construction figures were substantially greater than those of the Japanese. [p48682] This naval rearmament race was not of America's choosing. United States delegates to the London Naval Conference of 1935 had warned the Japanese that it would be the outcome of a failure to agree. The new treaty signed in 1936 between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had left the way open for Japanese participation; but again in 1937 Japan had refused to agree to any terms except those which would give her a preponderance of naval power in the Pacific. In February 1938 the Konoye Cabinet declined a last American invitation to forestall competitive naval rearmament. HIROTA REFUSES TO EXCHANGE NAVAL INFORMATION One result of the 1936 Treaty, in which Japan did not participate, had been the renewal of those provisions of the Washington Treaty which determined maximum permitted displacements for capital ships and cruisers, and limited the calibre of the guns which might be mounted upon each. This provision was, however, made subject to a right of escalation in the face of uncontrolled building by a nonsignatory power. On 4 November 1937 the Japanese had laid the keel of the "Yamato," a 64,000 ton capital ship designed to mount 18" guns. In February 1938 persistent rumours of {48,683] building by Japan, in excess of the 1936 Treaty limits, were causing concern in the United States. That country therefore brought the question to Japan's notice, explaining that, if satisfactory evidence of Japanese adherence to the treaty limits were not forthcoming, she must exercise the right of escalation which the treaty gave her. If, however, Japan had elected to exceed the limits set by other naval powers in 1936, the United States would, upon receipt of information as to the Japanese construction program, be prepared to discuss a new limitation as between herself and Japan. This overture was met by a point blank refusal either to negotiate or to give information. On 12 February 1938, Foreign Minister HIROTA made the government's reply. “Japan”, he said, “had no intention of possessing an armament which would menace other countries. Although his government was unable to comply with the American request for information, it saw no reason why the United States should conclude that Japan contemplated a naval construction program in excess of the limits prescribed by the 1936 Treaty.” Within two weeks of this communication being sent, the keel of a second 64,000-ton capital ship was laid in Japan. [p48684] HIROTA'S POLICY IS EXPLAINED IN THE WORDS OF THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY DECISION In this dealing with the United States, HIROTA's policy as Foreign Minister is plainly revealed. The national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had decreed that Japan "should also be prepared for Britain and America"; and that her naval armaments would be strengthened to an extent sufficient to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy. To that decision in which he had participated as Premier, HIROTA was, as ever, faithful. As in regard to Japanese aims in China, so in regard to Japan's naval construction program, he did not scruple to resort to deception in order to achieve his purpose. It was a cardinal principle of his policy to have Japan's preparations for war completed behind the facade of friendly foreign relationships. Each essential feature of HIROTA's foreign policy is to be found in that basic national policy decision, the text of which the Army and Navy had prepared. It was therein declared that Japan, while consolidating her position in Manchukuo, should strive to complete her national strength. It would be her aim to exclude from the continent “the Military Rule Policy of the Powers," and to establish her own order based [p48685] "on the co-existence and coprosperity principle." Yet Japan "would try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner," and "would always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers." Above all, HIROTA had been true to the basic aim of "securing a steady footing in the Eastern continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence." When Prime Minister Konoye had wavered in his resolution to complete the conquest of China, HIROTA had rallied the Cabinet to the pursuit of that unchanging goal. JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF HER SUBJECT TERRITORIES The month of January 1938 had marked the reinstatement of the Army's long-range economic and industrial planning for in that month the Planning Board produced and secured Cabinet acceptance of a new program of industrial development and economic control, limited in duration to the year 1938. After its reorganization in October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board's close association with the Army had been maintained. On 26 November 1937 Lieutenant- General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, was appointed a [p48686] Councillor of the Board; and Lieutenant-Colonel SATO, then a section staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau, became its Secretary. The Board's plan for 1938 related both to the development of the war-supporting industries and to the regulation of the supply and demand of essential materials. In January 1938 the Konoye Cabinet's newfound resolve to complete the conquest of China, while continuing to make preparations for other wars, placed an additional strain upon Finance Minister KAYA. The Army's demand for manpower and materials was absorbing both the products of Japanese industry and the men who produced them. Expenditure entailed by war and by war-supporting industrial development was rapidly increasing. In the result Japan was experiencing great difficulty in acquiring foreign exchange with which to finance the imports that she needed. The progress being made in securing and developing the natural resources of Manchukuo and of the occupied areas of China would serve in some degree to alleviate dependence upon importation from other countries. The development of synthetic industries was a second partial remedy. But these projects in turn demanded increased expenditure and continued reliance upon importation during the period of their development. [p48687] The Planning Board's program which the Cabinet adopted on 18 January 1938 curtailed drastically Japan's import quota for the year. It made necessary a reduction in the importation not only of normal domestic supplies but even of those commodities considered requisite to preparations for war. New measures of economic and financial control were therefore demanded. The remedy which the Cabinet adopted was designed to lessen the financial burdens of the Japanese people at the expense of those subject peoples whose territories Japan was exploiting. It was not a new development. Japan had long dominated the economies of Formosa and Korea through the Banks of Taiwan and Chosen respectively through the ownership of the vast majority of the companies doing business in those countries and through political control. The same methods had been used in Manchukuo. The Industrial Bank of Manchuria, established in December 1936 to secure funds for industrial development, had been authorized to issue debentures up to fifteen times its paid up capital. The facilities afforded by this Japanese-controlled bank had provided easy financing for the development of war- supporting industries in Manchukuo. Now the Konoye Cabinet planned a similar development in China. In February 1938 the "Federal [p48688] Reserve Bank of China" was established upon the same pattern as the Manchurian Bank. The Governor and Vice-Governor of the new bank were nominated by the Japanese Government and the directorate was predominantly Japanese. The sphere of operation was North China, and in that area the currency which the new bank issued became the only legal tender. The Federal Reserve Bank of China was designed to stabilize the currency system, and to control the money market. Through such devices as the extension of preferred credits and the manipulation of foreign exchange, it greatly facilitated the economic and industrial exploitation of North China, and provided an instrument for carrying out the Japanese Government's industrial planning in that area. Those industrial plans were already being put into effect; and the new war-supporting industries which the Japanese promoted were themselves of importance in establishing Japan's control of the North Chinese economy. In Manchukuo, industrial domination had been achieved through the device of the "national policy company," created by special legislation. Now, in the first six months of 1938 Japan was, by the same device, steadily acquiring control of the industries of occupied China. The Federal Reserve Bank of China began to do [p48689] business in March 1938. In the same month the "yen bloc," which since November 1935 had included Japan and Manchukuo, was extended to include North China. By this means the way was paved for Japanese investment and for the exploitation of Chinese industries. To maintain the value of Japanese currency, the practice of using Bank of Japan notes in occupied territories was discontinued. While the Federal Reserve Bank of China provided a new currency for North China, in Central and in South China worthless military script became the only permitted legal tender. Thus did Japan, while garnering the resources of the continent, bolster her own war-supporting economy at the expense of the peoples whose territories she had occupied. By September 1938 the practice of using Bank of Japan notes, backed by specie, had been discontinued in all the continental territories under Japanese domination. Thus, also, was Finance Minister KAYA's control over the Japanese economy consolidated. Since September 1937 he had exercised through the Bank of Japan complete control over Japan's finances. The funds of that bank were now no longer liable to uncontrolled dissipation in Japanese ventures on the continent of Asia. Thus protected, they were available to support new measures, taken in the first four months of 1938, [p48690] to develop, under government subsidies and control, the war-supporting industries of Japan herself. INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS: THE SYNTHETIC OIL AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY Notwithstanding its financial embarrassments, the Konoye Cabinet was determined to secure Japan's self-sufficiency in the materials of war, at whatever cost that process might entail. The Planning Board's interim program for 1938 had included a plan for the mobilization of commodities; and in the first four months of that year new measures were taken to promote and develop the war-supporting industries within Japan. Each such new measure had the effect of increasing the government's control over industrial development; and each had its counterpart in the Army's five-year plans of 1937. In every case, the government, by assuming an increased financial burden, planned to secure a rapid expansion of one or more of those industries which the Army had designated as vital to preparations for war. The first steps taken were designed to safeguard and develop the synthetic petroleum industry, which had been created in the latter half of 1937. The Army, in its five-year planning, had decided to enforce a decisive subsidizing policy for this industry, so that Japan might reduce her dependence upon importation. A [p48691] special company would ensure the manufacture of the machinery which the new industry required; and in the meantime, industrial plants would be imported from Germany. Great emphasis would be placed upon the production of diesel oil and aviation spirit, Manchukuoan coal resources would be used in the development of the artificial industry. The search for substitute fuels would be stimulated, and the country would be prospected for further hidden resources. A new company would be established to secure an ample supply of funds and to foster the development of the uneconomic infant industry. After the revival of the China war, no time had been lost in giving effect to these plans; and in January 1938 a new and heavily capitalized company was created by legislation to control the production of synthetic petroleum, and to provide a vehicle for government financing. It was just such a company as the Army had planned. In March 1938 under a law designed to promote the exploitation of all mineral deposits, the government took power to control prospecting, to stimulate it by subsidies, and even to enter into the prospecting business on its own account. In the same month, upon the Planning Board's advice, a system of rationing was introduced to limit [p48692] the amount of petroleum made available for civilian use; and, subsequently, a new national policy company was created to stimulate the production of substitute fuels. So great was the importance attached to the maintenance of oil and petroleum reserves that the government subsidized, through this new company, experimentation in the production and use of less efficient substitute fuels. Although the quantity imported was smaller than in 1937, and despite the demands of the war in China, Japan's reserves of oil and petroleum continued to increase throughout the year 1938. OTHER INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR March and April 1938 were months of industrial legislation, through which the Army's plans were realized. The new industrial hierarchy, dependent upon state support and responsive to Cabinet control, became an established feature of the Japanese system of government. The Cabinet by placing each industry under the ultimate control of one or other of its Ministers assumed an increased measure of responsibility for the guidance of the nation's mobilization for war. The electric power industry was among the first to be affected. This industry was vital to Japan's preparations for war because upon its expansion and coordination depended the development of other war-supporting [p48693] industries. The Army had therefore singled it out for inclusion in its 1937 plans and had accorded it a special priority in its program for the industrialization, of Manchukuo. The Army had envisaged a new national policy company which would, under governmental supervision, control the production of electric power in Japan and would promote its development in the manner needed to meet military requirements. To this plan effect was given in the Electric Power Control Law of March 1938. Until this time the production and supply of electric power had been in the hands of numerous undertakings; but, under the new law, all major companies were required to transfer control of their plant to one newly-constituted national policy company. The new company was placed under the government's direct control, and was accorded all the usual privileges of tax exemptions, subsidies and governmental guarantees. In March 1938 also legislation was passed to direct and stimulate production of aircraft which the Army had placed first in importance among the materials of war. Under the new law some aircraft production plants were placed under the direct control of the government and all were required to be licensed by the state. The usual steps were taken to relieve the industry of financial worries and so to ensure its [p48694] rapid expansion. But the development of the aircraft industry was in turn dependent upon an increased supply of aluminum, for over 70 per centum of Japanese aircraft and aircraft parts were made of that metal. The 1937 five-year plans had therefore placed stress upon the development of the light metal industries. They were to be encouraged by the cheap supply of electric power and by increasing the scope of public demand for their product. The new industries were to be capable of quick conversion in time of war to the production of aircraft and aircraft parts. Until 1932 there had been no aluminum industry in Japan; but its output, appreciable in 1936, had been doubled in the following year. On 28 April 1938, a new light metal manufacturing law was passed with the avowed object of contributing "towards the adjustment of national defence." It instituted the now familiar system of taxation and import duty exemptions, subsidies, and guarantees. All persons engaged in the industry were required to be licensed; and the government assumed control both of the technique of production and of the selection of the commodities to be produced. Thus the goal of wartime convertibility was kept in view. During March 1938 there was one other new law [p48695] of major importance; and this has already been mentioned in connection with the petroleum industry. The Act for the Promotion of Production of Important Minerals, passed in that month, placed nearly all mining operations under the direct control of the government. Production was demanded under threat of expropriation, and subsidies were provided to sustain the losses incurred through uneconomic industrial development. This law, which affected the iron, steel, coal, petroleum and light metal industries, brought many submarginal producers into the field, and involved heavy governmental expenditure. That Japan at a moment of economic crisis should embark upon such a measure affords the clearest proof that the Cabinet was determined to subordinate every other consideration to that of achieving national preparedness for war. THE ARMY PREPARES THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW This flood of new legislation had not been enacted without political incident. In February 1938 the Konoye Cabinet, strengthened in its resolve both to subdue China and to complete Japan's preparations for other wars, faced renewed opposition in the legislature. One group within the Diet was calling for the Cabinet's enforce resignation. Another group had focused upon the [p48696] electric power bill their opposition to the Cabinet's program of industrial legislation. This faction commanded the support of the industrialists themselves who, believing that Japan would not be long at war, were concerned lest the Cabinet's projected measures of uneconomic industrial expansion should involve them in ultimate loss. A third group within the Diet accused the Cabinet of half-heartedness in carrying out the Army's plans. In these circumstances, the whole program of mobilization for war was placed in jeopardy. Enormous quantities of materials were being used, and there was no immediate prospect of their replacement. The Army at this very moment was settling its plans and completing its military preparations for an early war with the Soviet Union. Well-knowing that the period of war would be a long one, the leaders of the Army were resolute in their determination that further stocks of war materials should be accumulated, even while the fighting in China continued. During the period of nearly two years since HIHOTA's Cabinet had taken office, the Army had planned and promoted every aspect of the national mobilization for war. Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who, throughout this time, had occupied the position of War Vice-Minister, was now in even closer touch with the Progress of the [p48697] Army's plans for the expansion and regimentation of the war-supporting industries. In addition to the numerous subsidiary appointments which his office entailed he had become, on 26 November 1937, a Councillor of the Planning Board. The secretary of that Board, Lieutenant-Colonel SATO, was a section staff member of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau. The plan which the Army now produced reflected the whole of its scheming and achievement during the two preceding years. On 20 May 1936, shortly after UMEZU had taken office as War Vice-Minister, the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry had produced its program for the control of information and propaganda in time of war. Now in early 1938 that Bureau produced a new plan which would bestow upon the Cabinet, once and for all, the powers needed to carry out every phase of the national mobilization for war. This Army plan was in the form of a draft "National General Mobilization Law," through the enactment of which the Diet would surrender any authority it had to control the Cabinet. Under this law the Cabinet would legislate by Imperial Ordinance. Once enacted, the provisions of the new law could be made operative at any moment which the Cabinet might choose. The mobilization law was a necessity, not only [p48698] for the success of the Army's military preparations, but also to ensure that the industrialists should receive an adequate inducement to cooperate and security from ultimate loss. Each of these considerations was well-known to SATO. [p48699] THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF FEBRUARY 1938: AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE MOBILIZATION LAW The situation which had arisen in the Diet provided a close parallel to that which had occurred in January 1937, when Hayashi succeeded HIROTA as Prime Minister. In each case the Cabinet, pursuant to the Army's planning, was engaged in putting into operation large-scale measures of industrial expansion and control. In each case the legislation necessary to achieve this purpose had met with strenuous opposition in the Diet. In each case the supporters of the Army, believing that the changes contemplated were not of a sufficient radical nature had concentrated their attacks upon political parties and upon the existing parliamentary system. This impatience with political parties was not a new development; for it had been expressed by the advocates of military supremacy, whenever they had encountered opposition to their schemes. As early as March 1931 HASHIMOTO had stated his belief that the Diet, which had then aroused the Army's indignation, should be crushed. In January 1932 he had advocated the immediate abolition of political parties, characterizing the party system as a dangerous anti-national structure, which must be destroyed "for the sake of [p48700] the construction of a cheerful new Japan". In December 1936 the same sentiment had been voiced by the military faction when the Seiyukai party had criticized the HIROTA Cabinet's first measures of industrial mobilization. Now, in February 1938, Konoye, confronted with a Diet united only in its opposition to his Cabinet, was threatened with the same downfall which had overtaken HIROTA in January 1937. The Cabinet, in this dilema, adopted the Army's plan. On 24 February 1938 Prime Minister Konoye presented to the Diet for enactment the National General Mobilization Bill; and called upon SATO to speak in its support. SATO has himself explained the difficulty and the delicacy of the situation in which he was placed. Upon the acceptance or rejection of this measure depended the goodwill of the industrialists, without whose assistance the plans for a national mobilization were impossible of achievement. SATO had earnestly desired the task of championing this bill; and, of those persons present before the Diet, he alone was capable of explaining its implications. He sincerely believed that his was the most powerful explanation given. In the result, opposition within the Diet was surmounted and the bill became law. By adopting the Army's measure as his own [p48701] Konoye had silenced the criticism of that faction which had accused him of insufficient diligence in prosecuting the Army's schemes. The Cabinet's position had been consolidated and the acceptance of its industrial program was assured. The Amy had gained the support of the industrialists, and had eliminated a new threat to the progress of the nation-wide mobilization for war. Furthermore, the Army had moved one stop nearer to the achievement of complete political supremacy in Japan. The Diet, in which the military faction had always seen a potential danger to the attainment of its aspirations, was now fettered. By passing this law, the legislature had thus deprived itself of any control over Cabinet measures relating to war and to preparations for war. From this time onward the Cabinet might, without recourse to the Diet, exercise the wide legislative and administrative powers which the new law gave. THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATI0N LAW AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY DECISION The National General Mobilization Law, which was made operative by Imperial Ordinance on 5 May 1938, followed the pattern of war emergency legislation in all countries. Although ostensible intended solely [p48702] to facilitate the prosecution of the war in China, it was utilized to the full in giving legal sanction to Cabinet measures in furtherance of the General plans for economic and industrial development. The law could be extended to cover any and every type of product, raw material and enterprise. It gave the Cabinet virtually unlimited powers to conscript materials, and to control industry and companies. Under its provisions the government might expropriate lands and buildings; authorize the payment of subsidies and compensation; enforce stabilization measures; prevent the publication of information; and direct the occupational training and education of the Japanese people. Above all, it might direct and conscript the manpower of the nation. At the time the law was enacted Konoye's Cabinet contained HIROTA as Foreign Minister, KAYA as Finance Minister, and KIDO is Education and as Welfare Minister. The provisions of the mobilization law serve to emphasize the many-sidedness and all-embracing nature of Japanese preparations for war. It was not merely a matter of military or naval or economic pro-preparedness. Every aspect of the national life was to be so ordered and controlled as to produce the maximum pitch of warlike efficiency. The entire [p48703] strength of the Japanese-nation was to be harnessed and developed with this single end in view. The National General Mobilization Law provided the instrument through which that goal might be achieved. The measure now taken had its counterpart in the national policy decision of 11 August 1936. It had then been determined that Japan's internal policies would be shaped in accordance with the basic plan; and this - in the words approved by the Five Ministers - consisted in "strengthening the foundation of our country both internally and externally." For that reason measures would be taken to safeguard the people's livelihoods, to develop their physical strength, and to direct their thinking. The people's will would be strengthened "to tide over the extraordinary emergency, which schemes of expansion and aggradisement were certain to precipitate. THE ARMY EXPLAINS THE PURPOSE OF THE MOBILIZATION LAW On 19 Hay 1938, two weeks after the National General Mobilization Law had been put into operation, the Army published in the Japanese press a commentary upon its purposes. It vies explained that, although the full story could not yet be told, an attempt would be made to interpret the spirit end substance of the [p48704] law as a whole, so that the public might understand its relationship to national defense. Japan, they said, was a country small in area and lacking in natural resources. She faced not only the determined resistance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China but also Soviet armies, fully mobilized and bent upon aggression in the north. Moreover, she was surrounded by the powerful navies of the United States and of Great Britain. For these reasons great difficulties were entailed in planning Japan's defense, which was now based, not on her own shores, but upon the boundaries of Manchukuo, and of North and Central China. The people of Japan were warned that the maintenance of these boundaries would call for great determination and very strenuous efforts for many years to come. Nothing less than complete mobilization of all resources of material and manpower would suffice. Military success would depend chiefly upon the systematic and effective mobilization of the "synthentic national strength". This the National General Mobilization Law was designed to achieve. [p48705] The remainder of the statement was devoted to telling the people of Japan what the realization of the "synthetic national strength" would entail. The first requirement was spiritual power, since the people themselves were the source of fighting strength. By mobilizing educational institutions and propaganda organs for a unified campaign, all possible efforts would be made to intensify the fighting spirit of the people, which would enable them to endure any amount of hardship and difficulties. Manpower would be mobilised in order to adjust the demand and supply of labour; so that, as young men were called to the colours, their places in industry would be filled. This transition to a wartime economy would entail government plans for occupational training and direction of labour. The plans for mobilisation of material resources other than manpower accurately forecast developments, the early progress of which has already been noted. While there was still time, vast quantities of materials for the Army and Navy would be acquired abroad. Production of war materials at home would be increased at the expense of peacetime industries. Therefore, all producing enterprises, as well as import and export businesses, would be unified under government direction. [p48706] The government would also take control of all financial credits. It would unify and develop all transportation facilities. It would mobilise science so that the pitch of efficiency might be raised. It would assume responsibility for the collection of information and the dissemination of propaganda at home and abroad, seeking to foster morale and to unify opinion in Japan, while creating a favourable impression in other countries. The government would also equip itself with long-range flexible plans to meet the varying needs of a general mobilisation, so that the Army and Navy would always be adequately supplied with, the muniments of war. Private enterprises would be required to conform to the plans prepared. Control would, as a matter of convenience, be exercised by Imperial Ordinances, without recourse to the Diet. A National General Mobilisation Research Commission and various semi-official bodies would be created to administer the law. These, and some self-governing bodies, would assist the government both in the formulation and in, the execution of Cabinet policy. THE ARMY HAD NOW SUCCEEDED IN COMMITTING JAPAN TO NATIONAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR In the period which was now ending the Army had made itself the master of Japan's destiny; and, at the Army's instigation, the nation had embarked upon a [p48707] programme of aggrandisement through expansion of military power. Foreign Minister HIROTA, in whose term as Premier the Army's schemes had first been formulated as the national policy, left the Cabinet at the end of May 1938; and at this time also Lieutenant General UMEZU, whose work had for so long been complementary to HIROTA's, resigned his office. UMEZU had become War Vice- Minister on 23 March 1936, while HIROTA was Premier, and prior to the important Five Ministers' conferences which settled the basis of the national policy. He had remained in that position during the premierships of Hayashi and Konoye. HIROTA and UMEZU had provided the most important links between Konoye's Cabinet and that of his predecessors for each had occupied a key position during a period that was remarkable for the steady development and fruition of the Army's planning. One by one the Army's detailed plans had gained acceptance, until at length all opposition within Japan had been overridden. Japan's military and naval forces were undergoing continuous expansion. Her growing military strength was still engaged upon the conquest of China. On 19 May 1938 the Japanese forces in Central China captured the town of Hsuchow, thus removing an island of Chinese resistance in an area which had been brought under Japanese control. [p48708] Although the battle for Hsuchow was not a decisive one, it stimulated Japan's long- deferred hope of crushing all resistance in China. Meanwhile the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, in collaboration with the Army General Staff, was making its preparations for war with the Soviet Union. In Japan itself a new fleet was in course of construction; and in the Mandated Islands, naval bases were being established in preparation for a Pacific War. Great efforts had been made to achieve the goal of economic and industrial self- sufficiency, which alone would enable Japan to sustain the burden of the wars which the Army had planned. In Japan itself, in Manchukuo, and in the occupied areas of North and Central China, new sources of vital raw materials were being developed, and new war-supporting industries were being established. The Cabinet had equipped itself with the legal powers required to mobilise for war the entire strength of the Japanese nation. Through regimentation and through propaganda the people of Japan had been made to identify their country's destiny with the schemes of aggrandisement which the Army had propounded. THE MANCHUKUOAN LONG-RANGE INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME OF MAY 1938 The fulfilment of the Army's five-year planning [p48709] demanded that the maximum use should be made of the natural resources and industrial potential of the continental areas which Japan had occupied. In North and Central China the groundwork of such a development was already being laid; but as yet Japan could expect no substantial contribution from those areas. In Manchukuo the situation was otherwise; for in February 1937 the Manchukuoan government had embarked upon a second five-year programme of industrial expansion. HOSHINO had shared in the formulation and in the execution of this programme, which formed an integral part of the Japanese Army's 1937 economic and industrial planning. Even after the Lukuochiao Incident, which revived the China war, no pains had been spared in maintaining the objects of the planning. In November 1937 the Konoye Cabinet had resolved that the promotion of heavy industry in Manchukuo was essential to Japan's purpose; and the Manchurian Heavy Industry Corporation, a new national policy company, had been created to give effect to the Cabinet's decision. In May 1938 the Japanese-dominated Manchukuoan government drew up an even more extensive programme of war-supporting industrial development. It was then decided to utilise the Manchurian heavy Industrial Corporation in achieving this new project. HOSHINO, as Chief of General [p48710] Affairs of Manchukuo, had a decisive voice in the inception of the new scheme, which was the outcome of the Konoye Cabinet's resolution of November 1937. The new plan laid great stress upon the cultivation of even closer ties between Japan and Manchukuo. In the light of experience already gained, the original 1937 programme was radically revised, so that Manchukuo might bear an increased share in the burden of Japanese preparations for war. The need for revision was attributed to changes in the international situation. The whole purpose of the new plan was to increase the output of those industries in which Japan was deficient, and which the Japanese Army had singled out as essential to the needs of war. The production of iron and steel would be greatly expanded for the express purpose of meeting Japan's increasing requirements. Mining operations would be extended to ensure Japan of coal supplies. Electric power facilities would be increased and production of machine tools would be promoted with the object of encouraging further industrial development. New chemical industries, ancillary to the production of aircraft and munitions, would be established. New aircraft manufacturing plants would be built in widely separated areas. Manchukuo would aim at the production of five thousand aircraft and thirty thousand automobiles [p48711] each year. Systematic efforts would also be made to increase the production of gold, for upon that commodity Japan's foreign purchasing power was in part dependent. The revised plan required an estimated capital expenditure of nearly five thousand million yen, which was little less than twice the figure budgeted for in 1937. Rather less than half of the required amount was to be raised in Japan. The Manchukuoan government would set up an Economic Planning Commission to superintend the execution of the scheme. This new body was to carry out in Manchukuo much the same functions which the Planning Board exercised in Japan. Under its auspices a new and complete survey of the country's natural resources would be made. Trade schools for training skilled labour would be established, and plans would be prepared for carrying cut the economic and administrative readjustment which the revised programme demanded. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF MAY 1938 THREATENED THE ARMY'S LONG-RANGE PLANNING The measures which had already been taken to give effect to the Army's planning had placed a steadily increasing burden upon the Japanese economy. Despite military victories and advances, the war in China was still a constant drain upon Japanese resources of material [p48712] and manpower. Furthermore, the Army had counted upon China as a vital source of raw materials, and as an area in which the war-supporting industries might be developed. The Army, in disclosing the purposes of the Mobilisation Law, warned the Japanese people once again that the continuation of the war in China must not be permitted to obscure the basic objects of the national policy. North and Central China, together with Manchukuo and Japan itself, were represented as constituting a single sphere, the integrity of which must be maintained, not only against local resistance, but also against both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The principal object of the Army's planning, now as at all other times, was the accretion of armaments and of other war potential upon a scale sufficient to ensure victory over each of these formidable adversaries. The Army was at this time gravely concerned lest the struggle in China might cause the breakdown of its long-range planning. Since the resumption of fighting at Lukouchiao, Japan had always been faced with the danger of economic collapse. Far-reaching measures of industrial, commercial and financial control had been taken in an attempt to avert this threat. The revised programme for industrial expansion in Manchukuo showed again the manner in which Japan was exploiting those continental areas which she [p48713] already controlled. The people of these territories had been made to bear an increasing share in the expansion of the industries of war, and in supporting the overtaxed economy of Japan. Nevertheless, it became apparent during May and June 1938 that Japan was beset by a severe economic and financial crisis. The Army, having won control of the Japanese government and people, faced a new challenge to the achievement of its ambitions. The adoption of its mobilisation programme had been secured. The question now was whether the Japanese nation could withstand the rigours which the Army's policy entailed. It was in these circumstances that, on 5 May 1938, the Cabinet had invoked the powers bestowed upon it by the National General Mobilisation Law. In its commentary upon the purposes of that law, the Army reaffirmed its determination to proceed with the national mobilisation for war, whatever difficulties might stand in the way of its achievement. THE CABINET REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938 Ten days later the Cabinet was reorganised to meet the situation which had arisen. HIROTA left the Foreign Ministry; and KAYA, who, as Finance Minister, had guided and controlled the subordination of the Japanese economy to the requirements of the Army's mobilisation [p48714] plans, also resigned his post. To meet the threatened breakdown of the Army's plans, the Cabinet was strengthened by the addition of two military men. Lieutenant General ITAGAKI succeeded Sugiyama as Minister of War. Since the Mukden Incident ITAGAKI had been prominently associated with the Army's schemes of expansion and aggrandisement through military power. From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937 he had served as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and since then he had taken part as a Divisional Commander in the conquest of China. General ARAKI, who now became Education Minister, had been a leader of the military faction during the early years in the development of the Army's schemes. In July 1931, two months before the Mukden Incident occurred, he was recognised as a prominent member of the Kokuhonsha, a secret society designed to foster the spirit of nationalism. In December of the same year, when the Inukai Cabinet took office, ARAKI was appointed War Minister at the instance of the younger Army officers. This position he retained under Inukai's successor, Saito. As War Minister during 1932 and 1933 ARAKI advocated the adoption of an emergency policy, which would enable Japan to perfect her preparations for war. He [p48715] was acknowledged as a leading representative of the powerful militarists. In his radio speech of June 1933 he was the first to reveal the full extent of the Army's long-range planning, and to exhort the Japanese people to cooperate in its fulfilment. ARAKI's conduct during 1933 caused dissension within the Saito Cabinet; for it was realised that the policy which he represented was isolating Japan from the rest of the world. In December 1933 Finance Minister Takahashi attributed to the militarists of the Army and Navy the deterioration which had taken place in Japan's foreign relations; and in the following month ARAKI left the Cabinet. He continued, however, to lead the faction which had demanded the conquest of Manchuria, and which advocated further schemes of expansion through military power. Since 23 January 1934 ARAKI had held office as a Supreme War Councillor; and, since the institution of the Cabinet Advisory Council on 15 October 1937, he had been in addition a member of that body. KIDO, under whose guidance the education system of Japan had been made to serve the purposes of the national mobilisation for war, remained in the Cabinet as Welfare Minister. He realised that it was essential to the achievement of the Army's planning that the war in China should be ended. He did not over-estimate the [p48716] importance of the victory at Huschow; but he did believe that already there was talk of peace among the Chinese. He considered, therefore, that Japan should now plan a new military offensive in the form of an advance upon the city of Hankow. THE KONOYE CABINET TAKES NEW STEPS TO ACHIEVE THE GENERAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR The economic and financial crisis was accentuated on 11 June 1938, when the United States, in view of Japan's repeated violations of treaty obligations in the conduct of the China war, placed a moral embargo on the sending of aircraft, armaments, engine parts, aerial bombs and torpedoes to Japan. On 23 June 1938 the reconstituted Cabinet, of which ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were now members, met to decide what measures should be taken to maintain the goal of national preparedness for war. The decision made was a vindication of the forecast contained in the Army's commentary upon the purposes of the Mobilisation Law. Great emphasis was laid upon the Cabinet's determination to subordinate all other considerations to that of fulfilling the aims of the basic national policy. Measures vital to the national mobilisation for war would be enforced immediately. The Cabinet's examination of the national [p48717] economy disclosed that during the current year Japan's exports had fallen off by one- third. For this and for other reasons her foreign trade balance was extremely precarious. If the situation should become worse, it would be very difficult, in case of emergency, to procure arms and other supplies, because of lack of foreign exchange with which to procure them. Even as the position now stood, it would be difficult to achieve the targets set in the 1938 plan for the mobilisation of commodities. The success of the five-year planning was already endangered. The situation was, in the Cabinet's opinion, too grave to be met by day to day expedients. Such an approach to the problem would gravely hinder the efforts being made to meet immediate military requirements, while attaining the expansion of productive power which Japan's present situation demanded. The drastic measures decided upon involved a further curtailment in non-military supplies. Even within the field of war-supporting industrial development there would be economies. In pursuance of this policy of retrenchment, measures would be taken to maintain the stability of the exchange rate, to keep up the supply of munitions, to promote exports, and to safeguard the people's livelihood. [p48718] The wide powers given by the National General Mobilisation Law would be utilised to this end. Prices would be fixed, and commodities would be rationed. Savings would be encouraged, war profits would be restricted, and waste materials would be salvaged. Funds in foreign countries would be conserved, and Japan would retaliate against boycotts of her foreign trade. The administration of foreign trade control would be unified in order to stimulate exportation. The production of munitions would be increased. In particular, drastic steps would be taken to conserve essential materials through the regulation of supply and demand. By linking exports of finished products with imports of materials therefor, the government would ensure that commodities destined for ultimate export did not become absorbed in the home market. The minimum quantity of imports necessary to maintain the nation's livelihood, its exports and its barter trade, would be permitted. With this exception only those imports which were needed to meet military demands and to ensure the production of munitions would be allowed. Each Ministry concerned was instructed to take its own steps to carry out the policy upon which the Cabinet had decided, and to treat the achievement of the national mobilisation as a matter of urgency. [p48719] ITAGAKI AND ARAKI OF THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR The two new members of the Cabinet were quick to lend their support to the programme of national mobilisation. On 26 June 1938, three days after the Cabinet had met, War Minister ITAGAKI, in an interview with the press, reflected the Cabinet's recognition of the economic difficulties which beset Japan, and his own determination that those difficulties should not stand in the way of the conquest of China. He said that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek did not count upon victories in the first line of battle, but hoped to overcome Japan by imposing a burden upon the country's resources over a lengthy period. ITAGAKI urged upon his readers the necessity of a long preparedness for war, expressing his own conviction that Japan was able to withstand future hostilities over an indefinite period. He exhorted the Japanese people to enter into the spirit of the Cabinet's programme for the convservation of national reserves, and to extend unstinting cooperation towards the authorities. In commenting upon the international situation, ITAGAKI said, "It is natural that third powers are resorting to various manoeuvres, for the sake of protecting their interests in China. It should suffice for Japan to follow its own policy without fear or hesitation.” [p48720] On 7 July 1938, the first anniversary of the Lukouchiao Incident, Education Minister ARAKI made a speech in which he expressed the same views as ITAGAKI. In its general tenor this address differed little from the one which he had given as War Minister in June 1933; for, on each occasion, ARAKI looked forward from the difficulties of the moment to the attainment of the Army's ultimate goal of world domination. "We must be prepared," he said on this occasion, "for the aggrandisement of national strength required to wage long-period war. With deep understanding of the national thought, we should clarify the absolute superiority of our national constitution, and the thought of Hakko Ichiu or the unification of the world under one roof should be pervaded to the whole world." "National Mobilisation must be achieved both in the material and in the spiritual sense, which will promote the conspicuous ever-progressing prosperity of the nation, who must not be left as a power in East Asia only, but must be promoted to the world's Japan as the leader of the new era; and the proper magnanimity and full vigour of her people should be cultivated so that the mission given to her may be thoroughly fulfilled." Despite the confident and aggressive tone which ITAGAKI and ARAKI had adopted, there was clearly [p48721] discernible in the statements of each an undercurrent of deep anxiety concerning the outcome of the campaign in China. While that issue remained unsettled the Army's long-range planning was in jeopardy. CHANGES IN THE ARMY STAFF ACCOMPANIED THE CABINET REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938 When the Cabinet reorganisation of May 1938 took place, changes were also made in Army Staff appointments. Lieutenant General TOJO was recalled from service in the field to replace UMEZU as Vice-Minister of War. As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army since 1 March 1937, TOJO had been intimately connected with the Army's planning and preparations for war with the Soviet Union. It was he who had advised the Army General Staff to strike a blow at China before attacking the U.S.S.R. After the fighting in China had revived, military preparations for war against the Soviet Union had continued to absorb his attention; and, in carrying out that work, he had been in close touch with UMEZU. On 18 June 1938 Lieutenant General DOHIHARA, who had commanded a division in the Japanese advance southward from Peiping, was recalled from China and attached to the Army General Staff. DOHIHARA, like ITAGAKI, had taken a prominent part in the planning and execution of the Mukden Incident, and in the subsequent development [p48722] of the Army's plans. He brought to Tokyo first-hand knowledge of the situation in China. [p48723] War Vice-Minister TOJO received during June 1938 many other appointments, each connected with some aspect of the national mobilization for war. Not even his predecessor UMEZU had held positions so numerous or so diversified. TOJO became a Councillor of the Planning Board, of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, and of the Information Bureau. He was appointed also to the new National General Mobilisation Council set up pursuant to the provisions of the Mobilisation Law. He became Chief of Army Air Headquarters, and a member of the Air Enterprise Investigation Committee. He joined committees concerned with the automobile, shipbuilding, electric power and iron industries; and became a member of the Scientific Council. The affairs of the Navy did not escape his notice, for he became also a member of the Naval Council. Lieutenant-Colonel SATO continued to provide a second link between military preparations and other aspects of the general mobilisation for war. He had, since 26 November 1937, combined the functions of Secretary of the Planning Board with those of a section staff member of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau. A NEW OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL CHINA: JULY 1938 While the Cabinet took steps to maintain the [p48724] supply of war materials, the Army General Staff was engaged upon the scheme which KIDO had favoured. During June 1938 they drew up operational plans for a new major offensive in Central China. Approximately four hundred thousand experienced troops were to take part in this advance under General HATA's command. The city of Hankow was their objective. The campaign, if successful, would close the breach which separated the existing puppet regimes in the north and in the south. The reconstituted Cabinet was determined that a supreme effort should be made to end Chinese resistance, so that the programme of mobilisation for war should no longer be imperilled. "We will not lay down arms", said General ARAKI in his speech of 7 July 1938, "until anti-Japanese China is completely crushed to the extent that she cannot stand up again." In July 1938 the offensive began, and during July and August minor victories were gained as more Chinese towns and villages were enveloped in the tide of the Japanese advance. There was, however, still no indication which would justify the hope of a Chinese capitulation. CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE ARMY BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY [p48725] While the new offensive in China was being launched, the Army continued to make ready for the expected war with the Soviet Union. On 19 June 1938, TOJO, the new War Vice-Minister, received an official communication concerning those military preparations with which he had been so closely concerned as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. The Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia was making a study of the strategic areas bordering upon the U.S.S.R. The Chief of Staff of that army also reported that the natural resources of Mongolia were under survey, and that the materials which had already been acquired were being examined. While the Cabinet struggled to achieve the national mobilisation for war in the face of economic difficulties, an attack upon the Soviet Union was still the project uppermost in the minds of the military faction. Both War Minister ITAGAKI and Education Minister ARAKI laid enormous stress upon the need for preparation for a long war. "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and Russia," said General ARAKI on 11 July 1938, "is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade." With this determination in mind the Army took, upon its own initiative, a new and important step towards the attainment of its goals of military conquest. [p48726] The programme of national mobilisation for war being now accepted and in course of achievement, the Army's attention was directed towards negotiating with Germany a closer alliance, which would reinforce Japan's own military strength. At the instigation of the Army General Staff Major-General OSHIMA, the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin, opened negotiations with the German government for a military alliance between the two countries. Such a conjunction of forces would complete the Army's preparations for war with the Soviet Union. From this time onwards Japan's relations with Germany are of significance, not merely as one aspect of Japanese preparation for war, but as an essential factor in determining the course of events within Japan itself. The new Germany, which had arisen under Hitler since the year 1933, was, like Japan, engaged in preparing for wars of conquest and territorial expansion. The two nations, each intent upon the realisation of its own schemes, entertained little regard for each other, but harboured common designs upon the Soviet Union. These had found expression in the Anti- Comintern Pact, concluded in November 1936. A military alliance with Germany had long held a place of importance in the Japanese Army's planning. [p48727] The need for it became more urgent as the time for attacking the Soviet Union appeared to draw near. In order that the origins and development of this phase in the scheming of the military faction may be understood, it is first necessary to survey broadly the progress of the Army's plan for making war on the Soviet Union. THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION HAD ITS ORIGINS IN THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA Japan's antipathy towards the U.S.S.R., which led her to make common cause with Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact, was inherent in the very nature of the Army's ambitions. When, in 1924, Okawa first proposed schemes of territorial expansion, he had advocated the occupation of Siberia. HIROTA, as Ambassador in Moscow in 1931, was also of that opinion. He then expressed the view that, whether or not Japan intended to attack the U.S.S.R., she must have strong policies towards that country, being ready for war at any time. The main object of such preparedness was, in his opinion, not so much as a defence against Communism, but rather as a means of conquering Eastern Siberia. Already there was a second reason for regarding the U.S.S.R. as an enemy. In 1930 military spokesmen, who were then campaigning for popular approval of [p48728] the Army's plan to conquer Manchuria, had stressed that Japan must defend that territory against the Soviet Union. In April 1932, when the new state of Manchukuo had been established, the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers were each acknowledged as enemies. Colonel ITAGAKI, then a member of the Kwantung Army Staff, received appointment to a new committee which would promote the interests of "the allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against Comintern aggression." Some three months later the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow reported to his government that a Russo-Japanese war was in the future unavoidable. He urged a non-committal attitude in regard to the proposal for a non-aggression pact made to Japan some six months earlier by the Soviet Foreign Commissar. On 13 December 1932, after five further months of delay, Japan rejected this proposal upon the ground that differences outstanding between the two countries had rendered negotiations for such an agreement untimely. In February 1933 Japan again refused a renewed offer to discuss such an agreement. Two months later, Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Army General Staff said that any such proposal must be denounced, since the Soviet Union was the absolute enemy, which aimed to destroy the [p48729] national structure of Japan. The Soviet Union was thus recognized by the military faction as the power which, above all others, stood between Japan and the achievement of the goal of supremacy in East Asia. The steady progress made in military planning and preparation for war with the U.S.S.R. has been mentioned frequently in the course of this narrative. By December 1933 the Japanese Army in Korea was already making preparations "in consideration of the time then we open hostilities against Soviet Russia." General ARAKI even then had designs upon Mongolia as a steppingstone for such an attack. In November 1935 SHIRATORI, the Minister in Sweden, told Arita that the time was ripe for an attack. He believed that Japan should immediately, by force or by threat of force, shut out the Soviet Union from East Asia. On 23 March 1936, after HIROTA's Cabinet had taken office, ITAGAKI, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army had taken measures to bring Outer Mongolia within the orbit of Japan's "new order." After 11 August 1936, when the basis of Japan's national policy was decided, preparations directed against the Soviet Union were intensified to enable Japan "to cope with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilise in the Far [p48730] East." It has been seen that the revival of the war in China was a part of the Army's plan of expansion which included an eventual attack upon the U.S.S.R. Before and after the fighting began at Lukouchiao, military preparations for war with the U.S.S.R. had been maintained and accelerated. The Kwantung Army in close collaboration with the Army General Staff, had made its dispositions for an immediate onslaught, to be launched at the earliest possible moment. If the attack were left for ten years, SHIRATORI had said in November 1935, the Soviet Union might become too powerful to touch; but the chances of immediate success were good. There was at that time, he added, no other country on earth which could become a real menace to Japan. The cession of Sakhalin and of the Maritime Province of Siberia should be demanded at a reasonable price. The Soviet Union should be reduced to a "powerless capitalistic republic," the natural resources of which would be rigidly controlled. THE ARMY DEFERS ITS PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION: AUGUST 1938 With this compelling sense of urgency, the Army had fretted at Japan's increasing commitments in China, and at the precarious position into which her [p48731] economy had lapsed. Military leaders had resolutely maintained their programme of preparations for war with the U.S.S.R. and had turned to Nazi Germany for support. In July 1938, after ITAGAKI and TOJO had been installed in the War Ministry, the Army's impatience to launch an attack upon the Soviet Union found an immediate outlet. At the beginning of July 1938 Japanese guards on the Soviet border in the region of Lake Khassan were strengthened; and in mid-July SHIGEMITSU was despatched to Moscow to secure acceptance of Japanese demands for certain territory in that area. The ground in dispute was an eminence of strategic value. SHIGEMITSU adopted a peremptory attitude throughout these negotiations; and made, on 20 July 1938, a formal demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, upon the pretext of Japan's obligations to Manchukuo. On the following day War Minister ITAGAKI, together with the Chief of the Army General Staff, attempted to obtain the Emperor's sanction to launch an attack at Lake Khassan, so that Japan's demands might be enforced. It was falsely represented to the Emperor that the Army's policy in this matter was supported by the Foreign and Navy Ministries. On the [p48732] next day, 22 July 1938, the scheme was disclosed to, and approved by, the Five Ministers' Conference. On 29 July 1933 the Japanese forces at Lake Khassan attacked the Soviet border guards. The fighting thus begun continued until 11 August 1938, by which time the Japanese forces employed in the operation had been routed. Thereafter Japan negotiated terms of peace, leaving the Soviet Union in possession of the disputed area. The fighting at Lake Khassan will be discussed fully in a later section of this judgment; but the circumstances in which the attack occurred are of importance in the present narrative. The scheme was promoted and put into effect upon the initiative of the Army. War Minister ITAGAKI had long believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. His Vice-Minister, TOJO, had supervised the detailed planning and preparation for such a war. The attack occurred at a time when the Army was negotiating with Germany for a new military alliance, directed principally at the U.S.S.R. It was a product of the Army's planning to crush the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Japan's defect at Lake Khassan caused an abrupt revision of the Army's plans. On 25 August [p48733] 1938 Colonel SATO, as spokesmen of the Ministry, expounded the Army's policy to the assembled Chiefs of the Police Bureau. In a speech which discussed the Army's resolves and the nation's difficulties, he revealed a new attitude towards the projected war with the Soviet Union. He warned his audience that military preparations must be continued, for such a war might break out at any time; but he said emphatically that it would be disadvantageous for Japan to provoke such a war at the present time. "If, however, a war with Russia is unavoidable," he added, "it will be necessary for Japan to seek a proper chance after her armament and production shall have been expended - - this should be after 1942." A curb had been imposed upon the impetuousness of the Army and its supporters. The leaders of the Army had resolved once more to follow the principles laid down in the basic national policy decision, which demanded, first and foremost, the establishment of Japan's "new order" in China, and the completion of preparations for war. The U.S.S.R. was, however, still regarded as a principal enemy; for that country stood between Japan and the attainment of the goal of supremacy in East Asia. SATO made it clear that Japan had not [p48734] abandoned its ultimate goal of forcing war on the Soviet Union. He urged that objective was a primary reason for completing the national mobilisation. He reaffirmed the Army's belief that the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy should be strengthened. But his speech disclosed that, as a result of its discomfiture at Lake Khassan, the Army was determined to achieve in greater measure the repletion of the national strength, before voluntarily undertaking any further liabilities. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48735] MARSHAL OF THE COURT; The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: DESIGNS UPON THE SOVIET UNION LED THE ARMY TO SEEK A GERMAN ALLIANCE Hitler came to power in Germany in 1935 and the Japanese Army, being then intent upon preparing for war with the Soviet Union, took an immediate interest in the new regime. In March 1934, while the Okada government was in office Colonel OSHIMA was appointed Military Attache in Berlin. Upon instructions of the Chief of the Army General Staff, OSHIMA was ordered to watch and investigate the stability of the Nazi regime, the future of the German Army, the state of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union and, in particular, the relations between the armies of those two countries. OSHIMA would also collect and report information relative to the Soviet Union. He would try to discover what would be the German attitude in case the U.S.S.R. should become involved in war. OSHIMA took up his new appointment in May 1934 and in the spring of 1935 he learned from Ribbentrop of German willingness to conclude an alliance with Japan. This information he conveyed to the Army General Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Wakamatsu, sent to Germany to invest- [p48736] igate the proposal, arrived in Berlin in December 1935. Already some, at least, of the military faction were confident of German support in case of war with the Soviet Union. "Since the relationship of Germany and Poland with Russia are in a same position as ours," wrote SHIRATORI to Arita in his letter of 4 November 1935, "there is no need for us to try to specifically weave understanding with them. Once the war breaks out they will surely rise on our side. The only trouble is England." In Berlin Wakamatsu and OSHIMA held discussions with the German authorities, and advised them that the Army General Staff was in favor of a general alliance between the two countries. This stage in the negotiations having been reached, the proposal was referred by the Army to the Cabinet. Meanwhile, HIROTA, who had five years earlier advocated the seizure of Soviet territory, had become Premier; and Arita, the recipient of SHIRATORI's confidences, was his Foreign Minister. In the Spring of 1936, several months before the basis of the national policy was finally decided, HIROTA's Cabinet took up the Army's proposal. Ambassador Mushakoji, newly arrived in Berlin, was able to confirm that Germany eagerly desired cooperation with Japan. Protracted negotiations resulted in the signing [p48737] of the Anti-Comintern Pact and a secret military agreement, both of which were ratified by the Japanese Privy Council on 25 November 1936. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT The Anti-Comintern Pact was not the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed, and which the Army General Staff had favored. Although the August Conference of Five Ministers had already committed Japan to a forthright anti-Soviet policy, the pact was framed as a purely defensive measure, designed to prevent advance of the Soviet Union into East Asia Foreign Minister Arita explained it in this light to the Privy Councillors, and was careful to disavow approval of German domestic policies. Public opinion in Japan was not yet prepared for an alliance with the Germans, and this fact had imposed a limitation upon the Cabinet's contractual powers. Yet, in effect, this agreement furthered Japan's aggressive policy against the U.S.S.R. HIROTA had obtained assurances from the Germans the spirit of the secret agreement would alone be decisive in [p48738] determining their attitude towards the Soviet Union. If occasion should arise, that agreement was to provide a basis for a further development of the relationship between the two countries. Furthermore, Arita himself belied the contention that the pact was defensive in nature, for he assured the Privy Councillors that the Soviet Union was behaving reasonably in all of its transactions with Japan. He did not himself believe that the U.S.S.R. would initiate any affair, even though Japan's preparations for war should not be adequate. Arita hoped also that the pact would strengthen Japan's position in her dealings with China. In reality the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded in an attempt to obtain the advantage of German support against the Soviet Union and in China, without alienating public opinion in Japan, and with the minimum possible degree of commitment on Japan's part. These same considerations governed the subsequent development of Japan's relationship with Germany. After the fighting had begun at Lukouchiao, Japan attempted unsuccessfully to justify her actions in China as a struggle against Communism, carried out in pursuance of the objects of the Anti-Comintern Pact. [p48739] THE FAILURE OF HIROTA'S POLICY IN REGARD TO GERMAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN CHINA On 27 October 1937 TOGO was sent to Berlin to replace Mushakoji as Ambassador. Some days later, on 6 November 1937, the Japanese Privy Council ratified a new treaty with Germany and Italy, by virtue of which each of the three signatories exchanged the undertakings contained in the Anti-Comintern Pact. HIRANUHA, the President, Foreign Minister HIROTA and Finance Minister KAYA attended the meeting. It was TOGO's task to convince Germany that Japan would certainly succeed in the conquest of China; and that, by supporting Japan, Germany might assure herself of a preferred position in the new China which Japan would create. This view the Germans accepted with reluctance in January 1938. Nevertheless, HIROTA had realized that Japan was dependent upon Great Britain and the United States for assistance in the economic development of China. He did not mean to offer to Germany more than the shadow of a special advantage. He intended in return to obtain from the Germans supplies and technical assistance which were needed in China. Therefore, HIROTA had [p48740] closely circumscribed the limits within which TOGO might make promises to the Germans. During May, June and July 1938, while the economic crisis deepened in Japan, Ambassador TOGO wrestled with this difficult task in the face of growing German dissatisfaction. The fact that the German government, in July and August 1938 negotiated with OSHIMA, the Military Attache, to the Ambassador's complete exclusion, provides an indication of the measure of TOGO'S failure. During May and June 1938 there had been repeated discussions between Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and TOGO concerning German economic participation in the reconstruction of China. Von Ribbentrop had claimed, in return for Germany's recognition and assistance, especially generous treatment in regard to her own foreign trade in China. TOGO had replied, cordially but guardedly, within the narrow limits HIROTA had allowed him. Pressed by von Ribbentrop, TOGO had explained that Japan could not assure Germany in treaty form of better treatment than other third powers. The German Foreign Minister, though he expressed dissatisfaction, had concluded that Japan was prepared to offer in practice what she would not concede in categorical treaty form. [p48741] At length, von Ribbentrop was disillusioned; for on 24 July 1938 the German Foreign Ministry received from its representative in China a detailed report upon conditions in the occupied areas of that country. It was there in disclosed that the Japanese authorities in China were practising systematic discrimination against German interests. Established German concerns were suffering serious injury through the preferences given to Japanese firms. The receipt of this information intensified the dissatisfaction felt in Germany. On 27 July 1938 TOGO was advised that reports from China had confirmed von Ribbentrop in his earlier decision. The vaguely-formulated Japanese offer of "especially favorable treatment" was regarded as inadequate; for it appeared to the German government that Japan had embarked upon a ruthless suppression of foreign trade - including German trade - in China. Disagreement between the two countries as to the terms of economic cooperation in China remained as wide as ever. Nor had any change in the situation occurred when, on 8 September 1938, TOGO was replaced as Ambassador in Berlin by his Military Attache, Major-General OSHIMA. [p48742] THE ARMY MAINTAINS JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY The revival of the war in China at Lukouchiao had at first incurred severe censure from Germany. Despite this estrangement, the Army, ever mindful of the coming struggle with the Soviet Union, had turned to Germany for assistance. In the latter months of 1937 the Army General staff, already apprehensive of Japan's increasing commitments in China, had sought German intervention to negotiate a settlement with the Chinese authorities. The German Foreign Minister, being then dissatisfied with the state of his country's relations with Japan, had approached, not the Japanese Ambassador, but his Military Attache. In January 1938 von Ribbentrop conveyed to OSHIMA his belief that Japan and Germany should collaborate more closely. OSHIMA passed this information on to the Army General Staff, which agreed in principle, provided that the U.S.S.R. was made the primary object of the new alliance. In the same month Germany, for reasons of expediency, had acquiesced in Japan's attempted conquest of China; and in the following month German recognition was accorded to the state of Manchukuo. The Army used this [p48743] event to strengthen the ties between Germany on the one hand and Japan and Manchukuo upon the other. Diplomatic relations were established between Manchukuo and Germany; and a treaty of amity between the two countries was signed. Lieutenant-General TOJO had there expressed the Kwantung Army's wish that Manchukuo become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact; and UMEZU had conveyed the Army General staff ready acceptance of this suggestion. Those transactions had taken place at time when the Japanese Army in occupation of Manchukuo was making its dispositions for the "East approaching war with the soviet Russia". THE ARMY INITIATES A PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE AMONG THE AXIS POWERS In early July 1938, shortly after ITAGAKI and TOJO had become respectively Minister and Vice-Minister of War, the Army had for the second time taken steps to promote a military alliance with Germany. OSHIMA made the proposal to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in a general form, stating that, in the Japanese Army's opinion, the time had come for Japan to conclude a general defensive alliance with Germany and Italy. The Army sought an agreement directed princip- [p48744] ally, if not wholly, against the Soviet Union; but von Ribbentrop, stressing the need for a strong alliance, refused to consider a mere agreement for consultation in the event of an attack by the U.S.S.R. OSHIMA, acting upon the German view, himself outlined the terms of the proposed pact, which was in form a mutual agreement to provide military assistance in case of any unprovoked attack upon a signatory power. It made provision also for consultation, and for mutual economic and political support. OSHIMA settled with von Ribbentrop the text of the proposed agreement, and dispatched the draft by special emissary to the Army General Staff. The draft agreement, accompanied by a note of von Ribbentrop's views upon the international situation, was treated in Tokyo as a proposal of German origin. The military leaders signified their general approval of OSHIMA's work by conveying the draft to Foreign Minister Ugaki, who immediately summoned a conference of Five Ministers to consider the new German proposal. On 9 August 1938 Prime Minister Konoye reported the proposal to the Cabinet as a whole. The Navy, in particular, was opposed to an agreement which definitely committed Japan to rendering military assistance; and KIDO also regarded it as a serious matter. But, after [p48745] the proposal had been discussed, the Chief of the General staff advised OSHIMA that Cabinet and Army favored the proposed alliance. Japan was willing to conclude a pact in which military aid was promised in case of unprovoked aggression; but it was desired that the agreement should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union, and secondarily against other powers. So secretly had the negotiations been conducted that Ambassador TOGO know nothing of them until after they had reached Konoye's hands. Ambassador Ott in Tokyo was not informed until eight further months had elapsed. Konoye received the draft proposal, believing that it had originated with von Ribbentrop, though, in substance at least, it contained the provisions which OSHIMA had first suggested to the Germans. Although the Konoye Cabinet took no new step during its five remaining months of office towards the conclusion of the proposed alliance, during that period relations within the Axis were strengthened; the first indications of a Japanese advance southward arose out of circumstances connected with the China War; and Japan's relations with the Western Powers continued to deteriorate. [p48746] THE ARMY RENEWS ITS DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE THE CONQUEST OF CHINA: AUGUST 1938 The revision of Army policy which followed the fighting at Lake Khassan was disclosed in two speeches made by SATO in August 1938. During the preceding month SATO had been promoted to the rank of Colonel, and had become a member of the Cabinet Information Bureau. In that month also he was relieved of his additional post as Secretary of the Planning Board. He retained his principal appointment as a member of the Military Affairs Bureau and assumed the duties of Chief of the War Ministry's Press Section. On 25 and 29 August 1938 SATO expounded the Army's policy for dealing with the China war to a conference of the Chiefs of the Hope Ministry's Police Bureau. These speeches, made to a group of responsible government officials by the War Ministry's spokesman, constitute an authoritative expression of Army policy at this time. The main theme which ran throughout SATO's discursive address was that the Army was determined upon crushing the resistance of the Chinese National Government's forces, while at the same time completing the [p48747] national mobilization for war. The Cabinet was still uncertain in its policy for dealing with the war in China; but the Army, having sacrificed its long-cherished plan for an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union, was the more determined that the main goals of the basic national policy decision should be achieved. SATO considered the possible outcome of the present drive towards Hankow, and showed that the Army was itself doubtful whether the capture of that city would put an end to Chinese resistance. Whatever might transpire, the Army was resolved that the fall of Hankow should be the occasion for establishing a new pro-Japanese central government of China. In the new China, said SATO, Japan would do her utmost in the role of leadership; but, unlike the case of Manchukuo, no government office would be held by a Japanese. North China and Inner Mongolia would form two areas each similar in status to Manchukuo. While the chief reason for securing Inner Mongolia was its value in preparing for war with the Soviet Union, North China would form an area in which economic and industrial expansion could be pushed ahead. Its resources would be developed to meet the needs of "national defence"; and Central China also would form a base for the expansion of Japan's economic power. [p48748] In justifying the Army's attitude towards China, SATO employed all the arguments which Konoye and HIROTA had advanced. He attempted to imbue his audience with the Army's enthusiasm for completing the conquest of China and for achieving the national mobilisation. Japan, he said, must surmount her difficulties, not sue for peace. The Army was determined that lack of resolution within the Cabinet must be overcome; and that foreign mediation in China should not be permitted. SATO expressed confidence that the Cabinet would not entertain the peace proposals which an emissary of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was now reported to be making. He was himself convinced, said SATO, that the establishment of a new regime in China was a condition which could not be modified. THE ATTEMPT TO FORM A PRO-JAPANESS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA General Ugaki, who had succeeded HIROTA as Foreign Minister, was himself of the view that immediate steps must be taken to link together the two pro-Japanese regimes already established in the north and in the south. In August 1938 Lieutenant-General DOHIHARA, recently attached to the Army General Staff, was sent [p48749] to China to see what could be done to settle the war. Being firmly committed to the view that there should be no compromise with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, DOHIHARA set about to find other leaders who would collaborate with the Japanese. During September 1938, the work of establishing a new central government with which Japan could make peace upon her own terms proceeded. On 11 September 1938, the Chinese National Government, in face of this new development, appealed once more to the League of Nations. Japan was invited by the League to join the committee which was set up immediately to investigate the dispute. On 22 September 1938 Foreign Minister Ugaki conveyed to the League the Cabinet's refusal so to do. The Japanese Government, he said, was convinced that such a proceeding could not "provide a just and adequate solution of the present conflict." On the same day a committee of Chinese, formed under Japanese auspices to facilitate the creation of a new central government, was established at Peiping. THE MILITARY FACTION OPPOSES COMPROMISES IN CHINA The need for reaching a speedy conclusion to the war in China was a matter upon which all were [p48750] now agreed. Cabinet and Army were equally resolved that China should constitute an area which would bolster Japan's precarious economy, and which would contribute to the achievement of the national mobilisation for war. But SATO had made it clear that there was within the Cabinet a difference of opinion whether compromise would be effective in attaining the main result. Foreign Minister Ugaki and some other members of the Cabinet had inclined to the view that the Army's goal of military conquest should be abandoned, and that direct negotiations for peace should be reopened. Nor was this disagreement confined to the Cabinet. By September 1938 there was a strong feeling in Japan that peace in China should be brought about, even if it should prove necessary to reopen negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Among the members of the Army General Staff this was the prevailing opinion. But, as SATO had shown, there was an influential faction within the Army which took the opposite view, and was determined to resist any attempt to compromise the war in China. Lieutenant-General TOJO, Vice-Minister of War, was the champion of this [p48751] standpoint; and War Minister ITAGAKI shared TOJO's views. ITAGAKI and TOJO were the arbiters of Army policy, and Colonel SATO was their spokesman. In his speeches of August 1938, SATO had launched an attack upon those who did not share the uncompromising views which he attributed to the Army as a whole. There were, said SATO, many doubtful points in the Cabinet's policy towards the war in China. The highest authorities were themselves not very clear what measures should be taken. He contrasted the indecision of the Cabinet with the firm determination of the military leaders; and charged those who supported Ugaki with hampering the execution of the Army's policy. As always when the Army encountered opposition to its schemes, there came from the military faction a prompt demand for the revision of the organs of government, and for the abolition of political parties. SATO spoke of the need for "renovation" within the government itself, so that the Army's policy in China might be carried out. He hinted also at new measures for dealing with "political party problems." There was a movement afoot to promote the formation of a "One Party System" of government which could deal resolutely with Japan's difficulties [p48752] at home and abroad. THE CABINET CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1938 LEADS TO THE RESIGNATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER UGAKI Prime Minister Konoye, fortified by knowledge of the German proposal for a general military alliance, was of the opinion which admitted no compromise in China. On 7 September 1938 he discussed with Welfare Minister KIDO and others the situation which would arise upon the capture of Hankow. KIDO, himself a staunch supporter of Japanese domination in China, expressed the view that if indications of a Chinese capitulation did not eventuate it might be necessary to reopen negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Konoye then replied that if he should be forced to take that step he would resign, for the responsibility would be too great for him to bear. He spoke bitterly of the criticism to which he had been subjected by Foreign Minister Ugaki; and expressed his belief that the faction which had gathered round Ugaki would attempt to force the resignation of his Cabinet. KIDO, as he had done in the political crisis of November 1937, immediately took the side of Konoye and the military faction. He said that if the political [p48753] situation should be dealt with according to Ugaki's policies, there might be disturbances within Japan which would lead to defeat at the hands of the Chinese. He therefore urged Konoye to muster up his courage and remain in office. KIDO's remarks on this occasion reveal his knowledge of the public approval which Ugaki's policy commanded. Konoye, being now assured of KIDO's support, disclosed that he was privy to the Army's plot for establishing a dictatorship. He said he thought it possible that the proposed merger of political parties might place him at the head of a determined "one party system," so that the national policy might be pursued without further opposition in Japan. Konoye had not committed himself to any view upon this question, but he remained in office to see what would transpire. The forces of the military faction ranged behind ITAGAKI, KIDO and Konoye, proved too strong for the Ugaki group. In this same month of September 1938 Ugaki left the Cabinet and Konoye himself assumed the duties of the Foreign Minister. The Government of Japan was once more committed to the steady pursuit of the aims set out in the national policy decision. [p48754] CHANGES IN ARMY POLICY: JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938 At this point it is appropriate to review and analyse the changes in Army policy which had occurred since the attack at Lukouchiao. The war in China had been revived upon the initiative of the Army General Staff acting on TOJO's advice. It was the first step towards the achievement of the Army's plans for making war on the Soviet Union. In the last quarter of 1937 the Army General Staff became increasingly concerned lest the growing war in China should frustrate the major aims of the Army's planning. So alarmed did the military leaders become that, again acting upon their own initiative, they sought German mediation of the dispute. In the result Chinese peace offers had been submitted through German agency in November and December 1937. They failed because Foreign Minister HIROTA was determined that there should be no compromise in dealing with China. Prime Minister Konoye, supported by KIDO and HIROTA, remained in office and pledged his Cabinet to have no further dealings with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This decision was taken at an Imperial Conference held on 11 January 1938. Even at that late date General Tada, the [p48755] Vice-Chief and virtual head of the Army General Staff, was strongly in favour of seeking an immediate settlement of the China war. On 15 January 1938 a Liaison Conference, lasting eleven hours, was held to consider what new action should be taken against China. So vehemently did the Army Central Staff oppose the Cabinet's China policy that Tada attempted to have the decision of the Imperial Conference recalled. The Army was prepared to make any sacrifice which would end the fighting more quickly, so that preparations for war with the Soviet Union should no longer be impeded. Konoye and KIDO resolutely opposed the Army's view, and HIROTA's policy prevailed. By May 1938 the economic and financial crisis which had threatened Japan since November 1937 had become more acute. Nor had Chinese resistance weakened. Although the Army had in the meantime secured the passage of the Mobilisation Law, the long-range programme of preparations for war and the plans for an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union were both gravely imperilled. Foreign Minister HIROTA, the man most responsible for this development, resigned his office, as did Finance Minister KAYA, who had not succeeded in averting an economic crisis. ITAGAKI and ARAKI, both leaders of the military faction, became members [p48756] of the Cabinet. TOJO, well versed in Japanese preparations for war against the U.S.S.R., succeeded UMEZU as War Vice-Minister. At this tine also General Ugaki joined the Cabinet as HIROTA's successor in the Foreign Ministry. Ugaki had for many years held views which were in marked contrast to those of the military faction. So little did he enjoy their confidence that, in January 1937, the leaders of the Army had foiled his attempt to form a Cabinet. Nevertheless, on one particular matter, Ugaki's views accorded with those of the military leaders. He was known to favour the early settlement of the China war, even if that settlement could be obtained only by negotiation with the Chinese National Government. TOJO, the new Vice-Minister of War, although he supported the Army's plans for an early attack upon the Soviet Union, maintained the view that the Army's aims in China must not be sacrificed through compromise. Prime Minister Konoye and Welfare Minister KILO, though they also desired an early settlement of the war in China, were committed to the view that Chinese resistance must first be crushed. In July and August 1938 Japanese troops attacked the Soviet forces at Lake Khassan, and were [p48757] repulsed. After this experience the Army postponed its plans for forcing immediate war upon the Soviet Union. In view of the intended delay, prompt settlement of the China war became less imperative. Although most members of the Army General Staff still favoured a negotiated peace in China, War Minister ITAGAKI agreed with TOJO that there should be no compromise with the Chinese National Government. Prime Minister Konoye adhered steadfastly to that opinion and found support in KIDO. Once more the views of Foreign Minister Ugaki were in direct opposition to those of the military faction whose confidence was increased by the prospect of a closer military alliance with Germany and Italy. Ugaki left the Cabinet, and the Army's policy was again unchallenged. The Army, by reconciling itself to the postponement of the attack on the Soviet Union, had secured the retention of the major aims of the 1936 national policy decision. The war in China would be ended only with the establishment of a new pro-Japanese central government, with which Japan could arrange peace upon her own terms. The new China would make a major contribution to the Japanese national mobilisation programme. [p48758] In the meantime Japan would negotiate a military alliance with Germany, and would hasten the completion of her internal preparations for war. [p48759] THE ARMY'S PART IN THE MOBILISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION On 19 May 1938 the Army, in its commentary upon the purposes of the National General Mobilisation Law, had announced that the first requirement of the mobilisation was that of "spiritual" power, since the people themselves were the source of the nation's fighting strength. With this end in view educational institutions and propaganda organs would be mobilised for a unified campaign. In the Cabinet reorganisation which took place a week later General ARAKI, a soldier and a leader of the military faction, became the new Education Minister. The very substantial measures of censorship and propaganda which had already been taken to prepare public opinion for war had been instituted by the Army in the years following the conquest of Manchuria; and for that development ARAKI was in large measure responsible. He became War Minister in December 1931, and held that appointment in the Inukai and Saito Cabinets until January 1934. During that period the Army's control over the expression of public opinion became firmly entrenched. Newspapers published the views which were acceptable to the military faction, and any adverse comment upon the Army's policy was met with threats or reprisals. [p48760] Statesmen, who ventured upon any criticism of the Army and its supporters, were also threatened. Political leaders, and even members of the Cabinet, were constantly shadowed by the police, who, though responsible to the Home Minister, acted in this matter upon the direction of War Minister ARAKI. This close association between the Army and the police was maintained in subsequent years. From 1935 onwards the press was completely subject to police domination. When HIROTA's Cabinet took office in 1936 the police permitted no one to criticise the policy of the government; and after the Lukouchiao Incident all opposition to the war in China was rigorously suppressed. It is indicative of the close liaison which existed between Army and police that when, in August 1938, the Army's planning was revised, the new policy was at once expounded by SATO, the War Ministry's spokesman, to the assembled Chiefs of the Home Ministry's Police Bureau. In the field of education the influence of ARAKI and the military faction had been no less great. Even before he became War Minister ARAKI had attempted to introduce in the universities the system of military training and instruction already established in Japanese schools. As War Minister in 1932 and 1933 he encouraged the extension of such training. The military instructors, [p48761] supplied by the War Ministry, gained an increased measure of control over the school authorities, and students were were taught to support the Army's expansionist aims. The pressure exerted by the military faction during 1932 and 1933, and the constant intervention of the Army in matters of domestic and foreign policy, caused dissension within the Saito Cabinet. In January 1934 ARAKI left the War Ministry. Thereafter rather less importance was attached to military training, and instruction in schools until, in March 1936, HIROTA's Cabinet came to power. After the revival of the war in China on 7 July 1937 all forms of control over public opinion were strengthened. The military instructors in schools acquired complete independence from the school authorities. Five months later, in November 1937, it was decided that the fundamental aim of all education should be that of promoting the cause of service to Japan. In the same month KIDO became Education Minister, and a start was made in converting the educational system to the task of fostering the warlike spirit of the Japanese nation. The police and Education Ministry authorities worked together to ensure that all university teachers should actively cooperate in preparing the minds of their students for war. The Army's commentary upon the purposes of the Mobilisation Law stressed the need for the intensification [p48762] of this work; and ARAKI, being appointed Education Minister, was on 26 May 1938 given charge of it. ARAKI'S INFLUENCE ON THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM On 29 June 1938, one month after ARAKI's appointment as Education Minister, a new instruction was issued to school and local government authorities. This new Education Ministry Ordinance reflected the wishes expressed by the Army on 19 May 1938. By mobilising educational institutions for a unified campaign, all possible efforts would be made to intensify the fighting spirit of the Japanese people. "It is the students and pupils," the Ordinance proclaimed, "which are the source of energy for national activities as well as the backbone of the nation. They must realize how great and important are their duties to the state." It should therefore, the Ordinance continued, be the primary aim of the whole educational system to foster and develop the spirit of the nation. "Every effort should be made to lay into the minds of youths the true significance of loyalty and patriotism, as well as to establish a spirit of self-sacrifice and public service." Students should be given a clear understanding of Japan's "national structure," and of the "special characteristic" of her "national culture." [p48763] Training of a purely military nature was to be given a place of prominence. It would be used not only to develop the military abilities of the student, "so that he might do his part as a subject of the Imperial Empire," but also to instil the spirit of patriotism and implicit obedience to authority. ARAKI continued the work which KIDO had begun. He held office as Education Minister from 26 May 1938 to 29 August 1939, when the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned. During this period the Japanese school system came completely under the domination of the military instructors whom the War Ministry had provided. Military training, as well as lectures, became compulsory in Japanese universities; and in both schools and universities all teaching was made to further the fundamental aim of cultivating a warlike spirit in the Japanese nation. THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR In September 1938 the Cabinet set out with renewed determination to achieve the objects of the Army's long-range economic and industrial planning. Already the programme of industrial regimentation within Japan was well advanced. In large measure it had been achieved through the device of national policy companies, organised under special [p48764] legislation for a specific governmental purpose. These companies were directly managed and controlled by the government and had very broad powers within their respective fields of enterprise. Approximately half of their capital was provided by the government, which also subsidized them and exempted them from taxation. KAYA, who as Finance Minister from 4 June 1937 to 26 May 1938, had superintended the creation of the new industrial hierarchy, was on 1 July 1938 appointed as adviser to the Finance Ministry. In his August speeches SATO had warned the Chiefs of the Police Bureau that this process must go on. "When we put into consideration the possible war with Russia," he had said, "our war production at the present is very inadequate." Therefore the Army was insistent that the change from free to controlled industrial management should be permanent and should be obtained through the enforcement of the National General Mobilisation Law. In particular, SATO had indicated, this process would be used to meet the related problems of Japan's dependence upon importation, and of her precarious foreign exchange position. Notwithstanding the exploitation of her subject territories and the drastic measures taken to repair the Japanese economy and to adjust her trade [p48765] balance, subsidies upon a steeply increasing scale were being paid to the war-supporting industries within Japan itself. The Cabinet's determination to pursue the objects of the national mobilization for war is well illustrated by the new measures taken at a time of grave financial embarrassment. On 16 September 1938 a new national policy company with a capital of fifty million yen was formed to exploit the gold resources of Japan and of the continental areas under her control. New steps were also taken to conserve those war materials the supply of which depended upon importation. On 21 November 1938 regulations were made for the collection and utilization of scrap iron and steel. A control company, having a monopoly over the distribution and sale of scrap, was established and placed under governmental control. In the latter half of 1938, however, the main expenditure was upon the development of China into an economic and industrial asset, as well as upon military operations in that country. The budget for the War Ministry alone increased from 2,750,000,000 yen in 1937 to 4,250,000,000 yen in 1938. The 1938 budget for the armed forces as a whole was three quarters of the total national budget for that year. The object of this vast expenditure was to complete the national [p48765-a] mobilization for war and, by subduing Chinese resistance, to open up new fields of natural resources and war-supporting industrial potential. It was an Army policy which had found its latest expression in the speeches of Colonel SATO. [p48766] THE EXTENSION OF JAPAN'S "NEW ORDER" TO THE OCCUPIED AREAS OF CHINA On 29 July 1938 Ambassador TOGO, making his last bid for German economic assistance, had admitted to von Ribbentrop that Japan proposed to extend her dominion until it embraced the whole of China. This aim, which was again stressed in SATO's August speeches, became the cardinal feature of Japanese policy during the last four months of 1938. In Central and in South China the Army gained victories, which placed the Japanese in control of substantially larger portions of Chinese territory. In North and Central China the Japanese system of political control and economic domination was strengthened and extended. Although Chinese resistance was not ended, Japan achieved in a considerable degree that "steady footing in the Eastern continent" which the 1936 national policy decision had demanded. After Foreign Minister Ugaki's resignation in September 1938, the Army's goal of conquest in China received unqualified support from the Konoye Cabinet, of which ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were members. Since 20 July 1938 General MATSUI had been a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council. Earlier in the China war, from 30 October 1937 to 5 March 1938, he had commanded [p48767] the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Central China. The military offensives, which began in July 1938, after the Cabinet reorganization had taken place, were continued during September and October 1938. On 20 October 1938, Canton, the principal city of Southern China, was captured by the Japanese. Five days later, on 25 October 1938, the Japanese forces in Central China attained their objective by taking the city of Hankow. This success they exploited by advancing further into Central China. In south China, where Japanese influence was smallest, a start was to be made in aiding the reconstruction and development of the territory subdued. The Planning Board announced that immediate action was necessary to consolidate the achievements of Japan's military triumph in that area. In North and in Central China a Japanese-controlled political and administrative system had already been established. The Army's planning for those areas called for reconstruction, economic exploitation and the expansion of the war-supporting industries. On 3 November 1938 Prime Minister Konoye made a radio speech, in which he heralded the advent of a new phase in Japanese policy towards China. He spoke of "economic collaboration," which would be achieved [p48768] through the development of China's natural resources. This, said Konoye, was the basic step in achieving Japan's purpose of a "new, ideal order" in East Asia. Reconstruction measures were as vital and urgent as military operations and political activities. Through these measures the Kuomintang government would be crushed, and the new pro-Japanese China would be consolidated. THE ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD On 16 December 1938 permanent machinery was established to secure Japan's political and administrative control of China; for on that date a new bureau of the Cabinet was created to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of that country. The Asia Development Board (Ko-A-In) would have a permanent staff of one hundred and fifty persons, but this number might be increased at the Prime Minister's pleasure. The Premier himself would be its President by virtue of his office. Similarly the War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers would be its Vice-Presidents. The permanent secretariat would be heeded by a Director-General and four section chiefs. The new board would guide the political, economic and cultural development of China. It would also coordinate all those aspects of Chinese [p48769] administration which were to be conducted by departments of the Japanese government. The significance of the Asia Development Board is twofold. In the first place it provided a means of bringing the affairs of subjugated China within the immediate purview of those five Cabinet Ministers whose offices were most vital to the conduct of the national mobilisation for war. It was the conference of Five Ministers which had, in 1936, settled the basis of the national policy. It was this same group to which the German proposal for a military alliance had first been referred by Foreign Minister Ugaki in August 1938. It was this "inner Cabinet" which was now to control the development of China, both as an integral portion of Japan's "new order," and as a contributory to her preparations for further armed expansion. In the second place there was provided a permanent secretariat, whose exclusive function it was to watch over developments in China, to regulate and administer Japan's conduct of Chinese affairs, and to ensure that no matter of importance affecting China escaped the attention of the Japanese Cabinet. On the day of its inception, Major-General [p48770] Depot, became one of the four section chiefs of the Asia Development Board. MEASURES TAKEN TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL EXPLOITATION OF CHINA As SATO had pointed out, military successes in China were merely the stepping- stones to the achievement of political and economic aims. After the victories of October 1938 had been gained, the Konoye Cabinet devoted its attention to achieving in China those economic and industrial developments which had been foreshadowed in the Army's 1937 planning. The new programme was to follow the same pattern of regimentation which had been adopted in Manchukuo and in Japan itself. In his radio speech of 3 November 1938 Prime Minister Konoye had described the manner in which this result would be obtained. The chief agencies for the economic development of North and Central China would be the two great national policy companies which had been created on 30 April 1938. The North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, said Konoye, had been established to carry out Japan's policy. He explained that these two holding corporations would finance the subsidiary [p48771] companies directly engaged in particular aspects of reconstruction and industrial development. The Central China company would undertake the reestablishment of an area which had been ravaged by warfare; but the North China company would make an immediate contribution to the needs of Japan's preparations for war. For in North China the destruction caused by fighting had not been so great; and in that area was an abundance of iron, coal and other natural resources, the development of which would be exploited. The political and economic, as well as the military, measures carried out in China were the product of the Army's planning. Lieutenant-General TOJO's determination to conquer China and to exploit its resources was in a great degree responsible for what had been achieved. When War Minister ITAGAKI was irresolute, TOJO had been firm; and ultimately ITAGAKI had come to share his views. As Vice-Minister of War since 30 May 1938, TOJO had held appointments which brought him into intimate contact with each major aspect of the mobilisation for war. He had been, in addition, a member of the organisating committee of the two national policy companies which were to control and [p48772] dominate the economies of North and Central China. On 10 December 1938, when the Army's plans for China were already in course of achievement, TOJO resigned his principal office and became Inspector-General of the Army Air Forces. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ARMY USED ITS ASSOCIATION WITH GERMANY TO EXERCISE TO CONTROL OVER JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY After the meeting on 9 August 1938, at which the German proposal for a general military alliance had been considered, the Cabinet was content to leave the matter in the hands of the military. OSHIMA was advised by the Army General Staff that both Cabinet and Army were in favour of the proposal which von Ribbentrop had made. It was desired, however, that the new alliance should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union. The Cabinet's acquiescence in this proposal shows the extent of the influence which the Army had gained over Japanese foreign policy. The relationship which had grown up between Japan and Germany had been developed and maintained by the Army through the agency of Kajor-General OSHIMA. OSHIMA had first taken up his post as Military Attache in Berlin in May 1934. His instructions then [p48773] were to appraise the stability of the Nazi regime, the potential worth of the German Army, and the attitude which would be taken in Germany, should the Soviet Union become involved in war. OSHIMA had become a confidant of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and through this association the Army had contrived to maintain its relationship with Germany. This connection the Army had used as on indirect means of influencing Japanese foreign policy. The Anti-Comintern Pact, concluded in Berlin in November 1936, had arisen out of discussions hold between von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA with the approval of the Army General Staff. In November 1937 the Army General Staff resorted to the same method in an attempt to change the Konoye Cabinet's policy towards China. Foreign Minister HIROTA reluctantly accepted a German tender of "good offices" in settlement of the China war, which had caused an estrangement between the Anti- Comintern partners. This attempt at mediation, which appeared to be made upon German initiative, was also prompted by OSHIMA at the instance of the Japanese Army General Staff, Finally, the German proposal for a general military alliance, conveyed to the Konoye Cabinet on 9 August 1938, was itself the outcome of an undisclosed arrangement between the German authorities [p48773a] and members of the Army General Staff. In the formulation of this last proposal OSHIMA had himself taken the initiative In the early months of 1938 he had received advice from the division of the Army General Staff directly concerned with such matters that, in their opinion the time was opportune for a general military alliance between Japan and Germany. Although his informants had made it clear that they did not speak for the Army General Staff as a whole, OSHIMA had advised the Germans that the Japanese Army desired to conclude such an alliance. OSHIMA himself had outlined its contents, and, together with von Ribbentrop, had settled the text of the draft proposal. Only then had the Army General Staff approved it, and handed it to Foreign Minister Ugaki as a proposal made upon German initiative. The negotiation between von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA had been carried on without TOGO's knowledge during the very months in which the Ambassador was discussing, on his government's behalf, the terms of German economic participation in the occupied areas of China. [p48774] CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION REVEAL THE CABINET'S DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY In September and October 1938, following Foreign Minister Ugaki's resignation, changes in diplomatic representation were made. These changes revealed that the Cabinet, though yet unwilling to make a positive commitment, shared the Army's eagerness for a closer alliance with Germany. Since immediate war with the Soviet Union was not now contemplated, there was need for a more conciliatory attitude towards that country. During August 1938 Japan's defeat at Lake Khassan had caused the abandonment of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU's bluntly worded demands for the cession of Soviet territory on the Manchukuoan border. On 22 September 1938 SHIGEMITSU was relieved of his appointment as Ambassador in Moscow, and was sent to London in a similar capacity. He was succeeded in Moscow by TOGO, whose experience as Ambassador in Berlin fitted him to carry out a less aggressive policy. During the preceding year he had laboured to convince the Germans of the sincerity of promises which Japan did not intend to keep. TOGO'S removal to Moscow served a double purpose for he was now discredited with the Germans. On 8 October [p48775] 1938 he was succeeded as Ambassador in Berlin by OSHIMA, his Military Attache. Already OSHIMA's activities had in large measure usurped TOGO'S diplomatic functions and undermined his authority. In 1937, while TOGO was giving assurances of Japan's determination to complete the conquest of China, von Ribbentrop had learnt from OSHIMA of the Japanese Army's desire to negotiate a settlement of the China war. In 1938 TOGO, in pursuance of HIROTA's policy, had offered Germany a preferred position in the occupied areas of China, while OSHIMA's advice had raised German hopes of concluding a military alliance among the three Axis powers. In August 1938 the emptiness of TOGO'S promises had been fully revealed, and in the same month OSHIMA's work had received the Konoye Cabinet's general approval. OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador was therefore an event of great significance. It set the seal of the Cabinet's approval upon negotiations for a military alliance made in contemplation of war with the Soviet Union. It placed a soldier, who enjoyed the complete confidence of the Army, in a position until then occupied by a professional diplomat. It was a triumph for the Army in the field of Japanese foreign policy, and a step forward in the Army's preparations for war. [p48776] OSHIMA's preferment was an assurance to the Germans that Japan now genuinely desired to act in concert with Germany and Italy. OSHIMA himself, with enhanced status and prestige, was free to work with von Ribbentrop for the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance. This work was also to be carried out in Italy. On 22 September 1938, two weeks before OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador in Berlin, SHIRATORI, who had long desired war with the Soviet Union, was appointed Ambassador in Rome. He himself regarded it as his principal task to achieve the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers. SHIRATORI's appointment provides another important illustration of the triumph of the Amy's policy in foreign affairs. His association with the military faction had been a long one. From 31 October 1930 to 2 June 1933 he was Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department; and during this period he showed himself to be a strong supporter of the Army's programme of conquest and expansion. In May 1932, a few weeks before the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai, there was a cleavage within the Cabinet and civil service between those who supported the liberal policy of the Premier, and those who adhered to the "Kodo" or military [p48777] faction which was led by War Minister ARAKI. SHIRATORI was at this time prominent among the group of Foreign Ministry officials who joined the Army in clamouring for Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. In his view, membership of that body was inconsistent with Japan's position following the conquest of Manchuria. Four months later, when the Saito Cabinet was in office, SHIRATORI again voiced the views of the military faction. He maintained that Japan's difficulties were due to the lack of a strong government. He therefore urged the appointment of War Minister ARAKI as Premier, saying that ARAKI, as a "representative of the powerful militarists", would proceed with an unwavering policy for the next five or six years. SHIRATORI regarded his own presence in Tokyo as important to the maintenance of the views he advocated and was therefore unwilling to accept an overseas appointment. Nevertheless, on 2 June 1933, he became Minister to the countries of Scandinavia, and, during his term of office abroad, supported the Army view that Japan should launch an attack upon the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment. On 28 April 1937, three months before the Lukouchino Incident occurred, SHIRATORI was recalled to Tokyo and assigned to temporary duty with the Foreign [p48778] Ministry. During the early months of 1938 he toured North and Central China, and found that his views upon foreign policy accorded well with those of Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI. In June 1938, within two weeks of his appointment as War Minister, ITAGAKI urged Konoye to appoint SHIRATORI as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. This request was soon afterwards supported by the younger Foreign Ministry officials in a petition presented by Okawa to Foreign Minister Ugaki. Konoye considered the proposal to be politically expedient, but Ugaki and senior Foreign Ministry officials were opposed to it, and the appointment was not made. In August 1938 the Cabinet accepted the proposal for a military alliance with Germany and Italy, while the Army revised its plans for war with the U.S S.R. Ugaki's resignation in September 1938 represented a triumph for the Army and its supporters, both in domestic and in foreign policy. In that month OSHIMA became Ambassador in Berlin and SHIRATORI was sent as Ambassador to Rome. THE ARMY CONTINUES TO NEGOTIATE FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH THE AXIS POWERS With this assistance from the Cabinet, the Army [p48779] made new efforts to consolidate its friendship with the Germans. On 2 October 1938 War Minister ITAGAKI sent to Hitler a telegram expressing the Army's deep admiration for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue in Czechoslovakia. He prayed that Germany's national fortunes might continue to rise, and that "the friendship of the German and Japanese Armies, united on the anti- Comintern front", would "be strengthened more than over". In Berlin Ambassador OSHIMA was furthering the aim of closer cooperation between the German and Japanese Armies. In September or October 1938 he sent out espionage agents across the Soviet frontier, and negotiated with German military leaders for the exchange of information relating to the Soviet forces. Meanwhile the scheme for a tripartite alliance was receiving attention both in Rome and in Berlin. The Germans had discussed the plan with Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Ciano. Mussolini, though not yet ready to conclude an alliance, had expressed fundamental agreement with the scheme. The text of the proposed alliance was worked out by OSHIMA, von Ribbentrop and Ciano as a result of direct consultation. The period of its duration was set at ten years. A new provision, in the form of a "no separate [p48780] peace" pact, was added; and a draft protocol, providing for immediate consultation when the obligation to furnish assistance arose, was also prepared. In December 1938 OSHIMA, with permission from Japan, visited Rome, but found that Mussolini was still not ready to consider the immediate conclusion of the alliance. We will recess until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200 a recess was taken.) [p48781] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment: THE CULTURAL TREATY WITH GERMANY AND THE KONOYE CABINET'S POLICY TOWARDS THAT COUNTRY In November 1936, when the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded, a secret military agreement was made between Japan and Germany. The Germans had then declared that the spirit of this latter agreement would alone be decisive in determining their attitude towards the Soviet Union and that that agreement would also, if occasion should arise, form the basis of a further development in German-Japanese relations. It was this development upon which the Army was now engaged. During October 1938 Arita became Foreign Minister, taking over an appointment which Prime Minister Konoye had himself assumed after Ugaki's resignation in the previous month. None was better acquainted than Arita with the Army's plans for he had held office as Foreign Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet. In that capacity he had attended the important series [p48782] of Five Ministers' conferences at which the basis of the national policy was decided. As Foreign Minister during that period Arita had directed the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the secret military agreement between Germany and Japan. When, in November 1936, that pact had come before the Privy Council for ratification, Arita had acted as the Cabinet's spokesman. On 22 November 1938 an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany was ratified by the Privy Council. HIRANUMA presided at the Council meeting and ITAGAKI and ARAKI, Ministers of War and Education respectively, were in attendance. Once more Arita was the spokesman for a measure designed to strengthen the relationship between Japan and Germany. The agreement, which recited that cultural relations between the two countries should be based upon their respective national spirits, had been approved by the Council's Investigating Committee. This body reported that the agreement might strengthen ties of friendship and the "promotion of the cause," as well as contributing to the attainment of the general aims of Japanese diplomacy. As had been the case when the Anti-Comintern Pact was ratified, some Councillors were still [p48783] apprehensive of the real significance of the Cabinet's pro-German policy. Arita gave assurances that the new agreement had no political implications but these did not satisfy one Councillor, who remarked that "the tendency to go with the German stream is not at all deniable in this country of late. In view of this fact," he added, "I repeat and hope that there should be some means to guard against all possible mistakes on the part of our nation before the agreement is ratified." The considerations which, two years earlier, had governed the Cabinet's policy towards Germany, still obtained. The record of this Privy Council meeting makes it clear that public opinion in Japan did not yet contemplate a close alliance with Germany and Italy. Arita had discounted the significance of the cultural treaty because the Cabinet was not ready to admit that such an alliance was intended. Furthermore, KIDO and others had expressed the fear that the form of alliance which Germany had proposed might prove an onerous commitment. Subject to these two limiting factors, the Konoye Cabinet had done everything possible to hasten the time when Japan's internal preparations for war would be reinforced by a tripartite military alliance of the three Axis powers. [p48784] THE GENERAL DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN POWERS DURING 1938 Although the proposed military alliance with Germany and Italy was at Japan's insistence to be directed primarily against the Soviet Union, it was inevitable that the new proposal should affect adversely Japan's relations with the Western powers. When in August 1938 Prime Minister Konoye first received the German proposal for a general military alliance, he was advised also of Germany's views upon the international situation. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop considered that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable; that Hungary and Czechoslovakia were potential allies, and that Roumania would remain neutral. It would not, he thought, be possible to separate France and Great Britain, and he implied that these countries were potential enemies by remarking that the United States would aid them financially, but not militarily. It was known to the Japanese that von Ribbentrop had discussed the proposed alliance at length with Hitler himself before submitting it for their approval. It was therefore apparent to the Cabinet and Army that Germany contemplated an alliance directed in part against the Western powers. The Cabinet had acquiesced in that proposal by agreeing to the negotiation [p48785] of a treaty which would be directed, not only against the U.S.S.R. but also against all other countries. In this same month of August 1938 the Army had reviewed its plans for launching an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union, and had concentrated its efforts upon establishing Japan's "new order" in China. By December 1933 the expansionist aims of the 1936 national policy decision had in large measure been attained. The existence of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" was openly proclaimed and Japan's position in that area demanded, in the words of the national policy decision, that she should "exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers." "Britain and Russia," said Colonel SATO on 25 August 1938, "are in the back of China, aiding her directly and indirectly, greatly hampering our field of operations." There occurred during these latter months of 1938 a pronounced deterioration in Japan's already strained relations with the Western powers. The execution of the Army's long-range planning had reached a stage at which protestations of friendship and respect for treaties were no longer plausible. Although the leaders of Japan were not yet ready for war, they were prepared to speak and act more boldly. The mobilization was partially achieved, and there was now the promise of [p48786] German assistance. The occupation of China appeared to be making steady progress and the existence of Japan's new empire could no longer be denied. These developments, which have now to be examined in more detail, did not indicate any change in policy. Japan, while completing her preparations for war, would still "strive to maintain amicable relations with the Powers"; but the aims of the national policy decision were to "be attained in spite of all difficulties." The new attitude towards the Western powers is indicated by SATO in his August speeches to the police chiefs. "We shall recognize the rights and interest of Britain to a limited degree," he said, "and have them cut all relations with Chiang Kai-shek." JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN CHINA, JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938 Since the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao on 7 July 1937 there had been a steadily lengthening list of Japanese violations of the rights and interests of the Western powers in China. Frequent attacks had been made upon British and American citizens and property in China and these had formed the subject of repeated diplomatic protests. Equally damaging to Japan's relations with the [p48787] Western powers had been the systematic violation of her treaty obligation to maintain the "open door," or equality of commercial opportunity, in China. The clearest substantiation of these practices came from German sources. On 24 July 1938 the German representative in China advised their government that the Japanese military authorities were striving to subjugate the economies of China and Inner Mongolia. Japan, they said, intended that the economies of these countries should benefit her exclusively and that all foreign interests should be eliminated. In response to foreign protests the Japanese authorities had professed a regard for treaty obligations, expressing regret for incidents which had occurred and pleading the exigencies of war. But in June 1938 when ITAGAKI and ARAKI had joined KIDO as members of the Konoye Cabinet there appeared gradually a new spirit of assertiveness. At the end of July 1938 the British Ambassador in Tokyo presented a summary of his country's outstanding grievances. Foreign Minister Ugaki, while expressing his willingness to settle these claims, told the Ambassador that a settlement would be reached more easily if Great Britain would be more friendly towards Japan and would cease to support Generalissimo Chiang. [p48788] As Japan had made no declaration of war upon China, there was no justification for complaint that other countries should offer assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government's forces. Furthermore, Great Britain and other countries which were members of the League of Nations were pledged to support the resolution passed by the League on 6 October 1937. It had then been resolved that, in view of the aggressive nature of Japanese activities in China, all member states should refrain from taking any action which might weaken Chinese resistance and that each state should consider what steps it might take to offer China positive aid. The real significance of Ugaki's statement is the implication that Japan was determined to exert pressure in order to gain the acquiescence of the Western powers in the subjugation of China. This policy was made clear in the following month. In August 1938 the Japanese demanded that Great Britain and France should suppress pro-Chinese activities within their respective concessions at Tientsin. These activities afforded Japan no ground for complaint in international law nor would their suppression have been in keeping with the tenor of the League's resolution. Yet the British and French authorities were threatened with the evacuation of areas which their [p48789] countries rightfully occupied, should they fail to comply with Japanese demands. After Ugaki's resignation in September 1938 the new spirit of defiance became more pronounced. During the last quarter of 1938 after Arita had taken office as Foreign Minister, there was for the first time an open acknowledgment of Japan's intention to violate her treaty obligations. It is therefore necessary to examine with some particularity the frequent interchange of diplomatic communications which occurred during this period. CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN CHINA AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" DOCTRINE OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1938 On 3 October 1938 Joseph C. Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, presented a summary of his country's complaints. He said that assurances as to the observance of the "open door" principle and the protection of United States interests in China had not been kept. He emphasized that there could be no "open door" as long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax and prohibit trade was in Japanese hands. Three days later Grew supported this protest in a detailed communication which pointed out that [p48790] Japanese companies in Manchukuo had been placed in a specially favored position, that restrictions upon the movement of goods had imposed upon foreign traders a handicap not shared by their Japanese competitors, and that already there was evidence that these measures would be applied in the rest of China also. In that country United States citizens were being kept away from their properties upon the pretext of military necessity. American ships had been denied passage on the lower reaches of the Yangtse, although Japanese merchant vessels continued to use them. The port at Tsingtao was in Japanese hands. At first these complaints evoked only a conciliatory answer from a Foreign Office spokesman who said that such conditions were due to the exigencies of the war situation and that other nations should understand Japan's position. But gradually there emerged the doctrine of the "new order" in East Asia. On 3 November 1938 Premier Konoye announced that Japan would cooperate with any Third Power which appreciated her real intentions and adopted a policy that conformed to the new state of affairs. On 18 November 1938 Arita made a general reply to these complaints, pointing again to the exigencies of the war situation and stating that the principles of the [p48791] pre-incident regime could not be applied now that Japan was striving for her "New Order in East Asia." The United States representative told Arita that this reply represented a wholesale denial of American demands and the Foreign Minister responded that it was extremely illogical to apply the principle of the "open door" to China only. Ambassador Grew again emphasized the adherence of the United States to treaty obligations and to the "open door" principles; and, by so doing, he elicited from Arita a more explicit reply. It was difficult, said Arita, for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of the "open door" principle at the present time though she wished to cooperate with Third Powers. Measures necessary for fostering the closer relations of China and Japan might at times necessitate the elimination of the practice of such principles but there would still be considerable room left for the economic activities of other countries. He could give no assurance upon the Yangtse question. Two days later after this exchange of views was completed, Ambassador Grew complained that earlier in November 1938 the Maritime Customs at Canton had been taken over by Japanese consular and military authorities, constituting yet another violation of the "open door" principle. This time Arita made the Japanese standpoint [p48792] quite clear. He said that the application, in their original form, of the various treaties for preventing international disputes in the Orient "rather hampered the bringing about of Peace and Universal Prosperity." Japan, he said, agreed in principle with the "open door" policy, but must be allowed "most favored relations" with China and Manchukuo, as was the case within the British Empire. Monopolies would be sanctioned to attend to vital defence needs, but in general no special discrimination would be practised against Third Powers. Grew stated that his government could not recognize any unilateral alteration in a treaty obligation; and on 30 December 1938 presented a further reply to Arita insisting that any alteration in the status quo should be effected at a conference of the powers. Thereafter conversations were suspended for a considerable period. THE DECISION TO CAPTURE HAINAN AND TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON FRENCH INDO-CHINA During the last quarter of 1938 there was a further development in Japanese policy calculated to intensify difficulty with the Western powers. On 17 July 1937, ten days after the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao, France had contracted to supply through [p48793] Indo-China arms and munitions for the Chinese National Government's forces. This contract constituted no breach of the law of neutrality, for Japan at no time made a declaration of war upon China. Nevertheless Japan had lodged repeated protests with the French authorities, and as a result of this pressure France had undertaken in October 1937 to cease the delivery of war supplies upon the completion of the existing contract. On 26 October 1939, after Arita's assumption of office as Foreign Minister, Japan complained that weapons were still being transported through French Indo-China to the Kuomintang forces. The French authorities denied that the Yunnan railway was being used for this purpose and refused to adopt the measures demanded by the Japanese. Nevertheless Japan continued to maintain that the Yunnan railway was being used to transport military supplies to China. On 9 December 1938 the Japanese Naval General Staff was, with Arita's approval, advised that the Foreign Ministry saw no objection to the bombing of the railway within Chinese territory in so far as operational circumstances might require it. It had previously been decided that the operational and political effects of this action would be very great, but that it would not cause "too much" alarm in France, [p48794] Great Britain or the United States. In keeping with this policy was a decision taken two weeks earlier at a conference of Five Ministers. On 25 November 1938 it was resolved by this body, of which War Minister ITAGAKI was a member, that the island of Hainan would, on case of necessity, be captured by military action. This Chinese island lay opposite to and dominated the coast of northern French Indo-China. THE SEVERANCE OF JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE During this same period Japan severed her remaining connections with the League of Nations. On 22 September 1938 Foreign Minister Ugaki had conveyed Japan's refusal to join the League committee set up to investigate the situation in China. A week after receipt of this reply the League had resolved that individual nations should apply sanctions against Japan and should give all possible assistance to China. On 2 November 1938, immediately following the announcement of the League resolution to apply sanctions, a Privy Council meeting was held. Among those in attendance were HIRANUMA, President of the Privy Council, Prime Minister Konoye, Education Minister ARAKI, Welfare Minister KIDO and War Minister ITAGAKI. [p48795] The Investigating Committee reported that since Japan's withdrawal from the League she had voluntarily continued to participate in various subsidiary organizations and activities. However the League had championed China's cause and had now resolved to apply sanctions against Japan. Although no concrete action had yet been taken, Japan and the League would be in complete opposition as long as the resolution stood. Therefore Japan must sever all relations with the League but would continue to rule the South Sea Islands in conformity with the provisions of the League covenant and the Mandatory Rules. She would as before furnish an annual report of her administration as a mandatory power. The Privy Council adopted the Investigating Committee's report, resolving unanimously that relations with the League of Nations be severed. This decision coincided with the first acknowledgments of Japan's intention to dominate East Asia. The Army's program of expansion through military power was by its very nature a denial of the rights of the community of nations; and, as the scheme progressed, this fact was inevitably becoming more apparent. In the year 1933 the League's condemnation of the conquest of Manchuria had prompted Japan to renounce her membership [p48796] of that body. In subsequent years the leaders of Japan had consistently avoided any international commitment which was incompatible with the execution of the Army's plans. Now that the objects of that planning had been in part attained, the leaders of Japan took the final step of withdrawal from the international community. Nevertheless, the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China and the provisions of the League covenant relating to the islands of the South Seas constituted two substantial commitments which were still binding upon Japan. These obligations Japanese spokesmen had professed to respect for it was a principle of the national policy decision that Japan, while preparing for war, should "strive to maintain amicable relations with the powers." The events of recent months in China had compelled Foreign Minister Arita to admit that his country no longer intended to observe the strict letter of treaties relating to the Orient. This new declaration of policy was attributed to the changed situation in the Far East, although Japanese aggression was responsible for the changes which had occurred. Under the League covenant from which Japan derived her authority as a mandatory, the erection of military fortifications was forbidden in the South Seas [p48797] area. The work of fortification, started three or more years earlier, was now proceeding at increased speed throughout the Japanese Mandated Islands. It was, however, still a closely guarded secret; and, where deceit was still practicable, the leaders of Japan resorted to it. The Privy Council reaffirmed Japan's intention to administer these islands in accordance with the provisions of the League covenant. PREPARATIONS FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE, AND ARAKI UPON JAPAN'S ULTIMATE AIMS On 3 November 1938 the Konoye Cabinet issued an official policy statement concerning the future of "Greater East Asia." This declaration, made upon the day following the decision to sever relations with the League of Nations, described the advent of Japan's "new order" in the vague and grandiose terms which Okawa and other publicists had popularized. It was inevitable, as those who framed the basic national policy decision had realized, that those developments would incur the enmity of the Western powers. Already Japan was mobilizing her entire resources for the time when further expansion could be achieved only by recourse to war with these countries. Under cover of secrecy a new navy was being built and naval bases were being prepared for war in the Pacific. [p48798] Nor was this preparation a mere defensive precaution against foreign intervention in the new empire which Japan was building upon the continent of Asia for Japan had designs upon the territories of countries other than China and the Soviet Union. The basic national policy decision had set a second goal - that of "developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence." Already Japan was making preparations for a southward advance. Between May and December 1938 officials of the Japanese government were preparing to conduct a propaganda campaign in the Netherlands East Indies. It was planned to publish a newspaper in the Malay language with the avowed intention of preparing for Japan's "march to the south." These ultimate aims of Japanese policy are reflected in a speech made at this time by Education Minister ARAKI. On 7 November 1938, four days after the Cabinet had issued its proclamation upon the future of "Greater East Asia," ARAKI gave a radio address which marked the fifteenth anniversary of an Imperial Rescript upon the "Awakening of the National Spirit." ARAKI reviewed Japanese successes in China, which he characterized as one phase in the fulfilment of this Rescript; but he warned his audience that the fundamental [p48799] question did not lie in the China Incident, which was merely a sign of the "new world peace." He expressed his belief that Japan was in a position to play an important role in the coming new world and that she must therefore be prepared for any emergency. "Whatever Chiang Kai-shek or the world may say about us," he continued, "we must push forward, slowly but steadily, towards the construction of a new world, ever storing up the national strength, ever reflecting upon our own essence and ever eradicating the roots of evils, as the subjects of a glorious country who is holding a heavy responsibility upon themselves at this dawn of a new world." JAPAN'S IMMEDIATE AIMS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION The achievement of these ultimate aims demanded that Japan should consolidate her hold upon China and redouble her efforts to achieve the national mobilization for war. In the pronouncements of November and December 1938 these immediate tasks were emphasized. The Konoye Cabinet, in its proclamation of 3 November 1938, announced that the National Government of China had been reduced to a local regime. As long as that government retained its pro-Communist anti-Japanese policy, the [p48800] statement continued, Japan would not lay down her arms until it had been utterly destroyed for Japan intended to establish her "new order" through collaboration with Manchukuo and the new China. On 29 November 1938 Foreign Minister Arita, in making a review of Japanese policy towards China, repeated these aims and intentions. From these declarations it is apparent that the Cabinet still regarded the Soviet Union as the most immediate obstacle to the achievement of her ambitions. War with the Western powers was now an ultimate probability but the U.S.S.R. was the proximate enemy, whose growing strength was a constant challenge to the Japanese goal of supremacy in East Asia. On 22 December 1938, six days after the Asia Development Board had been established, Prime Minister Konoye issued an official statement which made the Cabinet's policy even more explicit. He reiterated once again his Cabinet's firm resolve "to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti- Japanese Kuomintang government," while "proceeding with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia." Konoye went on to say that the existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia could not be tolerated and that an agreement, in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact, must be concluded with the new [p48801] China and with Manchukuo. Japan, he said, would demand the right to station troops in the new China, in Manchukuo, and in Inner Mongolia, as an anti-Communist measure. China would also be expected to extend to Japan facilities for the development of her natural resources, particularly those in the areas of North China and Inner Mongolia. THE RESIGNATION OF THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET 4 JANUARY 1939; AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET There was nothing of irresolution in the tenor of Konoye's speech. Yet, two days later, on 24 December 1938, the Prime Minister was once more talking of tendering his Cabinet's resignation. His period of office since 4 June 1937 had been marked by recurrent political crises, which had on several occasions prompted him to threaten to resign. Each threat had served only as a stimulus to the military faction, which had prevailed upon him to remain in office. On each occasion opposition to the development of the Army's plans had been overridden. While Konoye was Premier those plans had come to fruition. Japan had founded her "new order" on the Asiatic continent, and the national general mobilization for war had been undertaken wholeheartedly. [p48802] Konoye, himself a consistent supporter of the Army's program of conquest and preparation for war, had encountered little opposition to the execution of the general scheme; but the detailed measures taken to achieve the Army's aims had been subjected to recurrent criticism from within the Cabinet and without. In August 1938 Konoye had hoped to be placed at the head of a pre-party system of government in which the military faction would speak with one unchallenged voice. That hope, however, had not been realized. It would seem that discontentment must again have been voiced by those who doubted the wisdom of some aspect of the Cabinet's present policies. As before, Konoye was urged to retain the premiership. HIRANUMA, the President of the Privy Council, advised him that in view of the existing situation in China he should remain in office. Welfare Minister KIDO and War Minister ITAGAKI met the Premier to discuss "the development of the scheme." Major-General SUZUKI, the newly appointed head of the Political Affairs Section of the Asia Development Board, believed that Konoye should carry on. This time, however, their solicitations were of no avail. On 4 January 1939 Konoye tendered the resignation of his Cabinet. The ensuing change was a change in leadership [p48803] only. The coterie of important political leaders, who had worked with Konoye to accomplish the aims of the basic national policy decisions, without exception remained in office. Konoye became President of the Privy Council and HIRANUMA, whom he succeeded in that office, became the new Prime Minister. War Minister ITAGAKI, Foreign Minister Arita, and Education Minister ARAKI retained their respective offices. KIDO became Home Minister in the new Cabinet, and SUZUKI retained his recently acquired positions as a member of the Information Bureau and as a section chief of the Asia Development Board. Prime Minister HIRANUMA had held the presidency of the Privy Council from 13 March 1936 during the whole period since HIROTA's Cabinet first embarked upon the development of the Amy's schemes. On 25 November 1936 he had attended the Council meeting held in the Emperor's presence, at which the ratification of the Anti-Comintern Pact was unanimously approved. On 6 November 1937 he had presided over the Privy Council meeting which admitted Italy to participation in that treaty. On 20 January 1937 HIRANUMA had presided over the meeting which resolved that the Japanese mandated Islands might be placed under naval administration, because they had come to hold an important place in the [p48804] defence of the Empire. In January 1938 HIRANUMA expressed his approval of the long-range foreign policy formulated by Foreign Minister HIROTA and supported HIROTA'S view that the war in China must be fought to a finish. On 29 November 1938, little more than a month before HIRANUMA accepted the premiership, Foreign Minister Arita had explained in detail to the Privy Councillors his policy towards China, which, in all essential respects, embodied HIROTA's planning and the principles of the basic national policy decision. On 2 November 1938 HIRANUMA, as President, presided over the Privy Council meeting which resolved unanimously to sever Japan's remaining connections with the League of Nations, and on 22 November 1938 he attended the Council meeting in the Emperor's presence at which the agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany was approved. Even before the conquest of Manchuria HIRANUMA had achieved a position of pre- eminence among the leaders of the military faction. During the decade before HIROTA's Cabinet came to power he had held office as a Vice-President of the Privy Council. In July 1931 he was also the President of the Kokuhonsha, a secret society pledged to foster and exalt the spirit [p48805] of the Japanese nation. Among the directors of this organization was Lieutenant- General KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, who three months earlier had been a party to an Army plot to overthrow the liberal Wakatsuki Cabinet. This month of July 1931 was a critical time in the development of the Army's schemes. Already there was a sharp cleavage between the advocates of Army leadership and those who supported the Wakatsuki Cabinet. Two months later the Mukden Incident occurred. In December 1931 ARAKI became, as War Minister, the active leader of the movement for military supremacy in Japan and military domination In Manchuria. In July 1931 ARAKI was recognized by the liberals as a man whose presence near the Emperor was dangerous. He also was a director of the Kokuhonsha, over which HIRANUMA presided. It is indicative of HIRANUMA's importance as a leader of the military faction that, at the very outset of Japan's career of conquest and expansion the most prominent members of that faction should look to him for leadership. Among the liberals, and even within the ranks of the Army, ARAKI was then regarded as a follower of HIRANUMA. [p48806] THE BASIC CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE CONQUEST OF CHINA On 5 January 1939 when HIRANUMA became Prime Minister Japan had embarked upon a program of conquest and territorial expansion which could not readily be halted. The basic national policy decision required that the goal of self-sufficiency should be attained and that the entire strength of the nation should be mobilized for war. The resentment and apprehension which Japanese aggression in China had aroused in other nations made the completion of preparations for war more imperative than ever before, and this, in turn, called for the perfection of a war- supporting economy, freed from reliance upon foreign sources of materials. The vital need for self-sufficiency demanded the fulfillment of the second stage in the Army's planning, an advance to the south. The national policy decision had decreed that this step would be taken "under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence." The growing impetus of the events which led, on 7 December 1941, to war between Japan and the Western powers have yet to be considered. But the origins and pre- disposing causes of Japan's embroilment in the Second World War are to be found in the sequence of events which ended with the establishment of Japan's "new order" in the occupied areas of China. [p48807] On 29 November 1933, in the month in which the existence of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" was officially proclaimed, Foreign Minister Arita explained to the Privy Council Japan's policy towards China. There would, he said, be no peace with the Kuomintang, unless it should abandon its resistance and merge itself with the "New Central Government of China." No proposal for mediation would be accepted. When the time came, the settlement with the government of the "new China" would be based upon three principles which Prime Minister Konoye had enunciated. These principles of "neighbourly friendship", of "joint defence against the Comintern" and of "economic cooperation," were derived from Konoye's earlier statements in justification of the action which Japan had taken In China. The consequences which flowed from them became basic issues in the 1941 diplomatic discussions between Japan and the United States. During these negotiations, which ended with the outbreak of the Pacific War, the three principles were never satisfactorily explained; yet Arita, in November 1938, was able to define with some degree or clarity the significance of each. Using Arita's exposition as a basis, there may be traced the consistent development of the policy [p48808] which guided Japan during the period which began before the conquest of Manchuria and which ended in war with the Western Powers. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE PRINCIPLE OF "NEIGHBOURLY FRIENDSHIP" By the first principle of "neighbourly friendship" was meant simply the mutual recognition of Japan, Manchukuo and the "new China," stress being laid upon positive cooperation and the removal of all causes of friction among the three countries. This principle was, in short, merely the familiar concept of the "new order in East Asia." There was implicit in this statement the fundamental assumption of Japan's superior role in East Asia, and of her special rights and responsibilities in that area. This principle had formed the basis of every important Japanese policy declaration since the "Amau statement" of 17 April 1934. The failure of the United States to recognise the "reality of this situation" was, on the day the Pacific War began, alleged by the Japanese Government as the fundamental cause of hostilities between the two countries. Arita cited as a corollary to this principle Japan's refusal to permit foreign mediation of the war in China, and her withdrawal from international [p48809] obligations. It has been seen that this long-standing policy had found expression only three weeks earlier, when Japan had severed her remaining connections with the League of Nations. Arita now advised the Privy Council that, in view of the attitude of Great Britain, the United States and France "in interfering with Japan's policy towards China," Japan would endeavour to reject the idea of disposing of "the Chinese problem by the Nine Power Treaty and other collective machinery." The powers mentioned would, he said, be forced "individually to understand the facts of Japan's policy towards China, and either voluntarily to support our country's attitude or at least to stand by idly," while relations between the Axis powers were strengthened and the China war disposed of rapidly. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE PRINCIPLE OF "JOINT DEFENCE AGAINST THE COMINTERN" The second of the Konoye Principles was that of "joint defence against the Comintern." It involved, said .Arita, the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and the "new China" which Japan had created. They would conclude a military alliance and take measures for "joint defence." The needs of "joint defence" demanded [p48810] the retention of Japanese military and supervisory rights over all transport and communication facilities, and the stationing of Japanese troops in North China and Mongolia. Other Japanese troops would be withdrawn, but a garrison force would be kept in specified areas of South China, for the purpose of maintaining public peace and order. China would be required to contribute to their financial support. Here was the first formulation of a claim which, in substantially the form in which Arita now presented it, became one of the three fundamental sources of disagreement in the 1941 discussions between Japan and the United States. Arita cited an obvious corollary to the principle of "joint defence against the Comintern." He said that "every possible measure" would be taken "for making the Soviet Union refrain from actively participating in the present affair." This consideration again served to emphasize the need for stengthened relations among the Axis powers. Although the Tripartite Pact, which was to provide the second major source of disagreement in the 1941 discussions between Japan and the United States, was not concluded until 27 September 1940, the broad principles of such a treaty had already received the [p48811] general approval of the Konoye Cabinet. During the negotiations of 1941 Japan declined to indicate the nature or extent of her obligations as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. Japanese leaders maintained, however, that their alliance with Germany and Italy was a defensive one. Yet, in this policy speech, made on 29 November 1938, Foreign Minister Arita spoke of the conclusion of a closer alliance among the three Axis powers as being one of the "great diplomatic measures" which Japan would take against Great Britain, the United States and France. By such measures these countries would be made to acquiesce in the establishment of Japan's "new order" upon the Asiatic continent. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE PRINCIPLE OF "ECONOMIC COOPERATION" "Economic cooperation" was the third of Konoye's principles. Arita explained it as meaning reciprocity between Japan, Manchukuo, and the "new China" in making good deficiencies in the natural resources of each country. Special emphasis would be placed upon securing from North China those resources, especially mineral, in which Japan and Manchukuo were lacking; and for this purpose the Chinese were to offer every facility. Japan would assist China in her programme of industrialisation, [p48812] in establishing economic and financial policies, and in adopting a uniform system of customs. This policy, already in operation, had been clearly expressed in the Army's Plan for the Expansion of Important Industries, issued on 29 May 1937. Japan, it had then been stated, "should pick out the most important resources, should take the initiative in the exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources." Arita now proceeded to define, in substantially the same terms which HIROTA had used six months earlier, Japan's policy towards third powers in carrying out the principles of "economic cooperation." Some restrictions in the operation of the "open door" principle had, he said, been imposed by military necessity. The guiding principles would now be substantial control by Japan of the natural resources of North China and Mongolia; and the establishment, through control of China's currency and customs system, of a Japanese-Chinese-Manchukuoan bloc. "So long as the powers' rights and interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing two objects," he added, "we will not purposely exclude and restrict them." Further than that, Japan would settle "harmless individual cases" not affecting the superior position which she occupied in East Asia. It [is] [p48813] Japan's policy, Arita said, to influence the Western Powers, not by unnecessary frictions, but by the "great diplomatic measures" already outlined. Moreover, Japan would welcome the participation of powers which, like Germany and Italy, showed a friendly attitude towards her. The guarantee of rights and interests in China would provide a second means of influencing the Western Powers. Here, in fully-developed form, was the last of the three great obstacles to an agreement between Japan and the United States in 1941. THE CONTINUITY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING 1937 AND 1938 The basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had demanded, first and foremost, the achievement of two related aims. Japan, being already in possession of Manchukuo, would extend her dominion upon the Asiatic continent. Secondly, by using the resources of China to supplement her own, Japan would make ready for war by augmenting her military strength, by expanding the production of war- supporting industries, and by eliminating reliance upon foreign sources of supply. The military successes gained in China during the latter half of 1938 had brought about the substantial achievement of the aim of territorial expansion in China. By providing a new field for economic exploitation and [p48814] industrial development, and by reducing Japan's immediate military commitments, they had also enabled Japan to concentrate once more upon the attainment of the national mobilisation for war. In 1936 the Army had planned that this mobilisation should be completed by 1941. With that purpose in view the Army had made elaborate plans for the expansion of armaments and of war-supporting industries during the ensuing five-year period. In February 1937 a five-year plan for Manchukuo was adopted and put into operation. In May and June 1937 the Army produced similar programmes for the repletion of armaments and for the development of war-supporting industries within Japan itself. It was then planned that the whole economy and industry of Japan should be subjected to governmental control in order to achieve the complete mobilisation of Japan's resources in preparation for war. The Cabinet Planning Board, created in May 1937, had been charged with the supervision of this development. With the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao on 7 July 1937, adoption of the Army's long-range mobilisation plans for Japan had been deferred. Under the Planning Board's supervision, production was developed piecemeal to meet the immediate demands of the [p48815] Japanese armies in China. But the Army had adhered to its determination that the aims of the mobilisation programme should not be sacrificed. Of the vital materials which the Army controlled, only one-fifth were allocated to the prosecution of the war in China. During 1937 and 1938, in spite of the increasing scale and intensity of military operations in China, the aims of the Army's long-range plans were steadily pursued. In January 1938 the Planning Board reinstated the five-year programme by producing an interim plan for that year only. In the following month the Army secured the passage of the National General Mobilisation Law, which equipped the Cabinet with power to direct the entire resources and energies of the Japanese people to the achievement of preparedness for war. When, in May 1938, a severe financial crisis endangered the success of the mobilisation programme for Japan itself, the five-year plan for Manchukuo was revised, and its production goals were increased. The powers conferred by the Mobilisation Law were invoked, and the Army, in commenting upon the purposes of the law, reaffirmed its determination to proceed at all costs with the mobilisation programme. Nevertheless, in July 1938, the objects of that programme were once more deferred to the need for [p48816] consolidating Japan's position in China. The less urgent measures of war-supporting industrial expansion were postponed in order to ensure the supply of munitions and other materials vital to the success of a new military offensive. In October 1938, when Japanese control over the greater part of North and Central China was consolidated, the Konoye Cabinet had again given its full attention to the programme of economic self-sufficiency and the expansion of the industries of war. In the subjugated areas of China there was instituted a programme of economic exploitation and industrial development similar to that which was already in operation in Manchukuo. The speeches made by Konoye, Arita and ARAKI during November and December 1938 reflected the Cabinet's determination to devote every effort to achieving the completion of the national general mobilisation. The way was thus prepared for the reinstatement of the Army's five-year programmes of war-supporting industrial expansion. They had never been abandoned. In spite of the demands made upon the Japanese economy by the war in China, the production goals established in the Army's 1937 planning had been exceeded. In January 1939, the month in which the HIRANUMA Cabinet succeeded that of Konoyo, the Planning Board produced [p48817] a new plan which embodied and brought up to date the aims of the Army's 1937 planning. THE PLAN FOR WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION APPROVED BY THE HIRANUMA CABINET IN JANUARY 1939 In January 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet, of which Arita, ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were also members, approved the plan for the expansion of productive power which the Planning Board had prepared. Thus, for the first time, the aims and principles of the Army's 1937 economic and industrial planning received specific sanction from the Cabinet. The new programme was designed expressly to secure the repletion of the national power of Japan. It demanded the continued exploitation of Japan's subject territories through the establishment of an integrated production expansion plan for Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. Like the 1937 plans it aimed at the achievement within the area under Japanese domination of self-sufficiency in natural resources, so that Japan might, as far as possible, avoid dependence upon third powers in time of emergency. As in the Army's 1937 planning, the greatest importance was attached to achieving self-sufficiency in materials and repletion of armaments by the year [p48818] 1941, so that Japan might be prepared for the "epochal development" of her destiny in the future. In the plan which the Army had produced on 29 May 1937 certain industries, considered essential to the requirements of war, had been selected for rapid expansion under governmental subsidy and control. The 1939 programme, which was also restricted to those vital industries deemed to require rapid expansion under a unified plan, increased the production goals set in the earlier long-range programmes. The ship-building industry, essential to lines of communication in time of war, had already undergone enormous expansion through the provision of subsidies ranging up to one-half of the building cost; but the new programme called for a further increase of more than 50 per cent in gross tonnage by the year 1931. The infant light metal industries, vital to aircraft production, were singled out for further rapid and uneconomic expansion. The production of machine tools, for which Japan had depended largely upon importation from the United States, was to be more than doubled. The five-year programme for Manchukuo had already placed great emphasis upon the exploitation of that area's coal resources; but the new programme demanded a further substantial increase, which could [p48819] be achieved only by the payment of huge subsidies to submarginal producers. In the quest for iron and steel Japan had already resorted to submarginal production. Nevertheless the Planning Board's programme of January 1939 aimed at total increases in indigenous production of over 50 per cent in the case of steel and over 100 per cent in the case of iron ore. The automobile industry, already producing uneconomically 15,700 units a year, was required to increase that figure to 30,000 units annually by the year 1941. Special attention was paid to the production of oil and petroleum, for which Japan was almost wholly reliant upon importation. A synthetic petroleum industry had already been established, and had proved very costly. Nevertheless the new plan provided for increases of more than 600 per cent in the production of aviation spirit, 900 per cent in artificial heavy oil, and 2900 per cent in the case of artificial motor spirit. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET The "Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power" which the HIRANUMA Cabinet approved in January 1939 gave effect to measures which the Army had demanded on 19 May 1938 in its commentary upon the purposes of [p48820] the National General Mobilisation Law. The Army had then proclaimed that the government should be equipped with long-range plans to meet the varying needs of the national mobilisation, so that the Army and Navy should always be adequately equipped with the munitions of war. Industrial and military preparations were inter-related; and military successes would depend chiefly upon the systematic and effective mobilisation of the entire strength of the nation. For this reason production of war materials within Japan was to be increased at the expense of other industries, and all essential industries were to be unified under governmental direction. A National General Mobilisation Commission would administer the Mobilisation Law, and would assist the government in the formulation and execution of its plans. The method of execution which the 1939 production expansion plan prescribed reflected the Army's planning. Circumstances, it was stated, demanded that the future expansion of productive power should be both rapid and intensive. Therefore the government would make effective use of the measures already taken for the promotion and control of essential industries; and would devise new measures for those industries selected for rapid expansion. It would supply skilled and [p48821] unskilled labour, funds and raw materials, as they were required. For these purposes the Cabinet would, when necessary, utilise the powers conferred by the National General Mobilisation Law, or enact new legislation. The new plan was therefore a very important step towards the mobilisation of the Japanese nation in preparation for future wars. During the first eight months of 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet gave effect to the measures which it had approved. On 25 March 1939 an effort was made to ensure the secrecy of the programme of war-supporting industrial expansion upon which Japan was then engaged. A law was passed which aimed "at the prevention of leakage of information to foreign nations concerning matters respecting the manpower and material resources which are to be employed for military purposes." Three days later, on 28 March 1939, Education Minister ARAKI became the President of the National General Mobilisation Commission. In April 1939 there was passed a new law which provided further subsidies and exemptions for losses sustained in ship building. New measures were taken to increase governmental control over this industry, and to standardise its products. The production and distribution of electric-power was made completely [p48822] subject to governmental control and direction. Control over the iron and steel industry was increased, and the flow of production was directed to especially favoured industries. All bulk sales of coal were made subject to government licence. The subsidies paid for the production of petroleum products and to other artificially created industries were increased. In June 1939 it was reported in the official "Tokyo Gazette" that the five year programme for Manchukuo had yielded excellent results in the increased production of the iron and steel, coal and other war-supporting industries. In the same month a new national policy company was created to exploit the magnesite resources of Korea. While production for war purposes was expanded, the strength of the Army was increased. On 8 March 1939 the Military Service Law was amended, lengthening the period of supplementary service required of both Army and Navy reservists. The Army and Navy were also given a further measure of control over war-supporting industry, as the Army's rearmament programme of 23 June 1937 had demanded. In July 1939 an Ordinance was promulgated empowering the War and Navy Ministers, each acting upon his own initiative, to commandeer selected types of business enterprise, which were vital to [p48823] production for war. Through these and other measures effect was given to the Army's plans for mobilising the manpower and resources of Japan in preparation for war. [p48824] THE HIRANUMA CABINET'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND THE OCCUPATION OF HAINAN AND THE SPRATLEY ISLANDS The programme of economic and industrial preparation for war demanded above all other things the consolidation of Japan's dominion over China. In the speeches made by Foreign Minister Arita and other members of the first Konoye Cabinet during November and December 1938, the greatest emphasis had been placed upon Japan's determination to complete the conquest of China and to promote the development of the Japanese-dominated "Greater East Asia Sphere." The success of the programme for the expansion of war-supporting industries, approved by the HIRANUMA Cabinet in January 1939, called for the complete integration of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. The pursuit of this design, while the first Konoye Cabinet was still in power, had brought about a marked deterioration in Japan's relations with the Western Powers. The provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty had consistently been flouted and measures had been adopted to bring pressure to bear upon French Indo-China. When, on 5 January 1939, the HIRANUMA Cabinet took office, these policies were maintained. On 21 January 1939 the new Prime Minister explained his Cabinet's policy before the Diet. HIRANUMA said that [p48825] his Cabinet was determined at all costs to proceed to the achievement of Japan's final purpose in China. Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China must, he said, be speedily united, so that a "new order" might replace the old. These Chinese who persisted in their opposition to Japan would be exterminated. The new Cabinet, said HIRANUMA, had taken the various measures necessary to ensure the achievement of this aim. Thus under the new Cabinet the policies which had deepened the estrangement between Japan and the Western Powers were maintained. The continuation of the war in China during the first six months of 1939 was accompanied by further instances of violence directed against the persons and properties of United States subjects. Within the regions of China which had been subjugated, Japan continued to practice discrimination against the rights and interests of the Western Powers in violation of her obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. On 10 February 1939 Japanese naval forces surprised and seized the Chinese island of Hainan. This abrupt action which had been approved by the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 November 1939, caused representations to be made immediately by France, Great Britain and the United States. It constituted a threat to French [p48826] Indo-China, a country which the Japanese had repeatedly accused of offering assistance to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, the Japanese forces completed their occupation of the island; and six weeks later Japan moved further southward. On 31 March 1939 the Japanese Foreign Ministry proclaimed the annexation of the Spratley Islands, a group of small reefs in the South China Sea. These islands, seven hundred miles to the south of Hainan, were far removed from the sphere of Japanese activity in China. They were, however, situated within four hundred miles of Saigon, in French Indo-China. THE GROWING DEMAND FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE WHILE THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET WAS IN POWER Since 1934, when OSHIMA was first sent to Berlin as Military Attache, the Army regarded collaboration with Germany as essential. The policy of the military at this time was that an early attack on the U.S.S.R. was essential before the military power of the U.S.S.R., which was rapidly increasing under her successive Five-Year Plans, became too great. For the purposes of such an attack: an alliance with Germany against the U.S.S.R. was obviously desirable. After the reorganisation of the first Konoye-Cabinet, which occurred in May and June 1938, the Army [p48827] controlled Cabinet policy, which was now directed towards completing the conquest of China, launching an attack on the U.S.S.R. before she became too strong, and hastening the completion of the national mobilisation for war. These were foremost aims of the basic national policy decisions. After the Japanese defeat at Lake Khassan in August 1938, War Minister ITAGAKI and other Army leaders decided that the projected war against the U.S.S.R. must be postponed. The Amy's efforts were then centred for a time upon the conquest of China, on which in turn depended the fulfilment of the programme of economic and industrial preparations for war. During the latter months of 1938 the work of conquering Chinese resistance and of developing China into an economic asset was attended by a considerable measure of success. This was achieved at the expense of a pronounced deterioration in Japanese relations with Western Powers which was inevitable. The fixed determination of Cabinet and Army to violate the rights and interests of the Western Powers it China could no longer be concealed or excused. Japan's remaining connections with the League of Nations were severed. The establishment of the Greater East Asia Sphere was announced. Japan was inciting the opposition of the Western [p48828] Powers and a section of the military faction became more than ever insistent on a general military alliance with Germany and Italy. In July 1939 OSHIMA, then Military Attache in Berlin, proposed a new alliance between Germany and Japan Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at once made it clear that Germany desired a general military alliance, not an alliance directed solely or mainly against the U.S.S.R. Ribbentrop accompanied his statement with a note of his views on foreign policy which made it clear that Germany contemplated the likelihood of war between Great Britain and France and herself. OSHIMA, accepting Ribbentrop's view of the scope of the proposed alliance, himself outlined the provisions of the proposed alliance, which he thereupon transmitted to the Army General Staff. At the end of August 1938 OSHIMA was advised that both the Army and the Navy were in substantial agreement with the terms proposed. They wished, however, to make changes which would limit Japan's liability under the proposed treaty, which would be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and would be directed chiefly against the Soviet Union. OSHIMA was warned that care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the Western Powers were the principal enemies, and that Japan would not undertake an obligation to provide [p48829] instantaneous or unconditional military aid. This would safeguard Japan from becoming automatically embroiled in a European war. OSHIMA, however, interpreted this instruction by declaring to the Germans that Japan was ready to conclude a general military alliance. He ignored the instructions he had received that the proposed treaty should be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and should be directed principally against the U.S.S.R., and gave the Germans to understand that the Japanese military leaders were in full accord with the proposal which Germany had made. The draft of the proposed military alliance which was settled by agreement between Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA, was directed impartially against all third powers. Late in October 1938, OSHIMA who had recently been appointed Ambassador in Berlin, conveyed this draft to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, of which Arita had recently assumed control. The Cabinet, without making a definite commitment, expressed general approval of the proposal but stated Japan's desire that the new treaty should be directed principally against the U.S.S.R. The Konoye Cabinet took no further positive, steps to bring about the conclusion of such a treaty. In September and October 1938 SHIRATORI and [p48830] OSHIMA were appointed Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin respectively. These two were in favour of a general military alliance with Germany and Italy. Foreign Minister Arita desired a strengthened military relationship with Germany and Italy, but he wished also to maintain the semblance of friendly relations with the Western Powers. The Foreign Ministry advised OSHIMA that the proposed treaty would facilitate a settlement of the China war, would reinforce Japan's position against the U.S.S.R. thereby releasing troops for use elsewhere, and would strengthen Japan's position internationally. Arita did not, however, signify his acceptance of the German draft. He advised OSHIMA that Japan would submit a counter-proposal. On 25 November 1938 Arita told the Privy Council that it was Japan's policy to take every possible measure to make the U.S.S.R. refrain from intervening in Japan's activities in China. For this reason primarily Japan desired to strengthen her relationship with Germany and Italy. On 29 November 1938 the Konoye Cabinet's policy was clearly set forth by Arita. Japan would consolidate her position in China proper and Mongolia. Within the area she dominated Japan would take all necessary steps to create a state of military preparedness for war with [p48831] the Soviet Union. It was not, however, intended to seek to initiate an early war with the Soviet Union. Arita thus adhered to the position set forth in the basic national policy decision - namely, that the Soviet Union was the foremost enemy of Japan's schemes upon the Asiatic continent, which would almost inevitably lead in the end to war. But Arita had also been obliged to take a stronger stand against the Western Powers. He said that, since Great Britain, the United States and France had interfered with Japan's policy towards China, Japan would avoid the use of international agencies in settling the dispute in China. Treaty obligations would be observed only in so far as they did not conflict with Japan's policy in China. The Western Powers would be made to acquiesce in and voluntarily to support Japan's policy in China, or at least to stand by idly while that policy was carried out. For this reason, as well as in preparation for war with the U.S.S.R., relations between the Axis powers would be strengthened. It would mean, on the one hand, that the U.S.S.R. would be faced with the prospect of war on two fronts; and on the other hand, it would be a great diplomatic measure which would avert the risk of interference from the Western Powers in China. Arita [p48832] did not, however, want an alliance which would embroil Japan in war with Great Britain and France at Germany's election. Such a war might also involve Japan in a Pacific War with the United States. Throughout the period in which the HIRANUMA Cabinet held office, the Navy strongly supported Arita, for the Navy was not ready for Pacific War. Therefore Arita formulated the policy of closer relations with the Axis, which the Cabinet desired, as a strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, not as a general military alliance which was unnecessary for his limited purposes. Between November 1938 and March 1939 he made efforts to strengthen the substance of that pact, and to make other countries party to its provisions. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN POWERS AS AN ADDED REASON FOR STRENGTHENING AXIS RELATIONS. During the first four months of 1939 the gulf between Japan and the Western Powers was widening. Foreign Minister Arita himself had sanctioned the bombing of the Yunnan railway. Hainan and the Spratley Islands were occupied by Japanese forces. Preparations for the domination of the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea were being made. The need for oil and other raw materials indigenous in these areas was increasing. The interference [p48833] with the treaty rights of the Western Powers in China was also growing. To make matters worse the actions of the Army in China were deliberately aggravating the tension which existed with the Western Powers. For all of these reasons the members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet now became anxious to conclude some sort of military alliance with Germany and Italy, and Arita by April 1939 dropped his limited plan for a mere strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. But the Cabinet still wished the alliance to forestall a war with the Western Powers, not to precipitate one. We will adjourn for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows) [p48834] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENCE IN THE CABINET The issue which divided the HIRANUMA Cabinet was the degree of commitment which Japan should undertake in order to secure the conclusion of an alliance which all members of the Cabinet latterly came to desire. During November and December 1938 OSHIMA continued to work for the conclusion of a general military alliance to be directed against the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers alike. SHIRATORI likewise worked for the conclusion of such an alliance. In Japan Arita's policy of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact was followed. In December 1938 Arita advised OSHIMA that the Foreign Ministry still desired the proposed alliance to be directed principally against the Soviet Union. A commission headed by Ito, a Foreign Ministry representative, was despatched to Italy and Germany for the express purpose of seeing that Japan should not be irrevocably committed to participation should Germany become involved in war with the [p48835] Western Powers. Both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI protested because this policy was contrary to the commitment which OSHIMA had already made to Germany. On 7 February 1939, after the Ito Commission had visited Rome, SHIRATORI warned the Italians that Japan would submit a new proposal - presumably in line with Arita's policy - which Italy should reject. When the HIRANUMA Cabinet took office on 5 January 1939, it soon became apparent that ITAGAKI, who remained War Minister, supported SHIRATORI and OSHIMA in their demands for the conclusion of the general military alliance which Germany desired. On 7 February 1939 Foreign Minister Arita reported to the Emperor that the Army General Staff had warned OSHIMA not to exceed his prerogative in dealing with the Germans; but, on the same day, the Army showed its unwillingness to submit to the Emperor's suggestion that the treaty be directed solely against the Soviet Union. This was a reversal of the attitude of the Army as set forth in the instructions to OSHIMA in August 1938. It had then been stated that both the Army and the Navy wished the proposed treaty to be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and to be directed against the Soviet Union. Now the Army declared itself in favour of a general military [p48836] alliance. Both SHIRATORI and OSHIMA refused to communicate officially the proposals of the Ito Commission, which arrived in Berlin during February 1939. The two Ambassadors did, however, convey the Commission's instructions confidentially to Foreign Ministers Ciano and von Ribbentrop, and threatened to resign unless the German proposal was accepted by Japan. Foreign Minister Arita was now acutely anxious as to the outcome of SHIRATORI's and OSHIMA's activities. On 13 February 1939 he complained indignantly that Ambassador OSHIMA had reported directly to the Amy concerning the proposed alliance, and that the Foreign Ministry had not even been notified. Arita said that if he did not succeed in the strong stand which he had been driven to take against the Army Japan's foreign policy would be a total failure. At the Privy Council meeting of 22nd February 1939, which Prime Minister HIRANUMA and War Minister ITAGAKI attended, Foreign Minister Arita made clear his adherence to the policy that strengthened relations among the Axis Powers should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union. Arita said that not only would the Anti-Comintern Pact be strengthened quantitatively by increasing the numbers of [p48837] participating countries, but also it would be strengthened qualitatively by changes in the substance of the Pact, made by agreement among the three Axis Powers. Arita's statement shows why neither the first Konoye nor the HIRANUMA Cabinet up to this point had taken any positive step to conclude the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed in August 1938. Germany desired a general military alliance directed against both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The official policy of Japan at this time was an alliance directed principally, if not exclusively, against the U.S.S.R., and for this purpose no new alliance was required. It was sufficient for Arita's purpose that the provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact should be strengthened. There now developed a struggle within the HIRANUMA Cabinet. Foreign Minister Arita maintained the policy of the first Konoye Cabinet, and, while welcoming a treaty with the Axis directed against the Soviet Union, opposed the attempt being made to commit Japan to participation in a war between Germany and the Western Powers. War Minister ITAGAKI, on the other hand, championed the view that Japan should conclude the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed. It had now become clear that there was [p48838] among the military a faction which placed the conclusion of a general military alliance with Germany above all other considerations, and that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were acting with the knowledge and support of War Minister ITAGAKI in the interests of this faction. On 10 March 1939 Arita expressed his willingness to accept the proffered resignations of Ambassador OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, who had shown that their allegiance was to the Army rather than to the Foreign Minister. Arita believed that Prime Minister HIRANUMA would support him in so doing; but no such decision was made. On 17 March 1939, ITAGAKI and Yonai, though completely at variance over the question of the proposed general military alliance with Germany and Italy, had made a joint declaration of Japanese policy before the Diet. The War and Navy Ministers were agreed that Japanese policy for the new period in Asia would undoubtedly cause friction with third powers. They resented the attitude of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France towards the China war, and stated that unless these powers were ejected from China settlement of that conflict would be impossible. It was about this time, April 1939, that even Arita, under the stress of the deterioration of [p48839] Japan's relations with the Western Powers, dropped his proposal that nothing but an agreement extending the Anti-Comintern Pact should be concluded. During April 1939 Japan made a new counterproposal to Germany and Italy which contained concessions to the view which the military faction advocated. The German draft was in port accepted, but it was stipulated that it should be given a limited interpretation so that the suspicions of the Western Powers should not be unduly aroused. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI again refused to communicate this proposal officially, though once more they advised the Germans and Italians that if those countries should wage war against Britain and France, Japan would join in the war against the Western Powers. Germany and Italy rejected the limited Japanese proposal above noted. THE MILITARY FACTION RESISTS A CABINET ATTEMPT TO REACH A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY: APRIL 1939 During this period the members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet continued to hold many conferences in an attempt to settle their policy. OSHIMA's and SHIRATORI's declaration that Japan would join Germany and Italy in war against the Western Powers [p48840] intensified the opposition of Foreign Minister Arita, who reported to the Emperor that the two Ambassadors should be made to recant this assurance. The Emperor, agreeing with Arita, reprimanded War Minister ITAGAKI, who was resentful that the Emperor had been advised of his attitude. HIRANUMA was placed in a dilemma between the views of the military faction, led by War Minister ITAGAKI, and those of Foreign Minister Arita, who was supported by the Emperor's advisers. HIRANUMA himself inclined to the Army's view and wished to support it. Home Minister KIDO had advised him that it was desirable that the Emperor's views should correspond more closely with those of the Army. The whole Cabinet, desiring to strengthen Japan's relationship with Germany, was disposed to make concessions within the bounds which prudence dictated. The Army maintained that it did not desire Japan to become involved in an European War; but there was evidently no sincerity in this contention for the Amy wished to abrogate the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was this agreement which limited Japan's obligation to render military assistance to the event of war against the Soviet Union. The deadlock within the Five Ministers' [p48841] Conference continued, Finance Minister Ishiwata supporting War Minister ITAGAKI, and Navy Minister Yonai supporting Foreign Minister Arita. In these circumstances it was resolved, on 22 April 1939, that the Cabinet would adhere to the stand taken in its latest proposal. OSHIMA would continue to be used as the channel of communication with the Germans; and, if the negotiations should end unsatisfactorily, the Cabinet would resign. Meanwhile Germany and Italy had reached an agreement to wage war in Europe. On 16 April 1939 Goering and Mussolini had met in Rome. They had then decided that their two countries would await a favourable opportunity for initiating war against Great Britain and France. In the meantime each nation would arm itself to the utmost extent, and would maintain a state of mobilisation for war. In the same month von Ribbentrop warned both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI that, if the discussions for a pact between Germany and Japan were too prolonged, Germany might be forced to effect some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As it turned out the HIRANUMA Cabinet continued to be unable to agree on the conclusion of a general military alliance with the Axis Powers and Germany concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. [p48842] in August 1939. After it became known that SHIRATORI and OSHIMA had refused to present the Japanese counterproposal of April 1939, Home Minister KIDO's attitude had changed. Although he had previously advised HIRANUMA that every effort should be made to conclude an alliance with Germany, by 24 April 1939 KIDO considered that there was no alternative but to recall the two Ambassadors because of their continued support of a general military alliance and their disregard of contrary instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office. On the following day urgent requests were received from OSHIMA and SHIRATORI themselves, demanding that they be recalled. The situation was now critical. If the Cabinet did not succeed in strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy, it would have failed in its purpose. If, on the other hand, the Cabinet acceded to Germany's demands, Japan would be committed to participation in any war which might eventuate between Germany and the Western Powers which some members of the Cabinet did not at this time desire. In these circumstances the Cabinet decided to make a supreme effort to obtain an acceptable agreement with Germany and Italy. On 26 April 1939 [p48843] it was decided that, in view of the insubordination of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, HIRANUMA should make a direct approach to Hitler and Mussolini through the medium of the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo. Prime Minister HIRANUMA would make a general appeal for collaboration among the Axis Powers. Foreign Minister Arita would explain to the Ambassadors the particular problems with which Japan was faced. THE "HIRANUMA DECLARATION" OF 4 MAY 1939 This personal message, which became known as the "HIRANUMA Declaration," was delivered by Arita with obvious reluctance to the German Ambassador in Tokyo on 4 May 1939. In this declaration HIRANUMA expressed his admiration for Hitler's work in Germany, and advised that he was similarly engaged in the work of maintaining Japan's "New Order in East Asia." HIRANUMA expressed his satisfaction with the effect of the Anti- Comintern Pact in making possible the execution of the tasks which Germany and Japan had before them. He said that he now had in view the conclusion of an agreement which would strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and make closer the cooperation of Germany, Italy and Japan. "As far as the strengthening of our [p48844] relations is concerned," he continued, "I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even, if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union, and to afford then political and economic aid and, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance." HIRANUMA then added the saving clause which represented Arita's policy. "Japan is ready," he said, "in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement, to take up the military support of Germany and Italy. However, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should became possible through a change of circumstances." HIRANUMA asked for express confirmation that this reservation was acceptable, and asked also for caution in explaining the objects of the proposed alliance. The HIRANUMA declaration conceded something to Germany and the military faction in Japan, but the [p48845] provision that Japan should not be bound to give immedieta military aid to Germany if she became engaged in war against the Western Powers was important. The declaration was ignored, not only by the Germans and Italians, but also by Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. The situation within the Cabinet was one of unresolved conflict. Foreign Minister Arita and Navy Minister Yonai were vehemently opposed to the conclusion of an alliance which would commit Japan to fighting the Western Powers whenever Germany might elect to initiate such a war. War Minister ITAGAKI and Finance Minister Ishiwata wanted complete solidarity with the Axis. Among the other members of the Cabinet there were all shades of opinion. Home Minister KIDO sympathized with the Army's whole-hearted attempt to conclude a tripartite military alliance, but saw the dangers into which such an alliance might lead Japan. Overseas Minister KOISO, although a staunch supporter of the Army's schemes of aggrandisement, inclined to Arita's view, believing that when Japan's relationship with Germany had been strengthened in a limited manner, Great Britain could be induced to arrange a satisfactory settlement of the China war. The decisive voice was that of Prime Minister HIRANUMA, who was disposed to favour the Army's policy, [p48846] and to excuse the disobedience of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. His declaration of 4 May 1939 revealed his Cabinet's eagerness to conclude an alliance which would supplement Japan's own preparations for war and make possible the achievement of the goal of expansion through military power. But the formula which HIRANUMA adopted revealed also a continuing fundamental difference of opinion as to the form which the proposed alliance should take, and the purposes which it might be expected to fulfill. [p48847] THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES In the Japanese proposal of April 1939, and again in the HIRANUMA declaration of 4 May 1939, the Cabinet made new concessions to the German demand for a general military alliance. But the military faction continued to support Germany in demanding nothing less than full Japanese participation in an alliance which was now known to be directed in the first instance against the Western Powers. The HIRANUMA declaration had not eliminated the essential difference between Arita's policy and that of War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction. Both factions within the Cabinet acknowledged that the national policy of domination in China, and penetration into the countries of South-East Asia, would stiffen the opposition of the Western Powers. Arita, still regarding the Soviet Union as the principal enemy of Japan's "new order" in East Asia, desired an alliance directed primarily against that country, believing that such an alliance among the Axis Powers would also deter the Western Powers from interfering with the execution of the above-mentioned national policy. But the military faction, no longer obsessed with the prospect of immediate war with the U.S.S.R., had come to believe that the success of all the Army's [p48848] expansionist aims depended, not only upon the mobilisation of Japan for war, but also upon complete unity of purpose among the Axis Powers. The Western Powers stood between Japan and the goal of expansion southwards. They were relentlessly opposed to the aggressive war in China which the Army had waged. They controlled the vital raw materials upon which the success of the mobilisation for war depended. They must, in the view of the military faction, be restrained from opposing Japan's national policy of expansion by the threat which a general alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy would constitute. Von Ribbentrop had pointed out the advantages which Japan would gain, if the Western Powers should be defeated by Germany and Italy in the coming year. It had therefore become the cardinal feature of Army policy to demand a complete and unconditional military alliance. Since German policy had changed, and an attack on the Western Powers had now been determined on, the military faction was content that such an alliance should in the first instance be directed, not against the Soviet Union, but against the Western Powers. [p48849] HIRANUMA SUPPORTS A MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO CONCLUDE AN UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE During the month of May 1939, immediately after the HIRANUMA declaration had been made, the Army faction renewed its efforts to achieve the conclusion of a general military alliance. Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, reported that HIRANUMA had made his declaration in an attempt to counteract any doubts which might have arisen in Rome and in Berlin concerning Japan's readiness to go as far as possible in reaching a satisfactory compromise. He undertook to attempt to ascertain the Army's attitude towards the declaration. Two days later, on 6 May 1939, Ott was able to report the view of Army General Staff officers who were acting in direct accordance with the policy of War Minister ITAGAKI. The Army considered that HIRANUMA's declaration represented the best offer that could be hoped for in prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, the Army intended that the wording of the declaration, which made effective Japanese military aid against the Western Powers conditional upon an unspecified "change in circumstances", should be clarified and strengthened. The War Vice-Minister had told Ott that the [p48850] treaty would definitely bind Japan to the Axis powers, though Japan's relative isolation would place her at a disadvantage in offering direct cooperation. The Navy, however, had maintained its opposition to the policy expressed in the HIRANUMA declaration, and throughout the entire government a deep cleft had formed between friends and enemies of the alliance. Von Ribbentrop said that, although Japanese procrastination had made necessary a separate agreement between Germany and Italy, negotiations for a tripartite alliance would be in no way prejudiced. He also made it clear to OSHIMA that the immediate use of the new alliance would be against the Western Powers, saying that Germany and Italy had been compelled to act because they were directly face to face with France and Great Britain. On 6 May 1939, the day after the HIRANUMA declaration reached Germany, OSHIMA again defied Foreign Minister Arita's instructions. Von Ribbentrop, then on his way to Italy to discuss the bilateral alliance, had asked whether, in the event of Germany or Italy going to war with a third nation, it would be permissible to regard Japan also as being in a state of war, even if no military aid should be forthcoming from that country. OSHIMA, without referring to the [p48851] terms of the HIRANUMA declaration, informed Arita that be had replied affirmatively. Arita was exceedingly indignant that such an assurance should have been given without authority, and was the more distressed because he realised that Prime Minister HIRANUMA was disposed to support the Army, rather than to assume a neutral attitude. On the following day, 7 May 1939, the Five Ministers conference, now almost continuously in session, met to consider OSHIMA's report. As expected, Prime Minister HIRANUMA supported War Minister ITAGAKI, and upheld OSHIMA's answer to von Ribbentrop. Meanwhile, on 6 May 1939, an official of the German Foreign Ministry had made a new unofficial proposal, containing the demands which Japan had previously rejected, and making no reference at all to the HIRANUMA declaration. Foreign Minister Arita found, upon investigation, that the draft of this proposal had been submitted by the Japanese Army to the German Foreign Ministry. Arita disclaimed responsibility for the consequences of this military conspiracy, but Prime Minister HIRANUMA persisted in his support for the military faction. On 9 May 1939, two days after the meeting at which HIRANUMA had upheld OSHIMA's assurance of Japanese [p48852] participation in any war in which Germany or Italy was engaged, the Five Ministers Conference met to consider the unofficial German Foreign Ministry proposal, which was known to have been instigated by the military faction in Japan. Navy Minister Yonai strenuously objected to this proposal, saying that it had not been made officially, and that no reply to the HIRANUMA declaration had been received. HIRANUMA waived this objection, and maintained that the German attitude was sufficiently explained by the report of OSHIMA's assurance that Japan would participate, though perhaps not actively, in any war involving Germany and Italy. HASHIMOTO SUPPORTS THE AIMS OF THE MILITARY FACTION HASHIMOTO was the first to expound these aims publicly. While the conflict within the Cabinet continued, he wrote a series of newspaper articles, designed to rally public support for the Army's policy. In these articles, six of which were published between 1 May 1939 and 20 July 1939, HASHIMOTO revealed the changed policy of the military faction. Although he regarded both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers as the enemies of Japanese policy in China, it was his constant theme that Great Britain was Japan's foremost enemy. [p48853] HASHIMOTO said that the China war would not be ended until Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., the countries which supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had been destroyed. He regarded Great Britain as the chief opponent of Japanese aims in China, and advocated an attack on that country, saying that when Britain was overthrown, the Soviet Union would be left isolated. Therefore, HASHIMOTO insisted that Japan must defend herself against the Soviet Union, while advancing southward against the Western Powers. He insisted that Japan's destiny lay in the south, and that there, as in China, it was Great Britain which blocked the progress of Japanese expansion. Again and again HASHIMOTO exhorted Japan to attack Great Britain, saying that in the existing circumstances it would be easy for Japan to vanquish that country. He advocated the capture of Hongkong, and the seizure of the British concessions at Shanghai and Tientsin. He expressed his belief that the Japanese Air Force could annihilate the British fleet before it was able to reach Singapore. In the last of this series of articles, published on 20 July 1939, HASHIMOTO observed with satisfaction that public opinion in Japan had at length taken an anti-British turn. [p48854] For the reasons he had given, HASHIMOTO demanded the conclusion of the tripartite alliance which the military faction had demanded. He said that, although HIRANUMA and Arita desired to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy, they had, through fear of Great Britain, hesitated to conclude a general military alliance. He therefore urged the formation of a strong wartime Cabinet which would not hesitate to act. HASHIMOTO believed that Japan's schemes of aggrandisement through military power should be achieved by acting in concert with Germany and Italy. He said that, since it was the policy of those countries to destroy Great Britain, the interests of the Axis Powers were identical. Therefore he demanded that Japan should immediately expand and strengthen her relations with Germany and Italy, so that democracy as well as communism would be included as an object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, he said, it will be easy to put an end to Great Britain and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy would destroy both democracy and communism; and in the East, extended at least as far as India, Japan would destroy the countries which were founded on these principles. [p48855] HIRANUMA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY FACTION Japan's failure to agree to the German proposal for a general military alliance gave rise to grave dissatisfaction in Germany and Italy. On 15 May 1939 von Ribbentrop cabled Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, instructing him to bring the need for a quick decision to the Ambassador's confidants in the War Ministry; and, if possible, to War Minister ITAGAKI himself. Ott was to say that the conclusion of the alliance which Germany and Italy desired would be the best way to keep the United States from making war on the side of Great Britain and France. He would also point out that it must be understood by Japan that her supremacy in East Asia, and particularly in China, depended first on the superiority of the Axis powers over the Western Powers. Von Ribbentrop told OSHIMA that, although Germany and Italy would conclude a bilateral agreement, the way would still be open for Japanese participation. He impressed upon OSHIMA the desirability of formulating secretly an agreed version of the proposed tripartite alliance simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement between Germany and Italy. [p48856] War Minister ITAGAKI was determined that the alliance should be concluded immediately in the manner which OSHIMA and the Germans desired. On 20 May 1939 he promised von Ribbentrop, through OSHIMA, that Germany should have a positive new decision from the Japanese Cabinet by the following day at the latest. On 20 May 1939 the Five Ministers Conference again met, after War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai had made separate reports to Premier HIRANUMA. Foreign Minister Arita proposed that OSHIMA should be made to retract his affirmative declaration that Japan would participate in any Axis war. HIRANUMA, however, was evasive and declined to make him retract it. Although the Prime Minister was asked repeatedly to rescind Ambassador OSHIMA's words, he maintained the attitude that OSHIMA's statement of the position was satisfactory. When the conference adjourned, matters stood as they had before. The difference of opinion was unresolved. ITAGAKI'S undertaking to reach a positive new decision had not been fulfilled. Two days later, on 22 May 1939, the German-Italian alliance was concluded. [p48857] After the conference on 20 May 1939, Foreign Minister Arita sent specific instructions to OSHIMA that the Japanese government wished to reserve its right of entrance into a state of war in case of a European conflict. OSHIMA refused to communicate this information and told Arita so in a bluntly-worded telegram. SHIRATORI, in Rome, pursued the same course as OSHIMA. The dispute now hinged upon the real meaning of the HIRANUMA declaration. The Army said that it included participation in war; Foreign Minister Arita and the Navy said it did not. The Emperor supported Arita and protested against the Army's policy. But on 22 May 1939 Prime Minister HIRANUMA again supported the Army's interpretation, saying that the matter should be conducted in the way the Army wanted it done. ITAGAKI ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE CONCLUSION OF AN ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY AND ITALY War Minister ITAGAKI was now firmly resolved to right the matter out quickly even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow. Although OSHIMA, as Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, was responsible to the Foreign Ministry, ITAGAKI instructed OSHIMA to send no further communications to Foreign Minister Arita. ITAGAKI desired that the factions within the Cabinet should be left to settle among themselves [p48858] the question of the proposed military alliance. These developments OSHIMA explained confidentially to von Ribbentrop. On 28 May 1939 von Ribbentrop passed this information on to Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, instructing him to treat OSHIMA's information as confidential. Ott was required to bring further pressure to bear in order to secure a quick decision. He was instructed to convey to the appropriate authorities Germany's and Italy's dismay that ITAGAKI's promise of a definite reply by 21 May 1939 had not been kept. On 5 June 1939 Ott reported to von Ribbentrop information on which be had received from Foreign and War Ministry officials. The Army and Navy were said to have come to an understanding, the Army having prevailed upon all issues. HIRANUMA and Arita were stated to have acquiesced in this understanding which was shortly to be communicated to Berlin and Rome through diplomatic channels. According to Ott's informats, Japan had agreed to participate in the war against Great Britain and France, though she wished to reserve the right to enter the war at a favourable time. The communication which Ott had heralded was not forthcoming, because the agreement, which the Army's supporters claimed had been reached, was not a real one. Whatever concessions the Navy had made, it remained opposed [p48859] to the essentials of the Army's plan. The alleged agreement had been obtained with the support of HIRANUMA in part through the forcefulness and in part through the duplicity of War Minister ITAGAKI. The Emperor had continued to support the policy of Foreign Minister Arita. ITAGAKI had attempted to overcome that obstacle in the same manner in which, in July 1938, he had attempted to obtain the Emperor's consent to the use of force at Lake Khassan. He had falsely represented to the Emperor that Foreign Minister Arita had come to favour the alliance which the Army desired. The Emperor, however, had discovered that he had been tricked, and on 7 July 1939 he taxed ITAGAKI with deliberate falsehood and severely rebuked him. Throughout June and July 1939 no new Japanese communication reached Germany. The alliance which the military faction desired could not be concluded as long as the Emperor, the Navy and the Foreign Minister maintained their opposition to it. ITAGAKI recognized this, for on 23 July 1939 he enquired of Konoye, the President of the Privy Council, whether the Emperor's mind could not be changed. Konoye replied that he considered that it would be very difficult to accomplish this. ITAGAKI did not, however, relinquish his aim. On 4 August 1939 he advised Home Minister KIDO that he [p48860] would resign, if the Cabinet did not agree to the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance. THE CABINET'S DIFFICULTIES WERE INCREASED BY THE ARMY'S ACTIVITIES IN CHINA, AND BY THE ATTACK OF THE SOVIET UNION AT NOMONHAN Meanwhile the Army's activities in China and upon the Manchukuoan border had increased the Cabinet's difficulties. Both factions within the Cabinet had maintained their determination to consolidate Japan's position in China, and to resist any country which opposed that aim. On 6 July 1939 War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai once more expressed their firm determination to put an end to Chinese resistance. The two service Ministers said that the interference of third powers, which supported the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, must be crushed, and exhorted the Japanese people to spare no pains in striving for the attainment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia. An attempt was being made to establish a new puppet government for the whole of occupied China, and the Army, in carrying out this policy, had abandoned all pretence in its attacks upon the rights and interests of the Western Powers. Furthermore, the Army, in accordance with plans [p48861] made in the latter half of 1938, was endeavouring to include Outer Mongolia within the sphere of Japanese domination. Since January 1939, when the HIRANUMA Cabinet had taken office, Japanese armed detachments had on several occasions carried out skirmishing raids across the Outer Mongolian border. More important than these border raids was the action which began at Nomonhan during May 1939. While the leaders of the military faction were striving for the conclusion of a general military alliance with Germany and Italy, units of the Kwantung Army once more attacked the Soviet forces stationed upon the Manchukuoan border. This action, which will be described more fully in a later section of this judgment, developed into a campaign of considerable magnitude, and ended during September 1939 in the defeat of the Japanese forces engaged. There is no evidence before this Tribunal to show whether the attack at Nomonhan was made upon the instructions or with the connivance of the Army General Staff, or whether, as on earlier occasions, the initiative was taken by the Kwantung Army itself. The Cabinet, preoccupied with the question of the proposed military alliance with Germany and already hopelessly divided, appears to have regarded the campaign as an Army matter, and to have made no attempt at intervention. [p48862] It is, however, certain that this conflict with the Soviet Union brought about no change in the views of either faction within the HIRANUMA Cabinet. During the whole period that the fighting continued, War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction strove to conclude an alliance with Germany, aimed primarily against Great Britain and France. Foreign Minister Arita, Navy Minister Yonai and their supporters struggled with equal determination to avoid the conclusion of an alliance which would commit Japan to immediate participation in war against the Western Powers. These military activities increased the sense of urgency which attended the Cabinet's deliberations. The whole situation was summed up in the words used by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on 7 July 1939, on the occasion when the Emperor reprimanded ITAGAKI. The Lord Keeper then said, "The Army is confused and everything is lost." He regarded the position as tragic and lamented that the Army was going to destroy the nation. The members of the Cabinet were still agreed that the situation demanded some kind of an alliance with Germany and Italy. THE OPPOSING POLICIES OF ARITA AND THE MILITARY FACTION PREVENTED ANY NEW STEP BEING TAKEN DURING JUNE AND JULY 1939 [p48863] Nevertheless, throughout June and July 1939, the continued disagreement between the military faction and those who supported Foreign Minister Arita prevented any new step being taken, and from June to August 1939 there was no new development in the negotiations with Germany, or in the unresolved conflict within the HIRANUMA Cabinet. In August 1939 ITAGAKI knew that war in Europe was imminent. He was also apprehensive lest Arita's policy should gain a measure of success which would preclude any possibility of obtaining the HIRANUMA Cabinet's agreement to an unconditional tripartite alliance of the Axis Powers. Arita, fearful of the consequences of such an alliance, attached great importance to concluding with Great Britain an arrangement which would secure Japan's position in China. He was making overtures to the British Ambassador, Craigie, with that and in view. ITAGAKI knew that the suggestion that Japan might conclude a tripartite alliance was being used by Arita as an inducement to secure British cooperation in his alternative policy. [p48863-a] THE HIRANUMA CABINET ATTEMPTS TO DECIDE ITS POLICY REGARDING AN ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY 8 AUGUST 1939 To counteract this effort ITAGAKI made a further attempt to secure the Cabinet's agreement to the German proposal for an unconditional military alliance. He recognized the danger of a popular reaction in Japan in favor of an economically tempting settlement with Great Britain. On 4 August 1939 ITAGAKI discussed the position with Home Minister KIDO, who, while disapproving the open manner in which OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had subordinated Japan's interests to those of Germany and Italy, had consistently favored the Army's viewpoint, and had attempted to induce the Navy to abandon its opposition. ITAGAKI told KIDO that he would resign if the Cabinet did not agree to the conclusion of the military alliance with Germany and Italy. This would inevitably result in the downfall of the Cabinet. KIDO was apprehensive of any Cabinet change in the existing circumstances, and convinced ITAGAKI that any attempt to form a military administration should be resisted. ITAGAKI agreed that a solution to the deadlock between Army and Navy should once more be sought. Accordingly, on 8 August 1939, after the Five [p48864] Ministers had again discussed the question, the Cabinet met to consider what action should be taken. Prime Minister HIRANUMA had withdrawn somewhat from his position of complete acquiescence in the Army's plans. He pointed out that his Cabinet had all along been making efforts to conclude an alliance among the Axis Powers. He said that War Minister ITAGAKI had the day before claimed that the Army too had merely been making efforts to bring to fruition the prearranged plan; but HIRANUMA, for his part, could not think that that was the case. The Premier then invited other Cabinet members to speak. The consensus of opinion within the Cabinet was that changes in the situation necessitated an alliance which was both offensive and defensive. Although Japan would first try to conclude a defensive alliance, as had originally been planned, if that could not be done, an offensive and defensive alliance would be concluded. No attempt was made to define what limitations would be placed upon the offensive and defensive alliance; but Foreign Minister Arita considered that the Cabinet's agreement fell short of the unconditional alliance which ITAGAKI had demanded. Either the War Minister would have to resign, or the Cabinet would have to reach a further [p48865] agreement. ITAGAKI, for his part, made at this moment of general anxiety and disillusionment a confession of the role which he himself had played. He said that he was both War Minister and a member of the Cabinet. In the latter role he had concurred in the plan which the whole Cabinet approved; but as War Minister he had acted independently in accordance with the consensus of opinion within the Army. THE GERMAN-SOVIET NEUTRALITY PACT OF 23 AUGUST 1939 CAUSED THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET The Cabinet meeting of 8 August 1939 did not produce the positive decision which War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction desired. The Cabinet, while recognizing the need for an offensive and defensive alliance, declined to make any greater commitment than that made by ITAGAKI on 5 June 1939, that Japan would reserve the right to enter any war between Germany and the Western Powers at a favorable time, nor indeed did the Cabinet specifically endorse this previous offer. ITAGAKI thereupon determined to attempt once more a tour de force. He told Ott the position and said that circumstances were so compelling that he had [p48866] resolved as a last resort to risk his resignation. This would almost certainly entail also the resignations of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. It was hoped that these resignations would in the long run produce the alliance which Germany and the Japanese Army wanted, but it was recognized that their immediate result would be a violent setback to those plans. On 10 August 1939 ITAGAKI asked Ott to advise Germany and Italy of the serious state of tension which prevailed, and to ask them to help by making concessions. Specifically, ITAGAKI proposed that Germany and Italy accept the proposal of 5 June 1939 together with a guarantee that there were no mental reservations behind the condition made by Japan as to choosing her moment of entry into the war. ITAGAKI would then obtain express confirmation of the guarantee given. The agreement would be reached without advising the Foreign Ministry. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI would act upon ITAGAKI's instructions, and the Cabinet would be confronted with an arrangement which fell within the decision tentatively reached on 8 August 1939. Ott transmitted all the foregoing information to Germany and urged his government to accede to ITAGAKI's request. Ott pointed out that it was of prime importance to Germany to buttress the Army's [p48867] domestic political position, since the Army was the foremost advocate of the alliance which Germany desired. Furthermore, Ott felt that such a concession would restore the whole government to its decision to seek a German alliance, and would avoid the Cabinet's overthrow. On 18 August 1939 Ott reported that the conflict between ITAGAKI and Arita was still raging. ITAGAKI's position was reinforced by the pressure of junior military officers who were demanding an unconditional military alliance, but the Five Ministers' Conference would go no further than the offer transmitted unofficially to Germany on 5 June 1939. The Army was pursuing its alliance policy independently of the outcome of Arita's negotiation with Great Britain. Five days later, on 23 August 1939, the German-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed. On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland; and on 3 September 1939, in consequence of this action, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Germany had not made the concessions which ITAGAKI had asked, and the opportunity for the War Minister's attempted tour de force had failed. But the occasion called for more than the resignation of the War Minister. The Cabinet's policy also had been completely discredited. Cabinet [p48868] and nation had looked to Germany as an ally against the U.S.S.R. The Cabinet had from its very inception been pledged to achieving a more intimate relationship between Japan and the Axis powers. After meeting on 28 August 1939 and acknowledging the failure of their policy, the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned en bloc. The collapse of the Cabinet's pro-German policy made possible the pursuit of a modus vivendi with the Western Powers — the policy which ITAGAKI had feared. THE ABE CABINET TAKES OFFICE 30 AUGUST 1939 The Emperor summoned General Abe to form a new Cabinet and gave him certain instructions. Either HATA or UMEZU was to be the new War Minister. Discretion was to be used in appointing Home and Justice Ministers as the [p48869] maintenance of public order was of supreme importance. The foreign policy of the new Cabinet was to be that of cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. Obedience to this last instruction demanded the reversal of the foreign policy pursued by the first Konoye and HIRANUMA Cabinets; and this fact explains the necessity for the other instructions which the Emperor gave. The new War Minister would need to be someone who enjoyed the confidence of and was able to control the Army, and the success of the new policy would depend primarily on the ability of the Home and Justice Ministers to control the confused reactions of the Japanese public to the sudden reversal of their country's foreign policy. Abe in some perplexity reported the Emperor's instructions to Konoye, then President of the Privy Council, who in turn informed KIDO, the outgoing Home Minister. Kido advised Konoye, who agreed, that if Abe were to follow the Emperor's choice as to the selection of a War Minister, there was danger of a clash with the military. The Emperor should therefore convey this instruction to the Army itself or to the outgoing War Minister, and should allow the three Army Chiefs to select the new War Minister in the accustomed manner. As to the other Imperial instructions, KIDO considered that Abe might use his own discretion. These opinions KIDO [p48870] The Abe Cabinet, which was formed on 30 August 1939, contained no member of the out-going administration. HATA became the new War Minister. SHIRATORI was, at his own request recalled from Rome. On 5 September 1939 the Kwantung Army announced the termination and failure of the frontier war against the U.S.S.R. at Nomonhan. Two days later UMEZU, the Emperor's other candidate for the post of War Minister, became Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. The conduct of foreign affairs, at first assumed by Abe himself, was assigned to Admiral Nomura. Under Nomura's direction, the Cabinet's foreign policy attempted to improve Japan's relations with the Western Powers. No effort was made to seek a rapprochement with Germany and Italy. No steps were taken for a Japanese incursion into Southeast Asia. A bombing incident in French Indo-China, which had occurred during the last days of HIRANUMA's premiership, was settled and an indemnity paid by Japan. But the desire for better relations with the Western Powers implied no abandonment of the good of Japanese domination of China. This was the basic tenet of Japanese national policy. The Abe Cabinet desired the acceptance by the Western Powers of the "new order" in East Asia which Japan had created. [p48871] This policy is illustrated by the conversation held between Foreign Minister Nomura and the French Ambassador on 30 November 1939. Nomura told Ambassador Henri that Japan shared France's desire to restore friendly relations between the two countries. He expressed appreciation for the concessions which France had recently made. Nomura pointed out, however, that, while Japan was straining every effort to overthrow Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, France was continuing to support Chinese resistance. Furthermore, French territories in the Pacific, and particularly French Indo-China, were maintaining economic barriers against Japan. If France really desired a rapprochement with Japan, she should said Nomura, abandon equivocal action, sever relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and adopt an attitude in sympathy with Japan's attempt to settle the "China Incident". Nomura told Henri that large quantities of ammunition were still reaching the Chinese National Government's forces through French Indo-China, and that that French colony had become a base of pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese activities, and for the provisioning of the Chinese forces. Nomura desired to dispatch to Hanoi in Northern Indo-China a Foreign Ministry official accompanied by a military export to explain on the spot [p48872] the reasons for Japanese military activity in China close to the border of French Indo- China which was arousing French suspicions. Nomura suggested that in this manner French suspicions might be allayed, and the way be paved for an agreement. On 12 December 1939 Ambassador Henri presented a French reply which denied the transportation of munitions through French Indo-China, and expressed regret that Japan should have renewed this complaint. Henri said that France could see no justification for the despatch of a mission to Hanoi, since a Japanese Consul-General was stationed in that city. He expressed France's willingness to confer on all other differences outstanding between the two countries, and desired an explanation of Japanese military activities upon the border between China and French Indo-China. Nomura replied that the continued transportation of munitions was a plain fact which could not be contested. He acknowledged that France was under no legal obligation to suspend supplies to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces since war between Japan and China had not been openly declared, but he expressed his Cabinet's hope that France would take steps to suspend traffic which tended to help the forces of Chinese resistance. The Abe Cabinet's policy is also well exemplified [p48873] in the approach made to the U.S.S.R. immediately after the Cabinet came to power. The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, TOGO, had been instructed to propose a settlement of the war at Nomonhan; and within a few days such a settlement had been reached. TOGO was also instructed to propose the establishment of a general commission for settling border disputes, and the conclusion of a trade treaty with the Soviet Union. If the U.S.S.R. should propose a non-aggression pact between the two countries, TOGO would ask first whether the Soviet Union was prepared to deny help to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. THE MILITARY FACTION CONTINUES TO WORK FOR COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THE AXIS POWERS Despite the Cabinet's new policy of seeking a modus vivendi with the Western powers, the military faction maintained the policy of seeking complete solidarity with Germany and Italy. The German-Soviet Pact had come as a severe blow to the HIRANUMA Cabinet and to public opinion in Japan. Even OSHIMA had been surprised and resentful that such an agreement had finally been reached. Yet OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had had ample warning of Germany's intentions. OSHIMA enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler and the German Army. During the year preceding the [p48874] conclusion of the Neutrality Pact, he had been kept fully advised of German policy by von Ribbentrop. For a long time von Ribbentrop had been convinced that both Germany and Japan must reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. He now said that he would have striven for this result even if a tripartite alliance had been concluded. This policy von Ribbentrop had disclosed to OSHIMA more than a year before. On 16 June 1939 he had given OSHIMA and SHIRATORI a specific warning that, since Japan had not agreed to Germany's proposals, Germany would herself conclude a pact with the Soviet Union. SHIRATORI had realized that this was the German intention, but OSHIMA, believing such a rapprochement to be out of the question, had regarded the warning as a spur to induce Japan to conclude the German alliance. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German Neutrality Pact on 23 August 1939, SHIRATORI and the pro-German group to which he belonged had laboured to counteract the reaction which that event had produced in Japan. Since that aim had not been attained, he had insisted upon being recalled to Japan, where he could work more effectively for rapprochement among the Axis Powers. The HIRANUMA Cabinet had made a protest to the Germans concerning the conclusion of the Soviet-German [p48875] Neutrality Pact, which was regarded in Japan as a breach of the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact; but Ambassador OSHIMA was dissuaded from presenting this protest by the German Foreign Ministry official to whom he sought to deliver it. SHIRATORI, too, had advised him that the protest should not be delivered. OSHIMA nevertheless reported that he had complied with the Cabinet's instructions; but not until 18 September 1939, when the German invasion of Poland was completed, did he deliver the HIRANUMA Cabinet's protest. This OSHIMA did apologetically, and was satisfied that the German Foreign Ministry should accept the document unofficially and for their own information. Meanwhile SHIRATORI in Rome had made it clear that he did not share the indignation felt in Japan concerning the conclusion of the German-Soviet Neutrality Pact. On 4 September 1939 he spoke to the German Ambassador in Rome of the effect of the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact. That agreement was intended to prevent either country from concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which at the time the Pact was concluded appeared to be the chief enemy of both Germany and Japan. Since that time, said SHIRATORI, circumstances had entirely changed, and it would be unreasonable to expect any country to encompass its own [p48876] downfall for a treaty's sake. Great Britain had now become the chief enemy of both countries, and simply had to be beaten. In short, SHIRATORI recognized the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact for what it really was --a device on the part of Germany to avoid having to fight a war on her Eastern and Western frontiers simultaneously. On 2 September 1939 SHIRATORI had received official notification of his recall to Japan. He particularly desired an opportunity to urge his own pro-German views upon von Ribbentrop, and when it proved impossible for him to go to Berlin, he arranged to convey his sentiments through OSHIMA. In Tokyo, ITAGAKI, the outgoing War Minister, expressed his continued belief in Axis solidarity. On 6 September 1939, at a reception given to the German Army and Air Attaches, both ITAGAKI and HATA, the new War Minister, made speeches which were markedly cordial to Germany. ITAGAKI pointed out to Ambassador Ott his most sincere efforts to strengthen the bonds between Japan and Germany. These, he said, had failed because of developments in Europe. ITAGAKI emphasized, however, that his successor HATA completely shared his views. HATA referred to the Abe Cabinet's declaration on nonintervention, in the European War, but assured Ott that, [p48877] as a soldier, he fully understood the action which Germany had taken. THE MILITARY FACTION CONSPIRES TO ALLY JAPAN WITH GERMANY AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS Other members of the military faction made efforts to secure the continuation of close relationships between Japan and Germany; and these efforts the Germans encouraged and reciprocated. General Terauchi, War Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet and one of the men most responsible for the basis national policy decision of August 1936, arrived in Germany upon a goodwill mission shortly after the downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. He had been sent to attend the Nazi Party Conference at War Minister ITAGAKI's instigation. The Navy had opposed this mission, but ITAGAKI had advised the Emperor that Terauchi must be sent in order to strengthen the bond created by the Anti-Comintern Pact. On 2 September 1939 SHIRATORI had told the German Ambassador in Rome that he believed there was a good change of continuing with success the thwarted rapprochement with the Axis Powers. He said that public opinion in Japan in favour of a settlement with the U.S.S.R. was growing, and might lead to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Japan, freed from a Soviet threat, would be able to minimize the possibility of United States [p48878] intervention in the European War. On 4 September 1939 SHIRATORI advised the German Ambassador that in his opinion the only way to conclude Japanese-Soviet Pact was through German mediation. SHIRATORI had therefore urged OSHIMA to request German "good offices" with the U.S.S.R., without awaiting any instruction from Tokyo. He believed that the Axis power should unite against Great Britain, and hoped that a world war right be averted by reaching an acceptable armistice with France and Great Britain, after the Polish campaign had been completed. The views which von Ribbentrop urged upon OSHIMA two days later corresponded closely with those expressed by SHIRATORI. Von Ribbentrop told OSHIMA that Japan's fate was as over linked with Germany's. Should Germany be defeated a coalition of the Western Powers would prevent further Japanese expansion and would take away Japan's position in China; but should Japan maintain and enhance her relationship with Germany, Japan's position would ultimately be secured by German victories. The idea of close cooperation between the three Axis powers was, he added, not in the least dead. The three countries, having an understanding with the U.S.S.R., would, in accordance with the world situation, direct their activities directly against Great Britain. [p48879] This was in the real interest of all parties concerned. Von Ribbentrop would himself, above all else, work for an understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and he trusted that the same policy would prevail in Tokyo. The understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Japan would require to be achieved quickly, for Germany's conflict with Great Britain would be decisive for all world politics in the future. With all these statements OSHIMA expressed agreement. He said that the Japanese Army would doubtless appreciate the need for an understanding with the Soviet Union, and that there was certainly a prospect that these ideas would be embodied in Japanese foreign policy in the near future. SHIRATORI also would work for this result. Both von Ribbentrop and Hitler lost no opportunity of impressing these views upon OSHIMA and upon Terauchi. Ambassador Ott was instructed to talk quite openly with Kanin, the Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, upon the same lines. He was also to intimate the importance of OSHIMA's remaining in Berlin as Ambassador, for OSHIMA commanded the complete confidence of the German government and Army. OSHIMA, however, decided that he could work more effectively in Tokyo than in Berlin. On 27 October 1939, von Ribbentrop advised Ott that OSHIMA, upon his [p48880] projected return to Tokyo, would work for German-Japanese friendship. Ott was instructed to provide OSHIMA with a special channel of communication through the German Embassy to Berlin. We will adjourn now until half-past nine on Monday morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Monday, 8 November 1948, at 0930.) [p48881] Monday, 8 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with the exception of HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from the Government of India, not sitting from 1100 to 1200. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMFE.) [p48882] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. OSHIMA, WITH GERMAN ENCOURAGEMENT, PLANS FOR A JAPANESE ATTACK UPON THE PACIFIC POSSESSIONS OF THE WESTERN POWERS Von Ribbentrop, in urging Axis solidarity, sought to encourage Japan to move to the south. He impressed upon both OSHIMA and Terauchi that Japan's vital interests lay in that direction. If an understanding between Japan and the Soviet Union was reached through German mediation, Japan might freely extend her power in East Asia towards the south, and penetrate further than had been planned. Terauchi agreed, and said that it was in Japan's best interests to bring the China war to an end by a tolerable compromise, and to utilize the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy in the south, where greater economic successes were to be gained. OSHIMA not only agreed, but was enthusiastic. [p48883] He said that Japan would be perfectly ready for an advance in South-East Asia, which would include the capture of Hong Kong. This he had already proposed by telegraph. In OSHIMA's opinion Japan should penetrate deeply into South-East Asia. She needed tin, rubber and oil from the Fatherlands East Indies, cotton from British India, and wool from Australia. If all of these requirements were obtained, Japan would be very strong. He thought at this time that Japan should make a non-aggression pact with the Netherlands East Indies, at the same time reaching an agreement which would enable Japan to exploit the raw materials of the Indies in accordance with the agreement obtained. By the same device the Netherlands would be estranged from Great Britain. THE REASONS FOR THE DOWNFALL OF THE ABE CABINET AND THE RESUMPTION OF A PRO-GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY BY THE YONAI CABINET During Abe's tenure of office as Premier, neither War Minister HATA nor other members of the military faction are shown to have made any overt attempt to secure the adoption of their views. As SHIRATORI had pointed out, the accession to power of the Abe Cabinet promised certain advantages. The goal of Japanese policy was, as before, the establishment of a "new order" in [p48884] China. As a result of the Cabinet change the public illfeeling engendered by the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact had been considerably mitigated. There was in Japan a growing desire for a settlement with the U.S.S.R. which, if carried through in stages, might lead to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. With a new Cabinet in power, SHIRATORI considered that there was a well-founded opportunity for continuing the repair of German-Japanese relations. Both SHIRATORI and OSHIMA returned to Tokyo to make the most of this opportunity. The policy of the Abe Cabinet and the circumstances in which it was formed, themselves provide the reasons for its downfall. No Cabinet which renounced the aim of establishing Japan's "new order" in China could hope to remain in power. Yet the maintenance of that aim was incompatible with the reestablishment of friendly relations with the Western Powers. This was the foreign policy which the Abe Cabinet had been formed to promote. The impossibility of carrying out that policy was, however, soon recognised. Members of the military faction regained positions of influence. On 28 September 1939 DOHIHARA became a Supreme War Councillor. On 1 December 1939 ARAKI became again a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council. [p48885] Foreign Minister Nomura's negotiations in regard to French Indo-China did not lead to friendship with France; nor did Japan obtain the concessions for which Nomura had striven. On 5 December 1939 the United States lodged new complaints concerning damage done to United States property in China by the Japanese forces; and, ten days later, the United States extended the list of materials upon the export of which to Japan a moral embargo had been placed. Supplies of raw materials, which Japan had to import, would be withheld. On 12 January 1940 Japan advised the Netherlands of her intention to abrogate the arbitration treaty between that country and Japan. That treaty would thus expire in August 1940. Three days later the Abe Cabinet resigned, and, with its resignation, the policy of fostering more friendly relations with the Western Powers was abandoned. On the following day Yonai, who, as Navy Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had supported Arita's efforts to avoid a definite commitment that Japan would enter a war between Germany and the Western Powers, became the new Premier. HATA remained War Minister. KOISO, who, as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had lent general support to Arita's policy, resumed his previous post. Arita, who had been Foreign Minister in the [p48886] HIROTA Cabinet when the basis of the national policy was decided, and who had held that office again in the first Konoye and HIRANUMA Cabinets became once again Foreign Minister. With the outbreak of the European War circumstances had changed, but Arita's policy had not. He has himself testified before this Tribunal that the foreign policy of the Yonai Cabinet was to maintain good relations with Germany, in so far as that aim was not seriously harmful to Japan's major interests. THE YONAI CABINET ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY DECISION. Arita was influential during the term of office of the Yonai Cabinet in maintaining Japan's adherence to the principle of the national policy decision. To the primary goal of securing Japan's domination of China, each succeeding Cabinet had remained faithful. It was the cornerstone of Japanese policy. During 1939, while HIRANUMA was Premier, preparation had been made for establishing a puppet government for the whole of occupied China, excluding Manchukuo, under the leadership of the renegade Wang Ching-wei. This man had visited Tokyo in June 1939, and in the following month, on 7 July 1939, War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai had made a joint statement to the Diet regarding China, and had expressed Japan's [p48887] determination to resist any interference, either from the Western Powers or from the Soviet Union, with the attainment of Japan's ambitions in that country. It had been the vain hope of the leaders of the Abe Cabinet that they could win the acquiescence of the Western Powers in Japan's established position in China, and upon that basis restore good relationships with Great Britain, France and the United States. Before the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned, Wang Ching-wei, with the assistance of Japanese Army leaders in China, had begun to organise a Central Political Council, from which would be developed the new pro-Japanese Central Government of China. On 12 September 1939, twelve days after the downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet in which he served as War Minister, ITAGAKI had become Chief of Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. After Abe's accession to power, Japanese military operations in China were continued. On 30 November 1939, in pursuance of Japanese aims in China, Foreign Minister Nomura had renewed pressure upon the French to cease forwarding supplies to the National Government of China. When, on 16 January 1940, Yonai became Prime Minister and Arita returned to the Foreign Ministry, place for the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei [p48888] government were well advanced. During that month a meeting was held at Tsingtao for the purpose of amalgamating the existing puppet regimes in the occupied areas of China. The second principal goal of the national policy decision was that of achieving the mobilisation of the Japanese nation in preparations for war. In November 1938, shortly after he became Foreign Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet, Arita had laid stress upon the fact that this goal and that of achieving a position of supremacy on the Asiatic continent were interdependent. In January 1939, when HIRANUMA was Premier and Arita his Foreign Minister, the Cabinet had approved a new Planning Board programme for economic and industrial expansion. The objectives of the Amy's long-range economic and industrial planning, settled in the first half of 1937 before the revival of the war in China at Lukouchiao, then received for the first time specific Cabinet approval. In the light of the experience already gained, higher levels of production were demanded, so that the repletion of Japanese armaments might be completed by 1941. This was the year originally planned, but the war in China after 1937 had created a drain on Japan's military resources which for a time threatened to postpone the date of completion of armament. [p48889] The basic national policy decision, of 11 August 1936, which declared the consolidation of Japanese power in China and the mobilisation of the Japanese nation for war to be two principal aims of Japanese policy, declared also that in the pursuit of these aims, Japan should strive to maintain amicable relations with the Western Powers. Arita and Yonai, as members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had resisted steadfastly the attempt of the military faction to embroil Japan in the European War. The outbreak of that war in September 1939 had imposed upon Japan no new obligation, and had rendered less probable any intervention from the Western Powers in Japanese activities in China. Therefore the Yonai Cabinet was united in maintaining the Abe Cabinet's policy of non-intervention in the European War. It was this principle which constituted the factor limiting Foreign Minister Arita's desire to maintain good relations with Germany. Nevertheless it was also a goal of the national basic policy decision that Japan should strive to develop her interests in the South Seas, under the "joint efforts of national defence and diplomatic skill." The first major development in Japanese foreign policy after the Yonai Cabinet had taken office shows that in this regard also Arita adhered to the principles set out in the [p48890] national policy decision. The continuation of the war in China and the increased demands made upon the Japanese economy by the programme of economic and industrial preparations for repletion of armaments had increased Japan's reliance upon foreign sources of supply for vital raw materials. In December 1939 Foreign Minister Nomura's attempt to obtain by agreement increased supplies from French Indo-China had, in the absence of a general understanding, come to nothing. On 12 January 1940, three days before the downfall of the Abe Cabinet, Japan had advised the Netherlands of her intention to abrogate the Arbitration Treaty between that country and Japan. JAPAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A FAVOURED ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES On 2 February 1940 a new proposal was made through the Japanese Minister at the Hague to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. In form it was a reciprocal agreement which would govern Japan's relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Japan would undertake not to adopt restrictive measures in regard to the entry into that country of the employees of Netherlands firms, and the Netherlands would undertake to abolish or modify their existing restrictions upon employment of foreign labour in the Netherlands East Indies. There would be [p48891] granted to Japan facilities for new enterprises and extended facilities for existing enterprises in the Netherlands East Indies. In return for this concession, there would be afforded opportunities for new Netherlands investments in Japan, and the grant of similar facilities by the governments of Manchukuo and China would be "recommended" by Japan. The Netherlands, furthermore, would undertake to abolish or modify existing restrictive measures effecting the importation of Japanese goods into the Netherlands East Indies; and would take the necessary steps to render easier the flow of goods between the two countries. Japan, for her part, would take appropriate steps to increase her importation from the East Indies, and would, subject to her own economic difficulties and as far as circumstances permitted, refrain from restricting or prohibiting the exportation to the Netherlands East Indies of the principal commodities required by that country. Finally, the press of each country would, by strict measures of control, be made to refrain from comment unfriendly to the other. Japan, more than a year earlier, had made plans to secure the resources of these important Netherlands possessions. During the latter half of 1938, while the first Konoye Cabinet was in power, officials of the [p48892] Japanese government were engaged in conducting a propaganda campaign in the Netherlands East Indies, in preparation for Japan's "march to the south." The new proposal followed closely upon the abrogation by Japan of the existing treaty regulating her relationship with the Netherlands. Although it purported to be made upon a basis of reciprocity, it is apparent that the advantages offered by Japan to the Netherlands East Indies were nugatory. Japan, upon the other hand, stood to gain unrestricted access to the vital warsupporting raw materials produced in the East Indies. A suitable reply to this Japanese proposal was still under consideration by the Netherlands when, on 9 May 1940, that country was attacked by Germany. THE YOKAI CABINET'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN THE EUROPEAN WAR AROUSES STRONG OPPOSITION IN JAPAN. During the first half of 1940 the Yonai Cabinet adhered to the policy of non- intervention in the European War, so that the full strength of the nation might be directed to the task of securing Japan's position in China, and of completing Japan's measures for war. This policy was maintained in the face of considerable opposition within Japan itself. On 23 February 1940 Stahmer, newly arrived from Germany upon a special mission, reported to von Ribbentrop [p48893] that in Japan dommestic problems were paramount. He found that the attitude of OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, Terauchi and other members of the military faction which had supported an unconditional alliance with Germany was unchanged; and that they were ready to give every support. The Cabinet, he said, was trying to prevent Japan from being drawn into the European War, and to maintain a friendly relationship with Great Britain and the United States; but public opinion was definitely pro-German and anti-British. The influence of the Army, which had been gravely weakened while Abe was in power, was steadily increasing. Under Abe well-known pro-German officials of the Foreign and War Ministries had been systematically transferred to overseas posts; but now the contrary policy was being pursued. A further increase in Army influence might be counted upon. Japan's economic difficulties and shortages of essential materials had been increased and prolonged by the continuation of the war in China. Resentment against the opposition of the Western Powers to Japan's aims in China caused some Diet members openly to advocate the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty, and Japanese participation in the European War. During March 1940 Arita's policy of non- intervention was assailed in the Diet. The Foreign Minister was urged to strengthen [p48894] Japan's relations with the Axis. Arita in reply emphasized the friendly relationship which existed between Japan and the other Axis powers, but maintained that the settlement of the war in China precluded Japan from intervening in the European War. On 7 February 1940, at a meeting of the Diet Budget Committee attended by Yonai and Arita, one committee member advocated the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty, which he characterised as a scheme devised by Great Britain and the United States to restrain the continental policy of Japan. It was, he said, a serious obstacle to the achievement of the "new order," and it would cause great difficulties in the settlement of the China war, after the Wang regime had been established. At another meeting of this committee, held on 28 March 1940, one member mentioned reports that Hitler and Mussolini had met to consolidate their alliance against England and France, and inferred that Japan should not refuse an invitation to join such an alliance. Foreign Minister Arita in reply reaffirmed his conviction that the Cabinet's firm policy of non-intervention in European affairs was in the existing circumstances the most prudent one. He emphasized his adherence to the principles set out in the national policy decision by saying that, as long as Japan acted according to her own [p48895] just policies with Japan itself as the focal point, the fear that she might have to stand alone was unnecessary. War Minister HATA supported Arita. The Foreign Minister's reply prompted another committee member to raise the main question whether it was desirable that Japan should make a complete change in her foreign policy. He visualised the situation which might arise should the European War end sooner than was expected. He said that Great Britain and France would never cease to aid the forces of Chinese resistance. He feared that, if Japan maintained her present policy, even Germany and Italy, who now took the lead in supporting Japan's position in China, might turn against her. He pointed out that, when the Abe Cabinet was formed, the outcome of the war in Europe could not be foreseen; but he believed that now the situation had changed. He stressed the fact that the Cabinet's tendency to show partiality towards Great Britain and the United States was inviting the strong displeasure of the Japanese people, as well as German dissatisfaction. He therefore urged the Cabinet to abandon completely the policy of non-participation in the European War, and to enter into an alliance with the other Axis powers. He suggested that the establishment of the Wang regime would provide a suitable occasion for such a change in policy. [p48896] THE ARMY SUPPORTS THE NON-INTERVENTION POLICY IN ORDER TO COMPETE THE CONQUEST OF CHINA AND THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR War Minister HATA's statements at the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940 show that the Army was determined to uphold the policy of non-intervention in Europe, until Japan's own position had been consolidated. He said that Japan was concentrating upon the settlement of the war in China, and that therefore it was necessary to harmonize skilfully her politics and tactics in order to meet changes in the international situation. In order that the war in China might be settled there would be no change in Japan's policy, which was to concentrate her whole strength upon excluding any third power which interfered persistently with the establishment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia. HATA also made it clear that the Army regarded the policy of non-intervention purely as a matter of expediency. He stated that the Army regarded the policy which Yonai and Arita had so often expounded as one which preserved Japan's complete freedom of action. Two days later, on 30 March 1940, the new puppet government for the whole of China, established under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei, was formally inaugurated. At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March [p48897] 1940, War Minister HATA had said that this event would utterly ruin Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's position. The Army, said HATA, would give as much help as possible to the new regime and would continue the fight against the Chinese National Government's forces. HATA repeated that the object of the China war was to crush thoroughly the forces of Chinese resistance. The establishment of the Wang regime, he added, was therefore only a stage in the disposition of the China War. HATA's statements on this occasion showed also that the Army hoped, by exploiting the resources of China, to relieve the pressure of Japan's economic difficulties and to provide new sources of raw materials. He told the Budget Committee that the Army was making the maximum use of commodities obtained in the occupied areas of China; and that it was expected in the future to do this in greater degree. Self- sufficiency in vital materials was to be obtained simultaneously with the execution of the Army's pacification activities. [p48898] DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS PREVENTED JAPAN FROM OPENLY REPUDIATING THE NINE-POWER TREATY In striving to attain the goal of self-sufficiency in war-supporting raw materials, Japan was placed in a dilemma. The exploitation of the resources of China, now to be undertaken in greater measure than ever before, was being carried out in violation of Japan's obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. The very reasons which led Japan to seek new sources of essential raw materials restrained her from provoking an immediate breach with the Western Powers from whose territories she was deriving important supplies of these materials. It was admitted in an official document, prepared on 3 March 1940, that Japan was intensely reliant upon the United States as a source of materials vital to her preparations for war. For this reason, it was stated, Japan could not assume a resolute attitude towards that country. Ever since the outbreak of the war in China, the United States and other Western Powers had condemned Japanese aggression in that country, and had demanded the observance of the Nine-Power Treaty, Persistent violations of that treaty had caused the United States, on 11 June 1938, to place a moral embargo upon the {48,899] export of certain war materials to Japan. During the last months of 1938, while Arita was Foreign Minister, Japan had at last admitted that she did not intend to observe treaty obligations when they conflicted with her own vital interests. During 1939, following further complaints concerning the misconduct of the Japanese forces and the violation of Japanese treaty obligations in China, the United States had taken new measures to restrict the flow of supplies to Japan. On 26 July 1939, she had notified Japan of her intention to terminate that Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which, since 1911, had governed trade relations between the two countries. It had latterly proved inadequate to procure Japanese respect for American interests in China; and American fidelity to its provisions prevented the United States from taking economic measures which might induce Japan to desist from her policy of aggression. On 15 December 1939 molybdenum and aluminum were added to the moral embargo list. On 26 January 1940, pursuant to the notification already given, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation expired. In March 1940 legislation to prohibit the supply of war materials to Japan was under consideration in the United States. [p48900] These events caused the question of repudiating the Nine-Power Treaty to become a vital issue in the Diet Budget Committee's discussions of February and March 1940. At the meeting of 7 February 1940 one committee member drew attention to the restrictive measures imposed by the United States, and urged Arita to renounce the Nine-Power Treaty, pointing out that it would be a great obstacle to the achievement of Japan's further aims in China, after the Wang regime had been established. Arita agreed that the basic principle of that treaty was not applicable to the new situation in the Far East. On the one hand, he said, its repudiation was favourable to the establishment of Japan's "new order", and to the amelioration of conditions in Japan. On the other hand, however, there was the possibility that its renunciation would cause international repercussions. Therefore the problem required careful consideration. After the Wang regime had been set up, consultations would be held over this question. At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940, Arita reiterated that the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty might produce good results or bad results. He did not deny that such a step was desirable, but emphasized that the time for repudiation and the means to be employed required to be studied carefully. [p48901] War Minister HATA, who had pointed out that the establishment of the Wang government was only one step towards the realisation of Japan's aims in China, said that the Army would follow the Cabinet's policy in dealing with the Nine-Power Treaty. HATA gave it as his own view that the question was purely one of expediency. He considered that the existing situation in China was quite beyond the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty, and that that treaty should not be permitted to hamper the carrying out of Japanese military operations. The Army, he added, had decided for the moment to reopen the Yangtse River; but this, he said, was a question to be decided purely in a voluntary manner. JAPAN MAKES NEW PLANS FOR INDUSTRIAL SELFSUFFICIENCY IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES On 3 March 1940 there was formulated a policy which, taking cognisance of Japan's dependence upon the United States, set out measures through which Japan could eliminate her reliance upon that country, particularly in regard to the supply of materials essential for carrying out what the document calls "The Divine War". This secret Foreign Ministry document discloses an intention to revise the whole programme of economic and industrial expansion in order to achieve self- [p48902] sufficiency in the essential materials of war and in order to establish an economic system which would make Japan independent of the goodwill of the United States. The new plan called for a vast expansion in the manufacture of machine tools, for experimentation with substitute materials for the production of "special steel", and for alternative sources for the supply of scrap iron, petroleum and other war materials. Facilities for manufacturing finished steel and electrolytic copper, for refining crude oil, and for producing petroleum synthetically, were to be rapidly expanded. This costly and uneconomic policy would be financed by the temporary diversion of military funds to meet industrial needs. Greater emphasis was to be placed upon the nationalisation of industry, and upon the integration of the economies of Manchukuo and of the rest of China with that of Japan. So imperative was the new plan considered that funds allocated to the war in China and to military preparations for war with the Soviet Union were to be diverted to the realisation of the aims of this plan. For this reason Japan could endeavour to achieve a temporary adjustment of her relations with the U.S.S.R. It was intended that, as a result of the measures already described, Japan would be enabled to [p48903] adopt a firm attitude towards the United States; and it was expected that that country, confronted by the threat of war and under the pressure of the public opinion of its own people, would acquiesce in Japanese actions and remove embargoes upon the supply of raw materials. THE YONAI CABINET MAKES PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE The same considerations which restrained the Yonai Cabinet from openly repudiating the Nine-Power Treaty led Japan to disguise her aggressive intentions in the south; but plans for a move southward were prepared and developed during the first half of the year 1940. On 17 March 1940 the Budget Committee met to consider the huge estimated expenditure of the Overseas Ministry for that financial year. One committee member, seeking to discover the purposes of this expenditure, urged the view that Japan could obtain greater rewards by expanding southward than by concentrating upon the development of Manchukuo and the rest of China. He pointed out that Japan could find a treasure-chest of raw materials in the south, and took as instances the island of Mindanao in the Philippines and Celebes in the Netherlands Last Indies. He [p48904} advocated the seizure of these areas, though recognizing that this step could not at present be taken. Nevertheless he urged a fundamental change in national policy, saying that Japan must have both the North and the South as her objectives, and that her greatest exertions should be directed towards the south. In the present circumstances he believed that Japan should formulate a twofold plan, one phase being for defence and one for attack. He expressed the Committee's pleasure that Overseas Minister KOISO had stated similar opinions at several recent Cabinet meetings. KOISO in reply fully endorsed the opinion that Japan must regard both the North and the South as her objectives, and advised the Committee that this was the policy of the Overseas Ministry. In planning the future development of Manchukuo and the rest of China the movement of population was the primary task, and economic development the subsidiary goal. But in planning Japanese expansion to the south economic exploitation was the principal aim, and colonisation a means to that end. In conformity with the principles of the basic national policy decision, and within the limits which the Cabinet's desire to avoid an open breach with the [p48905] Western Powers imposed, Foreign Minister Arita supported the development of Japan's southward policy. At a press conference held on 15 April 1940 he made a statement concerning Japanese policy towards the Netherlands East Indies. There had in the meantime been no reply from the Netherlands to the Japanese proposal for a trade agreement, which had been delivered on 10 February 1940. Arita said on this occasion that Japan, in common with the other countries of East Asia, was intimately related with the regions of the South Seas, and especially with the Netherlands East Indies. The economic bonds between these countries were such that the prosperity of East Asia depended upon their mutual aid and inter- dependence. Arita said in response to questions that, if the war in Europe should effect the Netherlands East Indies, not only would these economic relationships be interfered with, but also there would arise a situation which threatened the peace and stability of East Asia. For these reasons, Arita added, Japan would be deeply concerned over any development arising out of the war in Europe which might affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. On the following day, 16 April 1940, this statement was published by [p48906] the Japanese Embassy in Washington. IN VIEW OF GERMANY SUCCESSES IN EUROPE, AND CONTINUED OPPOSITION FROM THE WESTERN POWERS, THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION GAINS STRENGTH During the first five months of the year 1940 the measures taken by the Yonai Cabinet produced no settlement of the China conflict. Within Japan itself distress and discontentment were wide-spread; and the pro-German sympathies of the Japanese public, already well-defined in February 1940, were strengthened. On 3 April 1940, in the presence of the Japanese Ambassador, a German-Japanese Cultural Committee was established in Berlin. Minister Director Weiszaecker of the German Foreign Ministry referred in his welcoming speech to the gratifying manner in which relations between Japan and various Nazi Party societies had developed during the preceding years. He described the new committee as an effective instrument for strengthening the traditionally close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan, and expressed his conviction that the political friendship which united the two countries would be increased. As the tide of German victories in Europe rose those who advocated the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty became more outspoken. This view was urged [p48907] not only at the meetings of the Diet Budget Committee, but openly in the Diet itself. On 23 March 1940 Ambassador Ott reported to von Ribbentrop that political events in Japan indicated a further deterioration in relations between that country and the Western Powers. The United States and Great Britain had maintained their opposition to the establishment of the Wang regime in China. The British Ambassador had lodged a protest against the formation of the new puppet government. The United States Ambassador, had presented two further complaints concerning violations of the "open door" policy in China. Diet members of several parties had simultaneously urged the Foreign Minister to strengthen Japan's connection with Germany and Italy, the countries friendly to her policy. At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940, one committee member regarded Germany's victory as certain, and advocated Japan's participation in the European War. [p48908] Arita's declaration of 15 April 1940 concerning the Netherlands East Indies produced an immediate reply from the United States. On 17 April 1940 the State Department issued a press release in which it was declared that any interference with the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies would prejudice the peace and stability of the whole Pacific area. On 9 May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands; and on the following day Stahmer, the German Foreign Ministry's special emissary, who had recently returned to Tokyo from the United States, reported to von Ribbentrop upon the situation in Japan. He said that recent German successes had created a deep impression in Japan, and had diminished the importance of Great Britain in the Far East. Within the Army and among the people of Japan, anti-British sentiment was markedly stronger. In view of the attitude which the United States had adopted, Stahmer was confident that the Yonai Cabinet's attempt to reach an understanding with that country and with Great Britain would be unsuccessful. Stahmer said that the difficulties of the Yonai Cabinet, the economic policies of which were inadequate, had again increased. He considered that the unrest and discontent which these policies had [p48909] engendered would lead eventually to the formation of a new Cabinet favorable to Germany; and hoped that, when the time came, Konove might be the new Premier. In any case, he added, the tension between Japan on the one hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other was bound to increase or at least to continue undiminished. He warned von Ribbentrop, however, that until the China war had been settled, and until urgent measures of domestic relief had been taken, Japan would be unable to change her policy, SHIGEMITSU COUNSELS ARITA TO CONCILIATE WESTERN POWERS In spite of the increasing clamor for closer relations with Germany, and for Japanese participation in the European War, Foreign Minister Arita had maintained his policy of non-intervention in the European War, and of seeking to avoid a definite cleavage in Japanese relations with the United States. In his despatch of 10 May 1940 Stahmer reported that the Yonai Cabinet was still striving to obtain a further measure of agreement with Great Britain and the United States. One Foreign Ministry official who had consistently urged this policy upon Arita was SHIGEMITSU, the Japanese Ambassador in London. During July and August 1939, prior to the [p48910] downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, Foreign Minister Arita had explored the possibilities of obtaining Great Britain's acquiescence in Japan's position in China. During the latter months of 1939, while the Abe Cabinet was in office, this had been the aim of Japanese foreign policy. After Yonai had become Premier and Arita his Foreign Minister, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU had striven to secure the maintenance of that aim. It was his contention that the objects of Japanese national policy should be pursued through establishing in China a government to which the Western Powers would not take exception. On 13 March 1940, less than three weeks before the Wang Ching-wei regime was established in China, SHIGEMITSU reported to Arita the efforts he had recently made to remove Great Britain's objections to Japan's provisions for the settlement of the conflict in China. He had spoken to Mr. R. A. Butler, the British Under-Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, of Japan's intention to set up the Wang Ching-wei regime as the new central government of China. Using the "Konoye principles" and other declarations of Japanese policy as the basis of his explanation, he had described Japan's intentions towards China in the most favorable light. He had said that it was Japan's policy to establish peace and order in China, and also cooperation [p48911] between the new Chinese government and foreign countries. Under the new regime, he had added, only those elements which plotted civil strife would be excluded. He hoped that, upon this basis, an opportunity for compromise with the National Government of China would be found. SHIGEMITSU strove to impress upon Arita that, if this policy were followed, there was the opportunity of reaching an agreement with Great Britain which would be advantageous to both countries. Butler, said SHIGEMITSU, had stated that, although Great Britain could not immediately change her policy of recognising only the National Government of China, he hoped that SHIGEMITSU's forecast of the situation would prove correct. As an earnest of Great Britain's willingness to make concessions which involved no sacrifice of principle, the British government had taken steps to resolve the dispute with Japan over the British concession at Tientsin. SHIGEMITSU told Arita that Great Britain's apprehension concerning the actions of the U.S.S.R. provided the basis for a more fundamental agreement with Japan. Butler had spread that there were reasons for a better understanding between their two countries both in regard to China, and, more generally, in regard to the world situation. [p48912] SHIGEMATSU had assured Butler that Japan was determined to maintain a position of strict neutrality in regard to the European war, and had expressed the hope that barriers to trade between the two countries might be removed. Butler had replied that Great Britain was ready to make every effort to reach that result. On 13 May 1940, four days after Germany had invaded the Netherlands and Belgium, SHIGEMITSU again reported to Arita. He said that it was evident that Hitler had resolved to stake everything upon this campaign, but he stressed the fact that Germany had by no means beaten France and Great Britain. He emphasized that Japan must be ready for every contingency, and that therefore it should be the guiding principle of her national policy to achieve a situation of stability in East Asia. SHIGEMITSU attempted to provide Arita with a formula which, falling within the principles of the basic national policy decision of 1936, would yet involve no resort to further measure of aggression. He said that, in view of the international situation, it was a matter of great urgency that Japan's position of leadership in East Asia should be established firmly. Regardless of the outcome of the European War, Japan would be placed at a disadvantage, if the conflict [p48913] in China were not first settled. He therefore stressed the need for conciliatory measures, suggesting that, whatever the sacrifices entailed, Japan should attempt to bring about a reconciliation with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, either directly or through the Wang regime. SHIGEMATSU urged Arita that Japan's policy towards the whole of the South Seas area should be based upon that already adopted towards the Netherlands East Indies. Japan, he said, should declare that she had no intention of changing the status quo of the South Seas area; that neither belligerents nor neutral powers should intervene in that area; and that the interests of the native peoples of the South Seas should be the first consideration. JAPAN STRESSES HER SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES: MAY 1940 Foreign Minister Arita's policy towards the Netherlands East Indies was governed in part by his desire to avoid an open breach with the Western Powers and in part by the wish to take advantage of German victories in Europe to achieve Japan's ambitions of expansion in the South. Arita's statement of 15 April 1940, expressing Japan's especial interest in the [p48914] maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies, had brought a prompt reassurance from the Netherlands. On 16 April 1940, the day after the statement was made, the Netherlands Foreign Minister had informed the Japanese Minister at the Hague that the Netherlands had not sought and would not seek any power's protection over or intervention in the Netherlands East Indies. Two days later, on 18 April 1940, this statement was confirmed by the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo. Nevertheless, on 11 May 1940, two days after Germany had attacked the Netherlands, Arita once more drew the attention of the Soviet Union, the United States, Italy and all belligerent countries to Japan's especial concern in the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. On the same day the United States Department of State announced that a number of governments had already made clear their intention of maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. In the State Department's opinion such declarations could not be too frequently reiterated. Great Britain advised Japan that she did not intend to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies, and France gave a similar assurance. On 15 May 1940 the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo informed Arita that his [p48915] government believed that neither Great Britain, France nor the United States would intervene. Despite these assurances, the controversy was kept alive in Japan. On 16 May 1940 Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, expressed his concern to the Japanese Ambassador, saving that every day [one] or two new aspects of the situation were being discussed in Japan, as though no pledges to preserve the status quo had been given by other nations. In view of such pledges, said Hull, it was difficult to understand Japan's insistence upon the existence of some supposed special Japanese interests in the Netherlands East Indies. He suggested that Japan, having made clear her intention to dominate the vast area of China, and to eliminate equality of trade with that country, might have similar designs upon the Netherlands East Indies. This the Ambassador denied, and expressed Japan's satisfaction with the position, provided that Great Britain and France did not attempt to land troops there. On the same day, 16 April 1940, the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies informed Arita that it was intended to maintain existing economic relations with Japan, and that no restrictions would be placed upon the exportation of mineral oil, rubber and other raw materials of vital importance to that country. [p48916] Arita was, however, still unsatisfied. On 20 May 1940 he informed the Netherlands Minister that there were many other commodities of equal importance to Japan. He required a definite assurance that a stipulated quantity of specified materials would be exported to Japan annually, and demanded written confirmation that these requirements would be met. JAPAN PREPARES FOR THE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH: GERMANY DECLARE HER DISINTEREST IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES During 1939, while the HIRANURA Cabinet was in power, Foreign Minister Arita had continued to regard the Soviet Union as Japan's foremost enemy. After the downfall of that Cabinet, which was caused by the conclusion on 23 August 1939 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had agreed with von Ribbentrop that they would work for reconciliation between Japan and the U.S.S.R. They planned that, once an understanding with the Soviet Union had been reached, the three Axis nations would be free to direct their activities exclusively against the Western Powers. Thus, the way would be made clear for Japan's advance to the south. OSHIMA and SKIRATORI returned to Tokyo in order to achieve their purpose. {48,917] During the last four months of 1939 the moderate policies of the Abe Cabinet paved the way for a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. The conflict at Nomonhan was quickly ended, and the antagonism of the Japanese public towards the Soviet Union was in some degree allayed. TOGO, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, was instructed to negotiate with the Soviet government a general settlement of border disputes and a new commercial treaty. He was told also that the negotiation of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. would depend upon Soviet willingness to abandon the support of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. After 5 January 1940, when Arita again took office as Foreign Minister in the new Yonai Cabinet, the fear of Soviet interference with Japan's ambitions in China continued. On 10 May 1940 the Yonai Cabinet was still striving for a greater measure of agreement with Great Britain and the United States. Japan and the U.S.S.R. were mutually distrustful. The German Embassy, assisted by OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other members of the military faction, was still endeavoring to promote a reconciliation between their two countries. Nevertheless, under pressure from the military faction and public opinion, the Yonai Cabinet's policy had shown a gradual change. The continued opposition [p48918] of the Western Powers to Japan's aggressive actions had increased the need for new sources of raw materials. In March 1940 the allocation of funds and materials for military preparations against the U.S.S.R. had been in part diverted to industrial production aimed at eliminating Japanese dependence upon the United States. The Overseas Ministry under KOISO had prepared plans for a Japanese advance into South-East Asia. German victories in Europe seemed to present the opportunity for carrying out these plans. When, on 9 May 1940, Germany attacked the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Arita invited German support, by intimating that a declaration of Germany's attitude towards the Netherlands East Indies would be welcome in Japan. At the Foreign Minister's press conference and in Japanese newspapers it was noticed that, while the Western Powers had each expressed their views in regard to the Netherlands East Indies, no word had been received from Germany. Thus was Germany presented with an opportunity to direct Japan's aggressive aims against the Western Powers. Ambassador Ott was instructed by von Ribbentrop to inform Arita that the German invasion of the Nether| lands was concerned only with the prosecution of the European War. Germany had herself no interest in the [p48919] Netherlands East Indies, but understood thoroughly Japan's anxiety over developments in that area. The activities of the Western Powers, said von Ribbentrop, had provided occasion for such misgivings, but Germany had always followed a policy of friendship towards Japan. Ott was to convey this message verbally to Arita, making it clear that Germany had declared definitely her disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies. On 22 May 1940 Ott told Arita of Germany's recent military successes, and conveyed to him von Ribbentrop's message, for which Arita expressed gratitude. A communique was issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, stating that Germany had declared herself to be disinterested in the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese press gave great publicity to this announcement, heralding it as complete acquiescence in Japanese policy for that area, and as a promise of future German support. The German attitude was contrasted with that adopted by the Western powers. JAPAN CONTINUES TO PREPARE FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE, DISREGARDING SHIGEMITSU'S ADVICE On 25 May 1940, immediately after Germany's declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU sent Arita another warning. [p48920] Once more he stressed that Japan should be prepared for all contingencies because the issue of the European War was still in doubt. He said that, although Germany had won the battle for the low countries, Great Britain and France were still firmly resolved to continue the fight. He urged again that Japan should maintain a policy of strict neutrality, and should end the China conflict by taking conciliatory measures. SHIGEMITSU pointed out that, as a result of events in Europe, Japan had, willy-nilly, become the stabilisation power in East Asia. Whatever the outcome of the European War, Japan's position would be strengthened by reaching through conciliation a settlement with China. If this were done Japan would be ready to take her place in the international arena. Otherwise the Western Powers, if victorious, would again intervene in the China affair. SHIGEMITSU's advice involved the abandonment of the plans for a southward advance by military force under cover of German victories in Europe. He urged Arita to declare formally a policy of conciliation in China, at the same time requesting the withdrawal of the forces of the European belligerents from that country. Japan, said SHIGEMITSU, should also consider the declaration of a zone of neutrality extending [p48921] three hundred miles seaward from the coastlines of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. Believing that the spread of the European War to the Pacific could in this way be prevented, he urged Arita to act without regard to the pressure of public opinion or of the military faction. There was, however, no change in Japanese policy. During late May and early June 1940 the British and French armies were driven back by the weight of the German attack. On 9 June 1940 the Soviet Union and Japan settled by agreement the frontier line dividing Mongolia from Manchuria. On 10 June 1940 Italy declared war upon Great Britain and France. On 17 June 1940 France was forced to seek an armistice. On 10 June 1940 Arita complained of the retention of the bulk of the United States fleet at Hawaii. Although Ambassador Grew assured him that the presence of the fleet at one of its normal stations constituted no threat to Japan, Arita maintained that its continued stay there implied a suspicion as to Japan's intentions in the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere in the South Seas. He once more assured Grew that Japan had no intention of acquiring new territories. Meanwhile, the German Embassy in Tokyo used its influence with the press and with leading politicians to [p48922] stir up ill-feeling against the United States. Ambassador Ott himself suggested to Konoye and to other men prominent in Japanese politics that a conflict between Japan and the United States was in the long run inevitable. OSHIKA, SHIRATORI and other members of the military faction collaborated with the Germans in this agitation. JAPAN MARK RENZWED DEMANDS UPON FRENCH INDO-CHINA; June 1940 As the fall of France impended, French Indo-China replaced the Netherlands East Indies as the next intended victim of Japanese aggression. In March 1940 Japan's demands, for the discontinuance of supplies to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been permitted to lapse in face of France's rejection of the demands. On 4 June 1940 strong representations were again made to the French Ambassador in Tokyo, and were again refused. Japanese policy towards French Indo-China was governed by her determination "to pipe out, at any cost, all obstructions to the building of a new order" in East Asia. Every avenue through which the forces of Chinese resistance might derive assistance would be closed. For that reason it bad been resolved that French Indo- China should be brought under Japanese control. On 12 June 1940 Japan strengthened her position [p48923] by concluding a pact of non-aggression and friendship with Thailand, whose territories were adjacent to the eastern frontier of French Indo-China. On the same day the Japanese South China armies, stationed near the northern frontier of Indo- China, announced that the greater part of the weapons and war materials which China purchased abroad were still being transported to Chunking via the Yunnan railway. The announcement stated that such action, taken by the French Indo- Chinese authorities in aid of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, could not be overlooked. Four days later, on 16 June 1940, Japan demanded that France put an end to the allegedly hostile activities of the colonial authorities in Indo-China. On 17 June 1940, the day on which France sought an armistice from Germany, the Governor-General of French Indo-China capitulated to these demands. He agreed to suspend the supply of all munitions and war materials to China, and consented also to the despatch of a Japanese military mission to northern French Indo-China. On the following day, 18 June 1940, Prime Minister Yonai, Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister HATA and Navy Minister Yoshida decided in conference to make further demands. Japan would require the French Indo-Chinese authorities to suppress all pro-Chinese [p48924] activities; and, if that requirement were refused, force would be employed. It was debated whether force should not be used immediately, but the Army advised against this policy, believing that the threat of force might be sufficient. Japan required and received further undertakings from the government of France, which was now subject to German domination. The prohibition placed upon the supply of certain war materials to China was, at Japanese instigation, extended to include a wide variety of other commodities. The French authorities undertook to enforce this blockade, by preventing smuggling activities. On 22 June 1940 France agreed formally to the sending of a Japanese mission. On 29 June 1940 this mission, comprising forty representatives of the Japanese Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry, landed in French Indo-China at Hanoi, and found that the blockade had been enforced in accordance with the undertakings given. THE YONAI CABINET, DESIRING A FREE HAND IN INDO-CHINA, MAKES OVERTURES TO GERMANY FOR COOPERATION AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS. Furthermore, Germany and Italy were informed that Japan was gravely concerned about the future of [p48925] French Indo-China, both from the political and from the economic standpoints. It now became clear that the Yonai Cabinet intended to act in concert with Germany against the Western Powers, provided that Germany did not drive too hard a bargain. On 19 June 1940, the day after Japan's policy towards French Indo-China had been decided by the conference of Four Ministers, Ambassador Kurusu broached the subject generally in an interview with an official of the German Foreign Ministry. Kurusu began by stressing Japan's desire for closer and more cordial relations with Germany. He said that even to those who had previously opposed this policy had now come the knowledge that Japan's future depended, not on the Western Powers, but upon an approach to Germany. As an indication of Japan's desire for the betterment of her relations with Germany, Kurusu referred to the approaching visit of Sato, Naotake, a former Foreign Minister of Japan. Kurusu went on to discuss Japan's position, and the Japanese view of the form which cooperation between the two countries should take. He no longer regarded Japan's shortage of raw materials as critical, because, in view of German pressure, the Western Powers were not in a position to impose an effective boycott upon exportation to Japan. The expansion of heavy [p48926] industry was now, he said, Japan's most important task. If Germany would cooperate in that development, Japan, being no longer dependent upon the United States, would gain freedom of action. In view of the unfriendly attitude which the United States had shown, Japanese industrialists would gladly exchange German for American sources of supplies. Japan's hostility towards the U.S.S.R. and Japan's failure to provide substantial economic assistance to Germany were obstacles to close collaboration between the Axis countries. Kurusu indicated that both would be overcome. He said that both Ambassador TOGO in Moscow and he himself were working feverishly for the betterment of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. He declared that in Japan it was becoming more and more clearly recognised that that country's future lay in the South, and that the enemy in the North must be made a friend. There were, he admitted, certain military groups which opposed this re-orientation, but OSHIMA, he said, would convince them of the need for it. [p48927] Kurusu intimated also that Japan should now be prepared to facilitate the shipment to Germany of raw materials from Japan's own sphere and from other overseas areas. He indicated that, in view of the present situation of the Western Powers, there was no longer need for insistence upon the strict letter of the law of neutrality. He visualised that, after the European War was over, there would remain four spheres of influence, dominated respectively by Germany and Italy, by the Soviet Union, by the United States, and by Japan and China. He considered that the close relationship between the German and Japanese blocs would then be of mutual advantage to the two countries, and suggested that Germany should assign to Japan an ample position in her post-war economic planning. SHIGEMITSU REMAINS OPPOSED TO POLICY OF YONAI CABINET On 19 June 1940 Ambassador SHIGEMITSU, having noted the latest developments in the Yonai Cabinet's policy, sent a specific warning to Arita. He said that, if it were decided to resort to force in French Indo-China or elsewhere, Japan should first consider carefully the attitude of the United States. Full attention should be paid, not only to economic questions, [p48928] but also to the naval strengths of the United States and of Great Britain, and to the condition of France. SHIGEMITSU thought that, if the surrender of France was completed, Australia might intervene in French Pacific possessions. In that case he considered that Japan might seize the opportunity to take positive action. He made it clear, however, that he did not share the Cabinet's confidence in the certainty of German victory. He advised Arita that, though France's fall should be complete, Great Britain would continue the fight and would not easily be beaten. Despite the setbacks which the Western Powers had sustained, SHIGEMITSU urged once more upon Arita the cardinal principles of the policy which he had advocated in earlier despatches. He considered that Japan should take advantage of the situation in Europe to strengthen her own position in East Asia. Japan, he said, should announce her grave concern for the stability of East Asia, including the islands of the South Seas. She should affirm her resolve to prevent the extension of the European War, and her determination that East Asia should no longer constitute a field for European exploitation. Having regard to the possibility of an Axis victory in Europe, Japan should also be ready to forestall a German incursion into [p48929] South-East Asia, lest such an encroachment should drive Japan to risk war with Germany. From this and earlier despatches, SHIGEMITSU's policy emerges clearly. He believed that, though the Western Powers should win the war in Europe, their influence in the Far East would be greatly weakened, and that Japan's position would therefore be enhanced. He pointed out that if, through conciliation, a settlement with China had been reached, there would in the future be no occasion for the Western Powers to intervene. By pursuing a policy of neutrality Japan would have qualified herself to take her place in the international arena. Furthermore, by opposing Western influence in Asia and in the islands of the East Indies, Japan would gain the favour and support of the peoples of the Orient, and would make reconciliation with China more easy of achievement. Thus by peaceful measures Japan would gain the very objects for which she was now preparing to make war. Even though the Axis Powers should prove to be victorious in Europe, similar considerations would apply. Japan, with unimpaired strength and with enhanced prestige among the peoples of Asia, would be ready to resist any German attempt to dominate the East. [p48930] ARITA REJECTS A PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES Japan's policy had, however, been decided on 18 June 1940 at the conference which Yonai, Arita, HATA and Yoshida had attended. The whole question of Germany's willingness to afford cooperation on acceptable terms was being explored. Japan's especial interest in French Indo-China had been intimated to Germany and to Italy on 19 June 1940. It was resolved that Japan's policy towards the United States and Great Britain would depend upon the replies to this intimation. While these replies were being awaited the United States made another attempt to reach an understanding with Japan, and to test that country's sincerity. Ambassador Grew was instructed to suggest to Arita that Japan and the United States should exchange notes declaring their common desire to maintain the status quo in regard to the Pacific possessions of the belligerent European Powers, except in as far as that status might be changed by peaceful means. Grew was to suggest also a provision for consultation between the two countries in case there should arise any issue which, in the opinion of either country, rendered consultation desirable. [p48931] On 24 June 1940 Grew made this proposal to Arita in strict confidence, making it clear, however, that the United States had not retreated from the stand taken upon other specific issues. The new United States proposal was intended as a means of discovering some method of improving relations between the two countries. Arita, being uncertain of Germany's attitude towards Japan, regarded this United States proposal as an extremely delicate matter. He saw in the proposal a revival of the Nine-Power Treaty system. Although that treaty was still binding upon Japan, that country had made every effort to escape and to renounce the obligations it involved. Arita did not wish new restrictions to be placed upon Japan's freedom of action, especially in regard to the Netherlands East Indies. Arita therefore told Grew that, in view of the many outstanding differences between Japan and the United States, it might be difficult to accept the new proposal, unless these differences were first reconciled. He referred to the pro-German trend of public opinion in Japan, and said that, although he was himself in favour of a rapprochement with the United States, that view had exposed him to [p48932] severe criticism. Nevertheless he undertook to give the proposal careful consideration. On 28 June 1940 Foreign Minister Arita made Japan's reply to the United States proposal. He told Ambassador Grew that, in view of the existing international situation, he doubted whether consideration could be given to a formal exchange of notes on the basis which the United States had suggested. Japan, said Arita, was greatly concerned with the effect which the European War would have upon the status of the Pacific possessions of the European belligerents. Japan, therefore, did not consider it desirable to conclude any sort of agreement during the present transitionary period. Arita said that he was himself endeavouring to prevent the extension of the European War to the Far East, and suggested that it might be timely to discuss those problems which affected only Japan and the United States. ARITA SHOWS THAT JAPAN'S POLICY IS BASED ON COOPERATION WITH GERMANY AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS On 29 June 1940, the day after he had rejected the United States proposal, Foreign Minister Arita made a policy speech which gave great prominence to the Yonai Cabinet's desire to act in concert with [p48933] Germany. He made it apparent that the two nations shared a common philosophy, saying that Japan's ideal since the founding of the Empire had been that all nations should be able to find their proper places in the world. Japan's foreign policy, said Arita, had been based upon this ideal, for which she had not hesitated to fight, even by staking her national existence. It was therefore a natural step that countries in the same part of the world, being linked also by close racial, economic and cultural ties, should first form a sphere for their own "co-existence and co-prosperity." The conflict in Europe, said Arita, had shown that war was usually due to failure to remedy the injustices of the existing order. It was for this reason that Japan had undertaken the task of constructing a "new order" in East Asia. It was, he said, extremely regrettable that, Japan's purpose being misunderstood, it had been obstructed by those who supported the forces of resistance in China. Japan was determined to eradicate all such opposition. The remainder of Arita's speech amounted to a declaration of Japanese suzerainty over the whole area of East and South-East Asia and the islands of [p48934] the East Indies. He said that the countries of East Asia constituted a single sphere destined to cooperate with each other and to minister to each other's needs. At the outset of the European War, he continued, Japan had proclaimed a policy of non- intervention in Europe and had stated her desire that the European conflict should not be permitted to extend to East Asia. Arita concluded his speech by admonishing the Western Powers against interference in his country's schemes. Japan, he said, trusted that the Western Powers would do nothing to extend the war to the Pacific. He stated that Japan, while carrying out the task of constructing a "new order" in East Asia, was paying serious attention to developments in Europe, and to the repercussions of the European War in the various regions of East Asia and the South Seas. The destiny of these regions was, he declared, a matter of grave concern to Japan "in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing power in East Asia." THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARES FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE YONAI CABINET AND THE CONCLUSION OF AN AXIS ALLIANCE In the foreign policy pronouncements and communications of May and June 1940 it had been made [p48935] clear that Japan, though desiring German cooperation, did not intend to enter into the European War. Yet since January 1940, when the Yonai Cabinet had taken office, popular clamour for intervention against the Western Powers had grown continuously, and had been cultivated assiduously by the members of the German Embassy, working in collaboration with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other leaders of the pro-German group in Japan. In August 1939, when the Abe Cabinet had replaced that of HIRANUMA, there had been grave obstacles to close cooperation between Japan and Germany. Public resentment against Germany had been aroused by the conclusion of the Soviet- Japanese Non-Aggression Pact. Among certain groups within the Army, and among the Japanese public at large, the Soviet Union was still looked upon as Japan's foremost enemy. The Abe Cabinet was pledged to seek a rapprochement with the Western Powers. When, in January 1940, the Yonai Cabinet took office, public opinion again favoured cooperation with Germany, and hostility towards the U.S.S.R. had in some measure diminished. But the struggle in China had not been ended, and in political circles the principle of non-intervention in the European War was firmly established. The pro- German group in Japan, [p48936] and even the German Ambassador himself, had recognised that Japan could not intervene in Europe, until the China conflict had been settled and internal political dissension resolved. The Army had therefore cooperated with the Cabinet. Although War Minister HATA shared ITAGAKI's desire to commit Japan to an unconditional alliance with Germany, he had not opposed the policies of either the Abe or the Yonai Cabinet. Gradually the obstacles to Japan's entry into the European War were overcome. With the stimulus of German victories in Europe and with the promise of rich rewards in the South, the Yonai Cabinet's policy had undergone an opportunist change. The Manchukuoan frontiers on the north had been settled by agreement with the Soviet Union, and plans and preparations for a southward advance had been made. The Western Powers had replaced the Soviet Union as the first of the intended victims of Japanese aggression. The Army had reopened negotiations for a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Since March 1940 it had been widely contemplated that the Yonai Cabinet would be replaced when a suitable moment occurred. In May 1940 the German Ambassador had looked forward to the formation of a new Cabinet of the pro-German group, probably under the [p48937] leadership of Konoye. Since that time Ambassador Ott, in continued collaboration with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other prominent Japanese, had worked to bring about Japanese intervention in the European War -- a step to which the Yonai Cabinet was resolutely opposed. With the fall of France in mid-June 1940, some members of the pro-German group felt that the time was fast approaching when the Yonai Cabinet should be replaced. On 18 June 1940 SHIRATORI addressed the members of a political society, the objects of which were the readjustment and reinforcement of the Japanese political system, and the establishment of a strong foreign policy. SHIRATORI told the meeting that, although as a civil servant he could not advocate the Cabinet's overthrow, he felt that, in view of Germany's successes, an opportunity had already been missed. He considered that there was no prospect of accord with Germany as long as those who were opposed to a tripartite Axis alliance retained office in the Cabinet. Germany, having already accorded Japan complete freedom of action in the Netherlands East Indies, did not respond to the new overtures made by the Yonai Cabinet in pursuance of Japan's designs upon French Indo-China. The new concessions asked for gave Germany the opportunity to drive a bargain. One German Foreign [p48938] Ministry official commented upon the economic sacrifices which Germany had made in deference to Japanese policy towards China, and pointed out that, since the European War had begun, Japan, insisting upon her neutral role, had not even facilitated the repatriation from the United States of German sailors or the despatch through Japan of supplier consigned to Germany. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48939] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. MEMBERS OF THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR While the Yonai Cabinet waited for Germany's reply to the message about French Indo-China sent on 19 June 1940, members of the pro-German faction took steps to remove two important obstacles to their plans. Major General MUTO, who since 26 October 1939 had held office as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and Secretary of the National General Mobilization Committee, approached the German Military Attache. He said that should occasion rise the Army would welcome it if Germany would act as mediator in the already extended conciliatory talks between Japan and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, so that the war might be concluded in a manner acceptable to Japan. MUTO declared also that Japan was very much interested in French Indo-China because of her desire to settle the China war. In response to the Attache's inquiry MUTO informed him that the Army believed conciliation with the Soviet Union to be necessary. [p48940] On 23 June 1940 SHIRATORI, whose name was being mentioned frequently as Arita's successor in the Foreign Ministry, advocated in a press interview the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union. Overseas Minister KOISO, whose Ministry was directly concerned with the planning of Japan's advance to the south, approached Ambassador Ott directly, and asked him what Germany's attitude would be, should Japan take military action in French Indo-China and in parts of the Netherlands East Indies. Ott referred to Germany's declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies, but indicated that in regard to French Indo-China Germany would make conditions. He said that Germany would probably raise no objection provided that Japan undertook to tie down the United States in the Pacific area, perhaps by promising to attack the Philippines and Hawaii if the United States should enter the European War. KOISO said that he would give this proposal further consideration, and went on to discuss the other obstacles to concerted action among the Axis Powers. Referring to the question of a possible Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, KOISO thought that the U.S.S.R. would probably demand certain territorial concessions [p48941] in Mongolia and in Northwestern China. These, he said, could be discussed. We admitted that even after the realization of her colonial aims in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies Japan would only gradually become economically independent of the United States. We considered, however, that the attainment of Japan's aims in Indo-China and the conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union would provide the expected Konoye Cabinet with a promising starting-point in reaching a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. POLITICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPECTED KONOYE CABINET AND A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM The preparation for a change in Cabinet had been long and thorough. Konoye's first Premiership had been marked by frequent political crises arising from differences of opinion among members of his Cabinet, and from conflict between Army policy and Cabinet policy. Then as in earlier years, when the Army encountered opposition to its plans, there had arisen an immediate demand for the abolition of political parties. In the political crises of September 1936 which led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Ugaki, there had been a strong demand for the formation of [p48942] a one-party system, which would replace the existing political parties, and which would "deal resolutely" with Japan's problems at home and abroad. Konoye, then Prime Minister, had hoped that he might be placed at the head of such a unified regime. The Army's policy would then be the Cabinet's policy, and no opposition or dissension would be possible. In 1938 the "one-party system" had not been realized; but during 1940, while the Yonai Cabinet was in office, the movement for "reinforcement of the domestic political system" grew simultaneously with the demands for a change in Cabinet, and the adoption of a "strong foreign policy". On 19 March 1940, after War Minister HATA had parried questions concerning the Army's part in politics, Major-General MUTO, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, made a forthright statement. He quoted with approval the dictum that the guiding principle of the Japanese nation "should be totalitarianism completely nationalist in principle and faith". He added that in this way the full power of the state would be displayed. The Army, said MUTO, favored the dissolution of political parties if they sought only to further their own interests in the current emergency. By 10 May 1940 it was settled that there should [p48942a] be a new political party of which Konoye would be President and KIDO a Vice- President. KIDO gave an assurance that he desired Konoye to be the leader, and would support him as lone as Konoye remained in public life. On 26 May 1940 Konoye and KIDO discussed their plans for the expected change in Cabinet, and for the establishment of their new political party. They agreed that when the Cabinet change occurred a few Ministers only would be chosen. The establishment of the New Party would then be announced, and the dissolution of all existing parties would be requested. The few Cabinet members already chosen would be required to join the new party, and the other cabinet members would be chosen only from among those who had already joined it. It was intended that the new Cabinet should give special consideration to the desires of the Army and Navy concerning national defense, Foreign affairs and finance. For this purpose it was proposed to establish a supreme national defense council of which the Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs as well as the Premier, War Minister and Navy Minister would be members. [p48943] THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARE FOR A CHANGE IN CABINETS, AND PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER YONAI AND OTHERS On 1 June 1940 KIDO was offered the position of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He was urged strongly to refuse the appointment, because of the importance of the part which he was expected to play as a leader of the new Konoye political party. Nevertheless, after consultation with Konoye, who had joined in recommenging his appointment, KIDO accepted the post. It was the duty of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, whose tenure of office was independent of changes in Cabinet, to act as the Emperor's regular adviser upon matters of state, and as the recognised intermediary between Emperor and Cabinet. The Lord Keeper's position was, therefore, one of great influence. On 24 June 1940, while the Yonai Cabinet waited for Germany's response to its proposals for cooperation among the Axis countries, Konoye resigned the presidency of the Privy Council. Ambassador Ott reported to Germany that this resignation indicated the continued progress of a political scheme which aimed the formation of a new Cabinet and a new [p48944] unified party under Konoye's leadership. Ott advised his government that leading members of the Konoye circle were obviously trying to communicate with him, and asked for authority to discuss with them the ideas which MUTO and KOISO had propounded. In this way he would be able to assess what results might be expected through German cooperation with the Konoye circle. In these circumstances it was not in Germany's interest to afford any encouragement to the Yonai Cabinet. On 1 July 1940 Ott reported that Foreign Minister Arita's policy speech of 29 June 1940 was an attempt to move in sympathy with internal political developments by announcing the adoption of a more positive foreign policy. Arita had hoped thereby to strengthen the position of the Yonai Cabinet. In connection with this speech opposition to the Yonai Cabinet became manifest. Arita had planned to declare categorically the Cabinet's determination to consolidate friendship with Germany and Italy, saying that it had never been intended to deviate from the line of Axis policy. The opposition, led by the Army, had protested against this sudden change in policy, upon the ground that Arita's statement of [p48945] sympathy with the Axis Powers was inconsistent with the policy which the Cabinet had hitherto pursued. The Army, desiring the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, was jealous of Arita's attempt to gain credit for the Cabinet at the expense of the opposition which had collaborated closely with Germany. At the Army's insistence the original text of Arita's speech was substantially modified. Thus his plan had been frustrated. The Army's influence, which had been reduced before the Yonai Cabinet took office, had once again grown very strong. A threatening military attitude had been adopted towards both French Indo-China and Hongkong. Internal political developments, said Ott, showed typical signs that pressure was being exerted and that a change of Cabinets would soon occur. On the following day fuel was added to the flames. The Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Bureau disclosed the original undelivered text of Arita's speech and the fact that the Army had successfully objected to it. The Press Chief was thereupon arrested and subjected to interrogation by the military police. After this disclosure a plot against the lives of Prime Minister Yonai and others who had opposed the aims of the military faction was hatched. On 5 July 1940 [p48945a] the conspirators were arrested and later on the same day KIDO, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, reported the circumstances to the Emperor. KIDO told the Emperor that, although the actions of the conspirators were blameworthy, their motives demanded the Cabinet's serious consideration. He then discussed with Konoye their plans for changing the political structure, and the measures to be taken in case a change of Cabinets occurred. [p48946] GERMANY, BY REFUSAL TO DECLARE HER POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN UNDERMINES THE YONAI CABINET'S POSITION Nevertheless the Yonai Cabinet maintained its efforts to conclude with Germany an agreement which would secure the Cabinet's retention of office. Sato, Japan's special envoy to Germany, had reached Berlin. On 8 July 1940 Sato and Ambassador Kurusu explained Japan's position to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. Sato stressed the common interests of Germany and Japan, which, he said, were each engaged in the construction of a "new order" within their respective spheres of influence. He pointed out that since both countries were for the moment obliged to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, they might co-operate in this regard also. Sato explained that since the beginning of the war in China the task of establishing the "new order" in that country had been Japan's paramount task. This, he said, explained the seemingly perplexing changes in Japanese policy, which had all been dictated by the circumstances of the China war. Japan was not making a determined effort to settle that war so that she might gain freedom of action. Sato drew von Ribbentrop's attention to the [p48947] services which Japan had rendered to Germany. For the three preceding years, he said, Japan had in some measure held the attention of the British, French and United States governments, and had thereby made Germany's task easier. The constant threat of Japanese action now kept the United States fleet from leaving the Pacific. It was, he added, Japan's policy that the United States should not be permitted to intervene in the Far East or elsewhere in the world outside the two American continents. Sato explained, however, that Japan could not afford to provoke the United States too much, lest that country should impose more severe economic sanctions, which would compel Japan to seek new sources of supply in the South Seas. Thus both Germany and Japan would be exposed to the danger of war with the United States, and this both countries were anxious to avoid. Sato therefore stressed the need for cooperation between Germany and Japan in economic as in other matters. He assured von Ribbentrop that Japan wished to allow Germany economic opportunities in China, saying that it was Japan's policy to be the host in China and other countries her guests. It was this policy, he added, which had for years caused Japan [p48948] to struggle against the influence of such countries as Great Britain, France and the United States. With German economic assistance Japan would succeed in her revolt against the Nine-Power Treaty system, settle the China war, and eliminate her dependence upon the United States. The essence of Sato's argument was that, by strengthening Japan's position in the Far East, Germany would be strengthening her own position in Europe. He, therefore, invited a declaration of Germany's policy in regard to Japanese aims in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Von Ribbentrop, being aware of political development within Japan, replied cautiously. He welcomed Japan's desire for co-operation with Germany, but gave the impression that Germany, being now confident of victory in Europe, no longer attached great importance to assistance from Japan. He declared that new opportunities for co-operation would arise in the future, but declined to say anything more definite upon the grounds that he was unfamiliar with Japan's political aims. He asked pointedly whether Japanese offers of co-operation were to be confined to the economic sphere, and gave no new indication of Germany's attitude in regard to French Indo-China or other Pacific areas. [p48949] THE EMERGENCE OF THE PLAN FOR AN AXIS ALLIANCE, WHICH WOULD ENABLE JAPAN TO DOMINATE EAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC The reports of this conference increased Foreign Minister Arita's difficulties. On 13 July 1940, three days before the Yonai Cabinet fell, Arita revealed his deep suspicion of German intentions. He inquired of Sato whether it was Germany's aim to force Japan's entry into the European War; and whether Germany did not herself hope to dominate the French and Netherlands colonies in the Far East. As KOISO and MUTO had ascertained from Ott on 24 June 1940 the very conditions which von Ribbentrop had received with reserve when presented to him by Sato on behalf of the Yonai Cabinet were acceptable to the Germans, who no longer felt the need for Japan's immediate intervention against Great Britain and the countries of the British commonwealth. The greatest obstacle to the conclusion of a tripartite Axis alliance had, therefore, been removed. What Germany most desired was a strong Japanese Government which would align Japan with Germany and Italy against the Western Powers. Germany believed that such a diversion in the Far East would ensure the continued neutrality of the United States. [p48950] On 12 July 1940, while Foreign Minister Arita speculated concerning Germany's real intentions, Foreign Ministry officials presented to Army and Navy representatives the first draft of a new plan, the principles of which governed Japanese policy from that time onward until Japan attacked the Western Powers. In all essentials it was the plan which Sato revealed to von Ribbentrop four days earlier. On both occasions it was recognized that since the occurrance of the Mukden Incident in September 1931 Japan's activities had been continuously directed towards the achievement of the same goal of conquest and aggrandisement. Notwithstanding frequent changes in policy and administration, it had throughout been Japan's aim to establish her dominion over the countries and territories of East Asia and the South Seas. It was now intended to utilize the conditions created by the European War in order to accomplish that purpose. Japan on the one hand and Germany and Italy upon the other would act in concert and in close co-operation within their respective spheres of influence. It would be agreed among the Axis countries that in South East Asia and in the South Pacific area Japan should enjoy the same freedom of action which Germany and Italy had arrogated to themselves in Europe. [p48951] Japan would undermine British influence and interests in the Far East and would serve as a deterrent to the entry of the United States into the war against Germany. The coalition between the two countries would provide each with added security against Soviet interference with their aggressive schemes. German economic assistance would enable Japan to reduce her dependency upon the United States, and Japan would ensure that Germany received from East Asia those raw materials of which she stood most urgently in need. For the present, however, any German tendency to importune Japan's entry into the European war would be steadfastly resisted. THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE ARMY OPPOSED THE YONAI CABINET The Yonai Cabinet lacked the resolution and singleness of purpose necessary to bring this plan to fruition. The Army demanded the "strong foreign policy" which Konoye and KIDO had decided that the new Cabinet would offer. During the Yonai Cabinet's tenure of office demands for the adoption of a pro-Axis policy had been persistently resisted. In 1939, while the HIRANUMA Cabinet was in power, Yonai and Arita had been instrumental in frustrating the military faction's schemes for a tripartite [p48952] military alliance. Now, when the Army had revived its demand for the speedy conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy, Arita was hesitant and Yonai was opposed to it. SHIRATORI had said that, while such people remained in office there was no prospect of accord between Japan and Germany. The question of the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance had become a fundamental issue between the Cabinet and those who demanded its resignation. [p48953] The second fundamental issue concerned the establishment of a new nation-wide political organization which was named the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" In times of political crisis, when the Army's plans were threatened or disputed, the military faction had always demanded the abolition of political parties. In March 1940 Major-General MUTO had revived this demand, saying that Japan needed a totalitarian regime, through which the full power of the state might be displayed. At their meeting of 26 May 1940 Konoye and KIDO had planned to promote a new party which would replace all existing political parties. They had planned also that the Army and Navy would be given a prominent part in determining the foreign and domestic policies of the new Cabinet. There would therefore be no opposition to the policies of the military faction, which Konoey's government would represent. These were the purposes which the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was designed to achieve. It would give full effect to a principle of the basic national policy decision which had been reiterated in May 1938 in the Army's commentary upon the purposes of the National General Mobilization Law. By stifling all opposition it would enhance the fighting strength of the nation and regiment the Japanese people in support [p48954] of the Army's policy. Prime Minister Yonai realised that this meant in effect the establishment of a dictatorship responsive to the wishes of the military faction. He knew that all existing political organizations would be abolished and that the Diet would lose the last vestige of freedom of deliberation. His Cabinet was therefore opposed to the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. War Vice-Minister Anami and MUTO, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, took the lead in demanding the Yonai Cabinet's resignation. They informed Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishiwata that, if the Cabinet refused to resign, it would be necessary to force the War Minister's resignation. When questioned by Yonai concerning this threat, War Minister HATA had answered evasively that he thought in the long run it was better that the Cabinet should resign. THE ARMY BRINGS ABOUT THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET The officers of the Army General Staff were resolved that, both from the military and from the political standpoints, the Yonai Cabinet was incapable of dealing with the existing world situation. When these views had been expressed, Kanin, the Chief of the Army General Staff, conveyed them to HATA, who was expected to inform [p48955] Yonai of the Army's attitude. Before doing so, HATA would discuss the position with Konoye. On 8 July 1940 KIDO was informed of these developments by War Vice-Minister Anami and by the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. Anami told KIDO that the Yonai Cabinet was wholly unsuitable to conduct negotiations with Germany and Italy, and that its direction of affairs might even lead to a fatal delay. He said that a change of Cabinet was therefore inevitable, and that it might be expected to take place within the next four or five days. KIDO was given to understand that the Army was waiting to see what action the Yonai Cabinet would take, when confronted with the Army's views. Anami's interview with KIDO is indicative of the commanding attitude which the Army had assumed. The War Vice-Minister told KIDO that the Army would unanimously support Konoye's candidacy for the premiership. When KIDO pointed out the difficulty of choosing a new Foreign Minister, Anami assured him that the Army was prepared to leave that question entirely to Konoye. As KIDO had been advised, a memorandum of the Army's opinions was prepared and submitted to Yonai. On 16 July 1940 the Prime Minister summoned HATA, and told him that the Army's opinions were not those of the Cabinet. He asked the War Minister to resign if he [p48956] disagreed with the Cabinet's policy. HATA thereupon submitted his resignation, and, when asked by Yonai to name a successor undertook to present a reply to this request upon the same day. After consulting the other two "Chiefs" of the Army, HATA informed Yonai that the Army was unable to make any recommendation. In this way the Army encompassed the downfall of the Yonai Cabinet. On 16 July 1940, the same day on which the War Minister resigned, the Premier, having no alternative, tendered his Cabinet's resignation to the Emperor. On the following day, 17 July 1940, Ambassador Ott reported to Berlin, that in view of the Cabinet change which the Army had forced, a speedy transition to a more actively anti-British policy was to be expected. The Army had already mobilized siege guns for an immediate attack on Hongkong, in case that policy should be ordained. War Minister HATA is not shown to have taken any active part in the plotting which led to the Yonai Cabinet's downfall. He had supported that Cabinet's policy, which was itself an aggressive policy designed to further the national aims of aggrandisement through military power. He had held office because the members of the pro-German faction had realised that Japan's [p48957] internal differences must be resolved before their own plans could succeed. He had shown that he regarded the Cabinet's cautious attempts to conceal its aggressive aims merely as a question of expediency. When the moment was opportune, he had permitted himself to be used in order to bring about the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, and the accession to power of a new Cabinet, responsive to the wishes of the military faction. KIDO'S PART IN THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET AND SELECTION OF KONOYE AS PHEMIER After his appointment on 1 June 1940 as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, KIDO had maintained his close association with Konoye, and had consistently furthered the aims of those who advocated the replacement of the Yonai Cabinet. On 27 June 1940 he had discussed the procedure which should be adopted at the time of the Cabinet change, and had exchanged views with Finance Minister Sakurauchi on the strengthening of the political structure. When, on 5 July 1940, a plot to assassinate the Premier and other prominent men had been discovered KIDO, in reporting the matter to the Emperor, had supported the motives of the conspirators. He had thereafter been privy to the Army's scheme to bring about the Yonai Cabinet's downfall and Konoye's accession to power. KIDO knew that, although the Emperor had come [p48958] to believe Yonai's resignation to be inevitable, he still had faith in Yonai and regretted the necessity for a change of Cabinets. When, on the morning of 16 July 1940, it became apparent that Yonai might be forced to resign immediately, KIDO reported the circumstances of HATA's resignation to the Emperor, and explained to him the method of selecting a new Premier. It had been the practice that certain of the Elder Statesmen, known as the "Genro", should advise the Emperor upon the appointment of a new Premier; but only one of them, Prince Saionji, survived. In the past Saionji's influence had been great; and largely through his advice and knowledge of the political situation, the court circle had at times been prompted to impose some restraint upon the activities of the military faction. Baron Harada, Saionji's secretary and confidant, was, with Yonai, marked down for assassination by the plotters whose motives KIDO upheld. In November 1939 KIDO had been engaged, at Konoye's request, upon the task of devising a new system of selecting a Premier. He had suggested that the "Genro" should be replaced by a body constituted of the President of the Privy Council, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and all former Premiers. The opinions of the members of this body of "Senior Statesmen" would be [p48959] conveyed to the Emperor. On 10 November 1939 KIDO had discussed this plan with Konoye, who desired it to be put into effect as soon as possible. Both Konoye and KIDO clearly regarded the new system as a means of eliminating Saionji's influence in political affairs; for KIDO expressed to Konoye the fear that the plan would be difficult to put into practice while Saionji was living. When, in January 1940, Yonai replaced Abe as Premier, the plan was not invoked; but, when, in July 1940, the Yonai Cabinet resigned, Saionji was infirm and out of touch with political affairs. KIDO's influence as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was therefore greatly enhanced. The Emperor accepted KIDO's explanation of the new system and, after the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet had been received, asked KIDO to summon a meeting of the Senior Statesmen. At this meeting Konoye was the only person suggested for the office of Premier. HIRANUMA, ten days earlier, had declared himself to be in favour of Konoye's candidacy. KIDO himself urged Konoye's appointment, saying that the Army was known to favour it, and that he believed one of the Army's recent actions to have been based on the assumption that Konoye would assume office. So the matter was settled. An emissary sent to inform [p48960] Saionji of this decision reported that the Prince, being sick and unfamiliar with the political situation, had declined to take the responsibility for advising the Emperor. KIDO then reported the Senior Statesmen's recommendation to the Emperor, who desired that Saionji should once more be consulted, before a final decision was made. KIDO, however, dissuaded him upon the ground of Saionji's infirmity, Konoye was then summoned, and received the mandate to form a new Cabinet. THE FORMATION AND POLICY OF THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET Konoye proceeded to construct his Cabinet in the manner which KIDO and he had planned on 26 May 1940. Konoye, after accepting the mandate to form a new Cabinet, told KIDO that he would ask the outgoing War and Navy Ministers to select successors who would each be willing to cooperate with the other arm of the service. When the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers had been selected, Konoye would discuss fully with them the questions of national defence, diplomacy, cooperation between Army and Navy, and the relation between the Supreme Command and the Cabinet. Not until the Four Minister's Conference had reached agreement on these questions would he begin to select the other Cabinet [p48961] Ministers. This plan Konoye carried out. Navy Minister Yoshida retained his office in the new Cabinet. Lieutenant-General TOJO was chosen as War Minister. After the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, HATA, the outgoing War Minister, had taken the unprecedented step of recommending secretly to the Emperor that TOJO should succeed him. From 30 May 1938 to 10 December 1938 TOJO had held office as Vice-Minister of War, and since that time he had served as Inspector-General of the Army Air Forces. Since 24 February 1940 he had been in addition a Supreme War Councillor. [p48962] The choice of a Foreign Minister had been recognized by KIDO as one of difficulty. SHIRATORI, an extremist in his advocacy of complete collaboration between Japan and Germany, had been favored for the post but Konoye chose Matsuoka. Even before his appointment had been announced the new Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador confidentially of this fact and expressed his desire for friendly cooperation with Germany. Throughout this period Germany was kept closely informed of developments in Japanese politics. On 20 July 1940 Ambassador Ott advised his government that Matsuoka's appointment would certainly lead to a reorientation of Japanese foreign policy. On 19 July 1940 Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Yoshida held a lengthy conference at which the principles of the new Cabinet's policy were settled and agreement was obtained. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin informed the German Foreign Ministry that through this unusual procedure the four ministers who would occupy the key positions in the new Cabinet had drawn up an authoritative foreign policy program which included a rapproachement with Germany and Italy. These matters of policy being settled, Konoye proceded with the selection of the other memebers of [p48963] his Cabinet. The formation of the new Cabinet was announced on 22 July 1940. HOSHINO, who had earlier controlled the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo, became a Minister of State and President of the Planning Board. This appointment was an important one for the new Cabinet placed great stress upon the acceleration of the national mobilization and upon the closer integration of the economies of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. Financial controls were to be strengthened, armaments were to be greatly increased, and war-supporting industries were to undergo further rapid expansion. Major-General MUTO retained his position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and HATA became a Military Councillor. Ohashi, a recognized leader of the pro-German faction, was appointed Foreign Vice-Minister. SHIRATORI informed Ott in confidence that he had refused this appointment. It was now expected that he would become permanent adviser to Foreign Minister Matsuoka. SHIRATORI believed that in that position he could exercise a far-reaching influence on Japanese foreign policy. On 28 August 1940 he became a Diplomatic Councillor to the Foreign Ministry. On 26 July 1940, four days after its formation, [p48964] the new Cabinet, of which TOJO and HOSHINO were now members, defined its policy. The basic principles of the new declaration were those of the national policy decision of 11 August 1936. It was stated that the world was now on the threshold of an historic change, and that new political, economic and cultural orders were in process of creation. Japan also was faced with an ordeal unparalleled in her history. It was declared that, if Japan were to act in accordance with the great ideal of Hakko Ichiu, the system of government must be fundamentally revised and the "national defence" structure of the state completed. It was Japan's aim to achieve the construction of a "new order in Greater East Asia." For that purpose she would increase her armaments and would mobilize the entire strength of the nation. Japan would first concentrate upon a successful settlement of the war in China. By adopting a flexible policy she would plan and prepare to take advantage of changes in the world situation in order to advance her own national fortunes. THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET WAS RESOLVED TO COMPLETE THE MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN It has been seen that, on 26 May 1940, Konoye and KIDO had planned to form a new Cabinet which, by acting in accordance with the wishes of the military [p48965] and by suppressing all political groups which might oppose its policy, would become the government of a totalitarian state. Thus the leaders of the military faction would be, in fact, the undisputed rulers of Japan. As early as September 1930, HASHIMOTO had advocated the formation of such a military Cabinet and from that time onward it had been an ultimate goal of the military faction's planning. The national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had decreed that steps would be taken to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's will to carry out the aggressive policy which had been adopted. The enactment, in February 1938, of the National General Mobilization Law had brought those objects within reach. The Army, in commenting upon the purposes of the law, had indicated that every aspect of the nation's life would be directed to the achievement of the maximum pitch of warlike efficiency. In the economic and industrial fields these results had in large degree already been obtained. Public opinion also had been rigidly controlled and attuned to the desires of the Army and its supporters. When the second Konoye Cabinet came to power the ultimate steps were taken to complete the military domination [p48966] of Japan. The new Cabinet owed its existence to Army support. In order that its policy should be founded firmly, Konoye had secured the prior agreement of the new War and Navy Ministers. It remained to carry out the measures necessary to ensure the unification of military policy and Cabinet policy, and to complete the regimentation of the Japanese nation in preparation for future war. When, on 26 July 1940, the new Cabinet, of which TOJO and HOSHINO were members, met to approve the policy already settled, these aims were given great prominence. It was then decided that all branches of government would be remodelled in accordance with the fundamental principle of the basic national policy decision. The education system would continue to be used for this purpose, and the Japanese people would be imbued with the idea that service to the state was the paramount consideration. The Cabinet, by setting up a new national political structure, would strive for a co- ordinated unity of government. The Diet system would be altered to conform to this plan. The nation would be reorganized upon the basis of service to the state and of cooperation between the people and their autocratic government. [p48967] These aims were attained through the collaboration of Army and Cabinet. Of the new means employed the most important were the "liaison conference" and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. THE LIAISON CONFERENCE AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DOMINATION OF THE MILITARY FACTION WAS MADE COMPLETE The purpose of the Liaison Conference was to ensure the unity of military and Cabinet policy. Its establishment had been foreshadowed by Konoye and KIDO at their meeting of 26 May 1940, when it was decided to set up a supreme national defence council of which the Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs as well as the Premier and the War and Navy Ministers would be members. The new body was larger than Konoye and KIDO had originally intended. It came to include, not only the members already specified, but also the Foreign and Finance Ministers, the Vice-Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs and the Chiefs of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus. Sometimes it was attended also by the President of the Planning Board and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The Liaison Conference met on 27 July 1940, the day after the new Konoye Cabinet had agreed upon the [p48968] principles of its future policy. At this meeting similar decisions were made covering every important aspect of the nation's domestic and foreign policy. The new conference, which for the first time enabled the leaders of the Army and Navy to take a direct part in the formulation of Cabinet policy, became itself a very important policy-making body. It tended further to diminish the influence of the Court circle by assuming the deliberative functions of the Imperial Conference. This latter body, which was summoned only to decide the gravest matters of state, after this time did little more than accord formal approval to decisions already reached by the Liaison Conference. The decisions of the new body represented the combined authority of the Army, Navy and the five most important Cabinet Ministers. They were therefore difficult to change. During the year 1941 Liaison Conferences were held frequently and came more and more to usurp the functions of the Cabinet meeting. The Liaison Conference served also to strengthen the position of the Premier. Previous Cabinets had been overthrown through the disaffection of the Army. Frequently decisions of the Four and Five Ministers' Conferences had been nullified because the [p48969] War Minister, after consultation with other Army and War Ministry officials, had withdrawn his agreement. Now that the service chiefs had themselves become party to important decisions, the settled policy could not afterwards easily be disrupted. The Army had planned to use Konoye as a mere instrument of its policy; but, through the careful manner in which he had constructed his Cabinet around a predetermined policy, and through the institution of the Liaison Conference, Konoye had achieved a commanding position as the leader of an authoritarian regime. The Cabinet and Army worked together to complete the military domination of Japan by regulating the political activities of the Japanese people and by eliminating political opposition. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was formally established on 10 October 1940, is discussed more fully in a later chapter of this judgment. It became a nation-wide organization heavily subsidized by the Japanese government. After its establishment all other political organizations disappeared. In this manner the revision of the Diet system was achieved, and the idea of service to the state was instilled into the minds of the Japanese people. The Army had intended through this new [p48970] association to drive out all existing political parties and to establish a new "pro-Army" party, subservient to the wishes of its own leaders. But Konoye, as he had planned with KIDO, had attracted to the new organization the members of existing parties. He had proclaimed that the military, the government authorities and the people must unite in order to construct a country with powerful "national defence." In August 1940 MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and one of the Army's most prominent leaders, conceded that the situation had changed. He pointed out that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was not a movement to which the people themselves had given rise, but something which had been imposed upon them. He believed that strong political powers should be delegated to the new organization. He recognized that Army and Cabinet should work together to lead and spread the movement, and so to promote the aggressive national aims which Army and Cabinet now held in common. THE TENTATIVE PLAN FOR COLLABORATION WITH GERMANY AND THE EXTENT OF JAPANESE PLANNING FOR THE DOMINATION OF GREATER EAST ASIA When on 16 July 1940 Konoye received the mandate to form a Cabinet, a tentative plan of Japan's new foreign policy had already been prepared. The [p48971] Foreign Ministry had at length determined upon the policy of close collaboration with Germany and Italy, which the members of the pro-German faction, and most notably SHIRATORI, had urged incessantly during the preceding year. Spurred on by von Ribbentrop's refusal to disclose Germany's intentions until Japan's own aims were clarified, the Foreign Ministry had drafted a proposal designed to secure Germany's cooperation without committing Japan to participation in the European War. The discussions of this proposal by Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives on 12 July 1940 and again on 16 July 1940 revealed the fear that events were passing Japan by. It was assumed that Germany would conquer Great Britain. It was believed that the European War might be ended in the near future. It was realized that, if Japan were not prepared to act quickly, the opportunity for conquests in the South might vanish. Japan feared that, once the war in Europe was over, Germany would resist Japan's attempts to extend her own domination throughout East Asia and the South Seas, and that Germany and Italy might then act in conjunction with other nations to frustrate a Japanese advance. On the other hand, as Foreign Minister Matsuoka [p48972] said later, it was believed that at this time "Japan has such a strength as she is able to tip the balance of the world as she likes." Encouraged by Germany's successes in Europe, Japanese leaders no longer spoke merely of the establishment of a "new order in East Asia. The phrase now commonly used was the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." At this moment when Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were in eclipse, it was decided that Japan should seize control of all British, French, Netherlands and Portuguese possessions in the areas of East and Southeast Asia and of the Pacific Ocean. On 16 July 1940 Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives agreed that the ultimate goal of Japanese expansion should include all the territory lying between Eastern India and Burma on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. As a more immediate objective Japan would aim at the domination of on area which included Hongkong, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and New Guinea. To achieve these aims it was thought imperative that Japan should make a definite proposal as a basis for her collaboration with Germany and Italy. Japan would not undertake to intervene in the European War, [p48973] but rather she would declare her intention of undertaking separately a war against Great Britain when it was felt that the opportune moment had arrived. Japan would, however, undertake to assist Germany in conquering Great Britain by all means short of a declaration of war. Japan would take steps to undermine Great Britain's influence in the Far East, and to foster separatist movements in India and Burma. Japan would offer Germany her support and cooperation in regard both to the United States and to the Soviet Union. Japan would minimize the possibility of United States intervention in the European War, because her actions would constitute a constant threat to American interests in the Pacific and in the Far East. Japan in turn would gain protection against the possibility of United States or Soviet interference with her plans. Japan would recognize the exclusive rights of Germany and Italy in Europe and in Africa, and would ask in exchange for an acknowledgment of her own right to political supremacy and economic freedom in East Asia and the South Seas. She would ask also for German cooperation in the war against China, and for German economic and technical assistance. She would promise in exchange to supply, both from China and from the South Seas, those raw materials of which Germany stood [p48974] in need. Japan and Germany would arrange for reciprocity in trade between the two vast spheres of influence which they expected to control when the European War was over. This plan became the basis of the second Konoye Cabinet's foreign policy. THE ADOPTION OF THE TENTATIVE PLAN BY THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET Although Japan had decided upon the conquest of Southeast Asia and the East Indies, there was great uncertainty as to the nature and timing of the actual measures to be taken. In part this element of indecision arose from the differing viewpoints of the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Ministry; but the principal reason for it was uncertainty as to Germany's real aims. There was great apprehension lest Germany herself might have designs upon French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, and other areas in the South Seas. It was felt that Japan must adopt a firm attitude upon this question, and must move quickly while Germany was preoccupied in Europe. On the other hand it was determined to present Japan's exclusive claim in the form most easy of German acceptance. Japan would conceal her aims of conquest saying only that she desired political leadership and economic [p48975] opportunity. Concern was also felt about Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union and with the United States. It was expected that, when the European War was over, these two countries, together with Germany and Japan, would emerge as the four remaining world powers. It was desired that, when this happened, Japan should continue to cooperate with Germany and Italy; but it was feared lest a change in German policy should leave Japan unsupported. It was agreed that Japan should negotiate with the United States solely for the purpose of furthering the achievement of her own aims in conjunction with these of Germany and Italy. It was recognized that the policy of fostering better relations with the U.S.S.R. should be followed only as long as it suited the plans of Germany and Japan. Lastly, there was uncertainty lest the degree of cooperation which Japan was prepared to offer should prove unacceptable to Germany. It was debated whether Japan should not immediately take stronger measures against Great Britain or should promise to attack Singapore when the war in China had been ended; but it was decided to make no definite commitments. These were uncertainties which it became the task of the new Cabinet to resolve. There was no such [p48976] doubt about the basic principles of Japanese foreign policy. The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives were agreed that Japan should, in spite of all difficulties, establish her dominion over the whole of East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area. For this purpose Japan would, if necessary, make war on any nation which opposed her purpose. Since expediency demanded it, she would first reach agreement with Germany and Italy. When on 19 July 1940 Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Yoshida met to formulate the policy of the new Cabinet, they adopted the plans which had already been made. They resolved to strengthen Japan's relationship with Germany and Italy so that the "new order" might be established quickly. In pursuance of this plan they determined to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, making Manchukuo and Mongolia parties to the new agreement. They decided that British, French, Netherlands and Portuguese territories should be included within the framework of Japan's "new order." If the United States did not interfere with these plans, Japan would not seek to attack her; but if the United States should attempt to intervene, Japan would not hesitate to resort to war. [p48977] THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET'S POLICY WAS BASED UPON THE NATIONAL POLICY DECISION OF 11 AUGUST 1936 Although when the second Konoye Cabinet took office Arita's conduct of foreign affairs gave place to the "strong" foreign policy of Konoye and the military faction, the central feature of Arita's policy was maintained. The new Cabinet was determined that Japan's longstanding national ambitions, which were again described as the ideal of Hakko Ichiu, should not be subordinated to those of Germany and Italy. While the terms of Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy were yet unsettled, the new Cabinet placed renewed emphasis on the unchanging aims of the Army's planning, which had been settled in the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. As in 1936, so on 26 July 1940, the foremost goals of Japanese policy were stated to be those of conquering China and of promoting every aspect of the national mobilization for war. While these settled aims were being carried out, Japan would adopt flexible policies so that she might take advantage of changes in the international situation to further her own interests. It was, however, stated clearly in the Cabinet decision of 26 July 1940 that Japan would construct a "new order in Greater East Asia," of which Japan, [p48978] Manchukuo and the rest of China would form merely the foundation. On 1 August 1940 this decision was published by the Foreign Ministry as a government announcement. On this occasion Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a statement in which he referred to Japan's mission as the task of spreading "Kodo" throughout the world. He said that it was the immediate aim of Japanese foreign policy to establish, in accordance with that spirit, a great East Asia chain of common prosperity with Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China as one of its links. For this purpose Japan would be prepared to surmount all obstacles, both material and spiritual, lying in her path. In concert with those friendly powers who were prepared to cooperate with her, Japan would strive with courage and determination for the fulfillment of the ideal and the heaven-ordained mission of her country. Meanwhile, at the Liaison Conference of 27 July 1940, the Army and Navy had signified their acceptance of the Cabinet's policy, and had resolved in the meantime "to settle the southern problem within limits, so as not to cause a war against a third power." While Japan sought to arrange the terms of collaboration with Germany and Italy and to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Japan would maintain a [p48979] firm, yet moderate attitude towards the United States. The Liaison Conference resolved that, "although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan," the resolution continued, "even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction." In this respect also the Cabinet adhered to that principle of the national basic policy decision which stated that Japan should extend her influence "in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence," while attempting to avoid the needless aggravation of other nations. [p48980] THE POLICY OF "SETTLING THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM WITHIN LIMITS" The Liaison Conference, acting in accordance with this principle, decided in detail the measures which should be taken immediately in pursuance of Japan's policy of advancing southward. Already northern French Indo-China was under Japanese control. Japanese forces had been mobilized in preparation for a possible attack on Hong Kong. Japan had made demands upon the Netherlands East Indies for a guaranteed supply of raw materials; and, on the day on which the new Cabinet took office, it had been announced that Japan would send an economic commission to the Netherlands East Indies to reach a settlement upon this matter. The Liaison Conference decided that these policies would be continued. For the time being Japan would attempt to secure the vital resources of the Netherlands East Indies by diplomatic means. She would negotiate for Germany's consent to Japan's occupation of French Pacific possessions, and for the retention of those formerly German islands, which Japan now administered under mandate. Japan would also try to foster the support of other [p48981] countries in the South Seas. In regard, however, to French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the settlements of the Western Powers in China, Japan would take stronger measures to prevent assistance to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to root out the feeling of enmity towards Japan. From French Indo-China Japan would demand the use of airfields, and the right of passage for her troops. She would require French Indo- China to provision her troops, and would also take steps to secure raw materials from that country. Those measures did not satisfy War Minister TOJO. On 31 July 1940 Ambassador Ott reported to Germany that TOJO was bringing about an acute deterioration in Japan's relations with Great Britain. By doing so he hoped further to undermine the influence of the pro-British groups in Japan, and to hasten the time when Japan would take action against British possessions in East Asia. SHIGEMITSU'S VIEWS ON THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" POLICY On 5 August 1940, when the second Konoye Cabinet's policies had been decided, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU sent Matsuoka a message in which he con- [p48982] gratulated the new Foreign Minister upon his appointment, and upon the establishment and enforcement of the "Greater East Asia policy". While the Yonai Cabinet was in office SHIGEMITSU had urged Foreign Minister Arita to resist the demands of the military faction. He had contended that, as a result of the war in Europe, the influence of the Western Powers in East Asia was being steadily contended. He had believed that the position of Far Eastern supremacy which Japan coveted could best be achieved by maintaining a policy of strict neutrality. The military faction had, however, come to power, and there was no longer any prospect that a policy of strict neutrality would be followed. SHIGEMITSU now lent his support to the aims of the new Cabinet, saying "In order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying then out at the direct expense of small nations, and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one". He instanced France and Portugal as countries at which these measures should be directed, remarking that in this way progress might [p48983] be made at the indirect expense of Great Britain and the United States. SHIGEMITSU, however, made it clear that he still believed in the likelihood of the ultimate victory of the Western Powers over Germany and Italy. He showed himself to be opposed to the cardinal principles of the Konoye Cabinet's policy, which was based upon the assumption that Germany would certainly conquer Great Britain. The new Cabinet had determined to intensify Japan's campaign to crush the resistance of the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; but SHIGEMITSU, as on earlier occasions, advocated the adoption of a liberal-minded attitude towards the settlement of the war in China. The Cabinet had also adopted a policy for southward expansion which contemplated attacks upon British possessions in the Far East. The Army and War Minister TOJO were eager to hasten the time when hostilities would begin. The Cabinet had resolved that the advance to the South would be carried out, even if war between Japan and the United States should ensue. SHIGEMITSU emphasized that it was necessary for Japan "to proceed with scrupulous consideration and prudence" in her relations with [p48984] Great Britain and the United States. He once more pointed out that Great Britain's influence in the Far East was diminishing, and claimed that even the United States was retreating from its position in East Asia. He adhered to the view that, if Japan acted with moderation in carrying out her East Asia policy, it could be expected that British and United States obstructions to that policy would in due course be removed. The second Konoye Cabinet had decided to foster Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy. The Army had renewed its demands for the inclusion of a tripartite alliance of the Axis Powers. SHIGEMITSU stressed the dangers entailed in taking any steps which bound Germany and Japan to the pursuit of a common policy. He warned Matsuoka that powerful movements were afoot to draw Japan into a Pacific conflict with Great Britain and the United States. He implied that this was Germany's policy; and that among certain circles in Great Britain it was desired that Japanese expansion in East Asia should be prevented by such a war. During the latter months of 1940 SHIGEMITSU, as Ambassador in London, encouraged members of the British government to soak a new basis for resuption of friendly relations with [p48985] Japan. In this dispatch of 5 August 1940 SHIGEMITSU urged that Japan should push forward with an independent policy, parallel to that of Germany and Italty. He draw attention to the Soviet Union's relationship with Germany as a model for Japan to follow. The U.S.S.R., he said, was maintaining strongly a policy of neutrality which left room for compromise with Great Britain. At the same time, SHIGEMITSU alleged, the Soviet Union was building up her power over small countries unconnected with the European War. This was the policy which SHIGEMITSU considered that Japan should follow in order to attain her main object of establishing "a powerful political and economic position in East Asia." MATSUOKA PROPOSES TO GERMANY THE TERMS Of JAPANESE COLLABORATION WITH THE AXIS POWERS Nevertheless, even before the terms of Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy had been arranged, an ultimate warlike advance into South-East Asia and the East Indies was already regarded as settled policy. Early in August 1940 Fushimi, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, advised the Emperor that the Navy wished for the pre- [p48986] sent to avoid the use of force against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He said that, after the decision for war was made, a further eight months at least would be required for preparations. He considered, therefore, that the later war came the better it would be. Already Foreign Minister Matsuoka had taken the first step towards reaching agreement with Germany and Italy. On 1 August 1940 he informed Ambassador Ott that both the government and people of Japan desired their country's relations with Germany and Italy to be strengthened. He said that he himself had always supported such a policy, but made it clear that the Cabinet's decision would depend upon the terms of co-operation which Germany offered. At the conference of July 1940 it had been decided that Japan would not undertake to intervene in the European War. Instead, Matsuoka invited Germany to take a broad view of the world situation. He pointed out that, even after Germany had conquered Great Britain, the destruction of the remaining countries of the British Commonwealth would prove no easy matter. Ott agreed that this was the case. Matsuoka said that Germany would be opposed both by the Soviet Union and by an Anglo-Saxon block consisting [p48987] of the United States and the surviving British countries, Japan would then be in a very strong position. Japan, said Matsuoka, was determined to continue the war in China until Chinese resistance had been crushed. This could be accomplished without German assistance. Japan, he continued, was also determined to realize her ambitions in the South. In Matsuoka's opinion, Japan would first concentrate upon the countries not further south than Thailand, but her objectives would change with changing world conditions. In order to secure German cooperation Matsuoka told Ott that Japan intended neither to subjugate nor to exploit the territories over which she would establish her control. Having thus taken the initiative, Matsuoka desired to know Germany's attitude towards Japan's policy, and what support Germany was prepared to offer. He wished also to find out Germany's policy in regard both to the Soviet Union and the United States, and what Germany desired of Japan in her relationships with these two countries. Upon the same day on which this conversation took place Ambassador Kurusu made similar overtures to an official of the German Foreign Ministry. The Germans concluded that, if Xurusu and Matsuoka correctly [p48988] represented their country's aims in East Asia and the South Seas, it was in Germany's interest to collaborate upon the terms which the Japanese had suggested. Accordingly, on 23 August 1940, Stahmer was despatched by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop as Germany's special emissary to Japan. Meanwhile Matsuoka conducted a thorough purge of all diplomats and Foreign Ministry officials who favored cooperation with the Western powers. SHIRATORI became the representative for foreign political matters on a commission established to "adjust state affairs upon an authoritarian model." The new commission demanded constantly a policy of cooperation with the Axis powers. We will adjourn until half-past one. (Whereupon, at 1200 a recess was taken.) [p48989] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue reading the Tribunal's judgment. THE DETAILED PLAN FOR A TRIPARTITE MILITARY ALLIANCE: FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, 4 SEPTEMBER 1940 On 4 September 1940 Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, War Minister TOJO and the Navy Minister met to plan the strategy of Japanese negotiations with Germany. It was felt that this was the opportune moment for initiating conversations with that country. Stahmer, the German special envoy, was on his way to Tokyo, and the desire for strengthening Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy had become very pronounced. At this Four Ministers' Conference there was no departure from the policies already decided upon; but the Japanese attitude towards all aspects of the negotiations with Germany and Italy was defined and set out with great particularity. It was decided [p48990] that Japan, Germany and Italy would reach a fundamental agreement so that the three powers might cooperate by all means, including recourse to war, in establishing their aims of domination in Asia and in Europe respectively. The three countries would agree upon the manner in which they would support each other in achieving these aims, and as to the policies which they would jointly adopt towards Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. After the shortest possible period spent in negotiations, the agreement reached would be published in the form of a joint declaration. This would provide the basis for a more detailed military agreement, the terms of which would not necessarily be made public. This latter agreement would define the obligations of each contracting power to furnish military, economic and other kinds of mutual support. The four Ministers planned in detail the forms which Japan considered this support should take, and settled the principles upon which Japan would negotiate for a tripartite military alliance. In the first place it was agreed that Japan's sphere of influence should include the Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific, French Indo-China and other French Pacific possessions, Thailand, Malaya, British [p48991] Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India and other countries. In conducting negotiations with Germany, however, Japan would speak only of the area from Burma eastward and from New Caledonia northward, including the Netherlands East Indies. If Germany should make reservations, Japan would express her intentions in such a way as to secure German recognition of her aim of predominance in the whole of East Asia, including the South Seas. Japan would maintain that her ultimate goal was to establish the independence of French Indo- China and the Netherlands East Indies, but that she desired first to gain a political and economic ascendancy over those countries. In the second place the three countries would adopt common policies in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States. It would be their aim to maintain friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., but they would agree also to act in concert in case it became likely that one of the contracting powers would be involved in war with the Soviet Union. Japan would cooperate with Germany and Italy in restraining the U.S.S.R. on the east, west and south, thus endeavouring to induce that country to align itself with the Tripartite Powers. The contracting powers would also set in [p48992] conjunction in restraining the United States by measures short of war. In accordance with this policy, the Philippines were not included among the countries which it was Japan's immediate intention to dominate. Their inclusion would depend upon the attitude of the United States. By political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy pressure would be brought to bear upon the United States, thus enabling the attainment of Japan's ambitions. In the third place the nature of the economic assistance to be rendered by each contracting power would be made the subject of a separate agreement. Japan would furnish from the areas under her control the raw materials needed by Germany for the prosecution of the war against Great Britain. Germany in turn would cooperate with Japan in facilitating the prosecution of the war in China; and would furnish technical assistance and materials of war for which Japan had in the past been largely dependent upon the United States. In the fourth place, Japan would take such steps as the situation might require to eliminate the political and economic interests of Great Britain in the Far East. By means of economic assistance to Germany, by political and economic pressure upon British [p48993] interests in China, by propaganda and by encouraging independence movements in British territories, Japan would assist Germany and Italy in the war against Great Britain. If Germany desired it, Japan would, as a matter of principle, declare her willingness to afford military cooperation against Great Britain. If not, her chief objective would be the United States. Nevertheless, concerning the possible use of armed force against Great Britain and the United States, Japan would reserve the right to make her decisions independently. If the war in China should be nearing settlement, Japan would use armed force, choosing as favourable an occasion as possible for this purpose. While the conflict in China continued Japan would not resort to war against the Western Powers, unless the situation should be such as to permit no further delay. The essence of the proposed alliance was that which Matsuoka had suggested to the Germans. When Germany had emerged victoriously from the war against Great Britain the world would be divided into four spheres of influence, dominated respectively by Germany and Italy, by Japan, by the Soviet Union and by the United States. Both before and after this situation had come about, Japan would act in conjunction with Germany and Italy so that each might realise fully its [p48994] aims of conquest and aggrandisement. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE 9 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1940 Five days later, on 9 September 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka met Stahmer and commenced negotiations with Germany. Stahmer, who spoke under the German Foreign Minister's direct instructions, revealed that Germany was no less eager than Japan to conclude the proposed tripartite alliance. In all material respects Germany's views corresponded closely with those which Matsuoka had expressed to Ambassador Ott on 1 August 1940. Germany, said Stahmer, desired to end the European War quickly, and did not at the present juncture require Japan's military assistance. Germany particularly wished Japan to restrain and prevent the United States from entering the war. The conclusion of the proposed alliance and the adoption of a strong foreign policy was considered to be the surest way of preventing war between the United States and either Japan or Germany. Germany and Italy, said Stahmer, would do everything possible to restain the United States, and would supply Japan with such war equipment as they could reasonably spare. In other respects also Germany's proposals [p48995] accorded well with Japanese aims. Germany, declared Stahmer, recognized and respected Japan's political leadership in East Asia. All that Germany required in that area was of an economic nature. She would collaborate with Japan, and would expect Japan to meet her economic needs. Germany would also assist in bringing about a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan, and believed that this would present no insuperable difficulty. Although Germany for the present desired Japan's neutrality, Stahmer made it clear that Germany regarded Japan as an ally in the coming struggle for world supremacy. The present war, he said, may end quickly, but the great struggle will go on, in one form or another, for decades. In the meantime Germany would do everything possible to prevent war between Japan and the United States, and even, if possible, to improve their relations. Nevertheless, said Stahmer, the tripartite powers must be prepared for the worst contingency. Germany believed that in the long run war between Japan and the United States could scarcely be avoided. Stahmer told Matsuoka that the war in Europe was destined in the end to develop into a struggle against the whole Anglo-Saxon world. Germany regarded the proposed alliance as a long-term arrangement for [p48996] cooperation in this struggle, and therefore desired that Japan should join the Axis quickly before the war with Great Britain was ended. Stahmer and Matsuoka met on 9, 10 and 11 September 1940. At the third meeting they settled between them the draft of the proposed tripartite alliance. At Germany's express desire, Italy was not invited to participate in these negotiations. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, received his first intimation of the proposed alliance from von Ribbentrop on 19 September 1940. The German Foreign Minister then expressed his belief that the alliance would have a double edge -- against the Soviet Union and against the United States. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE After Matsuoka and Stahmer had settled the draft of the proposed tripartite alliance, no time was lost in securing its conclusion. On 16 September 1940 the proposal was first submitted to an Imperial Conference which took the form of a meeting of the Privy Council in the Emperor's presence. Foreign Minister Matsuoka traced the course of the negotiations with Germany, and explained each clause of the proposed draft. The Navy, however, did not agree to the [p48997] proposal. Three days later, on 19 September 1940, the question was considered by the Liaison Conference, and, on 24 September 1940, agreement was finally reached. On 26 September 1940 this was reported to the Privy Council which again met in the Emperor's presence. Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Oikawa, who had now replaced Yoshida as Navy Minister, were in attendance. The spokesmen for the alliance included HOSHINO, the President of the Planning Board, MUTO, the Chief of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau, and representatives of the Finance and Navy Ministries. So great was the need for urgency now considered that the Privy Council departed from the usual practice of deputing an Investigating Committee to consider the draft and to submit a written report. Instead those present at the Privy Council meeting constituted themselves a committee of the whole under the chairmanship of the Council's Vice-President. Konoye and Matsuoka first explained the proposal. The ensuing discussions lasted all day and into the evening. The Investigating Committee of the whole then unanimously recommended the conclusion of the proposed alliance, and added a warning. It was resolved that the government should improve Japan's relations with [p48998] the Soviet Union, and should avoid any action which might incite Great Britain and the United States, but it was demanded that the government, while taking these measures, should prepare for the worst. The conference was then once more convened as a meeting of the full Privy Council, hold in the Emperor's presence. The Chairman of the Investigating Committee reported orally the recommendations decided upon, and, after some further discussions, the conclusion of the alliance was unanimously approved. On the following day, 27 September 1940, the Tripartite Alliance was concluded. An Imperial Rescript was issued, announcing that the new alliance was an instrument of peace, which enabled each nation "to have its proper place in the world." Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a speech declaring that Japan's responsibilities as the leader of the "new order" in East Asia had increased. He said that, although Japan intended to fulfill those responsibilities by peaceful means, occasions and circumstances might arise which called for a momentous decision. Japan's future, he added, was beset with countless difficulties which no ordinary effort would be sufficient to surmount. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were more explicit. [p48999] SHIRATORI, writing in December 1940, described the Tripartite Alliance as a means of achieving the "new world order," and as the climax of a movement which had first found expression in the conquest of Manchuria. In OSHIMA's view the Konoye Cabinet was at this time certain that the "Greater East Asia Sphere" could be achieved only through an advance to the south by military force. The only question, he said, was "when things should start." KIDO, too, understood clearly the full significance of the Tripartite Alliance. On 21 September 1940 he informed the Emperor of his belief that, if the alliance was concluded, Japan would eventually have to oppose Great Britain and the United States. He therefore considered that the war in China should be settled speedily. The Emperor had said that he would never give his consent to the proposed alliance. The Elder Statesman, Prince Saionji, upon whose advice the Emperor had greatly relied, was known to oppose it strongly. After the Navy's agreement had been obtained, the Konoye Cabinet had still this difficulty to overcome. It was surmounted through KIDO's connivance. As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal it was KIDO's duty to advise the Elder Statesman of the course of the [49,000] negotiations. Though fully aware of the gravity of the decision which was being made, KIDO left Saionji in complete ignorance of what was afoot. When taxed with this failure of duty he replied only that it was due to consideration for the Elder Statesman's ill-health. Saionji, upon learning that the alliance had been concluded, was greatly aggrieved, and felt that the Emperor had been deserted. THE TERMS OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND ASSURANCES EXCHANCED BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY 27 SEPTEMBER 1940 The preamble to the Tripartite Alliance recited the resolve of the contracting powers to establish "new orders" in Europe and in Asia respectively; and their determination to assist one another in so doing. The instrument provided that Germany and Italy would respect Japanese leadership in Asia, and that Japan would respect German and Italian leadership in Europe. The three countries pledged their mutual cooperation, the details of which were to be settled by a specialized joint commission appointed for the purpose. If any contracting power should be attacked by any country not presently engaged in the European War or in the war in China, the other parties to the alliance would render political, economic and military assistance. Germany [49,001] and Italy would confirm that the alliance would have no effect upon the present relations between the Soviet Union and any signatory power. The alliance would remain in force for ten years, and provision was made for its renewal. On 27 September 1940, the day upon which the Tripartite Alliance was concluded, further assurances between Japan and Germany were effected by exchange of letters. It was agreed that Japan should retain those former German Pacific Islands which she now administered under mandate from the League of Nations. Other former German colonies in the South Seas, presently under the control of other powers, would automatically return to German ownership when the war against Great Britain was won. Gemany, however, pledged her willingness to negotiate for their transfer to Japan. Matusoka set out Japan's desires in a letter to the German Ambassador. Japan, he said, shared German and Italian hopes that the European War would remain limited in scope and that it would be ended speedily. Japan would spare no effort to achieve such a result. He added, however, that "the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere" were such that there was danger of a war between Great Britain and Japan. His government was confident, [49,002] Matsuoka delared, that in such an event Germany would aid Japan by all means in her power. Ott acknowledged receipt of this letter and said that the circumstances in which aid would be given would be determined by consultation among the three powers. Germany pledged her own assistance and her good offices with the Soviet Union. She undertook also to give Japan such industrial and technical assistance as was possible. Germany, said Ott, was convinced that the tripartite powers were about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history, in which it would be their task to assume the roles of leadership in Europe and in "Greater East Asia" respectively. THE INTENTIONS OF JAPANESE LEADERS IN CONCLUDING THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE The Tripartite Alliance was concluded as a necessary step in Japanese preparations for a military advance into South-Last Asia and the South Seas. At the numerous discussions and conferences of September 1940 it was recognised by all who took part that the conclusion of the alliance would commit Japan to waging war against France, the Netherlands, and the countries of the British Commonwealth; and that it implied also Japan's willingness to wage war against the United States [49,003] should that country seek to stand between Japan and the attainment of her aggressive aims. It was acknowledged that Japan was not yet self-sufficient in the materials of war; but it was considered that, when the new alliance had been concluded, the advantage of securing new sources of materials in the south outweighed the dangers of war with the Western Powers. It was, however, also clearly understood that the alliance had broader aims. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka said at the Privy Council meeting of 26 September 1940, "The Pact now under review forms the basis of the future foreign relations of the Empire." It was expected that, when Germany had conquered Great Britain, there would remain as world powers the parties to the alliance, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contracting powers agreed that as a matter of expediency, they would in the meantime attempt to avoid war with both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The terms of the alliance, which were to be published to the world, were in form defensive. The obligations of the contracting powers to support one another were represented as arising only if an attack was made upon one or more of their number. Nevertheless, the whole tenor of the discussions before the Privy Council and elsewhere shows clearly that the three powers [49,004] were determined to support one another in aggressive action whenever such action was considered necessary to the furtherance of their schemes. Because the United States was recognised as the immediate obstacle to Japanese plans for advancing to the south, Matsuoka said that the alliance was directed principally against that country. Similarly, because it suited the purposes of the contracting parties, it was agreed that they should make every effort to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Yet it was recognised that the Tripartite Alliance was directed against that country also. Matsuoka did not contemplate that any improvement in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union would be of a permanent nature. He said that such an improvement could hardly last more than two or three years, and that after that time it would be necessary for the tripartite powers to review the position. In answer to a question put to him at the Privy Council meeting of 26 September 1940, Matsuoka said specifically that, notwithstanding the expressed terms of the alliance and the existence of a non- aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, the tripartite powers would aid each other in case one of them should become engaged in war with the U.S.S.R. [49,005] In summary, the Tripartite Pact was a compact made between aggressor nations for the furtherance of their aggressive purposes. Its true character was well revealed when one Privy Councillor asked how the statement contained in the Preamble of the Pact that each nation should have its proper place in the world could be reconciled with Hitler's principle that only the strongest should survive. Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and War Minister TOJO answered jointly that only the strong nations were worthy of survival. If Japan, they said, should fail in her "grand mission of spreading the Imperial Way," it could not even be helped if Japan herself went out of existence. [49,006] The decisions of the leaders of Japan, which followed the downfall of the Yonai Cabinet, are of outstanding importance, and have therefore been set forth in detail. They show that the conspirators were determined to extend the domination of Japan over a huge area and population and to use force, if necessary, to accomplish their aims. They show by plain admission that the purpose of the conspirators in entering into the Tripartite Pact was to secure support for the accomplishment of these illegal aims. They show that notwithstanding the seeming defensive terms of the Tripartite Pact, which were designed for publication, the obligations of the parties to support are another were expected to come into force if one of the parties became engaged in war whether defensive or aggressive. They wholly refute the contention of the defence that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to promote the cause of peace. The conspirators now dominated Japan. They had fixed their policy and resolved to carry it out. While the aggressive war in China was continuing with undiminished vigor, their preparations for further wars of Aggression which its execution would almost certainly involve were far on the way to completion. In the Chapter of the Judgment which deals with the Pacific War we shall see these preparations completed and the attacks [49,007] launched which the conspirators hoped would secure for Japan the domination of the Far East. PART B. -- CHAPTER V. JAPANESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA. SECTION I. INVASION & OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA. THE CHINA WAR AND ITS PHASES The war which Japan waged against China, and which the Japanese leaders falsely described as the "China Incident" or the "China Affair," began on the night of 18 September 1931 and ended with the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. The first phase of this war consisted of the invasion, occupation and consolidation by Japan of that part of China known as Manchuria, and of the Province of Jehol. The second phase of this war began on 7 July 1937, when Japanese troops attacked the walled city of Wanping near Peiping following the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident," and consisted of successive advances, each followed by brief periods of consolidation in preparation for further advances into Chinese territory. Some of the Accused were active in this war from the very beginning, some participated as the war progressed. SHIRATORI stated during the course of his lecture, "The Trend of the Great War," which was published in the Diamond Magazine for June 1940, "It is not too much to say that the fuse of the European War [49,008] was first attached by the China Incident." JAPAN'S FOOTHOLD IN MANCHURIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHINA WAR The position of Japan in Manchuria as at 18 September 1931 is described by the Lytton Commission in terms with which the Tribunal entirely agrees: "These treaties and other agreements give to Japan an important and unusual position in Manchuria. She governed the leased territory with practically full rights of sovereignty. Through the South Manchuria Railway, she administered the railway areas, including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun; and in these areas she controlled the police, taxation, education, and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in many parts of the country: the Kwantung Army in the Leased Territory, Railway Guards in the railway areas, and Consular Police throughout the various districts. This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighboring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges. A situation of this kind could possibly [49,009] be maintained without leading to incessant complications and disputes if it were freely desired or accepted on both sides, and if it were the sign and embodiment of a well-considered policy of close collaboration in the economic and in the political sphere. But, in the absence of these conditions, it could only lead to friction and conflict." The situation was not "freely desired and accepted on both sides," and the friction inevitably followed. By the use of force or the threat of force, Japan had secured concessions from China in the days of her weakness; the resurgent nationalism of China resented the losses which the decadent Empire of China had been unable to avoid. A more powerful factor, and ultimately the decisive factor in producing the friction, began to emerge as Japan, no longer satisfied with the rights she had gained, sought their enlargement on a scale which in the and involved the conquest of Manchuria. This policy on the part of Japan to sock enlargement of her rights and interests in China was first authoritatively announced in the time of the Tanaka Cabinet. THE TAMAKA CABINET AND ITS "POSITIVE POLICY" The political atmosphere had been tense in Japan before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, which came into power in 1927 advocating the so-called [49,010] "Positive Policy" toward China. The military group attributed what they termed the weakened condition of Japan at that time to the liberal tendencies of the Government as evidenced by the "Friendship Policy" advocated by Foreign Minister Shidehara. The "Friendship Policy," which was thus displaced, had been in force since the Washington Conference of 1922. The "Positive Policy," advocated by Premier Tanaka, was to expand and develop the special rights and privileges, which Japan claimed to have acquired in Manchuria, through collaboration with Manchurian authorities, especially Marshal Chang Tao-lin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese North-Eastern Frontier Army and Chief of the Administration of Manchuria and Jehol. Premier Tanaka also declared that although Japan would respect the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and would do everything possible to enforce the "Open Door Policy" in China, she was fully determined to see that no state of affairs arose in Manchuria which would disturb the local tranquility and put Japan's vital interests in jeopardy. The Tanaka Government placed great emphasis upon the necessity of regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China and declared that, if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia from other parts of China, Japan would defend her interests in these districts by force. The policy [49,011] thus involved an expressed intention to secure further rights in a foreign country and an implied claim of right to preserve internal peace and order in that foreign country. AGITATION IN SUPPORT OF THE "POSITIVE POLICY" Such organizations as the Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) and the Kokuhonsha (Foundation of the State Society) as well as such writers as Dr. Okawa (the former Accused) agitated strongly in Japan for the enforcement of Japan's special rights and privileges in China by force of arms if necessary. The Black Dragon Society had been formed on 3 February 1901 at Kanda, Japan, to promote nationalism and anti-Russian and anti-Korean sympathies. It had advocated annexation of Korea, and in general supported the expansionist aspirations of Japan. The Foundation of the State Society had been formed on 20 December 1920 to foster the spirit of nationalism and disseminate propaganda. It kept in close touch with the military and published a magazine to present its ideas to the public. HIRANUM was President and KOISO and ARAKI were Members of the Society. Dr. Okawa was a trusted employee of the South Manchurian Railway Company, and had been a Director of the East Asia Research Institute established by the [49,012] Railway Company to study the economic situation in Manchuria. He had published several books before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet. "Sato Shinen's Ideal State," published by him in 1924, stated: that according to Sato, Japan being the first country in the world to be created, it was the foundation of all nations and therefore had the divine mission to rule all nations. The book advocated the occupation of Siberia to prevent the southward advance of Russia, and the occupation of the South Sea Islands to prevent the northward advance of Britain. He published, "Asia, Europe and Japan," in 1925. In that book, he maintained that the League of Nations was organized to maintain eternally the status quo and further domination of the World by the Anglo-Saxons. He predicted that a war between the East and the West was inevitable. Providence was trying to elect Japan as the champion of Asia, he asserted. Japan should endeavor to fulfill that sublime mission by developing a strong spirit of nationalism, he advised. Dr. Okawa had been the organizer of many societies including the Kochisha, one principle of which was the liberation of the colored races and the unification of the World. The political philosophy of Dr. Okawa had appealed to certain of the Military who had adopted him as their spokesman among the civilians and often invited him to [49,013] deliver lectures at the Army General Staff meetings. Dr. Okawa became intimately acquainted with the Accused KOISO, ITAGAKI, DOHIHARA and other Army leaders. THE TSINAN INCIDENT Marshal Chang Tso-lin, having declared Manchuria independent of the Central Government of China at the time of the Washington Conference and made himself master of Manchuria, decided to extend his authority further into China proper and moved his headquarters to Peking. The policy of the Tanaka Cabinet, being based on the plan of collaboration with the Marshal, depended on the success of the Marshal in maintaining his leadership in Manchuria. Premier Tanaka repeatedly advised the Marshal to abandon his ambitions to extend his authority outside Manchuria; but the Marshal resented and refused this advice. Civil war between Chang Tso-lin and the Nationalist Government of China followed. In the spring of 1928, when the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were marching on Peking and Tientsin to drive out the army of Chang Tso-lin, and force it back into Manchuria, Premier Tanaka issued a declaration to the effect that Japan would maintain peace and order in Manchuria and was prepared to prevent a state of affairs which would endanger the interests of Japan in Manchuria. The Premier then sent a message [49,014] to the Chinese generals in effect telling them that the Japanese would oppose any invasion of Manchuria, including the definite statement that the Japanese would prevent defeated troops or those in pursuit from entering Manchuria. Even before the civil war spread to Manchuria, Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan in Shantung Province. A conflict ensued known as the Tsinan Incident, which aroused public opinion in Japan in favor of protection of Japanese rights in Manchuria. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings all over Japan in an effort to fan national resentment against China to the war pitch. MURDER OF MARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN Marshal Chang Tso-lin had not only disregarded the advice of Premier Tanaka in attempting to extend his authority south of the Great Wall, but had shown increasing unwillingness to allow Japan to exploit China by the privileges she derived from various treaties and agreements. This attitude of the Marshal had caused a group of officers in the Kwantung Army to advocate that force should be used to promote the interests of Japan in Manchuria and to maintain that nothing was to be gained by negotiating with the Marshal; however, Premier Tanaka continued to collaborate with the Marshal, relying upon the threat of force rather than its actual use to attain [49,015] his objectives. This resentment of the Marshal by certain officers of the Kwantung Army became so intense that a senior staff officer of that army, Colonel Kawamoto, planned to murder the Marshal. The purpose of the murder was to remove him as the obstacle to the creation of a new state in Manchuria, dominated by Japan with the Marshal's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, as its nominal head. In the latter part of April 1928, the Marshal was defeated by the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Premier Tanaka advised him to withdraw into Manchuria behind the Japanese lines before it was too late. The Marshal resented this advice, but was forced to follow it. The Kwantung Army, in accordance with Tanaka's declaration, that Japan would prevent defeated troops from entering Manchuria, was engaged in disarming Chinese troops retreating toward Mukden from Peiping, The Marshal, with his bodyguard, boarded a train for Mukden. The Japanese 20th Engineer Regiment, which had arrived at Mukden from Korea, mined the railroad with dynamite and a Japanese Captain placed his soldiers in position around the mine. On 4 June 1928, when the Marshal's train reached the mine, which was located at the point where the Peking-Mukden Railway passes underneath the South Manchurian Railway, there was an [49,016] explosion. The Marshal's train was wrecked and Japanese soldiers began firing upon the Marshal's bodyguard. The Marshal was killed as planned, an attempt was made to obtain an order to muster the entire Kwantung Army into action and exploit the incident and attain its original purpose but the effort was thwarted by a staff officer who apparently did not understand the real purpose of those desiring the issuance of the order. The Tanaka Cabinet was taken by surprise and greatly embarrassed as it saw its program endangered by this murder of the Marshal. Premier Tanaka made a full report to the Emperor and obtained his permission to court-martial those responsible. Upon his return from the palace, he summoned the Minister of War and other members of his Cabinet and stated that he was determined to discipline the Army. Those present agreed, but when the Minister of War took the matter up with his Ministry, he suggested that strong opposition on the part of the General Staff should be encouraged. Thereafter, the Minister of War reported to the Premier that the opposition of the Army General Staff was based on the idea that to court-martial those responsible would force the Army to make public some of its military secrets. This was the first time, according to the testimony of former Navy Minister Okada, that the Army had projected itself [49,017] into the formulation of government policy. It was at this time that DOHIHARA appeared upon a scene in which he was to play an important part. He had spent approximately eighteen years in China prior to the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin as aide to General Benzai, who had acted as advisor to various Chinese leaders. On 17 March 1928, DOHIHARA had requested and received permission from the Emperor to accept an appointment as aide to Matsui, Nanao, who was advisor to the Marshal. DOHIHARA reported for duty under the appointment and was present in Manchuria when the Marshal was killed. [49,018] MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, THE YOUNG MARSHAL The young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded his father; but be proved to be a disappointment to the Kwantung Army. He joined the Kuomintang Party in December 1928; and anti-Japanese movements began to be promoted on an organized scale and gained greatly in intensity. The movement for the recovery of Chinese national rights gained strength. There was a demand for the recovery of the south Manchurian Railway and in general for the limitation of the Japanese influence in Manchuria. In July 1928, soon, after the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin,Premier Tanaka had sent a personal representative had been instructed to inform the Young Marshal that Japan regarded Manchuria as her outpost and that the Japanese Government would like to cooperate with him "behind the scenes" and was prepared to spare no sacrifice under the Cabinet's "Positive Policy" to prevent an invasion of Manchuria by the Chinese Nationalist Armies. The Young Marshal's answer was to join the Fuomintang as related. JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS STRAINED Japanese-Chinese relations in Manchuria became extremely aggravated. The Japanese claimed several violations of the "Trade Treaty" with China The [49,019] Chinese proposal to construct a railroad parallel to the Nouth Manchurian Railroad, the claim that there was illegal taxation of Japanese in Manchuria, the claim of expression of Koreans, and the denial of the right of Japanese subjects to lease land in Manchuria, were all Manchurian Problems according to the Japanese agitators. The Military advocated Japanese occupation of Manchuria. They maintained that diplomatic negotiations were useless and that armed force should be used to drive the Chinese from Manchuria and set up a new regime under Japanese control. ITAGAKI, who had been appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army in law 1929, was one of those who advocated the use of force. Dr. Okama, who had visited Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and attempted to negotiate with him on behalf of the South Manchurian Railway, returned to Japan and engaged in a tour of over fifty prefectures in April 1929, giving lectures and showing pictures. The Army General staff, of which MINAMI was Vice-Chief began to cooperate with Dr. Okawa and to aid him in his propaganda program to instigate the people to take action against China. The Army General staff also began to study plans for operations in Manchuria and to declare that Manchuria was the "lifeline" of Japan. [49,020] RESIGNATION OF THE TANAKA CABINET The efforts of the Tanaka Cabinet to punish those responsible for the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin had alienated the Military. This group had joined with Dr. Okawa to create opposition among the civilians to the Cabinet, and had seized upon the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15), which they claimed violated the Japanese Constitution, as well as the terms approved by the Cabinet for the settlement of the Tsinan Incident, which they claimed were a disgrace to Japan, as opportunities to embarrass the Cabinet. The pressure became so great that on 1 July 1929 the Cabinet resigned. The resignation of the Tanaka Government was a distinct victory for the Military and their civilian spokesman, Dr. Okawa. From this time on, the influence of this element on government policies was to become stronger, and their insistence that Japan should occupy Manchuria by force and establish a puppet government there was to bear fruit. Dr. Okawa became recognized as a political leader; and the South Manchurian Railway Company officials, realizing his value to them, divorced the East Asia Research Institute from the Company and created a Foundation in July 1929 to assist him in his work of investigating and molding public opinion in [49,021] support of the Army's plan to occupy Manchuria. REINSTATEMENT OF THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY" The Hamaguchi Cabinet, which followed the Tanaka Cabinet, was formed on 2 July 1929; and Baron Shidehara, who continued to advocate the "Friendship Policy" toward China, was selected by Premier Hamaguchi as his Foreign Minister. The "Friendship Policy" rested upon good will and friendship as distinguished from the "Positive Policy" of the Tanaka Cabinet, which rested upon the threat of military force. As a result of the "Friendship Policy", Chinese boycotts of Japanese trade steadily decreased and normal peaceful relations might have prevailed but for violent agitation on the part of the Military. HASHIMOTO AND THE CHERRY SOCIETY In his book, "The Road to the Reconstruction of the World", HASHIMOTO, in discussing his tour of duty of three years in Istanbul as Military Attache, discussed the political condition of other countries and said. "I was clearly conscious that Japan was the only country within the whirlpool of world movement that stood within the bounds of liberalism. I considered if Japan goes on under the present condition, she would drop from the ranks in the community of nations. At this time, fortunately, I was ordered to go back [49,022] (to Japan). During my thirty days' voyage, I pondered on how to reform Japan and as a result, I succeeded in drawing a definite plan to a certain degree. On returning to the Army General Staff Office, my former haunt, I devised several schemes in order to put my ideas into execution." HASHIMOTO was attached to the Army General Staff on 30 January 1930. Between 1-10 September 1930, a score or more of army captains who had recently graduated from the Army Staff College, met at the Army Club in Tokyo under the sponsorship of Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and decided to organize a research organization to study Manchurian and Mongolian questions and the internal reorganization of the country. The Society's ultimate objective was later announced to be national reorganisation, by armed force, if necessary, in order to settle the so- called "Manchurian Problem" and other pending issues. The name "Sakurakai" (Cherry Society) was given to the organisation; and its membership was limited to army officers on the active list with rank of Lt. Colonel or under, who were concerned about national reorganisation. MANCHURIA AS JAPAN'S "LIFELINE" Dr. Okawa, with the aid of the East Asia Research Foundation and the officers of the Army General [49,023] Staff, had his propaganda campaign in full blast when HASHIMOTO returned to the General Staff Office. Propaganda was being disseminated through the newspapers and other media to establish the idea that Manchuria was Japan's "Lifeline", and that a stronger policy in connection therewith should be adopted. The military leaders issued instructions that all editorial writers, ultranationalistic speakers, etc., should unite to establish public opinion for more aggressive action in Manchuria. The Military argued that Manchuria was Japan's "Lifeline" and that Japan must expand into Manchuria, develop it economically and industrially, set it up as a defence against Russia, and protect the rights of Japan and is nationals there as Japan was entitled to do under existing treaties. An appeal to emotion was made; it being said that Japanese blood had been shed in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese war, and that by reason of that sacrifice, Japan was entitled to control Manchuria. The railroad question was still a burning issue; and Dr. Okawa insisted that Manchuria should be separated from Manking and placed under Japanese control to create a land founded on the "Kingly Way". HASHIMOTO in his book, "The Inevitability of Renovation", has explained well the meaning of the term "Kingly-Way" He said: "It is necessary to have [49,024] politics, economies, culture, national defence and everything else, all focused on one, the Emperor, and the whole force of the nation concentrated and displayed from a single point. Especially the political, economic and cultural lines which had been organised and conducted by liberalism and socialism in the past should be reorganised according to the principle of oneness in the Imperial Way, that is to say, 'Kodo Ittai Shugi'. This system is the strongest and the grandest of all. There are many countries in the world, but there is absolutely no nation that can compare with our national blood solidarity which makes possible a unification like ours with the Emperor in the center." It was Okawa's idea that after an independent Manchuria had been established on the "Kingly Way", with an inseparable relation between Manchuria and Japan, Japan could assume the leadership of the peoples of Asia. A General Investigation Section was created in the General Staff on 1 April 1930, as the Investigation Section of the Kwantung Army was considered insufficient to probe into the resources of Manchuria, the sentiments of the people and other kindred subjects of investigation. Around the headquarters of the Kwantung Army [49,025] at Port Arthur, the chief topic of conversation among the staff officers in those days was the "Manchurian Problem". ITAGAKI, who was one of those staff officers, had some definite ideas for solving the problem, which he expressed to a friend during the month of May 1930. ITAGAKI said that there were many unsolved problems between China and Japan, that they were so serious that they could not be solved by diplomatic means, and that there was no alternative but to use force. He expressed the opinion that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be driven from Manchuria so that a new state might be established in accordance with the principles of the "Kingly Way". ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER HAMAGUCHI On 4 November 1930, Premier Hamaguchi was on the platform of the Tokyo Railway station when, in the words of Foreign Minister Shidehara, "He was shot by a silly young man." The Premier was not killed instantly; but his wound was such that it was necessary for foreign Minister Shidehara to act as Prime Minister until the Hamaguchi Cabinet resigned on 13 April 1931. The Premier succumbed to his wounds and died on 26 August 1931. Acting Prime Minister Shidehara caused an investigation to be made and determined that the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi was caused by [49,026] dissatisfaction with the Premier's Naval Disarmament Policy. The London Naval Limitations Treaty had been signed on 22 April 1930. This treaty was in line with the policy of national economy and reduction of armaments which accompanied the Premier's "Friendship Policy". Also in line with this policy was the reduction of the Army from 21 divisions to 17 divisions. The signing of the London Treaty made the young Navy officers indignant. The Black Dragon Society began to hold mass meetings in protest. The Privy Council, of which HIRANUMA was Vice- President, was strongly against the Treaty and was taking the attitude that the Cabinet had usurped the powers and prerogatives of the Military in concluding the Treaty. It was in the midst of this violent political argument that the assassination had occurred. THE MARCH INCIDENT A military coup d'etat was planned to occur on 20 March 1931. The affair came to be known as the “March Incident". The continual agitation and dissemination of propaganda by the Army General Staff had its effect; and, as testified by Baron Okada, who was a member of the Supreme war Council at that time, it was generally understood that it was only a question of [49,027] time until the Army would undertake the occupation of Manchuria. Before the Army could move into Manchuria, it was thought necessary to place in power a Government favorable to such action. At the time, the Hamaguchi Cabinet was in power; and due to the attempted assassination of the Premier, the chief exponent of the "Friendship Policy", namely Foreign Minister Shidehara, was acting as Premier. HASHIMOTO's plan, which was approved by his superior officers of the Army General Staff, including Ninomiya, who was Vice-Chief of the Staff, and Tatekawa, who was Chief of the Second Division of the staff, was to start a demonstration as an expression of disapproval of the Diet. It was expected that a clash would occur with the police during the demonstration and that this clash could be expanded until the disorder would justify the Army in establishing martial law, dissolving the Diet and seizing the Government. KOISO, Ninomiya, Tatekawa and others called upon War Minister Uraki at his Official Residence and discussed their plans with him, leaving with the impression that he was a ready tool for their scheme. Dr. Okawa was instructed to proceed with the mass demonstration; and HAISHIMOTO delibered to him 300 practice bombs, which KOISO had secured for use on that occasion. They were to be used to spread alarm and [49,028] confusion in the crowd and increase the appearance of riot. However, Dr. Okawa in his enthusiasm addressed a letter to War Minister Ugaki in which he stated that the time was just ahead for a great mission to descend upon Minister Ugaki; the War Minister now realized the full import of the plot. He immediately called in KOISO and HASHIMOTO and instructed them to stop all further plans to use the Army to carry out this revolution against the Government. The projected coup d'etat was averted. KIDO, who was then the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was fully informed of the plot beforehand by a friend, who suggested that the Imperial Household should be advised. THE WAKATSUKI CABINET CONTINUED THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY" Although the "March Incident" hastened the fall of the Hamaguchi Cabinet, which was followed on 14 April 1931 by the formation of the Wakatsuki Cabinet, it did not succeed in displacing the "Friendship Policy" fostered by Baron Shidehara for he was retained as Foreign Minister by Premier Wakatsuki. General MINAMI, who had been a War Councillor since his relief as Commander of the Korean Army, was selected as War Minister. He replaced General Ugaki, who was in disgrace with the Army for having reduced the size of the Army [49,029] and for having refused to take part in the "March Incident". Ugaki resigned from the Army and went into retirement. THE WANPAOSHAN INCIDENT The "Friendship Policy" was destined to be put to further tests, by two "Incidents", which had far-reaching effect upon opinion in Japan. The first of these "Incidents" occurred at Wanpaoshan, a small village located some 18 miles north of Changchun, in Manchuria. The village is located in a law marshy area alongside the Itung River. A group of Koreans leased a large tract of land near Wanpaoshan and prepared to irrigate the land by digging a ditch several miles long, extending from the Itung River across a tract of land not included in their lease, and occupied by Chinese farmers. After a considerable length of the ditch had been constructed, the Chinese farmers arose en masse and protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, who dispatched police and ordered the Korean, to cease construction at once and leave the area occupied by the Chinese. The Japanese Consul at Changchun also sent police to protect the Koreans. On 1 July 1931, after negotiation had produced no results, the Chinese farmers took matters into their own hands and drove the Koreans from their lands and filled the ditch. During this operation, Japanese [49,030] Consular Police opened fire on the Chinese farmers and drove them away, while the Koreans returned and completed their irrigation project under the protection of the Japanese police. No, casualties resulted from this "Incident", but the sensational accounts of it printed in the Japanese and Korean Press caused a series of anti- Chinese riots in Korea in which Chinese were massacred and their property destroyed, which, in turn, caused a revival of the anti-Japanese boycott in China. About this time, the War Ministry invited officials of the South Manchurian Railway Company to discuss "Manchurian Problems". At the discussions, MINAMI represented the Army and stated that he had long recognized the necessity of increasing the number of divisions in Korea. THE NAKAMURA INCIDENT The killing of a Japanese army captain by the name of Nakamura, Shintaro, on 27 June 1931 by soldiers under the command of Kuan Yuheng, Commander of the Third Regiment of the Chinese Reclamation Army in Manchuria, which killing did not become known to the Japanese until about 17 July 1931, gave rise to the second "Incident". Captain Nakamura, a regular Japanese army officer, was on a mission under orders of the Japanese Army. According to the Chinese, he was armed and carried patent [49,031] medicine, which included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes. He was accompanied by three interpreters and assistants and represented himself as an "Agricultural Expert". When he reached a point near Taonan, he and his assistants were captured and shot; and their bodies were cremated to conceal the evidence of the deed. This "Incident" greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese Military against the "Friendship Policy"; and the Japanese Press repeatedly declared that "Solution of the Manchurian Problem ought to be by force!" THE ARMY ATTITUDE STIFFENED The Army stiffened its attitude in regard to reduction of armaments and the plan of the Finance Department to economize, and threatened to appeal to the Throne. The Foreign Minister was bitterly assailed in the Press and by ultra-nationalists and the militarists for "Shidehara's weak-kneed foreign policy". The Cherry Society continued its agitation for the use of force. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings. Dr. Okawa stepped up the tempo of his propaganda. He was conducting a campaign of public speeches and publications to build up sentiment in support of the movement to occupy Manchuria. He made a speech along this line at the Naval Academy. The Army was completed out of control and could not be restrained. The Chiefs [49,032] of Staff held a conference and decided that since one could not tell what Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang would do, he should be smashed firmly and without hesitation. Dr. Okawa confided in a friend that he and Colonel ITAGAKI and certain other army officers would bring about an "Incident" in Mukden later on that would solve all “Manchurian Problems". KIDO admits that Baron Harada informed him of a plot to this end on the part of the military officers in Manchuria as early as 23 June 1931. On 4 August 1931 MINAMI addressed a conference of Army Commanders and Commanding Generals. He said, "some observers, without studying the conditions of neighboring foreign countries, hastily advocate limitation of armaments and engage in propaganda unfavorable to the nation and the Army, Manchuria and Mongolia are very closely related to our country from the viewpoint of our national defense as well as politics and economics. It is to be regretted that the recent situation in that part of China is following a trend unfavorable to our Empire. In view of the situation I hope you will execute your duty in educating and training the troops with enthusiasm and sincerity so that you may serve the cause of His Majesty to perfection." The Citizens Disarmament League took issue with [49,033] MINAMI on this speech and addressed a letter to him in which they accused him of spreading propaganda in the Army in violation of the Military Criminal Code. Lt. Colonel HAISHIMOTO and Lt. Colonel Shigeto, who was also a member of the Cherry Society, dined at the home of a friend, Fujita, in Tokyo, during August 1931. During the course of the meal, the “Manchurian Problem" was discussed and the two Lt. Colonels agreed that positive action should be taken in Manchuria. A few days later, Lt. Colonel Shigeto appeared at the home of Fujita and deposited a large sum of money for safekeeping. During the following days this fund was drawn upon by Shigeto in varying amounts. After the "Mukden Incident", Fujita called at the home of Shigeto and exclaimed, "You have accomplished what you were contemplating in Manchuria!" Shigeto replied, "Yes!" and smiled; he then added, "We will expel Chang Hsueh-liang from Manchuria and bring Pu Yi to Manchuria and install him as Governor of the Three Eastern Provinces!" Upon questioning HASHIMOTO, Fujita received the reply, "Yes things have come to pass where they should come!" DOHIHARA INVESTIGATES Colonel DOHIHARA, who had been attached to the Army General Staff since his return from China in March 1929, was sent by the Chief of the General Staff to [49,034] investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. Although his mission was ostensibly to investigate Captain Nakamura's death, his real mission appears to have been to determine the strength, state of training and condition of the Chinese armies and the efficiency of their communication system. He departed from Tokyo in July, 1931 and traveled by way of Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping and Tientsin before reporting to Mukden. He admits that the investigation of the Nakamura Incident was only one of the missions that took him to China. Although the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army was in Port Arthur, the Headquarters of the Special Services Organization of that Army was in Mukden. DOHIHARA arrived in Mukden on 18 August 1931 and took command of the Special Services Organization. FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA ALSO INVESTIGATED Foreign Minister Shidehara, anxious to enforce his "Friendship Policy" in Manchuria and give the Army no occasion to capitalize on the "Nakamura Incident", dispatched Consul-General Hayashi from Tokyo on 17 August 1931 with instructions to investigate and settle the affair. The Consul-General called upon the Chinese Governor of Liaoning Province, who appointed a [49,035] commission to investigate and report upon the "Incident". This commission reported on 3 September 1931; but its report was unsatisfactory to the Chinese authorities. On the 4th of September, Consul-General Hayashi was informed by General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, that the report of the Commission was indecisive and unsatisfactory and that it would be necessary to conduct a second enquiry. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who was sick in a hospital at Peiping, was advised of the situation; and he immediately ordered a new commission to be appointed and instructed to investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. At the same time, he sent Major Shibayama to Tokyo to confer with Foreign Minister Shidehara and make it clear that he desired to settle the case amicably. In the meantime, he had sent a high official to Tokyo to confer with Baron Shidehara and ascertain what common ground could be found for the settlement of various Sino-Japanese issues then outstanding. [49,036] DOHIHARA REPORTED TO THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF Colonel DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo early in September to report to the Army General Staff. After his return, the Press freely published references to the fact that it had been decided to use force to settle all pending issues in Manchuria as recommended by Colonel DOHIHARA. The Press also stated that conferences were being held between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff to arrange definite instructions to be given to Colonel DOHIHARA. These publications may or may not be factually accurate. They were not officially denied. They fanned the rising flame of Japanese opinion in favoring the use of force against China. It is established that Colonel DOHIHARA disagreed with Consul-General Hayashi regarding settlement of the Nakamura Incident and continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the case. War Minister MINAMI later confided in a friend that at the time he had advocated decisive settlement of the "Manchurian Problem" in line with Army opinion. KIDO, as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, noted in his diary on 10 September 1931 that he agreed with the theory that "self-defensive" action might be unavoidable in connection with Manchuria according to future [49,037] developments. FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA CONTINUED EFFORTS AT MEDIATION Rumors were current in Tokyo that the Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden, and these rumors were heard by Foreign Minister Shidehara. In fact Shidehara stated, "Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, as Foreign Minister, I received confidential reports and information that the Kwantung Army was engaged in amassing troops and bringing up ammunition and material for some military purpose, and knew from such reports that action of some kind was contemplated by the Military Clique." It now appears from the evidence adduced before this Tribunal -- though these facts were not known to Shidehara at the time -- that Lieutenant, or Captain Kawakami, who was stationed at Fushun in command of a detached company of the Second Battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army which involved the absence of himself and his company from Fushun. The remaining companies of this battalion were stationed at Mukden and took part in the attack on the Chinese barracks at Mukden on the 18th of September, The full content of the orders [49,038] which Kawakami had received from the Commander-in-Chief is not established, but they involved that Kawakami and his company should entrain and leave Fushun upon the occurrence of a certain emergency. Thereupon Kawakami assembled the Japanese police, ex-servicemen, and civilians at Fushun and asked them what they would do if on the 18th September 1931 an event occurred in Mukden which required him and his company to leave Fushun. He is said to have been anxious about defense at Fushun should he and his company leave that city. He also assembled the officials of the Railway at Fushun. He told them that some acute situation might arise after the 17th of September and that arrangements ought to be made about trains at Fushun. It appears that up till that time no arrangement had been made for having a night train standing by at Fushun to move troops in case of emergency, and Kawakami desired that such provision should be made. The case for the defence in regard to this most significant affair is that Kawakami had no orders which related specifically to the 18th of September; that his orders were general, to take certain action if and when an emergency occurred; that upon a review of the situation Kawakami speculated that the emergency might occur about the 18th of September; and that [49,039] this guess of his alone accounts for his mention of that data when speaking to the people at Fushun. Thus, according to the defence, Kawakami guessed the exact date on which the Chinese would deliver a surprise attack on the Japanese troops at Mukden. Upon a consideration of all the facts relating to the incident of 18th September the Tribunal unhesitatingly rejects this explanation and holds that Kawakami had orders to take certain action in an emergency, which would occur on the night of the 18th of September, and was concerned since there was no provision for leaving a train available at Fushun at night. Upon receiving the report from Hayashi, Shidehara called upon War Minister MINAMI and strongly protested against the report. In the meantime, SHIGEMITSU was holding conferences with Mr. T. V. Soong, who was Finance Minister of the Republic of China, and they had agreed to meet in Mukden on 20 September 1931 and confer with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Count Uchida, who was President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, in an effort to settle all outstanding differences between Japan and the Marshal. NIGHT MANEUVERS BY THE KWANTUNG ARMY The Kwantung Army had begun carrying out night maneuvers on 14 September 1931 in the vicinity of the [49,040] barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade. These barracks were located near the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway, a short distance north of Mukden. The maneuvers involved vigorous rifle and machinegun fire, and the 10,000 men of the 7th Brigade had been confined to barracks on orders of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang in order to avoid a clash between them and the Japanese. These maneuvers continued up to and including the night of 16 September 1931. Mr. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Consulate who had been working with Hayashi in an attempt to settle the Makamura Incident, learned that the Kwantung Army Units stationed at the important coal mining district of Fushun would execute a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun at about 11:30 p.m. on the night of 18 September 1931. MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S COMMISSION RETURNED TO MUKDEN Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Commission, which had been investigating the Nakamura Incident, returned to Mukden on the morning of 16 September 1931. The Japanese Consul-General called upon General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, on the afternoon of 18 September 1931, and the latter stated that Commander [49,041] Kuan Yuhang had been brought to Mukden on 16 September 1931 charged with the responsibility for the murder of Captain Nakamura and would be immediately tried by a court-martial. It appeared that the case would be settled. However, the conference between the Consul and General Yung was adjourned at about 8 p.m. because it was felt that since a member of the military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Kwantung Army before any further representations could be made to the Chinese officials. Mr. Morshima of the Consulate was detailed to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference, which was to be held later in the evening. He endeavored to contact Colonel DOMIHARA and Major Hanaya; however, he was unable to locate either of them or any other officer of the Special Service Office, although he sought them at their respective hotels, offices, billets and other places which they frequented. He reported this to the Consulate and retired to his quarters. MINAMI'S EMISSARY WENT ASTRAY General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff arrived in Mukden via the Antung- Mukden Railway at 1:00 p.m. on 18 September 1931. He had been sent to [49,042] Manchuria to make an inspection for the Army General Staff; and War Minister MINAMI, acting on Foreign Minister Shidehara's protest against the rumor that the Army planned an "Incident" at Mukden for the 18th, had instructed Tatekawa to stop that plot. MINAMI's denial that he gave this order to Tatekawa is disproved by the subsequent statements of MINAMI and by other statements of Tatekawa. The Kwantung Army Commander Honjo, who had just completed an inspection of his troops and installations, was delivering an address to the 2d Division at Liaoyang when he received a telegram from his Chief-of-Staff, Miyake, in Port Arthur, informing him of Tatekawa's visit and suggesting that Staff Officer ITAGAKI or Staff Officer Ishihara be detailed to meet Tatekawa and escort him on his inspection tour. Colonel ITAGAKI was detailed and proceeded from Liaoyang to Mukden; and upon his arrival went to the Shinyokan Inn. DOHIHARA's assistant, Major Hanaya, of the Special Service Office in Mukden, met General Tatekawa and escorted him to join Colonel ITAGAKI at the Inn, where Colonel ITAGAKI and he dined that evening. According to ITAGAKI, General Tatekawa complained that he had not been able to rest on his trip and was not inclined to discuss business immediately, but did {49,043] state that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. To this ITAGAKI replied that there was no need to worry about that, and that he would hear the General at leisure the next day. After dinner, ITAGAKI took his leave of General Tatekawa and went to the Special Service Office, arriving there about 9 p.m. General Tatekawa later told a friend that he had no desire to interfere with any proposed "Incident" and had allowed himself to be decoyed to the Inn, where he was entertained by geisha girls while he listened to the sound of firing in the distance and later retired and slept soundly until called in the morning. THE MUKDEN INCIDENT At 9 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Officer Liu, at the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade, reported that a train composed of three or four coaches, but without the usual type of locomotive, had stopped on the South Manchurian Railway opposite the barracks. At 10 p.m. the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. The Japanese account is that Lieutenant Kawamoto of the Kwantung Army, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty, practising defense exercises along the track near the place where the explosion occurred, [49,044] that he heard the explosion; that his patrol turned and ran back about 200 yeard and found that a portion of one of the rails had been blown out; that while on the site of the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the tracks; that Lieutenant Kawamoto called for reinforcement; that at that moment the regular southbound train, due in Mukden at 10:30 p.m., was heard approaching; and that the train passed over the damaged rail without mishap to arrive in Mukden on time. Captain Kawashima and his company arrived at 10:59 p.m. and the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, commanding the Second Battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison, ordered two more companies to proceed to the spot. They arrived about midnight. Another company at Fushun, which was an hour and a half away, was ordered to proceed to the spot also. This was the Company of Kawakami, who had long ago announced that he and his Company would have to leave Fushun on the night of the 18th. The barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade were glittering with electric lights, but the Japanese attacked the barracks without hesitation at 11:30 p.m., employing artillery as well as rifles and machineguns. Most of the Chinese soldiers escaped from the barracks and retreated Erhtaitze, to the northeast; however, the [49,045] Japanese claim they buried 320 Chinese soldiers and captured 20 wounded. The loss to the Japanese was two privates killed and 22 wounded. Colonel Hirata, commanding the 29th Regiment, received a telephone message at 10:40 p.m. from Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto informing of the explosion on the railroad and the plan to attack the barracks. Colonel Hirata immediately decided to attack the walled city of Mukden. His attack commenced at 11:30 p.m. No resistance was offered. The only fighting that occurred was with the police, of whom approximately 75 were killed. The 2d Division and part of the 16th Regiment left Liaoyang at 3:30 a.m. of the 19th and arrived at Mukden at 5 a.m. The arsenal and aerodrome were captured at 7:30 a.m. Colonel ITAGAKI later admitted that heavy guns, which had been secretly installed in the Japanese Infantry Compound on the 10th, had proven useful in the bombardment of the airfield after the fighting got under way. After ITAGAKI took leave of General Tatekawa, he went to the Special Service Office. There, according to him, he was informed by Colonel Shimamoto of his decision to attack the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade and by Colonel Hirata of his decision to attack the walled city of Mukden. ITAGAKI says that he accepted their decisions and took steps to report [49,046] to the Commander-in-Chief at Port Arthur. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,047] MARSHAL, OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. ITAGAKI REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE In the meantime, at 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Mr. Morishima of the Japanese Consulate, received a telephone call from the Army Special Service Office in Mukden advising him that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that he should report to the Special Service Headquarters in Mukden. He arrived at 10:45 and found ITAGAKI and Major Hanaya and some others there. ITAGAKI stated that the Chinese had exploded the railroad, that Japan must take appropriate military action, and that orders had been issued to that effect. Mr. Morishima tried to persuade ITAGAKI that they should rely upon peaceful negotiations to adjust the matter. ITAGAKI then reprimanded him and wanted to know if the office of the Consul-General intended to interfere with the right of military command. Mr. Morishima insisted that he was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations. At that point, Major Hanaya unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if Morishima insisted, he should be prepared to suffer the consequences. Hanaya also stated that he would kill [49,048] anyone who endeavored to interfere. That broke up the conference. The Japanese Consulate received many requests during the night from the Supreme Advisor for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang imploring the office of the Consul-General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks. All these representations were communicated to the military but to no avail and the fighting continued. The Consul- General talked over the telephone a number of times during the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th with Colonel ITAGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting, but Colonel ITAGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul- General that he should cease interference with the right of military command. Consul- General Hayashi on the morning, of 19 September 1931 cabled Foreign Minister Shidehara, "In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I phoned to Staff Officer ITAGAKI and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and that, moreover, as China had declared that she would act upon the nonresistance principle absolutely, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavor to prevent the aggravation of the 'Incident' unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic [49,049] channels, but the above mentioned Staff Officer answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army, it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly." THE MUKDEN INCIDENT WAS PLANNED The evidence is abundant and convincing that the "Mukden Incident" was carefully planned beforehand by officers of the Army General Staff, officers of the Kwantung Army, members of the Cherry Society, and others. Several of the participators in the plan, including HASHIMOTO, have on various occasions admitted their part in the plot and have stated that the object of the "Incident" was to afford an excuse for the occupation of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army, and the establishment of a new State there based on the "Kingly Way" and subservient to Japan. In Japan General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff was the leader. This was the same Tatekawa whom MINAMI on Shidehara's complaint sent to Mukden to stop the plot, the same Tatekawa who had no desire to interfere with any proposed incident. In Manchuria, ITAGAKI was the principal figure. The case which has been presented to the Tribunal as a general defence of the actions of the Japanese on the night of 18th September and as a particular defence of those who, like ITAGAKI, were in action on that night is this: it is said that previous to that night [49,050] Chinese troops in Manchuria had increased so that the Japanese troops in Manchuria who numbered only some 10,000 men, then faced a hostile army which numbered some 200,000 men and was superior in equipment to the Japanese; it is said that the disposition of the Chinese troops had recently been changed so that the Japanese troops, widely dispersed in groups along the railway line, faced concentrations which threatened their annihilation; it is said that the behavior of the Chinese troops towards the Japanese troops was provocative and insulting; it is said that all indications pointed to an unprovoked attack by the Chinese troops upon the Japanese troops, in which the latter would be overwhelmed, unless decisive countermotion was promptly taken. Therefore, it is said, a plan was drawn up whereby, if the Chinese attacked, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the enemy, would settle the matter within a short period. It was a part of this plan that two heavy guns should be secretly set up in the Mukden Independent Garrison Barracks. Such is the testimony of ITAGAKI. When therefore, says ITAGAKI, he heard on the night of the 18th September of the blowing up of the railway and the fighting outside the Chinese Barracks, it was [49,051] apparent that, this was a planned challenge on the part of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese Army and he approved of the decisions to attack the Chinese Barracks and the walled city of Mukden, because it was absolutely necessary and in line with the plan of operations of the Army drawn up in case of emergency. The picture thus painted is that of a planned attack by the Chinese Army, overwhelmingly superior in numbers, upon some 1500 Japanese troops in the vicinity of Mukden; of a surprise attack upon an unanticipated occasion and of a swift counter-attack by the Japanese troops at the nucleus of the superior forces whereby they were routed. The picture is false save in the one particular, that Mukden was captured and the Chinese troops driven away. The Chinese troops had no plan to attack the Japanese. They were caught unprepared. In the attack on the Barracks, where there were thousands of Chinese troops, the Japanese fired from the darkness upon the brightly lit Barracks and met with trifling resistance, mainly from some Chinese troops who were cut off in their attempt to escape. In their capture of the city of Mukden, they met only negligible resistance on the part of some police. There is no question of the Japanese being surprised by the events of that night, For some time before 8 September 1931, rumors were current in Japan that the [49,052] Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden. Lieutenant Kawakami at Fushun had revealed that an "event" might occur in Mukden on 18 September 1931. Consul- General Hayashi had telegraphed to the Foreign Minister the news that the Company Commander of a Japanese Unit at Fushun had said that within a week a big "Incident" would break out. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate at Mukden, had learned that Kwantung Army units stationed at Fushun could execute a manoeuvre which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun about 11:30 on the night of 18 September 1931. The Foreign Minister attached so much credence to the information he had that he complained to the War Minister and persuaded the latter to dispatch General Tatekawa to Manchuria to "stop the plot," a General who, having no desire to interfere with any proposed "Incident" failed to fulfill his mission, And when, as the Japanese allege, a patrol of a Lieutenant and six men was fired on in the dark of the night of 18 September 1931, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria were brought into action almost simultaneously on that night over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, a distance of approximately 400 miles. [49,052a] The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Japanese Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in these places and the units of [49,053] the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. ITAGAKI was at the Special Service Office at Mukden to approve the initial attacks by the Japanese and to resist all efforts by the Japanese Consul- General Hayashi and the Japanese Consul Morishima to persuade him to stop the fighting, notwithstanding that the Consul-General informed him that China had declared that she would act on the principle of nonresistance. Even among the Japanese there were those who believed that the "Incident" was planned by the Japanese. A year after it happened, we find the Emperor inquiring if the "Incident" was the result of a Japanese plot, as rumored. The Tribunal rejects the Japanese contention and holds that the so-called "Incident" of 18 September 1931 was planned and executed by the Japanese. Preparation for war in China was not confined to the Kwantung Army. In Japan an unusual shift of personnel occurred on 1 August 1931 as if in anticipation of coming events. Such trusted officers as OSHIMA, KOISO, MUTO, UMEZU, HATA and ARAKI, were included in this personnel shift. OSHIMA was appointed a Chief of Section in the Army General Staff, a Member of the Military Technical Council, and Liaison Officer to the Navy General Staff; KOISO was appointed a Lt. General; MUTO was relieved as an Instructor in Strategy at the Military Staff College and made available [49,054] to the Army General Staff; UMEZU was made Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff Office; HATA was promoted to Lt. General and assigned as Inspector of Artillery and Commander of the 14th Division; and ARAKI was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Office of the Inspector- General of Military Education. GENERAL HONJO ASSUMED COMMAND AT MUKDEN Colonel ITAGAKI, who, as senior staff officer on the spot had been in active command at Mukden during the "Incident", was relieved by General Honjo, who arrived at Mukden at noon on 19 September 1931 and rapidly expanded the "Mukden Incident" into what came to be known as the "Manchurian Incident". Honjo had returned to Port Arthur, after delivering his address to the 2nd Division, the Division which attacked Mukden, arriving at Port Arthur about 9 p.m. on 18 September 1931. Honjo had received the first news of the fighting at Mukden at about 11 p.m. from a newspaper agency. He immediately went to Kwantung Army Headquarters in Port Arthur, where he issued orders that action should follow the operational plans already established. It is stated in evidence that a few minutes after midnight on the 18th a second telegram from the Special Service Office at Mukden was received at the Kwantung Army Headquarters [49,055] reporting that the fighting had become more widespread and that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. If a telegram to this effect was received, there was no basis in fact for the statement that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. They were in full retreat from the Japanese attack. Honjo's staff advised that he should "mobilize the whole of the Japanese military might to seal the fate of the enemy in the "shortest possible time." Honjo replied, "Yes, let it "be done." Orders were immediately issued bringing into action all Japanese forces in Manchuria; the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea was asked to send reinforcements in accordance with the pre-arranged plan; and the Second Overseas Fleet was requested to sail for Yingkow. Under these orders, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of 18 September 1931 over the whole area of the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. Upon arriving at Mukden, General Honjo set up a command post at the railway station and declared to the world his intention to wage a punitive war. MINAMI SANCTIONED THE KWANTUNG ARMY ACTION War Minister MIHAMI sanctioned the action of the Kwantung Army and acted as a buffer between that Army and [49,056] the Cabinet to prevent effective interference by the Government, He received information of the situation at Mukden in a telegram from the Special Service Office there at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 1931. Premier Wakatsuki first heard of the fighting when he received a telephone call from MINAMI sometime between 6 and 7 o'clock on the morning of 19 September 1931. The Premier called a meeting of the Cabinet for 10 a.m. MINAMI sent Lt. General KOISO, who was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, to act as Liaison Officer between the Army General Staff and the Cabinet. At the Cabinet meeting, MINAMI reported that the Chinese troops had fired on the Japanese troops at Mukden and that their fire had been returned, He characterized the action of the Japanese as "an act of righteous self-defense". The Cabinet expressed a desire that the affair be terminated at once. MINAMI stated that he would investigate and report to the Cabinet. The Cabinet then resolved upon a policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". The Premier called upon the Emperor a 1:30 o'clock that afternoon and informed him of the situation and the decision of the Cabinet. The Emperor agreed that the Army should not try to enlarge the situation but should stop further action as soon as it found itself in an advantageous position. MINAMI dispatched Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and two other officers of the Army General Staff to Mukden for the announced purpose or communicating to [49,057] the Kwantung Army Commander the decision of the Government to prevent the expansion of the "Incident". The Army was not to be controlled; and the Premier cast about desperately, but without success, far assistance in enforcing this policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". In an effort to find a way to control the Army, the Premier held a meeting at 8:30 of the evening of 19 September 1931 at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household; Senior Statesman Prince Saionji's Secretary Baron Harada, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, the Grand Chamberlain, the Vice-Grand Chamberlain, and the Military Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, among others, were present. The only suggestion came from KIDO, who proposed daily meetings of the Cabinet. This suggestion proved to be of no effect, since War Minister MINAMI reported at each of these meetings that for "strategic and tactical" considerations it had been necessary for the Japanese forces to pursue the Chinese troops a certain distance further into Chinese territory, but that such action was only "protective" and would in no sense be expanded. However, at this very time, the Chinese had proposed through Minister T. V. Soong that a powerful commission be organized consisting of both Japanese and Chinese in an effort to prevent further expansion of the conflict. SHIGEMITSU, in [49,058] reporting this proposal to Foreign Minister Shidehara suggested that it be accepted, if for no other reason than to strengthen the position of the Japanese in regard to the "Incident." Although Imperial Sanction was required under existing regulations for the Korean Army to commence operations outside Korea, the 39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division consisting of 4,000 men and artillery which had concentrated at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria on 21 September 1931 and arrived at Mukden around midnight of the same day, without having received the Imperial Sanction; nevertheless, the Cabinet decided on 22 September 1931 that the expenses incurred in this move should be defrayed and later the Imperial Sanction for this move was obtained. This had not been reported to the Cabinet by MINAMI. At the Cabinet meeting of 22 September 1931, MINAMI made further excuses for allowing the Army to continue its aggression. As Premier Wakatsuki says: "Day after day expansion continued; and I had various conferences with War Minister MINAMI. I was shown maps daily on which MINAMI would show by a line a boundary which the Army would not go beyond, and almost daily this boundary was ignored and further expansion reported, but always with assurances that this was the final move." KIDO recorded in his diary, that during a discussion [49,059] by a group at the residence of Baron Harada it was mentioned that although the Emperor had approved the Cabinet policy of non-expansion, the Army had been indignant that the Emperor had been induced by his personal attendants to form such an opinion. It was decided by this group that the Emperor had better say no more about the Cabinet's policy; and that Elder Statesman Prince Saionji had better remain out of Tokyo to avoid intensifying the antipathy held for him by the Military Clique. In this manner, MINAMI's effective cooperation with the Army General Staff through his Liaison Officer KOISO, prevented the Government from enforcing its decision to halt further expansion of the "Mukden Incident". This is confirmed by an admission made by MINAMI after the surrender that he had been in favor of the action taken by the Kwantung Army. COLONEL DOHIHARA RETURNED TO MUKDEN Colonel DOHIHARA had completed his report to the Army General Staff, recommended the solution of all pending "Manchurian Questions" by the use of force as soon as possible, and was on his way back to his Special Service Office in Mukden to play the principal role in the organization of the new State in Manchuria based on the "Kingly way", when the "Incident" occurred there. DOHIHARA's extensive knowledge of China and its people, gained over some eighteen years spent in active partici- [49,060] pation in local politics as a Military Aide under successive Chinese military leaders, qualified him more than any other Japanese Army officer to act as over-all advisor and coordinator in the planning, execution and exploitation of the "Mukden Incident". There can be no doubt that such was the part played by DOHIHARA. His reconnaissance trip through China, with a brief pause in Mukden before reporting to the ,.Army General Staff, and his return to Mukden on the eve of the "Incident", together with his actions thereafter, leave us with no other conclusion. COLONEL DOHIHARA AS MAYOR OF MUKDEN The organization of a provincial government for Liaoning Province had proven to be a difficult one, because Mukden was the canter of the Province, and during the fighting, most of the influential Chinese had fled to Chinchow where they were continuing to carry on the provincial administration. Chinese General Tsang Shih-yi who was Governor of the Province and had remained in Mukden, refused to cooperate with the Japanese in the organization of a new provincial government; for this, he was immediately arrested and confined in prison. Being thus hindered by lack of cooperation from the Chinese, the Japanese Army issued a proclamation on 21 September 1931 installing Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden; he [49,061] proceeded to rule the city with the aid of a so-called "Emergency Committee" composed mostly of Japanese. By 23 September 1931 DOHIHARA had made himself complete master of the city and was found by visiting journalists in the Japanese Army Headquarters, where he was acting as political representative and spokesman for the Army. From this point on the organization of provisional governments for the three Eastern Provinces made headway. On 23 September 1931, Lt. General Hsi Hsia was invited to form a provisional government for Kirin Province, and the next day, it was announced that a provisional government had been formed for Liaoning Province with Mr. Yuen Chin-hai as Chairman of the "Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order". The Japanese Press hailed this as the first step in a separatist movement. SELF-COVERNMENT CUILING BOARD The Self-Government Guiding Board was organized by the Japanese Army in Mukden during the last half of September 1931. The purpose of the Board was to start an independence movement and spread it throughout Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI was in charge of the Staff Section having supervision over the Board; and Colonel DOHIHARA, as head of the Special Service Office, supplied the Board with all necessary confidential information regarding the Chinese. Although the Chairman of the [49,062] Board was Chinese, approximately 90 per cent of the personnel employed by the board were Japanese residents in Manchuria. General Hsi Hsia accepted the Japanese invitation, called a meeting of government organization and Japanese advisors and on 30 September issued a proclamation establishing a provisional government for Kirin Province under protection of the Japanese Army. General Chang Ching-hui, Administrator of the Special District, also called a conference in his office at Harbin on 27 September 1931 to discuss the organization of an "Emergency Committee of the Special District." [49,063] General Honjo took advantage of some minor disturbances in the town of Chientao, in Kirin Province, to announce that Japan would no longer recognize the government of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and would not cease operations until his power was completely broken. PROTESTS AND ASSURANCES China lodged a protest with the League of Nations against the action of Japan in Manchuria. The protest was filed on 23 September 1931. The Council of the League was assured by the Japanese Government that Japan had started withdrawing her troops to the railroad zone and would continue the withdrawal; upon this assurance, the Council adjourned to meet again on 14 October 1931. The United States of America also protested against the fighting in Manchuria and on 24 September 1931 called the attention of both Japan and China to the provisions of the existing treaties. After a Cabinet meeting that day, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Secretary of State of the United States a Note in which it was stated among other things, "It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria." THE OCTOBER INCIDENT These assurances given to the League and to the [49,064] United States indicated that the Cabinet and the Army did not agree upon a common policy in Manchuria. It was this disagreement which caused the so-called "October Incident". This was an attempt on the part of certain officers of the Army General Staff and their sympathizers to organize a coup d'etat to overthrow the Government, destroy the political party system, and establish a new Government which would support the Army's plan for the occupation and exploitation of Manchuria. The plot centered around the Cherry Society; and the plan was to "cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere" by assassinating the government leaders. HASHIMOTO was the leader of the group and gave the necessary orders for the execution of the scheme. HASHIMOTO admitted that he originated the plot in early October 1931 to bring about a Government headed by ARAKI. KIDO was well informed of the proposed rebellion and his only concern seems to have been to find a way to limit the disorders so as to prevent widespread damage and sacrifices. However, a certain Lieutenant Colonel Nemoto informed the Police of the plot and War Minister MINAMI ordered the leaders arrested, thereby breaking up the plot. SHIRATORI criticized MINAMI for opposing the coup and declared that it was necessary to take prompt action so as to create a new regime in Manchuria; [49,065] and that if MINAMI had given his tacit approval to the scheme, it would have facilitated a solution of the "Manchurian Problem". After the failure of the "October Incident" rumors were heard to the effect that if the Central Authorities in Tokyo did not support the Kwantung Army in the execution of its plan to occupy all Manchuria and establish a puppet State there, that Army would declare itself independent of Japan and proceed with the project. This threat appears to have been effective in producing a change in the Government and its attitude. The War Ministry began censoring the news; and army officers called upon writers and editors, who wrote or published anything unsatisfactory to the War Ministry, and advised them that such writings were displeasing to the War Ministry. Violent organizations threatened editors and writers when they expressed views contrary to that of the War Ministry. DECISION TO ENTHRONE PU YI After this change of attitude by the Japanese Government, Colonel ITAGAKI and Colonel DOHIHARA decided to return Henry Pu Yi, the deposed Emperor of China, and enthrone him as Emperor of Manchuria as an emergency measure to combat the influence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, which was growing progressively stronger with the [49,066] unity between the Young Marshal and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The new provisional government operating under the protection of the Japanese Army had succeeded in taking over all tax collection and finance institutions and had further strengthened its position by reorganization, but it was having considerable difficulty due to the Marshal's continued popularity. The Kwantung Army General Staff became fearful that the provisional government set up by them would conspire with the Marshal; therefore, it was decided by Colonels ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA to proceed at once with the organization of an independent State by uniting the Three Eastern Provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning under the nominal leadership of Henry Pu Yi, the dethroned Emperor of China. COLONEL DOHIHARA PROCEEDS TO RETURN PU YI DOHIHARA was dispatched by ITAGAKI to Tientsin to return Pu Yi to Manchuria. ITAGAKI made all necessary arrangements and gave DOHIHARA definite instructions. The plan was to pretend that Pu Yi had returned to resume his throne in answer to a popular demand of the people of Manchuria and that Japan had nothing to do with his return but would do nothing to oppose the popular demand of the people. In order to carry out this plan, it was necessary to land Pu Yi at Yingkow [49,067] before that port became frozen; therefore, it was imperative that he arrive there before 16 November 1931. Foreign Minister Shidehara had learned of the scheme to return Pu Yi to Manchruia and had instructed his Consul-General at Tientsin to oppose the plan. On the afternoon of 1 November 1931, the Consul-General contacted DOHIHARA as instructed and tried every means at his disposal to persuade him to abandon the plan, but DOHIHARA was determined and stated that if the Emperor was willing to risk his life by returning to Manchuria, it would be easy to make the whole affair appear to be instigated by the Chinese, he further stated that he would confer with the Emperor; and if the Enperor was willing, he would go through with the scheme; but if the Emperor was not willing, then he would leave with a parting remark that there would be no such opportunity in the future for the Emperor, and dispatch a telegram to the military authorities at Mukden to the effect that he would consider an alternative as the present plan was hopeless of success. [49,068] During the evening of 2 November 1931 DOHIHARA visited Pu Yi and informed him as follows: Conditions were favorable for Pu Yi's enthronement and the opportunity should not be missed. He should make an appearance in Manchuria by all means before 16 November 1931. If he did so appear, Japan would recognize him as Emperor of an independent state and conclude a secret defensive and offensive alliance with the new state. If the Chinese Nationalist Armies should attack the new state, Japan's armies would crush them. Pu Yi appeared willing to follow DOHIHARA's advice upon being told that the Japanese Imperial Household favored his restoration to the Throne. The Consul-General continued his efforts to dissuade DOHIHARA but without results. On one occasion DOHIHARA threatened that it would be outrageous for the government to take the attitude of preventing Pu Yi's return; and that if this should occur, the Kwantung Army might separate from the government and no one could say what action it might take. Some difficulty was encountered by DOHIHARA in arranging the terms upon which Pu Yi was to return, and a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, under a Tientsin date line for 2 November 1931, published a complete account of the scheme and alleged that Pu Yi had refused [49,069] DOHIHARA's offer. To hasten Pu Yi's decision, DOHIHARA resorted to all kinds of schemes and intrigues. Pu Yi received a bomb concealed in a basket of fruit; he also received threatening letters from the "Headquarters of the Iron Blood Group," as well as from others. DOHIHARA finally caused a riot to occur in Tientsin on 8 November 1931 with the assistance of certain underworld characters, secret societies and rogues of the city, whom he supplied with arms furnished by ITAGAKI. The Japanese Consul-General, in a further attempt to carry out Shidehara's orders, warned the Chinese police of the impending riot; being forewarned, they were able to prevent the riot from being a complete success but it served to throw Tientsin into disorder. This disorder continued and during the riot on the night of 10 November 1931 DOHIHARA secretly removed Pu Yi from his residence to the pier in a motor car guarded by a party equipped with machine guns, entered a small Japanese military launch with a few plainclothes men and four or five armed Japanese soldiers and headed down the river to Tang-ku. At Tang-ku, the party boarded the ship "Awaji Maru" bound for Yingkow. Pu Yi arrived at Yingkow on 13 November 1931 and on the same day was taken to Tang-kang-tzu where he was held in protactive custody in the Hotel Tai Sui Haku by the [49,070] Japanese Army. An attempt was made to cause it to appear that Pu Yi had fled for his life as a result of threats and the riots in Tientsin. No doubt, these served to hasten Pu Yi's agreement with the terms offered by DOHIHARA. ENTHRONEMENT OF PU YI DELAYED In an effort to prevent further aggravation of Japan's position in the League and keep Japan's representative in a favorable position before the Council during its deliberations, MINAMI advised the Kwantung Army to delay the enthronement of Pu Yi. On 15 November 1931 he sent a telegram to General Honjo in which he said: "Especially, to commit such hasty actions when we have just begun to see the signs of favorable results of our efforts to improve the atmosphere of the League of Nations is by no means a wise policy. Therefore, for the time being we would like to have you lead the general public in such a way so as not have Pu Yi connected in any way, whether it be active or passive, with political problems. Naturally, in establishing a new regime, if our Empire takes the wrong attitude we must expect either an intervention by the United States based upon the Nine-Power Treaty or a council of the World Powers. Moreover, under the present conditions in Manchuria, it is an internationally recognized fact that an establishment [49,071] of the new regime would not be possible without the understanding and support of the Imperial Army. Therefore, when Pu Yi unexpectedly enters into the picture of the establishment of the new regime, and even if it is ostensibly performed according to the wishes of the people, there would be fear of arousing world suspicion. It is essential that our Empire lead world situations so that we can at least and at any time conduct a legal argument against the powers. I would like to have you keep this point in mind." The Army moved Pu Yi on 20 November 1931 to Port Arthur and installed him in the Yamato Hotel with explanation that he was receiving too many undesirable visitors at Tang-kang-tzu. DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI arranged secretly for the Emperor's wife to join him at Port Arthur. THE ADVANCE ON CHINCHOW An expedition to the Nonni River Bridge, which succeeded in defeating General Ma Chan-shen, the Military Governor of Heilungkiang Province, and driving him toward the northeast upon Hailun during the first half of November 1931, had also resulted in the occupation of Tsitsihar and the elimination of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's authority from all of Manchuria, except for a fragment of Southeast Liaoning Province surrounding [49,072] the city of Chinchow. The occupation of Chinchow was all that remained to make the subjugation of Manchuria complete. The Chinese Provincial Government, which had fled from Mukden, had established itself in Chinchow soon after the Mukden Incident and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had moved his headquarters from Peiping to Chinchow in the early days of October 1931, so that the city had become the center of opposition to the Japanese occupation. Japanese observation planes made frequent flights over the city and on 8 October 1931 six scouting and five bombing planes flew over the city and dropped some eighty bombs. The disturbances and riots organized by Colonel DOHIHARA gave the staff officers of the Kwantung Army an excuse to send troops to Tientsin to reinforce the Japanese garrison and protect the Japanese concession there. The first of these riots occurred on 8 November 1931 as heretofore related, but on 26 November 1931 a new series of disorders began. Colonel DOHIHARA had employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese plain-clothes men and formed them into operating gangs within the Japanese concession in order to start trouble in the Chinese section of Tientsin. On the evening of the 26th, a terrific explosion was heard, immediately [49,073] followed by firing of cannon, machine-guns and rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese concession were put out and plain-clothes men emerged from the concession firing upon the police stations in the vicinity. The most practical route for reinforcements to take in moving from Manchuria to Tientsin would have been by sea; but the route by land had distinct strategical advantages as it lay through the city of Chinchow; and any movement through Chinchow would afford an excuse for making an attack upon that city eliminating the concentration of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's army there. Neutral observers had expected an advance on Chinchow, and on 23 November 1931, during a conference on the subject, Foreign Minister Shidehara assured the American Ambassador in Tokyo that he, the Premier, the Minister of War, MINAMI, and the Chief of the Army General Staff had agreed that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow. However, DOHIHARA's riot on the night of the 26th precipitated such an advance on the morning of 27 November 1931; and a troop train and several airplanes crossed the Liao River, ostensibly for the purpose of relieving the Japanese garrison which was alleged to be beleaguered at Tientsin, but actually intending to drive Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow. [49,074] The Japanese met little or no resistance as Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had already begun withdrawal of his troops south of the Great Wall in order to remove all excuse for further advances by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the advance proceeded and Japanese planes repeatedly bombed Chinchow. The American Secretary of State protested the violation of the assurance so recently given the American Ambassador that no hostile action would be taken toward Chinchow; and on 29 November 1931 this assurance was reluctantly and belatedly honored by the Chief of the Army General Staff ordering Honjo to recall his troops to a position in the vicinity of Hsinmin. THE LEAGUE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY The Council of the League of Nations had been in session for approximately four weeks considering the dispute between Japan and China, when it resolved on 10 December 1931 to accept the suggestion of the Japanese representative and send a Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria to make a study of the situation "on the spot." The Council's resolution provided that the Commission should consist of five members from neutral countries with the right of China and Japan to appoint one "Assessor" each to assist the Commission. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution was in these terms: "(2) Considering that events have assumed an [49,075] even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life." Japan in accepting the Resolution made a reservation concerning paragraph (2) stating that she accepted it "On the understanding that this paragraph was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria." China accepted the resolution with the reservation that China's rights of sovereignty in Manchuria would not be impaired. With regard to the undertaking and injunction contained in paragraph (2), quoted above, China stated: "It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now preva- [49,076] lent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities." Despite this counter-reservation of China, the Japanese maintained that their reservation gave Japan the right to maintain her troops in Manchuria and made her responsible for the suppression of banditry. Under the pretext of suppressing banditry Japan proceeded to complete the conquest of Manchuria. In the words of the Lytton Commission, "The fact remains that, having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans." The membership of the Commission was not completely made up until 14 January 1932. The Rt. Honorable, the Earl of Lytton (British) was elected Chairman of the Commission, and the Commission has come to be known as the Lytton Commission. [49,077] THE WAKATSUKI CABINET WAS FORCED TO RESIGN The continued efforts of Premier Wakatsuki and his Foreign Minister Shidehara to enforce the "Friendship Policy" and the "Policy for Non-Expansion" generated so much opposition from the military and their sympathizers that the Cabinet was forced to resign on 12 December 1931. Premier Wakatsuki testified as follows: "It is true that in spite of the fact that the Cabinet had decided on the policy of stopping the 'Manchurian Incident,' it continued to spread and expand. Various methods were tried, and one of these was a coalition cabinet, which I hoped might be able to stop the action of the Kwantung Army. However, because of certain difficulties, this did not materialize, and that is why my Cabinet resigned." THE INUKAI CABINET The Inukai Cabinet was formed on 13 December 1931 with ARAKI as Minister of War. The three Army Chiefs, that is: the outgoing War Minister, MINAMI, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Education, whose duty it was under the Japanese Constitution to select the succeeding War Minister, had selected General Abe to be War Minister; but ARAKI was popular with the radical elements in the [49,078] Army, and they approached Inukai and demanded his appointment. General ARAKI received the appointment. Although Premier Inukai announced to Elder Statesman Prince Saionji that he intended to carry out the Emperor's wish that Japanese politics should not be controlled solely by the Army and although he adopted a policy to terminate the aggression of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, War Minister ARAKI was not in accord with this policy. ARAKI favored Commander Honjo's plan that the four provinces formerly under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be occupied and pacified. He admitted that this was so during an interrogation at Sugamo Prison after the surrender. His first act was to secure approval in the Cabinet and the Privy Council of an appropriation to carry out this scheme. HONJO AND ITAGAKI MOVED TO EXECUTE HONJO'S PLAN The formation of the Inukai Cabinet, with ARAKI as War Minister and favorable to the Honjo plan to occupy and pacify the four provinces, was the signal to the Kwantung Army to execute the plan. ITAGAKI moved quickly to strengthen the provisional government of Liaoning Province; a concentration of troops west of Mukden, poised for a drive on Chinchow and Tientsin, was begun; and ITAGAKI prepared to visit Tokyo to assist ARAKI in making detailed arrangements for carrying out [49,079] the plan. General Tsang Shih-yi, who had been incarcerated in prison on 21 September 1931 because of his refusal to cooperate with the invading Japanese Army, was starved into submission and forced to agree to accept the appointment as Governor of the Provincial Government, ad interim, of Liaoning Province. He was released from prison on the night of 13 December 1931; and after an interview with ITAGAKI, he was duly inaugurated as Governor on 15 December 1931. He was in such a nervous, weakened condition as a result of having been starved in prison that he fainted during his inauguration when a photographer exploded a flash bulb in making his picture. The inauguration of General Tsang Shih-yi was in preparation for a conference of all the Manchurian Provincial Governors, and the Kwantung Army was hastening preparations for the meeting. The concentration of troops for the advance on Chinchow had begun on the 10th; and by 15 December 1931 it was complete. However, the advance could not begin until approval of War Minister ARAKI had been obtained and funds provided. All preparations being complete, Commander Honjo dispatched ITAGAKI to Tokyo to convey to the government his opinion that Manchuria should be made [49,080] independent of China. War Minister ARAKI immediately supported Honjo's plan and said that complete independence was the only way in which the "Manchurian Incident" could be solved, but considerable opposition to the plan was found to exist and he was not able to obtain approval of the plan without difficulty. The question was finally presented to the Throne at an Imperial Conference on 27 December 1931 and ARAKI states: "We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending troops for the operation." At least a part of ITAGAKI's mission had been accomplished. On the very day that this decision to advance against Chinchow was made, the Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs handed the American Ambassador in Tokyo a memorandum in which it was stated that Japan was determined to remain loyal to the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties, and would abide by the two resolutions adopted by the Council of the League regarding the Manchurian situation. MANCHURIA WAS COMPLETELY OCCUPIED AFTER THE CAPTURE OF CHINCHOW The Kwantung Army pointed to the reservation made at Geneva, as already referred to, and continued [49,081] to deal with Manchuria according to plan. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, knowing that the attack on Chinchow was imminent, had made a last minute appeal to prevent further fighting by offering to remove all remaining Chinese troops south of the Great Wall, but nothing came of this appeal, and the Kwantung Army actually began its movement on 23 December 1931. The Chinese Army was forced to give up its position. From that day the advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met any resistance at all as the Chinese General had ordered a retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the morning of 3 January 1932, and the Kwantung Army continued its advance right up to the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan. ITAGAKI COMPLETED HIS MISSION AND RETURNED TO MUKDEN KIDO records in his diary for 11 January 1932 that ITAGAKI had obtained approval of the plan to set up a puppet state in Manchuria; the entry is in part as follows: "At 10:30 o'clock this morning in the antechamber connected with the lecture hall of the Imperial Palace, I, together with persons close to the Emperor, heard from Colonel ITAGAKI the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia. Colonel ITAGAKI first explained the situation concerning the progress of the campaign against soldier bandits in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the [49,082] progress in establishing a new state In Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI gave hint that Manchuria would be placed under a new ruler, and the Japanese Army would take charge of the national defense of the new Manchurian state. He further explained that Japanese people would participate in the management of the new state as high government officials." It will be noted that ITAGAKI followed the usual practice of referring to all Chinese soldiers as "bandits." The pretense of invoking the reservation made at Geneva was again employed. On his way back to Mukden, Colonel ITAGAKI called upon the new ruler mentioned in his conversation with KIDO. During his visit with Pu Yi at Port Arthur, ITAGAKI stated to Pu Yi, "In order to get rid of Chinese militarists and secure social welfare for the people of the Northeastern Provinces, we are willingly prepared to put up a new political regime in Manchuria." ITAGAKI proposed that Pu Yi should become the head of the new regime but demanded that as soon as the Manchurian regime was set up Japanese should be employed as advisers and officials. THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT GAINED IN INTENSITY After the fall of Chinchow, the independence movement made progress, especially in North Manchuria where DOHIHARA was on duty as Chief of the Special [49,083] Services in Harbin. After the Japanese occupied Tsitsihar on 19 November 1931 and drove the forces of General Ma toward Hailun, a Self-Government Association of the usual type was established in Heilungkiang Province; and General Chang Ching-hui was inaugurated as Governor of the province on 1 January 1932. General Chang Ching-hui, upon learning of the complete defeat and expulsion of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow, acceded to the requests of the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden and declared the independence of Heilungkiang Province. The declaration was issued on 7 January 1932. On the same day the Self- Government Guiding Board issued a Proclamation which it had prepared on 1 January but had been holding until an opportune time for publication. The Proclamation appealed to the people to overthrow Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and join the Self-Government Association. The Proclamation ended with these words: "Organizations of the Northeast, Unite!" Fifty thousand copies were distributed. Mr. Yu Chung-han, the Chief of the Board, and Governor Tsang Shih-yi of Liaoning Province were making plans for a new state to be established in February. This idea of Independence from China had received no popular support in Manchuria before the "Mukden Incident" of 18 September 1931. It is apparent that it was conceived, organized and carried through [49,084] by a group of Japanese civil and military officials, of whom Colonels ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA were leaders. The presence of Japanese troops to enforce their authority, the control of the railways by the South Manchurian Railway, the presence of Japanese Consuls in all of the important urban centers, and the coordinating effect of the Japanese controlled Self-Government Guiding Board, afforded the group a means of exercising an irresistible pressure to bring about this so-called independence and later to control the new puppet state. The independence movement and the Chinese collaborators were sustained by Japanese military might alone. ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES BY JAPAN On 7 January 1932, the day that General Chang Ching-hui proclaimed the independence of Heilungkiang Province, the American Secretary of State instructed the American Ambassador in Tokyo to deliver a note to the Japanese Government. The Secretary of State stated in that note that the Government of the United States deemed it a duty to notify both Japan and China that it would not admit the legality of any de facto situation nor recognize any treaty or agreement entered into so as to impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China or violate the conventional policy of the "Open Door" in China or impair the obligations of [49,085] the Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15). This note was not answered until 16 January 1932. The Japanese note stated that Japan was aware that the United States could be relied upon to do everything to support Japan's efforts to secure full and complete fulfilment of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15). This Japanese note went on to say that in so far as Japan could secure it the policy of the "Open Door" in China would always be maintained. Having regard to the Japanese military action in Manchuria which we have just described, this Japanese note is a masterpiece of hypocrisy. HASHIMOTO OBJECTED TO THIS ASSURANCE The next day HASHIMOTO published an article in the Taiyo Dai Nippon, apparently in protest against this policy of observing treaties and maintaining the "Open Door" in China. The title of the article was, "The Reform of Parliamentary Systems." In the article HASHIMOTO said: "Responsible government -- Party Cabinet System -- runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is the democratic government which ignores the 'Tenno' government, . . . which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the Constitution granted by the Emperor. When we consider their dangerous anti- national [49,086] structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan." DOHIHARA NEGOTIATED WITH GENERAL MA CHAN-SHAN After General Ma had been driven from Tsitsihar by the Japanese and had set up his capital at Hailun, from which he was attempting to govern Heilungkiang, Colonel DOHIHARA began carrying on negotiations with the General from his Special Service Office at Harbin. The General's position was somewhat ambiguous; although he continued negotiating with DOHIHARA, he continued to support General Ting Chao. General Ting Chao had never approved of the puppet government set up in Kirin Province by the Kwantung Army under the nominal leadership of General Hsi Hsia and had organized an army to oppose General Hsi Hsia. Not only did General Ma continue to support General Ting Chao, but these two Generals maintained some contact with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who gave them assistance. In an effort to force General Ma to terms, Colonel DOHIHARA requested General His Hsia to advance on Harbin and drive in the direction of Hailun. General [49,087] Hsi Hsia at the beginning of January 1932 prepared an expedition to the North with a view to occupying Harbin. General Ting Chao was between him and Harbin. General Hsi Hsia advanced to Shuangchong on 25 January; but Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang instructed Generals Ma and Ting Chao not to negotiate further; and fighting began on the morning of the 26th. DOHIHARA had failed in his attempt to intimidate Generals Ma and Ting Chao; and what was still worse, his ally, General Hsi Hsia, was meeting serious reverses at the hand of General Ting Chao. Thereupon, DOHIHARA was forced to call upon the Kwantung Army to assist General Hsi Hsia. To justify this, Colonel DOHIHARA created another of his "Incidents" in Harbin -- an engineered riot -- during which it is said that one Japanese and three Korean subjects of Japan were killed. Most of the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Northern Manchuria in order to use them in the Chinchow drive, but the 2d Division had returned to Mukden for a rest. Although the 2d Division was ordered to go to the rescue of General Hsi Hsia and entrained on 28 January, some delay was experienced because of transportation difficulties. This gave General Ting Chao time to seize the municipal Administration in Harbin and arrest General Chang Ching-hui, who had been acting as puppet Governor of Heilungkiang Province. [49,088] While the reinforcements were entraining to go to the aid of General Hsi Hsia, War Councillor MINAMI was delivering a lecture before the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo. His subject was, "The latest Situation in Manchuria". KIDO was present and recorded the lecture. MINAMI's conclusions as expressed to the Emperor were: (1) Japan would take over the national defense of the new state to be created in Manchuria, complete the Kirin-Kwainei Railway, and make the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into North Manchuria, thereby revolutionizing Japan's defense plans. (2) The joint management by Japan and the new State of economy of the area would make Japan self-sufficient in the World forever. (3) This arrangement would solve Japan's population problem, provided she established a colonial trooping system to the new State. KIDO further recorded that he thought the three or four Japanese organs in Manchuria should be united under one head when the new State was formed. This idea was to be carried out later. FIRST INVASION OF SHANGHAI After MINAMI had finished his lecture on the afternoon of 28 January 1932, fighting broke out in [49,089] a new place in China. At 11:00 p.m. fighting commenced in the first invasion of Shanghai. The commencement of the "Incident" is typical. The anti-Chinese riots in Korea following the "Wanpaoshan Incicent" led to a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in Shanghai, which had been intensified after the "Mukden Incident" and increased in intensity as that "Incident" grew into the "Manchurian Incident". Tension increased so that serious clashes occurred between Chinese and Japanese. The Japanese residents of Shanghai requested the dispatch of Japanese troops for their protection. The Japanese Consul-General presented five demands to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai; and the Admiral in command of Japanese naval forces at Shanghai announced that unless the Mayor's reply was satisfactory he would take action. On 24 January 1932 Japanese naval reinforcements arrived. The Chinese reinforced their garrison in Chapei, which is the native section of Shanghai. On 28 January the Municipal Council of the International Settlement met and declared a state of emergency as of 4:00 p.m.; at that hour the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular Body that a satisfactory reply had been received from the Chinese Mayor; and that no action would be taken. At 11:00 p.m. [49,090] on the same day, the Japanese Admiral announced that the Japanese Navy was anxious as to the situation in Chapei where numerous Japanese nationals resided and had decided to send troops to that sector and occupy the Shanghai-Woosung Railway Station and that he hoped the Chinese would speedily withdraw to the west of the railway. These Japanese troops sent to the Chapei section came into contact with Chinese troops which would not have had time to withdraw even had they wished to do so. This was the beginning of the battle of Shanghai. CHINA MADE ANOTHER APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE The next morning, 29 January 1932, the alarming situation caused China to submit a further appeal to the League of Nations under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. The Council of the League was in session when the fighting started at Shanghai and it received the new Appeal from China the next day. GENERAL MA BARGAINED WITH DOHIHARA In Mancuria, Colonel DOHIHARA was continuing his negotiations in an effort to obtain the support of General Ma in the formation of a new State in Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI had recognized General Ma as "a man of real worth possessing his own troops", and had attempted to arrange a truce with him after [49,091] the battle of Tsitsihar. General Ma continued to co-operate with General Ting Chao until the latter's defeat by the combined forces of General Hsi Hsia and the Japanese on 5 February 1932. After General Ting Chao's defeat General Ma resumed negotiations with Colonel DOHIHARA while his army escaped through Russian territory into China. With his army safe in China proper General Ma, it is said, accepted the one million dollars in gold offered by DOHIHARA. In any event, he now agreed on 14 February 1932 to become Governor of Heilungkiang Province and cooperate with the Japanese. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. (Thereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Tuesday, 9 October 1948, at 0930.) [49,092] Tuesday, 9 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IHTFE.) [49,093] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison Surgeon certifies they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Judgment: SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL According, to ARAKI, General Honjo conceived the idea of having the Governors of the Provinces organize a "Supreme Administrative Council" to make recommendations for the organization of the new State in Manchuria. He forwarded his plan to ARAKI and requested permission to set up a new State for the government of Manchuria with Henry Pu Yi as its head. During his interrogation at Sugamo Prison, ARAKI admitted that, since he had no better suggestion, and thought the General's plan would solve the "Manchurian Problem", he had approved the plan. ARAKI then sent additional experts into Manchuria to assist the Self- Government Guiding Board in carrying out General Honjo'a plan. General Ma having reached an agreement with DOHIHARA, the Self-Government Guiding Board called a [49,094] meeting of the Governors of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Special District to meet at Mukden on 16 February 1932 for the announced purpose of "laying the foundation" for the new State. The meeting was attended in person by General Ma, as Governor of Heilungkiang; General Chang Ching-hui as Governor of the Special District; General Hsi Hsia, as Governor of Kirin; and General Tsang Shih-yi, as Governor of Liaoning; but General Tang Ju-lin, the Governor of Jehol, was not present. The legal advisor for the meeting was Dr. Chao Hsin-po, the Tokyo University trained Doctor of Laws, who had relieved Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden. These five men decided that a new State should be established, that a North-Eastern Supreme Administrative Council should be organized which would exercise temporarily the supreme authority over the Provinces and the Special District, and that this Supreme Council should without delay make all necessary preparations for the founding of the new State. On the second day of the Conference, the Supreme Administrative Council was duly organized, to consist of seven members, namely: the Governors of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning, Jehol and the Special District, and the two Mongol Chiefs who had joined the Conference on the morning of the second day. The new [49,095] Supreme Council immediately proceeded to business and decided: (1) to adopt the Republican system for the new state; (2) to respect the autonomy of the constituting provinces; (3) to give the title of "Regent" to the Chief Executive; and (4) to issue a Declaration of Independence. That night, General Honjo gave an official dinner in honor of the "Heads of the New State". He congratulated them on their success and assured them of his assistance in case of need. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE The next morning after General Honjo's dinner party, that is to say, on 18 February 1932, the Declaration of Independence of Manchuria was published by the Supreme Administrative Council. Dr. Okawa in his book, "2600 Years of Japanese History", published in 1939, in commenting on this declaration, has this to say: "The Chang Hsueh-liang Regime was swept completely away from Manchuria in one swoop through the quick and daring action of the Japanese troops." The Tribunal finds upon the evidence that there was no popular movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and its creature, the Self- Government Guiding Board, with its Japanese Advisors. [49,096] ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW STATE The Declaration of Independence having been issued, Governors Ma and Hsi Hsia returned to their Provincial Capitals, but they designated representatives to meet with Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor Chang Ching-hui and Mayor Chao Hsin-Po for the purpose of working out the details of the plan for the new State. On 19 February 1932, this group decided that the form of the new government should be that of a Republic with a constitution drawn on the principle of the separation of powers. The group then agreed upon Changchun as the Capital of the new State, fixed the design of the new national flag, and agreed that Pu Yi should be asked to act as "Regent" of the new State. The Self-Government Guiding Board immediately began holding mass-meetings and demonstrations in the Provinces at which the Kwantung Army paraded its might and fired artillery salutes to impress the Manchurians with the power of Japan. After the proper foundation had been laid by these demonstrations, the Board took the lead in convening an All-Manchurian Convention, which was held in Mukden on 29 February 1932. At this Convention, speeches were delivered; a declaration denouncing the previous regime of General Chang Hsueh-liang was unanimously adopted; and resolutions welcoming [49,097] the new State with Pu Yi as its Chief Executive were approved. The Supreme Administrative Council met immediately in urgent session and elected six delegates to proceed to Port Arthur to convey their invitation to Pu Yi to head the new government. Pu Yi did not respond to the first invitation from the Supreme Administrative Council, so a second delegation was appointed on 4 March 1932 to induce Pu Yi to accept. Upon the advice or Colonel ITAGAKI, Pu Yi accepted the second invitation. After an audience with the Delegates on 5 March, Pu Yi left Port Arthur on the 6th for Tangkang-tze, and after two days, began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the "Regent of Manchukuo". Inauguration ceremonies were held at the new capital, Changchun, on 9 March 1932. Pu Yi declared the policy of the new State to be founded upon morality, benevolence and love. The next day he appointed the list of principle officials suggested by the Japanese. Prior to the arrival of Pu Yi, a number of laws and regulations, on which Dr. Chao Hsin-Po had been working for some time, had been made ready for adoption and promulgation. They came into effect on 9 March 1932 simultaneously with the law regulating the organization of the Government of Manchukuo. [49,098] Public announcement of the new State of Manchukuo was made on 12 March 1932 in a telegram to the foreign Powers, requesting that they recognize the new State. Dr. Okawa stated that Manchukuo was a result of the plan of the Kwantung Army approved by the Japanese Government, and the establishment of the State progressed smoothly, because it had been well planned and prepared beforehand. Pu Yi says that Manchukuo was under the complete domination of Japan from the beginning. JAPANESE CABINET APPROVED FAIT ACCOMPLI ARAKI was right when he said that the Honjo plan was approved by the Cabinet; but it was not so approved until 12 March 1932, after the plan had been executed and after the new State of Manchukuo had come into existence. It was on 12 March 1932, the day that the telegram announcing the formation of Manchukuo to the foreign Powers was sent out, that the Cabinet met and decided upon an "Outline for the Disposition of Foreign Relations Accompanying the Establishment of the New State of Manchukuo". It was decided to render "all sorts of aid" to the new State short of recognition under international law, and "lead her to fulfill the substantial conditions for an independent State step by step" in the hope that the Powers would ultimately [49,099] recognize her independence. To avoid intervention of the Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact (Annex No. B-10) it was thought best to have Manchukuo declare a policy consistent with the policy of the "Open Door" and in harmony with the principle of equal opportunity guaranteed by the Treaty. The Cabinet also decided that Manchukuo should seize the custom houses and salt-tax collecting organs; but that this should be done in such a way as not to "bring about trouble in foreign relations". One method agreed upon for doing this was to bribe the customs officials and replace them with Japanese. It was planned to seize military power in Manchukuo under the guise of subjugating banditry in line with the reservation made at Geneva. In short, the Cabinet fully realized that the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of an independent State there by Japan was a direct violation of existing treaty obligations; and it was trying to evolve a plan whereby the reality of the breach could be concealed by an appearance of compliance with the obligations. THE LYTTON COMMISSION ARRIVED IN TOKYO On the day that the All-Manchurian Convention was being held in Mukden, that is to say, on 29 February 1932, the Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo, where they [49,100] were received by the Emperor and commenced a series of daily conferences with the Government, including Premier Inukai, War Minister ARAKI, and others. Although these daily conferences continued for eight days, none of these government officials informed the Commission that Japan was forming a new State in Manchuria; and the Commission first learned of this after it had left Tokyo and arrived at Kyoto on its way to China. On the day that the Commission arrived in Tokyo KOISO was elevated by ARAKI from Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to the high position or Vice-Minister of War. ARAKI DISPATCHED REINFORCEMENTS TO SHANGHAI. The battle which had started at Shanghai on 28 January 1932 had developed to such an extent that the Navy Minister was forced to call upon War Minister ARAKI for reinforcements. The Chinese 19th Route Army was giving a Rood account of its fighting ability. Large numbers of Japanese destroyers were anchored in the Hwangpu and Japanese airplanes were bombing Chapei. The Japanese Marines were using their permanent garrison in Hungkow as a base of operations; and barricades erected between this garrison and Chapei served as the front line between the ground forces. The Japanese destroyers, firing point blank, bombarded the forts at [49,101] Wu-sung; this fire was not returned by the forts, for they had no guns capable of answering. The Japanese Marines had invaded areas adjacent to the International Settlement, disarmed the police and paralysed all city functions; a veritable reign of terror was in full swing when the Navy Minister requested these reinforcements. ARAKI states that he conferred with the Cabinet and it was decided to send supporting forces quickly; 10,000 men were dispatched the following day aboard fast destroyers. These reinforcements landed in the International Settlement fully equipped with tanks and artillery. The Navy drew up heavy ships and began shelling the city. However, this attack, which began on 20 February 1932, brought no marked success despite the fact that it continued for several days. Following this attack, ARAKI, claiming that General Ueda had suffered such great losses that it was necessary to send further reinforcements, sent the 11th and 14th Divisions to oppose the Chinese Army which had been defending the city. THE LEAGUE TOOK ACTION The League of Nations was aroused to action. The members of the Council, other than China and Japan, addressed an urgent appeal to the Japanese Government on 19 February 1932 calling attention to Article 10 of [49,102] the Covenant (Annex No. B-6); and the Assembly was convened to meet on 3 March 1932. The American Secretary of State advised the American Consul-General at Shanghai that the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah on the China situation was being released to the Press. In this letter the Secretary stated that the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex Ho. B-10) formed the legal basis upon which the "Open Door Policy" rested. He set forth a long history of the Treaty. He commented that the Treaty represented a carefully matured International policy designed to assure to all parties their nights in China and to assure the Chinese the fullest opportunity to develop their independence and sovereignty. He recalled that Lord Balfour, Chairman of the British Delegation, had stated that he understood that there was no representative present at the signing of the Treaty who thought that spheres of interest were advocated or would be tolerated. The Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15) was intended to reinforce the Nine- Power Treaty. The two Treaties were interdependent, he said, and were intended to align world conscience and public opinion in favor of a system of orderly development through international law, including the settlement of all controversies by peaceful means instead of arbitrary force. He said that in the past the [49,103] United States had rested its policy upon the abiding faith in the future of China and upon ultimate success in dealing with China upon principles of fair play, patience and mutual good will. The British Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, as one of the many attempts to secure a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai through the good offices of friendly Powers, held a conference on board his flagship on 28 February 1932. An agreement on the basis of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal was proposed; but the conference was unsuccessful, owing to the differing opinions of the parties. As though in resentment of this interference, the Japanese troops occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by the Chinese, and the Wu-sung forts and fortifications along the Yangtze were again bombed from the air and shelled from the sea, as bombing-planes operated over the whole front including the Nanking Railway and the airfield at Hungjao. Before the Assembly of the League could meet, the Council proposed a roundtable conference on 29 February to make local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai; both parties agreed to this conference, but it was not successful because of the conditions imposed by the Japanese. [49,104] General Shirakawa, who had been appointed to the Japanese supreme command arrived with reinforcements on 29 February. His first order directed the bombing of the airfield at Hangchow, which was approximately 100 miles away. General Shirakawa gained ground slowly as a result of heavy naval bombardment; and after a flank attack on 1 March, he was able to drive the Chinese beyond the 20 kilometer limit originally demanded by the Japanese as terms for cessation of the hostilities. This "face-saving" success permitted the Japanese to accept the request of the Assembly of the League of 4 March 1932 calling upon both Governments to make a cessation of hostilities and recommending negotiations for conclusion of the hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The opposing commanders issued appropriate orders and the fighting ceased; negotiations began on 10 March 1932. The Assembly continued its investigation of the dispute; and on 11 March 1932, it adopted a resolution to the effect that the provisions of the Covenant (Annex B-6) were applicable to the dispute, especially the provisions that treaties should be scrupulously respected, that members should respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence [49,105] of all the members of the League against external aggression, and that the members were obligated to submit all disputes between them to procedures for peaceful settlement. The Assembly affirmed that it was contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the dispute should be settled under stress of military pressure, affirmed the resolutions of the Council of 30 September and 10 December 1931, as well as its own resolution of 4 March 1932, and proceeded to set up a "Committee of Nineteen" to settle the dispute at Shanghai. Contrary to their obligation, the Japanese took advantage of the truce to bring up reinforcements, which were landed at Shanghai on 7 and 17 March 1932. It was not until 5 May 1932 that a complete agreement was ready for signature. SHIGEMITSU signed for the Japanese. The fighting at Shanghai had been characterized by extreme cruelty on the part of the Japanese. The needless bombing of Chapei, the ruthless bombardment by naval vessels, and the massacre of the helpless Chinese farmers whose bodies were later found with their hands tied behind their backs, are examples of the method of warfare waged at Shanghai. [49,106] This Incident furnishes another example of the Japanese determination to use military force against the Chinese and to impress the Chinese with the might of Japan, using any pretext for the purpose. The ostensible reason for the use of force in this case was the request from some Japanese residents of Shanghai for protection. The Tribunal has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the force used was out of all proportion to the existing danger to Japanese Nationals and property. There is no doubt that at the time feeling was running high and the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods induced at least in part by Japanese action in Manchuria, was being felt. In the light of all the facts the Tribunal is of the opinion that the real purpose of the Japanese attack was to alarm the Chinese by indication of what would follow if their attitude toward Japan continued, and thus break down resistance to future operations. The Incident was a part of the general plan. MANCHUKUO WAS CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED AS A PUPPET Manchukuo was definitely a totalitarian State, because of the power vested in the Regent; and those who controlled the Regent controlled the State. Ordinance No. 1, which was promulgated on 9 March 1932, [49,107] prescribed the organic law for Manchukuo. In formal expression, the position was as follows: the governmental power was divided into four divisions: the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial and the Supervisory: the Regent as the Chief Executive was the head of the State; all executive power as well as the power to override the Legislative Council was vested in him: the functions of the Executive Department were performed, under the direction of the Regent, by the Premier and the Minister of State, who formed a State Council or Cabinet: the Premier supervised the work of the Ministries through the powerful General Affairs Board, which had direct charge of their confidential matters, personnel, accounting and supplies; subordinate to the State Council were various bureaux, such as the Legislative Bureau; but, following the Japanese Constitution, the Regent had authority, when the Legislative Bureau was not in session to promulgate ordinances upon advice of his Privy Council; and the Supervisory Bureau supervised the conduct of officials and audited their accounts. The Legislative Council was never organized and legislation was therefore enacted by ordinance of the Regent. The General Affairs Board, the Legislative Bureau and the Advisory Bureau in practice by way of [49,108] contrast to form, constituted a Premier's Office. Upon establishment of the State, the Self-Government Guiding Board was abolished and its personnel were transferred to the Advisory Bureau, which continued the work of the Board through the Self- Government Committees previously established in the Provinces and Districts. The General Affairs Board, more than any other, was the agency of the Japanese for effective practical control and domination of every phase of the government and economy of Manchukuo. The Ministers of State were generally Chinese, but each Minister had a Vice-Minister, who was Japanese. There existed a committee in the Government of Manchukuo not provided for in the Constitution which was known as the "Tuesday Meeting." Each Tuesday there was a meeting of the various Japanese Vice-Ministers, presided over by the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board, and attended by the Chief of a Section of the Kwantung Army General Staff. At these meetings all policies were adopted, all rescripts, ordinances and other enactments approved; the decisions of the "Tuesday Meeting" were then passed on to the General Affairs Board to be officially adopted and promulgated as an act of the Government of Manchukuo. It was in this manner that Manchukuo was completely dominated [49,109] by the Kwantung Army. In a telegram sent by General Honjo to War Minister ARAKI on 3 April 1932, Honjo said: "I believe you have no objections that the execution of our policies regarding the whole of Manchukuo should, in so far as it involves negotiations with Manchukuo, be left chiefly to the Kwantung Army. In view of the recent conduct of the Japanese Government Offices and various other representing organs in Manchukuo, however, I fear that unless we make it thoroughgoing, confusion might arise." To this ARAKI replied: "I agree in principle to your opinion regarding unification in the execution of our Manchurian policies." At first Japanese "Advisors" were appointed to advise all the important government officials of Manchukuo; but shortly after the formation of the State, these "Advisors" became full government officials on the same basis as the Chinese. Over 200 Japanese were holding office in the Central Government alone, not including those in the War Ministry and Military Forces, during the month of April 1932 -- one month after the formation of the State. In most bureaux there were Japanese advisors, councillors, and secretaries. All important posts in the Supervisory Bureau were held by Japanese. Finally, most of the important [49,110] officials of the Regency, including the Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the Regent's Bodyguard, were Japanese. Even the Regent was "supervised" by General Yoshioka, who was appointed by the Kwantung Army for that purpose. In short, as for the Government and public services, although the titular heads were usually Chinese, the main political and administrative power was held by Japanese officials as advisors, councillors, supervisors, secretaries and vice-officials. The Japanese Cabinet at a meeting on 11 April 1932 considered methods for "guiding" Manchukuo and approved the method outlined above. ARAKI was a member of the Cabinet as War Minister at that time. The decision was: "The new State shall employ authoritative advisors from our country and make them the highest advisors in connection with financial, economic and general political problems. The new State shall appoint Japanese nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new State." The Cabinet then listed the offices of the government of Manchukuo which should be filled by Japanese. These included the Chief of the General Affairs Board and the Chief of each of that Board's sections, councillors and Chief Secretary of the Privy [49,111] Council, and offices in the Revenue, Police, Banking, Transportation, Justice, Customs, and other Departments. This measure was found to be necessary so that the new State would manifest the "very characteristics that are important factors for the existence of the Empire in relation to politics, economy, national defense, transportation, communication and many other fields," and so that "a single self- sufficient economic unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo will be realized." THE CONCORDIA SOCIETY AND THE "KINGLY WAY" The Concordia Society (Kyo-Wa-Kai) was organized by a committee composed of ITAGAKI and others in Mukden during April 1932. The Kwantung Army Commander was made ex-officio Supreme Advisor of the Society. The special mission of the Concordia Society was to spread the spirit and ideology of the State, the "Kingly Way", and to strengthen Manchukuo so that she could subserve Japan in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon World and the Comintern. The policy of the Government of Manchukuo was expressed in proclamations issued on 18 February 1932 and 1 March 1932; it was to rule in accordance with the fundamental principle of the "Kingly Way". In this manner, the consolidation of Japan's conquest of Manchuria was accomplished in the sphere of ideological propaganda. [49,112] No political party other than the Society was allowed in Manchuria. The titular head of the Society was the Prime Minister of Manchukuo; but actually, the leader was a member of the Kwantung Army General Staff. THE LYTTON COMMISSION VISITED MANCHURIA The Lytton Commission arrived in Manchuria in April 1932 and began its work of penetrating the veil of secrecy thrown over the situation by the intimidation of the inhabitants and obstruction of the Committee's efforts by the Kwantung Army and Japanese officials of Manchukuo. Under the excuse of offering "protection" to members of the Commission and prospective witnesses, the Army and the Gendarmes "supervised" their activities and movements. Pu Yi testified that, "We were all under the supervision of the Japanese Military Officers; and wherever Lord Lytton went, he was under the supervision of Japanese Gendarmes. When I interviewed Lord Lytton, many of the Kwantung military officers were beside me supervising, if I had told him the truth, I would have been murdered right after the mission left Manchuria." Pu Yi delivered to Lord Lytton a statement prepared by Colonel ITAGAKI, which Pu Yi now declares did not reflect the true facts. People who spoke Russian or English were carefully supervised during the Commission's stay in [49,113] Manchuria; some were arrested. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army suggested, in a telegram sent to the War Ministry on 4 June 1932, that Japan show her contempt of the Lytton Commission by taking over the customs during the visit of the Commission. He said: "It is rather advantageous to take this action during the stay of the League's Inquiry Commission in order to display the independence of Manchukuo, and to indicate the firm resolution of Japan and Manchukuo in respect to the ‘Manchurian Incident.’” THE ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER INUKAI The opposition of Premier Inukai to the establishment of Manchukuo as an independent State cost him his life. The Premier had consistently opposed the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan, maintaining that such recognition would be a violation of the sovereign rights of China. Within a few days after assuming office as Premier, Inukai sent a secret emissary by the name of Kayano to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to arrange terms of peace. Generalissimo Chiang was highly satisfied with Kayano's proposals and negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily when one of Kayano's telegrams to premier Inukai was intercepted by the War Ministry. [49,114] The Secretary of the Cabinet informed Inukai's son that, "Your father is carrying on negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang. Concerning this, the War Ministry is highly indignant." Although the negotiations were abandoned, the friction continued between the Premier and War Minister ARAKI. The conflict between Premier Inukai and the "Kodo" or "Imperial Way" faction, of which ARAKI was leader at that time, reached the explosion point on 8 May 1932, when Inukai delivered an anti-militaristic and pro-democratic speech at Yokohama. On 15 May 1932, the Premier was ill and temporarily alone in his Official Residence, when serveral naval officers forced their way into his home and assassinated him. Dr. Okawa furnished the pistols for the killing; and HASHIMOTO admitted in his book, "The Road to the Reconstruction of the world," that he was implicated in the murder. Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI, who was an official in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry at that time, warned that if a new Cabinet should be organized under the leadership of political parties, a second or third assassination would occur. He made this warning at a dinner attended by KIDO, KOISO and SUZUKI at Baron Harada's house two days after the [49,115] murder. The opposition to the expansionist policy had come largely from representatives of the political parties in Japan. RECOGNITION OF MANCHUKUO BY JAPAN ARAKI and KOISO retained their positions as War Minister and Vice-War Minister respectively in the new Cabinet; and under their leadership Manchukuo was recognized by the Government of Japan as an independent State. In replying on 4 June 1932 to a telegram from the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, the War Minister said, regarding the question of recognition: "It has a very delicate bearing on various circles at home and abroad, and therefore we are now determined and ready to effect the recognition whenever opportunity offers." He also revealed the plan to rule Manchukuo through the Kwantung Army; he said: "As regards unification of various organs in Manchuria, we are planning to establish a coordinating organ with the Army as its center, among other things aiming at the industrial development of Manchuria to meet with requirements for speedy stabilization of Manchukuo and national defense. Should such underlying motive by chance leak out at home or abroad, and especially in foreign countries, it would be extremely disadvantageous from the point of view of the direction of Manchukuo. [49,116] Therefore, we hope that you will be very circumspect even in the study of the matter in your own office." About the middle of June 1932, ARAKI stated before the Supreme War Council that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo could no longer be considered binding on Japan. The Kwantung Army assisted ARAKI in forcing the Government to recognize Manchukuo by sending a so-called "Peace Mission" to Tokyo in June 1932. The purpose of this mission was to urge the immediate recognition of the new State; it worked in conjunction with the Black Dragon Society, which held conferences at Hibiya Toyoken to assist this "Mission." In view of the change of Cabinets, the Lytton Commission returned to Tokyo on 4 July 1932 and held a series of conferences with the officials of the new Government in an effort to learn the views of the Cabinet regarding the situation in Manchuria. ARAKI was present at these conferences. [49,117] After the Commission returned to Peiping, that is to say on or about 8 August 1932, the "coordinating organ with the Army at its center", mentioned by ARAKI in his telegram to the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, was established as planned. The "Four-in-One" system was replaced by the "Three-in-One" system; under this new system, the Commander of the Kwantung Army became the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and at the same time Ambassador to Manchukuo. The new system took effect on 20 August 1932. A change of personnel was made to put this system in effect. Muto, Nobuyoshi, replaced Honjo as Commander of the Kwantung Army. ITAGAKI remained on the Staff of the Kwantung Army, and was promoted to the rank of Major General. Vice-Minister of War KOISO was sent to Manchuria as Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army with the concurrent assignment as Chief of the Kwantung Army Special Service Organization, or Intelligence Service. After the surrender, ARAKI stated: "At the conference of the Big Three (Foreign, Navy and War Ministers), when discussing recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state, I suggested that we exchange Ambassadors since Manchukuo was an independent state. The question came before the Cabinet at a meeting in August 1932. The discussion was as to when Manchukuo should receive recognition - now or later. The Kwantung Army put in a request that we [49,118] recognize immediately. I set the data of 15 September 1932 as the date to formally recognize Manchukuo. At this meeting we discussed the contents of the Treaty to be entered into with Manchukuo, and I approved the contents agreed upon." HIRANUMA, as Vice-President of the Privy Council, called a meeting of the Council on 13 September 1932 to consider the question of "Signing of the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo." HIRANUMA, who had also been appointed a Member of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, read the report of the Committee to the full Privy Council. The report stated, among other things, "Our Imperial Government firmly believed that it would be advisable to recognize that country without delay. Nevertheless, in order to use prudence and caution, our Government watched for half a year the developments in Manchukuo as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other countries. Indications are that our country's recognition of that country although it will as may be easily imagined cause for a time no small shock to the world, it will not bring about an international crisis. With the object of co-existence and co-prosperity, our country intends to take measures for recognizing Manchukuo by concluding an arrangement through this Protocol and the Notes exchanged between the two countries". [49,119] HIRANUMA was referring to four Notes as follows: 1) The first Note consisted of a letter and the reply thereto. The letter, which was dated 10 March 1932, the day after Pu Yi's inauguration, was addressed by Pu Yi to Honjo. In this letter, Pu Yi stated that he appreciated the efforts and sacrifices of Japan in establishing Manchukuo, put that the development of Manchukuo could not be expected without the support and guidance of Japan Pu Yi then requested that Japan agree, among other things, to the following (A) Japan to undertake, at the expense of Manchukuo, the national defence of the new State and the maintenance of order within the country, with the understanding that Manchukuo would furnish all military facilities required by the Kwantung Army; (B) Japan to undertake to control all existing railroads and other transportation facilities and to construct such new facilities as may be deemed desirable and (C) Japanese nationals to serve as government officials in all branches of the Government of Manchukuo, subject to appointment, removal and replacement at will by the Commander of the Kwantung Army. Honjo's reply to the letter was simply that Japan had no objection to Pu Yi's proposals. (2) The second Note was an agreement between the Prime Minister of Manchukuo and Honjo dated 7 August 1932 relating to the control of transportation facilities and making the Japanese control more absolute. (3) The third Note was another agree- [49,120] ment between the Prime Minister of Manchukuo and Honjo dated 7 August 1932. It related to the establishment of the Japan Air Transportation Company. This Company was authorized by a Cabinet decision of 12 August 1932 to take over the air-routes which had already been established in Manchuria by the Kwantung Army under the pretext of military communications. (4) The fourth Note was an agreement between Commander Muto and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo dated 9 September 1932 relative to mining concessions in Manchuria. According to the report read by HIRANUMA, these Notes were to be retroactive to the dates of their signing and were to be deemed international agreements, but were to be strictly secret. The Protocol, which was to be made public, provided that Japan had recognized Manchukuo; that Manchukuo affirmed all rights and interests possessed by Japan and her subjects in Manchuria at the time of the formation of Manchukuo; and that both parties agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of their national security, recognizing that a threat to either was a threat to both and giving Japan the right to maintain troops in Manchukuo. The investigation Committee recommended approval of the Protocol and Notes. The discoussion that followed the reading of the report of the Investigation Committee reveals that the member of the [49,121] Privy Council fully realized that the proposed Protocol and Notes violated the Nine- Power Pact (Annex No. B-10) and other treaty obligations of Japan. Privy Councillor Okada raised the question. The Foreign Minister had explained to the Diet that Japan would not be violating the Nine-Power Pact by recognizing Manchukuo, because Manchukuo had become independent, and Japan had not agreed to prevent the independence of the Chinese people. Okada expressed the opinion that the United States and others would not be satisfied by that explanation. As he explained, "The Americans might say that it would be all right if Manchukuo had become in- "dependent by the free will of her own people, but that it "was a violation of the Pact and a disregard of China's sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintain that in- dependence." The foreign Minister replied; "Of course, in this respect, various views are held in the United States and other countries, but these are their own views." ARAKI explained, "The national defense of Manchukuo is at the same time the national defense of our country". Councillor Ishii states: "I feel very uneasy about Japan's contention in regard to the connection between the 'Manchurian Problem' and the League of Nations", and he further observed: "It was almost an established view of a large number of the people of the United States and other countries that our action in Manchukuo violated the Pact of Paris [49,122] (Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-Power Pact." However, Councill or Ishii added: "Now that Japan has concluded an alliance with Manchukuo, for joint national defense I believe that there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese troops in Manchuria, this will make the League's past resolution a dead letter." He then observed: "It was rather strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian races had started no independence movement up to now!" The vote was taken, the Protocol and Notes were approved by unanimous vote and the Emperor withdrew. Ambassador Muto presented the Protocol to the Manchukuoan Prime Minister with the remark, "Here it is. This is the agreement that you have to sign". Although Pu Yi testified that he did not know of the existence of the Protocol up until the day it was presented for signing, he signed it on 15 September 1932. PREPARATION FOR THE CONQUEST OF JEHOL Efforts to persuade General Tang Ju-lin, who was Governor of Jehol Province, to declare his Province independent of China and place it under the jurisdiction of Manchukuo proved to be of no avail; therefore, with the conquest and consolidation of the Three Eastern Provinces completed, the Japanese Army began to prepare for the conquest of Jehol. After the surrender, ARAKI tried to explain the decision to invade Jehol by saying, in speaking of the Privy Council meeting of 17 December 1931 where it was decided - according to him - to [49,123] appropriate funds for the subjugation of Manchuria, "It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hauch-liang's territory required pacification; but a statement by Chang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four provinces expended the scene of activities to Jehol". At the organization of the Supreme Administrative Council by the puppet Governors of the provinces on 17 February 1932, it was provided that Jehol should be represented on the Council; however, Governor Tang Ju-lin ignored the invitation and continued to rule the Province, although the -ongols of the various Leagues within the Province attempted to collaborate with the new State and were claimed as subjects by Manchukuo. The Japanese, having made their reservation at Geneva needed only to find an excuse to proceed with their plan for the incorporation of Jehol into Menchukuo. The first excuse was presented when an official by the name of Ishimoto, who was attached to the Awantung Army, staged a "disappearance" while traveling between Peipiao and Chinchow on 17 July 1932. The Japanese immediately claimed that he had been kidnapped by Chinese Volunteers and sent a detachment of the Kwantung Army into Jehol on the pretext of rescuing Ishimoto. Although the detachment was equipped with artillary, it was repulsed and failed in its purpose, after occupying a village [49,124] on the frontier of the Province. During this encounter, Japanese planes dropped bombs on the town of Chaoyang; and through the month of August 1932, Japanese planes continued to demonstrate over this part of Jehol Province, On 19 August 1932, a Kwantung Army staff officer was sent to Nanling, a small village situated between Peipiao and the boundary of Jehol ostensibly to negotiate for the release of Mr. Ishimot. He was accompained by an infantry detachment. He claimed that on his return journey, he was fired upon and in self-defence returned the fire. On the arrival of another infantry detachment, as if by prearrangement, Nanling was occupied. Shortly after the engagement at Nanling, a declaration was issued to the affect that Jehol Province was the territory of Manchukuo, thus laying the foundation for its annexation through the action of the Kwantung Army. Military action continued upon one pretext or another, mostly along the Chinchow-Peipiao branch line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, which is the only means of access to Jehol from Manchuria by railway. This was to be expected as the main lines of communication at that time between China proper and the Chinese forces remaining in Manchuria ran through Jehol. [49,124a] It was evident to casual observers that an invasion of Jehol was imminent and the Japanese Press freely admitted that fact. In September 1932, the 14th Mixed Brigade arrived in Manchu- [49,125] ria with the announced mission of "mopping up" bandits in the Tung Pientao, which is the district on the north side of the Yalu River between Manchuria and Korea. The real mission of this brigade was to prepare for the invasion of Jehol. THE LYTTON COMMISSION REPORTED In Geneva, the Council of the League met on 21 November 1932 to consider the report of the Lytton Commission, which had been received on 1 October 1932. During the deliberations the Japanese Delegate, Matsuoka, declared, “We want no more territory!" However, due to the fact that Matsuoka refused to agree to any basis for settlement of the dispute, the Council was forced on 28 November 1932 to transmit the report of the Lytton Commission to the Assembly for action. The Lytton Commission in its report stated: "It is a fact that, without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. . . [49,125a] The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Convenant of the League of Nations (Annex No. B-6), the Kellogg Pact (Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington (Annex No. B-10), all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind. The justification in this case has been that all the [49,126] military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defense." However, the Commission further stated in discussing the events at Mukden on the night of 18 September 1931: "The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of ligitimate self-defense.” The Assembly of the League met on 6 December 1932; and after a general discussion, adopted a resolution on 9 December 1932 requesting the Committee of Nineteen, which it had appointed on 11 March 1932, to bring about a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, study the report, draw up proposals for settlement of the dispute, and submit those proposals to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment. The Committee of Nineteen drew up two draft resolutions and a statement of reason indicating generally the basis on which it thought it possible to continue its endeavors. On 15 December 1932 the two draft resolutions and the statement of reasons were submitted to the parties. The Chinese and the Japanese Delegates proposed amendments; and the Committee adjourned on 20 December 1932 to permit discussion of the proposed amendments, between the Delegates, the Secretary-General of the League and the President of the Committee. [49,127] THE SHANHAIKWAN INCIDENT Before this discussion proceeded very far, the serious "Shanhaikwan Incident" occurred on 1 January 1933. Situated at the extremity of the Great Wall, halfway between Peiping and Mukden, this city has always been regarded as of great strategic importance. It is on the route followed by invaders, who coming from Manchuria wish to penetrate into what is now the Province of Hopei. Moreover, from Hopei is the easiest route into Jehol. After Chinohow had been taken, the Japanese had advanced to Shanhaikwan - up to the Great Wall - and taken possession of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway. The railway continues from Shanhaikwan to Peiping, where Marshal Chang-Hsueh-liang was maintaining his headquarters. Although the railway station at Shanhaikwan is just south of the Great Wall, the Japanese trains from Mukden ran to the station; therefore, the Japanese maintained troops at the station under the pretense of guarding the trains. The Chinese trains from Peiping also ran into this station, and the Chinese maintained troops there. The Chinese Commander reported that all had been well at the station until this "Incident" occurred. The fact that this "Incident" occurred during the discussion of the proposed amendments to the two draft [49,128] resolutions submitted by the Committee of Nineteen strongly suggests that it was planned in order to stimulate justification of the action of the Japanese Government in rejecting all efforts of the Committee to arrive at a basis of settlement between China and Japan. On the afternoon of 1 January 1933, the Japanese claimed that some Chinese had thrown a land grenade. That was the excuse for a forthright assult on the walled city of Shanhaikwan. Smaller towns nearby were machine-gunned, American missionary property was bombed, and the fighting developed into old-fashioned trench warfare so that the North China Plain between Peiping and the Great Wall became criss- crossed by hundreds of miles of trenches. Thousands of peaceful citizens were slaughtered; and the Chinese Government addressed an appeal on 11 January 1933 to the signatories of the 1901 Protocol (Annex No. B-2). JAPAN DECLINED ALL EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN The Committee of Nineteen met pursuant to adjournment on 16 January 1933; and submitted to the parties a number of questions and requests for information in an effort to arrive at a basis of settlement between China and Japan. To all of its requests, the Committee received [49,129] unsatisfactory replies from Japan; and on 14 February 1933, the Japanese Government informed the Committee that it was convinced that the maintenance and recognition of the independence of Manchukuo were the only guarantees of peace in the Far East, and that the whole question would eventually be solved between Japan and China on that basis. This put an end to the Committee's deliberations and it immediately reported to the Assembly. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONDEMNED JAPAN The Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 February 1933 adopted the report prepared for it by the Committee of Nineteen condemning Japan as the aggressor in the war between her and China and making recommendations for termination of that war. The Assembly reported that for more than sixteen months the Council of the Assembly had continuously tried to find a solution for the Sino-Japanese dispute; however, the situation tended constantly to grow worse and the "war in disguise" continued. It declared that "Through all its wars and periods of 'independence', Manchuria remained an integral part of China, and that a group of Japanese civil and military officials conceived, organized, and carried through the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of 18 September 1931; and, with this object made use of the [49,130] names and actions of certain Chinese individuals and took advantage of certain minorities and native communities that had grievances against the Chinese administration." The Assembly decided that it could not regard as measures of self-defense the military operations carried out on the night of 18 September 1931 by the Japanese troops at Mukden and other places in Manchuria; and that this applied as well to the military measures of Japan as a whole, developed in the course of the dispute. It also stated that the main political and administrative power in the "Government" of "Manchukuo" rested in the hands of Japanese officials and advisors, who were in a position restfully to direct and control the administration. It found that the vast majority of the population did not support this "Government", but regarded it as an instrument of the Japanese. The Assembly declared that "It is indisputable that, without any declaration of war, a large part of Chinese territory has been forcivly seized and occupied by Japanese troops and that in consequence of this operation, it has been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China." The Assembly found as a matter of fact: "While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before 18 September 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for [49,131] the development of events since 18 September 1931." This was a finding of aggression against Japan and a warning that similar conduct would meet similar condemnation in the future. Therefore, no person in Japan could rightly say thereafter that he honestly believed that conduct of this kind would be condoned. This Tribunal finds no basis for disagreement with the report adopted by the Assembly of the League on 24 February 1933. The Accused SHIRATORI, who in his public announcements was one of the foremost assertors of the legitimacy of Japan's actions in Manchuria, expressed the truth in a private letter to Arite, then Japanese Minister to Belgium. Writing in November 1935, and speaking of Japanese diplomats who favored conciliation in international affairs, he said: "Have they enough courage to return Manchuria to China, to get reinstated in the League of Nations, and to apologize to the world for the crime?" [49,132] JAPAN WITHDREW FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS Rather than fulfill her obligations under the Covenant (Annex No. B-6), Japan gave notice on 27 March 1933 of her intention to withdraw from the League. The notice stated her reason for withdrawal to be: "That there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan and these Powers (The majority of the Members of the League) concerning the application and even the interpretation of various international engagements and obligations including the Covenant of the League and the principles of international law." INVASION OF JEHOL One day after the Assembly adopted its resolution condemning Japan as the aggressor in China, she openly defied the League by invading Jehol Province. Key points along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkou, fell into the hands of the Japanese as a result of the fighting that followed the "Shanhaikwan Incident", and the strategical situation of Jehol became very critical prior to 22 February 1933. On that date, the Japanese Army, in the name of the puppet State of Manchukuo, sent an ultimatum to China, stating that Jehol was not Chinese territory and demanding that Chinese forces in Jehol Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. The ultimatum was not satisfied and the advance of the Japanese Army [49,133] began on 25 February 1933. The Japanese advanced in three columns from their bases at Tungliao and Sui-Chung, and did not stop until all the territory north and east of the Great Wall was occupied and all the strategic gates along the Great Wall were captured. ITAGAKI and KOISO as staff officers of the Kwantung Army assisted in the completion of the occupation of all Manchuria by 2 March 1933. TANGKU TRUCE As a result of its advance to the Great Wall, the Japanese Army was in a favorable position to invade China proper; but time was needed to consolidate and organize its gains preparatory to the next advance; to gain this time, the Tangku Truce was signed on 31 May 1933. Commander MUTO (not the accused) sent representatives, vested with plenary power and armed with a draft of the Truce, which was prepared by the Kwantung Army, to negotiate with the Chinese representatives at Tangku. The Truce as signed provided for a demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall. The terms were that the Chinese forces would first withdraw to a specified line. The Japanese were authorized to observe by airplane from time to time whether the withdrawal was complete; on being satisfied with the withdrawal, the Japanese Army was to withdraw to the line of the Great Wall; and the [49,134] Chinese forces were not to again re-enter the demilitarized zone. ARAKI, A POPULAR FIGURE The successful conquest of all Manchuria by the Japanese forces made War Minister ARAKI a popular figure among certain groups in Japan; and he was constantly in demand as a writer and public speaker. In a motion picture adaptation of one of his speeches trade in June 1933 and entitled, "The Critical Period of Japan", he stated the ideals of the Military and revealed their plan to wage wars of aggression in order to dominate all of Asia and the islands of the Pacific. Among other things, he said: "Has peace reigned in Asia during the last fifty years? What is the situation in Siberia, Mongolia, Tibet, Singkiang, and China: Are the waves of the Pacific really calm? Can we expect the waves of the Pacific of tomorrow to be as calm as they are today? It is the holy mission of Japan, the Yamato race, to establish peace in the Orient with its ideals and power. The League of Nations does not respect this mission of Japan. The siege of Japan by the whole world under the leadership of the League was revealed by the 'Manchurian Incident'. The day will come when we will make the whole world look up to our national virtues." (On the screen was shown Japan and Manchuria in the center, then China, [49,135] India, Siberia and the South Seas). "Manchukuo, which was founded by the revelation of Heaven in the form of the ’Mukden Incident’, and Japan will work together and will secure permanent peace in Asia." He then defines national defence as follows: "I would not adopt such a narrow view that defence of the nation may be defined in terms of geographic position. It is the mission of the Army to defend the 'Imperial Way', in space, in time, in enlargement and development, in eternity and continuity. Our troops have fought with the everlasting spirit of the song: 'The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor.' Our Country is destined to develop in space. It is of course expected of the Army to fight against those who oppose us in spreading the 'Imperial Way'. Compatriots! Let us look at the situation in Asia. Is it to be left unamended forever? Our supreme mission is to make a paradise in Asia. I fervently beseech you to strive onwards united." (On the screen appeared the words: "Light comes from the East!") SECTION II. CONSOLIDATION AND EXPLOITATION OF MANCHURIA REORGANIZATION OF MANCHUKUO After the signing of the Tangku Truce, Manchukuo was reorganized so as to strengthen Japan's control over that puppet State and to facilitate the economic [49,136] exploitation of Manchuria in preparation for continuation of the war of aggression against China and the waging of wars of aggression against other Nations, who might oppose her domination of Asia and the Islands of the Pacific. The Japanese Cabinet decided on 8 August 1933 to "develop Manchuria into an independent Nation possessing indivisible relations with the Japanese Empire.” Control of Manchukuo was to be "executed by Japanese officials under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Kwantung Army." The aim of the Manchurian economy was to be "the unification of Japanese and Manchurian economies in order to establish securely the foundation for the expansion of the Empire's economic powers to the whole world." "Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and Manchuria" were to be "restricted by the demands of the national defense of the Empire." ARAKI, who was a member of the Cabinet at the time this decision was made, had defined national defense in no uncertain terms. The concrete plan for the execution of this policy was to be approved by the Cabinet only after careful investigation, it was decided. The investigations were not completed until after DORIHARA had been assigned to the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army on 16 October 1933, and HIROTA had [49,137] become Foreign Minister on 14 September 1933.However, on 22 December 1933, the Cabinet, with ARAKI and HIROTA present, decided that: "It seems that the Manchurian Government is considering a swift reformation to Monarchy as soon as possible. It must be made clear the the enforcement of the Monarchy is not the restoration of the Tsing Dynasty, but the foundation of a constitutional monarch; and all causes of hindrances to the development of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long." It was decided; that the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo should be strengthened that basic reformation of the internal structure of the Government of Manchukuo should be exercised, especially upon the personnel; and that the "existing conventions and agreements between Japan and Manchukuo should be acknowledged by the Monarchy." This, be it noted, was the Cabinet of Japan formulating its decisions as to the manner in which Manchukuo would be governed, a country which it was proclaiming to the World as independent, The astounding thing is that the pretence was still maintained before us and supported by hundreds of pages of evidence and [49,138] argument. No better proof that this dependent status of Manchukuo did not change can be found than the telegram from Foreign Minister TOGO to the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU dated 4 December 1941, which was only three days before the attack upon Pearl Harbor. In that telegram, TOGO gave the following instructions: "On the fourth, in a Joint Conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my telegram No. 873, our policy was changed as follows: 'When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Changchun will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly'." The next step in the reorganization was the enthronement of Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo. After the Cabinet decision of 22 December 1933 General Hishikari, who had succeeded General Muto (not the accused) as Commendor of the Kwantung Army, called upon Pu Yi and told him that he planned to convert Manchukuo into an [49,139] Empire. A new set of Organic Laws was promulgated for Manchukuo on 1 March 1934. These laws provided for an Emperor to rule Manchukuo and prescribed his powers, however they did not materially change the general construction of the Government. Japanese continued to hold important positions in the Government; the "Tuesday Meeting" was retained as the policy making organ; and General Yoshioka continued with his assignment of "supervising" the Emperor, even to the day of his capture after the surrender. On the day that the new laws were promulgated, Pu Yi, after paying obeisance to Heaven at a temple in Changchun, was enthroned as Emperor of Manchukuo. However, he had no power. Although he was allowed to give audience to his Ministers once a year, that audience was carefully supervised by the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board. Having installed Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo and revised the laws of that State to facilitate its economic exploitation, the Cabinet met on 20 March 1934 to discuss the policy to be followed in carrying out that exploitation. Although ARAKI had resigned as War Minister on 23 January 1934 to become a Supreme War Councillor, Foreign Minister HIROTA was present at this Cabinet meeting. It was decided that fundamental policy would be "based on developing Manchukuo as an independent [49,140] Nation possessing an indivisible relationship with Japan, establishing securely the base of Japan's worldwide economic expansion, and strengthening Manchukuo's economic powers." Transportation, communication and other enterprises in Manchukuo were to be developed by special companies directly or indirectly under the supervision of Japan so as to contribute to the "national defense" of the Empire. As though to remove all doubt regarding Japan's intentions toward China, HIROTA's Foreign Office issued a statement on 17 April 1934, which has come to be known as the "Hands Off China Statement" or the "Amau Statement", deriving the first name from its contents and the second name from the official who gave the statement to the Press. Amau was not only an official of the Foreign Office but also its official spokesman. On 25 April 1934, Foreign Minister HIROTA during an interview with the American Ambassador in Japan on his own initiative referred to the "Amau Statement"; he stated that under questioning of newspaper men Amau had given out the statement without his approval or knowledge and that the World had received a wholly false impression of Japanese policy. HIROTA added that the policy of Japan was complete observance and support of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) [49,141] in every respect. HIROTA's statement to the American Ambassador was a private statement, not a public statement. The "Amau Statement" was never publicly repudiated. Amau was regarded by the expansionists as a hero for having issued the Statement; and Foreign Minister HIROTA never disciplined him for having issued the Statement without authority of the Foreign Ministry. This Statement conforms closely to subsequent developments in Japanese foreign policy; and the Tribunal finds upon the evidence that it was an official declaration by the Foreign Ministry of Japan's policy toward China at the time and was issued for the purpose of warning the Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact that the Japanese Government would not tolerate any interference with her plans in China. This Statement contained, among other things, the following: "Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree with those of foreign Nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia. We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist [49,142] Japan. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the 'Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents' are bound to acquire political significance. Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle." "TWO-IN-ONE" SYSTEM The Kwantung Army received a new Commander and a new Vice-Chief-of-Staff on 10 December 1934, namely: MINAMI and ITAGAKI respectively. These appointments heralded the completion of the reorganization of Manchukuo and the machinery for its control by Japan. By Imperial Ordinance the Japanese Government created the Manchurian Affairs Bureau to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo in all Ministries. The Bureau was organized to correspond to the new "two-in-One" organization in Manchuria. The Commander of the Kwantung Army became Ambassador to Manchukuo as before, but the office of Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory was abolished and its duties were taken over by the Director of the newly created Kwantung Bureau, which was placed under the Ambassador. Thus MINAMI became Commander of the Kwantung Army; and at the same time as Ambassador, he controlled the Government of the Leased Territories, the Embassy and the South Manchurian Railway Company. Although the [49,143] Manchurian Affairs Bureau came under the Premier, the War Minister held the post of President of the Bureau, so that the effective control of Manchukuo remained with the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry. MINAMI stated on interrogation that as Ambassador his prime duty was "to preserve the independence of Manchukuo." At that time he advised the Government "on such matters as agriculture, transportation, education, etc." Upon being asked the question: "In fact, your advice in substance was a direction; was it not?", he replied: "You might say so -- yes." MINAMI was succeeded as Ambassador and Kwantung Army Commander by General Ueda on 6 March 1936, who served until he was replaced by General UMEZU on 7 September 1939. UMEZU held the post until 18 July 1944. MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU As mentioned, the Manchurian Affairs Bureau was organized to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo in all Ministries and set as the connecting link between the Japanese Government and the "Two-in-One" Administrator in Manchuria. It took charge of all matters concerning the Kwantung Bureau, the foreign affairs of Manchukuo, the corporations organized to exploit the economy of Manchuria, the colonization of Manchuria by the Japanese, cultural works for Manchukuo - which probably included the opium trade -, and any other matters concerning [49,144] Manchuria or the Kwantung Territory. By virtue of their positions as War Minister the following Accused served as President of this Bureau: ITAGAKI, HATA and TOJO. Also OKA and SATO each served as Secretary of this Bureau. The following served as Councillors to the Bureau at one time or another: KAYA, MUTO, SATO, SHIGEMITSU, OKA, UMEZU and TOJO. CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA In order to control the news coming out of Manchuria and direct propaganda, the Kwantung Army Commander, or "Two-in-One" control organ, organized all the Press and news agencies in Manchuria. All the agencies, which up to that time had been under the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government or the Manchurian Railway Company, were organized into an association, which was known as the Koho Association. This association was charged with the duty of rigidly supervising all domestic and foreign news releases, and deciding the policy and means of propaganda as well as enforcing that policy upon its member agencies and those agencies not members. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,145] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Continuing reading of the Tribunal's judgment: HOSHINO BECAME DIRECTOR OF ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA Under the new organization of Manchukuo, HOSHINO became the undisputed ruler of the economy of Manchuria. He began his training for this work when he left Japan on 12 July 1932 at the instance of the Japanese Minister of Finance to accept an appointment as a Commissioner in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo. He was told at that time that he was considered competent for the position as Chief of the General Affairs Board, the all-powerful agency of the Kwantung Army for control of the Manchukuoan Government. He was advanced by successive promotions to the position promised. Just before the completion of the reorganization of Manchukuo, he was appointed on 1 July 1934 as Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo. Then on 9 June 1936 he became Vice-Minister of Finance for Manchukuo. On 16 December 1936 he became Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the General Affairs Board, where he served until his elevation to the high office of Director of the Board on 1 July 1937. He continued in this [49,146] office until relieved to become President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau in Tokyo on 21 July 1940. Any exposition of the economic exploitation of Manchuria is essentially a story of HOSHINO. When he left Tokyo in July 1932 to become a Commissioner in the Manchukuoan Finance Ministry, he took with him a trained staff to assist him in his duties; and he soon became recognized in Manchuria as the Japanese official in charge of economic affairs under the authority of the Kwantung Army. ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA SEIZED At the very outset of the military occupation the Japanese seized control of the economy of Manchuria. The first public utility seized was the railroads. All the Chinese-owned railways north of the Great Wall and the monies standing to their credit in banks in Manchuria were seized. All railroads were coordinated, connected with and placed under the management of the Japanese Government agency known as the South Manchurian Railway Company. Electrical supply and distribution systems were quickly taken over. All sources of revenue were taken by force and the revenues expended to finance the new Government. The customs were seized on the pretense that Manchukuo was an independent state. The Central [49,147] Bank of Manchukuo was established on 14 June 1932 to replace the old provincial banks and the Frontier Bank, whose funds were used to capitalize the new organization. A new currency was issued by the Central Bank beginning on 1 July 1932. The telephone, telegraph and radio systems, being state owned, were seized and placed under Japanese control. On 14 April 1932 special officers were appointed to take charge of the Postal Administration; they had taken complete charge of this service by 26 July 1932. In all of these public services Japanese officials and advisors were placed in the main political and administrative offices and exercised effective control of the organizations. The Japanese Cabinet confirmed this practice in its decision of 11 April 1932. It was soon after this decision that HOSHINO was sent to Manchuria. He was a recognized authority on fiscal and economic problems and was sent to Manchuria to organize its economy. KWANTUNG ARMY'S ECONOMIC PLAN FOR GUIDING MANCHUKUO On 3 November 1932, after HOSHINO's arrival in Manchuria in July, Chief-of Staff KOISO of the Kwantung Army sent a telegram to the Japanese War Ministry outlining his plan for "guiding" Manchukuo. He said: "The administration shall be backed for the time being [49,148] by inner leadership of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and shall be carried out with officials of Japanese lineage as its leaders. Economically, co-prosperity and co-existence shall be the basic principle. In the future the systems accompanying the establishment of a unit for an economic 'bloc' between Japan and Manchukuo shall be kept according to the race co- ordinate to Japan and Manchukuo. In order to realize the organization of the economy of Japan and Manchukuo into a single 'bloc' we must realize industrially the idea of 'Fit Industry for Suitable Locality' both in Japan and Manchukuo with the aim of abolishing the mutual customs barriers." 11 plans adopted thereafter by the Japanese Cabinet for the control and exploitation of the Manchurian economy were based upon these ideas. ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR MANCHUKUO The day before the conquest of Jehol was completed, that is to say, on 1 March 1933, the Government of Manchukuo promulgated on "Economic Construction Program for Manchukuo". The Japanese Cabinet approved the essential features of this "Program" in its decision of 8 August 1933 as related. In the announcement of the "Program" it was stated: "Efforts will be made to promote a healthy and vigorous development [49,149] of the whole national economy by applying to capital such State control as may be necessary in view of the evils of uncontrolled capitalistic economy and by making the most of the uses of capital". It was announced that economic development was to proceed upon the following basic principles: (1) "To apply State branches of economic activity in order effectively to open up the various national resources with which his country is endowed and to promote a co-ordinated development in all fields of economic endeavor; (2) To aim at the co-ordination and rationalization of the East Asian economy, to place the emphasis on co-ordination with the good neighbor Japan in view of the economic relationship of mutual dependence between the two countries, and to make increasingly closer this relationship of mutual helpfulness". In accordance with basic principles it was announced that the Government proposed "to make it a guiding principle that important enterprises of the nature of national defense or public utilities should be managed by public bodies or special companies". At the Japanese Cabinet meeting of 20 March 1934, which was after the re- organization of Manchukuo and the installation of Pu Yi as Emperor, this "Program" received further sanction of the Cabinet and it was de- [49,150] cided that those industries necessary for "national defense" should be operated by special companies, which should hold a dominant position in the business in Manchukuo, so that rapid development might be expected. The organization and operation of these special companies created monopolies in favor of the Japanese and effectively defeated the "Open Door Policy" in Manchuria. The United States and other Powers protested this unwarranted violation of existing treaty obligations intended to insure "equal opportunity" for trade in China. However, the Japanese Government disclaimed all responsibility for the violation of treaties by Manchukuo on the theory that Manchukuo was an independent State. JAPAN-MANCHUKUO JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE A joint Economic Committee was established in 1935 by an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo. The agreement provided that the Committee was to consist of eight members, four from each country. Japan's members were to be: Chief-of- Staff of the Kwantung Army; the Councillor of the Embassy in Manchukuo; the Chief of the Kwantung Bureau; and one member specially appointed by the Japanese Government. It is to be noted that the Commander of the Kwantung Army automatically controlled three votes by this [49,151] arrangement. Manchukuo's members were to be: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Finance, and the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board. All questions before the Committed were to be decided by majority vote. In answer to a question put to him at the Privy Council meeting on 3 July 1935 during discussion of the question of ratification of the Agreement, HIROTA said: “I ask him (Councillor Motoda) to consider the fact that three out of the four members of the Committee from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one is the Director of the General Affairs Board, who is, and will be a Japanese forever, I am confident. Although he is an official of Manchukuo, he is a central organ assuming leadership of that country. Therefore, in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan". The Committee was to deliberate on all questions concerning the economic tie between the two countries and supervise the Joint Holding Company to be organized by Japan and Manchukuo later to control the industries of Manchukuo, however, it was provided that matters important to the economic power would not be discussed by the Committee; and because they were [49,152] not to be deliberated by the Committee, those matters were to be made into unilateral contracts binding only upon Manchukuo. HOSHINO became a member of this Committee upon his appointment as Director of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo. MINAMI was a member from the time of the creation of the Committee in 1935 until he was relieved as Commander of the Kwantung Army on 6 March 1936. UMEZU served on the Committee while Kwantung Army Commander from 7 September 1939 to 18 July 1944. ITAGAKI, who became Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army on 23 March 1936, became ex-officio a member of the Committee on that date. Thus, ITAGAKI was one of the foremost figures in the construction of Manchukuo. Others who served on this Committee while Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army were: TOJO, who served from 6 March 1937 to 30 May 1938, when he became Vice-Minister of War; KIMURA, who served from 7 November 1940 to 21 April 1941. Upon being appointed Vice-Minister of War, TOJO retained his post as a member of the Committee, but in the capacity as the Government Representative rather than as Chief-of-Staff. [49,153] YEN BLOC ORGANIZED One of the first acts of this Joint Economic Committee was to integrate the currencies of the two countries. In November 1935 the yen bloc was established and Manchukuo's currency was no longer based on silver and was stabilized at par with the yen. RELEASE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY The next important economic arrangement made by this Joint Economic Committee was a treaty which was signed between Manchukuo and Japan on 10 June 1936. The purpose of the treaty appears to have been to give Japanese all the benefits of Manchukuoan citizenship without imposing on them the corresponding obligations. The treaty recited that its purpose was to abolish by progressive stages the rights of extra-territoriality enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan. However, it recited that "Japanese subjects shall be free within the territories of Manchukuo to reside and travel and engage in agriculture, commerce and industry, and to pursue callings and professions, and shall enjoy all the rights relating to land." A supplementary agreement went much more into detail and set out at great length the rights of Japanese in Manchukuo. One of these provisions was, "The Government of Manchukuo shall speedily take necessary steps in order that the rights [49,154] of lease by negotiation hitherto possessed by Japanese subjects shall be converted into land- ownership or other rights relating to land." Thus was settled the highly controversial question involving the right to lease land growing out of the notes attached to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915. This was very important for Japan was colonizing Manchuria at a rapid rate. Between 1936 and 1940 approximately 221,000 Japanese migrated to Manchuria. By 1945 this number exceeded 1,000,000. Most of the Japanese men settling in Manchuria were fit soldiers and were used to man new divisions of the Kwantung Army. The land for settlement of these Japanese was requisitioned at a nominal price and the Chinese farmers so dispossessed were moved and allotted undeveloped lands. INDUSTRIAL BANK OF MANCHUKUO The Industrial Bank of Manchukuo, which was organized in December 1936, with a capital of 60 million yen, served as an easy means of financing preferred industries to be developed under the Japanese Cabinet Policy. This bank handled all loans made for industrial purposes in Manchukuo. The Manchurians were permitted to make deposits in the Central Bank of Manchukuo and its branches, but they were not allowed to borrow from the Industrial Bank; only Japanese were allowed to borrow from that [49,155] bank. A law of savings was enacted to force the people to save money and deposit it in the Central Bank for the Japanese. At the time of the surrender, approximately 600 Billion dollars were in this bank -- all the result of the compulsory savings law. SECOND PERIOD CONSTRUCTION PLAN HOSHINO said during his interrogation that instead of the haphazard development of the first five-year period from 1931 to 1936, it was deemed necessary that a concrete coordinated plan be formulated for the development of Manchukuo. HOSHINO, working with various Ministries of Manchukuo, the Cabinet Planning Bureau, the South Manchurian Railway Company, and ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, drew up an "Outline of Five Year Plan for Industrial Development of Manchukuo," which was completed in January 1937. HOSHINO says that the Commander of the Kwantung Army had the "final say" on all questions involving this plan. This Second Five-Year Plan followed the basic principles underlying the First Five-Year Plan and laid emphasis on opening up resources in Manchukuo and making them available for "national defense," that is to say, "war." The outline of the plan declared the policy with regard to mining and industries to be, "that munition industries for weapons [49,156] of war, airplanes, automobiles, and rolling-stock will be firmly established, and basic major industries such as those of iron, liquid fuel coal and electric power will be developed, and emphasis will be laid especially on the development of iron and liquid fuel industries, which materials are necessary for national defense." This plan was adopted at a conference of provincial governors and the Chiefs of the General Affairs Bureau of the various ministries in Manchukuo in January 1937. On 17 February 1937 the Government of Manchukuo issued its "Official Report on the Result of the First Period Five-Year Administration and Outline of the Second Period Construction Plan." The outline stated: "Five years have elapsed since Manchukuo founded her country. In this period, the administrative and economic system have been rearranged, and the second Five Year Plan will be inaugurated in 1937, with which epoch-making construction activity will be commenced dashingly." In effect, the second plan of the Kwantung Army for the exploitation of the economy of Manchuria was to be adopted without change. The Industrialist Aikawa was sent to Manchuria to help direct the five-year plan. He favored a huge holding company to control all industries in Manchuria, especially the heavy industries such as coal and steel. [49,157] CONTROL OF INDUSTRIES On 1 May 1937 Manchukuo promulgated a "Law Controlling Important Industries," which was so drawn as to provide for the licensing of "Important Industries," practically all industries being classified as "Important" under the law. The law was promulgated in order to coordinate the economy of Manchuria with that of Japan. The "Essentials of the Five Year Program for Important Industries" released by the Japanese War Ministry on 29 May 1937 contained the following: "We plan systematically to promote the activity of important industries generally, so that by 1941, if anything happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying the important materials in Japan, Manchuria and North China." The plan then went on: "In promoting important industries for national defense, the requisite industries should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of 'Fit Industry for Suitable Locality'." It was in order to enforce this rule of "Fit Industry for Suitable Locality" that the "Law Controlling Important Industries" was promulgated by the puppet government in Manchukuo. MANCHURIA HEAVY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION The Cabinet decided on 22 October 1937 to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development [49,158] Corporation "in order to secure and advance the developing policy of Manchurian Industry and to establish synthetically and speedily the heavy industry of Manchukuo." This was to be a huge holding company; and its shares were to be held only by Manchukuo, Japan and their nationals. The original issue of stock was to be sold one-half to the Government of Manchukuo and one-half to Japanese private interests. The management of this company was to be "entrusted to a powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians. The powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians is prearranged as Aikawa Gisuke, the present President of Nissan." The directors and the president of the company were to be appointed by the two governments. Pursuant to this Cabinet decision an agreement was entered into with Manchukuo for the establishment of the company. MANCHUKUO A WORK-HOUSE FOR JAPAN The economic organization completed by Japan with the organization of the Heavy Industry Development Corporation proved to be of benefit only to Japan and the Japanese. Its sole purpose was to make of Manchuria a work-house for the production of war goods for use by Japan. The effectiveness with which this purpose was realized is vividly expressed by HOSHINO, the one man more responsible than any other for such success; [49,159] he stated that Japan took everything out of Manchuria which could be obtained. Since Chinese business men were not allowed to enter important industries and were not allowed to make loans, most of them went into bankruptcy. The Chinese farmers lost their lands to Japanese immigrants. The savings law reduced the Chinese laborer to working for mere subsistence. The monopolies on rice and cotton deprived the Chinese of adequate food and clothing in order to furnish the best rice and cotton for Japan's Army. A labor and civil service law was put into effect by UMEZU while he was Commander of the Kwantung Army, which required all persons between 18 and 45 to render labor service to the Japanese Army in opening highways, digging mines, and constructing public works. These laborers were kept in concentration camps where they were fed short rations and furnished no medical attention whatever. Heavy penalties were imposed for escape. In the result a system was developed whereby the Japanese came first, Koreans second, and Chinese last. OPIUM AND NARCOTICS In order to finance her operations in Manchuria and also in order to weaken the power of resistance of the Chinese, Japan sanctioned and developed the traffic in opium and narcotics. As early as 1929, the National [49,160] Government of China was making an effort to fulfill its obligations under the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1925. (Annex No. B-11 & B-12). That government had issued its Laws for the Prohibition of Smoking Opium, effective as of 25 July 1929. The plan was gradually to suppress the production and consumption of opium by 1940. Japan as a signatory to the above opium conventions was obligated to assist the Chinese Government in the eradication of the drug habit by limiting the manufacture and sale of the drugs within her territory and by preventing smuggling of the drugs into China. The principal source of opium and narcotics at the time of the Mukden Incident and for some time thereafter was Korea, where the Japanese Government operated a factory in the town of Seoul for the preparation of opium and narcotics. Persian opium was also imported into the Far East. The Japanese Army seized a huge shipment of this opium, amounting to approximately 10 million ounces and stored it in Formosa in 1929; this opium was to be used later to finance Japan's military campaigns. There was another source of illegal drugs in Formosa. The cocaine factory operated at Sinei by Finance Minister Takahashi of Japan until his assassination in 1936, produced from 200 to 300 kilos of cocaine per month. This was one factory that was given [49,161] specific authority to sell its produce to raise revenue for war. Wherever the Japanese Army went in China, Korean and Japanese drug peddlers followed closely upon its heels vending their merchandise without hindrance from the Japanese authorities. In some cases, these traffickers were sent ahead of the invading Army to prepare a way for it by engaging in intrigue, espionage and sabotage; such seems to have been the case in North China and also in Fukien Province, where the Genki Plot was perpetrated. Even the Japanese soldiers and their officers at times indulged in this lucrative business of vending opium and narcotics. The Japanese Special Service Organization was charged with the duty of regulating the opium and narcotic traffic in territories immediately following their capture; and this organization in the Kwantung Army became so involved in the illicit traffic under KOISO that it was necessary for MINAMI, when he became Commander of the Kwantung Army in December 1934, to abolish the organization to prevent it from destroying all discipline in that Army. DOMIHARA was one of the foremost officers of this organization; and his connection with the drug traffic has been fully shown. The general principle of gradual suppression of [49,162] the traffic in and use of opium and narcotics was the underlying principle not only of the drug laws promulgated by China, but also of the international Opium Conventions of 1912, 1925 and 1931 (Annexes No. B-11, B-12, B-13). Japan, having ratified those Conventions, was bound by them. Using this principle of gradual suppression to their advantage, the Japanese promulgated Opium Laws in the territories occupied by them in China; these laws ostensibly followed the principle of gradual suppression by licensing known addicts to smoke in licensed shops. However, these laws were merely a blind or cover for Japan's real intention and operations. These laws created government controlled monopolies for the distribution of opium and narcotics to licensed shops; and these monopolies were nothing more than revenue collection agencies, which encouraged the use of the drugs in order to increase the revenue therefrom. In all areas occupied by the Japanese the use of opium and narcotics increased steadily from the time of such occupation until the surrender. This was the procedure followed in Manchuria. In the fall of 1932 the Opium Law was promulgated by Manchukuo and the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration was created as the administrative agency to enforce the laws. This agency was under the general supervision [49,163] of the Director of the General Affairs Board and became one of the important sources of revenue for Manchukuo. The reliability of the revenue from these sources is attested by the fact that the Industrial Bank of Japan was willing to underwrite the 30 million yen founding bond issue secured by the opium revenue of Manchukuo and negotiated by HOSHINO soon after his arrival in Manchuria. This procedure was repeated in North China and again in South China; however, the administrative agency in those places was the Ko-A-In or China Affairs Bureau, which maintained its main offices in Tokyo with branch offices all over North, Central and Southern China. These organizations created such demand for opium that the Cabinet was forced from time to time to authorize the farmers of Korea to increase their acreage devoted to growing poppies. The trade became so lucrative that Japanese trading companies, such as the Mitsubishi Trading Company and Mitsui Bussan, were induced by the Foreign Ministry to sign a contract limiting their trade areas and the amount of opium to be supplied by them. Japan's real purpose in engaging in the drug traffic was far more sinister than even the debauchery of the Chinese people. Japan having signed and ratified [49,164] the Opium Conventions was bound not to engage in the drug traffic, but she found in the alleged but false independence of Manchukuo a convenient opportunity to carry on a world-wide drug traffic and cast the guilt upon that puppet state. A large part of the opium produced in Korea was sent to Manchuria. There opium grown in Manchuria and imported from Korea and elsewhere was manufactured and distributed throughout the world. In 1937 it was pointed out in the League of Nations that ninety percent of all illicit white drugs in the world were of Japanese origin, manufactured in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, Dairen and other cities of Manchuria, Jehol and China, always by Japanese or under Japanese supervision. [49,165] SECTION III. THE PLAN TO ADVANCE FURTHER INTO CHINA. Japan' s occupation of Manchuria and Jehol was completed when the Tangku Truce was signed in the spring of 1933. Jehol, facing another Inner Mongolian Province of Chahar on the west and the North China Province of Hopeh on the south, became the frontier of the newly formed puppet state of Manchukuo. If Japan were to advance further into China from the territory she had already occupied, her advance would be from Jehol westwards into Chahar or southwards into Hopeh, besides the other route which linked Manchuria with the rest of China through the narrow corridor of the Liaoning Province around Shanhaikwan on the eastern end of the Great Wall. On 17th April 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "Amau Statement" warning the Powers who subscribed to the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) that the Japanese Government would not tolerate any interference with her plans in China. Although HIROTA later explained, upon inquiries, to the American Ambassador Grey, that the "Amau Statement" had been issued without his approval or knowledge, the fact remains that the "Amau Statement" truly represented Japan's policy towards China. Already, it appeared possible that Japanese ambitions in regard to China had not been satisfied by her occupation [49,166] of Manchuria and Jehol. Very shortly thereafter in May and June 1935 there took place two incidents, of trifling importance when compared with the demands based by the Japanese upon their occurrence, which resulted in the position of the National Government of China on both the Hopei and the Chahar fronts being substantially weakened. THE HOPEI INCIDENT In the middle of May 1935 two Chinese newspapermen were assassinated by unidentified assailants in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. The journalists were said to have been pro-Japanese in sentiment. UMEZU was then Commander of the North China Garrison Forces and with his approval certain demands were presented by his Chief of Staff to General Ho Ying-Chin, head of the Chinese military organization in Peiping. On the 10th of June 1935 the incident was settled, the Chinese authorities agreeing to withdraw the Chinese 51st Army from the province of Hopei; to close the party offices and to ban all party activities of the Kuomintang in that province and to ban all anti-Japanese activities in that province. The above settlement is the so-called "Ho-UMEZU Agreement." The defense submit that no pressure of any kind was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to [49,167] agree to the above major limitations on their sovereignty over the great province of Hopei. They say that the Japanese made no more than some "suggestions" which might improve future relations between the nations. In this connection the evidence of the defense witness, Kuwashima, should be noticed. He was then Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs in the Japanese Foreign Office, and Sino-Japanese relations were his direct concern. He testified that he learned from the Japanese Legation at Peiping that the Japanese had made "a considerably strong demand" upon the Chinese. A consideration of the whole of his evidence makes it plain that Kuwashima understood that the Chinese had been presented with an ultimatum. There is also an entry in the Harada-Saionji Diaries in which Okada, the then Premier of Japan, is recorded as having said that "in the beginning only an exceedingly light, friendly warning" had been intended "from which such a serious thing had resulted." When on 30th May 1935 KIDO drew the attention of SHIGEMITSU, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a report in the morning newspaper that the Japanese Garrison in North China had lodged a momentous claim, against the Chinese Government, SHIGEMITSU did not deny the report, but rather speculated as to the personalities in the Japanese army who were responsible for such action. [49,168] THE NORTH CHAHAR INCIDENT In June 1935, about the time when the Hopei incident was being settled by the "Ho- UMEZU Agreement," four members of the Japanese Army entered the Changpei District of Chahar province. This is in the southwestern part of Chahar, a little to the north of the Great Wall. As they did not have the required permits from the Chahar Provincial Government, they were taken to the headquarters of the Chinese Divisional Commander, who communicated with the general in command of the Chinese 29th Army. The latter ordered their release and that they be allowed to continue on their projected journey to Kalgan and Peiping, but with the warning that the appropriate permits must be obtained in future. The matter was at first taken up by the Japanese Consul at Kalgan, who represented to General Ching, Deputy Commander of the Chinese 29th Army, that the Chinese Guards had insisted on searching the Japanese personnel, had pointed rifles at them, had detained them some four or five hours at Divisional Headquarters, and had thus insulted the Japanese Army. Very shortly thereafter the consul stated that the matter was very grave and was beyond his power to settle. The matter had been transferred to the army. In December 1934 MINAMI had become Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and ITAGAKI had become his vice-chief of Staff. [49,169] DOHIHARA, then attached to the Kwantung Army, was appointed to negotiate with General Ching. In the end it was agreed that the commander of the regiment concerned and the judge advocate of the division concerned should be dismissed and punished. These measures, one would have thought, should have amply met the occasion, if these officers had been in the wrong. By far the most important provisions of the agreement, however, are those which followed, and they are largely, if not wholly unconnected with the incident. All units of the Chinese 29th Army were to be withdrawn from the districts north of Changpei, that is to say, from substantially the whole of Chahar province. The maintenance of peace and order there was to be entrusted to the Peace Preservation Corps, an organization of the nature of a police force. In the future no Chinese were to be permitted to migrate to and settle in the northern part of Chahar province. No activities of the Kuomintang were henceforth to be permitted in Chahar province. All anti-Japanese institutions and acts in Chahar province were to be banned. This is the so-called "Ching-DOHIHARA Agreement." Again the defense submit that no pressure of any kind was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to submit to the above major restrictions on the sovereignty of China over the great province of Chahar. [49,170] General Ching in his evidence calls it a "temporary settlement" accepted by the Chinese Government "in order to secure peace and under pain." Thus by June 1935, in less than two months, and nominally in settlement of two incidents of trifling importance in international affairs, the Japanese right flank in Jehol had been freed from any immediate threat of attack from Chahar; two Chinese armies, thought to be hostile to the Japanese, had been removed from Chahar and Hopei, and all activities of the Chinese National Party and all anti-Japanese activities had been banned in both provinces. INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT In the beginning of 1935 Prince Teh, the leader of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, was striving to set up an autonomous Mongolian Government there. The subsequent history of this movement is taken from the evidence of General Tanaka Ryukichi, a witness whom both prosecution and defense adduced from time to time, as occasion demanded, and whom both prosecution and defense cross-examined as a witness of no credit, again as occasion demanded. In this matter of the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regime there is no reason to distrust his account and he was certainly in a position to be familiar with the details. Tanaka' s account of this matter follows. [49,171] MINAMI and ITAGAKI gave earnest support to the establishment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government which they intended to be subservient to the wishes of Japan. In April 1935 MINAMI sent Tanaka and another officer to interview Prince Teh with a view to establishing such a government, and Prince Teh did not at this time come to terms. It should be noticed that there now followed the so-called "Ho-UMEZU" and Ching-DOHIHAKA Agreements of June 1935, the latter of which substantially affected the northern part of Inner Mongolia, the province of Chahar. According to Tanaka in August 1935 MINAMI had an interview with Prince Teh at which the Prince promised close cooperation with Japan and MINAMI promised financial assistance to the Prince. In December 1935 MINAMI sent two battalions of cavalry to assist Prince Teh in taking over the northern part of Chahar province. On 11th February 1936 Prince Teh transferred the seat of his autonomous regime from Pailinmiao, in Suiyuan province, to West Sunito, and Japanese civilians were sent there to act as advisers to him. There is a significant cable, dated 2 October 1935, from the Secretary General of the Japanese Embassy at Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA inter alia to the following effect: "the Japanese Forces' Mongolian Policy is making steady progress as I and Consul at [49,172] Changchiakou repeatedly reported to you. The other day Fajor Gereral DOHIHARA made a trip from Changchiakou to Chengte and back and saw the Governor of Chahar Province and Prince Teh; his mission was no doubt to promote the Inner Mongolian self-government." References will also be found in the Japanese Army plan for dealing with North China, transmitted to the Japanese forces in China on 13 January 1936, which make it plain that this Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government was supported and controlled by the Kwantung Army. This document will be considered more fully a little later. ATTEMPT TO SET UP A NORTH CHINA AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT General Tanaka testified that in September 1935 MINAMI sent DOHIHARA to Peiping with orders to set up an autonomous regime in North China. Tanaka was then a staff officer with the Kwantung Army and he stated that he had a hand in the drafting of DOHIHARA's instructions. He also said that DOHIHARA, ITAGAKI, and Sasaki considered that "Anti-Communism" should be added as a slogan to the objective of creating an autonomous regime in North China. We accept this evidence, for it fits in with what followed and its statement as to the real authors of the so-called autonomous movement in North China is confirmed by various documents from Japanese sources which will be [49,173] noticed hereafter. We have little evidence as to the events of the next two months. This is not surprising, for they were presumably months of intrigue, of dangerous intrigue. Negotiations on such matters are seldom recorded or made public. DOHIHARA first tried to persuade Wu Pei-Fu to become the head of a North China Autonomous Government and failed. DOHIHARA thereafter tried to induce General Sung Che-Yuan, then Garrison Commander of the Peiping-Tientsin Area, to lead such a government, and failed. DOHIHARA and Takahashi, who was Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy, then passed from persuasion to demands that a North China Autonomous Government should be formed and DOHIHARA and Matsui, who was Chief of the Japanese Special Services Board, further demanded that special economic concessions should be granted to the Japanese in North China. It is proved that when inducements failed to produce an autonomous government, DOHIKARA in November 1935 betook himself to threats of force, and even to the issue of an ultimatum for the purpose of procuring the establishment of such a government, and that the Kwantung Army backed up his threats by concentrating a striking force of tanks, mobile troops, and airplanes at [49,174] Shanhaikwan at the eastern end of the Great Wall, ready to advance into the Peiping-Tientsin area. About the end of the year 1935 there emerged two new forms of government in North China. One, which was set up directly as a result of DOHIHARA's effort, was called the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." It was established about the end of November 1935 with Yin Ju-Keng as its chairman. He had been administrative commissioner of the demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall in East Hopei. It proclaimed itself independent of the National Government of China. Its capital was Tungchow in the demilitarized zone, northeast of Peiping. The Japanese maintained garrison troops there. Its control extended over many districts of the demilitarized zone. The witness Goette travelled in this area many times after the establishment of this government, saw the Japanese garrison troops, and saw the Chinese gendarmerie of the new government, recruited, trained, and officered by Japanese. Being in the demilitarized zone, this new government was beyond the reach of the forces of the National Government of China. That government protested to the Japanese against the existence of this so-called autonomous government, but without effect. Another new governmental organ which made its [49,175] appearance in North China about this time was the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. It was created by the National Government of China as a result of pressure exerted by DOHIHARA and ostensibly to conform to his wishes. According to the Japanese Year Book it was a new political organ which had power to negotiate with Japan and Manchukuo for the maintenance of amicable relations. DOHIHARA's hopes of these regimes can be gathered from his report made to MINAMI in Tanaka's presence in the end of 1935. DOHIHARA reported that the Hopei-Chahar regime and the East Hopei regime, though unsatisfactory, had been established and would more or less obey the Kwantung Army, and that the North China regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime as its core. Similar hopes were entertained by the Japanese Army at home at this time. On 13 January 1936 it transmitted to the Japanese forces in China a plan for dealing with North China. The object of the plan was stated to be the realization of self- government in the five northern provinces of China. This it will be recalled was the object for which MINAMI had dispatched DOHIHARA to Peiping in September 1935. The plan suggested that Japanese advice and guidance should be given to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; that East Hopei independence should be upheld so long as the Hopei-Chahar Political [49,176] Council remained unsatisfactory, but, when it was established so as to justify confidence, a merger should be introduced; that measures should be avoided which might lend to Japan being misunderstood as if she were setting up a separate state like Manchukuo; that accordingly Japanese advisers should be limited in number; that measures towards Inner Mongolia should be continued as before, but measures which had become obstacles to the self-government power of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council should be held back for the time being; that management of North China should be the duty of the Commander of the Japanese troops in China; and that as a rule he should execute this informally by direct contact with the Hopei- Chahar and East Hopei Governments, THE JAPANESE ARMY' S PLANS FOR AN ADVANCE INTO NORTH CHINA About the time when DOHIHARA was expressing to MINAMI, commanding the Kwantung Army, his expectation that the Hopei Chahar Political Council would more or less obey the Kwantung Army, and that an independent North China regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime as its core, the Kwantung Army sent to Tokyo a Propaganda Plan which is most significant as to Japanese intentions towards North China. It was dispatched by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of [49,177] War on 9 December 1935. Certain passages in it merit quotation in full. As to the time of execution it is stated "Prior to the advance of our military forces into China proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly to support from the side the propaganda of the Japanese Government and the Japanese forces stationed in China. After the advance of our forces into China proper it shall be performed so as to facilitate our military activities." The general principle is stated to be "We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into China proper takes place. We shall launch out on a movement to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the Central Government by fomenting anti-Kuomintang and anti-communism agitation among them. As for the Chinese people and army of the rest of China we shall take a measure to form an anti-war atmosphere." We quote also the types of propaganda which are to be used. "1. The Central Government has regarded North China as a colony in a sense and has long made it the object of exploitation. The inhabitants in North China therefore have been cherishing a strong desire to establish a separate government of their own in order to shake themselves from the fetters of the Central Government. Burning, with strong aspiration for independence [49,178] the people concerned have expressed their firm resolution to establish an independent country. "2. The enactment of the nationalization of silver has made the Central Government the object of resentment and as a result of it the movement to establish a new independent government in North China is making rapid progress. "3. It is the greatest desire of the Japanese Government to form an anti-Communist front with the North China independent government, for it may be considered the first ray of hope for the establishment of lasting peace in the Orient by the harmonious cooperation among Japan, China and Manchuria. We therefore shall assume a definite attitude to support wholeheartedly the establishment and development of the independent government in North China. "4. The Chinese Central Government has violated the agreement of cessation of hostilities in North China and other military agreements; they have been disturbing the pence of Manchuria; instigating a boycott of Japanese goods and an anti-Japanese sentiment; and has become a great menace to the Japanese interests and residents in North China and the existence of the Manchurian Empire; therefore we have to make it clear that we shall be obliged to resort to arms if the Chinese Government [49,179] continues such underhanded tactics. "5. It must made clear that when we do dispatch our forces to China in the future. We do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military, and not the Chinese people at large. "6. We shall try to enhance an anti-war sentiment among the people by propagandizing extensively that the employment of military forces by the Chinese Central Government or other military lords will reduce the people to the greatest misery and will lead to the destruction of the country. "7. As for the Chinese forces, we will take a measure to promote antagonism between them and to increase their admiration for the strength of the Japanese military power, thus depriving their fighting spirit. "8. Our propaganda for Manchuria will be that the appearance of the independent government in north China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their longing for the fine administration of the Manchurian Government, and it will brighten the future of Manchuria." [49,180] We have quoted from this document so fully in order that its proposals, advanced on 9 December 1945 may be contrasted with the contention proposed by the defense in general, and by MINAMI, UMEZU, ITAGAKI, and DOHIHARA in particular, that the so-called North China independence movement was a spontaneous movement on the part of the people of North China, neither initiated nor furthered by Japan. Relevant also to the question of the attitude and intention of the Japanese towards the so-called autonomous movement in North China is a "Draft of Outline for the military Disposal of Various Railways in North China" sent by General Tada, then Commander of the Japanese garrison forces in North China, to the Ministry of War in Tokyo on 2 December 1935. This document contains detailed plans for the working of certain railways in North China on behalf of Japanese troops engaged in military operation in North China. The document does not specifically mention the nature of this proposed military operation. The operation is described in such vague terms as the "military objective", "military operations", and "when the army find it inevitable to settle the issue by armed force." A critical examination of the whole document, however, reveals that the Japanese Army [49,181] proposed to move from about the line of the Great Wall, driving before it the military forces of the National Government of China, and clearing Shantung, Hopei and Shansi, the three southern provinces of the five northern provinces of China. It is clear also that the operation was to be embarked on to support the proposed North China Autonomous Regime. Thus the Chinese employees of the railways were to be made to "understand the spirit of the North China Autonomous Movement," and General Tada expresses a private and strictly confidential opinion as to the disposal of the railways when normal political condition is restored. He says "When the situation in North China is restored to its normal condition after the military operations are over, the railways will be turned over to the North China Regime. Under the management of the Communication ministry of the North China Regime Japanese advisers and/or some railway employess will be employed. "Addenda. The following demands will be made of the North China Regime on the occasion of the abolition of the headquarters of the 'Japanese' Railway Corps. "1. Employment of adivsers and high-ranking officials by each railway. "2. The right of guarding the railways and of posting troops at the principal places along the [49,182] railway lines. "3. Cession of the Shantung Railway and the section of the Lunghai Railway east of Suchow. "4. The right of constructing new railways." Moreover the document shows that certain steps had already been taken in North China to pave the way for the operation. Thus "2. We shall endeavor to check the southward transfer of rolling stocks in counter opposition to the Nanking Government's policy of carrying away rolling stocks and other materials to the south. For this purpose we shall do our best in applying all possible indirect means, but in the case of Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway we shall check it even by might if necessary. In case such forcible measure is taken, we shall give as the nominal reason self-defense and protection of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway against the anti-Japanese military operations of the Making Government. (This is being enforced by the dispatch of military police under an agreement made with the Peiping-Shanhaikwen Railway Co.)" Thus during the latter half of the year 1935 the Kwantung Army and the North China Garrison Army with the support of and at times as directed by, the Japanese Ministry of War, were engaged in an attempt [49,183] to detatch the five northern provinces of China from allegiance to the National Government of China, and to set up an autonomous regime or regimes there, which would be subservient to Japan. The plan contained the two essential elements which had been present in the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol, namely, (1) military domination by Japan, and (2) a declaration of independence by such for Chinese figures as could be induced to serve Japan's purpose. In the Manchurian case, however, military conquest had preceded the artificially engendered declaration of independence. In the case or North China the Japanese military had hoped to avoid the appearance of military conquest, and had tried hard to induce the establishment of an artificially engendered North China Autonomous Government at first by persuasion and later by threat of the use of force. By the end of the year 1935 the Japanese military had evolved the plans for invasion which we have just considered. The efforts of the Japanese military were known to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and were resented by it, but only because they were regarded as an attempt by the Army to encroach on the Foreign Ministry's domain -- the conduct of the foreign relations of Japan. [49,184] HIROTA'S THREE PRINCIPLES While Japan's armies in China were formulating plans in anticipation of military operations in North China, the Japanese Cabinet was working on a program of subjugating China through diplomatic measures. On 5 August 1935, Foreign Minister HIROTA sent to the diplomatic and consular officials in China a plan prepared on his instructions by the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office, as a result of the reinvestigation of Japan's policy towards China which had been made by that Bureau in collaboration with the Army and Navy authorities. Three general principles were stated in the plan, as follows: (1) China should carry out strict control over all anti-Japanese speeches and activities, and both Japan and China should make efforts to promote friendship and cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual respect of independence, cooperation and mutual assistance, and should work for the development of relations between Manchukuo and China; (2) While the ultimate aim of the development of relations was that China would give formal recognition to Manchukuo and that Japan, Manchukuo and China would conclude an agreement to regulate the new relations among the three countries, China for the time being should not deny the fact of [49,185] Manchukuo's existence, at least in North China and in the Chahar district which bordered the Manchukuo territory, and should enter into actual relations of interdependence and cooperation with Manchukuo in the economic and cultural fields; (3) Japan and China should cooperate in Chahar and other districts bordering Outer Mongolia, with a view to removing the communist menace. In a subsequent telegram dated 28 September 1935, addressed to Japanese diplomatic and consular officials in China and Manchukuo, HIROTA reiterated the three principles as the basis of Japan's foreign policy to stabilize East Asia and to work for common prosperity by means of cooperation and mutual assistance between Japan, Manchukuo and China, putting Japan as its center. In substance the three principles were recited as follows: (1) China should carry out strict control of all anti-Japanese speeches and activities and should cooperate with Japan on concrete questions, putting an end to her policy of depending upon European and American countries; (2) China must ultimately give a formal recognition to Manchukuo, but for the time being China should give tacit consent to the independence of Manchukuo and enter into relations of interdependence and cooperation with Manchukuo in the economic and cultural fields, at least in North China which is an [49,186] area bordering Manchukuo territory; (3) China should cooperate with Japan in removing the communist menace in areas bordering Outer Mongolia. The telegram appended the additional instruction that in the event the above- mentioned principles were carried into execution steadily and China's sincerity sufficiently manifested, a general agreement would be concluded for the regulation of the new relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. One material alteration in this statement of the three principles as compared with the statement of 5 August 1935 is that the later version omits the statements that Japan and China should cooperate on the basis of the principle of mutual respect of independence. After considerable discussion with the Army and the Navy, the plan as set out in the second version of 28 September 1935 was adopted on 4 October 1935 by the Premier, the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers. Japanese diplomatic officials abroad were again notified and instructed to keep the matter strictly secret. On 21 January 1936, the three principles were made known to the public through HIROTA'S address to the Diet. On the part of China , however, no enthusiasm was shown for their acceptance inasmuch as these principles would involve China's recognition of the de facto status of Manchukuo. Thus the diplomats of [49,187] Japan would have secured for Japan the fruits of her conquest of Manchuria. While HIROTA, on 21 January 1936, was announcing his three principles, of Japanese policy towards China, the Japanese Foreign Office was fully aware of the Army's plan to set up an autonomous government in the five northern provinces of China, for on that same day, 21 January 1936, it had transmitted a copy of that plan to the Japanese Ambassador in China. THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT The February Incident was an outburst of the Army's resentment against the government under the premiership of Okada which was known as a Navy Cabinet and reputed to be opposed to the Army's policy of expansion on the continent of Asia by military force. The Incident occurred on 26 February 1936. Earlier, when Okada was Navy Minister in the Saito Cabinet, great difficulties were experienced by the Cabinet because the Cabinet was pursuing a policy of reducing the Army budget against vigorous opposition of the Army. When Okada became Premier in 1934, the power of the Army was increasing. There were already indications, while the Cabinet was being formed, that the Army would bring about disturbances and trouble with the new government. [49,188] On 26 February 1936, some 22 officers and 1400 men revolted against the Government, terrorized Tokyo for three and a half days, seized the Premier's official residence, the Diet Building, the Home and War Offices, the Metropolitan Police Building and the General Staff Building, assassinated Finance Minister Takahashi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saito and General Watanabe and attempted to assassinate Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Okada himself. As a result of the incident, the Okada Cabinet resigned on 8 March 1936, and HIROTA succeeded as Premier. The purpose of this Incident was to replace the Okada Cabinet by another with stronger policies which would fit into the policy of the Army for further expansion on the continent. Okada testified that he supposed the Incident was a spontaneous outburst of resentment on the part of a group of young officers against the Government's lack of sympathy with the ambitions of the military. We will adjourn until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) {49,189] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment. FORMATION OF THE HIROTA CABINET On 9 March 1936, as a result of the February Incident, HIROTA succeeded Okada as Premier of Japan. Instead of taking measures to enforce military discipline and eradicate the interference of the Army in political affairs, some dire effects of which had just been exhibited, already in the formation of his Cabinet he yielded to Army demands as to the choice of some of his ministers. Moreover, in May 1936, shortly after he assumed the premiership, the organization of the Army and Navy was changed to require that Army and Navy ministers should be of rank now lower than lieutenant-general and vice-admiral, and vice-ministers of rank not lower than major-general and rear-admiral, and that they should all be on the active list. Since 1913 the organization had in form permitted the appointment of reserve officers as Ministers of War and of the Navy. While the change [49,190] did, in fact, make the law conform to the existing practice of appointing War and Navy ministers from senior officers on the active list, it was done in compliance with the demand of the Army, who were thereby assured that whoever became War Minister, whether on the active list or recalled from the reserve list, would be subject to Army discipline and command and thus to control by the Army. FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER THE HIROTA CABINET On 30 June 1936, the War and Navy Ministries agreed upon a "Basis of National Policy." The fundamental policy was to consist in advancing toward and developing the South Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Asiatic Continent for stabilizing Japan's national defense. The principles stated were: (1) Japan must strive to correct the aggressive policies of the great powers and to realize the spirit of the "Imperial way" by a consistent policy of overseas expansion; (2) Japan must complete her national defense and armament to secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia; (3) Japan expects the sound development of Manchukuo and thus hopes to stabilize Japan- Manchukuo national defense; in order to promote economic development, Japan intends to be rid of the menace of the U. S.S.R. [49,191] to prepare against Britain and the United States and to bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo and China; in the execution of this continental policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers; (4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economical development in the South Seas, and without rousing other powers will attempt to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan may expect full development of her natural resources and develop her national defense. These plans were adopted on 11 August 1936 as the "Basic Principles of National Policy" by the Five Ministers Conference, consisting of the Premier, HIROTA, and the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers. While HIROTA contends that they were to be achieved by peaceful means and were defensive in nature, the contents of these principles speak for themselves. Japan proposed to assume the role of the leader of East Asia, thus bringing the entire sphere under her domination through expansion on the continent and to the South Seas, to the exclusion of the influence of western power. As has been previously observed the use of the words "national defense" in this document should be noted. They occur in many statements of [49,192] Japan's policy. They are never confined to defense by Japan against the aggressive acts of other nations. They always mean military support by Japan of her own policies, aggressive or not. ITAGAKI'S MONGOLIAN POLICY While the HIROTA Cabinet was formulating its expansionist foreign policy under the name of national defense, the Kwantung Army had its attention directed toward Mongolia in the north. Earlier, on 28 March 1936, five days after ITAGAKI was promoted to Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he had an interview with Ambassador Arita, expounding his views on the strategic impertance of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. ITAGAKI said: "Outer Mongolia is of importance from the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today, because it is the flank defense of the Siberian Railroad which is a connecting line between Soviet territory in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed without fighting. Therefore, the Army aims to extend Japanese-Manchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand." [49,193] In connection with Inner Mongolia, he said: "Western Inner Mongolia and the zone to the west of these are of great value for executing the continental policy of Japan. Should the said zone be placed in the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influence, it means that will be a base for pacification of their brothers of the same race in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, that the influence of Soviet Russia which comes from Province of Sinkiang, as well as a land link between Soviet Russia and China will be blocked. . . . From the above standpoint, the Imperial Army has been furthering its work with regard to Western Inner Mongolia for several years. The Imperial Army is resolved to further its work, overcoming all sorts of obstacles." This statement made by ITAGAKI shows what the Kwantung Army had done and would continue to do in those areas in line with Japan's "continental policy." It is to be recalled that a part of Inner Mongolia had already been brought under Japanese sway by the establishment of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime under Prince Teh through the efforts of DOHIHARA and others of the Kwantung Army in 1935. All that was left to be done was to extend the Japanese influence further west and to Outer Mongolia. This explains why the seat of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime, under [49,194] Prince Teh was moved from Pallingmiao to east Sunito in February 1936, and again to Teh-Hua in June of the same year. STATE-FOUNDING CONFERENCE IN MONGOLIA As a result of the adoption of a positive Mongolian policy by Japan, the autonomous movement in Inner Mongolia made steady progress. In April 1936, Prince Teh and Li Shou-Hsin met with the Japanese Special Service Chief Tanaka, Hisshi, at West Wuchumuhsin. Representatives of Mengchenhui, Hsilinkuolemeng, Tsaknarmen, Ulanchapmeng, Tumotechi, Alashan, Koshimouchi, Ikochiamang, Tsinghai and Outer Mangolis also attended this meeting, which was called the State Founding Conference, lasting from 21 to 26 April 1936. The principal matters decided at the conference were: (1) A plan to found the Mongolian State by amalgamating Mongolia and Tsinghai; (2) A plan to set up a monarchy, with a committee system to serve the purpose for the time being; (3) A plan to found a Mongolian Congress; (4) A plan to organize a military government; and (5) A plan to conclude a mutual assistance agreement with Manchukuo. In June 1936, the seat of the regime was moved to Teh-Hua and an independent Mongolian government was set up there. In July 1936, an agreement between [49,195] this government and Manchukuo was concluded, providing for mutual political and economic aid. After the conclusion of this treaty, Prince Teh set out to equip his army. The object was to increase cavalry divisions which had hitherto numbered three to nine. Both MINAMI and ITAGAKI gave their earnest support for the creation of the Mongolian State. The Army's policy was carried out in utmost secrecy. Preparations were made by the Japanese Army to recognize the independence of Inner Mongolia. JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD NORTH CHINA - 1936-1937 On 11 August 1936, "The Second Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided by the appropriate ministries in the HIROTA Cabinet. The main purpose of the policy was stated to be to assist the people in North China to procure perfect independence in administration, to set up an anti-Communist, pro-Japanese and pro- Manchukuoan area, to secure necessary materials for Japan's national defense and to improve the facilities of transportation against the possible invasion of Soviet Russia, thus making North China a base for cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China. The five provinces in North China should finally be put under self- government. Advice should be given to the East Hopei regime to reform their internal administration [49,196] so as to serve as an example throughout Hopei and Chahar. The object of economic development in North China was stated to be to create an inseparable connection between China and Japan based on the mutual economic interest promoted by free investment and also to make it contribute toward the preservation of friendly relations between Japan and North China, both in time of war or peace. Iron, coal and salt in the North China provinces should be utilized for Japan's national defense and for the promotion of transportation facilities and electric power. The same plan provided in detail for the unification and improvement of transportation facilities and the methods of developing natural resources in North China. There is internal evidence in this plan that the hopes entertained by Japan at the end of 1935 that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council would prove subservient to Japan had been disappointed. This plan says a fair and square attitude is required for the guidance of the leaders of Hopei and Chahar. It says the system should be improved, the personnel purged and changed, and efforts made to abolish the financial, economic and military administration of the Chinese military clique. The content of the self-government which Japan now proposed for North China was that the new regime [49,197] should have control of finances, industry and transportation and should be free of the anti-Japanese interference of the National Government of China. The plan at the same time provided that acts must be avoided which would make it appear as if Japan was infringing China's territorial rights or establishing an independent country, or making North China an extension of Manchukua. A similar provision, it will be remembered, appeared in the first plan, or Army plan, for North China forwarded by the Foreign Office to the Japanese Ambassador to China on 13 January 1936. The framers of Japan's policies still believed that black could be made to look white in the eyes of the world. The expose by the League of Nations of Japan's duplicity in regard to Manchuria had taught them nothing. Subsequently, on 20 February 1937, "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided upon by the appropriate ministries of the Hayashi Cabinet. There was no substantial change in contents. Again, on 16 April 1937, "The Plan for Guiding North China" was decided upon by the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers of the same Cabinet. The essence of the plan was to make the Chinese Government recognize the special position of North China and to carry out eccnomic measures. Both the Third Administrative [49,198] Policy Toward North China and the Plan for Guiding North China decided upon by the Hayashi Cabinet will be treated in more detail later. THE FENGTAI INCIDENT In May 1936, as a result of negotiations conducted between the Japanese forces and the Chinese authorities in North China, one Japanese battalion was permitted to be stationed at Fengtai, a town west of Peiping. On 18 September 1936, an incident occurred when a company of Japanese soldiers carried out maneuvers in Fengtai. As they passed through the garrison line of the Chinese troops there, the Chinese patrols attempted to halt them and a clash ensued. Although it was immediately settled, the Japanese used this incident as a pretext for reenforcement and occupied Fengtai. With the occupation of Fengtai, the Japanese were in a position to control the communications of the Peiping-Hankow railway line and to cut off North China from Central China. This was the stage-setting for the Lukouchiao Incident, sometimes referred to as the Marco Folo Bridge Incident which occurred on 7 July 1937. The bridge is on the railway from Fangtai to Peiping and if the Japanese could gain control of the bridge, their control of Peiping from the west would be facilitated. The Japanese forces stationed at Fengtai then [49,199] repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Lukouchiao and also from Chang-Sin-Tien, another strategic point on the railway leading to Peiping. In the winter of 1936, the Japanese intended to reenforce their garrison force in this vital strategic area and planned the building of barracks and an airfield there. For this purpose they wished to purchase large tracts of land in the area between Fengtai and Lukouchiao. These demands, however, were refused by the Chinese. THE CHANG-KAWAGOE TALKS In the autumn of 1936, a series of talks was held between the Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Chun and the Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe, with a view to adjusting Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Kawagoe also had an interview with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the end of November 1936, and there was a mutual expression of the desire to see the diplomatic relations between the two countries adjusted. During the talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister, the Japanese side submitted a proposal embodying the following important points: (1) Sino-Japanese economic cooperation; (2) Sino-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement; and (3) North China to be designated a special area in view of its relationship with Japan. [49,200] Chang Chun responded that he was, of course, in favor of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation but wished this to be based on the principle of reciprocity and equality. He was also very much in favor of Sino-Japanese Anti-Comintern agreement, but here too he wanted to see that the agreement would not infringe upon China's sovereignty. As to making North China a special area on account of its relation with Japan, he could only recognize a special economic relation, but would not be able to recognize any special administrative changes. These talks achieved no results since the attitude of the Chinese Government was incompatible with Japan's policies, particularly with regard to North China. THE FALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET On 20 January 1937, one of Japan's two political parties, the Seiyukai Party, issued a declaration attacking the HIROTA Cabinet on the ground, inter alia, that its members were too much influenced by the dogmatic prejudices of the bureaucrats and of the military, and that the wish of the military to interfere in every sphere was a threat to constitutional government in Japan. On 22 January 1937, War Minister Terauchi tendered his resignation because, as he stated, the views on the prevailing situation held by [49,201] the political party which had some members sitting as cabinet members differed fundamentally from the Army's. Under the then existing situation, there was no hope of getting a new War Minister who could in any manner reconcile the extremist policy of the Army with the party politics, and the HIROTA Cabinet had to resign. UGAKI FAILED TO FORM A CABINET Upon the resignation of the HIROTA Cabinet, Ugaki, on 24 January 1937, was given the Imperial Mandate to form a new Cabinet. Ugaki was not regarded with favor by the Army, which took appropriate and effective steps to prevent his accession to office. This was an important and significant happening, discussed in more detail in another part of this Judgment. Accordingly we do no more than mention the matter at this point as part of the narrative of events. THE HAYASHI CABINET AND ITS NORTH CHINA POLICY The Hayashi Cabinet was formed on 2 February 1937. UMEZU remained as Vice- Minister of War and KAYA was made Vice-Minister of Finance. The general policy of the Government was not changed. Continuing the estrangement policy of the HIROTA Cabinet with regard to North China, "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided on by the Ministries concerned on 20 February 1937. The principal object of [49,202] administering North China was stated to be to complete Japan's aim of making Manchukuo strongly pro-Japanese and anti-communistic, to procure defense materials, to protect transportation, to prepare defense against the U.S.S.R. and to establish unity among Japan, Manchukuo and China. To attain the above-mentioned object, Japan should carry out her economic policy in North China, secretly aid the government of North China and make the Chinese National Government recognize the special position of North China and the unity of Japan, Manchukuo and China. Again, on 16 April 1937 the "Plan for Guiding North China" was decided on by the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers. The essence of the guidance of North China was stated to be "to make the said area virtually a firm anti-communistic pro- Manchukuo Japanese region, and also to contribute to the acquisition of communicational facilities, thus partly preparing against the Red threat and partly forming a foundation for realizing the unity of mutual aid of Japan, Manchukuo and China." Regarding economic exploitation, the plan provided that the development of those military resources vital to national defense, such as iron, coal, salt and so forth, and the establishment of communications, should be speedily realized, by [49,203] special capital if necessary. Again the provision appears that actions which will cause other powers to misunderstand Japan's intentions must be avoided. The formulation of these policies in the Cabinet, participated in by the various Ministries concerned, revealed that not only the Army but also the other departments of the Government stood ready for some positive program in regard to North China to be carried out in the near future. THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET FURTHER PLANNING AGAINST NORTH CHINA After the fall of, the Hayashi Cabinet, Prince Konoye assumed the Premiership on 4 June 1937, with HIROTA as Foreign Minister and KAYA as Finance Minister. In Army circles, there was agitation for further military action in China. TOJO, Hideki, then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, sent a telegram on 9 June 1937 to the Army General Staff with the suggestion that judging from the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, Japan should "deliver a blow" first of all upon the Chinese National Government to get rid of the menace at the back if Japan's military power permitted it. In less than one month the suggested blow against the National Government of China [49,204] was delivered. The events we have just reviewed show that the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol was only the first step in Japan's plan gradually to control the whole of China so that that country with its great market for Japan's manufactured goods and its enormous natural resources would help to make Japan the overlord of East Asia. No sooner had Manchuria and Jehol been seized, and while yet their conversion to satellite feeders of Japan's economy was hardly begun, than in the spring of 1934 Japan was claiming a special position in regard to the five northern provinces of China. By June 1935 Japan had forced the conclusion of the so-called "Ho-UMEZU" and Ching- DOHIHARA agreements, whereby the hold of the National Government of China over two of these provinces, Hopei and Chahar, was substantially loosened. By the end of the year 1935 the support of Japan had established two so-called independent governments, which were her creatures, the Inner Mongolian Government of Prince Teh and the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government, whose capital was at Tungchow. By that time also there had been set up the Hopei-Chahar Political Council which Japan expected to be able to turn into a government of the five northern provinces which would be independent of the National [49,205] Government of China and subservient to Japan's will. Japan intended to follow the anticipated declaration of independence of the five northern provinces by a military occupation of them, and the military plans for this occupation and for the propaganda which was to accompany the movement were prepared for execution by the end of the year 1935. Neither persuasion nor the threat of force induced the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to proclaim the independence of the five northern provinces and, in our opinion, the occupation of these provinces by the Japanese Army would have occurred much earlier than it did if events in Japan had not compelled the Japanese Army to increase and consolidate its influence over the Government of Japan so that it might control that government in support of its military adventure. As a result of the military revolt of February 1936 the Army got rid of the Okada Cabinet which was not supporting the Army's ambitious policies, but that revolt revealed a grave lack of discipline and responsibility among the younger elements in the army which called for a pause while discipline was re-established. HIROTA, the next Premier, and the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers in his Cabinet, were wholly in favor of the expansionist policy which the army advocated, and the latter half [49,206] of the year 1936 saw the adoption by some or all of them of the "Basis of National Policy of June 1936" and of the "Basic Principles of National Policy" and the "Second Administrative Policy toward North China" of August 1936. Meantime the Army had secured a footing at Fengtai which should enable it to seize the Marco Polo Bridge, cut off the five northern provinces from the rest of China to the southward, and control Peiping. But the HIROTA Cabinet was not wholly in favor of the policies of the Army. There were elements in it which resented the increasing control of the military over the Government. These had to be got rid of, and in January 1937 the military brought about the fall of the HIROTA Cabinet and the failure of Ugaki to form a government. Finally in the beginning of June 1937, after the fall of the short-lived Hayashi Cabinet, Prince Konoye formed his first Cabinet, and government support for the adventures of the military was at last assured. The way was clear for the next step in Japan's plan to subjugate China. [49,207] SECTION IV. FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT (7 July 1937) TO THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938 Under the Boxer Protocol of 7 September 1901 (Annex No. B-2), China granted to the Powers having legations at Peiping the right to station guards in the Legation Quarters and at twelve specified points along the railway between Peiping and Tientsin for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. By a supplementary agreement of 15 July 1902 foreign troops stationed at these points were given the right to carry on field exercises and rifle practice without informing the Chinese authorities except in the case of feux de guerre. At the beginning of July 1937 Japan maintained a force, variously estimated from 7,000 to 15,000, in North China, while the other Protocol powers had only small detachments. The British had a total of 1007, including 252 members of the Legation Guards; the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei Province varied between 1700 and 1900, the bulk of whom were at Tientsin. The number of the Japanese troops greatly exceeded that needed to carry out the duties under the Protocol. From June 1937 the Japanese troops carried out intense night maneuvers in the vicinity of Lukouchiao [49,208] (Marco Polo Bridge). These maneuvers were held every night, while night maneuvers held by other foreign garrison troops were very much less frequent than those conducted by the Japanese. The Chinese had requested that notice be given beforehand of the night maneuvers, in order that the inhabitants of the territory should not be disturbed. To this the Japanese had agreed. On the night of 7 July 1937 the maneuvers were carried on without notice. It was therefore under an atmosphere of tension and unrest that on that night the Lukouchiao Incident broke out. At about ten o'clock in the evening, the Chinese authorities received a telephone message from Matsui, Takuro, Chief of the Japanese Special Services in Peiping, alleging that one of the Japanese soldiers was reported missing after the Chinese garrison forces in Wanping had opened fire at the Japanese maneuvering troops, and demanding that the Japanese troops be allowed entry into the city of Wanping to conduct searches. Wanping is in the neighborhood of Loukouchiao which, being on the main communication line west of Peiping, was of considerable strategic importance. Prior to July 1937 the Japanese forces at Fengtai had repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese forces stationed at this place. [49,209] We have already noticed that in 1936 the Japanese had endeavored to take up a large tract of land between Fengtai to the west of Peiping and Lukouchiao for the purpose of erecting barracks and an airfield, and how that endeavor failed. The strategic effect on North China of the removal of Chinese troops from Lukouchiao and the establishment of military posts by the Japanese between Fengtai and Lukouchiao is obvious. Peiping would be completely cut off from the South and West. General Chin Teh-Chun, at the time acting as Commander of the 29th Army in the absence of General Sung Che-Yuan who was then on leave at his home, instructed the Chinese liaison authorities to reply to the Japanese demand for entry into Wanping, that the maneuvers held under the circumstances of that night were illegal and therefore the Chinese authorities had no responsibility whatsoever for the allegedly missing soldier. However, he said that he would order the Chinese troops stationed at Wanping to conduct a search on their own behalf. The Japanese, not satisfied with the reply, insisted on conducting the search themselves. Wang Len-Chai, Administrative Commissioner in the city of Wanping, was ordered by General Chin to [49,210] investigate and report on the maneuvering of the Japanese troops and whether any Japanese soldier was missing. In the meantime, a report came to the Chinese authorities that a battalion of Japanese troops with six pieces of artillery was advancing from Fengtai to Loukouchiao. Chinese troops were thereupon ordered to be alert, while Wang Len-Chai was sent to negotiate with Matsui. While the investigation conducted by Wang Len-Chai did not locate the allegedly missing soldier and subsequent discussion with Matsui brought about no result, it was decided that a joint investigation should be conducted on the spot. After Wang Len- Chai and the Japanese representative Tarahira entered the city, the Japanese troops encircled it on three sides and opened fire. Chinese forces defended the city from the walls. At five o'clock in the morning of 8 July 1937, while the investigation was still going on, a Japanese battalion under its Commander Ichiki attacked the Chinese troops at Lungwangmino in the neighborhood of Lukouchiao. At about six o'clock the Japanese began to attack the walled city of Wanping with machine gun fire. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR TRUCE In the morning of 8 July 1937 the railway [49,211] bridge leading to Chang-Sin-Tien was captured by the Japanese. In the afternoon of the same day the Japanese sent an ultimatum to the Commander of the city of Wanping to surrender before seven o'clock in the evening, failing which, bombardment would begin. The Chinese, however, stood firm and promptly at seven the Japanese bombardment began. On the next day, 9 July 1937, the Japanese, through Natsui and others, informed General Chin that the missing soldier had been found and asked for a truce with the following conditions: (1) All military actions should cease on both sides; (2) Troops of both sides should return to their original positions; (3) The 37th Division, which entertained more hostile feeling towards Japan, should be replaced by another unit of the 29th Army for the defense of Wanping. An understanding was also to be reached on both sides to refrain from developing henceforth incidents of similar nature. The truce was agreed to on the same day. Chinese units under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chi Hsin-Wen retreated to their original positions, while the Japanese units were to withdraw toward Fengtai. At this point the incident might well be considered as having been settled, if the Japanese had conformed to the terms of the truce. But, it was later ascertained that some one hundred Japanese [49,212] soldiers along the railway tunnel were not withdrawn as agreed. During midnight on 9 July 1937 the Japanese troops there again fired into the city. Thereafter, Japanese troops continued to pour into the troubled area. By 12 July there were 20,000 Japanese troops and 100 airplanes in the area. There then occurred sporadic clashes between the two forces until the 27th of July when, as hereafter related, hostilities on a large scale broke out. ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT The official telegram reporting the outbreak of hostilities reached Tokyo on 8 July 1937. On the following day the Konoye Cabinet, in an extraordinary meeting, decided that the government attitude should be to hold fast to the policy of arresting the scope of the disturbance and to seek a prompt local settlement of the matter. Notwithstanding this decision of the Cabinet, the General staff decided on 10 July 1937 to re-enforce the garrison by sending two brigades from the Kwantung Army, one division from Korea and three divisions from Japan. The Cabinet, of which HIROTA and KAYA were members, approved the Army plan on 11 July. Units of the Kwantung Army were sent to the Peiping and Tientsin area. However, on the night of 11 July 1937, upon receipt of the report from the North China Forces that [49,213] the Chinese had come to terms, the Supreme Command decided to stop mobilization of the divisions in Japan proper. On 13 July 1917 the Supreme Command adopted the "Policy for the Treatment of the North China Incident", which provided that while the Japanese Army would follow the localization policy and would decide mobilization of the homeland forces in the light of future developments, they would nevertheless take resolute steps, if the Chinese neglected the terms they agreed upon, or showed their insincerity by moving their troops to North China. From 17 July 1917 while negotiations were being carried on between the North China Garrison Forces and the 29th Army on the spot, and between the Japanese diplomatic officials and the Chinese Government at Nanking, the Japanese Supreme Command proceeded to prepare for mobilization in Japan which had been interrupted on 11 July 1937. Even after Sung Che-Yuan, Commander of the 29th Army and head of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, was reported to have come to terms on 18 July 1937, the Japanese Supreme Command still pushed forward preparations for mobilization on the ground that the Chinese Government had shown no sincerity. On 20 July 1937 the Cabinet authorized mobilization of three divisions. One week later the Commander of the North China Garrison forces reported that, having [49,214] exhausted every means of peaceful settlement, he had decided to use force to chastise the 29th Army and requested approval, which was given by the supreme Command. In the meantime, mobilization orders were issued for four divisions. Also, ostensibly for the protection of Japanese residents in Shanghai and Tsingtao, one division was to be reserved for each city. It is important to note that under the "Draft of the Outline for the Military Disposal of Various Railways in North China" of 2 December 1935, which provided for a sweep by the Japanese forces of the provinces of Shantung, Hopeh and Shansi, Tsingtao was the port at which reinforcements from Japan were to be landed to take part in the sweep. On the diplomatic front, the Japanese Foreign Office took prompt measures to strengthen the diplomatic staff in North China, following the Cabinet meeting on 11 July 1937 in which the important decision was made to take necessary steps in connection with the dispatching of troops to North China. On 11 July 1937, Hidaka, Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, was instructed by the Foreign Office to notify the Chinese Government of the intention of the Japanese Government to settle the matter locally and to request the Chinese Government not to obstruct the Japanese efforts (to save [49,215] the situation promptly). When the Chinese Foreign Minister demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the places of disturbance and the cessation of sending re- enforcement from Manchuria, Korea and Japan proper, Hidaka evaded the issue by asking the Chinese Foreign Minister whether the Chinese Government had any intention of denying any agreement reached between the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot. After the Chinese Foreign Minister had pointed out in an official note that any local understanding or agreement would take effect only on confirmation by the Chinese Government, Hidaka was again instructed by the Japanese Foreign Office on 17 July 1937 to demand that the Chinese Government should not obstruct the execution of the terms of the settlement reached on the spot. It had thus become clear that what the Japanese authorities conceived as local settlement was the acceptance of Japanese demands by the North China authorities without the confirmation of the Chinese Government. Acceptance of this proposal would obviously have the dual effect of weakening the power of the local authorities by depriving them of the support of the Central Government, and of virtual recognition by the Central Government of an autonomous North China. [49,216] UNITED STATES OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES The hostilities which broke out in North China had caused serious concern to the third powers who desired to see peace in the Far East. On 16 July 1937 United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, issued a statement to the effect that the United States constantly and consistently had advocated maintenance of peace, national and international self-restraint, abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy, adjustment of international differences by peaceful means, faithful observance of international agreements, upholding of the sanctity of treaties, respect of nations for rights of others, and a revitalizing and strengthening of international law, and that the United States would avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but believed in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the above principles. It was on the same day that the Chinese Government sent a memorandum to all the powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10), and on the next day, 17 July 1937 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made a speech emphasizing that China was not seeking war but merely meeting attacks on her very existence. He then mentioned as minimum considerations for peaceful solution the following four points: (1) No encroachment on China's [49,217] sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) no alterations in the administrative system of the Hopei and Chahar Provinces; (3) no involuntary removal of principal officers appointed by the Central Government; and (4) no restrictions to be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Army. On 19 July 1937 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a memorandum to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking in which the Chinese Government renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their original positions on a date to be agreed upon by both parties. It also stated unequivocally that for the settlement of the incident, the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration. Mr. Hull, in an effort to settle the matter before it spread too far, held a talk with the Japanese Ambassador on 21 July 1937. Among other things, he told the Japanese Ambassador that the United States Government was ready and would be most glad at any time to say or do anything, short of mediation, which, of course, would require the agreement of both parties in advance, which [49,218] might in any way contribute towards composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China. But the attitude of Japan was made clear by Foreign Minister HIROTA who, in a speech made on 27 July 1937 before the Budget Committee of the Diet, stated that the Japanese Government would reject any third power intervention. On 10 August 1937 three days before the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, Mr. Joseph Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, told the Japanese Foreign Minister that his Government had authorized him to make a definite offer of good offices. Following this, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, in a note to the Department of State dated 13 August 1937 stated that while Japan concurred in the principles contained in the statement made by Mr. Hull on 16 July 1937 concerning maintenance of world peace, it was the belief of the Japanese Government that the objectives of those principles would be attained only by a full recognition and practical consideration of the actual circumstances of the Far Eastern region. The United States Department of State, however, on 23 August 1937 issued a press release reaffirming the principles laid down by the Hull statement of 16 July 1937 and urging the settlement of difficulties by negotiations. [49,218a] THE LANGFANG INCIDENT Despite the truce, fighting again broke out on 14 July 1937. Wanping was continuously shelled by Japanese artillery. On 18 July (1937) Sung Che-Yuan called on Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese Garrison Forces, and expressed regrets, as demanded by the Japanese Army. [49,219] However, this did not ease the tension. Numerous incidents occurred. On the 25th of July a clash occurred at Langfang between Peiping and Tientsin between a company of Japanese troops and Chinese forces. There was another clash the next day at the Kwanganmen Gate of Peiping as a battalion of Japanese infantry endeavored to enter the city for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents. While the exact cause of the outbreak of these incidents is not clear it is significant that on the 26th the Japanese had sent an ultimatum to the Chinese demanding, inter alia, the withdrawal of the Chinese 27th Division from the Peiping Area within twenty-four hours, failing which, Japan would attack with large forces. JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM REJECTED On 27 July 1937 the day after the Japanese had delivered the ultimatum, Premier Konoye announced that in sending troops to North China, the Government had no other purpose than to preserve peace in East Asia. Japan's ultimatum was not accepted. Fighting broke out on 27 July 1937 at Fengtai and in the vicinity of Lukouchiao. Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese Garrison Forces, ordered reinforcements from Tientsin and Tungchow with strong equipment and more than thirty airplanes. In the early morning of 28 July 1937, the Japanese made an onslaught at Nanyuan, outside the city of Peiping, [49,220] with aircraft and artillery, inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. Large scale hostilities had thus developed. REACTION IN GERMANY On 28 July 1937 the Japanese Ambassador Mushakoji called upon the German Reichminister Weizsacker and stated that Japan felt that Germany did not understand the anti-communistic efforts which the Japanese action in China constituted. He tried to show that Japan was doing anti-communistic work in China also for Germany's benefit. However, Weizsacker replied that he could not deduce an obligation on the part of Germany to approve or assist morally a Japanese action which might easily lead to the fostering of communism in China, the very opposite of the aim of both Germany and Japan. On the same day, Weizsacker sent a telegram to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, instructing him to advise the Japanese to be moderate. He told the Ambassador that attempts of Japan to base measures in China as a fight against communism on the strength of the Anti-Comintern Pact were devious, as the said Pact had not the objective of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states. On the contrary, Japan's actions were rather considered to be contrary to the Anti-Comintern Pact because they would obstruct the consolidation of China and thus [49,221] promote the spread of communism. Weizsacker further stated that the radio propaganda carried on by Japan in Germany, attempting to represent the war against China as a fight against communism, was unwelcome. In the light of the German attitude and the nature of the operations adopted by the Japanese very grave doubts are thrown on the Japanese reiterated declarations that they were primarily concerned in combating communism. Such declarations were repeatedly made by DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI in their initial efforts to establish the autonomous movement in North China. The Reichminister seemed to have foreseen a situation which was later testified to by a witness in this trial, that the Chinese communists began to gather strength in the troubled conditions developing after the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident and that it was the Japanese who thus nurtured the communist movement. PEIPING CAPTURED On the same day, 28 July 1937, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ordered General Sung Che-Yuan to retreat to Paoting in southern Hopei and to direct operations from there. During the next two days, 29 and 30 July 1937, intense fighting took place in Tientsin where the Chinese forces put up a stiff stand, but subsequently they fell back toward the south along the Tientsin-Pukow [49,222] Railway, while other troops fell back along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. Thus Peiping was isolated and finally captured on 8 August 1937 by the Japanese forces under the command of Kawabe, Shozo, who paraded the streets of Peiping with his troops announced by proclamations posted at important places that he was the military governor, and threatened with death anyone who would defy his edicts. According to neutral observers, within eight weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese had about 160,000 troops fighting in North China. THE OYAMA INCIDENT While the hostilities in North China were progressing and following the capture of Peiping by Japanese troops on 8 August 1937 another incident causing grave concern to the world occurred in Shanghai on the very next day. In the afternoon of 9 August 1937 Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and his driver, Seaman Saito, of the Japanese Naval Landing Party, were killed in front of the airdrome on Hungjao Road in a suburb of Shanghai while trying to enter the airdrome. The evidence as to the details of the incident is contradictory. However, one point is established beyond doubt: namely, that Oyama had no authority to enter the airdrome. In any event the incident, though it contributed to the tenseness of the situation generally, is of little importance as the [49,223] Japanese did not allege it as an excuse or justification for their subsequent operations. OTHER EVENTS PRECEDING THE SHANGHAI WAR After the Oyama Incident occurred, the situation in Shanghai became extremely tense. Within less than forty-eight hours thereafter Japan concentrated about thirty warships in Shanghai and increased her armed forces by several thousands. At the same time, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense were made on the Chinese authorities. Hostilities broke out on 13 August 1937 and furious fighting continued thereafter. As may be recalled, in the early part of 1932 the bestilities in the Shanghai region were brought to an end by the conclusion of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 5 May 1932 which stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions which they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the establishment of normal conditions in the area. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, then declared in particular that it was understood that nothing in this Agreement implied any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory. In June 1937 acting on a report that the Chinese were reinforcing the Peace Preservation Corps in what he called "the forbidden area" and were constructing [49,223a] defense works there, including the reconstruction of the Foosung Fortress, Okamoto, the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, called for a meeting of the Joint Commission set up under [49,224] the Cease-Fire Agreement. At the meeting held on 23 June 1937 Kayor Yui Hung- Chun, the Chinese representative took the position that the matter was not within the province of the Joint Commission, whose duty was, as was clear from the Agreement, to supervise the withdrawal of troops. The representatives of the participating powers concluded that they could not express an opinion on conflicting interpretations. While stating that he was not authorized to give any information concerning the number of Peace Preservation Corps in the Shanghai area and the question of fortifications, the Chinese representative did give an assurance that nothing undertaken in the area had any hostile intention or the nature of warlike preparation. On or about 15 July 1937 after the hostilities broke out in North China, Mayor Yui invited Consul-General Okamoto and the Japanese military and naval attaches to a meeting at which the Mayor expressed his desire to prevent the spread of hostilities to Shanghai and asked the Japanese to co-operate. Okamoto promised co-operation and asked that China control terrorism and anti-Japanese movement. Thereafter, they maintained close touch with each other. At times the Mayor called on Okamoto two or three times a day, requesting the latter to restrain certain actions on the part of the Japanese [49,225] marines. The actions which the Chinese complained of were such as maneuvers and emergency guard measures taken by the Japanese marines. According to Okamoto, he and the Commander of the Japanese Naval Landing Party agreed to restrain the maneuvers, but as to the emergency guard measures, he explained that they were taken as a result of the disappearance of a Japanese sailor by the name of Miyazaki, who was, however, subsequently found. In Japan following the occurrence of the Oyama Incident, the Army was notified by the Navy on 10 August 1927 that for the time being the units in Shanghai would take no further steps, but circumstances might require preparations for sending troops. The Japanese Government then decided that it would be worthwhile to study the proposal for eventual mobilization. After the Incident, the Japanese Naval Landing Party at Shanghai was reinforced by 1000 men from Japan. By noon of 11 August 1937 there was a relatively large fleet, including the Flagship Idzumo and other naval vessels, at the Shanghai waterfront. On 12 August 1937, another meeting of the Joint Commission was held in Shanghai. While reiterating that the Commission had no authority over the issues, the Chinese representative pointed out that it was Japan who had rend red the Cease-Fire Agreement null and void by stationing armed forces at Paitzuchiao or the Eight [49,226] Character Bridge, a place far beyond the railway from which it had been agreed that the Japanese forces would be withdrawn, and consequently Japan had no right to invoke the agreement. He further pointed out that Japanese armaments and supplies were being landed and further reinforcements were on the way; that these measures constituted a serious threat to the peace and order in Shanghai, and that China had the right to adopt measures for self-defense. The Japanese representative admitted in the meeting that Japanese forces had been in the Paitzuchiao area and made no denial of the naval concentration and reinforcements, other than an explanation that the Naval Landing Party had not yet prepared to do anything, while the Chinese representative also reiterated that the statement that the right to adopt measures of self-defense accounted for her military movements. At the same meeting on 12 August 1937 when the parties were asked to give assurance not to make an attack within forty-eight hours, the Chinese stated that they would not attack unless they were first attacked, while the Japanese rejoined that they would cause no trouble unless provoked or challenged, and then related the case of the arrest of a Japanese newspaperman by the Chinese as an illustration of provocation. The meeting brought about no solution of the trouble. [49,227] THE SHANGHAI WAR On 13 August 1937, fighting broke out at a point near the headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party and at another point in the Paitzuchiao area. The Japanese alleged that the cause of the outbreak was the firing by Chinese troops on the Japanese Landing Party. On this point the evidence is contradictory. Even if their version was correct it would not, in our opinion, justify the extent and magnitude of the operations which followed as hereafter related. As soon as the clash occurred, the Japanese Government on 15 August 1937 announced its decision to dispatch a force of two divisions from the homeland for the declared purpose of protecting Japanese subjects in Shanghai. A mobilization order was also issued on the same day and MATSUI, Iwane, was appointed Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Shanghai. Clearly, the Japanese Cabinet had decided to abandon the policy of localization. Fighting in the Shanghai area was intense. Further Japanese reinforcements arrived at Shanghai on 23 August 1937. Aircraft were brought into action by both sides. Japanese airplanes bombed Nanking, the capital of China, and numerous aerial bombardments were carried out on the ports, and also on cities in the interior. The Japanese fleet, while cooperating with the [49,228] forces on land, patrolled the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to the ports by Chinese ships, a number of which were sunk. While the fighting at Shanghai was in full swing Horinouchi, the Japanese Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a radio broadeast to the United States on 1 September 1937 defended Japan's actions in China on the ground of China's anti-Japanese acts and asserted that Japan's intentions were peaceful. He stated that the ultimate object of the current hostilities in North China and Shanghai was the realization of a situation permitting genuine cooperation between the two countries. Speeches of similar purport were subsequently delivered to the Japanese Diet by Foreign Minister HIROTA. It is clear that while these speeches were made, they had in mind Japan's policy of making North China a special area subservient to Japan, a policy which had been openly adopted by the successive cabinets since 1935. To implement this policy, a full scale war was being waged, extending as far south as Shanghai in Central China. As hostilities continued, still further reinforcements were poured into the Shanghai area. Between the end of September and the beginning of November, 1937, the Japanese Supreme Command dispatched five battalions from Japan and five more divisions from North China. In [49,229] the beginning of November 1937, three divisions landed in Hangchow Bay, about fifty miles south of Shanghai, and again, in the middle of the same month, one more division landed at Primaokiang, sixty miles up the Yangtze River from Shanghai. As the area of conflict was thus being expanded, the Expeditionary Forces under MATSUI and the divisions of the Tenth Army which had landed at Hangchow Bay were amalgamated into the newly formed Central China Expeditionary Forces with MATSUI as its Commander in Chief. The battle continued for three months and by 12 November 1937 the Chinese Army retreated to the West. On 5 December 1937, the Shanghai Ta-Tao City Government was set up, under the sponsorship of Colonel Kusumoto of the Military Attache's Office, Japanese Embassy, and Colonel Kagesa of the Headquarters of the Japanese Supreme Command, with Su Hsi-Wen, a Japanese-educated Chinese, as the Mayor. CONTINUED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA To coordinate the Japanese military activities being carried on in China, HATA, Shunroku, was appointed on 26 August 1937, as Inspector General of Military Education, one of the three chiefs who would nominate the War Minister whenever there was a cabinet change. DOHIHARA, in command of the 14th Division, in August 1937 took part in the drive along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and TOJO, [49,230] in command of an army corps, was engaged in hostilities in Chahar Province. At the same time the 5th Division under ITAGAKI was driving up the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway toward Kalgan, which was captured on 26 August 1937. It is worthy of note at this point that in November 1938 the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Shansi were organized as separate local government territories under the Autonomous Federation of Bengchiang. This was an organization intended by the Japanese to rule Mongolia and Sinkiang. At the head of the Federation was Prince Teh whose advisors were Japanese Army officers and others who took charge of political and economic questions in the Federation. On 31 August 1937, at Hwailai, approximately one hundred miles northwest of Peiping, where ITAGAKI had an interview with European and American correspondents, he declared that it was possible for him to turn south to [49,231] the Yellow River. This statement is the first indication to the public that the Japanese plans contemplated an advance to the South beyond the limits of North China which in fact followed soon after. On 4 September 1937, an Imperial Edict was issued, explaining the object of the Japanese military expedition in China as "to urge grave self-reflection upon China and to establish peace in the Far East without delay". These military activities were accompanied by propaganda in the form of press interviews, speeches and other utterances with the purpose of breaking the morale of the Chinese. On 24 September 1937, Paoting, capital of Hopei Province, was captured. The Japanese generals participating in the fighting at that time stated to a foreign newspaperman that the military aim of the Japanese Army was "not so much the acquisition of territory as the annihilation, smashing, and killing of Chinese Nationalist Armies". This policy of annihilation of the Chinese Armies had been previously expressed by HIROTA in his speech of 5 September 1937, delivered in the Diet, in which he said, "we firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defense as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country, so that it may [49,232] reflect upon the error of its ways. The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese Army, so that it may lose completely its will to fight". In the same speech, he reiterated Japan's policy in regard to North China and concluded that the urgent need for Japan at that moment was to take "a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways". Japan, he said, had no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China, all China freed from the danger of recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as to enable them to put into practice Japan's above-mentioned policy. ITAGAKI's troops made further advances, and on 14 October 1937, occupied Kweisui, the capital of Suiyuan Province. On the next day, 15 October 1937, an Imperial Ordinance was enacted in Japan, creating the Cabinet Advisory Council of which ARAKI was appointed a member, the responsibility of which was to participate in "the deliberation and planning of the Cabinet in regard to important state affairs concerning the China Incident". On 9 November 1937, Japanese troops captured Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province. Immediately the Japanese set about organizing an autonomous government [49,233] at Taiyuan to govern the northern part of Shansi Province. This puppet government was later combined with those organized at Kalgan and Kueihua as part of the new “Autonomous Federation of Mengchang” to which reference has already been made. In the Shantung Area, the North China Expeditionary Forces on 25 December 1937, captured Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province. At this stage, the Japanese Army had practically brought all the key points in North China under military occupation. CHINA APPEALED TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS On 12 September 1937, China appealed to the League of Nations against Japan, invoking Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the Covenant (Annex No. B-6). On 21 September 1937, the League of Nations invited the Japanese Government to participate in the Twenty-Three Powers Consultative Committee. Japan, however, maintaining an attitude of non-participation in any political activity of the League of Nations, on the ground that she had withdrawn from the League, refused the invitiation. At that time, HIROTA was the Foreign Minister in the First Konoye Cabinet. On 6 October 1937, the League of Nations found that the military operations carried on by Japan against China were out of all proportion to the incident which [49,234] was the cause of the conflict, that such action could not possibly facilitate or promote friendly cooperation between the two nations which Japanese statesmen had affirmed to be the aim of their policy, that it could be justified neither on the basis of existing legal engagements nor on that of the right of self-defense; and that it was in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 (Annex No. B-10), and the Pact of Paris of 27 August 1928 (Annex No. B-15). These conclusions were on the same day concurred in by the United States Government. JAPAN'S TERMS FOR PEACE While military operations were being successfully carried on, the Japanese Government adopted, on 1 October 1937, an "Outline Regarding the Settlement of the China Incident". It provided that the incident should be brought to a speedy conclusion through the efforts of armed forces combined with timely diplomatic action. In North China there should be designated a demilitarized zone in which peace and order were to be maintained by armed Chinese police. Japan would have the right to station troops, but she might reduce the number of occupation troops and limit them to the number present at the outbreak of "the Incident". While the Tangku Truce was to remain in force, other arrangements such as [49,235] the "DOHIHARA-Chin Agreement", the "UMEZU-Ho Agreement", and the arrangement concerning through railway traffic, mail service, air service, etc., should be dissolved. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the East Hopei Autonomous Council would be abolished and the administration in these areas would be conducted by the Chinese Government as it pleased. However, it was desirable that the administrative leaders of this area should bring about realization of friendly relations between Japan and China. As for the Shanghai area, there should also be designated a demilitarized zone in which peace and order should be maintained by the international police or the restrictedly armed Chinese police, to be assisted by the Municipal Police of the International Settlement. Japanese land forces might be withdrawn, but this should not include the right of anchorage of Japanese warships. For the general readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, negotiations should be simultaneously or subsequently conducted along political, military, and economic lines. China should grant formal recognition of Manchukuo and conclude an anti- Comintern pact with Japan, enforcing strict control in the North China demilitarized zone. The Chinese customs tariffs on specified goods should be reduced and the freedom to prevent smuggling in East Hopei should be restored to the Chinese Government. This [49,236] outline was approved by Premier Konoye, Foreign Minister HIROTA, the War and Navy Ministers. BRITISH OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES Prior to 27 October 1937, conversations were held between Foreign Minister HIROTA and British Ambassador Craigie concerning the cessation of hostilities in China. According to Horinouchi, then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, HIROTA expressed, as his personal views, the following conditions for solution: (1) Creation of a demilitarized zone in North China; (2) Adjustment of relations between North China and Manchukuo on a practical basis; (3) Control by China of anti-Japanese movements; and (4) Equal economic opportunities in the North China region. These views were conveyed by Ambassador Craigie to the Chinese Government, and the views of the latter were also conveyed on two or three occasions to HIROTA through the British Ambassador. On 27 October 1937, HIROTA, in an interview with the ambassadors from Great Britain, the United States, Germany and Italy, stated that while the Japanese Government could not accept the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference, it desired to have any one of the four powers use its good offices for bringing about direct peace negotiations between Japan and China. The British Ambassador soon called upon HIROTA and informed the [49,237] latter of his government's willingness to use its good offices for negotiations between the two countries. Horinouchi testified that HIROTA accepted, but it was realized afterwards that there was strong opposition within the army against Britain acting as a go-between and the scheme had to be held in abeyance. However, Horinouchi admitted in cross-examination that it was Japan's policy to reject intervention or arbitration at any time and that although good offices of third parties were always welcome, it was the desire and policy of the Japanese Government to effect a settlement of the trouble between Japan and China by direct negotiations. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE After the League of Nations had failed to bring Japan to the conference table for the settlement of differences by negotiations, another means was being sought for the achievement of the same purpose. On two occasions, October 20 and November 7, 1937, the Belgian Government invited Japan to attend a meeting at Brussels, with a view to examining, in accordance with Article VII of the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10), the situation in the Far East and of studying means of settling the conflict amicably. Japan again declined the invitation explaining that since the League of [49,238] Nations, to which the convocation of the proposed conference was closely linked, had expressed views hostile to Japan, the Japanese Government believed that frank and full discussion to bring about a just solution of the conflict could not be expected. On 15 November 1937, by a resolution adopted in the Brussels Conference, Japan was pronounced the aggressor in the Sino-Japanese conflict. THE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS Confronted with difficulties both at home and abroad, Premier Konoye desired to resign in the middle of November 1937, but was dissuaded by KIDO. On 20 November 1937, the Cabinet set up the Imperial General Headquarters, an organization to be established in war time only. It had control of operations and tactics. The Chief of Staff thus obtained virtual control over the War and Navy Ministers. Meetings were held once or twice a week. It had a great deal of influence on the Japanese Government prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, since its utterances were not only those of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff, but also of the Emperor, who was its head. THE ATTACK ON NANKING When MATSUI was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and left Tokyo for the [49,239] fighting area, he already had thoughts of pushing on to Nanking after the intended capture of Shanghai. He requested five divisions for the Shanghai Expeditionary Force before leaving Tokyo. Actual preparations for the advance upon China's capital were made, for he had previously made a study of the topography in the vicinity of Shanghai and Nanking. On 8 October 1937, MATSUI issued a statement in which he said "the devil-defying sharp bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so as to develop their divine influence, and that the mission of the Army was to fulfill all its duties of protecting Japanese residents and interests, and to chastise the Nanking Government and the outrageous Chinese." As the area of hostilities around Shanghai was likely to expand, MATSUI was appointed Commander in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces. MUTO, Akira, was appointed MATSUI'S vice-chief of staff in late November 1937. Approximately one month after the capture of Shanghai, the Japanese Army arrived outside the city of Nanking, MATSUI issued an order to the effect that as Nanking was the capital of China, its capture was an international event and careful studies should be made so as to dazzle China with Japan's military glory. The Japanese demand for surrender was ignored by the Chinese Government. Bombardment started and the city [49,240] fell on 13 December 1937. The Japanese Army that entered Nanking was a newly- formed organization, but it was composed of experienced troops. MATSUI made his triumphant entry on 17 December 1937. From 13 December onward, there occurred what has come to be known as the "Rape of Nanking" which will be dealt with in a later phase. On 1 January 1938, a provisional self-governing body was set up, flying the old discarded five-coloured Chinese flag instead of the Blue Sky and White Sun which is the official national flag of China. GEMANY ACTED AS GO-BETWEEN Having ignored the offers of good offices made by the United States and Great Britain, the Japanese Army desired that Germany should be asked to act as go- between. On 5 November 1937, certain peace terms proposed by Japan were conveyed to the Chinese Government through Trautmann, the German Ambassador in Nanking. Subsequently, on 28 and 29 November and 2 December, the German Ambassador again communicated the intentions of the Japanese Government and informed the Chinese authorities that the terms proposed by the Japanese Government early in November were still to stand. China was prepared to take the points proposed by Japan as the basis of discussion. The proposed terms were [49,241] embodied in what was called the August Plan drafted in July 1937, by officials of the Japanese Foreign, War, and Navy Ministries, but approved on 5 August 1937 by the above-mentioned ministries. It consisted of three main points: (1) Establishment of unfortified zones along the River Pai-Ho and the withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese troops from the areas specified as such; (2) No annexation of territories; and (3) No indemnities. Negotiations on the lines of these terms were being conducted between Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe and the Chinese, when they were interrupted by the outbreak of the Shanghai hostilities on 13 August 1937. One day in December 1937, according to the testimony of Horinouchi, Foreign Minister HIROTA was told by German Ambassador Dirksen that he had information from Ambassador Trautmann in Nanking that the Chinese Government had the intention of reopening peace negotiations on the basis of the Japanese terms, and was asked if there was any alternation in the peace terms of the August Plan. Thereupon, the question was submitted to the Liaison Conference of the Government and the Army and Navy, and was placed on the agenda for the meeting of 20 December 1937. The fall of Nanking on 13 December 1937 had considerably stiffened the attitude [49,242] of the Japanese towards China. The Liaison Conference decided upon four fundamental terms of peace, which were as follows: (1) Collaboration with Japan and Manchukuo in an anti-communist policy; (2) Establishment of demilitarized zones and special administrative organs in designated areas; (3) Creation of close economic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China; and (4) Necessary reparations by China. The differences between these Peace Terms and those of August 1937 which had been communicated to the Chinese Government were so great fundamentally that their acceptance by the Chinese would have involved amongst others, one that China had refused to accept from 1931; namely, the independence of Manchuria. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the overtures led to no practical solution of the difficulties. On 22 December 1937, HIROTA communicated the above terms to Ambassador Dirksen, stating that as there had been a great change in the situation, it was not possible any longer to offer the earlier conditions. He said that if the Chinese side would generally agree on the new terms, Japan would be ready to enter into negotiations; otherwise, Japan would have to deal with the incident from a new standpoint. These new terms were communicated to the Chinese Government on 27 December [49,243] 1937, through Ambassador Trautmann. On 13 January 1938, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to Trautmann that, as the new peace terms proposed by Japan were so general in their terms, the Chinese Government desired to be informed in detail of their nature and content in order to make a careful examination and reach a definite decision. The Chinese reply was communicated to HIROTA on 14 January 1938. [49,244] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment: THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE ON 11 JANUARY 1938 While the peace terms were being offered to China, there developed a difference between the Army and the Government in Japan. The Army General Staff thought that the terms of peace were not only vague, but also aggressive. They were in favor of giving more specific terms. The General Staff was concerned about the protracted nature of the war in China. Not only was it a drain upon Japanese resources, but it embarrassed military and economic preparations for war against Russia, America and Great Britain. The Government under Konoye preferred to state them in general terms. Foreign Minister HIROTA and Education Minister KIOO supported Konoye's view; Home Minister Suyetsugu drafted the four terms, and Foreign Minister HIROTA caused them to be communicated to the Chinese Government. On 11 January 1938, while the reply of the Chinese Government was being awaited, an Imperial Conference was held which was attended by HIRANUMA, who was President of the Privy Council. HIROTA explained the "Fundamental Policy for [49,245] the Disposition of the China Incident," providing for close collaboration and unity between Japan, Manchukuo and China. Based upon this policy, two alternative measures were adopted at the conference. On the one hand, the conference decided that if China should ask for conciliation, Japan would negotiate in accordance with the conditions of peace as contained in an addendum to the "Details of the Conditions of the Negotiation for Peace between Japan and China," which included, among other items, formal recognition of Manchukuo by China; establishment of an anti-communist self-government in Inner Mongolia; creation of demilitarized areas in occupied territories of Central China and recognition of Japan's right to station troops in designated areas of North China, Inner Mongolia and Central China. On the other hand, if China refused to reconsider, Japan would not only consider the Chinese Government her opponent but would assist in the formation of a new Chinese Government with which Japan could cooperate. Thereupon, the Chiefs of Army General Staff and Navy General Staff and the President of the Privy Council expressed their approval. Thus were the details of peace conditions drawn up. On the day when the Imperial Conference adopted [49,246] government that the telegram which he received from Tokyo contained no further information except that Japan seemed to be altering for the second time their peace proposals which were issued through the German Embassy, and "we are losing face with the Chinese through this." THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938 Upon receipt of the Chinese reply of the 14th of January through the German Ambassador, saying that the terms covered a very wide scope, that they desired further details in order to make a final decision, HIROTA became very angry and declared that it was China and not Japan who was beaten and must ask for peace. When reminded that officially China had knowledge of only four fundamental conditions and the rest had been kept, at his wish, in a very indefinite form, HIROTA agreed to take the matter up with the Cabinet. In an all-day session of the Cabinet on 14 January 1938, according to KIDO, HIROTA reported the course of the peace negotiations with China and concluded by asserting that there was not good faith on the Chinese side. The Cabinet decided not to deal further with the Chinese National Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On 15 January 1938 a meeting of the Liaison Conference was held and, after lengthy discussion, the government plan was adopted although some members of the [49,247] General Staff still preferred reconciliation. On 16 January 1939 Konoye issued a public statement announcing Japan's firm policy as decided by the Cabinet and the Liaison Conference. This historically important document which decided the trend of relations between these two Asiatic countries, as translated for this Tribunal, reads as follows: "The Imperial Government has been patient enough, after the occupation of Nanking, to give the last opportunity to the Chinese National Government for reconsidering the situation. But they do not understand our real intention, attempt foolishly to counterattack, disregard the greatest distress of the people at home and do not mind the peace of the entire East Asia. Thereupon, the Imperial Government will not care for the National Government thereafter, and expect the establishment and development of a new government of China which will really be worthy coalition with our Empire. We desire to strive, rising under cooperation with such new government, to arrange the relation between the two countries and to construct a new revived China. Of course, there will be not even a slight change in our policy that respects the territoriality and sovereignty of China and the rights and interests of other powers in China. Our responsibility [49,248] for the peace of East Asia is now increasing heavier and heavier. It is the most earnest desire of the Government that our people devote themselves to perform this important mission." The door was thus closed to further negotiations, and the stage was set for further invasion and the development of local regimes ultimately for the creation of a "new government" in China which would cooperate with Japan. SECTION V. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA Prior to Konoye's declaration that Japan would not deal with the National Government of China, new regimes had already been set up by the Japanese in occupied territories, such as those in Northern Shansi, Kueihua, Kalgan and Shanghai, as well as so-called "Peace Maintenance Organizations" in various localities. These were merely local authorities governing areas of limited extent. There was one which covered a much larger area and was in line with Japan's policy of establishing a pro-Japanese autonomous regime in North China, i.e., the Provisional Government in Peiping. When hostilities first broke out in North China, Wang Keh-min, a retired high-ranking Chinese official who later headed the Provisional Government, was in Hongkong. He was [49,249] persuaded to come. North by Japanese Army men stationed in Peiping and Shanghai, and staff officers from Peiping and Formosa were dispatched to Hongkong for the purpose. As a result, Wang came to Shanghai on 24 November 1937, and on 6 December 1937 was flown to Japan and went thence to North China. The Japanese authorities in North China had made great efforts under the plan to make the North China regime the Central Government of China in the future and arranged to invite not only Wang, but also other notable figures in South China through army officers who were stationed in Shanghai. After Wang's arrival in Peiping, on 14 December 1937, the day after the fall of Nanking, the Provisional Government was formally inaugurated in the presence of officers of the Japanese Army. Foreign journalists were invited to attend. Wang Keh-min became also the chairman of the Hsin-Min-Hui or New People's Association which had been created in December 1937 under orders of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in North China. The function of this association was to make known to the people the policies of the puppet government and to keep the latter in touch with the people. The vice-chairman of the association was a Japanese. The Konoye declaration of 16 January 1938 gave [49,250] fresh impetus to this Provisional Government. The various peace maintenance organizations in the Peiping and Tientsin areas had joined it and subsequently, on 30 June 1938, the East Hopei Regime was also amalgamted with it. By the end of January 1938 the Provisional Government had revised the Chinese customs tariffs on certain articles in the foreign export and import trade of North China. The United States Ambassador Grew delivered, on 31 January 1938, a protest to HIROTA, stating that the National Government of China was the only one authorized to do this and that the United States was addressing her representation to Japan, because "for the creation and the acts of the provisional regime the Japanese Government has an inescapable responsibility." The Federal Reserve Bank of China was incorporated in February and commenced its business on 10 March 1938 and was authorized by the Provisional Government to issue paper currency. While the governor and vice-governor were Chinese, the directing personnel were mainly Japanese. This Provisional Government, together with the Renovation Government in Central China, later accepted the invitation of Wang Ching-wei to participate in the organization of a so-called new Central Government. [49,251] Confirmation of the part played by Japan in the formation of the Provisional Government is derived from a document produced from the records of the General Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It recorded that, "In 1937, following the collapses of Teh-chow, Suiyuan, Changte, Taiyuan, etc., in North China, at the end of November the National Government had broken up and removed to Hankow, Chungking and Changsha and finally Nanking collapsed on 13 December, deciding the general trend of the war situation. Thus the opportunity to establish a new regime which was prearranged among the important men in North China had matured. "The circumstances in which Wang Keh-min consented to become the head of the North China regime are as follows: At the beginning of the incident he was at Hongkong. The head of special service facilities in Peking, Major General Kita, eagerly made efforts through Fiji Yamamoto, who was in Shanghai, to persuade Wang to accept the invitation; meanwhile, staff officers from Peking and Formosa were specially dispatched to Hongkong for the same purpose, as the result Wang came to Shanghai on 24 November and on 6 December made a flight to Fukuoka and went to North China with Yamamoto and Yu Chin. [49,252] "It is said that when Wang entered Shanghai, he had not yet consented to become the head of the North China regime but on condition that he made an inspection trip he consented to the journey. "The North China army authorities had made great efforts under the plan to establish the North China regime as the Central Government of China in the future and arranged to invite not only Wang but other influential men from South China through Yoshino and Imai (military officers) who were stationed in Shanghai. Toward this policy the central army and General Terauchi gave approval; however, a section of the military officers in Shanghai expressed opposition, especially Colonel Kusumoto was opposed to pulling out many influential men from Shanghai, on the ground that there is no necessity to determine North China as the political center from the beginning. "After the arrival in Peking, Wang Keh-min decided to accept the chairmanship of the North China regime and determined government organization and fundamental principles. On 14 December 1937 the Provisional Chinese Government was established in Peking." [49,253] THE RENOVATION GOVERNMENT IN CENTRAL CHINA The foregoing document shows further: "Movement for establishment of a new government in Central China. "When the Japanese force crushed the Chinese Army in Shanghai, and its vicinity, and subsequently on December 13, 1937, captured Nanking, movements for creating a new regime in the Central China were launched. First of all, the Shanghai Tatao Municipal Government was organized in Shanghai on December 5. In various places other than Shanghai public order maintenance associations came into being. Among those the major organs are the Nanking Public Order Maintenance Association and the Hangchow Public Order Maintenance Association established on January 1, 1938. Nevertheless, in Shanghai area the influence of the Chiang regime and the Nationalistic Party proved to remain strong, far more than what was anticipated, even after the fall of Nanking, so that it was impossible for pro-Japanese elements to openly approach the Japanese even in the International Settlement. Thus, the matter of building up a substantial regime had long been difficult unlike the case in North China." Following the declaration of 16 January 1938, [49,254] Premier Konoye and HIROTA addressed the Diet on 22 January 1938, and discussed Japan's policy, emphasizing the prospective emergence of a new Chinese regime to cooperate closely with Japan for the ultimate establishment of a new order in East Asia. On 27 January 1938 the Konoye Cabinet decided on a "Programme for the Establishment of a Central China New Regime." That is to say, notwithstanding protestations that this was a spontaneous Chinese movement, the Japanese Government took it upon itself to decide upon the "Programme for the Establishment of a Central China Nor Regime." The document already referred to as having been produced from the records of the General Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office discloses the extent of Japanese direction of the movement: "I. General Principles. "(1) They shall found a highly pro-Japanese regime, gradually free themselves from dependence on Europe and America, and establish the foundation of a district in China dependent on Japan. "(2) The direction of that regime shall be so exercised that the regime, in the course of its future development shall smoothly amalgamate with the North China Regime. The direction shall stop at general inner direction by Japanese advisors. Detailed direction and [49,255] interference in administration by appointing Japanese officials shall be avoided. "(3) Chiang Regime shall be annihilated. At the same time, elimination of Communists and destruction of the Nationalist Party in a short time within the area under Japanese occupation shall be realized. Afterwards similar operations shall be speedily extended to neighbouring areas." The programme provided for nominal Chinese control but as to administration and finance it was directed. "The foundation of finance shall speedily be established, banking organs adjusted, and Japan- China economic collaboration in Central China realized. Measures for it are described in another programme." The direction upon arms was: "As for armaments, minimum army shall be trained for maintenance of peace and order, and make efforts, under the guidance of the Japanese Army, to restore public order. But the navy and air force shall be included in the defence plan of Japan." The new regime was to be developed as follows. "The New Regime shall be speedily set up, and, by nurturing it, antagonistic influence shall be destroyed with physical and moral pressure. "For this purpose, local autonomous bodies which are being set up successively in the areas under [49,256] Japanese occupation, shall be strengthened, and public sentiments desiring the establishment of a New Regime backed by Japan shall be powerfully stimulated. Moreover, in and around Shanghai, economic rehabilitation shall be speedily realized, thereby to contribute to the establishment of the New Regime set up. "Of the expenditures in the initial stage of the New Regime, considerable part shall be borne by Japan. "For the relief of war sufferers, and rehabilitation of industries, emergency measures shall be speedily taken. Especially, agricultural produce shall be smoothly supplied to the market; and farmers shall take to spring farming without uneasiness. "For this purpose, maintenance of local peace shall be undertaken by the Japanese Army to the best of their ability until the establishment of new local government organs. "Order of the establishment of the new administrative set-up is as follows: "1. Central Government set-up, especially legislative and executive departments. "2. Shanghai Special Municipality set-up. "3. Provincial Governments set-up. "4. Organization of county autonomous bodies [49,257] and downwards. "In parallel with the execution of 1 and 2, the influence of Tsingpan and Chihpan (Chinese secret societies) shall be turned pro-Japanese, and made to assist the New Regime directly and indirectly. "In fixing new administrative districts, former ones shall generally be preserved. "In foreign settlements, with the strengthening of the New Regime, Japanese influence shall be gradually extended, and, after the establishment of the New Regime, the organs of the old regime under the control of Japanese Army and Navy shall be taken over by the New Regime at proper opportunity, causing at the same time outstanding issues to be speadily settled." In the early stage of the war, movements for creating a new regime had already been started. MATSUI, through Sugano, sought to persuade certain senior Chinese officials to form a new regime, but without success. When Liang Hung-chi, who later headed the Central China regime, and others came into the matter with the assistance of the Japanese Army and Navy special service organs, the new regime began to assume a more definite shape. On 28 March 1938, the Renovation Government, which was sometimes referred to as the Reformed Government or the Restoration Government, was [49,258] formally established. Together with the Provisional Government in North China, it later accepted Wang Ching-wei's invitation to organize a so-called new Central Government. Thus was realized the Japanese planning for the creation of a pro-Japanese, and indeed a Japanese-dominated, Chinese "Government." [49,259] OTHER CITIES INVADED BY JAPANESE TROOPS UNDER HATA'S COMMAND HATA was appointed Commander of the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Forces on 14 February 1938, succeeding MATSUI. Three days later HATA became Commander-in-Chief of all Expeditionary Forces in China, succeeding Nishio, and remained in that post until November 1938. HATA's original task was to conquer the triangular area between the cities of Shanghai, Nanking and Hangchow. There developed later the purpose of continuing the operations and to expand the area of conflict further into the interior if China did not come to terms. In a talk between Honjo and KIDO the former was quoted by KIDO as having said "After the battle of Suchow (Hsuchow) it is, on the one hand, necessary to show an attitude of advancing to Hankow, but, at the same time, it is essential to take steps for settling the incident. If things do not turn out as hoped for I believe it would, by all means, be necessary to establish a close connection also with the Supreme Command and enter into protracted warfare by planning to continue for about three years." KIDO agreed generally with Honjo's opinion and promised to do his best, as he records [49,260] in his diary of 19 May 1938. HATA, having secured the triangular district referred to proceeded against Hankow, which fell to the Japanese on 25 October 1938. In that campaign he had a force of 300,000 to 400,000 men sent to him from North China. These forces moved deep into the interior of China and at the dates shown below had captured the following important cities: 19 May 1938, Hsuchow, strategic junction of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai Railways; 6 June 1938, Kaifeng, capital of Honan Province; 27 June 1938, Matang, important fortification on the Yangtse River; 25 July 1938, Kiukiang, leading commercial city of Kiangsi Province; 12 October 1938, Sinyang, important point on the Peiping-Hankow Railway; 25 October 1938, Hankow, in the center of China. With the occupation of such important cities over so vast an expanse of territory, it is not surprising that HATA in interrogation acknowledged that it was a war that was being waged in China, rather than that which the Japanese Government euphemistically called an "Incident". THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW In anticipation of a protracted war, the [49,261] Japanese Government enacted a National General Mobilization Law. The draft had been prepared by the Mobilization Plans Bureau and approved by the Cabinet. When it came before the Diet in February 1938 SATO, then in the Military Affairs Bureau, assisted Premier Konoye in making the necssary explanations and securing the passage of the bill. It went into effect on 5 May 1938. It was designed to control and operate all human and material resources so as to utilize the national power most effectively for "national defense purposes" in time of war, "(including an incident corresponding to a war)". It authorized the general mobilization of all Japanese subjects and the compulsion of all Japanese subjects or juridical persons or other organizations to co-operate with State or other organizations or persons nominated by the Government. ITAGAKI BECAME WAR MINISTER Pursuant to the wishes of the Army, ITAGAKI on 3 June 1938 was appointed War Minister in the Konoye Cabinet after its reorganization in May. Immediately before this ITAGAKI had been successively Vice-Chief of Staff and then Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, Commander of a Division in China and on the General Staff. Muto in July 1938 was ap- [49,262] pointed Vice-Chief-of-Staff of the North China Expeditionary Forces. Japan had hoped the Hsuchow Battle would be decisive by engaging and defeating the main forces of the Chinese Army. As the Chinese Government did not yield, even after the capture of Hsuchow, the Japanese Supreme Command proceeded with the plan to drive on to Hankow to deliver yet another blow to the Chinese in the hope of reaching an end of the Chinese war. ITAGAKI, realizing that the war threatened to become a protracted one, sought to bolster the determination of the Japanese people. In his first press interview after assumption of the post of War Minister, on 26 June 1938, he told the Domei News Agency that the Army must be prepared to continue hostilities perhaps for ten more years. He said also that Japan would follow her own policy without fear or hesitation notwithstanding the attitude of Third Powers. He explained that there was no need for a formal declaration of war in view of the official declaration of the Japanese Government of the 16th January. Minister of the War ITAGAKI took part in the Five Minister's Conference, some of the decisions of which will be discussed presently. [49,263] CHINA POLICY AND THE FIVE MINISTERS’ CONFERENCE 1938 The practice of holding conferences apart from the Cabinet among the Premier, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister and Finance Minister, was not new when ITAGAKI joined the Cabinet. Discussions had been held and plans developed in this way under the HIROTA and Hayashi Cabinets. But meantime the Conferences had gained in importance and frequency because of the circumstances following the intensifying of the war which developed after ITAGAKI became War Minister. Between June and October 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference, with ITAGAKI participating, made successive decisions of the utmost importance concerning policies toward China, directed not only to the conduct of the war but also to the establishment of a Japanese dominated or "puppet" government for the whole of China as distinct from the local "Puppet" governments already established. For instance, on the 8 July it was decided in the event of the surrender of Chiang Kai- shek's Government: In case of surrender of the Central Government of China, Japan will regard it as one of the regime and treat it according to the ’Must be made to join the newley established Central Government of China’ policy decided upon by the Imperial Conference. [49,264] "In case the present Central Government of China surrenders and accepts the third condition, (item three of the document, the conditions for surrender) stated later, it shall either be considered as a friendly regime and will be permitted to join the newly established Central Government, or be made to establish another new central government in cooperation with various existing pro-Japanese regimes." The conditions for the recognition of the surrender of the present Central Government of China include: "Retiring from public life of Chiang Kai-shek." On the same day alternative decisions were made in the event of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continuing to fight on. It Is to be noted that the constant policy was to foster and enlarge the Japanese controlled "Central" Government, the creation of which by Japan has already been discussed. Again, on 15 July 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference decided in respect of the "new" Central Government of China: "Though the establishment of the new Central Government of China shall be undertaken mainly by the Chinese, it shall be internally assisted by Japan. The principle of the collaboration of [49,265] individual local governments shall be adopted to their government form. "A Joint Commission shall be established as soon as possible through the cooperation between the Provisional Government and the Restoration Government, to be joined later by the Mongolian and Sing-Kiang (Mengkiang) Joint Commission. Then we should guide this regime so as to grow into a real central government by gradually absorbing various other influences or collaborating with them." It was "we", the Japanese, not Chinese who were to guide the growth of the "new" Central Government. "The new Central Government shall not be established until after the fall of Hankow, with the Chiang Kai-shek regime reduced to a mere local government or until the reformation of the present Central Government is brought about by Chiang Kai-shek's retirement from public office. "In case the Chiang Kai-shek regime is broken up or reformed; and should a pro-Japanese government turn up, we would make it a factor of the central government system and proceed to set up a central government. "Adjustment of the relations between Japan and China in connection with our control of the establishment of the new Central Government of China, shall be done on [49,266] the following basis, and its concrete matters shall be decided separately." This "basis" included: "The establishment of the general policy for the collaboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China based upon reciprocity, particularly on neighbourly friendship and goodwill, anti- Comintern and joint-defense and economic cooperation. In order to attain the above objectives, Japan will give internal guidance during a certain period." The Military position of the "new" Chinese Government was settled in the following decision of the Five Ministers' Conference: "We will urge the surrender of the Chinese Army, conciliate them, and bring them under control, We will strive to make them support the new government by promoting their anti- Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Communist consciousness, and making as many Chinese troops as possible cooperate with the Japanese Army for destruction of the anti-Japanese and pro- Communist Army, and thus guide the racial conflict toward an ideological opposition. "The necessary Japanese troops will be stationed at ports, railways, waterways, etc. in the occupied areas which are strategic for communications, as well as at the locations of important resources; [49,267] and in remote districts armed Chinese troops will be organized to ensure the preservation of peace. The numerical strength of the troops will be decided in accordance with the actual local situation. "We will conclude an anti-Communist Military Alliance and gradually reorganize the Chinese Army to place it under the direction of the Japanese Army. When the circumstances permit, we will reduce our military strength to the minimum necessary for our national defense." The decisions upon economic matters included the following: "The development of the economy and communication will contribute to the establishment of the national defense of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and satisfy the development of the economy of the three countries and the welfare of its people. Japan especially will materially hold the necessary transportation. In North China the demand for national defense shall be the first consideration and in Central and South China the interests of the people will be particularly considered. "We shall carry out the development of economy following the principle of ministering to each other's wants among Japan, Manchukuo and China and advance [49,268] energetically for the accomplishment of the three countries' economic sphere. However, we shall respect the rights and interests, already obtained by the third countries, and not interfere with their participation in the economic development. "Railway, water transport, aviation and communication will be materially placed under Japan's power, and satisfy the accomplishment of military activities and contribute to the welfare of the people." These quotations from the policy decisions of the Five Ministers' Conference indicated the general scheme to create a government in China completely dominated by Japan but built up behind a facade of Chinese autonomy. THE DOHIHARA AGENCY To advance the programme of establishing a new central government in China along the lines just discussed, the Five Ministers' Conference on the 26th July 1938 decided upon the creation of a Special Commission on Chinese Affairs. In particular the decision was as follows: "The Special Commission for China belongs to the Five Ministers' Council and is an executive organ exclusively for working out important strategems against China and establishing the new Chinese Central Government [49,269] in accordance with the decisions of the Council. "Every organ at the actual places concerned with the above-mentioned business is directed by the Special Commission for China in connection with the said business. "The Army and Navy Ministers will be in charge of the liaison between Special Commission for China and the Imperial Headquarters." On the 29th July the Commission was set up under DOHIHARA, Tsuda and Banzai, its functions being defined thus: "The important strategems against China in Paragraph 1 are understood as political and economic strategies which are not directly connected with military operations." Although DOHIHARA was the youngest of the commissioners, he was the only one who was a soldier in active service. He it was who undertook the administration of the affairs of the Commission and for the purpose set up an establishment in Shanghai under the name of the "DOHIHARA Agency." DOHIHARA was able to make use of his wide knowledge of China and familiarity with the Chinese. He started accordingly to enlist Tang Shao-Yi and Wu Pei-Fu, retired Chinese statesman and general respectively, for the purpose of establishing an anti-Chiang Kai-shek government in the "enemy's midst" among high-ranking Chinese. Wu Pei-Fu [49,270] was then living in retirement at Peiping. DOHIHARA aimed to bring him out from retirement for active collaboration with Japan. This scheme came to be referred to as the "Wu Project." The expenses in connection with this project were to come from surplus revenues of the maritime customs in occupied China. Tang Shao-Yi was assassinated and negotiations with Wu Pei-Fu failed so DOHIHARA turned elsewhere. The DOHIHARA Agency in China aided the development of a scheme to bring Wang Ching-Wei to Central China. It reported to Tokyo a conference with associates of Wang Ching-Wei concerning arrangements for Wang Ching-Wei's coming to Shanghai, etc. Although DOHIHARA claimed that he was in Tokyo at that time, it is clear that he was in control of these plans. THE "FEDERATED COMMITTEE" OF PUPPET REGIMES While DOHIHARA and others were making efforts to carry out the policy of establishing a new central government in China through Chinese personages, the Japanese military authorities in Japan disclosed their determination in pursuit of this policy. SATO, then Chief of the Press Section of the War Ministry, made two speeches upon the "China Incident" and said that the fundamental attitude of the government was to be found in the declaration of 16 January 1938 and [49,271] that the plans for the establishment of a new regime were absolutely unchangeable. On 27 and 28 August 1938, representatives of the Tokyo government and of the Japanese army authorities in Tientsin met at Fukuoka, Japan, and decided on a basic plan for the coordination of the Provisional Government, the Renovation Government and the Mongolia-Sinkiang Federation. On 9 September 1938, a plan for the establishment of a Federated Commitee, or "Joint Committee," of these pro- Japanese organs in China was adopted by the Five Ministers' Conference. Consequent upon these decisions made in Japan the work of developing a "new" Central Government was pursued by the Japanese on the continent. On 9 and 10 September 1938, representatives of the Provisional Government and the Renovation Government met Japanese representatives at Dairen and arranged for the establishment of a "Federated Committee" at Peiping. It was to coordinate and unify the various puppet regimes, particularly the Provisional Government and the Renovation Government, and to prepare for the establishment of the future "new" central government. On 22 September 1938, the inauguration ceremony was held in Peiping and the first meeting of the committee was held on the next day. [49,272] OCCUPATION OF CANTON AND HANKOW Pursuant to a decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, held 8 July 1938, prescribing the occupation of certain strategic points in China, Japanese troops captured Canton on 20 October 1938 and Hankow on 25 October 1938. Steps were taken to provide for the administration of these two important cities and their adjoining areas under Japanese occupation according to the familiar pattern. On 28 October 1938 the arrangements for administration of the Canton and Hankow districts were agreed upon among the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers. They provided for Japanese control of political affairs and for the development of a "Peace Maintenance Association." Although such regimes were to be established ostensibly at the initiative of the Chinese, political guidance was to be given by the Japanese. They were to be kept in close connection and cooperation with the Special Commission on Chinese Affairs, which, as previously noted, was a special agency under the leadership of DOHIHARA. With regard to Canton, a special instruction was given by the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers as follows: "The organization of a local regime shall be initiated by the Chinese side. However, the establishment of the regime shall be accelerated with the [49,273] cooperation of our political guiding agency (The Liaison Conference of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministry authorities at Kwantung), chiefly by our strategy agency (The Special Committee Towards China). After the establishment of the regime the political guiding agency shall take up its internal guidance." The policy of occupying strategic points in China was carried much farther than the capture of Canton and Hankow, for on 25 November 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference decided upon the seizure of Hainan Island, in the extreme South of China. This island was captured by the Japanese on 10 February 1939. JAPAN TERMINATED ALL RELATIONS WITH LEAGUE OF NATIONS Although Japan had notified her withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933, she continued to participate in certain of the activities of the League. After the fall of Hankow and Canton, the attitude of Japan towards third powers stiffened. On 2 November 1933 at a meeting of the Privy Council, which was presided over by HIRANUMA and attended by the Premier and Ministers of State, including ARAKI, KIDO, ITAGAKI and Privy Councillors MINAMI and MATSUI, continuance of cooperation with the League was considered, inasmuch as matters relating to diplomacy and [49,274] treaties were within the province of the Privy Council. On the ground that a resolution had been adopted on 30 September 1938 by the Council of the League of Nations condemnatory of Japan, it was considered impossible having regard to national honour, for Japan to have further cooperation with the organs of the League, and consequently a plan for the termination of cooperative relations between Japan and the various organs of the League except the mandatory rule of the South Sea Islands was drawn up and adopted by unanimous vote at the Meeting. Notice to that effect was immediately served on the League of Nations. THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA Following her decision of complete withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan proceeded to what it called the "New Order in East Asia." On 3 November 1938 the Japanese Government issued a statement advising the world that with the fall of Canton, Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang, chief cities of China, the National Government had been reduced to a local regime and that the ultimate aim of Japan was to establish, in collaboration with Manchukuo and China, a New Order which would secure eternal peace in the Far East. On 29 November 1938 Foreign Minister Arita submitted a report to the Privy Council of which the [49,275] following are some of the more significant passages: "As to the policy for adjustment of new Sino-Japanese relations, it is our intention to proceed on the basis of the following points with a view to establishing a New Order in East Asia through mutual collaboration in political, economic and cultural fields among Japan, Manchukuo and China. . . . as to the problem of making peace with the Chiang Kai-shek Government . . . it is our policy not to carry this out. . . .Our country will foster the establishment of a new Central Government on the basis of the pro-Japanese regime which has been established in Handkow and Canton, and after the new Central Government has been firmly established, we hope to achieve the following: . . . General collaboration of Japan, Manchukuo, and China; . . . Establishment in North China and Mengchiang of a zone of high degree of Sino-Japanese unity in defense and economic spheres; . . . Establishment along the lower basin of the Yangtze River of a zone of a high degree of Sino-Japanese unity in economic collaboration. . . . In South China, besides the establishment of special zones on certain specified islands along the coast, endeavours shall be made to secure the foundation of Sino-Japanese cooperation and collaboration with the major cities and towns as [49,276] starting points. . . . Regarding . . . principle of joint defense, we hope to have Japan, Manchukuo and China, with the chief objects of jointly defending themselves against the Comintern and at the same time cooperating with each other in the maintenance of common public order and peace, adopt the following programme: . . . The early withdrawal of Japanese troops, excepting the stationing of troops in specified zones, and islands for the purpose of guarantee and the maintenance of public peace and order. . . . Recently Britain, the United States, etc., have made various representations based on the principle of open door and equal opportunity. In this connection it is the intention of the Imperial Government to cope with the situation by adopting the policy of examining the so-called open door and equal opportunity principle from the standpoint of the establishment of a Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc based upon the necessities for the existence and defense of cur Empire, and of not recognizing such a principle within the extent that it is incompatible with this standpoint. . . . Our chief objects are that: (a) Japan shall control in substance the development of natural resources for national defence and principally North China and Mengchiang; (b) The currency system, customs and maritime customs system in new China shall be [49,277] adjusted from the standpoint of Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc. So long as the powers' rights and interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing two objects, we will not purposely exclude and restrict them." Premier Konoye made a further speech on 22 December 1938, reiterating Japan's resolution to exterminate the Chinese National Government and to establish a New Order in East Asia. This Japanese "New Order in East Asia" caused the United States grave concern. On 30 December 1938 Ambassaodr Grew, under instructions from his Government, addressed a note to the Japanese Government, in the course of which he said: "Further, with reference to such matters as exchange control, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision, and monopolistic promotion in certain areas of China the plans and practices of the Japanese authorities imply an assumption on the part of those authorities that the Japanese Government or the regimes established and maintained in China by Japanese armed forces are entitled to act in China in a capacity such as flows from rights of sovereignty and further in so acting to disregard and even to declare non-existent or abrogated the established rights and interests of other countries including [49,278] the United States." Again, on 31 December 1938, Ambassador Grew delivered a note informing the Japanese Government of the view of his own Government that the so-called "New Order" could not be created by Japan's ex-parte declaration. ITAGAKI was quoted by "Japan Advertiser" newspaper of 17 March 1939 as having, declared in the Diet that in order to establish the so-called New Order, conflict with third powers was inevitable. Britain and France were Japan's next objective, while Russia was the first. On 7 July 1939, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident, ITAGAKI was reported as giving a press interview in the course of which he said that Japan’s mission of constructing a New Order in East Asia would necessitate the stamping out of unjust interference by third powers. [49,279] THE KO-A-IN OR ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD After the Japanese Army had made deep penetration into the interior of China, steps were taken by the Japanese to review the administration of the occupied areas, hitherto undertaken by the special service organs of the Japanese Army, preparatory to the formation of a New Central Government. Foreign Minister Ugaki desired to have a new organ to deal with China Affairs within the Foreign Office, but this suggestion was opposed by the Army. It was later decided at the instance of the Army that a China Affairs Board or some such organization be planned. The new organ to be set up was distinct from the Special Commission on Chinese Affairs created by the Five Ministers' Conference on 26 July 1938. The latter was an agency concerned with the means of crushing the Chinese National Government and establishing a new central government, while the Board to be established was to be concerned, primarily, with matters of administration in occupied areas. On 16 December 1938, this new organ came into being under the name of Ko-A-In, or Asia Development Board, but more frequently referred to as the China Affairs Board. The Premier was the President and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy were Vice-Presidents. According to the regulations governing [49,280] its organization, the Board was put in charge of the following: politics, economics and culture and the formulation of policies relative thereto; the supervision of commercial concerns to undertake enterprises in China under special laws or to do business in China; and the coordination of administrative affairs in China conducted by Japanese Government agencies. Its head office was in Tokyo, with four branch offices in Shanghai, Peiping, Kalgan and Amoy and two sub-branch offices in Canton and Tsingtao. SUZUKI, Teiichi, was one of the organizers of the Board and the head of the political or administrative division. Decisions made by the head office in Tokyo were transmitted to the Branch or "liaison" offices which dealt with the local Chinese authorities in working out methods of implementing decisions made in Tokyo. Notwithstanding the establishment of the Board, the Japanese Army in China did not forsake matters of administration. Special service organs continued to exist, and army interference was defended as necessary because of military operations. Among the various matters handled by the Asia Development Board was opium. It studied the opium needs in different parts of China and arranged for the distribution from Mongolia to North, Central and South China. Japan's policy upon narcotics in China is treated [49,281] elsewhere. WANG CHING-WEI DEPARTED CHUNGKING The movement for the establishment of the "New" Central Government in China received an impetus when Wang Ching-Wei left Chungking, China's wartime capital, on 18 December 1938. He was Vice Chairman of the Kuomintang Party and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. As early as the spring of 1938, Kao Tsung-Wu and Tung Tao-Ming, former officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, were brought into touch with Kagesa, Chief of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, and were taken to Japan by an army plane. There Kagesa had talks with them on reestablishment of peace between China and Japan. It was proposed that some person other than Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek must be sought to promote peace between the two countries and that Wang Ching-Wei would be a suitable person. The conversations were reported to the Army General Staff, which took up the discussions. In the autumn of 1938, an officer of the Army General Staff returned from Shanghai to Tokyo bringing "Tentative Terms of Peace between Japan and China" which had been drawn up by Kao Tsung-Wu and Mei Ssu-Ping. This was brought by ITAGAKI before the Five Ministers’ Conference, and amendments made to the "Tentative Plan" in accordance with the "Policy for the Adjustment of Relations between [49,282] Japan and China" which had previously been drawn un by the Japanese Government. On 18 November 1938, Kagesa, under orders of ITAGAKI, went to Shanghai to confer with Kao Tsung-Wu and Mei Ssu-Ping. After several amendments were made to the proposed terms, it was arranged that Wang Ching-Wei would leave Chungking according to a prearranged plan upon which the Japanese Government would announce the suggested terms of peace. These arrangements were approved by the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 November 1938, and by the Imperial Conference on 30 November 1938. As stated above, on 18 December 1938, Wang Ching-Wei left Chungking. He reached Hanoi in Indo-China on 20 December 1938. It is to be noted that the date of Wang Ching-Wei's intended departure from Chungking was known to the Japanese Government at least six days previously, as KIDO recorded in his diary on 12 December "it was reported that Wang Chao-Ming (Wang Ching-Wei) on the 18th would escape from Chungking, and for the present it was not good to disclose any political unrest in our country." KONOYE'S THREE PRINCIPLES On 22 December 1938, subsequent to Wang Ching-Wei's "escape" from Chungking, Premier Konoye issued a statement as pre-arranged. The essential points of this statement were as follows: (1) Japan, Manchukuo [49,283] and China should unite with the establishment of a New Order in East Asia as their common object and, in order to realize this, China would abandon resistance to Japan and hostility to Manchukuo; (2) Japan considered it essential for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations that there be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern agreement among Japan, Germany and Italy. In view of the circumstances prevailing in China, Japanese troops should be stationed at specified points. Inner Mongolia should be designated as a special anti-Communist area; (3) Japan did not desire economic monopoly in China or limitation of third powers’ interests; but she demanded that China should, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, recognize freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, to promote the economic interest of both, and should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in North China and Inner Mongolia. As planned, Wang China-Wei on 29 December 1938 made a speech in Hanoi in which he declared that the three points in the Konoye Statement were consistent with the spirit of peace, since the Japanese Government [49,284] had solemnly declared that she would respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of China and would neither aim at an economic monopoly in China nor demand the restriction of third powers' interests in China. He urged that the Chinese Government should, as soon as possible, exchange views for a speedy restoration of peace between the two countries. Thus was the ground prepared for acceptance of Japanese peace terms by the "New" Government intended to be created by Japan under Wang. By these means the difficult and embarrassing war with China would be ended, leaving Japan free to pursue its strategic plans elsewhere. At the same time a complacent Government would be created by Japan giving the latter complete control of China both militarily and economically. HIRANUMA FORMED A CABINET Toward the end of 1938, Premier Konoye contemplated resigning. HIRANUMA was opposed to this because, as he told KIDO, Wang Ching-Wei had left Chungking and the plot was proceeding steadily. Konoye however persisted with his resignation, and was succeeded by HIRANUHA on 5 January 1939. ARAKI remained as Education Minister, KIDO accepted the position as Home Minister and ITAGAKI continued to be War Minister. [49,285] Before ITAGAKI agreed to continue, he stipulated on behalf of the Army seven requirements, viz: (1) With regard to the "China Incident," the aims of the "Holy War" should be achieved and in accordance with fixed policies, particularly the declaration of 22 December 1938, containing the basis of readjustment of the relationship with China, which should be adopted in its entirety; (2) The plan for national defense should be established and expansion of armament should be the aim in order to cope with the new circumstances in East Asia; (3) The relations among Japan, Germany and Italy should be strengthened; (4) The system of national total mobilization should be reinforced and the Planning Board should be expanded and reinforced; (5) All efforts should be made to increase productivity; (6) National morale should be stimulated; and (7) Trade should be promoted. The first consequence of these demands was the adoption by a Cabinet Conference in January 1939 of the "Outline of the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power" drawn up by the Planning Board. This provided for the establishment of a comprehensive productive power expansion plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China, for the improvement of national defense and basic Industries by 1941, in preparation for the "epochal development of our country's destiny in the future." On 21 January 1939 [49,286] Premier HIRANUMA made a speech before the Diet, in which he said that his cabinet was committed to the same immutable policy as the previous cabinet with regard to the China Affair, and that for those who failed to understand and persisted even in their opposition to Japan, there would be no other alternative than to exterminate them. In the meantime, Japan continued her military operations in China. As has been related, the Hainan Islands were captured on 10 February 1939 and Nanchang, Capital of Kiangsi Province, was captured on 26 March 1939. We will adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, 10 November 1948, at 0930.) [49,287] Wednesday, 10 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) [49,288] KANSHAL OF THE COUNTE: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except KAYA, SKIRATORI and UMEZU who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. WANG CHING-WEI TAKEN TO SHANGHAI The declarations of 22 and 29 December 1930, made by Konoye and Wang Ching- Wei respectively, were but a prelude to the establishment of a new central government in China. In March 1939, the Five Ministers' Conference in Japan decided to send Kagesa to Hanoi to take Wang to a "safety zone," which was decided upon as Shanghai. He reached Hanoi on 17 April 1939, carrying personal letters to Wang from Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister ITAGAKI, Ko-A-In Division Chief SUZUKI, and Navy Minister Yonai. Wang informed Kagesa that he would launch a movement for peace with Shanghai as his base. Wang was conveyed by the Japanese with the utmost secrecy from Hanoi to Shanghai where he arrived on the 8th May 1939. [49,289] WANG CHING-WEI VISITED JAPAN While in Formosa with Wang on their way to Shanghai, Kagesa reported to the War Ministry in Tokyo that Wang, in view of expected opposition, wished to have himself set up as soon as possible at the place most convenient for his various activities. Later Kagesa actually set up headquarters for Wang in Shanghai. A Kagesa Agency was developed also to coordinate the work of the Japanese Gendarmerie and Wang's men. Wang was concerned to ascertain the views of the Japanese Government. Accompanied by Kagesa and other Japanese, he left Shanghai for Tokyo on 31 May 1939. While in Tokyo, he conferred with HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI, Konoye, Arita and Yonai. In his talk with HIRANUMA, soon after his arrival in Tokyo, HIRANUMA told him that his cabinet had inherited the ideas of the Konoye statement and was firmly adhering to it. On 15 June 1939, Wang had an interview with War Minister ITAGAKI, acting as the proxy of Premier HIRAKUMA. ITAGAKI, pointed out that Japan could not dissolve the two existing regimes, the Provisional Government and Renovation Government, as those associated with them had been loyal to the plan of peaceful cooperation between Japan and China. He suggested the establishment of a political council in the Provisional Government and an economic council in the Renovation Government as the basis of maintaining Sino- [49,290] Japanese relations locally. Wang was not opposed to this. ITAGAKI further suggested changing the Chinese national flag, because the Blue Sky and White Sun ensign was regarded as the symbol of anti-Japaniso. ITAGAKI also asked Wang's opinion upon the recognition of the independence of Manchukuo, to which the latter answered that as his aim was peace with Japan, he was firmly convinced that there was no alternative but to recognize Manchukuo. DECISION OF THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE - JUNE 1939 HIRANUMA says that in his talk with Wang Ching-Wei on the 10th of June 1939, he discussed the future of China and gave it as his opinion that there was no way but to "take the measure which China thought proper"; yet four days before, on 6 June 1939, while Wang Ching-Wei was still in Japan, the Five Ministers' Conference decided on a "Policy for the Establishment of a New Central Government". The Policy, generally speaking, was directed to the establishment of a pro-Japanese political system, with a "New" Central Government and a group of constituent local governments - a form of federal government, "but its details shall be conformed to the plan of adjusting a new relation between Japan and China". As to the Chungking Government, the plan provided that it could become a constituent element "provided that it changed its [49,291] mind and be reformed". In more detail it said "When the Chungking Government gives up its anti-Japanese and pro-communism policy and accomplishes the required personnel changes . . . it shall be made a constituent element of the new central government, concluding (sic) that it has surrendered to us". The policy provided that "the time of establishment and its details shall be settled after consultation with Japan". The decision was reached also that "positive and internal aid necessary for this movement shall be given from the side of Japan". This statement of policy was drawn up because of discussions then taking place with Wang and set out a series of conditions to be required of him as well as a "Plan of Guidance of Wang's Movements". A consideration of this policy decision discloses a clear purpose of using Wang in the development of a Japanese-controlled government throughout the entire area of China. This is the fact although Kagesa in his evidence said that "Wang’s party submitted a request containing broad principles such as respect for China's sovereignty, non-interference with domestic administration, the providing of Japanese advisers only at China's request, etc., and that these suggestions on the part of the Chinese were "generally admitted". [49,292] CABINET RESHUFFLED IN JAPAN AND CONTINUED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA Within a period of four and a half months between the end of August 1939 and the middle of January 1940, there were two cabinet changes in Japan. As a result of the signing of the Russo-German Non-Agression Pact on 22 August 1939, the HIRANUMA Cabinet, which had been striving for the conclusion of a Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy, submitted its resignation. On 30 August 1939, General Abe formed a new Cabinet. HATA succeeded ITAGAKI as War Minister and MUTO became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. On 12 September 1939 ITAGAKI was appointed Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces stationed at Nanking, where he continued his intrigues by supporting Wang Ching-Wei's "National Salvation Peace Movement". Military operations in China continued into the interior of China. On 20 July 1939, a "Situation Estimate" was made by the Army in Central China and presented to the Vice-Minister of War and other organs. This stated, among other things the future plans of the Army in China. It said that the Army had decided that a new central government should be established with Wang Ching-Wei as its head and should be given positive support in its development. [49,293] On 23 December 1939, Japanese landed in Lungchow in southernmost China. On the next day, they captured Nanning, the Capital of Kwangsi Province. At the end of 1939, Japan ordered her air force to bomb the Yunnan Railaway with a view to disrupting transhipment of war materials to the interior of China from the seaports of French Indo-China. In January 1940, another government change took place in Japan. Premier Abe resigned on 12 January 1940 and was succeeded by Yonai. The general policy of Japan towards China however remained unchanged. INAUGURATION OF THE PUPPET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT After his return from Japan, Wang Ching-Wei conferred with General Tada, Commander of Japanese Forces in North China, and with the leaders of the Provisional and Renovation Governments in regard to the proposed establishment of a puppet central government. By that time, July 1939, Kagesa had established in Shanghai the Kagesa Agency, which worked with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries, as well as with the Asia Development Board. This Agency assisted in the establishment of the Central Government. A loan of 40 million Yen was advanced to Wang Ching-Wei by Japan for that purpose. From 28 August to 6 September 1939, Wang conducted the "Sixth National Kuomintang "Congress", which revised the platform of the Party and adopted as "principles" Japan's proposals and [49,294] discussed a Central Political Conference to establish the new Central Government. Thereafter, Wang issued invitations to the Provisional and the Renovation Governments to participate in organizing the Central Political Council to create the new government. In Japan according to Kagesa, steps were being taken to implement a tentative plan which had been prepared by the Asia Development Board in October and this was agreed upon by the Japanese Government and Wang Ching-Wei on 30 December 1939. Details regarding the establishment of a new Central Government were also agreed upon by a representative of Wang and Japanese officials in Tokyo. Then in January 1940, representatives of the Provisional and the Renovation Governments, as well as of the Japanese Army met at Tsingtao and decided to amalgamate the existing regimes. On 30 March 1940, Wang's government was formally inaugurated. SECTION VI: GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE Closely associated with Japan's programme of dominating China on the continent was the idea of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This was recognized as being bound to bring her into conflict with the interests of third powers. On 7 July 1939, two years after the outbreak of hostilities at Lukouchiao [49,295] (Marco Polo Bridge), ITAGAKI and Yonai, War and Navy Ministers respectively of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, were reported in the "Japan Times and Mail" as stating that the unjust interference of third powers in the execution of Japan's mission of constructing a New Order in East Asia should be stamped out. "All the people in the country", the article continued, "must express their firm determination that Japan will never abandon her aim of making East Asia for East Asiatics. No pains must be spared for the attainment of the goal". On 29 June 1940, Japan's Foreign Minister Arita broadcast a speech reiterating Japan's mission of establishing a New Order in East Asia and her determination "to leave no stone unturned to eradicate activities assisting Chiang Kai-shek". He stated that the countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas were closely related to each other and were destined to cooperate and administer each other's need for their common welfare and prosperity, and that the uniting of all those regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and stability was a natural conclusion. References were made at conferences of representatives of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities to the possibility of fighting against Great Britain, the occupation of British colonies, and to Japan's intention that the New Order in the Far East [49,296] included the South Seas and in particular the regions extending from Burma and the Eastern part of India to Australia and New Zealand. The date of this public declaration of Japan's policy to expand in East Asia and the region of the Pacific Ocean, which was 29 June 1940, is significant. Of the countries interested in this sphere Holland had been overrun by the Germans and her government was in exile. France had surrendered to Germany. Britain was about to face a struggle for her existence. America, if she intervened, would almost certainly face a struggle with Japan, Germany and Italy, a struggle for which her state of rearmament was unfitted. Such an opportunity for Japan to expand at the expense of her neighbors would not easily occur again. THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET In the middle of July 1940, the Yonai Cabinet was forced by the Army to resign because, upon the resignation of HATA as War Minister, the Army refused to provide a successor. Konoye was again chosen to form a new Cabinet because, as KIDO said, he was to be "depended upon to settle the China Incident". TOJO became War Minister, while HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, and HOSHINO served as Ministers without portfolios. The new Cabinet was formed on 22 July 1940. Continuing the policy of establishing [49,297] a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the new Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared on 1 August 1940 that the immediate and of Japan's foreign policy was to establish a Great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the Japan-Manchukuo- China group as the core. On 28 September 1940 the Japanese Government prepared an "Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy" which provided that an effort must be made to realize general peace between Japan and China and to promote the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Under that plan, in the regions including French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, Straits Settlement, British Kalaya, Thailand, the Philippine Islands, British Borneo and Burma, with Japan, Manchukuo and China as centre, Japan should construct a sphere in which politics, economy and culture of those countries and regions would be combined. FURTHER MILITARY ACTION BY JAPAN AGAINST CHINA Although the Government of Wang Ching-Wei was formally installed on 30 March 1940, in Nanking, the Chinese National Government at Chungking was still holding out against Japan. In order to bring about the surrender of the Chinese Government, Japanese military operations continued with increasing vigour. On 12 June 1940 Japanese forces captured Ichang, gateway to the [49,298] Szechuen Province, within which is Chungking. On 30 June 1940 they again captured Kaifeng, which had been recovered by the Chinese. The Japanese Government also insisted upon sending troops to Indo-China in order to disrupt the supply line of the Chinese and to threaten them from the rear. On 14 September 1940 KIDO advised the Emperor to approve the action taken towards that end. After protracted negotiations, which will be discussed later, an agreement was made between the Japanese and French authorities to allow the Japanese troops to occupy northern French Indo-China from 23 September 1940 for operations against China. JAPAN SIGNED A TREATY WITH WANG CHING-WEI GOVERNMENT Upon the inauguration of the new government, it was not a professional diplomat but a soldier, General Abe, Nobuyuki, who was appointed the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. This arrangement followed the pattern of Manchukuo, where a soldier, the Commander for the time being of the Kwantung Army, was appointed Japanese Ambassador to the puppet government of Manchukuo. General Abe arrived at Nanking on 23 April 1940, and all preparations were completed for the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations. After protracted negotiations between Wang and Abe, a draft treaty was agreed upon on 28 August 1940 and initialled three days after- [49,299] wards. After further negotiations and some alterations had been made, a treaty in its final form was settled. Following an Imperial Conference of 13 November 1940, the treaty was submitted to the Privy Council and was approved at its full session on 27 November 1940. It was formally signed on 30 November 1940 at Nanking. "TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA" The Treaty and associated documents signed 30 November 1940 were ex facie directed to the maintenance of mutual respect and cooperation with each other as good neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia, and, with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general. The Treaty provided that the two governments agreed to eliminate causes prejudicial to amity between the two countries, and to engage in joint defense against communism, for which purpose Japan should station required forces in specified areas of Menchiang and of North China. The Wang Government agreed to recognize Japan's right to station naval units and vessels in specified areas in China. The Treaty further provided that the two governments should effect close cooperation so as to complement each other and minister to each other's needs in resources in North China and Menchiang, especially [49,300] materials needed for national defense. To develop resources in other areas, the Wang Government agreed to give positive and full facilities to Japan. The two governments agreed to promote trade and commerce and to extend specially close cooperation for the promotion of trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangtze River. Attached to the Treaty were two secret agreements. In the first, it was agreed that diplomacy would be based on concerted action and no measures would be taken with respect to third countries contrary to that principle. The Wang Government also agreed to comply with Japan's demands for military needs in railways, airways, communications and waterways in areas where Japanese troops were stationed. China's administrative and executive rights were to be respected in ordinary times. The second secret agreement allowed Japanese vessels to "freely enter into and anchor at the harbour areas within the territorial Jurisdiction of the Republic of China," The Wang Government agreed to cooperate in the planning, development and production of special resources, especially strategic resources, necessary for national defense, in Amoy, Hainan Island and the adjoining islands, and to facilitate the strategic depends of Japan. In a separate letter, addressed to Abe, Wang promised that so long as Japan was carrying on military [49,301] operations in China, the latter would cooperate toward the full attainment of Japan's war purpose. On the same say as the Treaty was formally signed there was published a "Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan, Manchukuo and China," which provided that the three countries would mutually respect their sovereignty and territories, and would bring about general cooperation as good neighbors, common defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation. By this treaty and associated secret agreements Japan secured the right to a voice in China's diplomatic activities, to maintain military and naval forces in China, to use China for strategic purposes, and to use Chinese natural resources for "national defense." In other words, despite the diplomatic protestations in these documents Chine was to become at the best a province or satrapy of Japan, and at the worst a country to be exploited to satisfy Japan's military and economic needs. INTERMITTENT PEACE TALKS AND CONTINUED MILITARY OPERATIONS The signing of the treaty might well be regarded by the Japanese Government with satisfaction, as the realization of the policy stated in the Konoye Declaration of 16 January 1938, in so far as the establishment of a new central government and the obtaining [49,302] of military and other advantages concerned. At the same time, the problem of how to deal with the Chinese National Government in Chungking, which was holding out, remained unsettled. The attitude of the Japanese Government during this period appeared to be devious or vacillating. Prior to the signing of the treaty, peace moves had been conducted toward the Chinese Government at Chungking, but they led to no tangible results. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in an attempt to take these negotiations into his own hands, despatched Tajiri, Matsumoto and others to Hong Kong. These efforts again proved fruitless. Following the signing of the treaty with Wang, the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the Chinese Government at Chungking again stiffened. On 11 December 1940, Abe was given instructions as follows: "The Imperial Government has now recognized the National Government (At Nanking) and had entered into formal diplomatic relations with it. However, in view of the situation that not only is the Incident still going on, but also that we are, at least, going to adapt the state for a long term warfare, you should try to rapidly bring up and strengthen the National Government (in Nanking), in accordance with the established policy of the Enpire and the provisions of the new China-Japanese Treaty." Thereafter, armed operations against Chungking [49,303] were continued. On 1 March 1941, HATA was again appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Japanese Forces in China. SATO become Secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau on 18 March 1941, and KIMURA Vice Minister of War on 10 April 1941. SUZUKI was made the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, following an agreement reached among Premier Konoye, KIDO, the War and Navy Ministers. On 21 April 1941, Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, which occupied a strategically important position in the rear of Chungking, was bombed, and the United States Consulate building there was badly damaged. Chungking, having previously suffered damage from Japanese air raids, was again bombed on 9 and 10 May and on 1 June 1941. HULL-NOMURA TALKS RELATING TO CHINA In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura was conducting negotiations with the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, at Washington over questions affecting world peace, particularly Sino-Japanese relations. These will be discussed more fully later. It is sufficient to mention here that Japan sought (1) to end American assistance to China, (2) the assistance of America to induce Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace direct with Japan - really to accept Japanese terms, (3) the recognition of Manchukuo, and (4) the right to hold [49,304] China in military subjection through the stationing of Japanese troops there. On 2 July 1941, another Imperial Conference was held, attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, HIRANUMA and OKA. A summary of Japan's policy in accordance with the current change of situation was adopted at the Conference. Among other things, it included a decision to exercise further pressure "to hasten the surrender of Chiang's regime." THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET Foreign Minister Matsuoka was not in full agreement with Premier Konoye in regard to procedure in the negotiation between Japan and the United States. Matsuoka was also in favor of a Japanese attack on Russia, which had now been invaded by Germany, as well as an advance in East Asia and the Pacific, a policy which most of Japan's leaders thought beyond her powers. The Cabinet resigned on 16 July 1941 as a means of getting rid of Matsuoka. On 18 July 1941, Konoye formed his third Cabinet. Toyoda replaced Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. The fundamental policy of the Japanese Government remained unchanged. The negotiations between the United States and Japan were continued. On 27 August 1941, Konoye sent a message to President Roosevelt. A Japanese Government statement bearing the same date was also delivered to [49,305] President Roosevelt. Among other things, the statement said that Japan's measures in Indo-China were intended to accelerate the settlement of the "China Incident." President Roosevelt, in reply, reiterated the principles regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest, viz: respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations and support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Upon receipt of the reply, Konoye called the Cabinet into session on 5 September 1941, which decided to hold an Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941. TOJO, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA were all present in the Imperial Conference, which, aside from making a decision to break off the negotiations in the middle of October, also set forth the following demands to be made in connection with the "China Incident" in the proposed discussions between Konoye and Roosevelt: (1) the United States and Britain should not interrupt the settlement of the "China Incident" which would be made in accordance with the "Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty" and the Japanese-Manchukuo-China Tri-Partite Joint Declaration; (2) The Burma Road should be closed and the United States and Britain should give Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek neither military nor economic support. On 22 September 1941 Toyoda delivered [49,306] to Ambassador Grew a statement of the terms of peace which Japan proposed to offer China. Those terms were: (1) Neighborly friendship; (2) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (3) Cooperative defense between Japan and China, for which Japanese troops and naval forces would be stationed in certain areas in China; (4) Withdrawal of Japanese troops upon the settlement of the China Incident excepting those which came under point 3; (5) Economic cooperation between Japan and China; (6) Fusion of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Government with Wang Ching-wei's Government; (7) No annexation; (8) No indemnities; (9) Recognition of Manchukuo. These terms, it will be noticed, not withing their well-sounding purposes and having regard to the treaty with Wang's Government, would have given Japan complete dominance of China politically, economically and militarily. In his discussion of the situation with Premier Konoye on 9 October 1941, KIDO stated that although it would be inadvisable to make war on the United States immediately, Japan should prepare for military action for the completion of the "China Incident" which might last for ten or fifteen years, and to apply the whole of Japan's military force in China to realize Japan's plans against Kunming and [49,306 A] Chungking. On 12 October 1941, the Cabinet reached an agreement, upon the insistence of War Minister TOJO, that Japan should not waver in her policy of stationing troops in China or other policies connected with China and that nothing be done which might prejudice the result of the China Incident. This meant, in other words, in no circumstances should Japan yield up any of the many material benefits already gained or in prospect in China. On 14 October 1941, prior to the Cabinet Meeting, Konoye spoke to TOJO and urged further consideration upon the opening of hostilities between Japan and the United States and the bringing to an end of the China Incident. TOJO, as before, opposed any concession to the United States in the matter of withdrawal of troops from China, and said Konoye was too pessimistic. In the Cabinet meeting hold that day, TOJO was insistent upon his view and brought about a complete deadlock, Konoye resigned on 16 October 1941. [49,307] TOJO FORMED A CABINET After the resignation of Konoye, TOJO became Premier upon the recommendation of KIDO. HIROTA also gave his specific approval to the recommendation. In the new Cabinet, TOJO was also War Minister and Home Minister. TOGO became Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs, while KAYA became Finance Minister. SUZUKI was Chief Director of the Asia Development Board and concurrently President of the Planning Board. SHIWADA became Navy Minister, while HOSHINO was designated Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. As before, the Premier served as President of the Asia Development Board, with the Army, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers, as Vice Presidents. CONTINUANCE OF UNITED STATES - JAPAN PARLEYS After the new TOJO Cabinet came into office, the Japanese Government continued diplomatic discussions with the United States Government, but, while appearing to be urgent for a decision, it showed no willingness to make any real modification of its attitude concerning China. On 4 November 1941 TOGO informed Nomura that Kurusu was being dispatched to assist him in the parleys. On the same day, TOGO sent to Nomura another message giving the terms to be presented to the United States Government, including those relating to the stationing [49,308] of Japanese troops in China. Japan still insisted that it should station troops in China, in the Mongolian border region and on the island of Hainan, even after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and that these would not be evacuated until the lapse of an indefinite period, which if necessary might be interpreted as 25 years. These terms were subsequently approved by the Imperial Conference held on 5 November 1941, at which TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA were present. Nomura was promptly notified of the approval. CONTINUED MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHINA The outbreak of the Pacific War did not abate Japan's military operations in China, nor alter the decision to crush the Chinese National Government at Chungking. Even before the outbreak of the Pacific War, casualties and losses suffered by China had assumed tremendous proportions. Up to June 1941, figures of the Japanese showed that the Chinese armed forces had lost 3,800,000 men killed, wounded and captured; that the Japanese had captured from the Chinese an enormous amount of booty; that they had destroyed 1977 Chinese planes; and that the Japanese had themselves lost 109,250 men killed and 203 planes. In May 1942, the Japanese took Lungling and [49,309] Tengchung in Yunnan Province, in the rear of Chungking. In December 1943, they captured Changteh in Hunnan Province, although it was soon recaptured by the Chinese. By the middle of 1944, military operations were intensified in the interior of Central China. Changchow fell on 20 April 1944, Loyang on 25 May 1944, Changsha on 18 June 1944 and Hengyang on 8 August 1944. Then in the winter of the same year the Japanese made a further thrust into the strategic southwestern China. They captured Kweilin on 10 November 1944 and Liuchow on 11 November 1944. At the close of the war, the official records of the Chinese Army showed that the army alone lost from 7 July 1937 to August 1945, 3,207,948 men killed, wounded and missing. We were not given figures on non-combatants killed or maimed in the course of the war, although there must have been very considerable civilian casualties. SECTION VII - JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION OF MANCHURIA AND OTHER PARTS OF CHINA The case made against the accused is of waging aggressive war, with the object, inter alia, of obtaining economic domination of Manchuria and other parts of China. It becomes necessary, therefore, that we should discuss shortly the evidence presented upon this subject. As already related the Japanese policy in Manchuria was [49,310] to consolidate the territory under government subservient to Japan and then by means of agreements with that government and by other means to obtain much needed basic materials required to carry out the program adopted in Japan and to obtain control of the communications and a substantial part of industry and commerce, all of which were of great value to later Military Operations. In North China the same plan was followed for the same purposes and particularly to fill the demand for supplies which at the time were not obtainable in foreign markets and which were badly needed in the campaign against the whole of China and were necessary to facilitate the over-all plan. The same policy was adopted as the war progressed into Central and Southern China. The political domination has already been dealt with; the following account of the various measures adopted indicates the extent to which the policy of economic domination was carried out. GENERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS The Japanese policy toward China has been dealt with at an earlier point in this judgment in relation to the political policy. Most of the "Plans and Policies” there referred to also deal with economic matters. Therefore at this step we mention only a few decisions which are particularly applicable to the question of economic [49,311] domination. Typical of the policy was the adoption by the HIROTA Cabinet on the 11th of August 1936 of "The Second Administrative Policy Toward North China," the main purpose of which was "To Assist the people in North China in procuring perfect independence and to set up on anti-communistic and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian area and to secure the necessary materials for our National defense as well as to improve the facilities of the transportation against the possible invasion of Soviet Russia, and by making North China the base for the cooperation of Japan, Manchuria, and China as well as for mutual aid." It was then provided that Japan should guide the local political powers to insure the independence of North China. It was finally provided that iron, coal, and salt existing in the province should be utilized for our national defense and for the promotion of our transportation facilities and electric power.” On the 20th of February, 1937, the Hayashi Cabinet adopted the "Third Administrative Policy Toward North China" the principal objects of which were procuring defense materials, improving transportation, preparing the defense against the USSR, and establishing cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China. On the 10th of June 1937, the War Ministry under the first Koroye Cabinet [49,312] prepared a "Resume of Policy regarding the execution of summary of five year program of important industries" which, as we have mentioned previously, was declared to be based upon a "policy for the establishment of a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchukuo, and China in order to prepare for the epochal development of Japan's destiny in the future." The plan also recites that it aims at the establishment of self-sufficiency in regard to important resources within the sphere of our influence and thereby a void depending upon the resources of a third power." On the 24th December, 1937 the Cabinet decided the "Outline of Measures for the China Incident" which contained a section entitled "Policy for Economic Development." That section provided that its object was the economic development of North China to coordinate Japanese and Manchurian economy and to establish co-prosperity and coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and China. For that purpose it was considered necessary to develop and adjust every phase of economics by closely combining Chinese capital with Japanese capital, thereby contributing to the development and increase of production of necessary materials for the national defense of Japan and Manchukuo. In order to give effect to the plans and policy last mentioned and to coordinate the Japanese efforts [49,313] in that regard provision was made in April 1938 for the creation of two national policy companies. These were the North China Development Company for North China and the Central China Promotion Company for Central China. The objects of the North China Development Company were to further economic development and to consolidate various undertakings in North China. Its operations were carried on as a holding company financing and controlling lending enterprises in transportation, harbor and port developments, electric power generation and transmission, mining, production and sale of salt and allied undertakings. It operated under the supervision of the Japanese Government and was subject to the orders of the government; in fact except in routine matters it required the approval of the government for all its decisions. For example the approval of the Japanese Government was required for the raising of loans, making changes in its articles of association, giving effect to mergers and dissolutions and distribution of profits. Its plans for investment and financing for each fiscal year also required the approval of the Government. UMEZU was appointed a member of the company's organizing committee with OKA as an assistant. KAYA served as president of the company for some time going [49,314] out of office on the 10th of October, 1941, when he became Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet. The Central China Promotion Company had objects very similar to those of the North China Development Company and was subject to substantially the same control by the Government. The operations in the development of public utilities, transportation, and natural resources which will shortly be referred to came under the control of one or the other of these companies. Before dealing with the particular operations reference should be made to the "Program for the Economic Development of China" adopted by the Planning Board in January, 1939. It was stated in this program that the development of natural resources in China had far-reaching consequences in realizing the ideas of economic collaboration between Japan, China and Manchukuo as the basic step for establishing a new order in East Asia. It was further stated that these activities were "as vital and urgent as military operations and political activities and that they should be carried out even during hostilities". [49,315] Reference should also be made to the "Summary of the Program for Economic Construction Embracing Japan, Manchukuo and China" put out by the Cabinet Information Bureau on the 5th of November 1940, the principal purpose of which was the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient economic structure within ten years to strengthen the position of East Asia in world economy. Under the program Japan's function was to promote science and techniques and to develop heavy industry, the chemical industry and mining. Manchukuo was to develop important basic industries and China her natural resources, particularly mining and the salt industry. Not only was no provision made in this program for consulting Manchukuo or China with regard to its operation but reading the document as a whole it is made clear that decisions as to its being put into effect in all its aspects were to be made by Japan and Japan alone. Significant of the purposes of the Japanese Plans in North China is a statement by KAYA that the plan for mobilization of materials in North China had three main points; the first was to supply Japan with war materials; the second was to expand Japan's armaments; and the third was to meet the needs of peace-time economy. [49,316] PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES The foregoing gives an outline of the general plans and policies adopted by the Japanese Government. A short outline of how the general plans were applied to particular industries and special phases of economics will be of value at this point. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS In 1935 when DOHIHARA was active in connection with the establishment of autonomous rule in North China he demanded the construction of a railway between Tientsin and Shihchiachuan. Reference has already been made to the railway plan drafted by the North China Garrison Force in November 1935 which indicated Japan's desire or intention to acquire the Shantung Railway and a section of the Lunghai Railway and to construct further new railways in China. In July 1938 the North China Telephone and Telegraph Company was organized, the North China Development Company owning more than 70% of its capital stock. Its objects were to construct and operate telegraph and telephone service including submarine cable in North China and connecting with Japan, Manchukuo, and the rest of the world. Other subsidiary companies of the North China Development Company were the North China Communications Company and the North China [49,317] Aviation Corporation. The North China Communications Company operated 3,750 miles of railways, 6250 miles of bus lines, and 625 miles of inland waterway communications in North China. NATURAL RESOURCES By "The Outline of Measures for the China Incident" of December 1937 provision was made for a National Policy Company to take over the salt industries and practically the whole mining industry in North China for the purpose of obtaining revenue for Japan. The Central Iron Mine Company, a subsidiary of the Central China Promotion Company, was set up in April 1938 to develop the estimated one hundred million tons of coal in Central China. Deposits of iron ore in North China estimated at approximately two hundred million tons, or more than half of China's estimated iron ore deposits, were take over in July 1939 by the Lungyen Iron Mine Company, a subsidiary of the North China Development Company. Of the mines coming under the control of this company, the one having the largest estimated deposits of all was the Lungyen Mine in Chahar Province. Part of the ore from this mine and the surplus of pig iron produced therefrom were exported to Japan. Of a total production of 4,300,000 tons of ore mined by the company, 700,000 [49,318] tons were used for the production of pig iron and of the balance 1,400,000 tons were sent to Manchuria and over a million tons to Japan. In Central China iron deposits in the Yangtze Valley were estimated at one hundred million tons. For the purpose of continuing the development of this deposit the Central China Iron Mine Company was established in April 1938. The company was controlled by the Central China Promotion Company and other Japanese interests; payment for Chinese interests in the property was arranged to be made in the form of equipment and goods. Coal deposits in North China were enormous and estimated to be more than 50% of the deposits in the whole of China. In developing these coal resources the Japanese adopted a policy of controlling the supply to the Chinese in order to insure a further supply for Japan, having particular regard for the need of coking coal. The Tatung Mine which had the largest annual production was taken over and operated by the Tatung Coal Mine Company, a subsidiary of the North China Development Company. By 1938 the greater part of the salt consumed in Japan was imported from various countries in the East and Middle East including China. In order to [49,319] increase the supply from China the North China Salt Company was organized as a subsidiary of the North China Development Company for the production of salt in North China. For the same purpose in Central China the Hua Chung Salt Company was organized by the Central China Promotion Company in August 1939 and plans were made to develop new salt fields by investment of the funds of the holding company. PUBLIC UTILITIES Immediately after the occupation of Shanghai in December 1937 the Japanese took over various public utility companies among which might be mentioned: (a) Puntung Electric Supply Company which was then made a subsidiary of the Central China Water and Electricity Company which in turn was Japanese controller; (b) the Chinese Electric Power Company in Shanghai was taken over in June 1938 and became a subsidiary of the same holding company. In these cases the owners of the companies were compensated at a valuation considerably below the real worth of the companies. The Chapei Water and Electricity Company was taken over and after the outbreak of the Pacific War the American owned Shanghai Power Company was also taken over. Evidence was made before the Tribunal that after the surrender in 1945 when the various plants were taken [49,320] back by the former owners the plant equipment and machinery had deteriorated far beyond ordinary wear and tear. BANKING From the beginning of the occupation of North China the Japanese Army circulated in North China bank notes of the Bank of Chosen and in Central China bank notes of the Bank of Japan, together with some military or occupation yen notes. However, the use of Japanese currency in occupied territories was disturbing to Japan's monetary system. In order to remedy this situation the Japanese Government organized the Federal Reserve Bank of China in February 1938, the main policy of which was to stabilize currency and control the money market in foreign exchange. It was authorized to issue paper currency which was linked to the Japanese yen and so made the basis for Japanese investments in North China. Controlled by the Japanese Government this bank became very important and carried out Japan's policy in the financial field of its operations. As a result of the Japanese virtual control of the economics of occupied China and its control of a substantial part of industry and commerce, many Japanese business men and industrialists went to China and entered the economic life making no effort to hide their control. [49,321] PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES The adoption of the measures just referred to inevitably had the result of affecting the trade and commerce of other powers. Consequently on the 6th of October 1938, United States Ambassador Grew wrote to Prime Minister Konoye that the events in Manchuria were being repeated; that the exchange control in North China was discriminatory and that with the alteration of customs tariffs the Japanese control of transportation and communications, and the proposal to create a monopoly in wool and tobacco was putting Japan and Japanese merchants in a preferred position in China. He consequently asked for discontinuance of (1) exchange control and other measures discriminatory to American trade and enterprise; (2) monopolies or preferences conferred on Japanese interests, superiority of rights in commence or the economic development in China and (3) interference with American property and rights, particularly censorship of mail and restrictions upon residence and travel by Americans and American trade and interests. To this protest the foreign minister, while admitting the truth of the charges, claimed justification for the economic measures as being for the benefit of China and East Asia. [49,322] NARCOTICS IN CHINA Reference has already been made to the traffic in narcotic drugs in Manchuria. A policy similar to that adopted in Manchuria was adopted from time to time as military operations succeeded in North, Central, and Southern China. This traffic is related to the military operations and political developments in that by means of it substantial funds were obtained for the various local governments set up by the Japanese, funds which would otherwise have to be furnished by Japan or found by additional local taxes. Incidentally, the effect on the morale of the Chinese population by the tremendous increase of drug addicts can be well imagined. Prior to the outbreak of the China War the Chinese Government had been making determined efforts to wipe out opium smoking. That these efforts were meeting with success is demonstrated by a report made by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations in June 1939 to the effect that the measures taken by the Chinese Government for the suppression of drug addition under regulations promulgated in June 1936 had produced highly satisfactory results. Connected with the opium traffic in China from 1937 were the Japanese Army, the Japanese Foreign Office, [49,323] and the Asia Development Board. The Mitsubishi Trading Company and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha were making large purchases of Iranian opium for Japan, Manchukuo and China. By arrangement with the Foreign Ministry the two companies in March 1938 made an agreement in respect to the places from which the opium was to be imported and their respective shares in the business. The distribution of opium for Japan and Manchukuo was to be handled by the Mitsubishi Company, and that for Central and South China by the Mitsui Company; the distribution for North China being shared equally and the government offices of Japan, Manchukuo and China were to decide upon and inform the two companies of the amount to be purchased for each year. At the request of the Asia Development Board the agreement was revised by providing for the organization of the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association, the opium business of that company to be divided equally between the two trading companies. The Special Service Organizations established in cities and towns under the China Expeditionary Force were entrusted with the sale of the opium. The Economic Division of the Asia Development Board stated the requirements of opium in North, Central and South China and arranged for its distribution. Profits from the sales of opium were transferred to the Asia Development [49,324] Board. At a later date a General Opium Suppression Bureau was created and the opium trade was administered by the Renovation Government which was to a certain extent supported by the profits from the sale of opium. But even at that time the KO- A-IN and the Japanese Army Head quarters in Central China were still responsible for policy making with regard to the opium trade. From time to time measures were adopted ostensibly to control or reduce the traffic. One example was the General Opium Suppression Bureau which was organized in 1938 and at about the same time the Renovation Government set aside $2000 a month for opium suppression propaganda. Notwithstanding these and other measures adopted, the traffic continued to increase. The explanation may be found in the cryptic evidence of Harada, Kumakichi, Japanese Military Attache at Shanghai from 1937 to 1939. He says, "When I was head of the Tokumu Bu, I received instructions through military channels to provide opium for the Chinese people by establishing an opium suppression board." In June 1937 at a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium of the League of Nations it was stated openly that the increase in illicit traffic in China coincided with the Japanese advances. [49,325] INNER MONGOLIA Following the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Chahar after the Ching- DOHIHARA Agreement of 1935 as already related Japanese influence was felt in the provinces of Chahar and Sulyuan. Thereafter the farmers were encouraged to raise more opium. As a result production of opium was substantially increased. NORTH CHINA In North China, particularly in Hopeh and Shantung, after the Tangku Truce of 1933, and the establishment of the demilitarized zone the Chinese were unable to control the drug traffic. There then followed a tremendous increase in the number of drug addicts, the distribution of the drugs being handled by various companies and associations controlled by Japanese. After the occupation of Tientsin in 1937 there was a notable increase in the use of narcotics. The Japanese concession in Tientsin became known as the center of heroin manufacturing. Not less than two hundred heroin factories were established in the Japanese concession and it was stated before the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium in May 1937 that it was common Knowledge that almost 90% of all illicit white drugs in the world were of Japanese [49,326] origin manufactured in Tientsin, Dairen and the other cities of Manchuria and North China. CENTRAL CHINA Here again substantially the same story is told. In Nanking opium consumption had been practically wiped out before 1937. After the occupation by the Japanese troops the trade in narcotics became public and was even advertised in newspapers. As was established in an earlier part of this chapter the profits made in the drug traffic monopoly were enormous. By the autumn of 1939 the monthly revenue from the sale of opium in Nanking was estimated at $3,000,000. It is therefore obvious having regard to the magnitude of the traffic in Manchuria, North, Central and South China how valuable the traffic was to the Japanese Government even if taken only in terms of revenue. We do not consider it necessary to give any further details of the traffic in drugs; it is sufficient to say that in Shanghai, in Fukien Province and Kwantung Province in South China and elsewhere after 1937, upon occupation of each province and large centre by the Japanese, the traffic in drugs increased on a scale corresponding to that in other parts of the country which has already been described. [49,327] CHAPTER VI JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARDS U.S.S.R. MANCHURIA, THE "LIFELINE" OF JAPAN Throughout the period covered by the evidence tendered to the Tribunal, the intention to undertake a war against the U.S.S.R. has been shown to have been one of the basic elements of Japan's military policy. The military party was determined to establish Japan in occupation of the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R., as well as in other parts of the continent of Asia. Although the seizure of Manchuria (the three Northeastern provinces of China) was attractive for its natural resources and for expansion and colonization, it was desirable also as a point of approach in the intended war against the U.S.S.R. Manchuria came to be referred to as a "lifeline" of Japan but it is quite clear that by this was meant a line of advance rather than a line of defence. The purpose of invading and possession itself of the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R. seems to have been a constant goad to the military ambitions of Japan. As early as 1924 Okawa, a vigorous advocate of Japanese expansion abroad, was pointing to the occupation of Siberia as one of Japan's objectives. This same attitude was taken also by the military, with whom [49,328] Okawa was in close accord. Army officers began to promote the idea that Manchuria was Japan's "lifeline" and should be developed as a "defence" against the U.S.S.R. ITAGAKI in 1930, when a Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army, advocated the use of force in the creation of a new state in Manchuria. Following the lead of Okawa he claimed that this would be a development of the "Kingly Way" and would lead to the liberation of the Asiatic peoples. HITORA in 1931, while Ambassador in Moscow, suggested for the information of the general staff that there was need to take a strong policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, with the resolve to fight the U.S.S.R. at any time when necessary. The objectives, however, were not defence against communism, but, rather, the occupation of Far Eastern Siberia. On the formation of the Saito Cabinet in May 1932 a degree of compromise was reached upon the conflict which had developed between military and civilian members of the Cabinet in respect of the Manchurian adventure. In consequence the Cabinet acceded to the Army policy in Manchuria and decided upon the development of that region under Japanese domination. The Army, now freed from opposition within the Cabinet, went forward with its advocacy of war with the U.S.S.R. in the North as well as with preparations for such a war. In July of [49,329] 1932 Kawabe, the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow, urged the importance of preparations for war with the Soviet Union which he said was inevitable. He regarded war with China and the U.S.S.R. as a foregone conclusion In 1932 the accused MINAMI advocated making the Sea of Japan into a lake by which he obviously meant the seizure of the Soviet Far East where it bordered the Sea of Japan. In April 1933 SUZUKI, then in the Military Affairs Bureau, referred to the U.S.S.R. as the absolute enemy because, as ha said, she aimed to destroy the national structure of Japan. "NATIONAL DEFENCE" It is interesting to notice at this time ARAKI's discussion of the term "national defence." This, he pointed out, was not confined to the physical defence of Japan but included the defence of Kodo, or the Imperial way. This was another way of saying that the conquest of neighboring countries by force of arms was justifiable as "national defence." At about this time, 1933, ARAKI, then War minister, forsook euphemism about "national defence" and told a conference of prefectural governors exactly what he meant, at least in respect of the Soviet Union. He said "Japan was to inevitably clash with the Soviet Union, therefore it was necessary for Japan to secure for herself through [49,330] military methods the territories of the maritime Province, Zabaikalye and Siberia." ARAKI's definition of "national defence" was adopted by the Saito Cabinet as a basis of its policy in Manchuria. As has been shown already Japan's leaders always sought to justify their aggressive military adventures by claiming they were defensive. It was in this sense that Manchuria was developed as the "lifeline" of Japan. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES That Japan's policy towards the U.S.S.R. was offensive or aggressive and not defensive is indicated by diplomatic exchanges in the period 1931-1933. During this period, the Soviet Government twice made formal proposals to the Japanese Government to conclude a non-aggression and neutrality pact. In a Soviet statement made in 1931 to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshizawa and to Ambassador HIROTA it was pointed out that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would "express the peaceful policy and intentions of the Government, and it will be well-timed especially now when the future of the Japanese-Russian relations is the subject of speculations in Western Europe and America. The conclusion of this pact would put an end to these speculations." The Japanese Government did not give a reply to this proposal for a year. It was [49,331] only on 13 September 1932 that the Soviet Ambassador to Japan received a reply from Minister of Foreign Affairs Uchida in which he declined the offer on the ground that ". . . the formal beginning of the negotiations on the subject between the two governments in this case seems to be untimely." The Soviet Government on 4 January 1933 again repeated its proposal for the conclusion of a pact, emphasizing that the previous proposal "was not called forth by the considerations of the moment, but resulted from its peaceful policy, and therefore continues in force for the future." The Japanese Government in May 1933, once more rejected the proposal of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that Japan rejected the proposal in spite of the fact that the Japanese Government had assurance at that time that it was a sincere expression of peaceful policy of the Soviet Union in the Far East. In a secret memorandum written by the accused TOGO, Director of the Bureau of European-American Affairs, in April 1933, he said, "The desire of the Soviet Union for a non-aggression pact with Japan is motivated by its desire to secure the safety of its Far Eastern territory from the increasing threat which it feels since the Japanese advance into Manchuria." By December 1933 the Kwantung Army was making plans and [49,332] preparations for the day when Japan would use Manchuria as a base for attack upon the U.S.S.R. CONTINUATION OF DESIGNS UPON U.S.S. R. In 1935 the Okada Cabinet, which had taken office the previous year, gave its support to the Army' economic planning in Manchukuo although HIROTA denied that Japan's intention was aggressive. In November 1935 SHIRATORI, then Minister in Scandinavian countries, wrote to Arita, the Ambassador to Belgium, pointing out that "Looking at the present-day power of Soviet Russia as from the standpoint of figures, it does seem to be most imposing, but, as the days are still shallow since the revolution and the dissatisfied elements still infest the countryside and shortages are still acute in implements and machineries, resources and materials, and manpower, it is clear that she will immediately sustain internal collapse once she fights against some great power. This is the unanimous opinion of those who are familiar with the actual situation. What is most desirous for Soviet Russia at present is to have peaceful and amicable relationships with the foreign powers. Therefore, countries which border Soviet Russia and who have any pending affairs that need to be settled sooner or later with her, should never idle away this opportune time of today." He [49,333] suggested that there should be demanded from the U.S.S.R. with resolution and as "minimum" concessions to "abolish military armaments in Vladivostok," etc., ". . . not stationing a single soldier in the area of Lake Baikal." SHIRATORI suggested as the fundamental solution of Japan's problems with the U.S.S.R. "in order to eliminate the menace of Russia forever, it is necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic and to rigidly control her natural resources. . . . At present the chances are good." THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT We have already discussed the downfall of the Okada Cabinet caused by an insurrection in the Army in Tokyo on the 26 February 1936. The Army's criticism was the insufficiently aggressive attitude of this Cabinet. On 27 February, the day after this incident, the Japanese consulate in Amoy explained that the purpose of the insurrection was to replace the Cabinet with a military one, and that the young military group intended that Japan should take the whole of China and prepare for an immediate war against the Soviet Union to the end that Japan might be the only power in Asia. THE 1936 STATEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY In August 1936 HIROTA who was now Prime Minister, in conjunction with his Foreign Minister, [49,334] War Minister, Navy Minister and Finance Minister, formulated a statement of Japan's national policy. This is an important and significant document directed, inter alia, towards "securing a steady footing of the (Japanese) Empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence." The invocation of "national defence" is significant. As one of the practical steps Japan "should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the North, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defence of both Japan and Manchuria." The statement prescribed that the measure of military strength would be that necessary "to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish and employ in the Far East." Especial attention was to be paid to the completion of military strength in Korea and Manchuria so that Japan might "strike a hit at the very outset of the war upon the Russians." In dealing with the extensive preparation for war which this policy decision would involve, it was decided that military expansion must go to the extent of creating fighting machines strong enough to inflict a crushing blow against the strongest forces which the U.S.S.R. could deploy along her Eastern borders. An examination of this [49,335] declaration of Japanese national policy in conjunction with the circumstances then prevailing reveals an intention of attacking the Soviet Union with the object of seizing part of its territories. Furthermore, this purpose was to be prepared for and to be carried out under the pretence that it was defensive. In 1937 plans produced by the Army consequent upon the national policy decision of August 1936 were clearly dictated by an expected war with the U.S.S.R. The plan for important industries issued in May 1937 was to procure a long stride development ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia." The program issued in June 1937 with the same end in view laid down that self-sufficiency was to be achieved by 1941 "in order to be prepared for the epochal development" of Japan's destiny which was to "be attained in spite of all difficulties." The plan dealing with war materials was to the same end and provided that Japan's economy "would be made to develop rationally by unifying the handling of affairs by military administration." Attention was to be given to preparations for a speedy movement from a peace-time to a wartime basis. This planning by the Army, although it so shortly preceded the continuance of the war in China at Lukouchiao, was not directed solely to that war. Okada [49,336] told this Tribunal that these plans were complementary to the Soviet Five-Year Plan and were for the purpose of maintaining Japan's strength vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. A consideration of the plans affecting both major industries and those dealing more directly with the production of war materials shows on their face that they were to secure "national defence power." As has been mentioned earlier, "national defence" meant to Japanese militarists expansion on the continent of Asia by force of arms. The plans now under discussion revealed the Army's intention to achieve that result. It is clear that these plans were offensive and not defensive plans and were directed against the U.S.S.R. We have already referred to the comments of the Military Attache in Moscow in 1932 and to those of SUZUKI to the same effect in 1933. The political maneuvers in North China were based upon the slogan of "anti- Communism." The national policy decision of August 1936 expressly pointed to the military strength of the Soviet Union as the yardstick for the development of military power by Japan and at the very moment of the issue of the Army plans of 1937 came the advice of TOJO that, having regard to the situation in China and the state of military preparedness against the U.S.S.R. it was desirable to attack China to clear the menace [49,337] to the Kwantung Army's rear before undertaking action, against the U.S.S.R. It was at this time also, namely, in July 1937, that HASHIMOTO, in a newspaper article, advocated development of an air force to be used not only as the mainstay or Japan's armaments, but also for use against the U.S.S.R. [49,338] EXPECTATION AND ADVOCACY OF WAR WITH THE U.S.S.R In 1938, at a time when, as we have already seen, the press of Japan was effectively controlled by the Army, ARAKI, then Minister of Education, is reported in the press as having said at a meeting of the Political Economic Society at Osaka that "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade." In 1938, also, General Ueda, Commander of the Kwantung Army discussing the position of North China, referred to "the fast-approaching war with Soviet Russia". Finally, the urgency with which the Army generally, and the General Staff in particular, sought to bring the war in China to an end was no doubt dictated by the imminence of the war it intended against the U.S.S.R. THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT The relations with Germany, which from the middle of the nineteen-thirties showed itself as the main aggressive force in Europe, were of particular importance to Japan having regard to its purpose of undertaking a war against the U.S.S.R. As early as in March 1934, when the Accused [49,339] OSHIMA, as a military attache, was being sent to Germany, he was instructed by the General Staff to watch the German-Soviet relations and to find out what Germany might do in case of war with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1935 OSHIMA and Ribbentrop entered upon discussions for a German-Japanese alliance. From the early part of December 1935 Lieutenant Colonel Wakamatsu, specially sent for that purpose by the Japanese General Staff, took part in the discussions. Inasmuch as the contemplated agreement had a general political purpose and the signing of it was outside the Army's jurisdiction, the matter was submitted to the Government for consideration and from 1936 Mushakoji, the Japanese Ambassador, took charge of the negotiations. On 25 November 1936 the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact" was signed by Japan and Germany. The Pact consisted of the text of the treaty and of a secret agreement. Only the text of the treaty was published to the world. It stated that the contracting parties agreed to inform each other of the activities of the Communist International, to confer an necessary measures for defense, and to take such [49,340] measures in close co-operation and jointly invite third nations to take offensive measures in conformity with the Pact or to participate therein. The secret agreement, as was provided in the agreement itself, was to be kept a secret. In fact, it was never published by the aggressive nations and became known to the Allied Powers only from captured secret files. In a statement, published in the press, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the existence of any secret articles attached to the Pact and declared that the Pact was an expression of a special kind of collaboration between the two countries in their struggle against the Communist International as such, that the Japanese Government did not contemplate the creation of an international bloc, that "the present agreement is not directed against the Soviet Union or any other special country". The purpose of the Pact was the creation of a limited alliance between Japan and Germany. It was pointed out by Cordell Hull, former United States Secretary of State, "While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against Communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations". Our [49,341] opinion, formed independently, is the same. The Pact was directed primarily against the U.S.S.R. The secret agreement created a limited military and political alliance of Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R. Both parties engaged not to conclude without mutual consent any political agreements with the U.S.S.R. incompatible with the spirit of the agreement. A year later, on 6 November 1937, Italy adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Formally, the arrangement provided for mutual obligation between Germany and Japan only in case of an unprovoked attack by the U.S.S.R. upon one of them, and limited the obligation to not rendering any assistance in such case to the U.S.S.R. In fact, at this time there is no evidence of aggressive intentions on the part of the U.S.S.R. against either Germany or Japan. Thus, the conclusion of the Pact against the eventuality of an unprovoked attack on the part of the U.S.S.R. would appear to have had no justification. That the Pact was not really defensive is shown by the broad interpretation of the commitments of the parties under the secret agreement. Such interpretation was given to those commitments by Germany and Japan from the very outset. [49,342] Thus, Japan's Ambassador to Germany, Mushakoji, in his telegram sent in October 1936 with Ribbentrop's knowledge and consent, advised Foreign Minister Arita that he had "the firm conviction that only the spirit of the above-mentioned secret agreement will be decisive for Germany's future policy towards the U.S.S.R." Foreign Minister Arita spoke to the same effect at the Privy Council meeting on 25 November 1936 which, with HIRANUMA presiding, approved the Anti-Comintern Pact. Arita emphasized the main purport of the Pact to be that "henceforth Soviet Russia has to consider the fact that she has to face both Germany and Japan . . ." That the nature of the alliance between Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R. was not defensive is indicated also by the fact that the conclusion by Germany of the non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939 was regarded by Japan's leaders as a flagrant violation by Germany of her conmitments under the Anti-Comintern Pact. In a letter to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin dated 26 August 1938, to be conveyed to the German Foreign Minister, it was pointed out that "The Japanese Government regards the pact of non-aggression and consultation recently concluded between the German government and the government of the Union of [49,343] Socialist Soviet Republics is running counter to the secret appended agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International". The main purpose of the Anti-Comintern Pact was the encirclement of the Soviet Union. This was partly admitted by Ribbentrop, one of its authors, when he said: "Of course, there was also a political weight against Soviet Russia that was more or less the background of the Pact". When on 25 November 1941 the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was originally stipulated to remain in force for five years, expired, and it was prolonged, the secret agreement was not renewed. There was now no necessity for it. The commitments under the secret agreement had been covered by the Tripartite Alliance concluded prior to this extension. The Anti-Comintern pact served as a basis of Japan's policy vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in subsequent years. This military alliance with Germany played an important part in Japan's policy and preparations against the U.S.S.R. Prime Minister HIRANUMA in his address to Hitler on 4 May 1939 specifically pointed out that ". . . it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the [49,344] execution of the task placed before them". THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE Japan's desire to realize her acquisitive plans on the Continent stimulated her policy of obtaining a closer association with Germany. The circumstances in which the Tripartite Pact of 27th September 1940 was formed have been discussed fully in an earlier part of this Judgment. We do not propose to make more than a short reference to them here. Although its application was not limited to the U.S.S.R., Japan's especial concern in the earlier negotiations was the U.S.S.R. These negotiations commenced as early as the middle of 1938. They were fruitless for over a year and a half, because Germany, involved in extensive aggressive plans in Europe, sought a military alliance directed against all potential enemies. Japan, on the other hand, desired that the Alliance should be a development of the Anti-Comintern Pact directed principally if not solely against the U.S.S.R. Prince Konoye, speaking in his memoirs of this earlier period, said "It was a plan to convert the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact which was in force at that time into a military alliance, the principal target being the U.S.S.R." The accused OSHIMA, one of the most active [49,345] participants of the negotiations, testified that the instructions received by him from the appropriate division of the Japanese General Staff in June 1938 provided for the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation against the U.S.S.R. In April 1939 Ribbentrop stated in a telegram to the German Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese asked for our express aporoval to be able to give, after the signing and publication of the Pact, a declaration to the English, French and American Ambassadors, with roughly the following contents: “The Pact had developed from the Anti-Comintern Pact; the partners had looked upon Russia being the anomy; England, France and America had no need to feel that they were meant by it." Although in the Tripartite Pact itself the fact that it was directed against the U.S.S.R. is not especially mentioned, this was not in doubt in the minds of the Japanese Army in September 1940, when the Alliance was signed. The reservation contained in Article 5 that the "above-stated articles of this alliance have no affect whatsoever to the present existing political relation between each or any one of the signatories with the Soviet Union", was not candid. The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, [49,346] Kurusu, in a telegram to Tokyo of 26 September 1940, said: "The German Government plans to guide the German press to lay particular emphasis on the fact that the treaty was not mean anticipation of war with Russia. But, on the other hand, Germany is concentrating troops in the Eastern regions as a check an Russia". Foreign Minister Matsuoka, too, speaking of Article 5 of the Pact at the meeting of the Privy Council Investigation Committee on 26 September 1940, said: "Although there exists a non-aggression treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. With regard to the word 'existing', if you mean to ask, if the present status of the Soviet Union cannot be modified, I say no; I mean that it will not be modified by the treaty under consideration. . ." The same appraisal of the Alliance was given by its author, Ribbentrop: ". . .this stroke will have a double edge. Against Russia and against America." On 22 June 1941, i. e., less than a year after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding the neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., Japan, as will be discussed later, did render aid to German while re- [49,347] fraining from open warfare against the U.S.S.R. THE PRESENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows.) [49,348] MARSHAL OF THE CCURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment. JAPANESE ATTACKS ON BORDERS OF MANCHURIA In 1938 and 1939 Japan launched offensive operations across the borders of Manchuria in the vicinity of Lake Khassan, in the East, and at Nomonhan, in the West. These will be discussed more fully later. NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION On 13 April 1941 Japan and the U.S.S.R. entered into a Neutrality Pact. This subject can be more conveniently discussed later, but it is mentioned here as having been signed at this time because of the disregard for it displayed by the Japanese in the matters now to be referred to. GERMANY ATTACKS THE U.S.S.R. IN JUNE 1941 After Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R. in June 1941 there was persistent advocacy of the seizure of Soviet territories in the Far East. This attack by Germany certainly stimulated the acquisitive policy by Japan against the Soviet Union. The Japanese ruling circles regarded Germany's victory over the U.S.S.R. as inevitable and imminent and thought this a favourable [49,349] opportunity for Japan to put into operation her aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R. At first, in consequence of the initial success of the Germans in their attack on the U.S.S.R. there existed a tendency among the Japanese militarists for the speeding up of an attack on the U.S.S.R. The German Ambassador Ott in his telegram of 22 June 1941, the day Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., reported his conference with Matsuoka, pointing out that "He" (Matsuoka) "was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run, Japan could not remain neutral in this conflict. . . . Towards the end of the interview Matsuoka received another telegram from OSHIMA wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far East. Matsuoka explained spontaneously that he would immediately propose counter-measures." The Japanese even had a fear that Japan might be late in her military preparations for an attack. Such a sentiment found expression in the telegram of 31 July 1941 (No. 433) from Foreign Minister Toyoda to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. "Needless to say the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. [49,350] If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action." A secret Imperial Conference of military and political leaders of Japan on 2 July 1941 decided: "Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German- Soviet war, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favorably to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the northern regions." This decision suggests that Japan, in spite of the Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., either considered herself bound as a participant in a conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. or was seeking an opportune moment to advantage herself. At any rate she intended to time her attack upon the U.S.S.R. with the most favourable moment in the Soviet- German War. That preparations were intensified after the decision of the conference is revealed by a telegram of the German Ambassador Ott from Tokyo to Berlin of [49,351] 3 July 1941. Upon the outbreak of the German Soviet War, Smetanin, the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Japan, saw Matsuoka and asked him the basic question concerning the attitude of Japan towards the war. Smetanin asked him whether Japan would remain neutral, as was the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the neutrality pact between the U.S.S.R. and Japan of 13 April 1941. Matsuoka evaded a direct answer to this question and said that his attitude to this problem had already been expressed (on 22 April of that year) in his statement made by him upon his return from Europe. At the same time he emphasised that the Tripartite Pact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the present war and the neutrality pact happened to be at variance with that basis and with the Tripartite Pact, the neutrality pact "will not continue in force." Ott, referring to this interview, of which he had been informed, in his telegram of 3 July reported: "Matsuoka said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present Smetain was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the Soviet Union as is hinted at in the government resolution transmitted to us." [49,352] At this time Germany was urging that Japan should attack the U.S.S.R. as early as possible. In his telegram of 10 July 1941 addressed to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, Ribbentrop stated: "Besides, I request that you go on working for the soonest possible participation of Japan in the war against Russia, as per my message to Matsuoka, using all the means at your disposal, for earlier this participation in the war materialises, the better it is. The natural goal must be, as before, to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position of the Tripartite powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation of the British Isles, will be only a question of time." The Japanese Foreign Ministry, at least, considered Japan's plans for war against the U.S.S.R. so close to realisation as to discuss the finding of suitable means to provoke war. In his telegram of 1 August 1941, Ott reported that, when in a conference with the Minister Secretary Yamamoto commissioned with the affairs of the Vice-Foreign Ministry, he "anticipatedly asked whether Japan intended to start her active advance with demands on the Soviet Government, the Vice Minister [49,353] marked this way as the best method of finding a defensive excuse for a Russo- Japanese attack in face of the neutrality agreement. He is personally thinking of demands of such sharpness that the Soviet Government could not possibly be able to accept them, whereby he seemed to have territorial cessions in mind." The failure of the initial German campaign against the U.S.S.R. made Japan delay her own offensive programme. The situation of the Soviet-German struggle called for caution. At the beginning of August, upon the slowing up of the advance of the German Army, OSHIMA asked Ribbentrop the reason. Ribbentrop referred him to Keitel, who explained that the advance of the German army was delayed by the excessive length of communications so that rear units were lagging behind and that in consequence the advance was approximately three weeks behind plan. The course of the Soviet- German war continued to influence Japan's immediate but not her long-range policy. Ott in a telegram to Berlin on 4 September 1941 said: "In view of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such as the German, the Japanese General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving a decisive success against Russia before winter sets in. Moreover, it is probably guided by the thought of Nomonhan still vivid in the memory, notably of Kwantung [49,354] Army." In view of that "....the Imperial Headquarters in the last days came to the decision to postpone action against the Soviet Union." In a telegram of 4 October 1941, Ott informed Ribbentrop that "Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring. . . . The tenacity displayed by the Soviet Union against Germany indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via Siberia be opened up this year." Postponing immediate attack on the U.S.S.R., Japan, however, continued to regard this attack as one of the main objects of her policy and did not slacken either in purpose or in preparation for that attack. In confidential talks with the ambassadors of Italy and Germany on 15 August 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister, referring to the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact and the Russian assumption that Japan would not come into the war, said: ". . . in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet which will be undertaken together with the German Government" and that "this is merely a temporary [49,355] arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed." In an intercepted telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 30 November 1941, apparently from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador, the latter was instructed to interview Hitler and Ribbentrop. The telegram instructed: "Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet . . . however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north." Japan's leaders, however, did not forsake their desires and designs. In August 1941 ARAKI is reported in the press as having said to the Secretary-General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association that "Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. . . . Japan's present ambition to dominate the continent may be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition." The same idea was developed by TOJO in 1942 after he had become Prime Minister, when in conversation with the German Ambassador Ott, he stated that Japan was a mortal enemy of the U.S.S.R., that Vladivostok was a permanent threat to Japan on the flank and that in the course of that war (i.e. the war between Germany and the U.S.S.R.) [49,356] there was an opportunity of removing that danger. He boasted that it could not be difficult as there was an excellent Kwantung Army which included the best troops. JAPAN DELAYS ATTACK ON U.S.S.R. Ribbentrop in a telegram to Tokyo on 15 May 1942, expressed his desire that Japan "would arrive at a decision to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest." He went on to say "this is all based on the premise that Japan is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature and will not have to free other forces which would weaken her position against England and America, as for example, in Burma. If Japan lacks the necessary strength to successfully undertake such an operation, then it would naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations with Soviet Russia. This also eases our burden since in any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict." At the end of 1942 because of the situation on the Soviet-German front Germany's desire that Japan should enter into a war with the U.S.S.R. became more insistent. In his conference with Ribbentrop on 6 March 1943, OSHIMA said that "The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a mutual conference between the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters, in which the question was exhaustively discussed and [49,357] minutely probed. The result was the following: "The Japanese Government thoroughly recognises the danger which threatens from Russia and has full understanding for the desire of its German ally, that Japan, too, enters into the war against Russia. It is not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it is in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government will never disregard the Russian question." Explaining this decision OSHIMA said that he knew "that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia. But for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one withdrew the front in the south and abandoned several islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the North, this could be possible. This would, however, mean a heavy defeat in the South. Both an advance to the South, and at the same time to the North was impossible for Japan." THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERI INCLUDES PART OF SIBERIA When the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was developed as a euphemism for [49,358] Japanese hegemony over East Asia it was inevitable that the seizure of Siberia and the Soviet Far East should be included. This was the natural consequence of the previous purpose and planning. In the "Plan for Management of Territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" worked out by the Japanese War Ministry and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, soon after the outbreak of the war against the United States of America and Great Britain, the seizure of the territories of the Soviet Far East was considered settled, the only question being the portions to be seized. It was pointed out in the part of the plan entitled "Future of Soviet Territories" that "though this problem cannot be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact" still in any event "the Maritime Province shall be annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian Empire shall be put into the Sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed under the complete control of Japan and Germany with Omsk as the point of demarcation." The Accused HASHIMOTO, in his article of 5 January 1942, entitled the "Great East Asia Sphere Under Imperial Influence" enumerating the countries which [49,359] were to be included In the Greater East Asia Sphere Under Imperial Influence mentions the Soviet Far East along with China, French Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, India, etc. He went on to say "We cannot yet decide whether all these countries should be incorporated at once into the sphere under Imperial Influence, but it is at least absolutely necessary to include for the sake of national defence these countries in the sphere of our influence." The "Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai" Society, of which prominent Japanese political and military leaders were members (including TOGO, KAYA, MUTO and SATO) and presumably playing an important role in advancing if not in formulating official policy contemplated in its "Draft of Measures for the Construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" published in May 1943 that ". . . a reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere includes" along with other component parts, "all the Eastern region of the Soviet Union including Lake Baikal. . . . All of Outer Mongolia." Similar aspirations of Japan are found in the studies made by the Institute of Total Warfare which was established by the Imperial Ordinance of 1 October 1940 and was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. Thus, the original draft plan of the establishment of the [49,360] Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere worked out by the Institute in January 1942 contemplated that "the central area" of various countries united by Japan would include besides Manchuria and North China the Soviet Maritime Province, and the so-called "Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere” would include, besides the rest of China and Indo-China, Eastern Siberia. The Tribunal is of the opinion that a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. was contemplated and planned throughout the period under consideration, that it was one of the principal elements of Japan's national policy and that its object was the seizure of territories of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East. [49,361] PLANNING AND PREPARING WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION MANCHURIA AS A BASE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. The warlike policy of Japan against the U.S.S.R. was indicated in Japan's war plans. The war plans of the Japanese General Staff from the commencement of the period under review contemplated, as a first step, the occupation of Manchuria. In Japan's war plans the seizure of Manchuria was regarded not only as a stage in the conquest of China, but also as a means of securing a base for offensive military operations against the Soviet Union. Kawabe Torashiro, then a General Staff Officer, testified that a plan of war against the U.S.S.R. worked out in 1930 when the accused HATA was Chief of the First Department of the General Staff contemplated military operations against the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-Manchuria border. This was before the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The accused MINAMI and MATSUI also confirmed before the Tribunal that Manchuria was considered necessary for Japan as a military base in case of war with the U.S.S.R. On 16 March 1931 HATA instructed a Colonel Suzuki to make a tour of inspection of the areas of [49,362] Northern Manchuria and Northern Korea with a view to operations according to the "Otsu" plan against the U.S.S.R. and the "Hei" plan against China. In a secret report presented by this officer upon the result of his tour detailed information was given relative to the "Otsu" plan which aimed at the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province. The seizure of Manchuria in 1931 provided bases for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. on a wide front for the purpose of seizing the whole of the Soviet Far East. Kasahara Yukio, Japanese Military Attache in the Soviet Union, in a secret report presented to the General Staff in the soring of 1931 advocating war with the U.S.S.R. and determining its objective wrote: ". . . we must advance at least as far as Lake Baikal. . . . In case we stop on the line of the Lake Baikal, the Empire will have to be determined and prepared to consider the Far Eastern Province which she will have occupied as a proper territory of the Empire. . ." Under cross-examination the witness Kasahara admitting the authenticity of the document, testified that he proposed to the General Staff a speedy opening of a war against the U.S.S.R. and proposed the increase of armaments for the purpose of being ready for a war at any moment. In the spring of 1932 Kasahara was transferred [49,363] to the General Staff wherein he held the post of Chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department. On 15 July 1932, shortly after that appointment, Kasahara sent a message through Lieutenant Colonel Kanda to the then Military Attache in Moscow, Kawabe Torashiro, regarding an important decision of the General Staff: ". . . that the (army and navy's) preparations have been completed. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war against Russia is necessary for Japan." In cross-examination the witness Kasahara explained that in the General Staff "there was an agreement among the section chiefs and the branch chiefs that preparations would be made for a war by 1934." When this decision was taken the accused UMEZU was Chief of the General affairs Department and TOJO and OSHIMA were Section Chiefs of the General Staff, while MUTO was a member of the Second Division of the General Staff. AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR OFFICE AND GENERAL STAFF In the summer of 1932 Section Chiefs of the War Office reached an agreement with Section Chiefs of the General Staff upon those preparations. Obviously this could not have been done without authorisation and approval of their seniors in the War Ministry. The accused ARAKI was then War Minister, the accused KOISO [49,364] Vice-War Minister and the accused SUZUKI was a member of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. ARAKI and SUZUKI, as was pointed out earlier, openly declared in 1933 the intention of seizing by force the territories of the Maritime Province, Zabaikalye and Siberia. MILITARY ATTACHE IN MOSCOW ADVOCATES ATTACK On 14 July 1932, Kawabe, from his position as Military Attache in Moscow, sent a report to the General Staff in which he said "a Russo-Japanese war in the future is unavoidable" for which reason "emphasis must be laid on the repletion of military armaments against Russia." He also urged "as to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact proposed by the U.S.S.R., we must be non-committal and reserve our freedom of action." This, no doubt, had reference to Russian proposals which had been made for a neutrality pact, as has been discussed already. PLANS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. As with the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, so with the invasion of the rest of China in 1937, the eventual war with the U.S.S.R. was always in mind. The strategy was directed to preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R. That was pointed out by the accused TOJO, the then Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, in June 1937, i.e., immediately prior to the beginning of an attack [49,365] on China, in a telegram to Vice-War Minister UMEZU and to the General Staff: "Judging the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back." Similarly, both during the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the invasion of the rest of China in 1937 the war plans of Japan against China and the Soviet Union were coordinated by the General Staff, the Japanese War Ministry and the Kwantung Army Headquarters. The accused MUTO admitted before the Tribunal that when he was Chief of the First Section of the General Staff he made a study of the 1938 plan. The war plans of the Japanese General Staff for 1939 and 1941 were aimed at the seizure of Soviet territories. The war plan for 1939 was based upon a concentration of Japan's main forces in Eastern Manchuria to take the offensive. The Kwantung Army was to occupy the Soviet cities of Voroshilov, Vladivostok, Iman and then Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The plan for 1941, prior to Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R, had similar aims. At the first stage of the war it was intended to occupy the cities of Voroshilov, [49,366] Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Iman, Kuibyshevka and at the next stage to occupy North Sakhalin, Petropavlosk of Kamchatka, Nikolaevsk on the Amur, Komsomolsk and Sovgavan. The offensive character of these plans and measures is indicated by the secret operations order dated 1 November 1941 of the Commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, wherein it was pointed out: ". . . if the Empire does not attack the Soviet Union, it is believed that the Soviet Union will not commence hostilities." The same view was expressed by TOJO at the meeting of the Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council on 8 December 1941: ". . . Soviet Russia is now fighting against Germany, so she will not avail herself of the Japanese southward advance." Although it was suggested that these plans were "routine", for a "strategic defensive" and so on, it is clear that they were offensive and not defensive. It may be that in some circumstances a defensive strategy would justify and, perhaps require offensive operations. A consideration of the nature of these plans, and the military policy of Japan in respect of the U.S.S.R., compels the conclusion that these plans were aggressive and not "strategic defensive". The were "defensive" only in the distorted sense already discussed, that [49,367] they defended the "Kingly Way", i.e., the expansion of Japan at the expense of its neighbours on the Continent of Asia. ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. Immediately after the seizure of Manchuria, Japan started stationing there her main armed forces. The purpose of their training was mostly a preparation for military operations against the Soviet Union and China. Tanaka, former Chief of the Military Service Section and Chief of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry, estimated that 2,500,000 Japanese soldiers were trained in Manchuria. In 1938, TOJO, as the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, in plans for the stationing of a meteorological service system in Chahar, stated its object was to "enable more accurate weather forecasting service in Japan and Manchuria and especially to strengthen aeronautical meteorological service system in preparation for a war with Soviet Russia." The accused MINANI, former Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, admitted during cross-examination that the construction of railways in Manchuria was directed towards the Soviet border, and admitted that they could have strategic uses, although he did claim that "their principal objective was the opening up of [49,368} Northern Manchuria." In January 1938 the Kwantung Army Headquarters, under TOJO, worked out the "Outline of the policy for the establishment of a New China." This document sent to the War Minister refers to the task of persuading the local population "to contribute to the preparation for the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia." TOJO contemplated the use of the Mongolia-Hsingkiang area "as a base for invading Outer Mongolia." In a secret telegram sent to the War Ministry in May 1938, TOJO, then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, pointed out that the South Manchuria Railway Company "....is receiving the Army's guidance for cooperating in the enforcement of the national policies of Manchukuo and also in the operations preparations, etc. against the Soviet Union." [49,369] The Army authorities did not permit the Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 to abate their preparations for war with the U.S.S.R. Thus, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, in an address at a conference of formation commanders in April 1941, discussing the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact said: "In accordance with the present situation of the Empire, it is a diplomatic measure planned to maintain for the time being, peace between Japan and the Soviet Union for the purpose of strengthening the Tripartite Alliance. Whether or not this pact can be made effective depends upon the future attitude of the two countries. It cannot be considered that we can immediately enter into friendly relations, with the present attitudes. Consequently, in order to make this pact effective, our Army absolutely cannot permit the slacking down in its preparations for military operations. By steadily strengthening and expanding these preparations the effectiveness of the pact will be promoted. The Army will not make any changes in its past policies." There are people in both Japan and Manchukuo who often say that military preparations against Soviet Russia may be reduced since the neutrality pact was concluded. However, as mentioned previously, there must not only be no changes in our past policy of military [49,370] preparations against Soviet Russia, but since the necessity for us to take a precise and lofty attitude towards ideology, counter-espionage, and other forms of stratagem is especially great, it is necessary for us to have our subordinates thoroughly understand this purport promptly." This text was obtained from a captured "Military top secret" document. The report does not disclose the presence of UMEZU, then the Kwantung Army Commander. He may have been present but a speech of such importance, a record of which was made and retained, must at least have had his approval. At a similar conference on 5 December 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army instructed formation commanders to complete preparations for operations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and to watch all changes in the military situation in the Soviet Far East and Mongolia in connection with the progress of the Soviet-German war in order to take advantage in good time of the turning point in the military situation. This speech was made while UMEZU was still the Commander of the Kwantung Army. PLANS FOR CONTROL OF OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES Japan's leaders considered the seizure of Soviet territories so practicable that in the General Staff and the Kwantung Army Headquarters specific plans were worked [49,371] out for the management of these territories. From July to September 1941 a special group of General Staff Officers made a study of occupation regimes for the Soviet territories to be occupied by Japanese troops. In September 1941, the Fifth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters was formed under Major General Ikeda, a subordinate of UMEZU, who was likewise engaged in the study of problems pertaining to occupation regimes for Soviet territories. Specialists from the General Affairs Department of Manchukuo were employed in this work. Officially, at least, the Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai Society was claimed to be an unofficial organization. However, for the purpose of working out its drafts and studies it received top-secret documents from the War Ministry, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs and other Governmental bodies. One example is the top-secret "Plan for Management of Territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" worked out by the War Ministry and by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs in December 1941. According to this plan the Maritime province of the U.S.S.R., as well as other Soviet territories as far as Lake Baikal, were to be incorporated either into Japan or into Manchukuo. The Society in its "Tentative Plan Concerning the Scope and the structure of the Greater [49,372] East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" dated 18 February 1942, planned in advance measures to prevent "the concentration in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from the European part of Russia". The intensification of war preparations involved the employment of increasing numbers of persons. Special organizations were developed. Among these were the Total War Institute under the Cabinet and the National Policy Research Association (Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai). The former Director of the Total War Research Institute, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku, testified that the Institute was instructed by Prime Minister TOJO to work out a draft plan of the system of administration for the territories of Greater East Asia to be occupied by Japanese forces. In all the studies made by the Institute the question of the invasion of the U.S.S.R. was regarded as already settled. "The Plans to Govern Siberia. Including Outer Mongolia" published in the summarised research papers of the Institute for the year 1942 contained rules for the Japanese Occupation authorities. Among these were: "All old laws and ordinances shall be declared void, and simple but powerful military orders shall be enforced instead. Under the powerful leadership of the (Japanese) Empire, the natives shall not be allowed, in [49,373] principle, to take part in any politics. If necessary, a low grade self-government shall be allowed." "If found necessary from the national defense and economic point of view, Japanese, Korean and Manchurian colonists shall be sent there." "If occasion demands, compulsory emigration of the natives shall be effected." "Permeation of our might shall be our aim, and we shall approach it with stringent power, not inclining into the so-called paternalism." The work of the "Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai" Society developed along the same lines as that of the Total War Institute. By the spring of 1942 the Kwantung Army Headquarters had drafted a plan for the military administration of Soviet areas to be occupied by Japan, and with UMEZU's approval this plan was forwarded to the General Staff. This plan included such sections as "administration, maintenance of peace and order, organization of industries, circulation of currencies, communication and transportation." In 1942 TOJO and UMEZU despatched Major General Ikeda and other officers to study the occupation regime established for the South Seas Area with a view to using it in the further working out of occupation regimes for [49,374] the territory of the Soviet Union. ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER GERMANY'S ATTACK UPON THE U.S.S.R. After the attack of Germany upon the Soviet Union, Japan increased overall preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. Although at that time Japan was already engaged in a protracted war with China, she hoped to take advantage of the war in Europe to achieve her schemes against the U.S.S.R. This involved a secret mobilization and the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army. In the summer of 1941, in accordance with the plan, a secret mobilization was carried out and 300,000 men, two fresh division and various special units were added to the Kwantung Army. By January 1942 the Kwantung Army had been increased to 1,000,000 men. It received a large amount of new equipment. There were twice as many tanks as in 1937 and three times the number of planes. A large concentration of troops was deployed in Manchuria along the border of the Soviet Union. Besides the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army and the Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia, troops stationed in Japan were to be used in the intended attack upon the U.S.S.R. In addition to men and material large supplies of provisions were prepared for the Kwantung Army. [49,375] SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE As well as direct military preparations, an elaborate programme of subversive activities against the U.S.S.R., designed both for peace and war time, was in contemplation or in progress, as is shown by a report submitted to the General Staff and to the Kwantung Army Headquarters as early as 1928 by Kanda Masatane, a Japanese intelligence officer, who later held the post of Chief of the Russian Section, Second Division, General Staff. General principles and measures of subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. were set forth in the report. In particular, subversive and provocative activities were planned and put into execution on the communication lines of Northern Manchuria, mainly on the Chinese-Eastern Railway. The report stated: "The affairs included in our sabotage activities against Russia are many and their activities will extend throughout the whole world." Kanda, a former Lieutenant-General, the author of the report, when examined in Court confirmed this document. A conference of Japanese military attaches in a number of countries, which was convened in April 1929 in Berlin by the accused MATSUI, then Chief of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, considered methods of sabotage to be used from European countries during the [49,376] war which, even then, was projected against the U.S.S.R. This conference contemplated the use of White Russian emigrants to foreign lands. It considered also the question of espionage against the U.S.S.R., conducted by Japanese military attaches outside the Soviet Union. The accused HASHIMOTO, who was Military Attache in Turkey at that time and who attended and spoke at that conference, when examined in Court named other participants of the conference, among, whom there were Military Attaches in Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, Austria, Italy and Russia, and he admitted that subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. were discussed at the conference by MATSUI and others. Following this conference, HASHIMOTO, in November 1929, submitted to the Japanese General Staff a report upon the "Situation in the Caucasus and its strategic use for the purposes of sabotage activities", in which he stressed that "the Caucasus area . . . is surely important from the standpoint of stratagem against Russia." HASHIMOTO advised "make all races in the Caucasus confront each other and consequently to bring confusion in the area." The accused OSHIMA while in Berlin secretly carried on subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. and its leaders and discussed this with Himmler. [49,377] In 1942 the Japanese General Staff and the Kwantung Headquarters worked out new offensive war plans against the U.S.S.R. which remained valid for 1943. Under these plans the war against the U.S.S.R. was to be commenced unexpectedly following the concentration in Manchuria of about thirty divisions. As with earlier plans, these last plans were not put into execution. At about this time the military prospects of the Axis Powers, Germany-Italy-Japan, began to deteriorate. Thereafter they were placed more and more upon the defensive and such a venture as Japan's contemplated attack upon the U.S.S.R. became less and less possible until the final defeat of the Axis in 1945. Until 1943, at any rate, the Tribunal finds that Japan not only planned to wage a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. but also that she continued with active preparations for such a war. NEUTRALITY PACT GERMANY'S ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R. As has been mentioned previously, Japan was invited by the U.S.S.R. in 1931 and 1933 to enter into a neutrality pact, but refused to do so. By 1941 Japan had forfeited her friendly relations with practically all the powers excepting Germany and Italy. The international [49,378] situation had so changed that Japan was now willing to do that which she had refused to do ten years previously. This willingness, however, did not indicate any change of the Japanese attitude towards the U.S.S.R., nor any abatement of her acquisitive designs upon that country. On 13 April 1941, that is, shortly before the attack of Germany upon the U.S.S.R., Japan signed the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union. The Pact provided: "ARTICLE I. "Both contracting parties engage to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between themselves and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party. "ARTICLE II. "In case one of the contracting parties becomes the object of military action from the part of one or several other powers, the other contracting party will maintain neutrality during the whole period of the conflict." In signing the Pact the Japanese Government placed itself in an equivocal position, as at this time it had commitments to Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Alliance. Its conduct in signing [49,379] the Neutrality Pact was still more ambiguous as, when it did so, it had every reason to expect Germany's impending attack upon the U.S.S.R. As far back as 23 February 1941 Ribbentrop told OSHIMA that Hitler had created a number of new formations during the winter as a result of which Germany would have 240 divisions, including 186 first-class attack divisions Ribbentrop also dwelt upon the prospects of a "German-Russian conflict", which he said "would result in a gigantic German victory and signify the end of the Soviet regime." The forthcoming attack of Germany upon the Soviet Union was discussed in still more definite terms in the conversations of Germany's leaders Hitler and Ribbentrop with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in March 1941. In his conversation with Matsuoka on 27 March 1941, Ribbentrop told him that "the German armies in the East are available at any time. Should Russia one day take up an attitude which could be interpreted as a threat against Germany, the Fuehrer would dash Russia to pieces. One is positive in Germany that such a campaign against Russia would end in a complete victory for German arms and the absolute destruction of the Russian Army and the Russian State. The Fuehrer is [49,380] convinced that in case of an advance against the Soviet Union a few months later, as a power (Grossmacht), Russia would no longer exist." On the same day Hitler spoke in the same tenor to Matsuoka when he stated in the presence of OSHIMA, Ott and Ribbentrop, that Germany had concluded certain treaties with the U.S.S.R., but still more important than this was the fact that Germany had 160 to 200 divisions at her disposal for her protection against the U.S.S.R. In his talk with Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop said that the largest part of the German Army was concentrated on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and once more expressed his belief in the complete defeat of the U.S.S.R. within a few months, once the conflict had broken out. In that conversation Ribbentrop also said “. . . a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realms of possibility. In any case Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible." In reply Matsuoka assured him that "Japan would also be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort." [49,381] Soon after his return to Japan after signing the Neutrality Pact in Moscow, Matsuoka told Ott, German Ambassador to Tokyo: "No Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity, to attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact could change this." In his telegram of 20 May 1941 to Matsuoka, OSHIMA advised that Weizsacker had told him that "the German Government attached great importance to Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ott to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war." The uncandid policy of the Japanese Government in signing the Neutrality Pact is confirmed by the fact that simultaneously with the negotiations for the signing of the Pact, negotiations with Germany were being conducted for the extension of the Anti- Comintern Pact which was to expire on 26 November 1941. That pact was to expire on 26 November 1941. That Pact was prolonged for another five years on 26 November 1941, after the war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. had broken out. The Japanese policy towards the U.S.S.R. and the Neutrality Pact is revealed by Smetanin's talk with [49,382] Matsuoka on the 25 June 1941, three days after Germany had attacked Russia. Matsuoka, being asked by Smetanin, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, whether Japan would remain neutral in accordance with the Neutrality Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Japan of 13 April 1941, evaded a direct answer, but emphasised that the Tripartite Pact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the present war and the Neutrality Pact happened to be at variance with that basis and with the Tripartite Pact, the Neutrality Pact "will not continue in force". We have already referred to the German Ambassador's report of Matsuoka's sinister comments upon his talk with Smetanin. In June 1941, shortly before Germany's attack upon the U.S.S.R., UMEZU in his conversation with Prince Urech said "he welcomed the Neutrality Pact Japan-Russia for the moment. Since, however the Tripartite Pact is the unchangeable basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan's attitude towards the Neutrality Pact must undergo a change just as soon as the hitherto existing German-Russian relations undergo an alteration." It would appear that Japan was not sincere in concluding the Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., but considering her agreements with Germany more advantageous, she signed the Neutrality Pact to facilitate her plans [49,383] for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. This view of the attitude of the Japanese Government towards the U.S.S.R. coincides with that reported by the German Ambassador to Tokyo in his telegram to Berlin of 15 July 1941. Japan's "neutrality" in the war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in reality served and seems to have been designed to serve as a screen for such aid as she could give Germany pending her own attack upon the U.S.S.R. The evidence presented to this Tribunal indicates that far from being neutral in accordance with the Pact with the U.S.S.R., Japan did render substantial assistance to Germany. GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY JAPAN TO GERMANY In Manchuria Japan carried out large-scale military preparations and concentrated there a large army, thereby containing considerable forces of the Soviet Army in the East which otherwise might have been used against Germany in the West. These military preparations were so regarded by the German and Japanese Governments. In his telegram to Berlin on 3 July 1941, the German Ambassador to Japan advised that "augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realising this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet [49,384] Russia in the Far East in her struggle with Germany is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government.” Ribbentrop in his telegram to Tokyo on 15 May 1942 likewise pointed out the great importance which a successful surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. would have for the further progress of the war in the interests of the Tripartite powers, but he emphasised at the same time, as has been mentioned before, the importance of Japan's "neutrality" as an active aid to Germany in her war against the U.S.S.R., "since in any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict," JAPAN GIVES GERMANY MILITARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE U.S.S.R. Evidence that Japan provided Germany with military intelligence about the U.S.S.R. is contained in a telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July 1941, in which Ribbentrop wrote: "Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister at this opportunity for having transmitted the telegram from the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow. It would be good if we could receive more news from Russia in this way at regular intervals." Evidence was presented to prove that Japan [49,385] provided Germany with economic, political and military intelligence about the Soviet Union, derived from Japanese military and diplomatic agencies. Major General Matzumura, who from October 1941 to August 1943 held the post of Chief of the Russian Section of the General Staff, testified that he, in accordance with the order of the General Staff, systematically provided the 16th (German) Section of the General Staff with intelligence for Colonel Kretschmer, the German Military Attache in Tokyo, regarding Soviet armed forces in the Far East, the war potential of the Soviet Union, the movement of Soviet troops from the East to the West, as well as of internal movements of Soviet troops. [49,386] Von Petersdorf, former Assistant Military Attache of the German Embassy in Tokyo, testified that he had systematically received from the Japanese General Staff secret information about the Soviet Army, and especially about the Far Eastern Army the disposition of troops, their strength, detailed information about the reserves, about the transfer of Soviet troops to the European front, about the war industry of the Soviet Union, etc. Von Petersdorf stated that the information which he had received from the Japanese General Staff differed in scope and nature from that normally received by military attaches through the usual channels. JAPANESE INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING The prosecution claimed and tendered evidence to show that, despite Japan's obligation of neutrality, the Soviet war effort was seriously interfered with by Japanese interference with Soviet shipping in the Far East. In particular there was evidence that at Hongkong in 1941 Soviet ships at anchor, clearly marked as such, were shelled and one sunk; that in the same month Soviet ships were sunk by bombs from Japanese aircraft; that many Soviet ships were unlawfully arrested by Japanese naval vessels and taken to Japanese ports and detained on occasion for lengthy periods. [49,387] Finally it was charged that the Japanese closed the Sangar Strait and compelled Soviet ships to use other less suitable and more dangerous approaches to its Far Eastern seaboard. All this it was claimed was done to hamper the U.S.S.R. in its war with Germany, in defiance of Japan's obligations under the Neutrality Pact and by way of indirect preparation for the war Japan intended to undertake against the U.S.S.R. It has certainly been established that the Neutrality Pact was entered into without candour and as a device to advance Japan's aggressive intentions aginst the U.S.S.R. JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. IN 1938-39 In the foregoing discussion of the Japanese attitude towards the U.S.S.R. we have refrained from any detailed consideration of the two matters raised by Counts 25, 26, 35 and 36 of the Indictment. These were not without significance in the earlier discussion, but as the Indictment raised them directly we thought it more convenient to reserve our detailed consideration of them until this time. Following Japan's alliance with Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 and her [49,388] military success in North and Central China after Lukouchiao in 1937, the Japanese Army, in the years 1938 and 1939, resorted to hostilities against the U.S.S.R. first in the East of Manchuria and then in the West. In July 1938 the scene of hostilities was in the Lake Khassan area close to the junction of the boundaries of Manchuria, Korea, and the U.S.S.R. Maritime Province. Then in May 1939 hostilities broke out in the Nomonhan Area which is on the boundary between the territories of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia or the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria. Both of these operations were claimed by the Japanese to be mere border incidents caused by uncertainty as to the boundaries and resulting in clashes of the opposing frontier guard detachments. HOSTILITIES IN THE LAKE KHASSAN AREA In the beginning of July 1938 the Japanese border guards in the area West of Lake Khassan were strengthened by a concentration of field troops on the eastern side of the Tumen-Ula River which is a short distance West of Lake Khassan. Between the river and the lake there is a range of hills overlooking both, along the crest of which, according to the U.S.S.R. contention, the boundary ran; the Japanese, on the other hand, contended that the boundary was [49,389] more to the eastward and was along the western shore of Lake Khassan. This height of land is of considerable strategic importance overlooking as it does to the West of the Tumen-Ula River, the railway running North and South and the roads communicating with the Soviet Maritime Province and the city of Vladivostok. From the Japanese side the importance of the high land was its value in protecting from observation and attack the railway and roads forming the line of communication to the North and East. Its military importance was realised by the Japanese and as early as 1933 the Kwantung Army had made a thorough topographical study of the area with a view, as stated by the Chief of Staff of that Army in his report to the Vice- Minister of War in December 1933, to "the time of hostilities against Soviet Russia." Contemporary reports of the Soviet border guard outposts as well as other evidence indicate that during the month of July 1938 the concentration of Japanese troops was being carried out on an increasing scale. Before the end of July approximately one division of the Korean Army was concentrated in small sector probably not exceeding three kilometers in length. General Tanaka, Ryukichi, in his evidence [49,390] for the defence says that when he arrived in the area on the 31 July the Japanese were attacking in force. Incidentally, his evidence on earlier preparations is interesting. He had paid a previous visit to the area on 15 July and he stated that at that time the Soviet troops had dug trenches and placed barbed wire on the western slope, i.e. on the Manchurian side of the Changku-Feng Hill, along the crest of which, according to the Soviet version, the boundary ran. These defensive measures are significant of the intention of the U.S.S.R. forces but Soviet witnesses denied that any such measures had been taken. If we accepted Tanaka's evidence to its full extent this might suggest encroachment by the Soviet troops on Manchurian territory. However, no claim was made by the Japanese in respect of these defensive measures. As will be seen later the Japanese complaint was that the Soviet troops should not have been posted anywhere to the westward of Lake Khassan. Prior to the clash the Soviet border guard was small in number, not exceeding one hundred in the sector under consideration. In the early part of July while the Japanese troops were being concentrated in the area of Lake Khassan the Japanese Government opened diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Government with a view to [49,391] obtaining the withdrawal of the Soviet border guards right back to the East side of Lake Khassan. On 15 July the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, Nishi, pursuant to the instructions of his government declared to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs that the entire territory West of Lake Khassan belonged to Manchuria and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the West side of the lake. About the same time SHIGEMITSU, who had been on a mission in western Europe, was sent to Moscow with instructions to secure the fulfillment of the Japanese demands. Then followed discussions in which the Soviet representative reiterated that the boundary ran along the height of land to the West of and not along the shore of Lake Khassan. He said this was supported by the Hunchun Protocol of 1886 by which the boundary line was fixed. SHIGEMITSU adopted a peremptory attitude and said regarding the Hunchun Protocol: "To my mind at this critical moment speaking of some map is unreasonable. This will only complicate matters." On 20 July SHIGEMITSU made a formal demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, adding that "Japan has rights and obligations to Manchukuo to use force and make the Soviet troops evacuate from the territory of Manchukuo unlawfully occupied by them." [49,392] On the question of the location of the boundary a map and a number of other evidentiary documents were produced before us and considerable evidence given. The Hunchun Protocol already referred to was signed in 1886 by the representatives of China and Russia and attached to it is a map indicating the boundary. In both the Chinese and Russian texts of the Protocol there is reference to the map and both contain the following significant passage, ". . . the red line on the map marks the boundary all along the watershed and the water that flows Westward and pours into the River Tumen belongs to China and the water that flows Eastward and pours into the sea belongs to Russia." There is a slight discrepancy in the two texts in the detailed description of the boundary. That there may have been some doubts at the time as to the exact location of the boundary cannot be disregarded; however, in the state of existing international law such doubt, if any, as existed would not have justified a resort to arms. On the 21st of July 1938 War Minister ITAGAKI together with the Chief of the General Staff obtained an audience with the Emperor and requested that the Emperor sanction the use of armed force at Lake Khassan to enforce the Japanese demands. The eagerness with [49,393] which the War Minister and the Army desired to resort to military operations is illustrated in ITAGAKI's untruthful statement to the Emperor, that the use of force against the U.S.S.R. had been discussed with the Navy and Foreign Ministers who were in entire agreement with the Army. On the following day, however, at a Five Ministers’ Conference attended by ITAGAKI the question of the opening of hostilities at Lake Khassan was discussed and in the decision adopted it was stated, "(We) have made preparations for emergencies. The use of prepared military power is to be carried out by the Imperial Order after negotiation with the authorities concerned." Thus was obtained authority for the use of armed force at Lake Khassan; the only question remaining unsettled was the date of commencement of hostilities. This question was settled one week later: namely, on the 29th of July 1938, when the Japanese launched the first attack in the nature of a reconnaisance in the vicinity of Besymyannaya Hill, one of the hills on the height of land. This attack was made by a small number of troops, probably not exceeding one company, which succeeded in overwhelming the small Soviet border guard posted on the hill. Later in the day Soviet border guard reinforcements were brought up and drove the Japanese from [49,394] the ground they had taken. On the night of the 30-31 July the Japanese returned to the attack with the main forces of one division this time on another of the hills on the ridge known as Zaozernaya Hill. The witness, Tanaka, Ryukichi, whose evidence for the defense has already been referred to, confirmed the fact that on the 31st of July when he returned to the area the Japanese troops were attacking in force. It is true that he adds that the Japanese troops were on Manchurian territory; but this statement may be based on the Japanese claim that Manchurian territories extended as far as the West shore of Lake Khassan; in any event the Tribunal can find no evidence that the initiative was taken by the Soviet troops, which alone would have justified the Japanese attack. The fighting in the area continued from the 31st of July until the 11th of August, 1938, by which time with the aid of Soviet support troops brought up after the opening of hostilities, the Japanese troops employed in the operation had been defeated and practically wiped out. Thereupon the Japanese Government agreed that hostilities should cease and that the boundary be restored to the height of land along the range of hills in conformity with the Soviet contention. [49,395] From the evidence as a whole the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the attack by the Japanese troops at Lake Khassan was deliberately planned by the General Staff and by ITAGAKI as Minister of War and was authorized at least by the Five Ministers who participated in the conference of the 22d of July, 1938. The purpose may have been either to feel out the Soviet strength in the area or to seize the strategically important territory on the ridge overlooking the line of communication to Vladivostok and the Maritime Province. The attack having been planned and undertaken with substantial forces cannot be regarded as a mere clash between border patrols. That the Japanese initiated the hostilities is also established to the Tribunal's satisfaction. Though the force employed was not very large the purpose above mentioned and the result if the attack had been successful are sufficient in the opinion of the Tribunal to justify describing the hostilities as a war. Furthermore having regard to the state of international law then existing and the attitude adopted by the Japanese representatives in the preliminary diplomatic negotiations, the operations of the Japanese troops were, in the opinion of the Tribunal, clearly aggressive. We will adjourn until half-past one. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) [49,396] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. OPERATIONS IN NOMONHAN (KHALKHIN GOL) The hostilities in the Nomonhan district which lasted from May until September in 1939 were on a very much larger scale than those at Lake Khassan. They occurred at the eastern boundary of Outer Mongolia where it adjoins the Province of Heilungkiang. Immediately to the South is the Province of Chahar which in 1939 was under Japanese control. The importance of Outer Mongolia in its relation to Japanese military plans toward the U.S.S.R. was great. Bordering as it does Soviet territory from Manchuria to a point West of Lake Baikal, its military control by an unfriendly state would be a menace to Soviet territroy generally and in particular a menace to the Trans-Siberian Railway which is the connecting link between Soviet territory in the West and in the East and which for many miles runs approximately parallel with [49,397] and not very far from the northern limits of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia's strategic importance was recognized by both the U.S.S.R. and Japan. As early as 1933 ARAKI in an article entitled "Japan's Mission in the Showa Era" advocated the occupation of Outer Mongolia adding that "Japan does not want such an ambiguous area as Mongolia to exist near to her sphere of influence. Mongolia by all means should be Mongolia of the East." A few years later in 1936 ITAGAKI, who was then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, pointed out in a conference with Ambassador Arita that "Outer Mongolia is of importance from the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today because it is the flank defense of the Siberian Railroad which is a connecting line between Soviet territories in the Far East and in Europe. If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territories in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed without fighting. Therefore, the army aims to extend Japanese-Manchurian Power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand. . . ." The U.S.S.R. in anticipation of a possible move by Japan or by any other country, in 1936 entered into a mutual assistance agreement with the Mongolian People's [49,398] Republic in virtue of which Soviet troops were stationed in a number of Mongolian towns; some Soviet troops had been sent to the Eastern part of Outer Mongolia a short time before the hostilities broke out in Nomonhan. On the 11th of May, 1939, hostilities opened with an attack on the Mongolian border guards by Japanese reconnaissance troops numbering several hundred. Between that date and the 27th of the month further attacks were made by the Japanese in small numbers, each of which was repulsed. In the interval support troops had been brought up by both sides. On the 28th of May fighting was resumed on a large scale supported by aircraft, artillery, and tanks. Thereafter the struggle developed on an increasing scale and was only then terminated in September when the Japanese admitted defeat. It is difficult to say with accuracy the size of the forces employed but that they were large can be judged from the various estimates of total casualties and the area of the operations. The Japanese casualties in killed, wounded, and prisoners exceeded 50,000, the Mongolian-Soviet losses being more than 9,000. The operations were on a front of 50 to 60 kilometers and to a depth of 20 to 25 kilometers. The defense in this case is much the same as [49,399] that in the Lake Khassan Incident: namely, that the affair amounted to nothing more than a border clash over a dispute as to the exact location of the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The Japanese contention was that in the area where the fighting took place the boundary was the Khalkhin Gol River which at that point flows in a North-Westerly direction, whereas the Mongolian contention was that it was some 20 kilometers to the east of the river. Many maps were produced and much evidence given regarding the location of the boundary. Furthermore, evidence was given by members of the Mongolian border guard who had served for sometime before the clash that the boundary line was clearly marked with border marks along the line claimed by them as the boundary. It is not necessary to determine the position of the boundary at this time. It was subsequently agreed upon. The issue before us is concerned with the justification for the fighting which took place. The most convincing evidence of the character and extent of the operations is found in captured Japanese document being a Proclamation of the Commanding General of the 6th Army, dated the 5th of September, 1939 It reads as follows: "Although the order to reform the 6th Army [49,400] was issued before, I must now state with sorrow that the realization of the glorious task of defense of the North-west area failed because the order was not carried out. The Army was cast into a whirlpool of irregular war on the frontier between Manchuria and Mongolia. Such control of actions on the front continued for more than ten days into the present. Due to the brave and resolute actions of all the units under Lieutenant-General Kamatsubara chaos in the course of battles was diminished. Now the Army is preparing in the Dzindzin Suma area for a new offensive. "The Commanding General of the Kwantung Army decided this autumn to help us by sending the well trained troops stationed in Manchuria, he transfers them to the place of the future battle, places them under my command and plans urgent measures to be taken to settle the conflict. The circumstances are now such that it is clear that the matter is beyond the limits of a mere frontier conflict. We are now waging sacred war in China and any changes in the conflict under the circumstances of the complicated inner and outer situation acquire great state importance. The army has only one way to carry out its actions, that is to make the army unanimous and consolidated and immediately strike a crushing blow at the enemy to annihilate its growing [49,401] insolence. At present the preparation of the army is being successfully carried on. The Army will meet the coming autumn by finishing with one blow this mouse-stirring and will proudly show to the world the might of the selected Imperial troops. The officers and soldiers have a deep understanding of the present circumstances. All men of the army from privates to high level are full of brave and decisive spirit and are sure of victory. The army is always ready to crush and destroy the enemy anywhere having a deep faith in its first marshal the Emperor." No serious attempt was made by the defense to establish that the Mongolian or Soviet troops initiated the fighting nor was it contended in argument that such was the case. On the other hand the prosecution brought witnessess who had taken part in the operations who say that the hostilities were initiated by the Japanese- Manchurian troops. The Tribunal accepts the prosecution evidence on that point. Preparations for the conflict were undoubtedly made by the Kwantung Army but no evidence was given to enable us to say whether the General Staff or the Government authorized the commencement of the hostilities. The most the Tribunal is prepared to say is that it is improbable for operations to have been conducted on so extensive a scale without the prior knowledge of [49,402] at least the Japanese General Staff and the War Ministry. Shortly after the outbreak of the affair, HIRANUMA, who was then Prime Minister, was informed of its occurence by War Minister ITAGAKI. He says in his interrogation before the trial that he requested ITAGAKI to stop the hostilities but that he "could give no orders" and that "the military circles were of a "different opinion". It is, therefore, clear that in the very early stages of the conflict both HIRANUMA and ITAGAKI had full knowledge of the situation and there is no evidence that either did anything to prevent continuation of the conflict. As in the case of the Lake Khassan Incident the Japanese troops were completely defeated; what would have followed if they had been successful is purely speculative. However, the mere fact that they were defeated does not determine the character of the operations. These operations were on a large scale extending over a period of over four months; they were obviously undertaken by the Japanese after careful preparation as appears from the Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army and the intention was to exterminate the enemy troops opposing them. The contention that the incident was a mere clash between opposing border guards is therefore untenable. In the circumstances the [49,403] Tribunal holds that the operations amounted to an aggressive war waged by the Japanese. THE DEFENSE OF CONDONATION A subsidiary contention of the Defence with respect to both the Lake Khassan and Nomonhan fighting is that each was settled by an agreement between the Japanese and U.S.S.R. Governments. By an agreement signed by SHIGEMITSU and Molotov on the 10th of August, 1938, the fighting at Lake Khassan was brought to an end; each side withdrew to the positions occupied by them prior to the hostilities and thereafter tranquility was restored. Under the TOGO-Molotov Agreement of the 9th of June, 1940, signed, long after the fighting had ceased at Nomonhan, Japan and the U.S.S.R. agreed on the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. Subsequently to these agreements a general settlement was made by the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in April 1941. Relying on these three agreements Counsel for Defence concludes his argument on the point by saying that after two types of agreements -- one specific, one general, these matters cannot now be reopened. In none of the three agreements on which the Defence argument is based, was any immunity granted nor [49,404] was the question of liability, criminal or otherwise, dealt with. The Tribunal is therefore of the opinion that these agreements afford no defence to the criminal proceedings being taken before this International Tribunal. In a matter of criminal liability whether domestic or international it would be against the public interest for any tribunal to countenance condonation of crime either expressly or by implication. DEFENCE THAT MONGOLIA WAS NOT INDEPENDENT Counsel for the Accused TOGO in his argument generally on Count 26 submitted that the Count was not proven for the reason that the "Soidisant Mongolian People's Republic" was an integral part of the Republic of China and not a sovereign state until 1945. The Tribunal is not concerned with nor does it consider it necessary to decide the status of Outer Mongolia. We are dealing with criminal matters in which intent is of paramount importance and the Defence will not now be permitted to repudiate the written committments of the Japanese Government in which it formally acknowledged the status of the Mongolian People's Republic. By agreement of the 9th June, 1940, between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Japan, signed on behalf of the latter by the Accused TOGO, provision was made for the fixing of the boundary between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, [49,405] the signatories respectively stating on behalf of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo that they consented to the agreement. In the face of this clear acknowledgement of the sovereign status of Outer Mongolia and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Accused cannot now be heard to say that the point has not been proven, nor can they be heard to say that the Tribunal may take judicial notice of the fact that Outer Mongolia was until 1945 an integral part of the Republic of China. PART B - CHAPTER VII PACIFIC WAR The failure in 1938 of the Japanese attack at Lake Khassan had revealed the unexpected military strength of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East. The conclusion on 23rd August 1939 of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and the preoccupation of Germany with her war against Britain and France had freed the U.S.S.R. for the time being of anxiety as to her Western frontier. Japan's advance to the North, hitherto intended to be the first step in the realization of her national policy, was not deferred until a better opportunity presented itself. As the door of opportunity closed in the North the Southern gates began to open and Japan took various [49,406] steps preliminary to the realization of the second major part of her national policy, the advance to the South. France and Britain suffered a grave rebuff at Munich in September 1938. Thereafter Prince Konoye, on 3rd November 1938, publicly declared Japan's intention to establish the New Order in East Asia, and in that same month Japan announced that she could no longer apply the Treaty System unconditionally. She said that the application of the principles of "The Open Door" and "Equal Opportunity" might have to yield in face of the changed conditions in China. In that same month of November 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference decided to capture Hainan Island. That island was taken in February 1939 and the Spratley Islands in March 1939. In September 1939 there came war between Germany and Poland, France and Britain. At once we find Ambassador OSHIMA and General Terauchi speaking of the advisability of Japan advancing to the South; from the month of September 1939 onwards the attitude of the Japanese military in China towards foreign interests was noticeably more intransigeant; and about that time the Japanese began to bomb the Yunnan Railway. In November 1939 the Japanese Foreign Office demanded that France should cease forwarding military supplies over the Yunnan Railway to China and should admit a Japanese [49,407] Military Mission to French Indo-China to see that no such supplies went forward. Nothing could better advertise Japanese aggressiveness in the South, for France was entitled to forward these supplies and there was as yet no indication that French military strength would be broken. Nevertheless Japan felt strong enough to present these demands upon France, in view of France's preoccupation with the war in Europe. On 2nd February 1940 Japan presented to the Netherlands demands which, if granted, would have given her a preferential position among the nations in respect to the economy of the Netherlands East Indies. In March 1940 KOISO told the Diet Committee of Accounts that Japan should expand into the Pacific Islands so as to be economically independent of the United States of America. On 9th May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands. Japan at once asked for and received from the United States of America, Britain and France assurances that they would preserve the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. Japan gave a similar assurance. Nevertheless by 22nd May 1940 she had asked for and received from Germany the statement that Germany had no interest in the Netherlands East Indies, a statement which was interpreted in Japan, and as it turned out rightly interpreted, as giving Japan a free hand in her relations [49,408] with the Netherlands East Indies, as far as Germany was concerned. On 17th June 1940 France asked Germany for an armistice. On 19th June 1940 Japan renewed her demand on French Indo-China for the cessation of passage of supplies through Indo-China to China and for the reception of a Japanese Military Mission to ensure that none went forward. These demands had been refused by France when they were made in 1939, but the situation of France was now very different, a fact of which Japan was taking advantage. Now the Governor of French Indo-China agreed, and the Japanese Military Mission arrived in Hanoi on 29th June 1940. KOISO, then Minister of Overseas Affairs, spoke to the German Ambassador on 24th June 1940, of Japan's colonial aspirations in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies and inquired what Germany's attitude was towards proposed military activity of Japan in these territories. The Ambassador adhered to the German declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies already given on 22nd May 1940. He further stated that Germany would probably raise no objections to Japanese action in French Indo-China but she would wish Japan to tie down the United States in the Pacific by a threat of attack on the Philippines and Hawaii. On [49,409] 1st July 1940 Japan refused a United States offer of an agreement to preserve the status quo in the Pacific during the European War. The reason for this refusal was stated in an interview between KIDO and Arita, the Foreign Minister, as the inadvisability at this time of having Japan's activities, including those in the Netherlands Indies, restricted. There could be no plainer admission of Japan's aggressive intentions towards her neighbours, On 8th July 1940 Kurusu and Sato told Ribbentrop that for nine years the object of Japan had been to build a new China freed from the Treaty System, thus giving the lie to repeated official declarations of Japan made during those years. On 16th July 1940 Japan notified the Netherlands that she was sending an economic mission to Batavia to discuss supplies by the Netherlands East Indies to Japan. On that same day the Yonai Cabinet resigned under pressure from the military and their supporters, who thought the Cabinet too supine to take advantage of the opportunity for Japanese aggression in the South now presented by the fall of France and the Netherlands and the anxieties of Britain in Europe. The way was clear for the accession of the Second Cabinet of Konoye on 22nd July 1940 and for the steps it took to further that policy of Japanese aggression to the South. [49,410] JAPANESE POLICY IN 1940 During the Second Konoye Cabinet, which took office on the 22nd July 1940, important decisions were made which contributed directly to the launching of the Pacific War on 8th December 1941. The negotiations with Germany leading to the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27th September 1940 have been discussed in an earlier part of the judgment. However, for a clearer understanding of the decisions made and the plans adopted during the Second and Third Konoye Cabinets and the succeeding Cabinet under TOJO, it is advisable to review briefly the policy and plans adopted from July to October 1940. These were a reaffirmation of the policy enunciated by the HIROTA Cabinet on 11th August 1936 and the practical application of that policy to the circumstances obtaining in the latter half of the year 1940. The important matters were: The Cabinet decision of 26th July 1940, the decision of the Four Ministers' Conference of 4th September 1940 and the Liaison Conference of 19th September 1940, the outline of Japanese foreign policy prepared in the Foreign Office on 28th September 1940 -- the day after the signing of the Tripartite Pact -- the decisions of the Cabinet meeting of 3rd October 1940, and the "Tentative Plan Towards the [49,411] Southern Regions" prepared in the Foreign Office on 4th October 1940. As a result of these it was settled by the beginning of October 1940 that the policy of the Japanese Government was to move to the Southern Regions with a view to the occupation of Singapore, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, at the same time striving to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. In the event of war breaking out with the United States, which was considered possible, the Philippines, Guam and other American possessions would be included among the territories to be taken. In somewhat more detail the policy aimed at the following: (1) reliance on the Tripartite Pact; (2) conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R.; (3) successful conclusion of the war in China; (4) incorporation of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, the Straits Settlements, British Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, British Borneo and Burma into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (which hereafter for shortness we will refer to as the "Co-Prosperity Sphere"); (5) to offer to mediate for settlement of the European War and in return obtain from Great Britain recognition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; (6) conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the United States, whereby [49,412] the United States would recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for Japanese respect for the independence of the Philippines. On 4th October 1940, Konoye made a statement to the Press in which he said that if the United States refused to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continued its challenging attitude and acts, both the United States and Great Britain would be forced into war with Japan, meaning that Japan would be compelled to go to war with them. He explained that Japan was maneuvering, diplomatically to induce the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States to suspend aid to China. By this time the aggressive intentions of Japan had become so evident that the United States of America was not prepared to continue to supply Japan with the raw materials to manufacture munitions of war which would be used to realize these aggressive aims. A Presidential Proclamation was issued extending to all iron and steel scrap, except to the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain, the embargoes imposed in 1938 and 1939 in protest against Japan's disregard of treaties. It should be noted that the United States of America had on 26th January 1940 terminated its Commercial Treaty with Japan. The embargo was extended and placed under [49,413] a licensing system on 10th December 1940. Copper, brass, zinc, bronze, nickel, and potash were added to the embargo list on 3rd February 1941. Scrap rubber was added on 5th May 1941. By 20th June 1941 the situation had so deteriorated that all petroleum exports from the United States were banned, except to Great Britain and South America. Measures were adopted to counteract the American embargoes by strengthening the national economy of Japan and by organizing Japan-Manchukuo-China as an economic bloc. The Cabinet decided that it was necessary to allot to each of the three countries within the bloc well defined spheres of activity in labor, finance, exchange, manufacturing, communications, transportation, etc., in order to avoid economic rivalry, dual investments, and duplication of enterprises. MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT POLICY In a policy study of 25th October 1940, the Konoye Cabinet decided to recognize the puppet Central Government of China led by Wang Ching-Wei and to negotiate a basic treaty with that government for adjustment of relations between it and the Government of Japan. The Treaty was signed on 30th November; and the new Ambassador to the puppet government was instructed that since the Cabinet had adopted the puppet Central Government as an [49,414] instrument for long term warfare, he should bear that point in mind and cooperate to the fullest extent with the Army and Navy. HOSHINO, as President of the Planning Board and formerly Director of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo, was actively directing the negotiation of a joint declaration to be made by Japan, Manchukuo and China upon the occasion of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. KIMURA was appointed to the Japan- Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee on 7th November 1940. The Japan- Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration was initialed in final form on 8th November and published on 30th November 1940 at the time the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty was announced. This joint declaration stated that the three countries would cooperate on a military and economic basis and take all necessary measures to establish the New Order in Asia. HOSHINO has explained the reorganization of the Japanese economy to bring it in line with the new economic bloc. He stated that in November the Cabinet decided upon a plan to group companies of each industry into associations in order to control those companies through the heads of the associations who were to be appointed by the Cabinet and placed under the supervision of the Minister of Commerce and Industry. He said that laws [49,415] and ordinances were issued to place the plan into effect and that there was little revision of the plan thereafter. As a result of that plan no less than 212 major corporation mergers took place in 1940 involving capital amounting to 2,300,000,000 yen; and during the first half of 1941 there were 172 major mergers involving over 3,000,000,000 yen. The Privy Councillors had indicated during the deliberation upon the Tripartite Pact a number of measures that should be taken to prepare Japan for the war which they expected to follow the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Immediately after the Privy Council meeting, HOSHINO began to take measures to strengthen Japan's financial structure. On 19th October 1940, an Imperial Ordinance entitled "Ordinance Concerning Operation of Funds of Banks and Other Financial Institutions" was promulgated to add to government control over finances by requiring all financial institutions to adjust their investment policies according to government directives and providing for compensating of losses incurred by financial institutions as a result of government directives. On the same day, the Imperial Ordinance for Control of Corporate Accounts was promulgated by which institutions were required to conserve funds for attainment of the object of the [49,416] National General Mobilization Law. IMPERIAL RULE ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION One of the matters giving the Privy Councillors concern at the meeting of 26th September 1940, during the discussion of the Tripartite Pact, was the reaction to be expected from the Japanese people to the hardships to which they were being subjected and which would be increased as a result of the signing of the Pact because of economic sanctions the United States was expected to impose. Konoye's answer to that problem was the organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association on 10th October 1940. KIDO and Konoye had discussed the organization of a great all-embracing political party in May 1940 before the fall of the Yonai Cabinet, but had deferred action. HASHIMOTO brought to the Preparatory Committee of the Association his long experience in the organization of political association; and HOSHIHO assisted as a member of the Committee. The Articles of Association were drawn in detail with the obvious intention that the Association should spread over Japan into every district, county, city and even into every home. The Association was designed to turn Japan into a one party state on the lines of totalitarian states in Europe. Other political parties would be abolished. The Premier was to be at the hand of the [49,417] Association and the leader of the one party. Its purpose was presented euphemistically as being to establish a spiritually and physically united national structure to aid the Emperor in realizing the aims of Hakko Ichiu and making Japan the leader of a glorious world. HASHIMOTO AND SHIRATORI APPEAL FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WAR POLICY A number of organizations were affiliated with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. HASHIMOTO was a member of the Board of Directors of the Association. He organized the Sekiseikai, an ultra nationalist society. On 7th November 1940, while on an organizing tour, he issued his command to that society as follows: "Rise up resolutely, time approaches, instigate at once a powerful national movement, using every kind of method, speeches, meetings, posters, etc., and begin a sweeping campaign against sympathizers of England and America and at the same time start a movement to inspire moral support of the Advance Southward." He delivered an address to a meeting of the society at Kyoto attended by more than 5,000 persons on 2nd January 1941. In that speech HASHIMOTO advocated the overthrow of England and America, as he had done in his popular speech "Praying to Soldiers". Here again, he advocated [49,418] a "Southward Advance". HASHIMOTO was engaged in writing during this period. He published his "Inevitability of Renovation" on 20th December 1940; and on 30th January 1941 he published his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World" and issued the 14th edition of his "Second Creation". In his "Inevitability of Renovation", after mentioning that the end of the year was approaching and that it was time to "ring a loud alarm bell", he advised that it was time to attack Great Britain while she was engaged in war with Germany and Italy in order to eliminate her opposition to the establishment of the New Order in Asia and the Pacific Region, and that the defeat of Great Britain should be followed by an attack upon the United States. His "Second Creation" contained the "Declaration of HASHIMOTO Kingoro". That declaration was to the effect that the world was facing an historic turning point, and that Japan, whose national policy was "Hakko Ichiu", should take a bold leap and immediately display her original character by following the Emperor blindly with all the Nation's capacity in order to become the glorious leader of the World. He stated that war preparations should be completed to enable Japan to crush Great Britain and the United States, who were interfering with Japan's expansion upon the [49,419] Continent of Asia and her advance to the south. In his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World", HASHIMOTO displayed his support of totalitarian government and admiration of the methods of dictators and admitted having taken part in the Manchuria Incident. Japan's secession from the League and renunciation of the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty, as well as in the May and February incidents and other plots in Japan. SHIRATORI had retained his position as ambassador to Italy until 28th August 1940 when he became a Diplomatic Councillor in the Foreign Office and assisted in the reorganization of the Government along totalitarian lines and in the purge from the Foreign Service of those thought to have Anglo-Saxon sympathies. During this period, he lectured and wrote extensively in support of the proposed Tripartite Pact. In November 1940 he collected a number of his lectures and magazine articles and published them in one volume for distribution in support of the Pact. He declared in his "European War and the Attitude of Japan", which had been published in November 1939, that the European War could be developed to aid Japan in the establishment of its aims in the Far East. He stated in his "Necessity of the Japan- Germany-Italy Alliance" of December 1939 that the aim of Germany and Italy was to divide the world [49,420] into a comparatively few groups of States with each group dominated by one member State, and that Japan should join Germany and Italy in their endeavor in order to establish the New Order in Asia, i.e. the domination of East Asia. In his "Trend of the Great War" of June 1940, he said that Japan was actually involved in the war because the fuse of the European War was first attached by the China War; and he asked significantly whether the enemies of Germany and Italy who were opposing the establishment of the New Order in Europe were not the enemies of Japan. He advised, in his "Comment on Japan's Non-interference" of June 1940, that since Japan had been assuming the leading role in establishing the New Order ever since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, she should give early assistance to the Axis Powers, who were attempting to destroy the Old Order based upon democratic capitalism and establish the New Order based on totalitarian principles. He advised that this assistance should take the form of containing the American Fleet in the Pacific and suggested as Japan's possible reward the Netherlands East Indies and British colonies in the Far East and the Pacific. [49,421] SHIRATORI continued his writings after the Tri-Partite Pact was signed. He stated in his "Conclusion of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance" of 29 September 1940 that historians of the future generations would probably refer to the Pact as the “Treaty of the New World Order," as it not only represented a racial feud between the Anglo- Saxon and the Teuton and between the yellow and white races, but it included a positive program to overthrow the status quo and prescribe the New World. He declared in his "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow," published in December 1940 that the totalitarian movement was spreading over the world like a prairie fire, leaving no room in the world of tomorrow for any other concept of world and man. He said that Japan had maintained a pure and unadulterated totalitarian government during her entire existence which embodied the principle of the unity of the sovereign and subjects of one organic body as the immutable faith of the Japanese people. He said that the Manchurian Incident was a bursting forth of this healthy instinct of the nation, which had been hitherto suppressed by conditions long imposed by the democratic powers. He called for re-examination and a return to the true spirit of Hakko Ichiu. He pointed to the China War as essentially a conflict between Japan and the democratic powers, and declared that the wars in [49,422] the East and in the West were in fact one war. TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE A Privy Councillor had inquired during the deliberations upon the Tri-Partite Pact about preparations to meet the situation in case of war. The National Policy Investigation Association or Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai had existed since 1936 as an investigating and advisory body to assist the government in the solution of the graver political problems; but its principal value was that it served as a medium to bind the Zaibatsu to the military. The Total War Research Institute was organized as an official government board or commission by Imperial Ordinance on 30 September 1940. The ordinance provided that the Institute should be under the Prime Minister and control basic study and research in connection with national total war as well as with the education and training of officials and others to wage total war. HOSHINO became the Acting Director of the Institute on 1 October; and he was followed by high-ranking Generals and Admirals who continued the work of the Institute until April 1945. SUZUKI was one of the Councillors of the Institute. Each Ministry of the Government was represented in the Institute. Many boards and bureaus of the government as well as the Government of Formosa, the South Manchurian Railway, [49,423] the Zaibatsu companies, and the Yokohama Specie Bank were also represented on the staff of the Institute. Students were selected from every branch and department of the country's activities. Lectures were delivered, studies or exercises were conducted. The Institute complied research reports on important subjects which were useful in planning total war. To provide more manpower in order to achieve Japan's leadership of all East Asia, a campaign to encourage increase of the birth rate of the Japanese was adopted by the Cabinet on 22d January 1941. HOSHINO advanced the plan and it was adopted by the Cabinet with Home Minister HIRANUMA and War Minister TOJO warmly supporting the measure. The plan was to make payments to young married people to encourage early marriages, reduce the marriage age, ban birth control, give priority on materials to prolific families and establish special bureaus to encourage a high birth rate. The purpose was to increase the population so as to insure the leadership of Japan over East Asia, and furnish manpower for labor and military service in the development of Japan's plan in East Asia. The goal set was a population for Japan of 100,000,000 by 1950. The plan was put into effect by appropriate ordinances and decrees. [49,424] COOPERATION UNDER TRIPARTITE PACT Active cooperation with Germany and Italy under the Pact began shortly after it was signed. OSHIMA wrote in a newspaper article published on 27 October 1940, that one could not fail to be deeply stirred by the fact that the Pact had been concluded and that Japan's objective of founding a New World Order had been made clear, but that the nation with unswerving resolution should make preparations for the attainment of that objective without delay. He advised that mutual economic and military cooperation with Germany and Italy should be perfected speedily so that no opportunities to establish the New Order in Greater East Asia and the South Seas would be lost. The three signatories of the Pact agreed on 20 December 1940 to form the commissions provided for by the Pact. The agreement called for the establishment of a General Commission and two Technical Commissions, military and economic, to be formed independently of each other in each of the three capitals. MUTO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and OKA, who had become Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, were appointed to the Technical Military Commission in Tokyo. OSHIMA was appointed Ambassador to Germany on [49,425] the day the agreement was reached and became a member of the General Commission in Berlin. The Army and Navy had urged OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador because he was recognized as a strong supporter of the Pact and his appointment would promote cooperation with Germany and Italy. Matsuoka, in a speech delivered on 15 January on the occasion of OSHIMA's departure for Germany, stated that he was most delighted that OSHIMA was returning as Ambassador to Germany as he had built up such a personal credit among the German leaders that he could talk to them without reserve, and that practical use of the Pact would largely depend upon OSHIMA's ability. Matsuoka planned a visit to Germany after OSHIMA's arrival there. His purpose was to promote cooperation under the Pact, to secure German assistance in settlement of the China War and to negotiate a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R., as contemplated by the Pact, for the purpose of neutralizing the U.S.S.R. during the advance to the South. The mediation of the border dispute between French Indo- China and Thailand, which we will mention presently, delayed Matsuoka's departure for Germany. He arrived in Berlin in March 1941, and after holding conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler proceeded to Moscow where he concluded the Soviet- Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 13 April 1941. [49,426] Ratifications of that Pact were exchanged in Tokyo on 20 May 1941. As we have indicated, and as we have discussed elsewhere, this Pact did not mean that Japan had abandoned its aims of aggrandizement at the expense of the Soviet. The Pact was dictated by expediency. It was a matter of timing. With war proceeding in China and a war in contemplation with Great Britain and the Netherlands and possibly with America, it was necessary to do everything possible to avoid immediate war with the U.S.S.R. PREPARATIONS FOR MOVE TO THE SOUTH One of the principal elements of the policy adopted by the Cabinet in September and October 1940 was the establishment of an economic bloc of Japan, Manchukuo and China in order to accelerate the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was decided that the first stage of development of the Co-Prosperity Sphere should be a penetration into the whole area west of Hawaii, including French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, British Burma, and the Straits Settlements, excluding for the time the Philippines and Guam. A complete strategical plan was formulated. An attempt was to be made to effect a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to employ his troops, rewarding China by allowing her to [49,427] annex Tonkin Province of French Indo-China and Northern Burma. It was planned to conclude protective treaties with French Indo-China and Thailand under the guise of military and economic alliances in order to secure bases in those countries for an advance on Singapore. Thailand was to be promised part of French Indo-China as her reward. However, in order to delay Thailand in making preparations to resist invasion by Japan, it was planned to pretend that Japanese-Thailand relations were secure until Japan was ready to start military action. To avoid destruction of the oil wells and other resources in the Islands of the Netherlands Indies, it was decided to capture Singapore before beginning operations against the Netherlands East Indies and to call upon the inhabitants during the seige of Singapore to declare their independence, seize the oil wells and hand them over intact to the Japanese. Independence movements were to be used in French Indo-China, Burma and Malaya to assist penetration in those areas. Military action was to begin upon settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or upon Germany's invasion of England, whichever occurred first; and in the event that neither occurred, the action was to commence when Germany had achieved some substantial military success. Action was to be coordinated with German military plans. [49,428] During November 1940 the Konoye Cabinet began to make advances to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for settlement of the China War. Matsuoka continued his overtures to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and expected favorable progress as a result of conversations to be held by him in Berlin. The recognition by Japan of the puppet Central Government of China, however, had destroyed any possibility of reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo. THAILAND'S CLAIMS With the outbreak of war in Europe, Thailand had presented demands to French Indo-China for the return to Thailand of territory lost to Indo-China in the year 1904. On 12 June 1940 a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between French Indo-China and Thailand. One of the terms provided for the appointment of a commission to settle the matter of the disputed border. When France sued for an armistice with Germany on 17 June 1940 Thailand demanded the revision of the border in accordance with her wishes as a condition of ratifying the Non-Aggression Pact of 12 June 1940. On 30 August 1940 there was concluded between Japan and France the so-called Matcuoka-Henri Agreement, by which France agreed to the entry of Japanese troops into Northern Indo-China. A note was sent by Thailand [49,429] to the French Indo-China authorities on 28 September 1940 repeating her demands and proposing the Mekong River as the boundary between Thailand and French Indo-China. The note stated that Thailand would not press her claims to territory in Laos and Cambodia unless and until such time as France renounced her sovereignty over French Indo-China. On 11 October the French rejected these demands. Thailand then began the concentration of troops along the border and France countered by a like concentration. It appeared that hostilities would commence soon, but Japan limited her occupation of French Indo-China to the northern part of that territory and Thailand, left without Japanese support, stayed her hand. In late October 1940 Thailand sent a delegation to Japan to learn the Konoye Cabinet's intentions regarding the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo- China. The Japanese plans formulated in September and October 1940 contained a suggestion that a secret committee should be formed under the Japanese Thailand Non-Aggression Pact to make preparations for a military alliance between Japan and Thailand, to be signed as soon as Japan should begin the military action against Singapore. Accordingly, it was decided at the Four Ministers' Conferences of 5 and 21 November 1940 to assist Thailand in her negotiations with French Indo-China [49,430] and force French Indo-China to accept Thailand's demands by returning the territory on the west side of the Mekong River across from Luangprabang and Bakuse to Thailand, provided Thailand would accept the Japanese demands. Prime Minister Pibun of Thailand accepted the Japanese demands. In this way Japan prejudged the issue of a dispute in which she subsequently insisted in acting as arbitrator. Following the Four Ministers' Conference of 21 November 1940 Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that he had proposed to Thailand that if she limited her territorial claims the Konoye Cabinet would be willing to mediate between Thailand and French Indo-China. He told the Ambassador that if the need should arise, Japan would request the support of the German Government in dealing with the Vichy French Government. He said also that a cruiser was to be despatched to Saigon as a demonstration against French Indo-China to force her to agree to the Japanese demands. This cruiser was scheduled to arrive in Saigon about the middle of December. The Prime Minister of Thailand having agreed to the Japanese terms for so-called "mediation" of the dispute, Thailand resumed military action against French Indo- China; and on 28 November 1940 an engagement was fought between Thailand and French troops. Taking [49,431] advantage of this action, Matsuoka informed the French Ambassador that he would act as an arbitrator regarding Thailand's demands for recovery of territory ceded to France in 1904. The Ambassador replied the next day that the Vichy French Government appreciated the offer of arbitration, but that it expected its territorial integrity in French Indo-China to be respected. FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND THAILAND TO BE USED FOR ATTACK ON SINGAPORE On 23 January 1941 Kurusu, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, explained to Weizsacker that an advance southward against Singapore was unthinkable without using the land bridge of the Malay Peninsula after crossing French Indo-China and Thailand territory. For that reason Britain should be prevented from interfering with Japanese arrangements with Thailand. A group led by Diplomatic Councillor SHIRATORI was demanding an immediate attack upon Singapore which they considered the key position in the Pacific area. As a consequence, the Japanese military authorities and the German Military Attaches in Tokyo in January 1941 made a study of the possibilities of such an attack. The conclusion reached was that the attack should be carried but in phases by occupying Saigon, and then landing on the Malay Peninsula. [49,432] The Liaison Conference of 30 January 1941 decided to utilize the mediation of the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand to establish Japan's position in those countries and to obtain naval bases on Camranh Bay as well as air bases in the vicinity of Saigon to be used for the attack upon Singapore. The steps taken to give effect to this decision will be dealt with later. The true purpose of the mediation was to be concealed, it was decided, and the negotiations were to be described as an attempt to maintain the peace between the disputing parties. After the Liaison Conference Konoye and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs informed the Emperor of the decision of the Conference and secured his approval. KIDO, who was aware of the decision, recorded in his diary that this procedure of by- passing the Imperial Conference was unusual. Germany prevented the Vichy French Government from sending reinforcements to French Indo-China, and French Indo-China was forced to sign an armistice with Thailand on 31 January 1941. Under the terms of the armistice, the troops of both countries were to retreat from the lines held on 23 January and all military action was to cease. Japanese were to supervise the observance of the armistice, which was to continue [49,433] until a permanent peace treaty could be agreed upon. SATO, who had been on temporary duty with the South China Expeditionary Forces during the first invasion of French Indo-China in September and October 1940, was one of Japan's representatives in the supervision of this armistice. He did not return to his duties in the Military Affairs Bureau until March, when an agreement had been reached between Japan and Vichy France for settlement of the dispute and France had agreed to all of Japan's demands. The armistice having been signed, preparations for the mediation proceeded. The Japanese Mediation Commission was appointed on 5 and 6 February 1941, with Matsuoka, MUTO and OKA among its members. The negotiations were to begin on 7 February; and on 6 February Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that his Cabinet intended to use the mediation to force both France and Thailand to agree to make no political or military agreement with any third power and requested that the German Government be so notified. The results of this mediation of Japan in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China were seen when the peace treaty between Vichy France and Thailand was finally signed on 9 May 1941. The treaty provided for the cession by France to Thailand of [49,434] territory and for the establishment of the border along the center of the Mekong River, all as claimed by Thailand. We have previously seen that this result had been determined at the Japanese Four Ministers' Conferences of 5 and 21 November 1940. LIAISON CONFERENCES The action of the Prime Minister and Chiefs of the General Staffs on 30 January 1941 established a precedent which was customarily followed until the end of the Pacific War. Important decisions were made at Liaison Conferences and reported directly to the Emperor for his approval. Thereafter Imperial Conferences were held only on the most important questions, such as decisions to declare war. The Liaison Conference therefore latterly became the real policy-determining body of the Empire. Members of the Conference were the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Home Minister, Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs and their Vice- Chiefs, the Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau and Naval Affairs Bureau, President of the Planning Board and the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. In the Second Konoye Cabinet, TOJO, HIRANUMA, HOSHINO, MUTO, SUZUKI after his appointment as President of the Planning Board, and OKA after his appointment as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, [49,435] regularly attended these Conferences and participated in the formation and execution of government policies. DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS In February 1941 British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden summoned Ambassador SHIGEMITSU for a conference on the situation. He referred to reports that the situation in the Far East was extremely strained and expressed disapproval of Matsuoka's statements and contentions that only Japan had the right to mediate in conflicts in the Far East. He condemned the fraudulent nature of the mediation then being conducted between France and Thailand. He declared Britain's intention to defend her territories in the Far East. SHIGEMITSU replied that he was not aware of any strained situation. The evidence shows, however, that he was not only aware of the critical situation but was also thoroughly familiar with the plans adopted by the Konoye Cabinet and the action which had been taken up to that date to carry them into effect. He said that he interpreted Mr. Eden's remarks as a clear statement of the British position based on the premise that British-Japanese relations were near the breaking point; and after complaining of British-American cooperation he stated that he would make a complete report to his government and request instructions. [49,436] Matsuoka saw in this conference between Mr. Eden and SHIGEMITSU an opportunity to carry out the fifth provision of the plan adopted in September and October 1940, which was that at an appropriate time Japan should attempt to mediate so that Britain would make peace with Germany and to use that mediation to obtain from Britain recognition of Japan's domination of Southeast Asia and the adjacent parts of the Pacific. The plan was that Japan in return for that recognition would promise the preservation of the British Empire, including Australia and New Zealand, and would promise general economic cooperation with Britain. Matsuoka was conducting the mediation between France and Thailand; and on 10 February 1941 he informed the German Ambassador that an attack upon Singapore was being prepared. However, on 13 February he cabled SHIGEMITSU to inform Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an impending crisis in the Far East was a ridiculous fantasy. Matsuoka told SHIGEMITSU that the report of the British Ambassador seemed to have been made upon the assumption that Japan would acquire military bases in French Indo-China and Thailand and then commence action against Britain in the South Seas concurrently with Germany's invasion of England. He said it was difficult to understand on what ground the Ambassador in Tokyo had [49,437] based the alarming report as he, Matsuoka, had privately investigated and had been unable to find any basis for the report. Notwithstanding Matsuoka's denial the substance of the British Ambassador's report was in fact what had been decided by the Liaison Conference of 30 January 1941 at which Matsuoka was present. Matsuoka instructed SHIGEMITSU to say to Mr. Eden that there was no basis for the press reports that Japan was planning to start military action at any moment as there was nothing that Japan could gain by such action. Matsuoka saw the British Ambassador in Tokyo on 15 February 1941 and, after attempting to learn the source of the Ambassador's information regarding the impending crisis in the Far East, assured him that so long as Britain and the United States refrained from taking provocative action Japan would under no circumstances initiate action which should cause anxiety on the part of those powers. The Ambassador enquired whether Matsuoka would check the southward advance and asked whether Japan expected exorbitant compensation for her role as mediator of the French-Thailand dispute. Matsuoka replied that he would try to check the southward advance to the best of his ability and assured the Ambassador that Japan's purpose in mediating [49,438] the dispute was solely to restore peace between French Indo-China and Thailand. Matsuoka on 20 February 1941 complained to the British Ambassador regarding the reinforcement of the British garrison in Malaya. Matsuoka complained also to the American Ambassador that Britain was taking offensive action in reinforcing the garrison in Malaya. The American Ambassador replied that it seemed to him extraordinary that Japan should interpret and characterize an obviously defensive measure as an offensive one. He then mentioned the occupation by Japan in succession of Weichow, Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands, as well as the concentration of troops in French Indo-China and the public declarations of intention to advance to the South. He observed that the facts could hardly be interpreted by either Great Britain or the United States as indicating peaceful intentions on the part of Japan. Matsuoka addressed a note to Mr. Eden on 17 February 1941. He denied the report of an impending crisis in the Far East. He claimed that the primary purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to limit the sphere of the European War by preventing third powers from becoming engaged and thereby to bring the war to an early termination. He assured the British Government that [49,439] this was the sole object of the Pact, which constituted the fundamental basis of Japanese foreign policy. He submitted that he could not but be anxious because of the British and American Governments' attempt to prepare for supposed contingencies in the Pacific Ocean and in the South Seas, and observed that if the United States would restrict its activities to the Western Hemisphere, the situation would indeed be very much mitigated. He then stated that the uppermost thought in his mind had always been world peace and that he sincerely hoped for an early termination of the China and European Wars. He suggested that Japan act as mediator for the settlement of the European War. The British Government replied to Matsuoka's offer of mediation of 24 February 1941. After assuring the Japanese Government that the preparations by Great Britain and the United States in the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas were purely defensive and that they intended to take no offensive action against Japan, the British Government rejected the offer for mediation of the European War. The British Government stated that it had made every effort to avert the hostilities in Europe before their commencement; but having been forced into the hostilities, it had no thought but to carry them to a victorious conclusion. [49,440] Mr. Churchill had a conversation with SHIGEMITSU on the day this reply was despatched to the Japanese Government in which he emphasized Britain's determination to continue the war. He expressed regret that Anglo-Japanese relations, which had been friendly from the time of the conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, should be getting worse. He said it would be a tragedy if a clash should occur between the two nations, that the defensive works under construction around Singapore were merely for protection, expressed his confidence in victory in the European War, and said that the question of mediation of that war as mentioned by Matsuoka would not arise. SHIGEMITSU denied that Matsuoka had suggested mediation and stated that Matsuoka had only intended to emphasize Japan's spirit toward peace. He expressed regret that Britain had been giving aid to the Chungking Government in its resistance to Japan. Matsuoka, in a communication addressed to Mr. Churchill on 27 February 1941, reaffirmed his explanation of Japan's intentions under the Tripartite Pact, and again assured Britain that Japan had no intentions of attacking her. He professed surprise that his note to Mr. Eden of 17 February had been interpreted as an offer of mediation, but hinted that he was not [49,441] adverse to the idea. PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK UPON SINGAPORE The failure of the attempt to destroy British-American cooperation and gain British acceptance of their penetration into Southeast Asia through mediation in the European War made it necessary for the Japanese leaders to pursue their alternative plan to use force to accomplish the same end by an attack upon Singapore. Preparations for the attack proceeded at a rapid pace. Aerial photography was undertaken in January 1941 to collect data for the landing operations at Kota Bharu. Additional mapping of that area was completed by the Japanese Hydrographic Office in July 1941. The maps were completed and printed by the Naval General Staff in early October 1941. The War Ministry, in conjunction with the Finance Ministry, as early as January 1941 commenced preparing military currency for use in the areas which they expected the Japanese troops to occupy in the advance to the South. Special currencies were printed and deposited with the Bank of Japan to be drawn by the Army as it occupied enemy territories. The military currency thus prepared consisted of dollars which were suitable for use in Malaya, Borneo and Thailand; guilders for use in the Netherlands East Indies; and pesos for [49,442] the Philippines. In January 1941 therefore both the War Ministry and the Finance Ministry contemplated Japanese armies occupying those territories for which this currency was prepared. The Total War Research Institute early in 1941 compiled research reports on such subjects as "The Estimate of the Domestic and Foreign Situation from the Total War Viewpoint," "Study of Total War Pertaining to the National Strength of Imperial Japan and the Foreign Powers," "Draft of the Plan for the Establishment of Greater East Asia," and "First Phase in the Total War Plan." OSHIMA returned to Berlin to take up his duties again as Ambassador to Germany. He informed Weizsacker of the German Foreign Office on 22 February 1941 that Singapore would have to be seized by an attack from the sea and from the land; and on 27 February he told Ribbentrop that preparations for the attack upon Singapore would be completed by the end of May; he added that the occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need. On 23 March 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsuoka that the capture of Singapore was essential and that the Philippines could be occupied at the same time. Matsuoka agreed with Ribbentrop and felt that if Japan did not take the [49,443] risk of conquering Singapore, she would become a third-rate power. FURTHER PREPARATION The Japanese Imperial Headquarters continued its preparations for the attack upon Singapore during Matsuoka's visit to Germany. The Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs informed the German Ambassador late in March 1941 that they were vigorously preparing for the attack upon Singapore. SHIRATORI discussed with the German Ambassador the strategy for the attack; it was his opinion that a frontal attack by the Navy should not be made but that bases should be established on the Malay Peninsula from which the Japanese Air Force aided by German dive bombers might bomb Singapore in preparation for the attack down the peninsula. Matsuoka, in a conference with Field Marshal Goering on 29 March 1941, made arrangements for assistance from the German Air Force in return for an increase in the amount of rubber to be supplied to Germany by Japan. Economic measures for war were being accelerated in Japan. An important question was oil as the United States was increasing its embargo and the negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies at Batavia were making no progress. HOSHINO of the Planning Board estimated that the Army and Navy had sufficient oil in storage [49,444] until the oil in the Netherlands East Indies could be seized. He, however, believed that the margin was narrow, as Japan's production was only 300,000 tons and her annual consumption was 2,000,000 tons. This fact made careful planning necessary for the capture of the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies intact. This need far careful planning caused the Imperial Headquarters to suggest to Konoye in April 1941 that HOSHINO be replaced by SUZUKI, a soldier, in whom the Army and Navy had complete confidence. Konoye discussed the matter with KIDO, and on the 4th April HOSHINO was appointed a member of the House of Peers and SUZUKI was appointed President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio. The leaders of Japan now decided to strengthen the close relationship among Japan, French Indo-China and Thailand to continue economic negotiations with the Netherlands at Batavia and to maintain normal economic relations with other countries, but, in case they should conclude that the Empire's self-existence was threatened by the embargoes of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, to resort to arms immediately to prevent consumption of Japan's reserve of vital war materials. KIMURA was appointed Vice-Minister of War on 10th April and nine days later he became Director of [49,445] War Supplies. These appointments necessitated his relief from the Japan- Manchukuo Joint Economic Commission. Military topographical data was being assembled for military operations in various parts of the world. Espionage activities in the Netherlands East Indies were being carried out increasingly. Operations were being planned against Java, Sumatra, Bali and other places as well as Singapore. Mandated Islands were being fortified and plans were being completed for operations in the South Seas. Data were being assembled for use in Burma and Malaya. The work of printing military script for use in the occupation of southern areas continued. Matsuoka, in conference with Hitler on 4 April 1941, requested Hitler to furnish Japan through the Technical Military Commission established under the Tripartite Pact with all available information including the latest technical improvements and inventions relating to submarine warfare. He explained that the Japanese Navy would need this information in case it should decide to attack Singapore. Matsuoka added that sooner or later war with the United States would be unavoidable and Japan desired to be ready to strike decisively at the right moment. But Matsuoka cautioned Hitler not to mention in any cables to Japan that an attack upon [49,446] Singapore had been agreed upon, lest the secret leak out. Ambassador OSHIMA took part in Matsuoka's conferences in Berlin relating to assistance in the plans for the attack upon Singapore. NEUTRALITY PACT - JAPAN - U.S.S.R. An important question was the time for the attack upon Singapore. The Germans urged its immediate commencement, but the Konoye Cabinet's policy from the beginning, which Matsuoka had helped to form at a conference on 19 July 1940, had contemplated a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. to protect the Japanese rear during the attack upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Hitler insisted in his conversation with Matsuoka on 27 March 1941, with OSHIMA and others present, that a better opportunity to begin the attack than the present would newer occur again. Matsuoka replied that it was only a matter of time before Japan would attack as the Japanese had the feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years. Matsuoka referred to negotiations with the U.S.S.R. for a Non-Aggression Pact. The next day Ribbentrop tried to discourage Matsuoka from concluding the Pact with the U.S.S.R., stating that Japan should attack Singapore immediately and that if the U.S.S.R. interfered, Germany would attack the U.S.S.R. [49,447] immediately. Ribbentrop repeated that assurance the following day. Matsuoka maintained his intention to visit Moscow on his return from Berlin and he concluded the Pact with the U.S.S.R. on the 13th of April 1941. FRENCH INDO-CHINA Matsuoka returned to Japan to conclude the formal agreements with France and Thailand which he had arranged before his departure for Berlin and support for which he had obtained during that visit. In June 1940, shortly after the fall of France, she was forced to agree with Japan's demands to permit a military mission into Indo-China to ensure observance of the embargo on materials to China. The Military Mission arrived at Hanoi on the 29th June 1940. The Japanese Cabinet having decided upon its foreign policy, Foreign Minister Matsuoka moved on 1 August 1940 to put that policy into effect. He called the French Ambassador and delivered what was virtually an ultimatum to France regarding French Indo-China. He else discussed with the German Ambassador an alliance and the securing of German approval to a Japanese invasion of French Indo-China. In presenting his views to the French Ambassador, Matsuoka informed him that although Japan appreciated the admission of the military mission into French Indo- China [49,448] the Konoye Cabinet desired that France should allow Japanese troops to be stationed in Northern French Indo-China and the right to establish air bases there for action against the National Government of China. The French Ambassador pointed out that the demand was equivalent to requesting France to declare war against China although Japan had not done so. Matsuoka replied that the request was the result of necessity and that unless it was granted French neutrality might be violated. Matsuoka assured the French Ambassador that if the request was granted Japan would respect French territorial integrity and would evacuate French Indo-China as soon as possible. Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador of his demands upon France and stated that he would be grateful if the German Government would not object to the action taken and would use its influence to induce the French Government to grant the demands. The French Ambassador asked, on 9 August 1940, for a clarification of the Japanese demands and a guarantee of French territorial rights in French Indo- China. Matsuoka again requested the German Government on 15 August 1940 to support the Japanese demands by influencing the Vichy France Government. On that day he threatened France with military action if the decisions to grant the demands of Japan [49,449] were further delayed: After further negotiation between Matsuoka and Henri on 20 and 25 August, the latter on 25 August informed the Japanese Foreign Office that France had decided to yield to the Japanese demands. The so-called Matsuoka- Henri Agreement, consisting of an exchange of letters, was signed on 30 August 1940. According to the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, the occupation of French Indo-China was to be temporary as it was stated to be solely for action against China and would be limited to Tonkin Province; and further, that Japan would respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China. The arrangements for the establishment of air bases and the passage of Japanese troops into Tonkin Province were left for negotiation between the head of the Japanese Military Mission at Hanoi and the Governor-General of French Indo-China. The Governor-General of French Indo-China was slow to yield to the demands of the leader of the Japanese Military Mission, Nishihara. Nishihara threatened on 4 September 1940 to remove his mission form Hanoi and order the advance of the Japanese South China Expeditionary Army across the French Indo-China border. On 4 September 1940 an agreement was signed [49,450] but certain details remained to be settled. On 6 September 1940 a unit of the Japanese Army in China crossed the border into French Indo-China. This action was said to have occurred through mistake and negotiations were continued. The American Ambassador called upon Matsuoka on 13 September 1940 and informed the Foreign Minister that the United States Government regarded Japan's demands upon France as a serious infringement of the status quo in French Indo- China contrary to the Japanese Cabinet's announcement. The Ambassador's remonstrance was disregarded, however, as an understanding had been reached with the German Government and the Tripartite Pact was expected to be signed in a few days. The Vice-Foreign Minister informed the French Ambassador on 19 September that unless an agreement was reached between Nishihara and the Governor-General of French Indo-China before 23 September, the Japanese Army would cross the border into Indo-China on that day. The Japanese Military Mission evacuated French Indo- China and put to sea on 22d September in preparation for the expected invasion. The Japanese Army began the advance into French Indo-China at 2:30 p.m. of the same day. Faced with an actual invasion, the Governor-General was forced to accept the Japanese demands and signed an [49,451] agreement on 24 September 1940 for military occupation of Tonkin Province, the establishment of air bases and the grant of military facilities in French Indo-China. The occupation of Tonkin Province proceeded rapidly and the air bases were established. [49,452] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment. RELATIONS WITH THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Japan's policy and actions having provoked sanctions and economic restrictions by America, she decided that her warlike needs, especially of oil, must be obtained from the Netherlands East Indies. On 12th January 1940 Japan gave notice to the Netherlands that the Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration, and Conciliation of August 1935 would expire in August 1940. Under this treaty the parties were bound to settle any dispute between them by peaceful means and a permanent committee had been set up to settle disputes. The Foreign Office made a study of Japan's economic preparation for war in March 1940. That office came to the conclusion that the United States, having insisted upon observance of the Nine-Power Pact from the very beginning of the China War, might be expected to extend her embargoes against vital war supplies for Japan if Japanese aggression continued. Ways and means were considered to make Japan independent of the United States for the supply of war materials. Counter-measures [49,453] suggested were: to seek sources or supplies in other countries, to consolidate the "intimate relationship" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, and to bring the countries of South East Asia under Japan's economic control. The Japanese Minister at The Hague had delivered to the Netherlands Foreign Minister a Note on 2nd February making certain demands. The principal demands made at that time were: that restrictions upon exports from the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies to Japan and restrictions upon imports from Japan into the Netherlands East Indies should be removed; that laws respecting entry into the Netherlands East Indies should be modified; that facilities for Japanese investments in the Netherlands East Indies should be extended; and that all anti-Japanese publications in the Netherlands East Indies should be censored. A reply to these demands was still under consideration when Germany invaded the Netherlands. On the 15th April 1940 Foreign Minister Arita issued a statement to the press. In this he pointed out that an intimate economic relationship of mutual dependence existed between Japan and the South Seas Region, especially the Netherlands East Indies, and that if the European War were allowed to spread so as [49,454] to disturb the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies Japan would be deeply concerned and the peace of East Asia would be disturbed. The next day, the Japanese Minister at the Hague called upon the Netherlands Foreign Minister to explain Japan's concern regarding the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Minister replied that his Government had not sought, nor would it seek any country's protection of the Netherlands East Indies and that it was determined to refuse any offer of protection or intervention of any kind which might be made by any country. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in reply to Arita's press statement, informed him on 17th April that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies or any alteration of the status quo anywhere in the entire Pacific Area by other than peaceful means would be a threat to the peace. Germany invaded the Netherlands on 9th May 1940; and two days later Arita reaffirmed his statement of 15th April regarding the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. This statement contained the information that he had called upon the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo to reaffirm the determination of the Netherlands Government to accept no intervention in the Netherlands [49,455] East Indies. The announcement stated that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy had been notified of Japan's continued concern over the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, issued a statement the day following in which he said that during recent weeks a number of Governments, including the United States, Great Britain and Japan, had made clear in official utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, that this was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922, and that he assumed those Governments would continue to abide by their commitments. The British Ambassador called upon Arita on 13th May and delivered a British statement to the effect that the British Government had no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies and believed the Dutch forces there sufficient to maintain the status quo. The Netherlands Minister called upon Arita on 15th May and informed Arita that the Netherlands Government believed that Great Britain, the United States and France had no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies. The French Ambassador called upon Arita on 16th May and stated [49,456] that his Government agreed that the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies should be maintained. The day after the French Ambassador had called upon Arita and delivered to him the assurance from France, which completed the assurances from all the Allied and Neutral Powers concerned that the status quo would be maintained in the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese Ambassador called upon Mr. Hull in Washington. After the Ambassador had questioned Mr. Hull regarding the status of certain Netherlands possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Hull interrupted him and pointed to material which had arrived via news services from Tokyo in which the Yonai Cabinet was reported to be discussing frequently questions regarding the Netherlands East Indies and Japan's supposed special rights in them. He said that the United States, Great Britain and France had recently renewed their commitments to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, but notwithstanding the efforts to maintain an understanding with Japan there were constantly coming from Tokyo statements implying that the commitments had not been made. The Ambassador assured Mr. Hull that the Yonai Government was completely satisfied with the situation following the statements of the Powers and that his Government had no intention [49,457] of proceeding against the Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Minister assured Arita on 16th May 1940 that the Netherlands East Indies had no intention of placing any restrictions on the exportation of oil, tin, rubber and other raw materials vital to Japan and was desirous of maintaining general economic relations with Japan. In a Note handed to the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo on 20th May, Arita referred to that assurance and informed the Minister that Japan desired the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to give definite assurances that the quantities of articles enumerated in an accompanying list would be exported to Japan each year regardless of circumstances which might arise. This demand was rejected by the Netherlands on 6th June and attention was called to the fact that economic relations between the two countries were governed by the so- called Hart-Ishizawa Agreement of April 1937 and to the further fact that Japan had recently renewed its commitment to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. In Berlin the Japanese Ambassador called at the German Foreign Office in Berlin on Arita's instructions and asked for a declaration of the German position upon the status of the Netherlands East Indies. Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador in Tokyo [49,458] to assure Arita that Germany had no interest in the Netherlands East Indies and that she thoroughly understood Japan's anxiety regarding the Netherlands East Indies. He instructed the Ambassador to mention during his interview with Arita that Germany, in contrast to the policy of the other great Powers, had always pursued a policy of friendship with Japan and believed that this policy had been advantageous to Japanese interests in East Asia. The German Ambassador delivered this declaration of disinterest to Arita on 22nd May as instructed, for which Arita expressed gratitude. The next day, the Japanese Press gave great publicity to the declaration, contrasted the German attitude with that of the other Powers, and asserted that the German declaration gave Japan a free hand to act as she desired with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. Subsequent events showed that this assertion was entirely justified. On 24th June KOISO told the German Ambassador that Japan had colonial aspirations in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Japan, having received Germany's statement of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies on 22nd May 1940, informed the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo on 16th July 1940 of their intention to send a delegation into Batavia for economic negotiations. [49,459] Before the departure of the mission from Japan, the Yonai Cabinet resigned. The Second Konoye Cabinet took office on 22nd July. The basic principles of foreign policy decided by Konoye, War Minister TOJO, Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the Navy Minister on 19th July before they assumed office were formally adopted at the Liaison Conference of 27th July. The policy thus adopted among other things called for strengthening of the diplomatic policy towards the Netherlands East Indies in order to obtain important materials. Accordingly, the Konoye Cabinet proceeded with arrangements to despatch the economic mission to Batavia. Drafts of alternative demands to be made upon the Netherlands were in the course of preparation while the selection of a chairman for the economic mission was being debated. The Navy was not prepared for an attack against the Netherlands East Indies. This is confirmed by a statement made by Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff, to the Emperor on 10th August 1940 that the Navy at that time wished to avoid using force against the Netherlands and Singapore and that the later war came the better, since at least eight months were needed to complete preparations after a decision for war was made. Now the help of the Navy was essential in any attack on [49,460] the Netherlands East Indies, for seaborne expeditions would be necessary. The drafts of the alternative demands to be made upon the Netherlands stated that the Cabinet had decided to express their opinions frankly upon the problems of entry, enterprise and investment in the Indies and requested that the Netherlands Government agree to the demands of the Japanese Empire which was devoting itself to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia and Japan maintained that it was necessary to establish rapidly the economic self-sufficiency of the Co-Prosperity Sphere centred around Japan, Manchukuo and China and extending to the South Pacific. The first proposal asked, inter alia, that the Netherlands East Indies as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere give preferential treatment to Japan and allow Japan to exploit and develop certain natural resources of the Indies. The second proposal asked that the Netherlands East Indies cease relations with Europe and take its place as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, allow measure of self- government by Indonesians, and conclude a joint defence agreement with Japan to defend the Co-Prosperity Sphere. All restrictions on the export of goods, especially to Japan, must be abolished. These were demands which no independent country would grant save under duress. [49,461] The mission met with a cool reception when it arrived in Batavia in September 1940, and Kobayashi, the head of the Mission, advised Matsuoka on 13th September 1940 that the Governor-General of the Indies was not impressed by the serious situation and by Japan's threatening attitude. He suggested termination of the negotiations as he considered them to be futile. Matsuoka, however, had advised Kobayashi's assistant, Consul-General Saito, on 3rd September 1940, that the negotiations should not be limited to political problems and should also be directed toward the acquisition of oil fields as that was one of the Cabinet's main purposes in despatching the mission to Batavia. Kobayashi advised Matsuoka on 18th September that he would continue the negotiations as an aid to the acquisition of oil fields, but suggested that the negotiations on that subject, which had until than been in progress in Tokyo, be transferred to Batavia. The Tripartite Pact was signed, and the occupation of Tonkin Province together with the acquisition of military bases in French Indo-China was assured in late September 1940. According to the plan adopted in September and October 1940 it was decided to develop the attack upon Singapore by securing bases in French Indo-China and Thailand and to lull the Dutch into a [49,462] sense of security by continuing the economic negotiations at Batavia while secretly instigating an independence movement among the natives and securing military data for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. It was decided also to launch a sudden attack upon Singapore, and while that attack was in progress to call upon the natives of the Netherlands East Indies to declare their independence of the Netherlands, secure the oil wells and natural resources of the Netherlands East Indies and deliver them intact to the Japanese forces as they advanced from Singapore to occupy the Netherlands East Indies. The call for the uprising of the natives of the Indies was to include a warning that if any of the oil wells or other resources of the Netherlands East Indies were destroyed the leading Dutch officials would be killed by the invading Japanese forces. The plan contained provisions for the organization of a new government in the Netherlands East Indies in order that Japan might conclude a protective treaty with it under the guise of a military alliance which would provide for the appointment of Japanese military and economic advisers in powerful positions in the new government. The new government was to be organized by a committee of Japanese and natives, with the Japanese forming a [49,463] majority, and the Netherlands East Indies were to be governed by the committee until the new government could be established. The signing of the Tripartite Pact and the invasion of French Indo-China raised serious misgivings among the Netherlands delegation at Batavia who hesitated to continue the negotiations. The Japanese delegation assured them that the Pact was not directed towards the Netherlands Government and that Japan desired to continue the negotiations in order to promote friendly political and economic relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan. The Netherlands delegation agreed to continue on the understanding that Japan had no hostile intentions towards and did not claim leadership over the Netherlands East Indies and requested the Japanese delegation to submit a list of points for discussion. On the day that this assurance was given, Kobayashi sent to Matsuoka a recommendation that no time should be lost in placing the Netherlands East Indies in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and that, with that in mind, appropriations should include funds for propaganda and training of personnel in preparation for that move. The new policy necessitated the replacement of Kobayashi by a man thoroughly familiar with the policy and plan. Kobayashi announced his recall to Tokyo two days after giving the above assurance. [49,464] The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin informed the German Government that Japan was prepared to act as purchasing agent to supply the German Government with vital war materials from the Far East and the Netherlands East Indies in return for Germany's support of Japan's advance to the South and into the South Seas. The German Government accepted this offer and on 4th October 1940 delivered to the Ambassador bills of exchange as advance payment for tin, rubber, castor oil and spices to be obtained in the Netherlands East Indies. A complete working agreement for conducting the purchases was made. This agreement made further revision of the policy toward the Netherlands East Indies necessary. The Cabinet on 25th October 1940 revised its policy to meet its agreement with Germany. It was decided that the obligations of the Japanese Government to Germany required the Indies to be in the Greater East Asia Economic Sphere immediately by establishing close economic relations and by developing and utilising their rich natural resources for cooperation with the Axis Powers. Complete details of a plan to place the policy into effect were agreed upon. Among others, these were that the Netherlands East Indies should sever economic relation with Europe and America, that the production in and export of essential war materials from the Netherlands East Indies should be placed under [49,465] Japanese control, and that the formulation and execution of all economic problems of the Netherlands East Indies should be placed under a Japanese-Netherlands Commission. Had these ends been achieved, Japan would have controlled the economy of the Indies. OSHIMA, who at this time had no diplomatic post, wrote an article for the Yomiuri newspaper on 27th October 1940 in which he called attention to Japan's obligation to cooperate with the Axis, pointing out that the Tripartite Pact imposed new obligations. He advised that the Japanese should realise that fact and establish a close relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity among Japan, French Indo-China, India, the Netherlands East Indies, the South Seas Islands, etc., for cooperation with Germany and Italy. He referred to the American embargo on vital war supplies, which was then being increased in an effort to halt further Japanese aggression, and said that America was not the world's arbiter and that if she would employ her vast natural resources to help establish the New Order she would indeed make a great contribution to world peace. The Netherlands delegation had given the Japanese an elaborate and detailed statement of the oil situation on 7th October 1940, in which they set forth the amount of the various petroleur products they were prepared to [49,466] supply to Japan in view of the over-all situation and demands by other countries and also detailed the areas in the Netherlands East Indies which were available to the Japanese for exploration and exploitation for oil. The Japanese delegation replied on 21st October 1940 that they were not satisfied with the amount of oil which the Dutch proposed to supply and expressed general dissatisfaction with the proposals. They said that Japan desired to acquire rights to explore and exploit not only the oil areas reserved for private enterprise but also the Government reserve areas as well. Consul-General Saito, in commenting upon the proposals to Matsuoka on 25th October 1940, explained that from the viewpoint of an industrialist the proposals were most reasonable, but that from a strategical viewpoint they should be given further consideration. He pointed out that the plan to prospect for oil must be used for the exploration of areas as bases for military operations against the Dutch by sending into those areas a large number of planes as well as troops disguised as labourers, and he requested advice as to the areas considered strategically important by the Military. The Japanese delegation purported to accept the Dutch proposals on 29th October 1940. They, however, stated that they understood the proposals and their [49,467] acceptance as granting to Japan certain large areas in Borneo, the Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, the Aroa Archipelago and the Schouten Archipelago as Japan's sphere for exploration and exploitation for oil. They added that areas in Sumatra were also desired and that Japanese interests desired to participate in the capital investment of the Dutch oil companies. The Dutch took the position that the acceptance, which went far beyond the Dutch offer, put an end to the negotiations. The Konoye Cabinet however had completed its plans to place the policy decisions of September and October 1940 into effect. Their preparations for employing force against the Netherlands were not yet complete. They announced that a special envoy was about to be appointed to instil new life into the negotiations. This envoy was appointed on 28th November 1940. He was Yoshizawa, a member of the House of Peers and formerly the Foreign Minister in the Inukai Cabinet. Yoshizawa proceeded to Batavia and presented new proposals on 6th January 1941 which were in keeping with the policy decisions of October 1940. In the preamble to those proposals it was stated that a certain interdependence existed between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies, that the Indies were abundant in natural resources and thinly populated and undeveloped, and [49,468] that Japan earnestly desired to participate in the exploitation of their natural resources and to promote trade and economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. The detailed proposals called for modification of the entry laws, granting mining and fishing rights to Japanese, opening an air service between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies, abolition of restrictions upon Japanese ships, the lifting of import and export restrictions, and the granting of manufacturing and enterprising rights to Japanese nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. These proposals if accepted would have placed the Netherlands East Indies under the economic domination of Japan. Had they been accepted Japan would have obtained without war at least a considerable portion of her aggressive aims in South East Asia. Yoshizawa reported to Matsuoka that he did not expect a favourable reply to his proposals as the Netherlands East Indies were depending more and more on Great Britain and the United States since the removal of the Dutch Government to London following the German invasion of the Netherlands. He stated that the defeat of the Italian Army in the Mediterranean Theater, the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and the improvement of the Indies defences, had given the Dutch new confidence, and that determined measures would [49,469] be necessary to include the Netherlands East Indies in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Netherlands delegation answered Yoshizawa's proposals on 3rd February 1941 by stating that their first consideration was to provide for the welfare and progress of the native population of the Netherlands East Indies by improving economic relations and increasing trade with all neutral countries in a spirit of goodwill, and that the interest of the Netherlands East Indies demanded that economic relations with foreign countries be maintained on a basis of strict non-discrimination. They also pointed out that during the war it was necessary to restrict trade and other economic activities in order to ensure that direct or indirect advantages would not accrue to enemies of the Netherlands. A strong objection was then made to the claim of interdependence between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies as being unwarranted by the facts. The Dutch reply to Yoshizawa's proposals left the door open for further negotiations, but the Dutch were aware of a speech delivered by Matsuoka before the Diet on 21st January 1941 as well as of events in French Indo-China and Thailand which seemed to indicate preparation for military action by Japan against the Netherlands East Indies and consequently were suspicious of the [49,470] continuation of the negotiations. They warned the Japanese delegation that a Japanese occupation of Southern French Indo-China would constitute a military menace towards the Netherlands East Indies of such seriousness that it would cancel any agreement reached in the economic negotiations. Matsuoka had said in his speech on 21st January 1941 that the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for geographical reasons, should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with Japan. He declared that the situation which had hitherto thwarted that relationship should be remedied, and pointed to the negotiations at Batavia as being directed to that end. Yoshizawa attributed the rejection of his proposals to Matsuoka's speech and complained to Matsuoka, warning him that if he were to be successful in maintaining the negotiations while the attack was being prepared, it was necessary for the officials in Tokyo to conduct themselves in a manner more conducive to that end. The Dutch had been warned; and on 13th February 1941 Yoshizawa informed Matsuoka that the Dutch expected positive aid from the United States and Great Britain and preferred to rely upon the United States rather than upon Japan. He advised that discontinuance of the negotiations at Batavia was merely a matter of time, and [49,471] that Japan's only means of settling the Indies problem was by force. Konoye instructed Yoshizawa on 28th March 1941 that failure of the negotiations would injure Japan's prestige, and that as the European situation was rapidly changing, the Japanese delegation should remain in Batavia to await developments, despite the Dutch attitude. These instructions were followed and the negotiations continued. The Japanese delegation replied on 14th May 1941 to the Dutch rejection of their proposals by making modified proposals but stated that they desired to make it clear that the views expressed in the preamble to their proposals of 16th January were firmly held by the Japanese Government. The Netherlands delegation, aware of the further developments in the dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, rejected the modified proposals on 6th June 1941 as being incompatible with the essential principles of Netherlands economic policy. They also required that raw materials exported from the Indies to Japan would not be re-exported to Germany. The next day Yoshizawa urgently requested authority to withdraw from the negotiations as he feared a Dutch request for the departure of his delegation. Matsuoka, describing the terms of the Dutch reply as [49,472] "unwarrantable," authorized discontinuance of the negotiations. Yoshizawa asked for an audience with the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 17th June 1941. After making one last futile attempt to secure modification of the Dutch attitude, he produced a draft of a joint communique to be issued announcing termination of the negotiations. The communique, designed to save "face" for Japan both at home and abroad, was approved with minor changes by both delegations; it contained this statement: "It is needless to add that the discontinuance of the negotiations will lead to no change in the normal relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan." PREPARATIONS FOLLOWING TRI-PARTITE PACT TOJO said, during the discussion of the Tri-partite Pact before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, that the Cabinet had considered the possibility of war with the United States resulting from the conclusion of the Pact and revealed that there had been careful planning to meet that eventuality. The discussion at the Imperial Conference and before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council in September 1940 revealed that the Navy considered a Japanese-American war inevitable and was completely prepared for it, excepting that no adequate provision had been made for [49,473] replenishing its war reserves of oil. HOSHINO said that the Planning Board had been carefully planning for the war with the United States by accumulating vital war materials, including oil, and that he considered the supply sufficient for a short, decisive war. He considered, moreover, that the supply could be replenished from the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere if the war should be prolonged. The Privy Councillors were aware that the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact probably meant war with the United States and in reporting upon the Pact recommended that all necessary preparations be made for it. [49,474] Extensive preparation for war with the United States, Great Britain and other Powers followed. The puppet Central Government of China was recognized and the Japan- Manchukuo-China economic bloc was strengthened to improve Japan's economic position to meet the American embargo on war supplies after War Minister HATA and other Japanese leaders had publicly proclaimed that Japanese operations would not be stopped by what they termed the obsolete Nine-Power Treaty. The Planning Board under HOSHINO renewed its efforts to accumulate vital materials. As already related Konoye's Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized with the help of KOSHINO, KIDO and HASHIMOTO to steel the people against the privations of the war with the United States and Great Britain which the Japanese leaders claimed to be inevitable. Propaganda in the form of writings and lectures was disseminated to popularize the waging of wars of aggression for acquisition of territory and natural resources. HASHIMOTO, SHIRATORI and OSHIMA were heavy contributors to this propaganda campaign. A military planning board in the form of the Total War Research Institute was organized and placed in operation with HOSHINO as its first President and with SUZUKI as one of its Councillors. OSHIMA was sent to Germany to promote [49,475] cooperation between the Axis members in the adventure upon which they had embarked. RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. AND GREAT BRITAIN In October 1940 Konoye issued a statement to the Press in which he said that his Government was maneuvering diplomatically to induce the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere envisaged by the Japanese leaders, a euphemism for Japan's domination of East Asia. He implied that if the United States refused to understand the real intentions of Japan she as well as Britain would be forced into war. The United States Government because of that statement extended its embargo to iron and steel scrap and increased its preparedness for defence. The Japanese Embassy in Washington complained that the Japanese Government found it difficult to concede that the extension of the embargo was caused solely by concern for the defence of the United States. The United States Government replied that despite the Nine-Power Treaty and other Japanese obligations, American trade had been practically eliminated from Manchuria and North China, and that it now appeared that Japan was intent upon forcing American enterprises from Shanghai also. [49,476] The United States Government was concerned about Japan's advance to the south and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact which had been followed by Konoye's warning. The President of the United States in an address to Congress declared that at no previous time had American security been so seriously threatened. On 15th January 1941 the Secretary of State told the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that it was clear that Japan was animated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific, and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms so as to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one half of the entire population of the world. It was apparent to the Government of the United States that the Japanese military leaders were about to undertake the conquest of the entire Pacific Area at least to the westward of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The United States Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, represented one of the greatest obstacles to the execution of the Konoye Cabinet's policy for military moves to the South. It was feared [49,477] by many of the Japanese leaders that this fleet might be used to reinforce Singapore, and they advocated an immediate attack upon Singapore to prevent this. The Japanese Navy, however, was demanding that more oil and other vital supplies be accumulated and that adequate preparations be made for replenishing those supplies before launching the attack upon Singapore. The Navy estimated in August 1940 that at least eight months would be required for this preparation. The Navy maintained its demands before the Imperial Conference and the Privy Council during the discussions which preceded the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The general plan adopted by the Konoye Cabinet took the Navy's demands into consideration by providing for an attempt to eliminate the threat of the United States Pacific Fleet through negotiations for a nonaggression pact with the United States Government. The suggestion was that as part of such a Treaty Japan should guarantee the security of the Philippines and Guam and the United States of America should recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Preparation for an attack upon the United States forces was to proceed during the negotiations, so that in case the negotiations should fail, a surprise attack might be launched. A plan to destroy the United States Pacific [49,478] Fleet while it lay at anchor in Pearl Harbor by a surprise attack to be launched while the United States was at peace with Japan was conceived and submitted to the Commander of the Combined Fleets for study. He approved the plan and transmitted it to the Imperial General Headquarters as early as January 1941. The plan called for the organization of a task force to deliver an aerial attack upon the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. To avoid detection and make the surprise complete, this force was to use a northern route little used by commercial shipping. In conjunction with the aerial attack, it was planned to use submarines to destroy any ships that might attempt to escape the sir attack. There were many details to be worked out, such as the development and manufacture of shallow water torpedoes and midget submarines, as well as the perfection of a method of refueling at sea to allow the employment of the longer but more secure northern route of approach. The Japanese leaders considered that if the attack upon Pearl Harbor should be successful and result in the destruction of the United States Fleet, they would be able to seize all the important points in the Pacific and Indian Oceans before the United States would be able to prepare and launch a counter-attack. It was hoped [49,479] then that the United States would weary of a prolonged and costly war and negotiate a peace which would recognize Japan's supremacy in the territories it would have seized. Foreign Minister Matsuoka took the first step toward the execution of the Cabinet's plan in January 1941 by appointing Nomura as Ambassador to the United States to undertake the negotiations. Matsuoka delivered to Nomura his instructions on 22d January, immediately before Nomura's departure from Japan. These were that Nomura should make the President of the United States and his subordinate officials understand that Japan had been forced to sign the Tripartite Pact because of American and British interference with the organization of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, that the Pact was merely defensive, but that it provided for immediate military assistance from the other two Powers in case the United States attacked any one of the Signatory Powers, and that Japan would be faithful to the Alliance. He further instructed Nomura to advise the United States Government that it would be well for the United States to cease interference with Japan's aims in East Asia and to cooperate with Japan in the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for an opportunity to participate in the benefits which [49,480] might accrue from the establishment of that sphere. A propaganda campaign was immediately commenced, which was designed to convince the United States Government of the gravity of the situation and of the need for prompt negotiation of an understanding. The Cabinet decided to secure bases on Camranh Bay and around Saigon for an attack to the South and called upon the German Government to prevent the reinforcement of French troops in French Indo- China. The plan was approved at the Liaison Conference on 30th January 1941. The United States Government learned of the plan from its observer at Vichy, France, who reported on 28th January 1941 that the German Government had forbidden the Vichy Government to send reinforcements. In consequence of this America, on 3d February 1941, added many non-ferrous metals and potash to its embargo list. It was at this time that Mr. Eden saw SHIGEMITSU and asked for an explanation of the report from the British Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that a crisis was expected in the Far East within a week or two. The extension of the embargo by the United States Government caused Matsuoka some embarrassment in the Diet. He sent Nomura further instructions. He urged Nomura immediately upon his arrival in Washington [49,481] to make it clear that Japan had never intended to attack the United States, but that the Japanese Government could not understand why the United States was preparing for war against Japan, and that, if the United States continued to prepare, the result would endanger peace in the Pacific, as Japan had not been so much exhausted by the China war as some seemed to think, and that continued warlike preparation by the United States was not advisable. He again instructed Nomura to emphasize the necessity for cooperation between the two Governments in the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to avert a crisis in the Pacific Area. The United States Lend-Lease Act became effective and gave new encouragement to the Powers resisting the Axis to the extent that the Netherlands delegation increased its resistance to the demands of the Japanese economic mission at Batavia. Mr. Eden was awaiting a reply from SHIGEMITSU to his inquiry regarding the report of an impending crisis in the Far East, and the American Ambassador in Tokyo was demanding cessation of Japanese interference with American trade in French Indo-China. Matsuoka instructed SHIGEMTSU to inform Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an impending crisis was a ridiculous fantasy, although only three days before he had informed the German [49,482] Ambassador that he planned to visit Berlin to learn the attitude of the German Government toward the activities of the United States Government, for, as he explained, Japan planned to attack Singapore to deprive the United States of bases in the Pacific in case she should enter the European War. This was the situation when Nomura arrived in Washington. The President of the United States received Nomura on 14th February 1941. He said that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating as a result of Japan's advance to the South and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. He suggested that the new Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the United States Secretary of State the important phases of American-Japanese relations. Nomura made a cautious reply to the President and in reporting to Matsuoka asked for further clarification of Japan's obligation to attack the United States in the event of that Power's entry into the European War. Matsuoka replied to Nomura on 4th March that he had made his position clear on that point on a number of occasions, that Japan would participate in the war in case the United States declared war on Germany. The preparations for the attack upon Singapore were rapidly progressing. OSHIMA informed Ribbentrop [49,483] in Berlin on 22d February 1941 that the preparations would be complete by the end of May, and that for safety's sake preparations were also being made for war upon the United States as well as upon Great Britain. He said that the occupation of the Philippines had been included in the preparations. Notwithstanding these preparations, Matsuoka assured Mr. Eden in his message of 17th February of the Japanese Government's peaceful intentions, and suggested that Japan act as mediator of the European War. The British Government rejected the offer on 24th February 1941 and said that, although it had been an unwilling participant in the European War, with the assistance it was receiving from the United States it would be able to maintain itself against all enemies, and that it was determined to continue the war until Naziism was completely eradicated from Europe. United States Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura held a conversation on 8th March 1941. Nomura said it was unthinkable that Japan and the United States should fight because of the destructive effects that would inevitably result. Mr. Hull agreed with him, but inquired whether the Japanese Military, who were in control of the Japanese Government, could expect the United States to sit quiet [49,484] while two or three nations organized naval and military forces and went out to conquer the rest of the world. Nomura denied that these were the intentions of his Government and said he did not believe there would be any more military movements unless the United States embargo should force his Government to make them. Mr. Hull then mentioned the Tripartite Pact and the public declarations of Hitler, Matsuoka and other important German and Japanese leaders to the effect that their countries under the Pact were determined to establish a New Order in the World by use of force. Nomura again denied that it was the intention of his Government to use military force for conquest. Mr. Hull replied that so long as Japanese forces were all over China and as far south as Thailand and Indo-China, and so long as this was accompanied by threatening declarations by Japanese statesmen, there could only be increasing concern by nations who were vitally interested in halting world conquest by force. The President of the United States talked with Nomura again on 14th March 1941, only three days after Matsuoka, with the assistance of the German Government, had forced the Vichy French Government to accept Japanese terms of settlement of the border dispute between France and Thailand. The President [49,485] complained to Nomura that the American people were aroused over what appeared to be a concerted effort under the Tripartite Pact to effect a junction of the German and Italian forces approaching the Suez Canal and the Japanese forces approaching Singapore. Nomura assured the President that Japan did not intend to advance further to the South. The President then suggested that an armed clash between Japan and the United States could be avoided if the Japanese Government would remove the cause of the American people's suspicion of their intentions. Matsuoka went to Berlin for consultation with Hitler upon the question of concerted action under the Tripartite Pact after receiving the French acceptance of his terms for settlement of the France-Thailand dispute. He paused in Moscow, and the American Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. was invited to talk with him on 24th March 1941. Matsuoka was emphatic in his assurance to the American Ambassador that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any American, British or Dutch possession and he insisted that Japan had no territorial ambitions. He said that Japan was ready to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity and political independence of the Philippines. He declared that Japan [49,486] would not go to war with the United States. However, upon Matsuoka's arrival in Berlin, he explained to Hitler that his denials of his Government's intentions to attack were intended to deceive the British and Americans until the day when Japan would suddenly attack Singapore. UNITED STATES CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS Colonel Iwakuro, of Nomura's staff, working in cooperation with certain private citizens of the United States and Japan, composed a draft of proposals which it was thought might serve as the basis for an agreement between Japan and the United States. This draft was presented to the State Department for delivery to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hull saw Nomura on 16th April 1941, informed him that the draft had been received but that the United States Government could only consider proposals presented formally by the Ambassador. Nomura said he was prepared to present the draft formally as a basis for negotiations. Mr. Hull explained to Nomura that before the United States Government would commence negotiations it was necessary for the Japanese Government to convince the American Government of its sincerity by abandoning its doctrine of conquest by force and its use of force as an instrument of national policy and to adopt the principles which [49,487] the United States had proclaimed and was practicing and which it considered as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest. Mr. Hull then stated these principles as being: (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Equality of commercial opportunity; and (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo of the Pacific, except by peaceful means. Mr. Hull emphasized that his talk must not be considered as the commencement of negotiations and that his statement of principles must be accepted before negotiations could begin. Nomura replied that he was convinced that his Government had no intention of advancing further to the South but that he would submit the principles enunciated by Mr. Hull to his Government and ask for instructions. [49,488] Nomura's request for instructions was received in the Japanese Foreign Office on 18 April 1941 and Konoye consulted with KIDO and the Emperor upon the answer to be given. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity appealed to the Zaibatsu which urged the Cabinet to commence negotiations upon the basis of the proposed draft. KIDO and Konoye agreed that negotiations might be commenced with the United States Government, but that the Cabinet should be careful to keep faith with the German and Italian Governments and should not abandon its plan to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere, that being Japan's fixed national policy. Matsuoka on his return to Tokyo again paused in Moscow, where negotiations resulted in his signing of the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 13 April 1941. He explained to the German Ambassador to Japan, who was accompanying him, that the Pact would substantially facilitate the Japanese advance to the South. Konoye after discussing with KIDO and the Emperor the reply to be given to Nomura's request for instructions, cabled Matsuoka to return to Tokyo promptly in order to consider the matter. Matsuoka arrived in Tokyo on 22 April 1941 and sent Nomura a draft proposal to submit to the United States Government. [49,489] The campaign or infringement of the interests of the United States continued during the deliberation upon the answer to be given to Nomura. Japanese interference with the movements of American nationals and American merchandise in China became more pronounced. The American Consulate at Kunming in China was bombed for the third time and heavy damage caused. The Japanese Navy occupied Eniwetok Atoll and began setting up naval installations there. On 5 May 1941 the United States Government answered these acts by adding additional items, including scrap rubber, to its embargo list. Ribbentrop learned of the conditions laid down by the United States for the commencement of the negotiations between Japan and the United States, and of the Japanese Cabinet's decision to open negotiations. He immediately stated to Ambassador OSHIMA that he could not understand Japan submitting to such conditions. OSHIMA assured Ribbentrop that his Government had no intention of entering into any treaty with the United States embodying the principles laid down by Mr. Hull. Ribbentrop accused the Japanese Cabinet of having abandoned its plan for attacking Singapore and or having broken faith with the German Government. He demanded that the Japanese Government either refuse to agree to the Hull principles or agree only on condition that the American [49,490] Government give its assurance that it would remain neutral. OSHIMA agreed with Ribbentrop, transmitted his views to Matsuoka, and stated that he considered Ribbentrop's suspicions and accusation well-founded. He recommended that the Cabinet adopt Ribbentrop's suggestion. On 8 May 1941 Nomura reported to Matsuoka and pointed out that the United States would not recognize the New Order in East Asia nor the retention of territory acquired through aggression and was insistent on the observance of the four principles enunciated by Mr. Hull. Nomura delivered the first official Japanese proposal to Mr. Hull on 12 May 1941. That draft was couched in obscure and platitudinous terms, which really provided for a secret understanding between the two Governments, in substance as follows: The United States Government would agree (1) to recognize the establishment by Japan of the New Order in China in accordance with Konoye's three principles as embodied in the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration of 30 November 1940 and to advise Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to negotiate peace with Japan forthwith; (2) to enter into a secret agreement to withdraw aid to the National Government of China if the Generalissimo did not enter into negotiations for peace; (3) to recognize the right of Japan to estab- [49,491] lish the Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing China and the Southern Area upon the understanding that Japan's expansion in that area was to be of a peaceful nature and to cooperate in producing and procuring from this sphere the natural resources which Japan needs; (4) to amend its immigration laws so as to admit Japanese nationals on the basis of equality and non-discrimination; (5) to restore normal economic relations between the two countries; (6) to take note of Japan's obligation under Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact to attack the United States if in the opinion of the Japanese Government the assistance rendered to the Allied Powers resisting Germany and Italy amounted to an attack upon the Axis; and (7) to refrain from rendering assistance to the Allied Powers. The Japanese Government in return would agree to (1) resume normal trade relations with the United States; (2) assure the United States a supply of the commodities available in the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (3) join the United States Government in a guarantee of the independence of the Philippines on condition that the Philippines would maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The day after this draft proposal was delivered to Mr. Hull, the Japanese delegation at Batavia delivered its amended demands to the Dutch delegation which reiter- [49,492] ated the Japanese Government's previous declaration of interdependence between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan. In Tokyo Matsuoka informed the American Ambassador that both he and Konoye were determined that Japan's advance to the South would be made by peaceful means, "unless", he added significantly, "circumstances rendered that impossible." The American Ambassador inquired what circumstances Matsuoka had in mind. Matsuoka replied that he referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya, which he described as provocative. Ribbentrop learned of the draft proposal presented by Nomura to the United States of America and immediately took OSHIMA to task, expressing resentment of Matsuoka's decision to commence negotiations with the United States without consulting the German and Italian Governments. He demanded that the attack upon Singapore be commenced without further delay. OSHIMA, reporting to Matsuoka, said: "I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking Singapore, she will invite the contempt not only of the United States and Great Britain, but also of Germany and Italy." He informed Matsuoka of the resentment of the German leaders against the negotiations with the United States and stated that, since the [49,493] Japanese-American negotiations were considered to involve a change in Japanese foreign policy which violated the plans of the military, he had taken the liberty of informing the Japanese Army and Navy officials. This was the beginning of the friction between Konoye and Matsuoka. UNITED STATES AGREES TO NEGOTIATE - May 1941 The United States Government accepted the Japanese draft proposal of the 12 May 1941 as a starting point for the negotiations and undertook to explore the possibility of an understanding with the Japanese Government. On 28 May 1941 Mr. Hull and Nomura met. In the course of the conversation it became clear that there were two great obstacles to any successful prosecution of the negotiations: (1) the obscurity in which Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact were at present left, and (2) the provisions for settlement of the China question. As to the first matter, Mr. Hull desired that Japan qualify its attitude towards the possible event of the United States being drawn into the European War as a measure of self-defense. As to the second matter, Mr. Hull pointed out that the Japanese insistence on retaining [49,494] troops in China after the conclusion of any peace treaty with China would be a factor operating against friendship between the United States and Japan. Nomura was not able to state how many troops Japan proposed to retain in China nor the areas where they would be quartered. On 31 May Mr. Hull told Nomura that at some proper time before definitive discussions he would discuss the draft proposal in strict confidence with the Chungking Government. Moreover, on 31 May a further United States draft was handed to Nomura in which it was proposed, inter alia, that Japan should state that the provisions of the Tripartite Pact did not apply to nations which became involved in the European War by reasons of protection, self-defense and national security. It was further proposed that Japan should submit to the United States of America the framework of the terms which she would submit to China. Annexed to this draft was a full statement of the attitude of the United States towards the activities of Germany and a declaration that the United States was resolved to take measures of self- defense in resistance to a movement which, in the view of the United Sates of America, was clearly directed to world conquest by force. On 4 June the Japanese Embassy suggested certain amendments to the American proposals. Among them was the [49,495] suggestion that the United States should drop from its draft the provision that the obligations of Japan under the Tripartite Pact did not apply to the case where a nation became involved in the European War as a measure of self-defense. Mr. Hull considered these Japanese amendments and on 6 June he told Nomura that they had carried the negotiations away from the fundamental points which the United States of America believed to be involved. In his view they revealed a stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis, no clear indication of intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which would contribute to peace in the Far East, and a veering away from clearcut commitments on policies of peace and non- discriminatory treatment. Nevertheless, Nomura on 15 June 1941 submitted to Mr. Hull a new draft embodying the very suggestions to which Mr. Hull had already taken objection. Chungking was bombed by more than 100 Japanese planes on 10 June and American property was destroyed. Public statements by spokesmen of the Japanese Government emphasized Japan's commitment and intentions under the Tripartite Pact in a sense hostile to the interests of the United States of America. The negotiations at Batavia were obviously breaking down. The United States Government issued an order on 20 June banning all shipments of oil except those to Great Britain [49,496] and South America. The Japanese had been pressing for an answer to their proposals of 12 May. Mr. Hull talked to Nomura on 21 June. He referred to the accumulating evidence from all over the world, including the public statements of Japanese leaders, indicating that the Japanese Military would endorse no understanding with the United States except one that envisaged Japan fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States become involved in the European War through its programme of aid to the democracies. He then stated that the proposal of 12 May 1941 violated the principles which the American Government was committed to uphold, particularly in respect to the provisions of the proposal relating to China. Mr. Hull then informed Nomura that he had come to the conclusion that before proceeding with the negotiations the United States Government must await some clearer indication than had yet been given that the Japanese Government desired to pursue a course of peace. He expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would manifest such an attitude. We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, 11 November 1947, at 0930.) [49,497] Thursday, 11 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) [49,497-A] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except KAYA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment: PREPARATIONS INTENSIFIED The plan of September and October 1940 had been followed. The ultimate objective of the plan was the domination of East Asia by Japan. That objective was to be reached by the use of force if necessary. Some of the steps to be taken in the execution of that plan were in the alternative. The Tripartite Pact had been entered into and used as an instrument for intimidation of the Western powers and as a guarantee of cooperation by the Axis Powers with Japan as she advanced to the South. The Non-Aggression Pact had been signed with the U.S.S.R. as a protection of Japan's rear as she made that advance. The attempt to negotiate a peace with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in order to free Japanese troops and acquire the use of Chinese troops in making that advance had failed. The attempt to mediate the [49,498] European War and thereby secure British recognition of Japan's advance into Southeast Asia so as to eliminate the necessity of an attack upon Singapore had likewise failed. The attempt to eliminate possible interference with that attack by the United States Pacific Fleet through negotiation with the United States had also failed. The negotiations at Batavia for acquisition of oil and other vital materials had failed also; those negotiations had terminated on 17 June 1940. Japan's reserves of war supplies were in danger of being depleted. The decision of the Imperial General Headquarters made in early April 1941 stood. The time for final preparation had now arrived. The Japanese Navy began training and practice for the attack on Pearl Harbor in late May 1941. Dive bombing was practiced at Kagoshima, Japan, where the terrain resembled that at Pearl Harbor. The development of a shallow water torpedo had been started early in 1941 as the waters in Pearl Harbor were shallow. The Navy spent considerable time in developing and experimenting with that type of torpedo during the summer. Refueling at sea was made a matter of special training in order to permit the use of the more secure northern route of approach to Pearl Harbor. [49,499] CABINET POLICY AND DECISIONS OF JUNE AND JULY 1941 OSHIMA, acting on instructions from his Government, began discussions with Ribbentrop on 10 June 1941 which were to lead to the acquisition of additional naval bases in southern French Indo-China for use in the attack upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. KIDO was advised by Konoye of the decision of the Imperial General Headquarters to attack Singapore and the proceedings under that decision. On 21 June 1941 Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador of the decision, telling him that the situation had become unbearable, that the negotiations with the Netherlands Government were not to be resumed, and that in order to attack Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies additional bases were required in southern French Indo-China, He said that he had instructed OSHIMA to inquire whether the consent of Vichy France could be obtained by the German Government and if not he would take the matter up directly with the Vichy French Government. OSHIMA informed Konoye as early as 6 June 1941 that the German Government had decided to attack the U.S.S.R. This information caused considerable confusion among the Japanese leaders. There were some, including Matsuoka who considered it better for Japan to postpone [49,500] the attack to the South and emulate the role of Italy in the European War by attacking the U.S.S.R. in the rear at the opportune time in the German-Soviet struggle for the purpose of seizing Soviet territories in the Far East thereby obtaining oil from Sakhalin. There were others, including Konoye and KIDO, who argued that the original plan of September-October to prosecute the advance to the South should not be abandoned. Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. on 22d June. Acting upon KIDO'S advice, the Emperor instructed Matsuoka to conform to Konoye's wishes and KIDO and HIRANUMA repeated this advice. The Liaison Conference of 25 June 1941 attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA and others decided that Japan would accelerate its measures towards French Indo-China and Thailand. This was necessary in view of the failure of the negotiations at Batavia. Naval and air bases were to be established promptly in southern French Indo-China and force employed if the French did not comply with the Japanese demands. Preparations were to be made for despatch of the necessary military force before beginning negotiations with France. These bases were needed for the attack on Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Konoye and the Chiefs of Staff reported these decisions to the Emperor. [49,501] The decisions of the Liaison Conference show that HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA agreed with Konoye that the fixed policy should not be changed. TOJO reported to the Emperor on 28 June 1941. He told KIDO later in the day that the Army's plan was for the time being to remain neutral in the German-Soviet War, with the Kwantung Army "remaining calm and prudent" and to strengthen the Imperial General Headquarters by arranging for it to meet every day in the Palace. SUZUKI had proposed measures for strengthening the Imperial Headquarters on 23 June. KIDO had agreed with him but advised that the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals should be consulted. DOHIHARA was a member of the Board and was present when TOJO and his Vice-Minister of War, KIMURA, appeared before the Board on 30 June to express TOJO'S views regarding the fast-moving situation. Thus the military marshalled their forces to prevent Matsuoka from upsetting their strategy by his plan of postponing the move southward and attacking the U.S.S.R. at once, which he had outlined to the Emperor on 22 June 1941. The embarrassment caused by Matsuoka's attitude and the necessity of his resignation was being discussed. The Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 following the Liaison Conference of 25 June finally put the [49,502] question at rest. TOJO, SUZUKI, HIRANUMA and OKA, among others, were present at that conference. The Conference decided that regardless of any change in the situation Japan would adhere to its plan for the domination of East and Southeast Asia and would proceed with the southward advance at the same time being ready to take advantage of any favorable situation in the German-Soviet War to attack the U.S.S.R. Necessary diplomatic negotiations were to be continued while final preparations for the attack upon Singapore and Pearl Harbor were being completed and the Japanese forces were moving into position in southern French Indo-China and Thailand for the attack. Japan was to remain neutral in the German-Soviet War while secretly preparing an attack upon the Soviet Union which was to be launched if and when it became apparent that the U.S.S.R. had been so weakened by the war that it would not be able to offer effective resistance. TOJO was a strong advocate of this plan and stated that, "Japan would gain great prestige by attacking the U.S.S.R. at a time when it is ready to fall to the ground like a ripe persimmon." The Army General Staff was ordered to proceed with its final operational plans for the campaigns to be waged in the Southern Areas. The troops which later carried out landing operations in the Philippines and in [49,503] the Malaya-Peninsula began practicing landing operations along the China coast; on Hainan Island, and along the coast of French Indo-China while others trained on Formosa. The units which were to attack Hongkong were given rigorous training in night fighting and in storming pillboxes at a station near Canton, China. Training areas were selected at places where the terrain and climate approximated to that of the area to be attacked. The training continued all through the summer and until the actual attack. Admiral SHIMADA was in command of the China Area Fleet while this training was in progress. Three Japanese Army divisions were prepared for action against French Indo-China. The Japanese Government planned to demand that the Vichy French Government grant permission to the Japanese Government to occupy southern French Indo- China and to construct military bases there. This action had been suggested to OSHIMA by Ribbentrop, who considered it inadvisable for Germany to make the demand. The Japanese plan was that the demand would be made in the form of an ultimatum which was to be followed by invasion if the demands were not granted. The demands were to be made on 5 July 1941, but inquiries by the British and American Ambassadors revealed that the plan had leaked out, and KIDO recorded in his diary that in view of that fact it had been [49,504] decided to postpone issuance of the ultimatum for five days in order to observe what moves if any the British and Americans would make to resist the ultimatum. The American and British Ambassadors were given a flat denial of any intentions to advance into southern French Indo-China. Matsuoka instructed the Japanese Ambassador to Vichy France on 12 July 1941 to serve the ultimatum and demand an answer on or before 20 July. The next day, Konoye in a personal message to Marshal Petain assured the Marshal that Japan would respect the sovereign rights of France in French Indo-China if the Japanese Army were allowed to base there and establish their naval bases on the shores. Before an answer to the ultimatum was received the Second Konoye Cabinet resigned because of disagreement between Konoye and Matsuoka regarding the strategy to be employed. THIRD KONOYE CABINET Following the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 Matsuoka was not easily reconciled to the decision of the Conference and did not act completely in accord with it. MUTO and OKA, as Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Naval Affairs Bureau respectively, had drawn up a formula which would insure continuation of the negotiations with America by making additional [49,505] proposals. Konoye had agreed to continue with Matsuoka as his Foreign Minister provided Matsuoka would cooperate in applying the MUTO-OKA formula. Matsuoka said he had no objection to the formula, but at the same time he insisted on rejecting Mr. Hull's statement to Nomura of 21 June 1941 as being disgraceful to Japan. This was the statement in which Mr. Hull had said that before proceeding with the negotiations the United States must await some clearer indication than had yet been given that the Japanese Government desired to pursue a course of peace. Matsuoka proposed to present the MUTO-OKA proposals only after Mr. Hull's statement had been specifically rejected. Konoye was fearful lest this action might cause the United States to refuse to negotiate further and insisted that Matsuoka send the counter- proposals drafted by MUTO and OKA to Nomura along with the instructions for rejection of Mr. Hull's statement so that the danger of termination of the negotiations might be reduced. Matsuoka disregarded Konoye's advice and in the instructions he issued to Nomura acted on his own view thus precipitating a Cabinet crisis. KIDO upon learning of the crisis was determined to preserve the Konoye Cabinet for the execution of the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 and conferred with members of the Imperial [49,506] Household and with the Emperor upon a plan to return the Imperial Mandate to Konoye if the Cabinet should resign en bloc. KIDO recommended that Matsuoka be asked to resign. Konoye vetoed that suggestion lest Matsuoka and his followers make political capital of his forced resignation by suggesting that it had been dictated by America. The Konoye Cabinet accordingly resigned en bloc on 16 July 1941 and the Emperor ordered KIDO to summon the Jushin, a body composed of the former Prime Ministers acting as Senior Statesmen, together with the President of the Privy Council, to recommend Konoye's successor. On 17 July 1941 KIDO conferred with the Senior Statesmen upon Konoye's resignation statement. Wakatsuki, Abe, Okada, Hayashi, Yonai and HIROTA were present. The view was expressed that Konoye would be able to unite all political circles behind the military and the meeting was unanimous that he should be recommended to the Emperor. The Emperor summoned Konoye and delivered the Imperial Mandate to him to form a new Cabinet. The Third Konoye Cabinet was formed on 18 July. Toyoda became Foreign Minister, TOJO remained as War Minister, HIRANUMA became Minister without Portfolio, and SUZUKI remained as President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio. KIMURA remained as Vice-Minister of War. MUTO and OKA continued in their positions. The new Foreign [49,507] Minister declared that there would be no change in policy as a result of the Cabinet change. OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA OSHIMA handed Ribbentrop a memorandum on the Japanese ultimatum to the Vichy French Government on 19 July 1941 explaining that the ultimatum had been delivered in order to secure military bases in French Indo-China as the first step in the "push to the South,” meaning thereby the attack upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. He requested the German Government to advise the Vichy Government to accept the ultimatum and meet the demands of the Japanese Government. Toyoda advised the German Ambassador in Tokyo on 20 July that the Cabinet change would not affect the policy decision reached at the Imperial Conference on 2 July. After reporting to Germany the terms of the ultimatum with the statement that it had no alternative but to give in to violence, Vichy France accepted the Japanese ultimatum and agreed to the Japanese demands. 40,000 troops sailed on 24 July to take up the occupation of Southern French Indo-China and the construction of eight air bases near Saigon and of naval bases at Saigon and Camranh Bay, in accordance with the agreement. The formal agreement was ratified on 28 July and signed the next day. TOJO, MUTO, SUZUKI and OKA were present at the meeting of the [49,508] Privy Council on 28 July and represented the Cabinet as explainers of the agreement. TOJO stated that the agreement was one of the measures decided at the Imperial Conference of 2 July based upon the decision of the Liaison Conference of 25 June, that the Cabinet and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff were united and were holding Liaison Conferences almost every day in the Palace in order to take appropriate measures under the Cabinet's strategic policy. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ambassador Nomura had warned on 3 July and 19 July 1941 in telegrams to the Foreign Minister that when the advance to the South commenced there would be danger that diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States might be severed by the United States Government. The American Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, inquired of Nomura on 23 July the meaning of the demands upon Vichy France; and in reply to Nomura's explanation that Japan needed to secure an uninterrupted supply of raw materials and insure against Military encirclement, he stated that the agreement which had been under discussion between the Japanese and American Governments would give Japan far greater economic security than would the occupation of French Indo-China. He added the United States Government considered the occupation as notice [49,509] that Japan "was taking the last step to proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas," and that he had been instructed to say that the Secretary of State could see no basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. The next day the American State Department issued to the press a statement that by the course the Japanese Government had followed and was following in Indo-China, it was giving a clear indication of determination to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force and that there was no apparent reason which warranted the occupation of French Indo-China other than a desire for military bases to be used in the conquest of adjacent areas. The President of the United States proposed to the Japanese Government on 24 July 1941 that French Indo-China be regarded as a neutralized zone, Japan being given full opportunity of assuring for herself food supplies and other raw materials she was seeking, but the proposal was rejected. On 25 July the President issued a directive freezing all Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States. Japan's actions towards Indo-China were regarded as creating a great risk of war compelling the threatened nations to take steps to prevent their security being wholly undermined. On 26 July 1941 [49,510] Toyoda, the Japanese Foreign Minister, explained Japan's actions towards French Indo-China as being necessary to carry through the China affair. He alleged also that Japan had reports of an intended encirclement of French Indo-China which would be a menace to the area which was indispensible in prosecuting the China affair. No evidence of any such intended encirclement of French Indo-China or of any report thereof has been adduced before us. The evidence is conclusive that Japan's reason for advancing into southern French Indo-China was the desire to secure bases for an attack upon Singapore, preliminary to an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies. These bases also threatened the Philippines. When Singapore was in fact attacked, troops from Saigon and planes from bases in southern French Indo-China took part in the attack. Britain and the Netherlands issued similar freezing orders on 26 and 28 July respectively. On 3 August, after the freezing order was issued by the United States Government, Nomura inquired of the American State Department whether it might be possible for the responsible heads of the two governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of relations. After reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal negotiations between him and Nomura, the Secretary of State said that [49,511] it remained with the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views. SUPPLY PROBLEMS OSHIMA learned of the slowing down of the German advance into Russia at the end of July 1941, which information give the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters considerable concern for it was realized that Japan's supply of accumulated war materials was not sufficient to wage war against the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain at the same time. It was feared that the U.S.S.R. might assist the United States by giving the United States military bases in Soviet territory if Japan should attack the United States of America. This possibility was discussed between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in early August 1941. Towards the end of July 1941 the Emperor called the Naval Chief of Staff for consultation on the subject of Japan's policy with the United States. Nagano, the Chief of Staff, informed the Emperor that he was opposed to the Tripartite Alliance and believed that so long as it existed it would be impossible to adjust relations between Japan and the United States of America. If the [49,512] relations could not be adjusted and Japan was cut off from oil, in case of war with the United States of America, Japan's oil supply would be sufficient for only one and a half years. There would be no alternative but to take the initiative in operations. The Emperor asked Nagano if it would be possible to win a sweeping victory. Nagano replied that it was doubtful if Japan would win. The Emperor expressed anxiety to KIDO about having to wage a desperate war, but KIDO reassured the Emperor by saying that the opinion of the Chief of Staff was too simple. He said that Japan was not without means of restoring the friendship between the United States of America and Japan. He stated, however, that he would ask the Prime Minister to give careful consideration to the questions raised by the Navy Chief of Staff. KIDO and Konoye considered the questions on 2 and 7 August 1941. KIDO outlined in his diary the points advanced by the Navy in its argument against proceeding with the attack. The Navy had expected to obtain oil from Sakhalin and the Netherlands East Indies to replenish its supply in case the war should be prolonged. Now there was a possibility that the U.S.S.R. would become allied with the United States thus preventing the acquisition of oil from Sakhalin. The risk involved [49,513] in depending upon the capture of the oil installations in the Netherlands East Indies intact and upon the transportation of the oil over great stretches of submarine- infested waters which might be patrolled by aircraft based on Soviet territories was entirely too great. The Army did not agree with the Navy and maintained that the accumulated supply of oil would be sufficient to ensure victory. Konoye and KIDO agreed that the situation was serious and that it was necessary to have an agreement between the Army and Navy without loss of time. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ambassador Nomura's suggestion of 26 July 1941 following the American freezing order of the 25th, that the heads of the two Governments should meet in an effort to adjust relations was renewed on orders of his government on 7 August and was welcomed by the Government of the United States. Accordingly on 17 August, while the Japanese Army and Navy Chiefs canvassed the subject of oil to supply the Japanese Navy in a war with the United States, the President replied to Nomura's suggestion. He said that if the Japanese Government were in a position to embark upon a peaceful program along the lines suggested by the principles stated by Mr. Hull, the United States Government would be pleased to resume the [49,514] informal discussions and endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place for the heads of the two governments to exchange views. The President referred to the circumstances in which the discussions had been interrupted and said it would be helpful before proceeding with plans for a meeting if Japan would furnish a clear statement as to its present attitude and plans. The President further stated to Nomura that nothing short of complete candor would further the objective. If Japan took any further steps in pursuance of a policy of military domination by force or threat the United States of America would be compelled to take steps immediately to safeguard the rights, interests, safety and security of the United States and its nationals. The Total War Research Institute had been studying the question of negotiations with the United States and during the first half of August 1941 suggested a solution: "To the proposal of America, we shall neither give our word clearly concerning the position of Japan, but adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, repleting war preparations in the meantime." Konoye addressed a letter to the President on 27 August 1941 in which he stated that he believed that the deterioration of relations between the two countries was largely due to a lack of understanding [49,515] and that he desired to meet the President personally for a frank exchange of views. He suggested that they meet first and discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems before a formal negotiation of an agreement. At the same time a statement from the Japanese Government was also presented to the President. In this the Japanese Government said it welcomed the invitation to an exchange of views, that Japan was ready for peace and would be proud to make sacrifices to obtain peace in the Pacific. It said that Japan's action in French Indo-China was intended to hasten settlement of the China Incident, to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It said also that Japan did not intend to threaten other countries and was prepared to withdraw its troops from French Indo-China as soon as the China Incident was settled or a just peace established in East Asia and that Japan's action in French Indo-China was not preparatory to a military advance into neighboring territories. The statement continued that the Government of Japan was willing to restrict the discussions to proposals which were in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States had long been committed, as the national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government was in full accord on that point. [49,516] Japan's statements in regard to French Indo-China were false. We now know that Japan's motive for quartering troops and seizing bases in southern French Indo- China in July 1941 was the desire to secure a base and jumping off place for her intended attack on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It had nothing to do with the so-called "China Incident." Japan was proposing, as we now know, that she should retain this base for attack on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, which was also a threat to the Philippines and the sea lanes, until her demands on China were satisfied or until "a just peace" was established in East Asia, an event the occurrence of which she alone would determine, for no other criterion for its determination was suggested. This statement is founded on by the defense as amounting to Japan's agreement that the four principles stated by Mr. Hull would be given effect to. If any clear representation by Japan to that effect can be read out of the statement it is now proved that at that time the leaders of Japan had no intention of living up to such representation. The President replied to Konoye's letter and his government's statement on 3 September 1941. He said that he noted with satisfaction Konoye's expressed desire for peace in the Pacific and his government's statement [49,517] that its long cherished national policy was in accord with the principles to which the United States Government had long been committed. The President stated that he could not avoid taking cognizance, however, of indications in some quarters in Japan of support of concepts which would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between Konoye and the President along the lines proposed. He therefore suggested that it would seem highly desirable to take precautions toward ensuring success for their proposed meeting by entering immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental questions on which they sought agreement. The President requested an indication of the Japanese Government's attitude regarding those fundamental questions. Meantime, from the month of August onward the Japanese General Staff had been advocating an immediate breaking off of negotiations and the opening of hostilities. Konoye was opposed to this and held repeated conversations with the Army and Navy Ministers and others in which he sought to counter this policy. Immediately upon receipt of the President's letter on 5 September 1941, Konoye called a Cabinet meeting, TOJO opposed the proposed meeting of Konoye and the President. He testified before this Tribunal that his reason for doing so was that the President expressed [49,518] reluctance to meet with Konoye unless an agreement was first reached covering all the essential matters. The Emperor asked Konoye many questions regarding the strategy to be employed in a war with the United States and Britain. Konoye advised the Emperor to summon the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy to answer those questions and KIDO seconded that advice. [49,519] IMPERIAL CONFERENCE - 6th SEPTEMBER 1941 The Imperial Conference met on 6th September 1941 with TOJO, SUZUKI, MUTO, OKA and others present. The Conference decided that Japan should advance to the South, that an effort should be made to obtain Japan's demands through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain, but that if those demands were not fulfilled by the beginning of October a decision on the opening of hostilities would be made. The demands which Japan desired to see fulfilled were also decided at that Conference and were as follows: "Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection. Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain). (1) Matters concerning the Chinese Incident. The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident. (a) They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration. [49,520] (b) "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support. . . . (2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense. The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defense. (a) Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement. (b) They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East Indies, China and far-eastern Soviet territory. (c) They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East. (3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials. The United States and Britain will co-operate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources. (a) They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South Western Pacific with resources indispensable for her self- existence. [49,521] (b) They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic co-operation with Thailand and French Indo-China. Sect. II. The limit Japan is able to come to an agreement. If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I: (1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China. (2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East. (3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines." One cardinal vice in this decision is the proposal that Japan should be left controlling the economy of China for her own ends, as had been achieved by the agreement Japan had made with the puppet government of China, and that America and Britain should withdraw all military and economic support from the legitimate government of China which had long been the victim of Japan's aggression, which support these countries were quite entitled to give. If Japan had revealed that this was her "minimum demand" [49,522] to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States of America and Britain" it is not too much to say that these negotiations would have proceeded no further. This "minimum demand" was in vital conflict with the four principles which Mr. Hull had stated, upon the observance of which he insisted throughout the negotiations. CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR The Chief of the Army General Staff instructed his Chief of Operations immediately after this Imperial Conference to intensify his plans and preparations for war. Because of the practices governing the relationship between the War Ministry and the General Staff, War Minister TOJO, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO, and Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau OKA, must have known and assisted in the preparations being made. The training for the attack upon Pearl Harbor and the training along the China coast for the landing operations against Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo were drawing to a close. Admiral SHIMADA, Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Floot, was transferred to command the Yokosuka Naval District near Tokyo and was appointed [49,523] a member of the Naval Officer's, Council on 1st September. The final "War Games" or Naval Staff Conferences to work out details for the operation, in which a large number of high-ranking naval officers participated, were held at the Naval War College in Tokyo between 2nd and 13th September 1941. The problems to be solved were two: First, the problems of working out the details of the carrier attack upon Pearl Harbor, and Second, the problem of establishing a schedule of operations for the occupation of Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and the Solomon and Central Pacific Islands. The solution of these problems as worked out constituted the basis of Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1, which was later issued. The Foreign Minister, Toyoda, whose Consul-General at Hawaii was engaged in espionage, arranged a code on 24th September for transmitting secret reports on the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters. Internal preparations for the attack continued at a rapid pace. TOJO made a survey of the preparations and reported on that survey to KIDO on 11th September. The Cabinet adopted a "Workers Mobilization Plan" which had been devised jointly [49,524] by SUZUKI's Planning Board and the Welfare Ministry for increasing production of munitions. The Inspector General of Military Education issued training manuals on landing operations and identification of Allied planes. TOJO's War Ministry prepared operational maps for Singapore and Hawaii. The Cabinet Printing Bureau continued printing occupation currency in pesos, dollars and guilders for use in the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. [49,525] TALKS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONTINUED Konoye, on 6th September, the day of the Imperial Conference just referred to, and notwithstanding the contrary nature of the decisions of that conference, told the American Ambassador that he fully subscribed to the four principles which Mr. Hull and the President of the United States had enunciated. The next day in Washington, Ambassador Nomura presented a new Japanese draft proposal to the United States Government which was apparently intended as a basis for the commencement of the preliminary negotiations to which the President had referred in his letter to Konoye on 3rd September. The essence of that draft proposal was that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" make further military moves to the South and would interpret her obligations under the Tripartite Pact "by the concepts of protection and self- defence" without consideration of the views of the other Axis Governments. The United States was to cease giving aid to China, assist Japan in negotiating peace with China on Japanese terms, agree to cooperate with Japan in the acquisition and development of natural resources in the Southern areas, and suspend military measures in the Far East and in the South Western Pacific Area. Japan had refused to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. This draft proposal [49,526] reaffirmed Japan's intention to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, for Japan refused to give or evaded giving her assurance that she would not attack the United States under the terms of that Paot. The subsequent negotiations revealed the peace terms for China as founded on the Konoye principles which would have given Japan economic domination of China enforced by Japanese troops stationed in China, and as providing for the recognition by China of Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The acceptance of this proposal by the United States would have secured the Japanese Government its objective as decided on 3rd October 1940. That this was the intention of the Japanese Government is revealed by Toyoda, who instructed Nomura on 13th September 1941 that his Government was not prepared, as he expressed it "to swallow" the four American principles. The United States Government considered that the draft proposal of 3rd September was unsatisfactory and inconsistent with Konoye's letter and his Government's statement to the President of 28th August 1941. On 25th September 1941 the Japanese Government presented to the American Ambassador in Tokyo a completely new draft proposal and urged that an early reply be made. The new draft did not indicate any modification of the Japanese attitude on fundamental points. [49,527] HASHIMOTO declared in an article published in the Taiyo Dai Nippon on 25th September that there was no hope of adjusting relations with the United States and Great Britain and that proper action for the Japanese Government was clearly indicated in the Tripartite Pact, meaning thereby direct action in conjunction with Germany and Italy. The President of the Cabinet Information Bureau made a speech in commemoration of the first anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Pact in which he said that the real meaning of the Pact was clear from the Imperial Rescript issued on the day of its conclusion. He declared that by that Pact the leading position of Japan in the establishment of the New Order in Greater East Asia was definitely recognized and that whatever changes might occur in the international situation and whatever difficulties Japan might encounter there would be no change whatever in the fact that the Pact constituted the keynote of Japan's diplomacy. The beginning of October, the time set by the Imperial Conference of 6th September for the decision on the opening of hostilities, was rapidly approaching, but the Army and Navy were still contending as to whether the Navy would be able to carry out its mission with the existing supply of oil. TOJO was impatient of the diplomatic discussions with America and insisted that [49,528] the attack should not be delayed. The Army leaders declared that they would withhold the attack until 15th October, but would wait no longer. Konoye and KIDO discussed the question of disagreement between the Army and Navy on the subject of oil reserves. Konoye declared that he had no confidence so long as this disagreement existed and there was no choice for him but to consider his resignation if the Army insisted on starting the war on 15th October. KIDO implored him to be prudent, and called in SUZUKI for consultation. Mr. Hull delivered to Nomura a complete review of the negotiations on 2nd October. The review concluded with a statement that the United States Government had endeavoured to make clear that it envisaged a comprehensive programme calling for the uniform application to the entire Pacific Area of the principles which Mr. Hull and the President had enunciated, but that the Japanese Government had indicated its intention to circumscribe the application of those principles by qualifications and exceptions. Mr. Hull then asked: "If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of Government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind?" [49,529] The impression was correct. As we have previously noted, Toyoda, Japan's Foreign Minister, told Nomura on the 13th September that Japan could not accept the four principles. Nomura reported to Toyoda on 8th October 1941 that the Americans insisted upon the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries should be adjusted, that they had always felt that if conversations between Konoye and the President were to occur it would be necessary to have a definite understanding that those principles would be applied to the problems in the Pacific, and that they believed that so long as there was disagreement on that matter it would be futile to discuss details. KIDO and Konoye agreed after receiving this message that the prospects of an agreement were very discouraging; and KIDO suggested that it might be necessary to reconsider the decision of 6th September and postpone the attack until Japan should be better prepared. KIDO suggested that the termination of the China Incident was the first consideration, meaning thereby the military defeat of China. DECISION FOR WAR - 12 OCTOBER 1941 War Minister TOJO, the Army Chief of Staff and other Army leaders revealed in their discussion of the subject with the German Ambassador in the first days of October that they had signed the Tripartite Pact in order [49,530] to carry out the advance to the South and establish Japan in South East Asia, and that in order to accomplish their purpose by defeating Britain it was necessary to keep America at bay and eliminate the U.S.S.R. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet discussed the American negotiations with KIDO on 7th October 1941. He reported that the Army, under the leadership of TOJO, was of the opinion that there was no room left for the continuation of the parley with America, but that the Navy held the opposite view. He suggested that Konoye should talk to TOJO in an effort to promote a better understanding with the Navy and then call TOJO and the Navy Minister to a meeting with Konoye and the Foreign Minister to secure cooperation between the Army and Navy. Konoye talked with TOJO, but TOJO insisted that there was no hope for diplomatic success in the American negotiations and that the Cabinet should make up its mind for war. Konoye requested War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister Oikawa, Foreign Minister Toyoda and President of the Planning Board SUZUKI to meet at his residence on 12th October 1941 for a final conference on the question of war or peace. Before the conference, the Navy Minister sent OKA to Konoye with the message that the Navy was not ready for war with the United States but was prevented from saying so by its prior consent to go [49,531] to war given at the Imperial Conference of 6th September. Accordingly he intended at the approaching conference to leave the matter to Konoye and that he hoped Konoye would decide to continue the negotiations. Konoye opened the meeting on 12th October 1941 by stating that at last the Ministers must decide whether it would be war or peace and suggested that they re-examine the possibility of success by diplomatic negotiations. TOJO retorted that there was no hope of success by continuing the negotiations. The Navy Minister suggested that the decision of that question should be left to the Prime Minister. TOJO declared that, since all of the Ministers were responsible for the decision, it should not be left to the Prime Minister alone. TOJO agreed to reconsider his determination to break off the negotiations provided the Foreign Minister would assure him of inevitable success by continuing them. The Foreign Minister pointed out the obstacles to an agreement between Japan and the United States and stated that the major obstacle was the presence of Japanese troops in China. TOJO emphatically declared that Japan could not yield on that point, and that, due to the sacrifices she had made in the China War, the Government must insist upon complete realization of the Konoye principles. It was finally decided (1) that Japan should not abandon the [49,532] plan adopted in September and October 1940, (2) that an effort should be made to determine whether the negotiations with the United States would be successful within the time to be set by the Imperial Headquarters, and (3) that preparations for the attack should not be discontinued unless that question should be answered in the affirmative. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet reported the results of the Conference to KIDO: and the next day KIDO and SUZUKI, in discussing the Conference, came to the conclusion that Konoye should made further efforts to promote an understanding between TOJO and the Navy Minister. That night Konoye summoned Toyoda to give a complete report upon the Japanese-American negotiation. Toyoda gave it as his opinion that Japan would inevitably be forced to withdraw her troops from China in order to reach an agreement with the United States. The next morning, 14th October 1941, prior to the Cabinet meeting Konoye summoned TOJO, informed him that according to his investigation there was no hope of obtaining Japan's objectives through negotiating with the United States if Japan insisted on retaining troops in China, but there was some hope of success if Japan "yielded on the pretence and took the reality." He tried to persuade TOJO to agree to an abandonment of the plans for the advance to the South and to concentration of Japan's [49,533] efforts on settlement of the China War. He pointed out the apparent weakness of Japan and her Allies and warned that if Japan should attack the United States it would be a real world war. TOJO answered that the sacrifices of Japan in the China War were such that he could not agree to Japanese troops being withdrawn from China even if it meant his resignation from the Cabinet. Konoye then requested that he repeat his statement at the Cabinet meeting. TOJO maintained his position before the Cabinet meeting of 14th October, and the meeting adjourned without reaching a decision. MUTO attempted through OKA to persuade the Navy Minister to declare whether or not the Navy was prepared to proceed with the war, but MUTO was unsuccessful. Late on the night of 14th October 1941 TOJO despatched SUZUKI to Konoye with a message to the effect that since the Navy Minister would make no declaration in the matter nothing could be done, and that since the Cabinet was unable to carry out the decision of the Imperial Conference of 6th September there was nothing left for them to do but resign en bloc. He asked Konoye to inform KIDO. Konoye in turn instructed SUZUKI to inform KIDO, which he did the next morning. Later in the day, Konoye called on KIDO and told him that he would no longer continue as Prime Minister because of the disagreement [49,534] with TOJO. TOJO had said that he did not wish to discuss matters with Konoye as he was not sure he would be able to control his anger. Konoye collected the letters of resignation of his Ministers on the morning of the 16th October 1941 and adding his own delivered them to the Emperor over the objection of KIDO late in the afternoon of that day. Konoye's letter of resignation gives a vivid explanation of the situation. He explained that, when he organized the Third Konoye Cabinet to prosecute the expansion to the South, it was his firm conviction that his Cabinet's objective would be obtained through negotiations with the United States Government, and that although his expectations had not been realized to date he still believed that "If we take the attitude of yielding to her in appearance but keeping for us the substance and casting away the name," those objectives might be obtained through the negotiations. Konoye said that TOJO had been demanding that war be commenced with the United States on 15th October in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of 6th September and had given as his reason that the situation had come to a point when no other means could be found to obtain the Japanese demands. Konoye declared that it was impossible for him to accept the responsibility for [49,535] plunging the Nation again into a titanic war the outcome of which could not be forecast. TOJO BECOMES PRIME MINISTER - 18 OCTOBER 1941 KIDO made a last minute appeal to TOJO for harmony among the Cabinet members by explaining that the country had a right to expect unity of purpose and cooperation between the Army and Navy before plunging into a war with the United States. He suggested that the decision of the 6th September to begin the war in the first part of October might have been wrong and that it should be reviewed in an effort to obtain complete agreement. TOJO agreed with KIDO; but before KIDO could take further action, Konoye had submitted the resignation of his Cabinet. KIDO immediately saw the Emperor and discussed a successor to Konoye. KIDO recommended either TOJO or the Navy Minister should be appointed. The next morning the Senior Statesmen assembled with Wakatsuki, Okada, Hayashi, HIROTA, Abe and Yonai, among others, present. KIDO opposed a suggestion of either Prince Higashikuni or Ugaki as a successor to Konoye and suggested TOJO. He said that the most important matters were the revision of the decision of 6th September and the settlement of differences between the Army and Navy. HIROTA was among those who gave positive approval of KIDO's a suggestion [49,536] that TOJO be Prime Minister, none opposed it. Upon submitting the recommendation, KIDO advised the Emperor to issue special instructions to both TOJO and the Navy Minister. These special instructions were discussed by KIDO with TOJO and the Navy Minister in the anteroom after their audience with the Emperor. KIDO told them that he presumed that the Imperial message had just been given them regarding cooperation. He understood it to be the Emperor's wishes that in deciding national policy it was necessary to investigate domestic and foreign affairs more broadly and deeply and to carry out an earnest study without considering themselves bound by the decision of 6th September. He then delivered to each of them written instructions calling for cooperation between the Army and Navy and specially calling upon the Navy Minister to further that cooperation more closely. TOJO was promoted to General on 18th October 1941 and given permission to remain on active duty while serving as Prime Minister in order that he might also serve as War Minister. He held both of these positions during the entire term of his Cabinet. He also served as Minister of Munitions and for short periods or time as Minister of Education, Home Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Commerce and Industry. SHIMADA served as Navy Minister for the entire term of the TOJO [49,537] Cabinet. In February 1944 TOJO took over the duties of Chief of the Army General Staff in addition to his many other duties, and SHIMADA took over the position of Chief of the Navy General Staff at the same time in addition to his position as Navy Minister. KIMURA remained as Vice-Minister of War until 11th March 1943, when he became War Councillor. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in Burma on 30th August 1944. MUTO remained as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau until 20th April 1942, when he was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division in northern Sumatra. SATO remained in the Military Affairs Bureau and succeeded MUTO as Chief of that Bureau. OKA remained as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry during the entire term of the TOJO Cabinet. TOGO served as Foreign Minister until 1st September 1942. KAYA served as Minister of Finance until 19th February 1944. SUZUKI served as President of the Planning Board and as Minister without Portfolio until the TOJO Cabinet resigned. HOSHINO was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet during its entire term. OSHIMA continued as Ambassador to Germany. SHIGEMITSU remained as Ambassador to Great Britain until his appointment as Ambassador to the Puppet Central Government of China on 16th December 1941 where he served until his appointment as Foreign Minister in the TOJO [49,538] Cabinet on 20th April 1943. DOMIHARA remained as Chief of Air Inspectorate General and concurrently a Supreme War Councillor. Later, in May 1943 he was given command of Japan's Eastern Army until March 1944 when he was appointed Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore. HATA, UMEZU, and ITAGAKI were in command of Japanese forces in China and Korea. PREPARATIONS FOR WAR CARRIED ON UNDER TOJO TOJO carried on the plan decided in September and October 1940. Under interrogation after the surrender he was asked: "You explained that the policy after the 6th September (1941) Imperial Conference was on the one hand to negotiate for peace and on the other to prepare for war; did you continue that policy?" TOJO answered, "Yes, I undertook the work as Premier." The Japanese overseas intelligence service was improved and extended after the TOJO Cabinet was organized, particularly in the Netherlands East Indies, in preparation for the capture of the oil installations in those islands. The Kokusaku- Kenkyu-Kai, or National Policy Investigation Association, which had been in existence since 1936, began to make plans and appointed a "Committee for Administrative Measures" to devise plans for administration of the Southern Areas which the Japanese Government expected to occupy. Its first report was forwarded [49,539] to TOJO as Prime Minister in October 1941. The Army and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs adopted the plan. Additional invasion maps were prepared. The Army and Navy began issuing plans and regulations for joint operations, and the organization of the Southern Army, which was later to have its headquarters at Singapore, was completed and its commander selected. Its initial headquarters was established at Saigon. The Corps in training near Canton for the attack upon Hong Kong was preparing intensively for the attack and, according to captured diaries of its members, expected to complete its training early in December. SHIMADA and OKA were concerned with the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Discussions took place at the Naval War College regarding the plan. The Commander of the Combined Fleets, Yamamoto, proposed to attack the United States Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Others advocated a waiting strategy, which called for an attack upon the American Fleet if and when it attempted to advance among the Japanese fortified islands of the Pacific. Yamamoto threatened to resign and secured the adoption of his plan. The final plans were completed by 1st November 1941. These plans provided for attacks against Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and various other American, British as well as Dutch possessions. [49,540] TOJO immediately upon the formation of his Cabinet began to act upon KIDO's advice as approved by the Emperor "to investigate the domestic and foreign affairs more broadly and deeply." A list of subjects to be so investigated was completed in the latter half of October. The list was entitled "Major Items to be Re-Examined Concerning Essentials for the Prosecution of National Policies." The list contained such subjects as: "What is the future outlook of the European War Situation?" "What is the outlook from the point of view of strategy in regard to a war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the initial stage and when protracted over several years?" "Assuming that we initiate war in the Southern Regions this Fall, what will be forthcoming as relative phenomena in the North?" "What degree of cooperation can we induce Germany and Italy to give us in connection with the opening of the war against the United States, Great Britain, and Holland?" "Is it possible for us to restrict our adversaries of the war to only the Netherlands, or Great Britain and the Netherlands?" "Will it be possible to attain within the shortest possible time our minimum demand which was decided at the Imperial Conference of 6th September by continuing negotiations with the United States?" The foregoing subjects were assigned to various [49,541] Ministries and Bureaux for study and the Government conferred upon them with the Imperial General Headquarters in a series of Liaison Conferences. These Liaison Conferences were held almost daily as TOGO explained to Nomura in Washington, "in order to lucubrate upon a fundamental national policy." The conferences were regularly attended by TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA. HOSHINO, formerly Director of the General Affairs Board of the puppet state of Nanchukuo in which position he had worked with TOJO, and formerly President of the Planning Board in Japan, had been selected as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet by TOJO because of his long experience in economic planning and had been charged by TOJO to devote his main efforts to such activities in cooperation with SUZUKI, whom TOJO had selected to head the Cabinet Planning Board. HOSHINO also acted as Recorder for the conferences. SUZUKI acted as liaison between the conferences and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO. MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and OKA as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau acted as liaison between their Ministries and the Army and Navy General Staffs respectively. [49,542] NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RENEWED TOJO had selected TOGO as his Foreign Minister primarily to conduct the negotiations with the United States. Ambassador Nomura was uncomfortable and desired to be relieved. He said in his communication to TOGO on 23rd October, "I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former Cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere I was, yet knew how little influence I have in Tokyo. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections at the Foreign Ministry now that I am already a dead horse. For me, it is painful to continue in a deceptive existence, deceiving myself and others." TOGO advised Nomura on 2nd November, "We have carefully considered and discussed a fundamental policy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America; but we expect to reach a final decision at the Imperial Conference on the morning of 5th November and will let you know the result immediately. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. When we resume negotiations, every aspect of the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is to be strictly kept for your information." TOGO cabled Nomura again on 4th November. He [49,543] said that conference had followed conference and at last they were able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet and the Military. He added, however, that this would be the last effort at negotiation, that they had decided to gamble the fate of their land on the throw of this die, and that if a quick accord was not reached the talks would be ruptured and the relations of the two countries would be on the brink of chaos. He declared that Japan was making her last possible bargain. He instructed Nomura to follow his instructions to the letter in conducting the negotiations as there would be no room for personal interpretation. He then impressed upon Nomura the importance of his mission by stating that he was in a key position and that the Cabinet was placing great hopes on his ability to "do something good for our Nation's destiny." At that point he urged Nomura to think deeply and compose himself and make up his mind to continue at his post. TOGO, in his series of cables to Nomura on 4th November, transmitted the counter- proposal which had been decided upon. He said that the proposal was yet to be sanctioned at the Imperial Conference scheduled for the next morning, but that as soon as that [49,544] sanction was obtained he would inform Nomura and that he desired the proposal presented immediately upon receipt of that information. The proposal was designated "Proposal A", and was in the form of an amendment of the Japanese Government's proposals of 25th September, and was described in the cable from TOGO to Nomura as an "ultimatum". The proposal provided for a gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops. The first withdrawal was to be from French Indo-China and was to be made if and when a peace treaty should be signed with the National Government of China. Upon the signing of the peace treaty troops would be withdrawn from China, except in designated areas to be specified in the treaty, whence they would be evacuated after a situable period. On the period of the stationing of troops in these areas, TOGO told Nomura "Should the American authorities question you in regard to 'the suitable period' answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years." Regarding the Tripartite Pact, the proposal renewed the Japanese Government's determination not to give an assurance that Japan would not attack the United States as provided by the Pact, but the Japanese Government would make its own interpretation independently of the other Axis Powers, of its obligation under the Pact. On the question of non-discrimination [49,545] in trade, Japan would agree to apply the principle provided it would be applied universally throughout the world. TOGO made it clear that while terms might be made with Armerica upon other matters Japan would not yield on their demand to station troops in China. Their sacrifices in China over four years and the internal situation in Japan made it impossible to yield upon this point. In other words Japan required America to condone the invasion of China and to leave that country in servitude to Japan. A "Proposal B" was also transmitted to Nomura to be presented if no agreement could be reached on "Proposal A." This will be dealt with later. TOGO informed Nomura in his telegram on 4th November that in view of the gravity of the negotiations and in view of Nomura's request to be relieved he was sending Ambassador Kurusu as a Special Envoy to assist him in conducting the negotiations, but that he was carrying no new instructions. A few days later, TOGO confided to the German Ambassador that Kurusu had been instructed on the firm attitude of the Japanese Government and that Kurusu had been given a definite time limit which he could not cross. Nomura was instructed to make arrangements for Kurusu to see the President of the United States immediately upon his [49,546] arrival. The Cabinet imposed additional censorship regulations on news dispatches and speeches which might disclose Japanese war preparations and strategic activities during the conduct of the negotiations. An Imperial Conference was held on 5th November 1941 as TOGO had advised Nomura, TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO, OKA and HOSHINO were present. The policy to be pursued against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands was decided upon. It was decided to re-open the Japanese- American negotiations and to offer the United States Government two propositions in the alternative which were designated as "A" and "B". These were the propositions transmitted to Nomura the day before. It was further decided that if neither of these were accepted by the United States on or before 25th November, the Japanese Government would notify the German and Italian Governments of its intention to begin the war against the United States and Great Britain and call upon them to participate and to agree not to make a separate peace. The decision contemplated using the American Government for securing an agreement with Great Britain if the American Government agreed to either of the proposals. Immediately after the conference on 5th November, [49,547] TOGO cabled Nomura that the proposals had been sanctioned at the conference and that he was to begin the talks along the lines given in the instructions of the day before. While arrangements for signing any agreement must be completed by the 25th November, Nomura was instructed to avoid giving the impression that a time limit for agreement had been fixed by the Japanese or that the proposal was of the nature of an ultimatum. It was further decided at the Imperial Conference that Thailand should be approached to permit passage of Japanese troops through her territory. Japan would promise to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. The bait was to be held out to Thailand that Japan would consider giving her part of Burma or Malaya. As to the Netherlands East Indies, to conceal Japan's intentions negotiations would be opened on the subject of procuring essential materials for Japan. The Philippines would be made independent after occupation as would also a portion of the Netherlands East Indies, while the rest would be retained by Japan. TOJO called upon KIDO immediately after the conference and informed him of the decisions just mentioned, of the formation of the Southern Army and of the decision to send Kurusu to Washington to assist [49,548] Nomura. On 5th November 1941 TOGO sent a further cable to Nomura making 25th November positively the final date for signing terms with America. NAVY ORDER FOR ATTACK The Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleets, Yamamoto, visited the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, in Tokyo on 3rd November and gave his approval to the final draft of the Combined Fleet Operations Order which had been under preparation for months. The order provided for the execution of the advance to the South by attacking Singapore and completing an enveloping movement against the Netherlands East Indies in the manner originally planned on 4th October 1940. It also provided for the attack upon the Philippines which OSHIMA had mentioned to Ribbentrop months before as being under preparation. Those attacks were to be covered by an attack upon Pearl Harbor to destroy the United States Pacific Fleet. The British and Americans were to be driven from China by attacks upon Hong Kong and Shanghai and other incidental operations were included. The order read: "The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) [49,549] for commencement of operations (sic) and announcing 'First Preparation for War.'" The order then continued with instructions that upon the announcement of Y-Day all fleets and forces, without further special orders, would organize and complete battle preparations and when directed by their commanding officers the various fleets and forces would proceed to their rendezvous and wait in readiness for the attack. The order provided further: "The time for outbreak of war (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters Order. This order will be given several days in advance. After 0000 hours, X-Day, a state of war will exist, Each force will commence operations according to plan." After leaving the Imperial Conference on 5th November, the Chief of the Naval General Staff ordered Yamamoto to issue the order and it was issued on that day. PROPOSAL "A" PRESENTED 7 NOVEMBER 1941 Ambassador Nomura presented his "Proposal A" to Mr. Hull on 7th November. On 10th November he read a memorandum explaining that proposal to the President of the United States, but the memorandum was vague and uncertain. On the day Nomura was reading that memorandum, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, who was to command the carrier task force in its attack upon Pearl Harbor, issued his order to his task force to rendezvous at Tankan Wan (Hitokappu [49,550] Bay, Etorofu Island, Kuriles). SHIMADA said that the order directed all ships of the task force to complete battle preparations by 20th November and proceed to the rendezvous under strict security regulations. Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 3 of 10th November fixed 8th December as "X-Day." That was the day when after 0000 hours a state of war would exist, On 12th November Mr. Hull told Nomura that the Japanese proposal was being studied and that he hoped to reply to it on the 15th. The United States Government was maintaining close contact with the British, Netherlands and Chinese Governments during the conduct of the negotiations and there was an understanding that if the Japanese Government should agree to the four basic principles which Mr. Hull and the President had enunciated, those Governments would be consulted before any agreement would be reached upon specific problems in the Far East and the Pacific Area. Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared on 10th November in the course of a speech delivered in London: "We do not know whether the efforts of the United States to preserve peace in the Pacific will be successful. But, if they fail, I toke this occasion to say -- and it is my duty to say -- that should the United States be involved in a war with Japan, a British [49,551] declaration will follow within an hour." The British Ambassador called upon TOGO the next day to explain his Government's position. During the course of the conversation, TOGO informed the Ambassador that the negotiations had entered their final phase, that Japan had made her final proposal, and that if the United States rejected it, there would be no reason to continue negotiations further. The Liaison Conferences continued almost daily for the decision of questions relating to the attack. The conference of 11th November decided upon the policy to overthrow quickly the American, British and Dutch bases in the Far East, to establish Japanese self-sufficiency, and at the same time to hasten the surrender of the Chungking Regime. The plan was to concentrate on Great Britain with the cooperation of the Axis Powers so as to defeat that country first and then deprive America of her will to continue the war. Japanese troops were moving into position. The air units were assembling at Saigon for their attack upon Singapore. The ships which were to make up the carrier task force for the attack upon Pearl Harbor were sailing from Japanese ports bound for their rendezvous at Tankan Wan. The United States Government impliedly rejected the "ultimatum" or "Proposal A" presented by Nomura on [49,552] 7th November when Mr. Hull delivered a memorandum to Nomura on 15th November replying to that proposal. Mr. Hull pointed out that the proposals regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops were indefinite and uncertain as they did not specify a time limit for such withdrawal nor the areas to be evacuated. He said also that the United States could not undertake that other Powers would give universal application to the principle of non-discrimination in trade. No reply was ever received to this memorandum. Nomura had advised TOGO the day before that the United States Government was determined to do everything possible short of war to stop further Japanese military moves either southward or northward and that rather than yield on that point they would not hesitate to fight, as they had no intention of committing another mistake like that of Munich. After receiving the memorandum from Mr. Hull, TOGO began final preparations for the attack. He cabled the Japanese Consul-General in Honolulu to take extra care to preserve secrecy, but to make his reports on ships in harbor at least twice a week as the situation was most critical. Nomura had asked for an extension of time, but TOGO replied to him on the 16th as follows: "I set the deadline for the solution of those negotiations [49,553] and there will be no change." He instructed Nomura to press for a solution on the basis of the proposals "A" and "B" and to do his best to bring about an immediate solution. TOGO then turned his attention to negotiation of an agreement with the German Government not to conclude A separate peace in case Japan became involved in war with the United States regardless of the cause of the war. The agreement was reached on 21st November. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,554] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I proceed with the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment: PROPOSAL "B" 20th NOVEMBER 1941 Special Envoy Kurusu arrived in Washington on 15th November 1941, but he did not present any new proposals until he and Nomura presented to Mr. Hull the alternative "Proposal B" on 20th November. This was the alternative which TOGO had transmitted to Nomura on 4th November and which had been approved by the Imperial Conference on 5th November. TOGO had instructed Nomura not to present "Proposal B" until it became apparent that an agreement could not be reached on "Proposal A". This "Proposal B" was a completely new draft proposal and was not intended as an amendment of prior proposals. It made no mention of the Tripartite Pact, the question of removal of troops from China, or the principle of non- discrimination in trade. Japan offered to withdraw her troops from southern French Indo-China upon acceptance of the proposals and to withdraw them from northern French Indo-China upon negotiation of a peace treaty with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, or upon the conclusion of an equitable peace in the Pacific. In return for these so-called concess- [49,555] ions, the United States was asked to agree not to interfere with the negotiation of the peace treaty with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and to agree to furnish Japan with oil. The proposal also provided for a mutual agreement to cooperate in the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources in the Netherlands East Indies and to cooperate in the restoration of commercial relations to the situation existing before issuance of the freezing orders. The American Government arrived at the conclusion that the Proposal B was not sincere in view of information contained in Japanese messages which the American intelligence service had intercepted and decoded, and in view of the fact that troops withdrawn from southern French Indo-China were to be maintained in northern French Indo-China and on Hainan Island, whence they could be brought back in a day or two. Japan proposed to maintain the position she had seized vis-a-vis southern French Indo-China, a position which threatened the countries to the south and threatened the trade routes. The American Government considered that acceptance of this proposal would amount to condonation of Japan's past aggression and approval of unlimited conquest by Japan in the future as well as abandonment of the principles of the United [49,556] States of America and the betrayal of China. Mr. Hull called a conference of the Ambassadors and Ministers from Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands on the morning of 22nd November and asked for their opinions on the Japanese proposals. This conference agreed that if Japan sincerely desired peace and firmly intended to adhere to a peaceful policy they would welcome it and would be glad to cooperate in resuming normal trade relations with Japan, but that the proposals and statements of Japan's Ambassadors in Washington seemed to be opposed to the statements of the Japanese leaders and Press in Tokyo. The British and Dutch representatives agreed to consult their Governments and to report their opinions to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hull met Nomura and Kurusu on the afternoon of the 22nd November 1941. He informed them of the meeting held that morning and of his expectation of a decision by the conference on the following Monday, 26th November. Nomura and Kurusu pressed for an expression of the American attitude independently of the British and Dutch opinions. Mr. Hull replied that all of the Powers concerned were anxious that the pressing problems in the South Pacific be resolved, but from that viewpoint the latest proposal was not sufficient. On 22nd November TOGO cabled Nomura that the 29th November was the latest [49,557] date for the conclusion of an agreement as "after that things are automatically going to happen." Nomura and Kurusu met Mr. Hull again on 26th November. Mr. Hull, after pointing out that the "Proposal B" violated the four fundamental principles which he had enunciated early in the negotiations and to which the United States of America was committed, informed the Ambassadors that the American Government was of the opinion that the adoption of the proposals would not contribute to ultimate peace in the Pacific. Mr. Hull suggested that further efforts be made to reach an agreement on the practical application of these four fundamental principles. With that object in view, be offered a new draft proposal which in its essence provided for enforcement of the four fundamental principles in the Far East, and which contemplated a multilateral agreement among the United States of America, Great Britain, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Thailand and the U.S.S.R. for withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and for maintaining the territorial integrity of that country. The proposed agreement provided that Japan and the United States of America, with a view to ensuring a lasting peace in the Pacific, would declare (1) that they had no designs on the territory of other nations; [49,558] (2) that they would not use military force aggressively; (3) that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of other states; and (4) that they would settle international disputes by peaceful processes. These were the four general principles which Mr. Hull had stated as early as 16 April 1941, and which the United States of America had all along insisted must be agreed upon in principle and applied in practice. They were principles to which Japan had, prior to 1930, repeatedly stated her adherence but which she had since that date often infringed in practice. In the domain of international commerce it was proposed (1) that there should be no discrimination as between nationals of different states; (2) that excessive restrictions on the flow of international trade should be abolished; (3) that there should be access without discrimination by the nationals of all states to raw materials; and (4) that trade agreements between states should ensure the protection of the interests of the populations of countries which must import goods for consumption. These were principles to which Japan in her dependence on international trade and as a large importer of goods for consumption could hardly object, and, indeed, there had already been agreement on the substance of them [49,559] in the course of the prior negotiations. But the practical application of all the above principles was a different matter. Japan had waged a war of aggression against China for years, in the course of which she had possessed herself of Manchuria, had occupied a large part of the rest of China, and had controlled and diverted much of Chinese economy to her own uses. She had now obtained the essential bases in French Indo-China for, had made all the preparations for, and was poised to launch a now series of predatory attacks upon her neighbors to the South. She hoped that these would secure for her the booty of her past aggressions and the further territories and materials she required to make her dominant in East Asia and the Western and Southern Pacific. The practical application of the above principles would involve the surrender of the fruits of her past aggression and the abandonment of her schemes for further aggression towards the South. From the beginning of the negotiations the United States of America had steadfastly insisted on an acknowledgement of the principles she had stated, and Hull had repeatedly called attention to the necessity of working out the translation of these principles into practice. In the early stages of the negotiations Japan had evaded giving in unequivocal declaration of agreement [49,560] with the principles. About the month of August 1941 Konoye succeeded after great difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Military to his informing the United States of America that Japan accepted the four principles. As we have seen, this was a mere empty gesture. There was no intention to apply the principles. The leaders of Japan had never been prepared to give practical application to the principles, to surrender the booty of the past and to abandon the booty in prospect. They had carried on the negotiations in that knowledge, although they had all along been warned by the United States of America that the practical application of the principles was an essential to any agreement. Some of them apparently hoped by a mixture of military threat and diplomatic maneuver to persuade the United States of America to relax the application of her principles so far at least as to allow Japan to retain the dominant position she had seized in Manchuria and the rest of China. They were not certain that Japan would emerge victorious from a war with the United States of America and the Western Powers, and, if they could persuade these powers to acquiesce in the position Japan had secured in Manchuria and the rest of China they were prepared to abandon, for a while, the projected advance to the South. Others of them did not believe that the Powers could be [49,561] so beguiled and only acquiesced in the protraction of the negotiations until these who were more hopeful should be persuaded that the beguilement was impossible - which would make for national unity - and until Japan's preparations for war should be completed. In his note of 26th November, Hull detailed certain measures which were essential if the principles were to be acknowledged and put into practice. These were (1) that there should be a non-aggression pact among all the nations with interests in the Far East; (2) that all these nations should reject preferential treatment in their economic relations with French Indo-China; (3) that Japan should withdraw her armed forces from China and French Indo-China; and (4) that Japan should withdraw all support from her puppet government in China. This suggested practical application of the principles brought the leaders of Japan sharply face to face with reality. They had never been prepared to apply the principles in practice and were not prepared to do so now. Their preparations for war were now complete. The fleet which was to strike at Pearl Harbor sailed this day in the early morning. They unanimously resolved to go to war and so to manipulate the diplomatic exchange that their military forces would be able to [49,562] attack the armed forces of the United States of America and Britain at the chosen points before warning, through the breaking off of the negotiations, could reach them. Nomura and Kurusu cabled TOGO that their failure and humiliation were complete. On 27th November the Japanese Foreign Office instructed Kurusu not to break off negotiations. TOGO telegraphed Nomura and Kurusu on 28th November. He said, "In spite of the efforts you two Ambassadors have made, it is surprising and regrettable that such a proposal as the recent one (Mr. Hull's proposal of 26th November) had been made to Japan by the United States. It is impossible for us to negotiate on the basis of their proposal. With the submission of the Imperial Government's opinion of the American proposal (which will be telegraphed in two or three days) the situation will be such that there will be nothing left but to practically drop the negotiation. But, we wish you to refrain from giving the impression to the United States that the negotiation is broken off. Tell them that you are waiting for instructions from your Government." On the 29th November 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office instructed Kurusu and Nomura to make certain representations to the United States State Department but to be careful not to say anything which could be construed as a rupture of the negotiations. The Foreign [49,563] Office repeated this warning to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington on the 30th November. KIDO had discussed the situation with the Emperor on 19th November. He advised the Emperor that if the war should be commenced merely because the time limit for the negotiations had expired, it might subject the Emperor to undue criticism and that therefore the Premier should be ordered to convene another Imperial Conference in which the former Prime Ministers would be allowed to participate before giving his sanction to the commencement of the war. At a later conference between KIDO and the Emperor on 26th November, they decided that, under the circumstances, another Imperial Conference upon the war should be held. Accordingly, on the morning of 29th November, the Jushin, or Council of Senior Statesmen, was convened in preparation for their meeting with the Emperor later in the day. During the morning session TOJO, SUZUKI, SHIMADA, TOGO and KIMURA were present. TOJO explained the inevitability of war with the United States. After an interval, the Jushin and TOJO met with the Emperor, who heard each man's opinion in turn. TOJO gave the Government's point of view. The discussion proceeded upon the theory that war was inevitable, as TOJO had said, and HIRANURA as well as the other members of the Jushin, with the exception of HIROTA and Konoye, [49,564] contented themselves with giving advice based on that assuption. LIAISON CONFERENCE - 30 NOVEMBER 1941 The Liaison Conference which met on 30 November was the conference at which the final details for the attack upon the Allied Powers was agreed upon. TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO, OKA, and HOSHINO were present. The planned attack upon Pearl Harbor was freely discussed. The form and substance of the note to the Government of the United States, rejecting Mr. Hull's draft proposal of the 26th and implying a rupture in the negotiations at Washington, was agreed upon. It was agreed that a declaration of war would not be necessary. The time of delivery of the note was discussed. TOJO said that there were various theories advanced as to the time that should elapse between the delivery of the note implying a rupture in the negotiations and the actual attack upon Pearl Harbor. He said that some thought an hour and a half should be the time allowed and that other periods of time suggested were one hour, thirty minutes, etc. All agreed that the time of delivery of the note should not be permitted to destroy the element of surprise in the attack. MUTO said it was finally decided to allow the Navy General Staff to decide upon the time to be allowed between the delivery of the [49,565] note and the beginning of the attack; that the Navy General Staff was to estimate when their operations would take place and then notify the Liaison Conference of the time at which the United States could be notified. IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1 DECEMBER 1941 The Imperial Conference called to sanction the decisions made at the Liaison Conference on 30 November met on 1 December. TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA were present, among others. TOJO presided at the conference; he explained the purpose of the conference and thereafter the Ministers and the Chiefs-of-Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of their responsibility. The question was war or peace with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The decision was in favor of war. The record of that decision reads: "Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy, adopted 5 November, have finally failed. Japan will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands." KIDO recorded in his diary: "At 2 p.m. the Imperial Conference was held, and at last, the war against the United States was decided upon. At 4:30 p.m. the Prime Minister visited me to discuss the Imperial Rescript to Declare War." The next [49,566] day, that is to say, 2 December, the Imperial General Headquarters issued the order designating 8 December as X-Day, but as we have seen, this date had already been fixed by Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 3 of 10 November 1941. Admiral Yamamoto issued an order from his flagship in Hiroshima Bay on 22 November 1941 which was directed to the carrier task force then in its rendezvous at Tankan Wan. The order was to the effect that the force would move out of Tankan Wan on 26 November and proceed without being detected to Latitude 40 degrees North, Longitude 170 degrees West, so as to arrive there by 3 December. Refueling was to be carried out there as quickly as possible. On the morning of 26 November the carrier task force steamed out of Tankan Wan, headed for its refueling point. The force consisted of Japan's six large aircraft carriers as well as battleships and destroyers and other craft. Admiral Nagumo had issued the simple order, "Attack Pearl Harbor" Nothing further was necessary, for on 23 November he had issued detailed orders for the attack. [49,567] TERMINATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA In Washington the peace negotiations were continuing. President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu held a conversation on 27th November 1941 from 2:30 p.m. for a period of about an hour. After this interview, Kurusu attempted to carry on a telephone conversation with a member of the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo in which he displayed an ignorance of voice code but a surprising knowledge of the plans of the TOJO Cabinet to use the negotiations in Washington as a screen to cover the attack upon the Allied possessions in the Pacific. He was advised that the attack was imminent and that he was expected to keep the negotiations going at all costs, in effect, that the appearance of continued negotiations was to be maintained although "the date set . . . has come and gone." The United States was to be prevented "from becoming unduly suspicious." At about 10 a.m. on 7th December 1941 (Washington time 8 p.m. 6th December) TOGO's message to Nomura and Kurusu transmitting the note to be delivered to the United State Government in reply to the United States draft proposal of 26th November and implying a rupture in the negotiations began to [49,568] arrive in Washington. It was transmitted in several parts. In one part TOGO informed Nomura that, "Although the exact time for presenting the note to America will be telegraphed later, all necessary preparations should be made upon receipt of this memorandum so that it can be carried out as soon as instructions for such action are received." President Roosevelt in a final effort to reach a peaceful settlement with the Japanese Government dispatched a personal message to the Japanese Emperor. The message was sent to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Grew, with instructions to deliver it to the Emperor. This message reached Tokyo at noon and although its contents were known to Japanese officials in the course of the afternoon it was not delivered to Mr. Grew until nine o'clock that night. As soon as he had decoded the message Mr. Grew called upon Foreign Minister TOGO at 15 minutes after midnight on the morning of 8th December 1941 and requested an audience with the Emperor for the purpose of delivering the message; but TOGO informed Mr. Grew that he would present the message to the Throne. Mr. Grew took his leave at 30 minutes after midnight (Washington time 10:30 a.m., 7th December 1941). By this time the two countries were at war as the Naval [49,569] Operations Orders already referred to fixed 0000 hours of the 8th December (Tokyo time) as the time at which "a state of war will exist." The attack upon Kota Bharu commenced at 1:25 a.m. and upon Pearl Harbor at 3:20 a.m. (both Tokyo time). No satisfactory explanation of the delay in delivering to Mr. Grew the President's message to the Emperor was given to this Tribunal. Whatever effect that message might have had was precluded by this unexplained delay. PEARL HARBOR The Japanese Task Force had proceeded to carry out its operation orders as scheduled. One hour after Mr. Grew had taken his leave of TOGO, that is to say at 1:30 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Pearl Harbor time, 6 a.m., 7th December) (Washington time, 11:30 a.m., 7th December) the planes which were to deliver the first attack on Pearl Harbor took off from the decks of their carriers at a point approximately 230 miles north of Pearl Harbor. Ambassador Nomura in Washington had asked for an appointment to see Secretary Hull at 3 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time 1 p.m., 7th December), but he later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 3:45 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time 1:45 p.m., 7th December). Before Nomura called upon [49,570] Mr. Hull the first assault upon Pearl Harbor was delivered at 3:20 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Pearl Harbor time 7:50 a.m., 7th December) (Washington time 1:20 p.m. 7th December). Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu arrived at Secretary Hull's office at 4:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time 2:05 p.m., 7th December), which was 45 minutes after the first attack was actually delivered at Pearl Harbor, and were not received by Mr. Hull until one hour after the attack had begun. The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver his message at 3 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time 1 p.m., 7th December), but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to trouble in decoding and transcribing the message. The Secretary asked why he had been told to deliver the message at the specific hour of 1 p.m. Washington time. The Ambassador replied that he did not know, but that was his instruction. It is true that TOGO had telegraphed instructions to Nomura on 8th December 1941 (Washington time 7th December), as follows: "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time." A second attack was delivered upon Pearl Harbor by horizontal bombers from 4:10 a.m. to 4:45 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time 8:40 [49,571] a.m. to 9:15 a.m.) and a third attack was delivered by dive bombers from 4:45 a.m. to 5:15 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time 9:15 a.m. to 9:45 a.m.). KOTA BHARU Forty-five minutes after Mr. Grew had taken his leave of TOGO in Tokyo, that is to say at 1:25 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time 11:45 p.m., 7th December) (Washington time 11:25 a.m., 7th December), the beach defence troops on the Badang and Sabak Beaches on the east coast of British Malaya, the point of junction of which at Kuala Peamat is about one-and-a-half miles northeast of Kota Bharu Airfield, reported ships anchoring off the coast. TOJO said that these ships had sailed from Saigon in French Indo-China. At 1:40 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time, midnight 7th December) (Washington time, 11:40 a.m., 7th December) these ships began shelling the beaches. This was one hour and twenty minutes before the time at which it had originally been arranged that Kurusu and Nomura should call on Mr. Hull with the Japanese note and two hours and twenty-five minutes before they actually arrived at Secretary Hull's office. About 2:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time 12:25 a.m., 8th December) the first wave of Japanese troops landed at the junction [49,572] of Badang and Sabak Beaches. Having secured the first line of beach defences, the Japanese began the second phase of their landing operations against the British Malaya Peninsula. This second phase was a landing operation at Singora and Patani, which towns were located just north of the boundary between British Malaya and Thailand and were therefore in Thailand. This second landing began at 3:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time, 1:25 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 1:05 p.m., 7th December). Air reconnaissance revealed that the Japanese ships were disembarking troops at Singora and Patani and that the airdrome at Singora was under occupation by the Japanese landing party. The Japanese forces later crossed the Malaya-Thailand Border at Pedang Besar and at Kroh to execute a flanking movement against Kota Bharu. An air raid was made upon the City of Singapore in British Malaya by Japanese planes beginning at 6:10 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Singapore time, 4:30 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 4:10 p.m., 7th December). These attacking planes came from bases in French Indo-China according to TOJO and from carriers off- shore. Bombs were dropped on the Seletar and Tengah airfields as well as on the city. [49,573] THE PHILIPPINES, WAKE AND GUAM The first attack on the Island of Guam was delivered at 8:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 6:05 p.m., 7th December), when eight Japanese bombers came through the clouds and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the Cable Station and Pan-American compound. During the early morning hours of 8th December 1941 (Wake and Washington time, 7th December) the attack began on Wake Island with bombing by Japanese planes. The Philippines received their first attacks on the morning of 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 7th December) also. Heavy bombing attacks were made by the Japanese forces on the City of Davao on the Island of Mindanao and on Clark Field on the Island of Luzon. HONG KONG Hong Kong received its first attack at 9:00 a.m., 8th December (Hong Kong time, 8:00 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 7:00 p.m., 7th December). Although war had not been declared against Great Britain, a broadcast from the Tokyo Radio, which was in code and which gave warning to the Japanese nationals that war with Great Britain and the United [49,574] States was imminent, had been picked up by the authorities at Hong Kong around 5:45 a.m., 8th December 1941. This warning allowed the defenders of Hong Kong to make some preparation for the expected attack. SHANGHAI The third invasion of Shanghai began in the early morning hours of 8th December (Washington time, 7th December) when Japanese patrols were observed crossing the Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek and running military telephone lines as they went. They met no opposition and were able to take over the Bund without difficulty. They had taken complete possession of it by 4:00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Shanghai time, 3:00 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 2:00 p.m., 7th December). [49,575] THE JAPAMESE NOTE DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON ON 7th DECEMBER 1941 Hague Convention No. III of 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, provides by its first Article "The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." That Convention was binding on Japan at all relevant times. Under the Charter of the Tribunal the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances is declared to be a crime. Many of the charges in the indictment are based wholly or partly upon the view that the attacks against Britain and the United States were delivered without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. For reasons which are discussed elsewhere we have decided that it is unnecessary to deal with these charges. In the case of counts of the indictment which charge conspiracy to wage aggressive wars and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances we have come to the conclusion that the charge of conspiracy to wage aggressive wars has been made out, that these [49,576] acts are already criminal in the highest degree, and that it is unnecessary to consider whether the charge has also been established in respect of the list of treaties, agreements and assurances - including Hague Convention III -which the indictment alleges to have been broken. We have come to a similar conclusion in respect to the counts which allege the waging of wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances. With regard to the counts of the indictment which charge murder in respect that wars were waged in violation of Hague Convention No. III of 1907 or of other treaties, we have decided that the wars in the course of which these killings occurred were all wars of aggression. The waging of such wars is the major crime, since it involves untold killings, suffering and misery. No good purpose would be served by convicting any defendant of that major crime and also of "murder" eo nomine. Accordingly it is unnecessary for us to express a concluded opinion upon the exact extent of the obligation imposed by Hague Convention III of 1907. It undoubtedly imposes the obligation of giving previous and explicit warning before hostilities are commenced, but it does not define the period which must be allowed between the giving of this warning and the commencement of hostilities. The position was before the framers of the Convention and has been the [49,577] subject of controversy among international lawyers ever since the Convention was made. This matter of the duration of the period between warning and hostilities is of course vital. If that period is not sufficient to allow of the transmission of the warning to armed forces in outlying territories and to permit them to put themselves in a state of defence they may be shot down without a chance to defend themselves. It was the existence of this controversy as to the exact extent of the obligation imposed by the Convention which opened the way for TOGO to advise the Liaison Conference of 30th November 1941 that various opinions were held as to the period of warning which was obligatory, that some thought it should be an hour and a half, some an hour, some half an hour. The Conference left it to TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staff to fix the time of the delivery of the Note to Washington with the injunction that that time must not interfere with the success of the surprise attack. In short they decided to give notice that negotiations were broken off at so short an interval before they commenced hostilities as to ensure that the armed forces of Britain and the United States at the points of attack could not be warned that negotiations were broken off. TOGO and the naval and military men, to whom the task had been delivered, arranged that the Note should be delivered in Washington at 1:00 p. m. on 7th December 1941. [49,578] The first attack on Pearl Harbor was delivered at 1.20 p.m. Had all gone well they would have allowed twenty minutes for Washington to warn the armed forces at Pearl Harbor. But so anxious were they to ensure that the attack would be a surprise that they allowed no margin for contingencies. Thus, through the decoding and transcription of the Note in the Japanese Embassy taking longer than had been estimated, the Japanese Ambassadors did not in fact arrive with the Note at Secretary Hull's office in Washington until 45 minutes after the attack had been delivered. As for the attack on Britain at Kota Bharu, it was never related to the time (1.00 p.m.) fixed for the delivery of the Note at Washington. This fact has not been adequately explained in the evidence, The attack was delivered at 11.40 a.m. Washington time, one hour and twenty minutes before the Note should have been delivered if the Japanese Embassy at Washington had been able to carry out the instructions it had received from Tokyo. We have thought it right to pronounce the above findings in fact for these matters have been the subject of much evidence and argument, but mainly in order to draw pointed attention to the defects of the convention as framed. It permits of a narrow construction and tempts the unprincipled to try to comply [49,579] with the obligation thus narrowly construed while at the same time ensuring that their attacked shall come as a surprise. With the margin thus reduced for the purpose of surprise no allowance can be made for error, mishap or negligence leading to delay in the delivery of the warning, and the possibility is high that the prior warning which the Convention makes obligatory will not in fact be given. TOJO stated that the Japanese Cabinet had this in view for they envisaged that the more the margin was reduced the greater the possibility of mishap. THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR The Japanese Privy Council's Committee of Investigation did not begin the consideration of the question of making a formal declaration of war upon the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands until 7.30 a.m., 8th December (Tokyo time) when it met in the Imperial Palace for that purpose at that time. SHIMADA announced that the attack had been made upon Pearl Harbor and Kota Bharu; and a bill declaring war on the United States and Great Britain, which had been drafted at the residence of HOSHINO during the night, was introduced. In answer to a question during the deliberations on the bill, TOJO declared in referring to the peace negotiations at [49,580] Washington that, "those negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy". TOJO also declared during the deliberations that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience; and that a declararation of war against Thailand would not be made as negotiations were in progress between Japan and Thailand for the conclusion of "an Alliance Pact". The Bill was approved; and it was decided to submit it to the Privy Council. The Privy Council met at 10.50 a.m., 8th December 1941 and passed the Bill. The Imperial Rescript declaring war against the United States and Great Britain was issued between 11.40 and 12.00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 10.40 p.m. and 11.00 p.m., 7th December) (London time, 2.40 a.m. and 3.00 a.m., 8th December). Having been attacked, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declared war on Japan on 9th December 1941 (London and Washington, 8th December). On the same day the Netherlands, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Free France, Canada and China, also declared war on Japan. The next day, MUTO stated in a conversation with the Chief of Operations of the Army General Staff that the sending of Ambassador [49,581] Kurusu to the United States was nothing more than a sort of camouflage of events leading to the opening of hostilities. CONCLUSIONS It remains to consider the contention advanced on behalf of the defendants that Japan's acts of aggression against France, her attack against the Netherlands, and her attacks on Great Britain and the United States of America were justificable measures of self-defense. It is argued that these Powers took such measures to restrict the economy of Japan that she had no way of preserving the welfare and prosperity of her nationals but to go to war. The measures which were taken by these Powers to restrict Japanese trade were taken in an entirely justifiable attempt to induce Japan to depart from a course of aggression on which she had long been embarked and upon which she had determined to continue. Thus the United States of America gave notice to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan on 26th July 1939 after Japan had seized Manchuria and a large part of the rest of China and when the existence of the treaty had long ceased to induce Japan to respect the rights and interests of the nationals of the United states in China. It was given [49,582] in order that some other means might be tried to induce Japan to respect these rights. Thereafter, the successive embargoes which were imposed on the export of materials to Japan were imposed as it became clearer and clearer that Japan had determined to attack the territories and interests of the Powers. They were imposed in an attempt to induce Japan to depart from the aggressive policy on which she had determined and in order that the Powers might no longer supply Japan with the materials to wage war upon them. in some cases, as for example in the case of the embargo on the export of oil from the United States of America to Japan, those measures were also taken in order to build up the supplies which were needed by the nations who were resisting the aggressors. The argument is indeed merely a repetition of Japanese propaganda issued at the time she was preparing for her wars of aggression. It is not easy to have patience with its lengthy repetition at this date when documents are at length available which demonstrate that Japan's decision to expand to the North, to the West, and to the South, at the expense of her neighbors was taken long before any economic measures were directed against her and was never departed from. The evidence clearly establishes contrary to the contention of the [49,582a] defense that the acts of aggression against France, and the attacks on Britain, the United States of America and the Netherlands were prompted by the desire to deprive China of any aid in the struggle she was waging against Japan's aggression and to secure for Japan the possessions of her neighbors in the South. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the leaders of Japan in the years 1940 and 1941 planned to wage wars of aggression against France in French Indo-China. They had determined to demand that France cede to Japan the right to station troops and the right to air bases and naval bases in French Indo-China, and they had prepared to use force against France if their demands were not granted. They did make such demands upon France under threat that they would use force to obtain them, if that should prove necessary. In her then situation France was compelled to yield to the threat of force and granted the demands. [49,583] The Tribunal also finds that a war of aggression was waged against the Republic of France. The occupation by Japanese troops of portions of French Indo-China, which Japan had forced France to accept, did not remain peaceful. As the war situation, particularly in the Philippines, turned against Japan the Japanese Supreme War Council in February 1945 decided to submit the following demands to the Governor of French Indo-China: (1) that all French troops and armed police be placed under Japanese command, and (2) that all means of communication and transportation necessary for military action be placed under Japanese control. These demands were presented to the Governor of French Indo-China on 9th March 1945 in the form of an ultimatum backed by the threat of military action. He was given two hours to refuse or accept. He refused, and the Japanese proceeded to enforce their demands by military action. French troops and military police resisted the attempt to disarm them. There was fighting in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom-Penh, Nhatrang, and towards the Northern frontier. We quote the official Japanese account, "In the Northern frontiers the Japanese had considerable losses. The Japanese army proceeded to suppress French detachments in remote places and contingents which had fled to the mountains. In a month [49,584] public order was re-established except in remote places.” The Japanese Supreme War Council had decided that, if Japan's demands were refused and military action was taken to enforce them, "the two countries will not be considered as at war." This Tribunal finds that Japanese actions at that time constituted the waging of a war of aggression against the Republic of France. The Tribunal is further of opinion that the attacks which Japan launched on 7th December 1941 against Britain, the United States of America and the Netherlands were wars of aggression. They were unprovoked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the possessions of these nations. Whatever may be the difficulty of stating a comprehensive definition of "a war of aggression," attacks made with the above motive cannot but be characterised as wars of aggression. It was argued on behalf of the defendants that, inasmuch as the Netherlands took the initiative in declaring war on Japan, the war which followed cannot be described as a war of aggression by Japan. The facts are that Japan had long planned to secure for herself a dominant position in the economy of the Netherlands East Indies by negotiation or by force of arms if negotiation failed. By the middle of 1941 it was apparent that the Netherlands would not yield to the [49,585] Japanese demands. The leaders of Japan then planned and completed all the preparations for invading and seizing the Netherlands East Indies. The orders issued to the Japanese army for this invasion have not been recovered, but the orders issued to the Japanese navy on 5th November 1941 have been adduced in evidence. This is the Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to. The expected enemies are stated to be the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The order states that the day for the outbreak of war will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order, and that after 0000 hours on that day a state of war will exist and the Japanese forces will commence operations according to the plan. The order of Imperial General Headquarters was issued on 10th November and it fixed 8th December (Tokyo time), 7th December (Washington time) as the date on which a state of war would exist and operations would commence according to the plan. In the very first stage of the operations so to be commenced it is stated that the Southern Area Force will annihilate enemy fleets in the Philippines, British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies area. There is no evidence that the above order was ever recalled or altered in respect to the above particulars. In these circumstances we find in fact that orders [49,586] declaring the existence of a state of war and for the execution of a war of aggression by Japan against the Netherlands were in effect from the early morning of 7th December 1941. The fact that the Netherlands, being fully apprised of the imminence of the attack, in self-defence declared war against Japan on 8th December and thus officially recognised the existence of a state of war which had been begun by Japan cannot change that war from a war of aggression on the part of Japan into something other than that. In fact Japan did not declare war against the Netherlands until 11th January 1942 when her troops landed in the Netherlands East Indies. The Imperial Conference of 1st December 1941 decided that "Japan will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands." Despite this decision to open hostilities against the Netherlands, and despite the fact that orders for the execution of hostilities against the Netherlands were already in effect, TOJO announced to the Privy Council on 8th December (Tokyo time) when they passed the Bill making a formal declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience. The reason for this was not satisfactorily explained in evidence. The Tribunal is inclined to [49,587] the view that it was dictated by the policy decided in October 1940 for the purpose of giving as little time as possible for the Dutch to destroy oil wells. It has no bearing, however, on the fact that Japan launched a war of aggression against the Netherlands. [49,588] The position of Thailand is special. The evidence bearing upon the entry of Japanese troops into Thailand is meagre to a fault. It is clear that there was complicity between the Japanese leaders and the leaders of Thailand in the years 1939 and 1940 when Japan forced herself on France as mediator in the dispute as to the border between French Indo-China and Thailand. There is no evidence that the position of complicity and confidence between Japan and Thailand, which was then achieved, was altered before December 1941. It is proved that the Japanese leaders planned to secure a peaceful passage for their troops through Thailand into Malaya by agreement with Thailand. They did not wish to approach Thailand for such an agreement until the moment when they were about to attack Malaya, lest the news of the imminence of that attack should leak out. The Japanese troops marched through the territory of Thailand unopposed on 7th December 1941 (Washington time). The only evidence the prosecution has adduced as to the circumstances of that march is (1) a statement made to the Japanese Privy Council between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) that an agreement for the passage of the troops was being negotiated, (2) a Japanese broadcast announcement that they had commenced friendly advancement into Thailand [49,589] on the afternoon of the 8th December (Tokyo time) (Washington time, 7th December), and that Thailand had facilitated the passage by concluding an agreement at 12.30 p.m., and (3) a conflicting statement, also introduced by the prosecution, that Japanese troops landed at Singora and Patani in Thailand at 3.05 in the morning of 8th December (Tokyo time). On 21st December 1941 Thailand concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan. No witness on behalf of Thailand has complained of Japan's actions as being acts of aggression. In these circumstances we are left without reasonable certainty that the Japanese advance into Thailand was contrary to the wishes of the Government of Thailand and the charges that the defendants initiated and waged a war of aggression against the Kingdom of Thailand remain unproved. Count 31 charges that a war of aggression was waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Imperial Rescript which was issued about 12 noon on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) states "We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire." There is a great deal of lack of precision in the use of terms throughout the many plans which were formulated for an attack on British possessions. Thus such terms as "Britain", "Great Britain", and "England" [49,590] are used without discrimination and apparently are used as meaning the same thing. In this case there is no doubt as to the entity which is designated by "the British Empire". The correct title of that entity is "the British Commonwealth of Nations". That by the use of the term "the British Empire" they intended the entity which is more correctly called "the British Commonwealth of Nations" is clear when we consider the terms of the Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to. That order provides that a state of war will exist after 0000 hours X-Day, which was 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time), and that the Japanese forces would then commence operations. It is provided that in the very first phase of the operations the "South Seas Force" will be ready for the enemy fleet in the Australia area. Later it was provided that "The following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit, a, Eastern New Guinea, New Britain". These were governed by the Commonwealth of Australia under mandate from the League of Nations. The areas to be destroyed or occupied are also stated to include "Strategic points in the Australia area". Moreover, "important points in the Australian coast" were to be mined. Now the Commonwealth of Australia is not accurately described as being part of "Great Britain", [49,591] which is the term used in the Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1, nor is it accurately described as being part of "the British Empire", which is the term used in the Imperial Rescript. It is properly designated as part of "the British Commonwealth of Nations". It is plain therefore that the entity against which hostilities were to be directed and against which the declaration of war was directed was "the British Commonwealth of Nations", and Count 31 is well-founded when it charges that a war of aggression was waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is charged in Count 30 of the Indictment that a war of aggression was waged against the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The Philippines during the period of the war were not a completely sovereign state. So far as international relations were concerned they were part of the United States of America. It is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was waged against the people of the Philippines. For the sake of technical accuracy we shall consider the aggression against the people of the Philippines as being a part of the war of aggression waged against the United States of America. PART B. CHAPTER VIII CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES (Atrocities) After carefully examining and considering all [49,592] the evidence we find that it is not practicable in a judgment such as this to state fully the mass of oral and documentary evidence presented; for a complete statement of the scale and character of the atrocities reference must be had to the record of the trial. The evidence relating to atrocities and other Conventional War Crimes presented before the Tribunal establishes that from the opening of the war in China until the surrender of Japan in August 1945 torture, murder, rape and other cruelties of the most inhumane and barbarous character were freely practiced by the Japanese Army and Navy. During a period of several months the Tribunal heard evidence, orally or by affidavit, from witnesses who testified in detail to atrocities committed in all theatera of war on a scale so vast, yet following so common a pattern in all theaters, that only one conclusion is possible - the atrocities were either secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the Japanese Government or individual members thereof and by the leaders of the armed forces. Before proceeding to a discussion of the circumstances and the conduct of the accused in relation to the question of responsibility for the atrocities it is necessary to examine the matters charged. In doing so we will in some cases where it may be convenient [49,593] refer to the association, if any, of the accused with the happenings under discussion. In other cases and generally, as far as it is practicable, circumstances having relevance to the issue of responsibility will be dealt with later. At the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941 the Japanese Government did institute a system and an organization for dealing with prisoners of war and civilian internees. Superficially, the system would appear to have been appropriate; however, from beginning to end the customary and conventional rules of war designed to prevent inhumanity were flagrantly disregarded. Ruthless killing of prisoners by shooting, decapitation, drowning, and other methods; death marches in which prisoners including the sick were forced to march long distances under conditions which not even well-conditioned troops could stand, many of those dropping out being shot or bayonetted by the guards; forced labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun; complete lack of housing and medical supplies in many cases resulting in thousands of deaths from disease; beatings and torture of all kinds to extract information or confessions or for minor offences; killing without trial of recaptured prisoners after [49,594] escape or for attempt to escape; killing without trial of captured aviators; and even cannibalism. These are some of the atrocities of which proof was made before the Tribunal. The extent of the atrocities and the result of the lack of food and medical supplies is exemplified by a comparison of the number of deaths of prisoners of war in the European Theater with the number of deaths in the Pacific Theater. Of United States and United Kingdom forces 235,473 were taken prisoners by the German and Italian Armies; of these 9,348 or 4 per cent died in captivity. In the Pacific Theater 132,134 prisoners were taken by the Japanese from the United States and United Kingdom forces alone of whom 35,756 or 27 per cent died in captivity. ALLEGATION THAT THE LAWS OF WAR DID NOT APPLY TO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN CHINA From the outbreak of the Mukden Incident till the end of the war the successive Japanese Governments refused to acknowledge that the hostilities in China constituted a war. They persistently called it an "Incident". With this as an excuse the military authorities persistently asserted that the rules of war did not apply in the conduct of the hostilities. This war was envisaged by Japan's military [49,595] leaders as a punitive war, which was being fought to punish the people of China for their refusal to acknowledge the superiority and leadership of the Japanese race and to cooperate with Japan. These military leaders intended to make the war so brutal and savage in all its consequences as to break the will of the Chinese people to resist. As the Southern movement advanced to cut off aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek, the Chief-of-Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Force on 24 July 1939 sent an estimate of the situation to War Minister ITAGAKI. In that estimate of the situation, he said: "The Army Air Force should carry out attacks upon strategic points in the hinterland in order to terrorize the enemy forces and civilians, and so develop among them an anti-war, pacifist tendency. What we expect of offensive operations against the interior is the mental terror they will create among the enemy forces and civilians rather than the material damage inflicted direct upon enemy personnel and equipment. We will wait and see them falling into nervous prostration in an excess of terror and madly starting anti-Chiang and pacifist movements." Government and military spokesmen alike from time to time stated that the purpose of the war was to [49,596] make the Chinese people "seriously reflect" upon the error of their ways, which in effect meant acceptance of Japanese domination. HIROTA in February, 1936, speaking in the House of Peers said "Japan has been endeavoring to make the Chinese Nationalist Government take reflections, if possible, while chastising their mistaken ideas by armed force . . ." In the same speech he said "Since they were facing Japan with very strong anti-Japanese feeling, we decided on a policy whereby we had to necessarily chastise them." HIRANUMA began his "stimulation of the national morale" by a speech to the Diet on 21 January 1939 in which he said: "In regard to the China Incident upon which both the Cabinet and the people are concentrating their endeavors, there exists an immutable policy for which Imperial Sanction was obtained by the previous Cabinet. The present Cabinet is of course committed to the same policy. I hope the intention of Japan will be understood by the Chinese so that they may cooperate with us. As for those who fail to understand, we have no other alternative than to exterminate them." We will adjourn now until half-past one. (thereupon, at 1200, a. recess was taken.) [49,597] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment: FORMULATION OF MILITARY POLICY Before discussing the nature and extent of atrocities committed by the Japanese armed forces it is desirable to state, very shortly, the system under which such conduct should have been controlled. Those having authority in the formulation of military policy were the Army and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Inspector-General of Military Education, the Supreme War Council of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the War Council. The Army and Navy Ministers administered; the Inspector- General of Military Education supervised training; and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs directed operations of the armed forces. The two war councils were advisory groups. The Army enjoyed special prerogatives. One of these was the exclusive right to nominate the successor of the War Minister. By the exercise of this power the Army was able to enforce continued [49,598] adherence to the policies advocated by it. In the War Ministry the policy initiating agency was the Military Affairs Bureau, which after consultation with the Army General Staff, other Bureaus of the War Ministry and other departments of the government concerned, announced the policy of the Japanese military, usually in the form of regulations issued over the signature of the War Minister, this was the Bureau which formed the policy and issued regulations governing the conduct of war in general and the treatment of civilian internees and prisoners of war in particular. Such administration of prisoners of war as there was during the war in China was conducted by this Bureau. Until the opening of hostilities in the Pacific War, the administration of civilian internees and prisoners of war was retained by this Bureau when a special division was created in the Bureau to perform that function. Three of the accused served as Chiefs of this powerful Military Affairs Bureau; they were KOISO, MUTO and SATO. KOISO served at the beginning of the war in China between the dates of 8 January 1930 and 29 February 1932. MUTO served before and after the commencement of the Pacific War; he became Chief of the Bureau on 30 September 1939 and served until 20 April 1942. SATO was employed in the Bureau before the beginning of the [49,599] Pacific War, having been appointed on 15 July 1938; when MUTO was transferred to command troops in Sumatra, SATO became Chief of the Bureau and served in that capacity from 20 April 1942 to 14 December 1944. The corresponding Bureau in the Navy Ministry was the Naval Affairs Bureau. The Naval Affairs Bureau formed and promulgated regulations for the Navy and prescribed the policy of the Navy in conducting war at sea, occupied islands and other territory under its jurisdiction, and administered such prisoners of war and civilian internees as came under its power. The accused OKA served as Chief of this Bureau before and during the Pacific War from 15 October 1940 to 31 July 1944. In the War Ministry, the Vice Minister of War was the operating chief of the War Ministry Office and was responsible for coordination of the various Bureaus and other agencies under the Ministry. He received reports and suggestions from commanders in the field, advised the War Minister on the affairs under the Ministry and often issued orders and directives. Three of the accused served as Vice-Minister of War during the period prior to the Pacific War. KOISO served from 29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932. UMEZU occupied the position from 23 March 1936 to 30 May 1938. TOJO became [49,600] Vice Minister of War on 30 May 1933 and served until 10 December 1938. KIMURA was Vice Minister of War before and after the commencement of the Pacific War; he was appointed on 10 April 1941 and served until 11 March 1943. Lastly, of course, the commanders in the field were responsible for the maintenance of the discipline and the observance of the laws and customs of war by the troops under their command. CAPTIVES TAKEN IN THE CHINA WAR WERE TREATED AS BANDITS The Japanese delegate at Geneva in accepting the resolution of the League of nations of 10 December 1931 setting up the Lytton Commission and imposing a virtual truce, stated that his acceptance was based on the understanding that the resolution would not preclude the Japanese Army from taking action against "bandits" in Manchuria. It was under this exception to the resolution that the Japanese military continued hostilities against the Chinese troops in Manchuria. They maintained that no state of war existed between Japan and China; that the conflict was a mere "incident" to which the laws of war did not apply; and that those Chinese troops who resisted the Japanese Army were not lawful combatants but were merely "bandits." A ruthless campaign for the [49,601] extermination of these "bandits" in Manchuria was inaugurated, Although the main Chinese Army withdrew within the Great Wall at the end of 1931, resistance to the Japanese Army was constantly maintained by widely dispersed units of Chinese volunteers. The Kwantung Army Intelligence Service listed a large number of so-called Chinese route-armies, which in 1932 formed the subdivisions of the volunteer armies. These volunteer armies were active in the areas around Mukden, Haisheng and Yingkow. In August 1932 fighting broke out in the immediate vicinity of Mukden. At the height of the fighting at Mukden on 8 August 1932 Vice- Minister of War KOISO was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army and also Chief of its intelligence service. He served in that capacity until 5 March 1934. On 16 September 1932 the Japanese forces in pursuit of defeated Chinese volunteer units arrived at the towns of Pingtingshan, Chienchinpao and Litsekou in the vicinity of Fushun. The inhabitants of these towns were accused of harboring the volunteers or "bandits" as they were called by the Japanese. In each town the Japanese troops assembled people along ditches and forced them to kneel; they then killed these civilians, men, women and children; with machine guns; those who survived [49,602] the machine-gunning being promptly bayoneted to death, Over 2,700 civilians perished in this massacre, which the Japanese Kwantung Army claimed to be justified under its program of exterminating "bandits." Shortly thereafter, KOISO sent to the Vice Minister of War an "Outline for Guiding Manchukuo" in which he said: "Racial struggle between Japanese and Chinese is to be expected. Therefore, we must never hesitate to wield military power in case of necessity." In this spirit the practice of massacring, or "punishing" as the Japanese termed it, the inhabitants of cities and towns in retaliation for actual or supposed aid rendered to Chinese troops was applied. This Practice continued throughout the China War; the worst example of it being the massacre of the inhabitants of Nanking in December 1937. Since the Government of Japan officially classified the China War as an "Incident" and considered Chinese soldiers in Manchuria as "bandits," the Army refused to accord to captives taken in the fighting the status and the rights of prisoners of war, MUTO says that it was officially decided in 1938 to continue to call the war in China an "Incident" and to continue for that reason to refuse to apply the rules of war to the conflict. TOJO told us the same. [49,603] Many of the captured Chinese were tortured, massacred, placed in labor units to work for the Japanese Army, or organized into army units to serve the puppet governments established by Japan in the occupied territory in China. Some of these captives who refused to serve in these armies were transported to Japan to relieve the labor shortage in the munitions industries. At the camp at Akita, on the northwest shore of Honshu Island, 418 Chinese out of a group of 981 so transported to Japan died from starvation, torture or neglect. THE POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED AFTER THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT Both the League of Nations and the meeting at Brussels of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty failed to stop Japan's pursuing this "punitive" war on China after the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937. This policy of Japan to treat the China War as an "incident" remained unchanged. Even after the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters which was considered appropriate only in the case of an "incident" of such an extent as to require a declaration of war, as suggested by the War Minister at the Cabinet meeting held on 19 November 1937, no additional effort was made to enforce the laws of war [49,604] in the conduct of the hostilities in China. Although the Government and the fighting services were organized on a full wartime basis, the China War was still treated as an "incident" with the consequent disregard of the rules of war. THE RAPE OF NANKING As the Central China Expeditionary Force under command of MATSUI approached the city of Nanking in early December 1937, over one-half of its one million inhabitants and all but a few neutrals who remained behind to organize an International Safety Zone, fled from the city. The Chinese Army retreated, leaving approximately 50,000 troops behind to defend the city. As the Japanese forces stormed the South Gate on the night of 12 December 1937, most of the remaining 50,000 troops escaped through the North and West Gates of the city. Nearly all the Chinese soldiers had evacuated the city or had abandoned their arms and uniforms and sought refuge in the International Safety Zone and all resistance had ceased as the Japanese Army entered the city on the morning of 13 December 1937. The Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city and committed various atrocities. According to one of the eye witnesses they were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said by eye witnesses that the city [49,605] appeared to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese is captured prey, that it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and that the members of the victorious Japanese Army had set upon the prize to commit unlimited violence. Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering, raping, looting and burning. There was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese men, women and children without apparent provocation or excuse until in places the streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their victims. According to another witness Chinese were hunted like rabbits, everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non- combatant Chinese men, women and children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings during the first two or three days of the Japanese occupation of the city. There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest resistance on the part of a victim or the members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of tender years and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behavior in connection with these rapings occurred. Many women were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated. [49,606] Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city during the first month of the occupation. Japanese soldiers took from the people everything they desired. Soldiers were observed to stop unarmed civilians on the road, search them, and finding nothing of value then to shoot them. Very many residential and commercial properties were entered and looted. Looted stocks were carried away in trucks. After looting shops and warehouses the Japanese soldiers frequently set fire to them. Taiping Road, the most important shopping street, and block after block of the commercial section of the city were destroyed by fire. Soldiers burned the homes of civilians for no apparent reason. Such burning appeared to follow a prescribed pattern after a few days and continued for six weeks. Approximately one-third of the city was thus destroyed. Organized and wholesale murder of male civilians was conducted with the apparent sanction of the commanders on the pretense that Chinese soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population. Groups of Chinese civilians were formed, bound with their hands behind their backs, and marched outside the walls of the city where they were killed in groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets. More than 20,000 Chinese men of military age are known to [49,607] have died in this fashion. The German Government was informed by its representative about "atrocities and criminal acts not of an individual but of an entire Army, namely, the Japanese," which Army, later in the report, was qualified as a "bestial machinery." Those outside the city fared little better than those within. Practically the same situation existed in all the communities within 200 li (about 66 miles) of Nanking. The population had fled into the countryside in an attempt to escape from the Japanese soldiers. In places they had grouped themselves into fugitive camps. The Japanese captured many of these camps and visited upon the fugitives treatment similar to that accorded the inhabitants of Nanking. Of the civilians who had fled Nanking over 57,000 were overtaken and interned. These were starved and tortured in captivity until a large number died. Many of the survivors were killed by machine gun fire and by bayoneting. Large parties of Chinese soldiers laid down their arms and surrendered outside Nanking; within 72 hours after their surrender they were killed in groups by machine gun fire along the bank of the Yangtze River. Over 30,000 such prisoners of war were so killed. [49,608] There was not even a pretence of trial of these prisoners so massacred. Estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and prisoners of war ordered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That these estimates are not exaggerated is borne out by the fact that burial societies and other organizations counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They also reported that most of those were bound with their hands tied behind their backs. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning or by throwing them into the Yangtze fiver or otherwise disposed of by Japanese. Japanese Embassy officials entered the city of Nanking with the advance elements of the Army; and on 14 December an official of the Embassy informed the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone that the "Army was determined to make it bad for Nanking, but that the Embassy officials were going to try to moderate the action." The Embassy officials also informed the members of the committee that at the time of the occupation of the city no more than 17 military policemen were provided by the Army commanders to maintain order within the city, when it transpired that [49,609] complaints to the Army officials did not have any result, those Japanese embassy officials suggested to the foreign missionaries that the latter should try and get publicity in Japan, so that the Japanese Government would be forced by public opinion to curb the Army. Dr. Bates testified that the terror was intense for two and one-half to three weeks, and was serious six to seven weeks following the fall of the city. Smythe, the Secretary of the International Committee for the Safety Zone, filed two protests a day for the first six weeks. MATSUI, who had remained in a rear area until 17 December, made a triumphal entry into the city on that day and on 18 December held a religious service for the dead, after which he issued a statement in the course of which he said: "I extend much sympathy to millions of innocent people in the Kiangpei and Chekiang districts, who suffered the evils of war. Now the flag of the Rising Sun is floating high over Nanking, and the Imperial Way is shining in the southern parts of the Yangtze-Kiang. The dawn of the renaissance of the East is on the verge of offering itself. On this occasion I hope for reconsideration of the situation [49,610] by the 400 million people of China." MATSUI remained in the city for nearly a week. MUTO, then a colonel, had joined MATSUI's staff on 10 November 1937 and was with MATSUI during the drive on Nanking and participated in the triumphal entry and occupation of the city. Both he and MATSUI admit that they heard of the atrocities being committed in the city during their stay at rear headquarters after the fail of the city. MATSUI admits that he heard that foreign governments were protesting against the commission of these atrocities. No effective action was taken to remedy the situation. Evidence was given before the Tribunal by an eye witness that while MATSUI was in Nanking on the 19th of December the business section of the city was in flames. On that day the witness counted fourteen fires in the principal business street alone. After the entry of MATSUI and MUTO into the city, the situation did not improve for weeks. Members of the diplomatic corps and press and the Japanese Embassy in Nanking sent out reports detailing the atrocities being committed in and around Nanking. The Japanese Minister-at-Large to China, Ito, Nobofumi, was in Shanghai from September 1937 to February 1938. He received reports from the Japanese [49,611] Embassy in Nanking and from members of the diplomatic corps and press regarding the conduct of the Japanese troops and sent a resume of the reports to the Japanese Foreign Minister, HIROTA. These reports as well as many others giving information of the atrocities committed in Nanking, which were forwarded by members of the Japanese diplomatic officials in China, were forwarded by HIROTA to the war Ministry of which UMEZU was Vice-Minister. They were discussed at Liaison Conferences which were normally attended by the Prime Minister, War and Navy Ministers, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister KAYA, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. News reports of the atrocities were widespread. MINAMI, who was serving as Governor-General of Korea at the time, admits that he read these reports in the press. Following these unfavorable reports and the pressure of public opinion aroused in nations all over the world, the Japanese Government recalled MATSUI and approximately 80 of his officers but took no action to punish any of them. MATSUI, after his return to Japan on 5 March 1938, was appointed a Cabinet Councillor and on 29 April 1940 was decorated by the Japanese Government for "meritorious services" in the China War. MATSUI, in explaining his recall, says that he was not replaced [49,612] by HATA because of the atrocities committed by his troops at Nanking but because he considered his work ended at Nanking and wished to retire from the Army. He was never punished. The barbarous behaviour of the Japanese Army cannot be excused as the acts of a soldiery which had temporarily gotten out of hand when at last a stubbornly defended position had capitulated rape, arson and murder continued to be committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the city had been taken and for at least four weeks after MATSUI and MUTO had entered the city. The new Japanese Garrison Commander at Nanking, General Amaya, on 5 February 1938, at the Japanese Embassy in Nanking made a statement to the foreign diplomatic corps criticizing the attitude of the foreigners who had been sending abroad reports of Japanese atrocities at Nanking and upbraiding them for encouraging anti-Japanese feeling. This statement by Amaya reflected the attitude of the Japanese military toward foreigners in China, who were hostile to the Japanese policy of waging an unrestrained punitive war against the people of China. [49,613] THE WAR WAS EXTENDED TO CANTON AND HANKOW When Shanghai capitulated on 12 November 1937 and MATSUI began his advance on Nanking, the National Government of China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek abandoned its capital city, moved to Chungking with interim headquarters at Hankow and continued the resistance. After the capture of Nanking on 13 December 1937 the Japanese Government established a puppet government at Peiping. The program designed to "pacify" the inhabitants of this occupied area and "make them rely on the Japanese Army" and force "self examination" on the part of the National Government of China, which was adopted at Shanghai and Nanking and proclaimed by MATSUI at Nanking, indicated settled policy. In December 1937 at Hsing Tai district on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, gendarmes under the command of a Japanese warrant officer seized seven civilians, who were suspected of being Chinese irregulars, tortured and starved them for three days, then bound them to a tree and bayoneted them to death. Soldiers from this Army had appeared at the village of Tung Wang Chia, in Hopeh Province, earlier in October 1937 and committed murder, rape and arson, killing 24 of the inhabitants and burning about two-thirds of the homes. Another [49,614] village in the same province known as Wang-Chia-To was visited by a Japanese unit in January 1938 and more than 40 of the civilian inhabitants were murdered. Many of the inhabitants of the area around Shanghai fared no better than those in Nanking and other parts of North China. After the fighting had ceased at Shanghai, observers found around the ashes of farm houses in the suburban areas of Shanghai the bodies of farmers and their families with their hands tied behind them and bayonet wounds in their backs. As MATSUI's troops occupied village after village on their march to Nanking they plundered and murdered and terrorized the population. Soochow was occupied in November 1937 and a number of residents who had not fled from the advancing troops were murdered. HATA's troops entered Hankow and occupied the city on 25 October 1938. The next morning a massacre of prisoners occurred. At the customs wharf, the Japanese soldiers collected several hundred prisoners. They then selected small groups of three or four at a time, marched them to the end of the gangplanks reaching out to deep water; pushed them into the river and shot them. When the Japanese saw that they were being observed from the American gunboats anchored in the river off Hankow, they stopped and adopted a different method. [49,615] They continued to select small groups, put them into motor launches and took them out in the stream where they threw them into the water and shot them. It was during the Third Konoye Cabinet that the massacre at the town of Powen, on the Chinese Island of Hainan, occurred. In August 1941 during a punitive operation, a Japanese naval unit passed through the town of Powen without opposition. The next day, as a detachment from that unit returned to Powen, they found the dead body of a sailor of the Japanese Navy who had apparently been dead for several days. Under the assumption that the sailor had been killed by the residents of Powen, the detachment burned the native houses and the church of the town. They killed the French missionary and 24 natives and burned their bodies. This incident is important because the wide circulation given the report of the massacre must have informed the members of the Cabinet and its subordinate officials of the method of warfare continuing to be employed by the Japanese military forces. The Chief of Staff of the Japanese occupation forces on Hainan Island made a complete report of this matter to Vice-Minister of War KIMURA on 14 October 1941. KIMURA at once circulated the report for the information of all concerned to the various bureaus of the War Ministry and then sent it to [49,616] the Foreign Ministry. It received wide circulation both in and out of the Army. An indication that the ruthless methods of the Japanese Army in waging war continued is revealed by the conduct of a detachment of soldiers from UMEZU's Army in Manchukuo in the campaign designed to stifle all resistance to the puppet regime under Emperor Pu Yi. This detachment visited the village of Si-Tu-Ti in Jehol Province one night in August 1941. It captured the village, killed the members of more than 300 families and burned the village to the ground. Even long after the occupation of Canton and Hankow the Japanese, while carrying on campaigns into the farther interior, committed large-scale atrocities there. Toward the end of 1941 Japanese troops entered the city of Wei-Yang in Kwantung Province. They indulged in a massacre of Chinese civilians, bayoneting male and female, old and young without discrimination. One eye witness, who survived a bayonet wound in the abdomen, told of the slaughter of more than 600 Chinese civilians by Japanese troops. In July 1944 Japanese troops arrived at the Tai Shan district in the Kwantung Province. They committed arson, robbery, slaughter and numerous other atrocities. As a result thereof, 559 shops were burnt, and more than 700 Chinese civilians [49,617] killed. From Hankow the Japanese troops carried on their campaign southward to Changsha. In September 1941 the Japanese troops of the Sixth Division forced more than 200 Chinese prisoners of war to plunder large quantities of rice, wheat and other commodities. Upon their return the Japanese soldiers, to conceal these crimes, massacred them by artillery fire. After the Japanese forces had occupied Changsha, they also freely indulged in murder, rape, incendiarism and many other atrocities throughout the district. Then they drove further down southward to Kweilin and Diuchow in Kwangsi Province. During the period of Japanese occupation of Kweilin, they committed all kinds of atrocities such as rape and plunder. They recruited women labor on the pretext of establishing factories. They forced the women thus recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops. Prior to their withdrawal from Kweilin in July 1945 the Japanese troops organized an arson corps and set fire to buildings in the entire business district of Kweilin. RETURNING SOLDIERS TOLD OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THEM After the occupation of Hankow, Japanese soldiers returning from China told stories of the Army's [49,618] misdeeds in China and displayed loot which they had taken. This conduct, on the part of the soldiers returning to Japan apparently became so general that the War Ministry under ITAGAKI, in an effort to avoid unfavorable criticism at home, issued special orders to the commanders in the field to instruct returning officers and men upon the proper conduct to be followed by them upon reaching Japan. These special orders were prepared in the Military Service Section of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry, classified as "Top Secret" and issued by ITAGAKI's Vice Minister of War in February 1939. They were transmitted by the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff to the Japanese Army Commanders in China. These secret orders detailed the objectionable conduct of returning soldiers which was to be corrected. It was complained that the soldiers told stories of atrocities committed by them on Chinese soldiers and civilians; some of the stories commonly heard were cited as follows: and "One company commander unofficially gave instructions for raping as follows: 'In order that we will not have problems, either pay them money or kill them in some obscure place after you have finished'"; "If the army men who participated in the war were investigated individually, they would probably all be guilty of murder, robbery [49,619] or rape"; "The thing I like best during the battle is plundering. In the front lines the superiors turn a blind eye to plundering and there were some who plundered to their heart's content"; "At . . . we captured a family of four. We played with the daughter as we would with a harlot. But as the parents insisted that the daughter be returned to them we killed them. We played with the daughter as before until the unit's departure and then killed her"; "In the half year of battle, about the only things I learned are rape and burglary"; "The plundering by our army in the battle area is beyond imagination"; "The prisoners taken from the Chinese Army were sometimes lined up in one line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine gun." Concerning loot brought back to Japan by returning soldiers, it was noted that some commanders distributed among the men license cards authorized by the stamp of the unit commander permitting the soldiers to transport their loot to Japan. These orders stated: "Not only does the improper talk of the returned officers and men become the cause of rumors, but also impairs the trust of the people in the Army, disrupts the unity of the people supporting the Army, etc. I repeat the order again to make the control of instruction even more strict and consequently glorify the meritorious deeds, [49,620] raise the Japanese Army's military reputation and insure that nothing will impair the accomplishment of the object of the Holy War." [49,621] MURDER OF CAPTURED AVIATORS Japanese leaders feared that aerial warfare might be waged against the cities and towns of Japan. One of the reasons given by the Japanese Military for opposing ratification of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 was that such ratification would double the range of enemy planes making raids on Japan in that the crews could land on Japanese territory after completing their missions and be secure in the knowledge that they would be treated as prisoners of war. The fear that Japan would be bombed was realized on 18 April 1942, when American planes under the command of Colonel Doolittle bombed Tokyo and other cities in Japan. This was the first time Japan had been subjected to a bombing raid; and in the words of TOJO, it was an awful "shock" to the Japanese. Sugiyama, the Chief of the Japanese General Staff, demanded the death penalty for all aviators who bombed Japan. Although there had been no law or regulation of the Japanese Government prior to this raid under which the death penalty could be administered, Prime Minister TOJO ordered regulations issued to be retroactive to the time of the raid which would permit the death penalty to be imposed [49,622] upon the Doolittle fliers. TOJO later admitted that he took this action as a deterrent to prevent future raids. These regulations which were dated 13 August 1942 were made applicable to "enemy fliers who have raided" Japan, Manchukuo or Japanese operational areas "and have come within the jurisdiction of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China". Thus, they were directly and retrospectively aimed at the United States airmen already in the hands of the Japanese in China. The offences were air attacks (1) upon ordinary people, (2) upon private property of a non-military nature, (3) against other than military objectives, and (4) "violations of war-time international law", The punishment prescribed was death or imprisonment for ten years or more. Conduct defined as offenses 1, 2 and 3 were such as the Japanese themselves had regularly practiced in China. It will be remembered that in July 1939 the Chief-of-Staff of the Central China Expedi- [49,623] tionary Force reported to War Minister ITAGAKI that a policy of indiscriminate bombing in order to terrorize the Chinese had been adopted. The fourth, violations of the laws of war, required no such regulations. Their breach was punishable in any event, but, of course, only upon proper trial and within the limits of punishment permitted by international law. The crews of two of the Doolittle planes which had been forced to land in China were taken prisoner by the Japanese occupation forces under the command of HATA. These eight fliers composing the crews were treated as common criminals, being handcuffed and bound. The members of one crew were taken to Shanghai and the members of the other crew were taken to Nanking; at each place they were interrogated under torture. On 25 April 1942 the fliers were taken to Tokyo and were kept blindfolded and handcuffed until they were inside the Military Police Headquarters in Tokyo. They were then placed in solitary confinement, from which they were taken out and questioned again under torture for eighteen days. At the end of this period the fliers, to avoid further torture, signed statements written in Japanese, the contents of which were unknown to them. [49,624] The fliers were returned to Shanghai on 17 June 1942, where they were incarcerated, starved, and otherwise ill-treated. On 28 July 1942 Vice-Minister of War KIMURA transmitted TOJO's orders to HATA, who was the Supreme Commander of all Japanese Forces in China at that time. TOJO's orders were to the effect that the fliers were to be punished under the new regulations. On orders from the Chief of the General Staff, HATA instructed that the fliers be put an trial. At this "trial" some of the airmen were too ill to take part in the proceedings, there was no translation of the matters charged, and they were given no opportunity to defend themselves. The trial was a mere mockery. This trial was hold on 20 August 1942 when all of the fliers were sentenced to death. Upon review in Tokyo, and on the recommendation of TOJO, five of the sentences were reduced to life imprisonment and the remaining three death sentences were approved. On 10 October 1942 HATA ordered the sentences to be executed and reported his action to the Army Chief or Staff. The death sentences were carried out as ordered. In this manner was begun the policy of killing Allied fliers who fell into the hands of the Japanese. This was done not only in Japan but in [49,625] occupied territories curing the remainder of the Pacific War. The usual practice was to starve and torture captured aviators before their murder. Even the formality of a trial was often omitted. Where a court-martial was held prior to their being killed it appears that the court-martial was a mere formality. As an illustration, we cite the case of two American B-29 fliers at Osaka on 18 July 1945, who were charged with violation of the regulations. Prior to the trial, their case was investigated by an officer appointed to perform that duty, who recommended the death penalty. The recommendation was approved by the Commander of the Central Military District and by General HATA, who was at that time the Commander of the Second Army Corps at Hiroshima. The recommendation of the Investigating Officer, with the approval of the Military Commanders, was sent to the War Ministry for final approval; and that approval was obtained. At the trial the report and recommendation of the Investigating Officer and the approval of General HATA and others were read to the court-martial by the prosecutor, who demanded the death penalty based upon those documents. The accused were asked a few routine questions and the death penalty was imposed. They were executed the same day. [49,626] In the Tokai Military District, prior to May 1945, eleven Allied airmen were subjected to trials in which their interests were not safeguarded, sentenced to death and executed. However, the Commandant of Military Police for Japan considered this procedure imposed an unnecessary delay in the killing of captured Allied fliers; consequently in June 1945, he sent a letter to each of the Military Police Headquarters Commandants of the several military districts in Japan complaining of the delay in the disposition of captured Allied airmen, stating that it was impossible to dispose of them immediately by courts-martial, and recommending that the Military Police in the military districts dispense with courts-martial after securing the approval of the Commander of the Military District. In the Tokai Military District 27 Allied fliers were killed without trial after this letter was received. In the Central Military District over which HATA exercised administrative command, 43 Allied airmen were killed without having been tried by courts-martial or otherwise. At Fukuoka eight Allied airmen were killed without trial on 20 June 1945, eight more in the same manner on 12 August 1945, and three days later on 15 August 1945 the third group of eight, making a total of 24 Allied airmen killed, at Fukuoka [49,627] without being given a trial after the above-mentioned letter recommending this procedure was sent out from Tokyo by the Commandant of Military Police. The killing of Allied airmen in the Tokai, Central and Western Districts of Japan was done by firing squads; in the Eastern District, which embraced Tokyo, more inhumane methods were used. Allied airmen captured in that district were detained in the Military Police Headquarters Guard House, pending a so-called investigation to determine whether they had violated the Regulations. This investigation consisted of interrogation under torture in an effort to coerce the victim into confessing to facts which would subject him to the death penalty under the regulations. No less than 17 airmen died in this guard house as a result of torture, starvation and lack of medical care. Those who survived this torture were victims of a more dreadful death. The Tokyo Army Prison was located on the edge of the Yoyogi Military Parade Ground. This prison was a disciplinary barracks in which were confined Japanese soldiers serving sentences. The prison grounds were small and surrounded by a brick wall approximately 12 feet high. The prison buildings were of wood and were constructed so close together as to occupy all of the ground available within the [49,628] brick wall except for necessary alley-ways and courts. One of the cell blocks was set apart by a wooden wall seven feet high. On 25 April 1945, five Allied fliers were placed in that cell block; on 9 May, 29 more were added; and on 10 May, 28 others were confined there. On the night of 25 May 1945 Tokyo was heavily bombed. On that night there were 62 Allied fliers confined in this cell block. There were 464 Japanese Army prisoners confined in other buildings within the prison. The wooden buildings of the prison, as well as the highly inflammable dwellings surrounding it, were hit and set on fire by incendiary bombs. The prison was completely demolished; and after the fire, it was found that all of the 62 Allied fliers had perished. It is significant that none of the 464 Japanese or any of their jailors suffered a similar fate. The evidence shows that the fate of the Allied airmen was deliberately planned. In the occupied territories, one of the methods of killing captured airmen was by decapitation with a sword, and at the hands of a Japanese officer. Captured airmen were killed this way at Singapore, Malaya (June-July 1945); Samarinda, Borneo (January 1945); Palambang, Sumatra (March 1942); Batavia, Java (April 1942); Menada, Celebes (June 1945); Tomohon, [49,629] Celebes (September 1944); Toli Toli, Celebes (October 1944); Kandari, Celebes (November 1944), (January 1945), (February 1945); Beo, Talaud Islands (March 1945); Rainis, Talaud Islands (January 1945); Singkang, Celebes (July 1945); Carara, Ambon Island (August 1944); New Guinae (October 1944); Totabil, New Britain (November 1944); Porton Island (December 1943); Kwajalein Island (October 1942); and Cebu City, Philippines (March 1945). Another method of murdering Allied fliers was used at Hankow, China, in December 1944. Three American fliers, who had been forced down and captured sometime before, were paraded through the streets and subjected to ridicule, beating and torture by the populace. When they had been weakened by the beatings and torture, they were saturated with gasoline and burned alive. Permission for this atrocity was granted by the Commander of the 34th Japanese Army. The cruelty of the Japanese is further illustrated by the treatment of an Allied airman, who was captured at Rabaul on the Island of New Britain. He was bound with a rope on which fish-hooks had been attached so that when he moved the hooks dug into his flash. He ultimately died of malnutrition and dysentery. [49,630] MASSACRES Massacres of prisoners of war, civilian internees, sick and wounded, patients and medical staffs of hospitals and civilian population were common throughout the Pacific Area. Prisoners of war and civilian internees were massacred in some instances shortly after capture. A massacre at Balikpapan in Borneo occurred in the following circumstances: On January 20, 1942, two Dutch POW officers were ordered by the Japanese to Balikpapan to transmit an ultimatum to the Dutch commandant in which it was demanded to surrender Balikpapan intact. In case of noncompliance, all Europeans were to be killed. The ultimatum was read in the presence of a Japanese Major General and five other Japanese officers to the Dutch officers who had to deliver it to the commander at Balikpapan. Reply was sent by the Commander of Balikpapan to the Japanese to the effect that the Commander at Balikpapan had had from the Dutch authorities the necessary instructions with regard to demolition, which, therefore, had to be carried out. When the Japanese approached Balikpapan, the oil fields were set on fire. In an affidavit of an eyewitness, the Tribunal was given a description of [49,631] the massacre of the white population of Balikpapan numbering between 80 and 100, who were executed in a cruel manner on 24 February 1942 by being driven into the sea and subsequently shot after some had been killed by having arms and legs lopped off with swords, as is described later. In this relation, it is interesting to note that there was produced, in this trial, a Foreign Affairs document, marked "very secret", containing a "tentative draft of Japan's policies toward the Southern Regions", dated October 4, 1940. In this draft it states with regard to the Dutch East Indies: "If any of the important natural resources should be destroyed, all the persons connected with the raw material, ten government officials concerned, shall be severely punished as being the responsible persons." It was of vital importance for Japan to take the NEI oil fields intact. The oil question was a decisive element in the move to the South, and the Japanese Government was very much afraid lest, in case of war the oil fields would be set on fire. Matsuoka gave expression to this fear to von Ribbentrop on March 29, 1941, when he stated: "If at all avoidable, he would not touch the [49,632] Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the oil fields would be set on fire. They could be brought into operation again only after one or two years." In view of this, and remembering the fact that the Japanese Government officially ordered the destruction of all harmful document's, this Foreign Office draft obtains a special significance. Yamamoto, a former high official in the Foreign Office, when asked for the reason why most of the things planned in the "tentative draft" actually did occur, in spite of the fact that this draft was, according to him, made only by a junior secretary, cynically replied that "these secretaries were very good students." Taking all these facts together, the result justifies the inference that the plan proposed in the draft of October 4, 1940, was accepted as government policy, the more so because a massacre of male personnel also occurred at Blora, apparently in relation to the demolition of the oil fields at Tjepu, Java. Women in this place were not killed, but were all raped several times in the presence of the commanding officer. Instances of such massacres occurred at: Hong Kong, China (December 1941); Ipoh, Malaya (December 1941); between Parit Sulong and Maur, Malaya (January [49,633] 1942); Parit Sulong, Malaya (January 1942): Katonga, Malaya (January 1942): Alexander Hospital, Malaya (January 1942); Singapore, Malaya (February-March 1942) Panjang, Malaya (February 1942); Maur, Malaya (February 1942); Jampong Job, Thailand (December 1941); Longnawa, Borneo (August 1942); Tarakan, Borneo (January 1942); Banka Island, Netherlands East Indies (February 1942); Kota Radja, Sumatra (March 1942); Rembang, Java (March 1942); Lembang, Java (March 1942); Soebang, Java (March 1942); Tjiatar Pass, Java (March 1942); Bandoeng, Java (March 1942); Laha, Ambon Island, Moluccas (February 1942): Okabeti, Dutch Timor (February 1942); Oesapa Besar, Dutch Timor (April 1942); Tatu Meta, Portuguese Timor (February 1942); Milne Bay, British New Guinea (August 1942); Buna, British New Guinea (August 1942); Tol, New Britain (February 1942); Tarawa Island (October 1942); Camp O'Donnell, Philippines (April 1942); and Santa Cruz, Manila, Philippines (April 1942). Massacres occurred in this manner in French Indo-China in the hostilities against the Free French organizations there. Prisoners of war and detained civilians were massacred at such places as: Langson (March 1945); Dinh Lap (March 1945); Thakhek (March 1945); Tong (March 1945); Tan Qui (March 1945); Loas (March 1945); Dong Dang (March 1945); Hagiang [49,634] (March 1945); and Tonkin (March 1945). Citizens of the U.S.S.R. at Hailar in Manchuria were massacred on 9 August 1945. This was done at the instance of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. Those murdered were not charged with any offense, but the reason given for the murders was that they might carry on espionage or sabotage against the Japanese Army. After the Japanese forces had occupied territory and fighting had ceased, massacres were freely committed as a means of terrorizing the civilian population and subjecting them to the domination of the Japanese. Massacres of this type were committed against the civilian population at the following places: Shanyway, Burma (1945); Tharrawaddy, Burma (May 1945); Ongun, Burma (May 1945); Ebaing, Burma (June 1945 ); Kalagon, Burma (July 1945); Mantanani Island (February 1944); Sulug Island (October 1943); Udar Island (Early 1944); Dinowan Island (July 1944); Pontianak, Borneo (October 1943-June 1944); Singkawang, Borneo (August 1944); Buitenzorg, Java (1943); Java (The "Koo" Incident) (July 1943-March 1944); Lautem, Portuguese Timor (January 1943); Moa Island (September 1944); Semata Island (September 1944); Mileu, Portuguese Timor (September 1942); Nauru Island (March 1943); [49,635] Hopevale, Philippines (December 1943); Alaminos, Philippines (March 1944); San Carlos, Philippines (February 1943); Barrio Anged, Philippines (November 1944); Palo Beach, Philippines (July 1943); Tigbuan, Philippines (August 1943); Calbayog, Philippines (July 1943); Ranao-Pilayan, Philippines (June 1944); Bogo, Philippines (October 1944); Barrio Umagos, Philippines (October 1944); Lipa Airport, Philippines (1944); Santa Catalina, Philippines (August 1944); and Sitio Canugkay, Pilar, Philippines (December 1944). There were massacres of prisoners of war and civilian internees or conscripted laborers during the occupation which were committed because they had become starved, diseased or otherwise disabled and were no longer of use or for other reasons had become a burden to the Japanese occupation force. Such massacres were committed at the following places; Chaymoge Labor Camp, Siam (February 1944); Hsipaw, Burma (January 1945); Port Blair, Andaman Islands (August 1945), Kota Tjane, Sumatra (May 1943); Sibolga, Sumatra (April 1942); Djombang, Java (April 1942); Amboina, Ambon Island (July 1943); Wewak, British New Guinea (May 1944); Aitape, New Guinea (October 1943); But, New Guinea (June 1944); Rabaul, New Britain (January 1943); Bougainville (August 1944); Wake Island (October 1943); [49,636] and in the labor camps along the Burma-Siam Railroad Project (1943-1944). There were some massacres which were intended to discourage general violation of regulations such as that at the labor camp on Hainan Island (May 1943) in an effort to prevent smuggling; that at Saigon, French Indo-China (December 1943) intended to prevent illegal use of the radio; and that of civilians and prisoners of war at Amboins, Ambon Island (July 1943) where the civilians were killed for giving, and the prisoners for receiving, food. In addition to those referred to were other massacres and murders, such as that aboard the Nitta Manu (December 1941) where American prisoners of war were beheaded; and that on New Guinea which involved the killing of two American prisoners of war (October 1944). In the latter case, the Japanese officer responsible said, "I asked if I could get an American prisoner of war and kill him." The Commander of the 36th Japanese Division promptly granted the request and delivered two prisoners to be killed. They were blindfolded, tied and stabbed in the back with bayonets and then decapitated with shovels. There were massacres perpetrated in anticipation of a Japanese withdrawal or of an Allied attack. These were not limited to prisoners of war, although [49,637] many prisoners were massacred under these circumstances, apparently to prevent them from being liberated by the Allied forces. Civilian internees and members of the civilian population were also massacred under such circumstances. Massacres of this type occurred in the following places: Hailar, China (August 1945); Malacca, Nicobar Islands (July 1945); Sandakan, British Borneo (June-July 1945); Ranau, British Borneo (August 1945); Kuala Belat, British Borneo (June 1945); Miri, British Borneo (June 1945); Labuan, British Borneo (June 1945); Lacluta, Portuguese Timor (September 1945); Ballah Island (January 1943); Ocean Island (September 1943); Puerto Princesa, Philippines (December 1944); Irisan Area, Philippines (April 1945); Calambya, Philippines (February 1945); Panghulo, Philippines (February 1945); Tapel, Philippines (July 1945); and Barrio Dinwiddie, Philippines (August 1945). Massacres of this kind were very numerous in Batangas Province of the Philippines. They were committed among others at the following places: Barrio San Indres (January 1945); Bauan (February 1945); Santo Tomas (February 1945); Lippa (February and March 1945); Taal (February 1945); Tanauan (February 1945); and Rosario (March 1945). When it became apparent that Manila would be liberated massacres of this type were committed all over [49,638] the city as well as rape and arson. We have not mentioned massacres of prisoners of war at sea, to be discussed later, non those that occurred in "death marches." These also we shall mention later. Apart from the massacres already mentioned there were many individual murders. Many of them were committed in horrible fashion; many were committed in connection with other crimes such as rape, robbery and arson, while others were committed apparently for no other purpose than to gratify the cruel instincts of the perpetrators. Some of the massacres call for further description especially those of patients and medical personnel in military hospitals which were clearly marked with the Geneva insignia and entitled to protection under that convention as well as the general laws of war. During the massacres at Hong Kong, Japanese troops entered the Military Hospital at St. Stephens College and bayoneted the sick and wounded in their beds, and raped and murdered nurses who were on duty there. During the battle of Northwestern Jehore in Malaya (January 1942), an ambulance convoy containing sick and wounded was captured by Japanese soldiers. The personnel and wounded were removed from the ambulances and killed by shooting, bayoneting and burning [49,639] alive after being saturated with oil. At Katonga in Malaya (January 1942), an ambulance convoy was fired upon by Japanese machine gunners. The personnel and wounded were taken from the convoy, tied together and shot in the back. The Alexandra Hospital at Singapore, Malaya, was captured by the Japanese forces on 13 February 1942. The Japanese troops went through the first floor of the hospital and bayoneted everyone on that floor. They entered the operating room where a soldier was under chloroform undergoing an operation and bayoneted the patient, the surgeon and the anesthetist. They then went to the second floor and other parts of the building and removed the patients and medical personnel and massacred them. When the Japanese troops entered Soebang, Java, in March 1942, they removed a nurse and her patients from the Military Hospital and massacred them with women and children of the civilian population. These massacres in disregard of the laws of war respecting the treatment to be accorded to military hospitals and their personnel and patients illustrate the attitude of Japanese soldiers and their officers towards the laws of war. There is a similarity of method to be found in most of the massacres. The victims were first bound and than shot, bayoneted or decapitated with swords. [49,640] In most instances, the victims were shot and then bayoneted by Japanese slodiers who went among the wounded killing those who still lived. In a number of cases they were gathered on a beach with the water to their backs or on the edge of a cliff and there killed. In some places even more dreadful methods were employed. At the Manila German Club and at Fort Santiago the victims were gathered together in a building, which was set on fire; and those who attempted to escape were shot or bayoneted as they emerged from the flames. In evidence upon the atrocity committed at the German Club in Manila in February 1945, it was disclosed that fugitives took shelter under the Club from bombardment and shell-fire then proceeding. Japanese soldiers surrounded the Club by a barricade of inflammable material, then poured gasoline over this barricade and ignited it. Thus the fugitives were forced to attempt to escape through the flaming barricade. Most of them were bayoneted and shot by the waiting Japanese soldiers. Some of the women were raped and their infants bayoneted in their arms. After raping the women the Japanese poured gasoline on their hair and ignited it. The breasts of some of the women were cut off by Japanese soldiers. [49,641] A massacre took place at St. Paul's College in Manila in the following manner: Approximately 250 people were placed in the building and the doors and windows solidly shot and barred. While so confined it was noticed that the three hanging chandeliers were wrapped in blackout paper and that strings or light wires ran from inside these wrappings to the outside of the building, Later the Japanese brought in biscuits, candy and liquor of some sort, placed them in the centre of the room and told the captives that they were safe where they were and that they might have the food and drink which had been brought to them. Accordingly they went to the food as deposited and within a matter of moments there were three explosions. The covered chandeliers had contained explosives. Many were thrown to the floor and a panic ensued, Japanese outside the building began firing machine guns into it and threw grenades. The explosions had blown out the windows and a portion of the well, through which those who were able endeavoured to escape. Many of these were killed as they tried to do so. [49,642] At a prisoner of war camp above Puerto Princesa Bay on the Philippine Island of Palawan there occurred a particularly cruel and premeditated massacre of American prisoners. There were some 150 prisoners in this camp. They had been told previously by their captors that if Japan won the war they would be returned to America but that they would be killed if Japan were defeated. Before the massacre there had been some raiding of the island by American aircraft. In the camp a number of shallow and lightly covered air raid shelters had been dug. At about 2 p.m. on 14 December 1944, the prisoners were ordered to go to these shelters. Japanese soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns were posted around the camp. When the prisoners were all in the shelters, gasoline was thrown into them from buckets and then this was followed by lighted torches. Explosions followed and those prisoners who were not too badly burnt struggled to escape. These were killed by fire from the rifles and machine guns placed in position for the purpose. In some cases they were killed by bayonet thrusts. Five only of the 150 survived this dreadful experience. They did so by swimming out into the bay whence after nightfall they escaped into the jungle and eventually joined up with Philippines guerillas. Mass drowning was used at Port Blair, Andaman [49,643] Islands (August 1945), where the civilian internees were placed aboard ship, taken to sea, and forced into the water. A combination of drowning and shooting, similar to that employed at Hankow, was used at Kota Radja (March 1942), where Dutch prisoners of war were placed in sloops, towed to sea, shot and thrown into the sea. At Tarakan, Borneo (January 1942), Dutch prisoners of war were taken aboard a Japanese light cruiser, taken to the spot where a Japanese destroyer had been fired upon by them, decapitated and thrown into the sea. MASSACRES WERE ORDERED The evidence shows that most of these massacres were ordered by commissioned officers, that some of them were ordered by high-ranking generals and admirals, that in many cases commissioned officers were actually present during their commission, observing, directing or actually doing the killing. Japanese orders were captured which gave directions for killing Filipinos. The file of orders issued by the Manila Navy Defence Force between December 1944 and February 1945 was captured. It contained this order: "Be careful to make no mistake in the time of exploding and burning when the enemy invades. When killing Filipinos, assemble them together in one place as far as possible thereby saving ammunition and labor." Diaries of Japanese soldiers were captured [49,644] indicating that their owners had been ordered to massacre and had done so pursuant to such orders. Battle reports of military units and police reports of military police, which were captured, contained reports to superior authorities relating to massacres which had been committed, together with the number of rounds of ammunition expended and the number of victims killed. Prisoners of war from many camps in Japan and the occupied areas have testified that they were informed by their Japanese, Formosan and Korean guards that they would be killed in case the Allies invaded the locality or if Japan should lose the war. We have referred to cases where these threats were carried out. In one camp, at least, written evidence of an order from higher authority to kill the prisoners of war was found. The captured journal from a camp in Formosa contained an entry showing that a reply had been sent to an inquiry from the Chief-of-Staff of the 11th Military Police Unit of the Kiirun Fortified Area Headquarters regarding "extreme measures" for prisoners of war. The method to be employed in carrying out these "extreme measures" was detailed as follows: "Whether they are destroyed individually or in groups, or however it is done, with mass bombing, poisonous smoke, poisons, drowning, decapitation, or what, dispose of them as the situation dictates. In any case, it is the aim not to [49,645] allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces." This annihilation was, inter alia, prescribed in all cases "where escapes from the camp may turn into a hostile fighting force." A general order was issued by Vice-Minister of War Shibayama on 11 March 1945. The order stated: "The handling of prisoners of war in these times when the state of things is becoming more and more pressing and the evils of war extend to the Imperial Domain, Manchuria and other places, is in the enclosed summary. We hope you follow it, making no mistakes." The enclosed summary to which reference was made began: "The Policy: With the greatest efforts prevent the prisoners of war falling into the hands of the enemy. Further for this purpose carry out a transfer of the place of confinement for those prisoners of war for whom it is necessary." The Ranau Death Marches, which began at about this time between Sandakan and Ranau in Borneo to which we will refer presently, conformed to the policy indicated by the order just quoted. DEATH MARCHES The Japanese Army did not observe the laws of war in the movement of prisoners of war from one place to another. Prisoners were forced to march long distances without sufficient food and water and without [49,646] rest. Sick and wounded were forced to march in the same manner as the able. Prisoners, who fell behind on such marches were beaten, tortured and murdered. We have been furnished evidence of many such marches. The Bataan March is a conspicuous example. When General King surrendered his forces on Bataan on 9 April 1942, he was assured by Japanese General Homma's Chief-of-Staff that his soldiers would be treated humanely. General King had saved sufficient trucks from demolition to move his men from Bataan to the prisoner of war camp. The American and Filipino soldiers on Bataan had been on short rations and the sick and wounded were numerous. However, when General King suggested the use of the trucks, he was forbidden to do so. The prisoners were marched in intense heat along the highway to San Fernando, Pampanga, which is a distance of 120 kilometers or 75 miles. The sick and wounded were forced to march. Those who fell by the roadside and were unable to continue were shot or bayoneted. Others were taken from the ranks, beaten, tortured and killed. The march continued for nine days, with the Japanese guards being relieved at five kilometer intervals by fresh guards who had been transported in the American trucks. During the first five days the prisoner received little as no food or water. [49,647] Thereafter, the only water available was that from an occasional artesian well or caribou wallow. When the prisoners grouped around a well in an attempt to get water the Japanese fired upon them. Shooting and bayoneting of prisoners were commonplace. Dead bodies littered the side of the road. Murata, who had been sent to the Philippines in February 1942 by War Minister TOJO as a civilian advisor to General Homma, drove along this highway and saw the dead bodies along the highway in such great numbers that he was prompted to ask General Homma about the situation. Murata testified that, "I merely saw it; I did not complain about it; I just asked questions." At San Fernando, the prisoners were crowded into railway freight cars to be transported to Camp O'Donnell. They were forced to stand through lack of space and many died in the cars from exhaustion and lack of ventilation. It is not clear how many died in this movement from Bataan to Camp O'Donnell. The evidence indicates that there were approximately 8,000 deaths of American and Filipino prisoners. At Camp O'Donnell, the evidence shows that from April to December 1942 no less than 27,500 Americans and Filipinos died. TOJO admitted that he heard of this march in 1942 from many different sources. He said that his [49,648] information was to the effect that the prisoners had been forced to march long distances in the heat and that many deaths had occurred. TOJO also admitted that the United States Government's protest against the unlawful treatment of these prisoners had been received and discussed at the bi-weekly meetings of the Bureaux Chiefs in the War Ministry soon after the death march occurred, but that he left the matter to the discretion of the Bureau Chiefs. TOJO said that the Japanese forces in the Philippines were not called upon for a report on the incident and that he did not even discuss the matter with General Homma when that General visited Japan in early 1943. TOJO said that he first inquired into this subject when he visited the Philippines in May 1943; and at that time he discussed it with General Homma's Chief-of-Staff, who informed him of the details. TOJO explained his failure to take action to prevent a repetition of similar atrocities as follows: "It is Japanese custom for a commander of an expeditionary army in the field to be given a mission in the performance of which he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo, but has considerable autonomy." This can mean only that under the Japanese method of warfare such atrocities were expected to occur, or were at least permitted, and that the Government was not concerned to [49,649] prevent them. Such atrocities were repeated during the Pacific War which it is reasonable to assume resulted from the condonation of General Homma's conduct at Bataan. OTHER FORCED MARCHES On the march from the port to Koepang prisoner of war camp on Dutch Timor in February 1942 the prisoners suffering from wounds, hunger, malaria and dysentery were marched for five days with their hands tied behind their backs, and were driven and beaten along by their Japanese and Korean guards like a herd of cattle. Similar marches were imposed upon Indian prisoners between Wewak, But and Aitape in British New Guinea during 1943 and 1944. On those marches the prisoners who became ill and were unable to keep up with the main body were shot. There was evidence of other similar happenings. Those mentioned show the accepted and common practice followed by the Japanese Army and Prisoner of War Administration when moving prisoners of war from one place to another under harsh conditions enforced by the beating and murdering of stragglers. The Ranau marches are in a different category. They began early in 1945, when the Japanese feared that the Allies were preparing a landing at Kuching; the [49,650] purpose of these marches was to remove the prisoners to prevent their liberation. The village of Ranau is in a jungle over 100 miles west of Sandakan in Borneo on the eastern slope of Mt. Kinabalu. The trail from Sandakan to Ranau lies through dense jungle and is too narrow for vehicles. The first 30 miles are marshy and heavy with mud and slush. The next 40 miles are in higher country over short, steep hills. The next 20 miles are over a mountain. The last 26 miles are all uphill and mountainous. Australian prisoners of war were moved along this jungle trail in a series of marches. The prisoners were suffering from malaria, dysentery, beri-beri and malnutrition before they were taken from the camp at Sandakan. The test to determine whether a prisoner was fit to make the march was to beat and torture him to make him stand; if he did stand, he was considered fit for the march. The prisoners were forced to carry food and ammunition for their guards as well as their own scanty rations. One party of 40 prisoners was forced to subsist for three days on this march upon six cucumbers divided among them. Those who fell out of the marching column were shot or bayoneted to death. The marches continued until the first part of April 1945. The trail was littered with the corpses of those who perished along the way. Less than one third of the prisoners of war who [49,651] began these marches at Sandakan ever reached Ranau. Those who did reach Ranau were starved and tortured to death or died of disease or were murdered. Only six out of more than two thousand who were prisoners at Sandakan are known to have survived. These did so by escaping from the camp at Ranau. Those who were too sick to begin the marches at Sandakan died of disease or were murdered by their guards. We will adjourn for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,652] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment. BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY A flagrant example of atrocities over an extended period in one area is found in the treatment of prisoners of war and native workmen employed in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway. Prior to and during the work prisoners were constantly subjected to ill-treatment, torture and privation of all kinds, commencing with a forced march of 200 miles to the area under almost indescribable hardships. As a result in eighteen months 16,000 prisoners out of 46,000 died. To further their strategic plans in Burma and India, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters early in 1942 considered the question of communications. The shortest convenient line of communications at that time was through Thailand. It was decided to link the railroad running from Bangkok in Siam with that from Moulmein in Burma, the distance of the gap being about 250 miles (400 kilometers). This communication with the Japanese armies in Burma would be facilitated. [49,653] For that purpose, on the advice of TOJO, it was decided to use prisoners of war and orders were issued to the Southern Army then stationed in Malaya to proceed with the work with all possible speed, November 1943 being fixed as the completion date. Pursuant to these orders two groups of prisoners were sent from the Singapore area commencing in August 1942; one group known as "A" Force being sent by sea and the second group, composed of "F" and "H" Forces by rail to Bangpong. From Bangpong they were made to march to the various camps along the line of the projected construction. Before "F" and "H" Forces left Singapore, the Japanese general in charge of the prisoner of war administration informed the prisoners that they were being sent to rest camps in the mountains where the food situation was better because so many of them were sick and suffering from malnutrition, caused by lack of food and insanitary conditions in the Singapore camps. He therefore insisted that the sick be included in those to be sent to the labor camps. The prisoners were crowded into railway freight cars with the men sitting cross-legged on the floor without sufficient space to lie down. They had been told that it would not be necessary to carry along their cooking [49,654] utensils as they would be replaced. However, they were not replaced. Furthermore, the only food furnished the prisoners was thin vegetable stew, and for the last twenty- four hours of the trip by rail no food or water was available. After four days and four nights the prisoners were detrained and required to surrender their baggage and what cooking gear they had brought, as well as all drugs and medical equipment. They were then required to march 200 miles on foot in two and onehalf weeks. The march would have taxed fit soldiers, as the route lay over rough jungle tracks in mountainous country. The march was accomplished in fifteen night stages in the rain and mud of the monsoon. The weakened condition of the prisoners, together with the necessity of carrying some 2,000 non-walking sick, made this march almost beyond human endurance. Some of those who became sick or too weak to march were beaten and driven by their guards. In the camps established along the projected railway, which lay in virgin jungle, no cover was provided; sanitary facilities were almost non-existent, medical care and drugs were not provided, clothing was not furnished, rations were completely inadequate, while the constant driving and daily beating of the [49,655] prisoners added to the ever-mounting toll of dead and disabled. Those who tried to escape were killed. Other groups of prisoners of war from Singapore followed "F" and "H" Forces and were accorded similar treatment. TOJO told the Tribunal that he had received reports of the poor condition of the prisoners employed on this project and that he sent the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau to investigate in May 1943. He admits that the only action which he took as a result of that investigation was to court-martial a certain company commander who had dealt unfairly with the prisoners of war, and to relieve from duty the Commanding General of Railway Construction. However, we find from other evidence that the Commanding General was not removed because of the ill- treatment of prisoners of war. The first Commanding General of Railway Construction, who was in charge of this project, was killed by an Allied air raid. The second Commanding General in charge of the project was transferred because he was too sick to attend to his duties, and because the work was not progressing fast enough for the Imperial General Headquarters. The inspector, who recommended the removal of the second Commanding General was not, as stated by TOJO, the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, but Wakamatsu, the [49,656] Director of the Third Division of the Army General Staff in charge of transportation and communication. He reported to the Chief of the Army General Staff that the work was not making sufficient progress and recommended that the General in command of the railroad units in Malaya be placed in charge of the construction and that he be allowed a two-months extension of the date set for the completion of the road. The court-martial of one company commander was so insignificant and inadequate as a corrective measure in view of the general disregard of the laws of war by those in charge of prisoners of war on this project and the inhumane treatment to which they were subjecting the prisoners as to amount to condonation of their conduct. One of the principal concerns of the Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff in 1943 was that the railway should be completed in time to use it in resisting the advance of the Allied forces which was making progress in Burma. No concern appears to have been shown for the cost in sick, wounded and dead Allied prisoners of war caused by the constant driving, beating, torturing and murdering at the hands of their Japanese and Korean guards and the insanitary conditions in which the prisoners were required to live and work and the failure of the [49,657] Japanese Government to furnish the barest necessities of life and medical care. The lack of proper accommodation, the treatment of the sick, and the inhumane treatment of prisoners engaged in connection with construction of the railway, which is typical of Japanese treatment of prisoners of war, is described by the witness, Colonel Wild, who was kept on this project until November 1943. Colonel Wild, who, by reason of his knowledge of Japanese, acted as liaison officer between the prisoners of war and the Japanese officers, visited many of the camps in which the prisoners were kept and had a first-hand knowledge of the treatment accorded them. The following extract from his evidence graphically describes conditions: "Q: Substantially, was there any difference between the living conditions and treatment of prisoners of war in these various camps? A: None. Q: Will you describe one of them as an example? A: When I entered Songkrai camp on the third of August 1943, I went first to a very large hut accommodating about 700 men. The hut was of the usual pattern. On each side of an earthen gangway there was a [49,658] 12-foot wide sleeping platform made of split bamboo. The roof was inadequately made with an insufficient quantity of palm leaves which let the rain through almost everywhere. There were no walls, and a stream of water was running down the earthen gangway. The framework of the hut was bamboo tied with creeper. In this hut were 700 sick men. They were lying two deep along each side of the hut on the split bamboo platform. Their bodies were touching one another down the whole length of the hut. They were all very thin and practically naked. In the middle of the hut were about 150 men suffering from tropical ulcers. These commonly stripped the whole of the flesh from a man's leg from the knee to the ankle. There was an almost overwhelming smell of putrefaction. The only dressings available were banana leaves tied around with puttees, and the only medicine was hot water. There was another hut further up the hill of similar design in which so-called fit men were kept, and one well-roofed and better constructed hut occupied by the Japanese guards. Q: Was there any bedding supplied? A: None whatever. Q: What did they have to cover them from the rain? [49,659] A: When we first entered these working camps none of them were roofed at all for the first few weeks. The monsoon had already broken, and during those weeks the men had nothing whatever to cover themselves from the rain except banana leaves. If they were strong enough each man cut a couple of banana leaves and put them over his own body. Q: Was any roofing material ever received? A: In my own camp of which I was in command, Lower Niki, we got a lorry load of atap palm, which was enough to roof half the hut in which the worst of the sick were lying. In Niki Camp no atap palm was ever received, but we got some rotten, leaking canvas. In the other four camps after a few weeks about enough atap palm was supplied to roof all the huts with about half the amount that was necessary. Again, this does not apply to the Japanese and Korean guards, who always had a proper roof over them. Q: By the middle of July 1943, that is ten weeks after you had left Singapore, what was the state of 'F' Force at a whole? A: We had 1700 deaths by that time, and 700 men out of the 7,000 were going out to work. Of these 700, we British officers considered that 350 should have been lying down sick." [49,660] The account of the construction of this railway could be incomplete without reference to the treatment of the conscripted native labour employed. To supplement the prisoners of war employed on the work, native labourers, Burmese, Tamils, Javanese, Malayans and Chinese were recruited, sometimes on promises of varying kinds, and at others by force for labour in occupied areas. In all about 150,000 of these labourers were employed on the railway work. The treatment given them and the conditions under which they existed were, if anything, worse than those already described. At least 60,000 of the 150,000 died during the period of construction. We shall deal later in some detail with protests made by the Allies against ill- treatment of prisoners and shall refer to knowledge of atrocities on the part of the General Staff and the Government. It is, however, pertinent at this stage to refer to the evidence establishing that before the railway project was begun the Army was advised of the terrible conditions under which the work would be done; that the Government had knowledge of the casualties and failed to remedy these conditions. In 1942 before the work began the Southern Army Headquarters was advised of the danger of prisoners [49,661] contracting the various tropical diseases, and from time to time the death rate was reported. Confirmation of the knowledge of the danger to the health of the prisoners and the insufficiency of food, shelter and medical supplies is found in a report dated 6 October 1944 from the Chief of Staff of the Southern Army to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, reading in part: "For strategic reasons the completion of the railway was most urgent. Since the proposed site of this railway line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food, provisions and medical supplies were far from adequate and much different from normal conditions for prisoners of war." In July 1943, when thousands of prisoners had died or were incapacitated by disease, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU in reply to a protest said that the prisoners were equitably treated and that all sick received medical attention. Yet, even according to Japanese figures, within a month of the sending of SHIGEMITSU's message the total prisoners who had died in Thailand alone was 2,909. According to the same source the death rate had increased enormously month by month from 54 in November 1942 to 800 in August 1943. In the summer of 1943 Wakamatsu on his return to Tokyo from his inspection of the area previously [49,662] referred to, reported personally to Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff, that he had seen many cases of beri-beri and dysentery and that the quality of the food was not of the required standard. It is claimed that many of the deaths occurred because the Allied Forces interfered with the regular supply of food and drugs. However, for the very reason of this interference with shipping the order was given in February 1943 to shorten the terms by which the work had to be finished by four months. Since that order the commanders became reckless. POW were told: Man are of no importance, the railroad has to be built irrespective of any suffering or death, or, "the construction of the railway had to go on without delay as it was required for operational purposes, and had to be finished within a certain time at all costs, irrespective of the loss of lives of British and Australian prisoners." Finally we refer to one of the monthly reports, dated 3 September 1943, received by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau from the Prisoner of War Commandant in Thailand, which stated that of a total of 40,314 prisoners 15,064 were sick. In view of the practice of forcing beri-beri and dysentery cases to continue to work, the number of sick, if these had [49,663] been included, would have been much greater. TORTURE AND OTHER INHUMANE TREATMENT The practice of torturing prisoners of war and civilian internees prevailed at practically all places occupied by Japanese troops, both in the occupied territories and in Japan. The Japanese indulged in this practice during the entire period of the Pacific War. Methods of torture were employed in all areas so uniformly as to indicate policy both in training and execution. Among these tortures were the water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. The Japanese Military Police, the Kempeitai, was most active in inflicting these tortures. Other Army and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the Kempeitai. Camp guards also employed similar methods. Local police forces organized by the Kempeitai in the occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture. We will show how the Chiefs of Camps were instructed in Tokyo before assuming their duties. We will also show that these Chiefs of Camps were under the administrative control and supervision of the Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to which they [49,664] rendered monthly reports. The Kempeitai were administered by the War Ministry. A Kempaitai training school was maintained and operated by the War Ministry in Japan. It is a reasonable inference that the conduct of the Kempeitai and the camp guards reflected the policy of the War Ministry. To indicate the prevalence of torture and the uniformity of the methods employed we give a brief summary of these methods. The so-called "water treatment" was commonly applied. The victim was bound or otherwise secured in a prone position; and water was forced through his mouth and nostrils into his lungs and stomach until he lost consciousness. Pressure was then applied, sometimes by jumping upon his abdomen to force the water out. The usual practice was to revive the victim and successively repeat the process. There was evidence that this torture was used in the following places: China, at Shanghai, Peiping and Nanking; French Indo-China, at Hanoi and Saigon; Malaya, at Singapore; Burma, at Kyaikto; Thailand, at Chumporn; Andaman Islands, at Port Blair; Borneo, at Jesselton; Sumatra, at Medan, Tadjong Karang and Palembang; Java, at Batavia, Bandung, Soerabaja and Buitenzorg; Celebes, at Nakassar; Portuguese Timor, at Ossu and Dilli; Philippines, [49,665] at Manila, Nichols Field, Palo Beach and Dumaguete; Formosa, at Camp Haito; and in Japan, at Tokyo. Torture by burning was practiced extensively. This torture was generally inflicted by burning the body of the victim with lighted cigarettes, but in some instances burning candles, hot irons, burning oil and scalding water were used. In many of these cases, the heat was applied to sensitive parts of the body, such as the nostrils, ears, abdomen, sexual organs, and in the case of women, to the breasts. We have evidence of specific instances in which this form of torture was employed in the following places: China, at Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai and Nomonhan; French Indo- China, at Haiphong, Hanoi, Vinh and Saigon; Malaya, at Singapore, Victoria Point, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur; Burma, at Kyaikto; Thailand, at Chumporn; Andaman Islands, at Port Blair; Nicobar Islands, at Kakana; Borneo, at Jesselton; Sumatra, at Palembang and Pakan Baru; Java, at Batavia, Bandung and Semarang; Moluccas Islands, at Amboina; Portuguese Timor, at Ossu; Solomon Islands, at Buin; Philippine Islands, at Manila, Iloilo City, Palo, Bataan and Lumagueto; and in Japan, at Kawasaki. [49,666] The electric shock method was also common. Electric current was applied to a part of the victim's body so as to produce a shock. The point of application was generally a sensitive part of the body such as the nose, ears, sexual organs or breasts. The evidence shows specific instances of the use of this method of torture at the following places; China, at Peiping and Shanghai; French Indo-China, at Hanoi and Mytho; Malaya, at Singapore; Thailand, at Chumporn; Java, at Bandung, Buitenzorg and Semarang; and in the Philippine Islands, at Davao. The so-called knee spread was a frequent method of torture. The victim, with his hands tied behind his back, was forced to kneel with a pole, sometimes as much as three inches in diameter, inserted behind both knee joints so as to spread those joints as pressure was applied to his thighs, at times by jumping on his thighs, The result of this torture was to separate the knee joints and so cause intense pain. The evidence shows specific instances of this torture being used at the following places: China at Shanghai and Nanking; Burma, at Tavoy; Andaman Islands, at Port Blair; Borneo, at Sandakan; Sumatra, at Pakan Baru; Moluccas Islands, at Halmahera Island; Portuguese Timor, at Dilli; Philippine Islands, at Manila, Nichols Field and Pasay Camp; and in Japan [49,667] at Tokyo. Suspension was another common form of torture. The body of the victim was suspended by the wrists, arms, legs or neck, and at times in such manner as to strangle the victim or pull joints from their sockets. This method was at times combined with flogging during suspension. Specific instances of the employment of this method of torture occurred in the following places: China, at Shanghai and Nanking; French Indo-China, at Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore, Victoria Point, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur; Thailand, at Chumporn; Burma at Kyaikto; Borneo, at Sandakan; Sumatra, at Brastagi; Java, at Bandung, Soerabaja and Buitenzorg; Moluccas Islands, at Amboina; Portuguese Timor, at Dilli; Philippine Islands, at Manila, Nichols Field, Palo, Iloilo City and Dumaguete; and in Japan, at Tokyo and Yokkaichi. Kneeling on sharp instruments was another form of torture. The edges of square blocks were mostly used as the sharp instruments. The victim was forced to kneel on these sharp edges for hours without relief; if he moved he was flogged. Specific instances of the use of this method have been shown to us to have occurred at the following places: French Indo-China, at Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore; Andaman Islands, at Port Blair, Moluccas Islands, on Halmahera Island; Philippine Islands, at Davao; [49,668] and in Japan, at Fukuoka and Omuta. Removal of the nails of the fingers and toes also occurred. Instances of this method of torture are found at the following places: China, at Shanghai; Celebes, at Manado; Philippines, at Manila, Iloilo City; and in Japan, at Yamani. Underground dungeons were used as torture chambers at the following places: French Indo-China, at Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore; and in Java, at Bandung. Flogging was the most common of the cruelties of the Japanese. It was commonly used at all prisoner of war and instance camps, prisons, Kempeitai headquarters and at all work camps and on all work projects as well as aboard prison ships. It was indulged in freely by the guards with the approval and often at the direction of the Camp Commandant or some other officer. Special instruments were issued for use in flogging at camps; some of these were billets of wood the size of a baseball bat. On occasions prisoners were forced to beat their fellow prisoners under the supervision of the guards. Prisoners suffered internal injuries, broken bones, and lacerations from these beatings. In many instances they were beaten into unconsciousness only to be revived in order to suffer a further beating. The evidence shows that on occasions prisoners were beaten to death. [49,669] Mental torture was commonly employed. An illustration of this form of torture is to be found in the treatment to which the Doolittle fliers were subjected. After having been subjected to the various other forms of torture, they were taken one at a time and marched blindfolded a considerable distance. The victim could hear voices and marching feet, then the noise of a squad halting and lowering their rifles as if being formed to act as a firing squad. A Japanese officer then came up to the victim and said: "We are Knights of the Bushido of the Order of the Rising Sun; we do not execute at sundown; we execute at sunrise." The victim was then taken back to his cell and informed that unless he talked before sunrise, he would be executed. On 5 December 1944, the Swiss Legation in Tokyo delivered to Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU a Note of Protest from the British Government. In that note SHIGEMITSU was informed that a copy of a book entitled, "Notes for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War", and issued by the Japanese Hayashi Division in Burma on 6 August 1943, had been captured. The note gave SHIGEMITSU direct quotations from that book as follows: "Care must be exercised when making use of rebukes, invectives or torture as it will result in his telling falsehoods and making a fool of you. The following are the methods normally to be adopted: [49,670] (a) Torture, which includes kicking, beating and anything connected with physical suffering. This method to be used only when everything else fails as it is the most clumsy one." (This passage was specially marked in the copy captured.) "Change the interrogating officer when using violent torture, and good results can be had if the new officer questions in a sympathetic manner. (b) Threats. (1) Hints of future physical discomforts, for instance: torture, murder, starving, solitary confinement, deprivation of sleep. (2) Hints of future mental discomforts, for instances: he will not be allowed to send letters, he will not be given the same treatment as the other prisoners of war, he will be kept till the last in the event of an exchange of prisoners, etc." The note then continued: “The Government of the United Kingdom has requested that the attention of the Japanese Government be drawn to the foregoing. It recalls that the Japanese Government has recently strongly denied that Imperial Japanese authorities make use of torture. See the letter from SHIGEMITSU to the Swiss Minister of 1 July 1944." We have no evidence that any action was taken to stop this practice of torturing Allied prisoners of war; on the other hand, the practice continued to the time of the surrender of Japan and, when the surrender came, orders were issued to assist the criminals in [49,671] avoiding just punishment for their crimes. In addition to ordering all incriminating evidence in the form of documents to be destroyed, the following order was issued by the Chief of Prisoner of War Camps of the Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau on 20 August 1945: "Personnel who mistreated prisoners of war and internees or are held in extremely bad sentiment by them are permitted to take care of it by immediately transferring, or by fleeing without trace." This order was sent to various prisoner of war camps including those in Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Hong Kong, Borneo, Thailand, Malaya and Java. VIVISECTION AND CANNIBALISM Vivisection was practiced by Japanese Medical Officers upon prisoners in their hands. There were also cases of dismemberment of prisoners by Japanese who were not Medical Officers. In addition to the incidents stated below other dismembered bodies of dead captives were found in circumstances indicating that the mutilation had occurred before death. There was evidence that at Khandok a prisoner of war described as "healty, unwounded", was treated as follows: "The man was tied to a tree outside the Hikari Kikan Office. A Japanese doctor and four Japanese medical [49,672] students stood around him. They first removed the finger malls, then cutting open his chest removed his heart, on which the doctor gave a practical demonstration.” The captured diary of a Japanese, apparently an officer, recorded an incident on Guadalcanal. "26 September - Discovered and captured the two prisoners who escaped last night in the jungle, and let the Guard Company guard them. To prevent their escaping a second time, pistols were fired at their feet, but it was difficult to hit them. The two prisoners were dissected while still alive by Medical Officer Yamaji and their livers were taken out, and for the first time I saw the internal organs of a human being. It was very informative." A case of mutilation of a living captive, this time not by a medical, but by a combatant Japanese officer, was deposed to from Canangay, in the Philippines. The evidence was: ". . . A young woman (. . .) about 24 years old was caught hiding in the grass. The officer in charge of the entire patrol tore off her clothes, while two soldiers held her. He then had her taken to a small nipa hut, without walls . . . and there the officer in charge of the patrol used his sabre to cut her breasts and womb. Soldiers held her while the officer did this. At first the girl was screaming. [49,673] She finally lay still and silent. The Japanese then set fire to the nipa hut. . . ." At Manila an eye witness described how his house boy was tied to a pillar. The Japanese then cut off his genitals and thrust his severed penis in his mouth. Other instances of the mutilation of prisoners in the hands of Japanese soldiers occurred at Balikpapan in Borneo. The incident was related by an eye witness as follows: "I saw a district officer in uniform and a police inspector in uniform. A Japanese officer started a conversation with that district officer. . . . I saw that during that conversation that officer was ill-treating the district officer by blows in his face with the hand, and further with the scabbard over his body. . . . The Japanese officer who had started the talk with the (Dutch) district officer, drew his sword and hewed off both the district officer's arms, a little above his elbows, and then his two legs at the height of the knees. The district officer was also taken to a cocoanut tree, bound to it and stabbed to death with a bayonet. . . . After this, the same officer went over to the policeman in uniform; . . . he was kicked and beaten with the hand and with the sword in the scabbard. After this, that (Japanese) officer hewed off his arms under the elbow and his legs near the knees. I heard him shout once more, 'God save the Queen'. [49,674] With bayonet thrusts and kicks the policeman was made to stand up and, standing on his leg stumps, he was stabbed to death with a bayonet." Towards the end of the Pacific War the Japanese Army and Navy descended to cannibalism, eating parts of the bodies of Allied prisoners whom they had unlawfully killed. This practice was not unnoticed nor even disapproved by the Japanese Army. A Japanese prisoner upon interrogation said: "On 10 December 1944 an order was issued from 18th Army Headquarters that troops were permitted to eat the flesh of Allied dead but must not eat their own dead." This statement was confirmed by a captured memorandum upon discipline found in the possession of a Major General. In this memorandum occurs the passage: "Although it is not prescribed in the criminal code, those who eat human flesh (except that of the enemy) knowing it to be so, shall be sentenced to death as the worst kind of criminal against mankind." At times this consumption of the flesh of their enemies was made into something of a festive occasion at officers' quarters. Even officers of the rank of General and Rear- Admiral took part. Flesh of murdered prisoners, or soup made from such flesh was served at meals of Japanese below the rank of officers. The evidence indicate that this cannibalism occurred when there was other food [49,675] available. That is to say, on such occasions, this horrible practice was indulged in from choice and not of necessity. PRISON SHIPS WERE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK The Japanese practices in the movement of prisoners of war by sea was in line with equally unlawful and inhumane methods of movement by land. The prisoners were crowded into holds and coal bunkers of ships with inadequate sanitary facilities and insufficient ventilation, and were given no medical service. They were forced to remain below decks during long voyages and to subsist on meager rations of food and water. These prison ships were unmarked and subjected to Allied attacks in which thousands of prisoners perished. The method employed to conserve space was generally as follows: wooden stages or temporary decks were built in empty coal bunkers and holds with a vertical distance of three feet between them. The space allotted to prisoners on these temporary decks was an area six feet by six feet for 15 prisoners. They were compelled to sit cross-legged during the entire voyage. Space was conserved also by the elimination of proper sanitary facilities. The sanitary facilities provided consisted of buckets or boxes which were lowered into the hold or [49,676] bunker with ropes and were removed in the same manner for emptying over the side. Drippings from these containers added to the general insanitary conditions. Many prisoners were suffering from dysentery when taken on board; and their excreta fell freely through the cracks of the wooden stages upon the prisoners below. To save space for the preparation of food, the prisoners were served uncooked food or food that had been prepared before sailing. For the same reason, an inadequate supply of water was carried. To add to the horrible conditions which prevailed prisoners were not allowed on deck. This method of transportation, by sea of prisoners of war prevailed generally during the entire period of the Pacific War. It has been defended as necessary because of a shortage of tonnage possessed by Japan, This is not a good defense; for the Japanese Government was not entitled to move prisoners if it was unable to do so under the conditions prescribed by the laws of war. [49,677] This method of transportation was used in August 1942 in moving the first group of British prisoners from Singapore to Moulmein to labor on the Burma-Siam Railroad. It occurred again when the "Nitta Maru" called at Wake Island in January 1942 to remove 1,235 American prisoners of war and civilian internees to Yokohama and Shanghai. In this case as in others, the prisoners and internees were forced to run the gauntlet of Japanese soldiers in which they were beaten and kicked as they went aboard. It was in connection with this voyage that our attention was first called to the the "Regulations for Prisoners" which were in force aboard prison ships. Those regulations among other things provided as follows: "The prisoners disobeying the following orders will be punished with immediate death: (a) those disobeying orders and instructions; (b) those showing a motion of antagonism and raising a sign of opposition; . . . (d) those talking without permission and raising loud voices; (e) those walking and moving without order; . . . (i) those climbing ladder without order; . . . the Navy of the Great Japanese Empire will not try to punish you all with death. Those obeying all the rules of the Japanese Navy, cooperating with Japan in constructing the 'New Order of Great Asia will be well treated." On some voyages the prisoners were crowded into bunkers not fitted with temporary decks [49,678] and forced to range themselves around the coal so long as standing room remained. On other voyages, highly inflammable cargo was packed into the hold with the prisoners. In addition to the many obvious discomforts and dangers to health to which this method of packing prison ships subjected the prisoners, it made their escape from the ship in case of sinking almost impossible. The prison ships were often attacked in the same manner as other Japanese ships by the Allied forces who could not distinguish them from other ships. A large number of sinkings resulted and thousands of Allied prisoners of war were lost. It was the practice in some cases, when these attacks occurred, to fasten down the hatches to prevent the escape of the prisoners and to station Japanese soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns with orders to kill those prisoners who might overcome these obstacles and escape from the sinking ship. This happened on the "Libson Maru" which was sunk in October 1942 on a voyage cut of Hong Kong with British prisoners aboard. In other cases, the prisoners were shot or otherwise murdered after the sinking and while in the water. This was done in the case of the "Oryoku Maru", which was sunk on a voyage from Manila in December 1944 with American prisoners of war aboard. The same thing occurred in the case of the sinking of the "Van Waerwyck" [49,679] in the Malacca Straits in June 1944. This occurred again in the sinking of the "Junior Maru" in September 1944 off the east coast of Sumatra with large numbers of Ambonese prisoners of war and conscripted Indonesian laborers aboard. Many prisoners of war died on these voyages from suffocation, disease and starvation; those who survived were so weakened from the ordeal of the voyage that they were unable to labor upon arriving at their destination. This impairment of the ability of the prisoners of war to perform labor caused the War Ministry to issue "Despatch, Army Asia Secret Order No. 1504" dated 10 December 1942. In that order it was stated that, "Recently during the transportation of the prisoners of war to Japan many of them have taken ill or have died and quite a few of them have been incapacitated for further work due to the treatment on the way, which at times was inadequate." Instructions were then given to insure the arrival of the prisoners at their destination in condition to perform labor. The condition of the prisoners transported by sea was not materially improved by the issuance of this order, however; and on 3 March 1944, [49,680] TOJO's Vice-Minister of War, Tominaga, issued another order to "the Units concerned" in which, among other things, he said: "In the Prisoner of War Administration, the use of prisoners for labor has been stressed heretofore. Although this has directly helped to increase our fighting strength, the average prisoner of war's health condition is hardly satisfactory. Their high death rate must be brought to our attention. In the light of the recent intensified enemy propaganda warfare, if the present condition continues to exist, it will be impossible for us to expect the world opinion to be what we wish it to be. Such will cause an obstacle to our prosecution of moral warfare. Not only that, it is absolutely necessary to improve the health condition of prisoners of war from the standpoint of using them satisfactorily to increase our fighting strength. It should be added that, although efforts must be exerted to utilize spaces on ships in transporting war prisoners it is necessary that the purport of the Despatch, Army Asia Secret No. 1504 of 1942 be thoroughly understood in handling war prisoners at this juncture." Members of the Government and many government officials were aware of the effect of these methods upon the prisoners. Such corrective measures as were taken by them, which were totally inadequate, were designed to preserve the ability [49,681] of the prisoners to perform labor for use in the prosecution of the war, not to insure the enforcement of the laws of war relating to the movement of prisoners of war. SUBMARINE WARFARE Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the Japanese Navy in 1943 and 1944. Survivors of passengers and crews of torpedoed ships were murdered. Ambassador OSHIMA was empowered by the TOJO Cabinet to discuss the prosecution of the war with the Reich Foreign Minister; and although technical questions were to be discussed directly by members of the Mixed Commission, it was OSHIMA's expressed opinion that it was of the greatest importance that questions of policy should be discussed exclusively by OSHIMA and Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. OSHIMA had a conference with Hitler on 3 January 1942. Hitler explained his policy of submarine warfare, which he was conducting against Allied shipping, and said that although the United States might build ships very quickly, her chief problem would be the personnel shortage since the training of seafaring personnel took a long time. Hitler explained that he had given orders for his submarines to surface after torpedoing merchant ships and to shoot up the life-boats, so that the word would get about that most seamen were lost in torpedoing and the United [49,682] States would have difficulty in recruiting new crews. OSHIMA, in replying to Hitler, approved this statement of policy and stated that the Japanese, too, would follow this method of waging submarine warfare. An order issued by the Commander of the First Submarine Force at Truk on 20 March 1943, contained this command: "All submarines shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks against enemy convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes; at the same time, you will carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships; if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy." This order for inhumane warfare at sea was followed by the Japanese submarine commanders. Between 13 December 1943 and 29 October 1944, Japanese submarines, after sinking eight British, American and Dutch merchant vessels in the Indian Ocean and one American vessel in the Pacific Ocean, surfaced after firing their torpedoes attempted to or did take on board the master of the ship and then proceeded to destroy the life-boats and murder the survivors. Repeated protests were made by the Allied Governments in which they stated the exact date and position of the sinkings and the details of the atrocities [49,683] committed upon the passengers and crews of the torpedoed vessels. No satisfactory answer was made to these protests and the sinkings continued without modification of the treatment of survivors. The action taken by the Japanese Navy in the sinking of the British Merchant Ship "Behar" by gunfire on 9 March 1944 is illustrative. One hundred and fifteen survivors were picked up by the crusier "Tone". Later in the day, the "Tone" reported the sinking and capture to the flagship "Aoba". Orders were immediately signalled to the "Tone" from the "Aoba" to kill the survivors. It was later decided to place fifteen of the survivors, including two women and one Chinese in a civilian internee camp and to kill the remaining one hundred. On orders of the captain of the "Tone" these hundred survivors were killed aboard the "Tone." The massacre of survivors of the American ship "Jean Nicolet" is another example of methods employed by the Japanese Navy. This ship was travelling from Australia to Ceylon in July 1944 when she was torpedoed at night by a Japanese submarine while some 600 miles from land. Her ship's company was about 100 of whom about 90 were taken aboard the submarine. The ship was sunk and her boats were also smashed by gun fire although all did not sink, The hands of the survivors were tied [49,684] behind their backs. A few of the officers were taken below and their fate is not known to the Tribunal. The remainder were made to sit on the forward deck of the submarine as she cruised searching for survivors, During this time some were washed overboard and others were beaten with wooden and metal bludgeons and robbed of personal property such as watches and rings. Then they were required to proceed singly towards the stern between lines of Japanese who beat them as they passed between their ranks. Thus they were forced into the water to drown. Before all the prisoners had been forced to run the gauntlet the vessel submerged leaving the remaining prisoners on her deck to their fate. Some, however, did survive by swimming. These and their comrades whom they kept afloat were discovered the next day by aircraft which directed a rescuing ship to them. Thus twenty-two survived this terrible experience, from some of whom this Tribunal received testimony of this inhumane conduct of the Japanese Navy. ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT, STAVATION AND NEGLECT OF PRISONERS AND INTERNEES General Uemura, Director of the Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the war Ministry, only a few weeks after the agreement with the Allies to apply the provisions of the Geneva [49,685] prisoner of War Convention to prisoners of war and civilian internees, advised the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese Army in Formosa on 2 April 1942 that "Plans are now being pushed for the use of prisoners of war in production", and requested an immediate report upon the number that might be utilized for that purpose in Formosa. On 6 May 1942; the Vice-Minister of War informed the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in Formosa of the policy governing employment of prisoners of war. He said that it had been decided that "Prisoners of war can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Superior technicians and high ranking officers - Colonels and above - will be included among the prisoners of war confined in Formosa, Those who are not suitable for use in enlargement of our production will be confined in prisoner of war camps which will be built immediately on the spot." General Uemura on 5 June 1942 directed the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in Formosa as follows: "Although the working of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities is that under the situation of our country where not one person now eats without working they want them to set to work. It is [49,686] desired that you give proper orders on this." These instructions were also sent to all other Army units concerned. This directive originated within the Cabinet for on 30 May 1942, Prime Minister TOJO issued instructions to the Commander of a Division, which had a prisoner of war camp under its jurisdiction in which he said: "The present situation of affairs in this country does not permit anyone to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. with that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I hope you will see that they may be usefully employed." On 25 June 1942, TOJO issued his instructions to newly appointed Chiefs of Prisoner of War camps. He said: "In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America. In dealing with them, you should, of course, observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an adequate application of them...At the same time, you must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort ought to be spared." The application of these instructions account at least in [49,687] part for the constant driving, beating and prodding of the sick and wounded prisoners and those suffering from malnutrition to force them to labor upon military works until they died from disease, malnutrition and exhaustion These instructions were repeated on 26 June 1942 by TOJO to another group of newly appointed prisoner of war camp chiefs and again to another such group on 7 July 1942. That the Cabinet supported TOJO in his program to employ prisoners of war to aid in the prosecution of the war is shown by the "Foreign Affairs Monthly Report" of the Foreign Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry issued for the month of September 1942. The report showed that due to the labor shortage in Japan, the Cabinet Planning Board with the concurrence of the Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the was Ministry held a conference on 15 August 1942 at which it was decided to transfer prisoners of war to Japan and employ them to mitigate the labor shortage in the industries in the National Mobilization Plan. According to the report, it had been decided to employ the prisoners of war in mining, stevedoring, and on engineering and construction works for national defense. A complete plan had been agreed upon whereby the prefectural governors cooperating with the Welfare Ministry and the Army would take charge of [49,687-A] the supervision of the prisoners of war and their employment. With members of the Government, HOSHINO and SUZUKI participated in this decision. HOSHINO had been selected as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet by TOJO because of his long experience in economic planning and had been charged by TOJO to devote his main efforts to such activities in cooperation with SUZUKI, whom he had selected to head the Cabinet Planning Bureau. HOSHINO became Chief Secretary of the Cabinet on 18 October 1941 and served until the fall of the TOJO Cabinet on 19 July 1944. SUZUKI became a Councillor of the Planning Bureau on 30 May 1939 and when HOSHINO was relieved as President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau and as Minister without Portfolio on 4 April 1941, SUZUKI succeeded him and continued to serve as Minister without Portfolio and President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau in the Third Konoye Cabinet and the TOJO Cabinet until the TOJO Cabinet resigned on 19 July 1944. [49,688] CONSIDERATION FOR RACIAL NEEDS FOOD AND CLOTHING The Japanese Government promised early in 1942 to take into consideration the national customs and racial habits of the prisoners of war and civilian internees in supplying them with food and clothing. This was never done. Regulations in force at the time this promise was made required that camp commandants in supplying prisoners of war and internees with food and clothing should be guided by the Table of Basic Allowances governing the supply of the Army. The commandants were authorized to determine the amount of the allowance to be made to the inmates of the camps but were directed to make such determination within the limits prescribed in the Table of Allowances. These Regulations, insofar as they affected diet, were interpreted as forbidding the prisoners and internees sufficient food, even when other food existed in the vicinity of the camps. This rule was followed even when the inmated of the camps were dying in large numbers from malnutrition the amount and kind of food prescribed by the Table of Allowances was not materially changed during the war, except to reduce the amount prescribed, although it soon became apparent to those in command that due to different national dietary customs and habits, the [49,689] prisoners and internees could not subsist on the food supplied. On 29 October 1942, orders were issued to all camp commandants that "in view of the consumption of rice and "barley by workers in heavy industries in Japan," the ration for prisoners of war and civilian internees who were officers or civil officials should be cut so as not to exceed 420 grams per day. In January 1944, this ration of rice was further cut to a maximum of 390 grams per day. As the inmates of the camps began to suffer from malnutrition, they fell easy prey to disease and were quickly exhausted by the heavy labor forced upon them, Regardless of this, the commandants of the camps enforced TOJO's instructions that those who did not labor should not eat and still further reduced the ration and in some cases withdrew it entirely from those who were unable to labor because of illness or injury. The Regulations provided that the prisoners of war and civilian internees should wear the clothing formerly worn by them, that is to say the clothing they were wearing when captured or interned. This Regulation was enforced by the camp commandants with the result that in many of the camps the inmates were in rags before the war ended. It is true that the Regulation allowed the camp commandants to lend certain items of clothing [49,690] in cases where the clothing formerly worn by the prisoners or internees was unfit, but this appears to have been used only in rare cases. MEDICAL SUPPLIES The Japanese Army and Navy were required by their regulations to keep on hand and in storage a supply of medicine and medical and equipment sufficient for one year's use. This was done in many instances by confiscating Red Cross drugs and radical supplies, but the supplies were kept in storage or used mostly for the benefit of Japanese troops and camp guards, The prisoners of war and civilian internees were rarely furnished medicines and equipment from these warehouses. At the time of surrender, large quantities of these supplies were found stored in and around prisoner of war and civilian internee camps in which prisoners and internees had been dying at an alarming rate for lack of such supplies. Suzuki, Kunji, who served as a staff officer of the Eastern Military District, on Honshu Island under DOHIHARA and other Commanders, testified before this Tribunal. Suzuki admitted that he authorized chiefs [49,691] of camps and guards at the detention camps in his district to confiscate Red Cross parcels intended for prisoners of war. The evidence shows that this was common practice at the camps located in Japan as well as in Japan's overseas possessions and in the occupied territories. Incidentally Suzuki also admitted that he knew that his guards were beating and otherwise illtreating the prisoners, Failure to afford adequate or any medical supplies to prisoners of war any civilian internees was common in all theatres of war and contributed to the deaths of thousands of prisoners and internees. HOUSING The regulations provided that Army buildings, temples and other existing buildings should be used as prisoner of war and internee camps. The regulations also provided that employers using prisoner of war and civilian internees in war production should furnish necessary shelter for them. Nevertheless the housing provided was in many instances inadequate as cover or insanitary or both. The Japanese adjutant at the Kanburi camp in Siam opened a hospital for the sick prisoners of war in a group of approximately 20 empty huts, which had been evacuated shortly before by a Japanese cavalry regiment which had been using the huts [49,692] as stables. Atap huts with dirt floors furnished the only shelter available in most of the camps located on islands in the Pacific and along the Burma-Siam Railway. It was common practice to build these camps with the labor of the prisoners of war who were to occupy them, and to force the prisoners to live in the open, exposed to the weather until the huts were completed. However, in some instances, the prisoners were spared the labor of construction by moving them into atap hut camps, which had been depopulated by epidemics; this was the case at the 60 kilometer camp on the Burma-Siam railway project where approximately 800 Australian prisoners of war were quartered in the huts recently occupied by Burmese laborers who had died of cholera. A former Javanese labor camp at Lahat, Molucca Islands, was converted into a prisoner of war camp in August 1944. When the Dutch and British prisoner of war arrived at the camp, they found it filled with dead bodies of Javanese, KIMURA as Vice-Minister of War when informed that ITAGAKI was planning to quarter 1,000 British and l,000.American prisoners of war in three theological schools in Korea inquired if the buildings scheduled for accommodation of the prisoners of war were not too good for them. [49,693] Work The policy of the Japanese Government was to use prisoners of war and civilian internees to do work directly related to war operations. In the theater of operations they were used to construct military air fields, roads, railroads, docks, and other military works and as stevedores to load and unload military supplies. In the overseas possessions and in Japan they were forced in addition to the foregoing work to labor in mines, in munitions and aircraft factories, and in other projects bearing a direct relation to war operations. As a general rule, the camps in which the prisoners of war and civilian internees were detained were located near the place of employment without regard to their safety, in consequence they were subjected to unnecessary danger from air raids both on and off their work, There is evidence that in some instances the camps were so located deliberately with the intention of deterring the Allies from raiding the military works or factories concerned. Native Labor Having decided upon a policy of employing prisoner of war and civilian internees on work directly contributing to the prosecution of the war, and having established a system to carry that policy into execution, the Japanese [49,694] went further and supplemented this source of manpower by recruiting laborers from the native population of the occupied territories. This recruiting of laborers was accomplished by false promises, and by force. After being recruited, the laborers were transported to and confined in camps, Little or no distinction appears to have been made between these conscripted laborers on the one hand and prisoners of war and civilian internees on the other hand. They were all regarded as slave laborers to be used to the limit of their endurance. For this reason, we have included these conscripted laborers in the term "civilian internees" whenever that term is used in this chapter, The lot of these conscripted laborers was made worse by the fact that generally they were ignorant of the principles of hygience applicable to their unusual and crowded conditions and succumbed more readily to the diseases resulting from the insanitary conditions of confinement and work forced upon them by their Japanese captors. PRISONERS AND INTERNESS FORCED TO SIGN PAROLE To reduce the number of guards necessary for prisoners of war and civilian internees, regulations in defiance of the Rules of War were issued by the War Ministry early in 1943 providing, "As soon as prisoners of war have been imprisoned, they shall be administered [49,695] an oath forbidding them from making an escape. Prisoners of war who refuse to take the oath mentioned in this paragraph shall be deemed to have intentions of escaping and shall be placed under strict surveillance." This "strict surveillance" in practice meant solitary confinement on reduced rations or subjection to torture until, the took the oath required. At Singapore in August 1942, 16,000 prisoners, who had refused to give the parole demanded, were herded into a barrack square and kept there without food or latrine facilities for four days to force them to sign the parole. The resulting conditions are too disgusting to describe. Some of the prisoners of war at Hong Kong, who refused to sign the parole, were confined in a prison without food and forced to kneel all day. If they moved they were beaten. The senior prisoner of war at the camp at Sandakan, who, with his men, refused to sign was immediately seized and beaten. A firing squad paraded. He was saved from death only when his men agreed to sign. Prisoners of war in craps in Batavia and Java were beaten and deprived of food until they signed the parole. At Zentsuji Camp on Shikoku Island, 41 prisoners were kept in confinement from 14 June 1942 until 23 September 1942 for refusing to take the oath and were finally threatened with death if they persisted in their refusal. As [49,696] already stated, the Prisoner of War Regulations also applied to civilian internees by virtue of another regulation which we have quoted. To enforce this parole, which was obtained by coercion, the regulations further provided, "Persons on parole, who break the parole, shall be subject to either the death penalty, or hard labor, or imprisonment for life or for a minimum of seven years. When the persons mentioned offer armed resistance, they shall be subject to the death penalty". The regulations also provided: "Those persons, who violate any other oath, shall be subject to a maximum of ten years imprisonment." This latter provision is explained by still another article in the regulations as follows, "Before a commandant of a prisoner of war camp dispatches prisoners of war (i. e. sends prisoners of war to work details or to work camps from the prisoner of war camp), he shall endeavor to prevent escapes and unexpected disturbances, investigating thoroughly the characters, mental attitudes, pest histories, as well as the abilities of the prisoners of war, and in addition he shall administer a solemn oath on other matters of importance." ITAGAKI, as Commander of the Korean Army, informed War Minister TOJO by a message dated 4 September 1942, that he intended to force all prisoners of war including officers [49,697] and warrant officers under his jurisdiction to work; as he put it, "Not one prisoner of war must be left to time in idleness". He stated that one of the regulations he had issued was that "It is important to guard against destruction by the prisoners of war; if necessary, make them give an oath and establish severe penalties." On 1 September 1942, TOJO received a message from the Commander of the Formosa Army that, "399 prisoners of war, including Lt. General Percival, 6 Major-Generals, or Rear Admirals, 27 Brigadier-Generals, or Commodores, 25 Colonels, or Navy Captains, 130 officers of the rank of Lt. Colonel, or Commander or below, and 210 non- commissioned offices together with 6 civil officials, who had been transferred from the Tomi group, were interned on 31 August 1942 in the Formosa Prisoner of War Camp. At first Lt. General Percival and others refused to make an oath, but finally all but three (1 Brigadier-General, 1 Navy Captain and 1 Engineering Lieutenant) signed their names." This system of regulations issued and enforced by the Japanese Government to compel prisoners of war and civilian internees by duress to give an oath not to escape and not to violate other regulations and orders of the Japanese Government violated the general laws of war. The system was devised, instituted and maintained [49,698] as part of the policy of the Japanese Government in disregard and violation of the laws of war. We will adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow morning. (Where upon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Friday, 12 November 1948, at 0930.) [49,698-A] Friday, 12 November 1948 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, all Members sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the language Section, IMTFE.) [49,699] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except KAYA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment, EXCESSIVE AND UNLAWFUL PUNISHMENT WAS IMPOSED. TOJO, in his instructions to chiefs of prisoner of war and civilian internee camps told those officials to tighten their control over their subordinates and to supervise the prisoners rigidly; he said, "It is necessary to put them under strict discipline." He repeated this charge in his instructions to the Commander of the Zentsuji Division on 30 May 1942, when he said: "Prisoners of war must be placed under strict discipline as far as it does not contravene the law of humanity. It is necessary to take care not to be obsessed with the mistaken idea of humanitarianism or swayed by personal feelings towards those prisoners of war which may grow in the long time of their imprisonment." The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 provided with respect to punishment of prisoners of war [49,700] for offenses committed while they were prisoners: "Any corporal punishment, any imprisonment in quarters without daylight, and, in general any form whatever of cruelty is forbidden," and "Collective punishment for individual acts is also forbidden." Other important limitations upon punishments that might be inflicted upon prisoners of war were included. All of them were designed to insure humane treatment of the prisoners. One of these limitations was contained in a provision of the Convention which dealt with escapes and attempts to escape; that provision reads: "Escaped prisoners of war who are retaken before being able to rejoin their own army or to leave the territory occupied by the army which captured them shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment. After an attempted or accomplished escape, the comrades of the person escaping who assisted in the escape may incur only disciplinary punishment on this account. Arrest is the most severe summary punishment which may be imposed on a prisoner of war. The duration of a single punishment may not exceed 30 days." In this connection disciplinary punishment and summary punishment were used as synonymous terms. It was also provided that, "Attempted escape, even if it is not a first offense, shall not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in case the prisoner of war should be given [49,701] over to the courts on account or offense against persons or property committed in the course of that attempt." That the Japanese truly understood the Convention is shown by their objection in 1934 to its ratification. They said that under the Convention "Prisoners of war could not be so severely punished as Japanese soldiers and this would involve a revision of Japanese Military and Naval Disciplinary Codes to put them on an equal footing, a revision which was undesirable in the interests of discipline." The real objection to the ratification of the Convention was that the Military desired to avoid any express commitments which would hinder their policy of ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Early in the Pacific War and after the Japanese Government had given its promise to apply the provisions of the Convention to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, ordinances and regulations were made contrary to that promise. In 1943, this regulation was published: "In case a prisoner of war is guilty of an act of insubordination, he shall be subject to imprisonment or arrest; and any other measures deemed necessary for the purpose of discipline may be added." Under this regulation, corporal punishment as well as torture and mass punishment was administered, It was common practice [49,702] in all areas in which prisoner of war and civilian internee camps were located to inflict corporal punishment for the slightest offence or for no offence. This punishment in its mildest forms was beating and kicking the victim, The victim if he became unconscious was often revived with cold water or by other means, only to have the process repeated. Thousands died as a result of this punishment. In some cases death was hastened by weakness due to starvation and disease. Other forms of cruel punishments frequently employed were: exposing the victim to the hot tropical sun for long hours without headdress or other protection; suspension of the victim by his arms in such a manner as at times to force the arms from their sockets binding the victim where he would be attacked by insects; confining the victim in a cramped cage for days without food; confining the victim in an underground cell without food, light or fresh air for weeks; and forcing the victim to kneel on sharp objects in a cramped position for long periods of time. In direct defiance of the rules of war mass punishments were commonly employed as punishment for individual acts, especially when the Japanese were unable to discover the offender. The usual form of mass punishment was to force all members of the group involved to assume a strained position such as sitting with the legs [49,703] folded under the body and the hands on the Knees with the palm turned upward, or kneeling, and to remain in that position during daylight hours for days. Other forms of mass punishment were also employed such as that used at Havelock Road Camp in Malaya where the prisoners were forced to run in a circle without shoes over broken glass while being spurred on by Japanese soldiers who beat them with rifle butts. On 9 March 1943 an ordinance was issued providing the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or confinement for ten years or more for a number or offences; the novel feature of this ordinance was that in the case of each offence it provided for the death penalty or other severe penalty to be imposed upon the so-called "leader" of any group action resulting in the commission of the offence named and the same punishment, or a slightly less severe penalty, for all others who might be involved. Under this ordinance, mass punishment was often inflicted upon groups of prisoners of war or civilian internees for what at the most amounted to no more than an individual act. This ordinance also provided the death penalty for "prisoners of war who defy or disobey the orders of persons supervising, guarding, or escorting them"; it also provided imprisonment for five years for "prisoners of war who privately or publicly insult persons supervising, guarding or [49,704] escorting them." This is an example, or which there are a number, where the Japanese Government departed from its undertaking in respect of the Geneva Convention by altering its laws concerning prisoners of war. During the Pacific War, contrary to its undertaking already referred to, the Japanese Prison of War regulations were amended to permit an escaping prisoner to be punished in the same way as a deserter from the Japanese Army. The ordinance of 9 March 1943 contained the following provision: "The leader of a group of persons, who have acted together in effecting an escape, shall be subject to either death or to hard labor or to imprisonment for life or for a minimum of ten years. The other persons involved shall be subject to either the death penalty, or to hard labor or to imprisonment for life or for a minimum of one year." This provision taken together with the regulations governing paroles not to escape, which prisoners of war were forced to give, constituted the regulations governing escapes which were enforced in all camps. These regulations were in direct violation of international law and, as we have just pointed out, were contrary to the Convention which Japan had promised to apply. Under these regulations, the death penalty was imposed almost without exception upon all prisoners who attempted to escape or escaped and [49,705] were recaptured. Also, under these regulations, those comrades who assisted a prisoner to escape were also punished, frequently by the death penalty. In some camps, the prisoners were divided into groups and the practice was to kill all members of the group if one member attempted to escape or was successful in escaping. Even the formality of a trial was dispensed with in many instances. The death penalty is proved to have been imposed for attempt to escape at the following camps: Mukden in Liaoning Province of China (July 1943); Hong Kong, China (July 1943); Singapore, Malaya (March 1942) Mergui, Burma (1942); Tarakan, Borneo (1942 and 1945); Pontianak, Borneo (June 1942); Bandjermasin, Borneo (July 1942); Samarinda, Borneo (January 1945); Palembang, Sumatra (March 1942); Djati Nanggor, Java (March 1942); Bandung, Java (April 1942); Batavia, Java (April 1942); Soekaboemi, Java (May 1942); Jogjakarta, Java (May 1942); Tjimahi, Java (May 1942); Makassar, Celebes (September 1942); Amboina, Moluccas Islands (November 1942) (April 1945); Oesapa Besar, Dutch Timor (February 1942); Cabanatuan, Philippines (June 1942); Motoyama, Japan (November 1942); Fukuoke, Japan (May 1944); Wake (October 1943); and Ranau, Borneo (August 1945). PRISONERS OF WAR HUMILIATED. The Japanese maintained a policy of submitting [49,706] allied prisoners of war to violence, insults and public humiliation to impress other peoples of Asia with the superiority of the Japanese race. On 4 March 1942, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA received a telegram from the Chief- of-Staff of the Korean Army, of which ITAGAKI was Commander, stating that: "As it would be very effective in stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America, and also in establishing in them a strong faith in victory, and as the Governor-General and the Army are both strongly desirous of it, we wish you would intern 1,000 British and 1,000 American prisoners of war in Korea. We wish you would give us special consideration regarding this matter." The Governor-General of Korea at that time was MINAMI, On 5 March 1942, KIMURA replied that about 1,000 white prisoners of war were to be sent to Fusan, Korea. On 23 March 1942, ITAGAKI sent a message to War Minister TOJO informing him of the plans to use the prisoners of war for psychological purposes; he said: "It is our purpose by interning American and British prisoners of war in Korea to make the Koreans realize positively the true might of our Empire as well as to contribute to psychological propaganda work for stamping out any ideas of worship of Europe and America which the greater part of Korea [49,707] still retains at bottom." ITAGAKI went on to say that the first camp would be located at Seoul, Korea, in the abandoned Iwamura Silk Reeling Warehouse; his former plan to confine the prisoners in the theological school in Fusan having been abandoned when KIMURA objected that those buildings were too good for prisoners of war. Among the main points of his plan, ITAGAKI stated that the prisoners or war would be used on various works in the principal cities of Korea, especially where psychological conditions were not good, in order to achieve his purpose stated at the beginning of his message; and that the equipment of the camps would be cut to a minimum and that the internment, supervision and guarding of the prisoners would be carried out so as to leave nothing to be desired in the accomplishment of the purpose for which the prisoners of war were being transported to Korea. On 2 April 1942, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in Formosa informed the Prisoner of War Information Bureau that he planned to use prisoners of war not only for labor to increase production for war but also "as material for education and guidance." Thus was applied the plan to use prisoners in violation of the laws of war as pro- Japanese propaganda on 6 May 1942, the Vice-Minister of War informed the [49,708] Chief-of-Staff of the Formosa Army that "white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa, and Manchuria." He added, "for the purpose, of control and security it is planned to assign special units organized of Koreans and Formosans." The psychological effect was to be attained by allowing Koreans and Formosans to take part in the plan to submit Allied prisoners of war to insult and public curiosity! On 16 May 1942, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA notified the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Area Army, whose headquarters were at Singapore, that between May and August the white prisoners of war at Singapore should be handed over to the Formosan and Korean Armies. The white prisoners of war were handed over and sent to Korea. About 1,000 prisoners captured in the fighting in Malaya arrived in Korea and were inarched through the streets of Seoul, Fusan, and Jinsen where they were paraded before 120,000 Koreans and 57,000 Japanese. These prisoners had previously been subjected to malnutrition, ill-treatment and neglect so that their physical condition would elicit contempt from those who saw them. ITAGAKI'S Chief-of-Staff in reporting to KIMURA on what he considered the great success of this demonstration of Japanese superiority quoted a Korean bystander who had remarked: "When we look at their frail [49,709] and unsteady appearance, it is no wonder that they lost to the Japanese forces"; he also quoted another Korean bystander who remarked: "When I saw young Korean soldiers, members of the Imperial Army, guarding the prisoners, I shed tears of joy!" ITAGAKI'S Chief-of-Staff concluded his message with the observation that, "As a whole, it seems that the idea was very successful in driving all admiration for the British out of the Koreans minds and in driving into them an understanding of the situation." As far away as in Moulmein, in Burma, this practice of parading prisoners of war was followed. In February 1944, 25 Allied prisoners of war were paraded through the streets of that city. They were in an emaciated condition and were forced to carry notices in Burmese, falsely stating that they had been recently captured on the Arakan front. They were ridiculed and held up to contempt by a Japanese officer who accompanied the parade. THE SYTEM Certain changes made regarding the enforcement of the laws of war and the administration of prisoners of war and civilian internees by Japan after the outbreak of the Pacific War were nominal only; they did not secure the enforcement of the laws of war. The attitude [49,710] of the Japanese Government toward the enforcement of the laws of war, as demonstrated in its prosecution of the China War, did not really change with the commencement of the Pacific War. Certain changes in governmental organizations and methods of procedure were made, but no real effort was made to secure the enforcement of the laws of war. In fact, as has been shown in the Regulations affecting attempts to escape, changes were made which enjoined the commission of grave breaches of the laws of war. During the China War no special agency had been created by the Japanese Government for the administration of prisoners of war and civilian internees and no Prisoner of War Information Bureau was maintained as required by The Hague and Geneva Conventions. MUTO said that "the question of whether Chinese captives would be treated as prisoners of war or not was quite a problem, and it was finally decided in 1938 that because the Chinese conflict was officially known as an 'incident' although it was really a war that Chinese captives would not be regarded as prisoners of war." TOJO said that this was true; and that after the commencement of hostilities in the Pacific War, he considered that Japan was bound to abide by The Hague and Geneva Conventions; and for that reason, he caused a Prisoner of War Information Bureau to be created. This statement [49,711] by TOJO that he considered that Japan was bound to abide by The Hague and Geneva Conventions in the prosecution of the Pacific War must be interpreted in the light of his statement made during a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on 18 August 1943. He then said: "International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our own opinions." This idea was the basis upon which the policy of the Japanese Government for its treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees was developed. JAPAN AGREED TO APPLY THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1929 The Secretary of State of the United States directed the American Legation in Switzerland, on 18 December 1941, to request the Government of Switzerland to inform the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States intended to abide by the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and the Geneva Red Cross Convention, both of which had been signed on 27 July 1929, that it further intended to extend and apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention to any civilian enemy aliens that it might intern, that it hoped that the Japanese Government would apply the provisions of these conventions reciprocally as indicated, and that the Government of the United States would [49,712] appreciate an expression of intention by the Japanese Government in that respect. The inquiry was delivered to the Japanese Foreign Minister TOGO on 27 December 1941 by the Minister for Switzerland. The Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand also inquired through the Argentine Ambassador in Tokyo on 3 January 1942. In that inquiry, those Governments said that they would observe the terms of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 towards Japan and asked if the Japanese Government was prepared to make a similar declaration. On 5 January 1942, the Argentine Ambassador delivered another note on behalf of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, proposing that in the application of Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention relative to the provision of food and clothing to prisoners, both parties take into consideration the national and racial customs of the prisoners. Upon receipt of these inquiries, TOGO called upon the War Ministry, Navy Ministry, Ministry for Home Affairs and Ministry of Overseas Affairs for their opinion. At that time TOJO was concurrently Prime Minister and War Minister; MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry; SATO was MUTO's [49,713] assistant in the Military Affairs Bureau, KIMURA was Vice-Minister of War; SHIMADA was Navy Minister; OKA was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry; and HOSHINO was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. TOGO was concerned for the safety of the Japanese living in Allied countries and for that reason desired to give a favorable answer to the inquiries and so instructed the Bureau of Treaties, pointing out that the fate of Japanese residents, amounting to several hundred thousands, in the enemy countries would be affected by the treatment by Japan of the prisoners of war and civilian internees who might be in her power. The War Ministry agreed with TOGO. On 23 January 1942, KIKURA told TOGO: "In view of the fact that the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war was not ratified by His Majesty, we can hardly announce our observance of the same. But it would be safe to notify the world that we have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war. As regards providing prisoners of war with food and clothing, we have no objection to giving due consideration to the national or racial habits and customs of the prisoners." TOGO answered the American and British inquiries on 29 January 1942. His note to the Government of the United States rend as follows: " Japan strictly observes [49,714] the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the Red Cross, as a signatory of that Convention. The Imperial Government has not yet ratified the Convention relating to treatment of prisoners of war of 27 July 1929. It is therefore not bound by the said Convention. Nethertheless it will apply 'mutatis mutandis' the provisions of that Convention to American prisoners of war in its power." The note addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the same date was as follows: "The Imperial Government has not ratified the agreement concerning the treatment of prisoners of war dated 27 July 1929, and therefore, it would not be bound to any extent by the said agreement, but would apply 'mutatis mutandis' the provisions of the said agreement toward the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war under Japanese control, The Imperial Government would consider the national and racial manners and customs under reciprocal conditions when supplying clothing and provisions to prisoners of war." The same assurances were given to the other allied powers. As the War Ministry had not agreed to extend these provisions to civilian internees, TOGO through his Vice-Minister inquired of the War Ministry on 27 January 1942 regarding the application of the Prisoner of War [49,715] Convention to non-combatant internees. After conferences the War Ministry acquiesced further in TOGO's plan to protect Japanese nationals in Allied countries, and on 6 February 1942 KIMURA told TOGO: "The 1929 Convention relating to prisoners of war has no binding power whatsoever on Japan. But this Ministry has no objection to applying the principles of the Convention to non- combatant internees within such limits as it is applicable, provided, however, that no person be subjected to labor against his will." TOGO informed the Government of the United States on 13 February 1942 that, "The Imperial Government will apply for the duration of the war under conditions of reciprocity the provisions of the Convention relating to treatment: of prisoners of war of 27 July 1929 to enemy civilian internees, in so far as they are applicable and provided that they are not made to work without their consent." [49,716] Taking note of the assurances TOGO had addressed the British counties on 29 January 1942 that Japan would take into consideration the national and racial customs of the prisoners of war in supplying them with clothing and provisions, the United States addressed another inquiry on that subject. That inquiry was dated 20 February 1942 and stated that the Government of the United States would be bound by the same previsions for prisoners of war as for civilian internees in conformity with Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention and expected in consequence that the Japanese Government would equally conform to those provisions in the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees. TOGO answered this inquiry on 2 March 1942 in the following manner: "The Imperial Government intends to take into consideration, with regard to provisions and clothing to be distributed, the racial and national customs of American prisoners of war and civilian internees placed under Japanese power." This exchange of assurances constituted a solemn agreement binding the Government of Japan as well as the Governments of the other combatants to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 27 July 1929 to prisoners of war and civilian internees when supplying them with food and [49,717] clothing as required by that Convention and not to force internees to work. The agreement provided that the Convention was to be applied in a spirit of reciprocity, that is to say equally by both sides, each performing in kind and in return for that done by the other. The only exception to this rule established by the agreement were such as might be justified under the reservation "mutatis mutandis". That the agreement did not allow an exception to be made by reason of conflict with the municipal law of Japan is plain upon construction and is shown by TOGO'S testimony as follows: "The inquiries from the United States and Britain were therefore referred in the normal course by the Foreign Ministry Treaty Bureau, which managed such matters, to the War Ministry, as the ministry empowered to decide the question. The answer which came back was that we should undertake to apply the terms of the Geneva Convention 'mutatis mutandis', and it was therefore so replied to the Governments inquiring. "Although the prosecution seems to consider that by giving of this answer Japan became bound by the Convention to the same extent as if she had ratified it, I assumed (and still assume) that we were binding ourselves only to apply the Convention so far [49,718] as circumstances permitted. 'Mutatis mutandis', then, I supposed to imply that in the absence of serious hindrances the Convention would be applied; I assumed also (although this was only assumption on my part) that where the requirements of the Convention came into conflict with the provisions of domestic law the former would prevail." The Director of the Bureau of Treaties, who conducted the conferences with the other Ministries regarding the answer to be given the Allied inquiries, further, confirmed this. Although when it was made the members of the TOJO Cabinet intended that the Allied Powers should understand the agreement as we have interpreted it, they did not abide by the agreement. Instead it was used as a means to secure good treatment for Japanese who might become prisoners of war or be interned by the Allied Powers. When Vice-Minister KIMURA answered TOGO's request for his opinion regarding the answer to be made to the Allied inquiries, he said that "it would be safe to notify the world" that Japan would observe the Convention, but he prefaced that statement with the remark that the Government could hardly afford to announce an intention to observe the Convention in view of the fact that the Emperor had not ratified it. The successive Japanese governments did [49,719] not enforce the Convention, for although the Ministers of State considered those assurances to the allies to be a promise to perform new and additional duties for the benefit of prisoners of war and internees, they never issued any new orders or instructions to their officers in charge of prisoners of war and internees. to carry this new promise into execution and never set up any system which secured performance of the promise. Instead of making an effort to perform this agreement they made efforts to conceal from the Allies their guilty non-performance by denying access to the prisoner of war and internee camps; by limiting the length, contents and number of letters which a prisoner or internee might mail; by suppressing all news regarding such prisoners and internees; and by neglecting to answer or by making false answers to protests and inquiries addressed to them regarding the treatment of prisoners and internees. Reference has been made in an earlier part of this judgment to the effect of the various conventions in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees and to the obligations of belligerents in that respect, Whatever view may be taken of the assurance or undertaking of the Japanese Government to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War [49,720] Convention "mutatis mutandis" the fact remains that under the customary rules of war, acknowledged by all civilized nations, all prisoners of war and civilian internees must be given humane treatment. It is the grossly inhumane treatment by the Japanese military forces as referred to in this part of the judgment that is particularly reprehensible and criminal. person guilty of such inhumanities cannot escape punishment on the plea that he or his government is not bound by any particular convention. The general principles of the law exist independently of the said conventions. The conventions merely reaffirm the pre-existing law and prescribe detailed provisions for its application. As to the effect of the undertaking by the Japanese Government to observe the convention "mutatis mutandis" for at no stage in the defence was anything said or even usggested to the effect that these words justified the atrocities and other grossly inhumane acts of Japanese forces nor was it argued that these words could justify the looting, pillaging and arson which has been clearly established. On those points the accused who gave evidence, for the most part, did no more than plead complete ignorance of the happenings deposed to, {49,721] Any interpretation placed on the condition which attempted to justify the atrocities would amount to nothing more than a submission that by the insertion of the words "mutatis mutandis" the Japanese military forces would be permitted with impunity to behave with gross barbarity under the guise of complying with a Convention which prescribed humane treatment as its cardinal principle. Such a submission could not be accepted. ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR A POLICY The Japanese Government signed and ratified the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which provided for humane treatment of prisoners of war and condemned treacherous and inhumane conduct of war. The reason for the failure of the Japanese Government to ratify and enforce the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which it signed at Geneva in 1929 is to be found in the fundamental training of the Japanese Soldier. Long before the beginning of the period covered by the Indictment, the young men of Japan had been taught that "The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor," a precept which we find ARAKI repeating in his speeches and propaganda motion pictures. An additional precept was taught that it is an ignominy to surrender to the enemy. [49,722] The combined effect of these two precepts was to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in defiance of the rules of war was demonstrated in their ill-treatment of prisoners. In this spirit they made no distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and courageously up to an inevitable surrender and the soldier who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded as being disgraced and entitled to live only by the tolerance of their captors. Ratification and enforcement of the Geneva Convention of 1929 it was thought would involve abandonment of this view of the Military. The Convention had been signed by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries at Geneva in 1929; but when the Convention came up for ratification in 1934, both the Japanese Army and Navy petitioned against ratification; and by that time they had sufficient political power to prevent ratification, They gave as some of their reasons for resisting ratification, that the obligations imposed by the Convention were unilateral, that the Convention imposed new and additional burdens on Japan, but that Japan could not gain anything by ratifying it, for no Japanese soldier would ever surrender to the enemy. [49,723] In this connection it is interesting to note that TOJO giving instructions to chiefs of prisoner of war camps said: "In Japan we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America." JAPANESE PURPOSE WAS TO PROTECT JAPANESE NATIONALS The decision to create a Prisoner of War Information Bureau was prompted by an inquiry from the International Red Cross in Geneva, which was forwarded to the War Ministry from the Foreign Ministry on 12 December 1941. The International Red Cross had telegraphed the Japanese Foreign Ministry that in view of the fact that the war had extended to the Pacific its Committee had placed the services of the Central Prisoner of War Bureau at the disposal of the belligerent States and inquiring whether the Japanese Government was disposed to exchange by the intermediary of the Central Bureau of Geneva lists of information on prisoners of war and in so far as possible on civilian internees. Conferences were held by the officials in the War Ministry; and on 28 December 1941, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA informed Foreign Minister TOGO that the War Ministry was ready to exchange information. [49,724] that "it is not that we "declare that we are prepared to apply in practice' the provisions of the Prisoner or War Convention of 1929, but that we "utilize them for the convenience of transmission of information.'" By 12 January 1942, the International Red Cross had received replies from Japan and the United States declaring that they were ready to proceed with the transmission of information. CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU The Prisoner of War Information Bureau was created by Imperial Ordinance on 27 December 1941. The Bureau was charged with making investigations of the following subjects: internments, removals, releases on parole, exchanges, escapes, admissions to hospitals and deaths of prisoners of war, It was also given the duty of maintaining records for each prisoner of war and managing the communications and correspondence regarding prisoners of war, and of collecting information pertaining to the condition of prisoners of war. The ordinance provided that the Bureau should have a Director and four Secretaries. This Prisoner of War Information Bureau was placed under the supervision and control of the War Minister and was organized as a section of the Military Affairs Bureau, where at [49,725] different times it came under the control and supervision of MUTO and SATO. All personnel of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau were appointed on the recommendation of the War Minister. TOJO appointed Lieutenant General Uemura as the first Director of the Bureau. CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR ADHINESTRATION SECTION On 31 March 1942, "Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners or War" were promulgated, creating what was called the "Prisoner of War Administration Section" in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry under the supervision and control of TOJO as Was Minister. TOJO exercised this control and supervision through MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. The regulations provided that the Section should have a Director and other personnel to be appointed upon the recommendation of the War Minister. TOJO appointed Lieutenant General Uemura as the First Director of the Section, thereby combining in one person the administration of the Prisoner or War Information Bureau and the Prisoner or War Administration Section. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau was only an information and records office created, as KIMURA said, to use the provisions of the Prisoner of [49,726] War Convention of 1929 for the purpose of gaining information; it had no power of control or supervision. over prisoners of war and civilian internees, The Prisoner of War Administration Section on the other hand was given authority to "conduct all of affairs relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the theater of war." [49,727] THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU RETAINED CONTROL The Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry under MUTO and later under SATO retained control of the system set up for enforcement of the Laws of War during the Pacific War. Although the ordinance creating the Prisoner of War Information Bureau provided: "In regard to matters falling within his jurisdiction, the Director may demand information from any military or naval unit concerned," General Uemura and the Directors following him were required to transmit all inquiries and other communications through the office of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. They had no power to take any action without the approval of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. According to TOJO, all orders and directives relating to prisoners of war and civilian internees were issued by the War Minister. He also says that these orders and directives were drafted by the Military Affairs Bureau after the Chief of that Bureau had held conferences with the General staff and other agencies of the Government concerned. As we will discuss presently, bi-weekly conferences of all Bureau Chiefs in the War Ministry were held and attended by the War Minister and Vice-Minister of War TOJO and KIMURA attended most of these conferences. [49,728] KIMURA was Vice-Minister of War from 10 April 1941 to 11 March 1943. Matters relating to prisoners of war and civilian internees were discussed at these conferences, with TOJO and KIMURA at times attending. Orders and regulations were formulated and forwarded to all agencies of the Government concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees. DETENTION CAMPS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION Detention camps for prisoners of war were authorized by Imperial Ordinances and Regulations issued by the War Ministry on 23 December 1941. These regulations provided that prisoner of war camps were to be administered by a commander of an Army or a commander of a garrison under the general supervision of the Minister of war, as we have stated, however, all these camps were not under the Army commanders; in those areas under the jurisdiction of the Navy, the camps were administered by Navy officers of corresponding rank and authority. Detention camps for civilian internees were authorized by regulations issued by the War Ministry on 7 November 1943. The regulations Provided "when the commander of an Army, which term shall herein include persons of the equivalent status as a commander of an Army, has interned enemy nationals or neutrals at the [49,729] front, he shall establish an army internment camp as soon as possible. The commander of an army that establishes the army internment camp shall administer the same." General regulations were issued providing for the administration of civilian internees, which were not materially different from those providing for the administration of prisoners of war. All regulations applicable to prisoners of war were made applicable to civilian internees, except in those cases where specific regulations were issued applicable to civilian internees alone, These regulations also provided that, "The commander of an army that establishes the army internment camp shall administer the same." The following accused administered detention camps as military commanders during the Pacific War, namely: DOHIHARA as Commander of the Eastern Military District in Japan and as Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore; HATA as Commander of all Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China and as Commander of the military districts in Central and Western Honshu in Japan; ITAGAKI as Commander of the Korean Army and as Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore; KIMURA as Commander of the Army in Burma; MUTO as Commander of the Japanese Army in Northern Sumatra; SATO as Commander of the Army in French Indo-China; and UMEZU as Commander of the [49,730] Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The regulations provided that, "A commander of an Army or a commander of a garrison may, whenever necessary, delegate his subordinates to assist in the management of a prisoner of war or, civilian internee camp. Persons delegated according to these provisions shall be under the supervision and command of the Commandant." Special supervisors or chiefs were selected and trained in Tokyo to manage prisoner of war and civilian internee camps; and after careful and detailed instruction, which was completed by a personal message from Prime Minister TOJO, these chiefs of camps were sent out from Japan to all places where prisoner of war and civilian internee camps were located to take charge of those camps and manage them under the command of the Army and Navy commanders. These chiefs of camps were required by regulations to make monthly reports to the Prisoner of War Administration section in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. These reports were discussed at the bi-weekly conferences of the Bureau Chiefs in the War Ministry, which were usually attended by the War Minister and Vice-Minister of War. These reports were included in statistics relative to the high death rate in the camps due to malnutrition and other causes. TOJO said that this item received his particular attention. A summary of the [49,731] monthly reports from the chiefs of camps was filed in the office of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, which was under the same director as the Prisoner of War Administration Section. THE NAVY PARTICIPATED IN THE SYSTEM It was contemplated that the Navy would deliver to the Army for detention and administration all prisoners of war taken and civilian internees interned by it, but in many cases this was not done or was delayed for a long time. Also, in some areas the Navy exercised jurisdiction for administration of occupied areas. For instance, the Navy occupied such islands as Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas, Timor and other islands east of a line through Bali. It also occupied other islands, such as Wake Island. In those areas occupied by the Navy, the prisoners of war and civilian internees were administered by the Navy Minister and the enforcement of the laws of war in those areas became the responsibility of the Navy, under the directions to SHIMADA and OKA. ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN JAPAN PROPER Prisoners of war detained in Japan were under the War Ministry in the same manner as prisoners in other areas, but it is said that the Home Ministry war in charge of the police in Japan and war therefore considered [49,732] to be the proper Ministry to administer all matters relating to civilian internees in Japan proper. It will be noted that TOJO served as Home Minister from 18 October 1941 to 17 February 1942, and from 25 November 1942 to 6 January 1943. TOJO said that "there was a separate body under the Home Ministry to deal with civilian internees, but I don't know what the name of that was." For the purpose of defense, and military administration, Japan was divided into eight military districts. Each military district was occupied by an army, the commander of which was also the military administrator of the district and in charge of all prisoner of war camps within his district. The Eastern District embraced the Tokyo-Yokohama Area and was occupied by the 12th Area Army. DOHIHARA commanded that army and administered the district from 1 May 1943 to 22 March 1944, and again from 25 August 1945 to the time of the surrender on 2 September 1945. The Chugoku Military District embraced the Hiroshima Area and the western tip of Honshu Island and was garrisoned by the Second Army Corps. HATA commanded that Corps from 7 April 1945 until the surrender on 2 September 1945. [49,733] ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN FORMOSA, KOREA AND SAKHALIN In the overseas possessions of Japan, which were not in a theater of operations, such as Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin, civilian internees were under the administration of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, but prisoners of war in those possession were under the administration of the War Ministry in the same manner as prisoners in other areas. The Ministry of Overseas Affairs was established by Imperial Ordinance of 10 June 1929. That Ordinance provided that this Ministry was to control all affairs relating to the Korea Governor-General's office, the Formosa Governor-General's office, the Kwantung Administration office and the South Seas administration office. To provide for the major wartime reorganization of the Japanese Government, this Ministry was abolished in 1943 and its functions divided and transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Greater East Asia. TOGO was Minister of Overseas Affairs from 18 October 1941 to 2 December 1941. ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES The Ministry of Greater East Asia was created by Imperial Ordinance on 1 November 1942. That Ordinance directed that "the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs [49,734] shall administer the execution of various political affairs excepting purely diplomatic affairs concerning Greater East Asia, which is hereinafter defined as excluding Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin. The Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs shall superintend affairs concerning the Kwantung Bureau and of the South Seas Government Office. There shall be instituted in the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs the following four Bureaux; The General Affairs Bureau, the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, the Chinese Affairs Bureau and the Southern Area Affairs Bureau." This Ministry was organized to govern all areas which had fallen or might fall under the military power of Japan, except Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin. The Ordinance further provided, "To extend cooperation to the Army and the Navy, the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs shall conduct affairs concerning administration of the occupied areas within the Greater East Asia Area." The first Minister was Aoki, who was followed by SHIGEMITSU who took over this Ministry on 20 July 1944 and served in that capacity until 7 April 1945, when he was succeeded by TOGO who held the office until 16 August 1945. [49,735] ACCUSED WHO ADMINISTERED THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UMEZU became Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army on 7 September 1939 and served in that capacity until 18 July 1944. He was the virtual ruler of Manchukuo and was directly responsible for the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in Manchuria. HATA was Commander in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China from 1 March 1941 to 22 November 1944. On 11 March 1943, KIMURA resigned as Vice-Minister of War; he was appointed Commander-in- Chief of the Japanese Army in Burma on 30 August 1944 and served in that position until the surrender. During his tour of duty in Burma he put into practice the policies which he helped to develop during his term of office as Vice-Minister of War. He first established his headquarters at Rangoon. At this time atrocities occurred in that area, at Hsipaw, Moksokwin Reserve Forest, Henzada, Ongun Cemetery, Tharrawaddy and at the Kempeitai Jail in Rangoon. At the and of April 1945, KIMURA moved his headquarters to Moulmein. Thereafter atrocities occurred at or near Noulmein. The entire population of Kalagon, a village 10 miles from KIMURA's headquarters, was massacred on 7 July 1945 under order of his field officers. Massacres occurred in Moulmein after KIMURA's arrival; the Kempeitai became more inhumane in their treatment of [49,736] Burmese and the internees in the camp at Tavoy were starved and beaten. MUTO made an inspection trip to the southern Regions from 20 March 1942 to 12 April 1942; he visited Formosa, Saigon, Bangkok, Rangoon, Singapore, Palembang, Java, Manila and other places. He returned to Tokyo and was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division on 20 April 1942 and stationed in Northern Sumatra. He was the Japanese military commander in Northern Sumatra, with his headquarters at Medan until 12 October 1944, when he was transferred to the Philippine Islands. During his term of office as such commander, he put into practice the policies which he advocated as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in Tokyo. In the area occupied by his troops in Northern Sumatra, some of the most disgraceful atrocities of the war were committed. Prisoners of war and civilian internees were starved, neglected, tortured, murdered and otherwise mistreated and civilians were massacred. The laws of war were ignored. MUTO further demonstrated his disregard for the laws of war upon his transfer on 12 October 1944 to become Chief-of-Staff of the 14th Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands under General Yamashita. On the night of 20 October 1944, MUTO arrived at Fort McKinley in the Philippines to assumed his duties as Chief-of-Staff to [49,737] General Yamashita. He held that assignment until the Japanese surrender in September 1945. During his tenure as such Chief-of-Staff, a compaign massacre, torture and other atrocities were waged by the troops under Yamashita and MUTO on the civilian population of the Philippines, including the massacres in Bantangas and massacres and other atrocities at Manila. These bore the same features and followed the pattern set eight years earlier at Nanking when MUTO was a member of MATSUl's staff. During this period prisoners of war and civilian internees were starved, tortured and murdered. DOHIHARA commanded the 7th Area Army at Singapore from 22 March 1944 until he was relieved by ITAGAKI on 7 April 1945 to become Inspector General of Military Education. During his period of command prisoners of war were treated as common criminals, starved, tortured and otherwise ill-treated. After ITAGAKI assumed the command of the 7th Area Army at Singapore there was no improvement in the condition of the prisoners of war under, the jurisdiction of that Army. During June and July 1945, while he was in command, no less than 17 Allied airmen were taken from their cells in the Outram Road Gaol and murdered. [49,738] ALLIED PROTESTS Formal and informal protests and warnings against violations of the laws of war lodged by the Allied Powers and the Protecting Power during the Pacific War were ignored; or when they were answered, the commission of the offenses was denied, or untruthful explanations were given. The procedure followed in Tokyo was described to us as follows: Formal protests from the Allied Powers and the protecting Power were regularly delivered to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry then circulated copies of these protests to the Ministries and Bureaux of the Japanese Government concerned. All protests concerning matters under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau were first delivered to the Secretariat of the War Ministry. The Secretariat forwarded the protests to the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. MUTO was Chief of this bureau from 30 September 1939 to 20 April 1942. SATO was Chief of this Section from 15 July 1938 until he replaced MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in 1942. SATO served as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau until 14 December 1944. The Military Affairs Section discussed the protests with the various sections of the [49,739] Military Affairs Bureau concerned, such as the Prisoner of War Administration Section or the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. The protest was then taken up and discussed at the bi-weekly meetings of the Bureaux Chiefs of the War Ministry which were usually attended by the War Minister and Vice-Minister of War. At these meetings it was decided whether a reply would be made to the protest and the nature of the reply to be made. The Director of the Prisoner of War Administration Section, who was also the Director of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, attended these discussions and received orders on important matters direct from the War Minister and the Vice-Minister; he furnished copies of the protests and the replies to be made thereto to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau for filing. This was the practice even when the copies of the protests were addressed to the War Minister or the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. In addition to formal protests, radio broadcasts were regularly made over Allied stations detailing the atrocities and other violations of the laws of war being committed by the Japanese armed forces and warning the Japanese Government that it would be held responsible for these offenses. These broadcasts were monitored by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and [49,740] distributed to all ministries, bureaux and officials concerned. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO recorded in his diary on 19 March 1942 that: "The Imperial Household Minister came to the office and told me about Eden's address in Parliament concerning our soldiers atrocities at Hong Kong, and we exchanged opinions". The formal protests delivered were too numerous for detailed mention here. In general, it may be said that these protests related to the violations of the laws of war which we have mentioned as well as to many others. In each case, specific and detailed facts were stated which permitted complete investigation. The same thing may be said of the protests and warnings delivered over the radio. We will mention here, by way of illustration only, some of these protests and warnings. As early as 14 February 1942 the United States Government delivered a note through the Swiss Government stating that it had received reports that the Japanese authorities in the occupied areas of the Philippines were subjecting American civilians to an extremely rigid and harsh regime involving abuse and humiliation and that the American Government desired assurances that immediate stops had been taken to remedy the situation [49,741] and to accord to Americans in the Philippines moderate treatment similar to that being extended to Japanese nationals in the territories of the United States. Foreign Minister TOGO replied on 24 February 1942 that "conditions applied to American Nationals in the Philippines by the Japanese authorities are more favorable than contemplated by the Geneva Convention of 1929". This statement was false. He denied that American nationals were being subjected to unfavorable treatment and said that the "Apprehensions of the American Government were based on unknown sources and cited no exact facts and therefore were without foundation". On 12 December 1942 the United States Government delivered another formal protest. It stated that it had learned of gross ill-treatment suffered by American civilians and prisoners of war in violation of the commitment of the Japanese Government to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 to American prisoners of war and, in so far as they might be applicable, to civilian internees. The United States stated that it was evident that Japan had failed to fulfill its undertaking and that some Japanese officers and agencies had violated the principles of that Convention not only by positive ill- [49,742] treatment but by failure to provide for those American nationals the necessities of life. The United States then lodged an emphatic protest and stated that it expected this inhumane and uncivilized treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees to be made a matter of immediate investigation, that it expected those responsible to be disciplined immediately, and that it expected an assurance that ill- treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees would be discontinued. Specific instances were cited, giving dates and other facts to support this protest. No reply was made to this protest until 28 May 1943, when Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU replied that an investigation was being made and that he would communicate "in due course" when the results of the investigation were known. In the meantime, on 5 April 1943, the United States had filed another protest against the ill-treatment of the Doolittle fliers. The United States Government warned: "The American Government also solemnly warns the Japanese Government that for American prisoners of war or for any other acts of criminal barbarity inflicted upon American prisoners in violation of the laws of warfare, accepted and practiced by civilized nations, as military operations [49,742a] now in progress draw to their inexorable and inevitable conclusion, the American Government will visit upon the officers of the Japanese Government responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment they deserve". [49,743] A large number of specific protests was lodged by the United States with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU before be finally answered, on 24 April 1944, the protest of the United States which had been made on 12 December 1942. In that reply, he indicated that the investigation, which he had mentioned in his Note of 28 May 1943, had been completed, and that he had a report thereon. He accused the Government of the United States of "distorting and exaggerating the facts" and rejected the protest; he went to greet length to set out what he claimed to be the facts as disclosed by the so-called investigation. The United States replied to this accusation on 1 March 1945 by a note reading "The United States Government cannot accept a statement by the Japanese Government impugning its veracity. The United States Government's protest concerning treatment accorded by Japanese authorities to American nationals in Japan and Japanese occupied territory is based on documentary evidence, which cannot be refuted in such an arbitrary fashion by the Japanese Government. The statements contained in the Japanese Government's reply of 24 April 1944 are so far removed from the facts as known to the United States Government that it can only conclude that the Japanese Government has permitted itself to be misled by fabricated reports of local officials and [49,744] had not made an independent investigation of the matters protested in the United States Government's Note of 12 December 1942. The United States Government therefore considers the reply unsatisfactory and will continue to hold the Japanese Government answerable." British protests were treated in the same fashion as those from the Government of the United States. An illustration is afforded by the protests and answer regarding the treatment of prisoners of war in Rangoon Gaol. On 8 July 1942, the British Government caused a protest to be delivered to Foreign Minister TOGO in which it was stated that a photograph had appeared in the Japan Times and Advertiser, a newspaper published in Tokyo, which showed British prisoners of war cleaning the streets of Rangoon under the amused eyes of the public. The protest was renewed on 1 August 1942. On 15 September 1942, the British Government further protested that the prisoners in Rangoon Gaol were furnished insufficient rations, that they were forced to sleep on the bare floors of the prison and that their boots had been confiscated. TOJO acted as Foreign Minister from 1 September 1942 to 17 September 1942; and while occupying that office received a Note calling his attention to the foregoing protests. On 9 February 1943, Foreign Minister Tani, who had [49,745] replaced TOJO as Foreign Minister replied, "the competent authorities have stated after having made a full inquiry that the facts stated in said letters never happened.'' The protests of the British Government against the treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma and Siam received similar treatment. The British Government protested on 4 July 1944 in a Note delivered to SHIGEMITSU that it had learned from postcards printed by the Japanese authorities that about twenty thousand British prisoners of war had been transferred to the vicinity of Moulmein without notification. It also protested against the unfavorable conditions and ill-treatment to which these prisoners were subjected, SHIGEMITSU replied on 26 August 1944 that the "majority of British and Allied prisoners of war, who were in Burma on 4 July 1944 were prisoners who had been attached to camps in Thailand and Malaya and had been provisionally transferred to Burma." SHIGEMITSU replied on 3 October 1944 to further protests from the British Government relative to the health of prisoners laboring in Burma and Siam. In that reply he said: "The Imperial Government, by exercising great vigilance as to the health and hygiene of prisoners of war, takes added measures, such as monthly medical examination of each prisoner of war camp, to enable sickness to be treated in the first stage." [49,746] He then detailed the medical aid which he claimed had been given to the prisoners on the Burma-Siam Railway. The facts stated were entirely false as the prisoners had not received medical attention and had been dying by thousands from beri-beri, cholera, malaria and other tropical diseases. The true facts were learned when the Rakuyo Maru was torpedoed and sunk in the South China Sea on 12 September 1944. There had been 1300 prisoners of war aboard that unmarked Japanese prison ship. The Japanese picked up the Japanese survivors, but deliberately left the prisoners to their fate. Approximately 100 Australian and United Kingdom Survivors were later rescued and taken to Australia and Great Britain. From these prisoners it was learned that all available prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved early in 1942 to Burma and Thailand to work on the Burma-Siam Railway project. We have already described the conditions under which they traveled and the terrible conditions during the construction of the railway. SHIGEMITSU was informed of the facts learned from these rescued prisoners of was in a Note from the British Government dated 4 December 1944, renewing the British protests. Forced at last to reply, TOGO, who had succeeded SHIGEMITSU as Foreign Minister, made a belated reply to these protests on 15 May 1945. He said that [49,747] it was regretted that the situation was such that "the concerted efforts of all the sanitary services of the Japanese troops cannot prevent the spread of diseases of the digestive system, etc." He denied that atrocities had been committed by Japanese troops in Burma and as to the protest against the parading of British prisoners of war in Moulmein, which we have mentioned, he gave the conventional Japanese answer that it "never happened". In addition to the disregard shown these formal protests, the many protests and warnings given over the radio were completely ignored although these had been regularly recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office and distributed to the various ministries. On 24 January 1944, a report from the United States Government giving the details and results of the Bataan March was broadcast over the British Broadcasting Corporation's network and recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office. Again on 29 January 1944 radio station KWID at San Francisco, California, broadcast White House Secretary Stephen Early's disclosure that the Japanese would not permit the United States Government to send food and supplies to United States and Filipino prisoners. Early said, "The time has come for releasing the factual reports which have been carefully investigated [49,748] and authenticated because we cannot expect to get further relief to our prisoners now in the hands of the Japanese." This broadcast was recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office, KWID again broadcast on 29 January 1944 statements by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Mr. Hull in speaking of the treatment of prisoners of war in Japanese hands stated: "According to the reports of cruelty and inhumanity, it would be necessary to summon the representatives of all the demons available anywhere and combine their fiendishness with all that is bloody in order to describe the conduct of those who inflicted those unthinkable atrocities on the Americans and Filipinos." The vigor of this language was fully justified by the evidence given before the Tribunal. Mr. Eden had stated before the House of Commons that British protests had drown unsatisfactory results from Japan. He said that the Japanese were violating not only international law but all human, decent civilized conduct. He warned the Japanese Government that in time to come the record of their military atrocities in the war would not be forgotten. Mr. Hull had closed his statement with the remark that the United States Government was assembling all possible facts concerning Japanese treatment of [49,749] prisoners of war and that it intended to seek full punishment of the responsible Japanese authorities. General MacArthur's General Headquarters issued a warning on 22 October 1944 to the Japanese Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore, who had jurisdiction over the Philippine Islands as well as a large segment of the Pacific area. General MacArthur warned that he would hold the enemy leaders immediately responsible for any failure to accord prisoners of war and civilian internees proper treatment. He said that although the Americans and Filipinos who surrendered in the Philippines believed they would be treated with the dignity, honor and protection to which prisoners of war were entitled under the laws of war, unimpeachable evidence had been received of the degradation and even brutality to which they had been subjected in violation of the most sacred code of martial honor. All of these broadcasts were recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office and given a wide circulation among the Japanese Ministries. ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES WAS CONDONED AND CONCEALED The Japanese Government condoned ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees by failing and neglecting to punish those guilty of ill-treating them or by prescribing trifling and inadequate penalties [49,750] for the offence. That Government also attempted to conceal the ill-treatment and murder of prisoners and internees by prohibiting the representatives of the Protecting Power from visiting camps, by restricting such visits as were allowed, by refusing to forward to the Protecting Power complete lists of prisoners taken and civilians interned, by censoring news relating to prisoners and internees, and ordering the destruction of all incriminating documents at the time of the surrender of Japan. The following are examples of inadequate sentences imposed for ill-treatment of prisoners. For flogging, the punishment imposed was admonition or a few days confinement in quarters or a few days extra duty. A guard guilty of torturing prisoners of war was admonished. A guard who was guilty of frequently lynching prisoners of war was admonished. Several guards were found guilty of lynching prisoners of war; the most severe punishment imposed was discharge. The penalty imposed on the officer responsible for the burning alive of 62 Allied fliers during an air raid on the Tokyo Army Prison was an admonition. These cases arc evidence that the War Ministry knew there was ill-treatment of prisoners. The trifling nature of the punishments imposed implies condonation. [49,751] The Government actively concealed the ill-treatment to which prisoners of war and civilian internees were being subjected by refusing visits by representatives of the Protecting Power designated by the Allies. The Swiss Minister in Tokyo, as early as 12 February 1942, delivered a note to Foreign Minister TOGO in which he said: "I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the Government of the United States is prepared to facilitate, at the request of the representative of the Protecting Power, their visits to Japanese subjects who are temporarily detained, interned, or at liberty on parole. I would be greatly obliged to Your Excellency if you would facilitate in part the task of my Legation so far as it concerns visits to internees." He delivered another note to Foreign Minister TOGO on 17 February 1942 in which he said: "The Government of the United States of America has already informed the Spanish Ambassador, protecting Japanese interests in the United States, that he is at liberty to visit prisoner of war camps as well as places where civilian internees are detained. The Government of the United States requests, in conformity with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, that the Swiss representatives in Japan and in the territories occupied by Japanese forces be authorized [49,752] as soon as possible to commence their visits of inspection to places where American citizens, who are prisoners of war or civilian internees, are located." He delivered other notes to TOGO in March and June 1942 repeating those requests. During June 1942 he requested the same permission to visit the subjects of Great Britain and the Dominions, who were detained as prisoners or internees. TOGO at last replied to these requests on 30 July 1942 by a note in which he said: "I desire to inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government having in principle refused to recognize the representation of any interests in the occupied territories comprising the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, it follows that permission cannot be given to your delegates to visit American prisoners of war and civilian internees in the above-mentioned territories; but that in respect of Shanghai only, in occupied China, the competent authorities can give this permission." The Governments of the United States and Great Britain protested immediately and renewed their requests. The correspondence between the Swiss Minister and Foreign Minister Tani, who succeeded TOGO, reflects that this policy of refusing permission to visit prisoners and internees detained in the occupied [49,753] territories and in Japan's overseas possessions was continued. The Swiss Minister continued to press for permission, however; and on 22 April 1943, SHIGEMITSU, who had become Foreign Minister, delivered a Note Verbal to the Swiss Minister in which he said: "As the Foreign Minister has communicated to the Swiss Minister by Note dated 20 July 1942, the Imperial Government shall not permit visits to prisoners of war and civilian internee camps in occupied territories." Although the Swiss Minister had been informed by Foreign Minister TOGO that representatives of the Protecting Power would be allowed to visit camps at Shanghai, the visits were not made because the so-called "competent authorities," to which TOGO referred the Swiss Minister, refused to give permission for the visits and the permission was not forthcoming from the TOJO Cabinet in Tokyo. SHIGEMITSU was informed of this in a note from the Swiss Minister dated 12 May 1943. In response to these persistent and repeated requests from the Swiss Government for permission to visit prisoners of war and civilian internees, a few selected camps, which had been prepared for the occasion, were allowed to be visited in Japan. The Swiss Minister, on 2 June 1943, requested permission from SHIGEMITSU to visit the remaining camps in [49,754] Japan as well as the camps in the occupied territories, and inquired when a second visit might be made to the camps which had been visited in Japan. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU replied on 23 July 1943 and said: "As regards prisoner of war camps in the occupies areas, a notification will be made to Your Excellency if the time comes when permission can be granted; and as regards prisoner of war camps in Japan proper, which have not yet been visited, permission will be granted gradually at a favorable opportunity. Permission for periodic visits to those camps, that have already been visited, shall not be granted in advance; but in case a visit is desired, consideration will be given to applications made on all such occasions." However, consideration was not given to these applications; and on 12 February 1944, the Swiss Minister complained to SHIGEMITSU that no reply had been made to requests to visit detention camps between August 1943 and February 1944. This complaint was repeated in a note to SHIGEMITSU on 30 March 1944, in which the Swiss Minister said: "You know that I am not satisfied with my activities as representative of foreign interests in Japan. The results do not correspond to the efforts. I can see this in a concrete fashion as shown by the statistics of my services and requests which have been made by my Government at the request of the [49,755] Governments who have confided their interests in us. I desire to confine myself for the moment to my requests to visit prisoner of war camps. Reviewing my requests made over more than two years, I find that from 1 February 1942 to 15 March 1944, I have intervened 134 times in writing. These 134 notes have brought exactly 24 replies from the Foreign Ministry. Most of these replies are either negative or forward to me decisions made by competent authorities. I have received three replies in nine months." It was not until 13 November 1944 that he was notified by SHIGEMITSU's Foreign Ministry that the time had come when permission could be granted to visit prisoners of war and internees in the occupied territories; and then the visits were limited to Manila, Shonan and Bangkok. In a note addressed to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo on 17 November 1944, SHIGEMITSU informed the Swiss Minister that visits would be allowed to prisoner of war camps in the occupied territories on condition of reciprocity if they did not interfere with military operations. The Swiss Minister in a note dated 13 January 1945, asked SHIGEMITSU when these visits could be commenced. I was not until 7 April 1945, that TOGO, who had succeeded SHIGEMITSU as Foreign Minister, replied to the many urgent requests [49,756] to visit detention camps in the occupied territories. In that reply, TOGO stated that Japan "would lose no time" in making preparations for visits in Thailand. By the use of one excuse or another, visits were never freely allowed throughout the war. In the few cases where the representatives of the Protecting Power were allowed to visit detention camps, the camps were prepared for the visit, and the visits were strictly supervised. Regulations issued by the TOJO Cabinet early in the Pacific War provided that when an interview with a prisoner of war was authorized restrictions regarding the time and place of the interview and the range within which the conversation was to be conducted would be imposed and that a guard would be present during the interview. These regulations were enforced notwithstanding the repeated objections of the Protecting Power. In a note to the Swiss Minister, dated 22 April 1943, SHIGEMITSU said: "The Imperial Government shall not allow delegates of the Protecting Power to interview prisoners of war without the presence of a guard." The Swiss Minister protested and SHIGEMITSU replied on 24 June 1943: "The Ministry hastens to inform the Legation that Article 13 of our country's detailed regulations stipulates that a guard shall be present [49,757] when prisoners of war are interviewed, and that it is not possible to modify our treatment of prisoners of war practiced in conformity with the said Article." After a visit to the prisoner of war camp at Motoyama in Japan in the spring of 1943, the senior prisoner at the camp, who had dared to complain of the working conditions to which the prisoners had been subjected, was tortured. He was forced to kneel for five hours before a Japanese guard. The next time this camp was visited, this senior prisoner was placed in confinement and was not allowed to speak to the representative although that representative demanded to interview him. The fate of prisoners of war and civilian internees was further concealed by refusal to forward to the Protecting Power a list of the names of prisoners of war and civilian internees detained. An example of the refusal to supply such lists is the case of the prisoners of war and civilian internees detained after the capture of Wake Island. The Swiss Minister on 27 May 1942 requested of TOGO the names of the prisoners of war and civilian internees captured on Wake Island and their present whereabouts. On 6 October 1942, the Swiss Minister informed the Foreign Minister, then Tani, that the United States [49,758] Government was still without report on approximately 400 American civilians who were on Wake Island at the time of its capture. On 8 April 1943, the list not having been furnished, the Swiss Minister informed Foreign Minister Tani that the United States Government was insisting upon being furnished the names and location of the remaining 400. Foreign Minister Tani replied on 19 April 1943 that all information to be furnished had already been given. On 21 August 1943, the Swiss Minister furnished the new Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU a list of 432 American civilians who should have been on Wake Island at the time of its occupation by the Japanese forces, but whose names were not found on the lists furnished to the International Red Cross Bureau by the Japanese, and requested information regarding those civilians. On 15 May 1945, the Swiss Minister informed Foreign Minister, now TOGO, that no answer had been received to the request for information regarding the remaining 432 civilians from Wake Island. The information was pot obtained until after the surrender of Japan. In truth, 98 of these unfortunate people were murdered by the Japanese Navy in October 1943. In the draft already issued it stated that all the people were murdered; actually 98 were murdered. [49,759] That correction should be made. News reports and mail were specially censored, no doubt to prevent disclosure of the ill-treatment to which prisoners of war were being subjected. Censorship regulations issued by the Information Bureau of the War Ministry on 20 December 1943, while TOJO was War Minister, provided among other things the following: "Care should be taken to avoid issuing twisted reports of our fair attitude which might give the enemy food for evil propaganda and bring harm to our interned brothers. For this reason, any reports including photographs, pictures, etc., which come under the following categories are prohibited: Anything that gives the impression that prisoners of war are too well treated or are cruelly treated; any concrete information concerning facilities, supplies, sanitary conditions, or other matters pertaining to living conditions within prisoner of war camps; any information giving the names of any location of prisoner of war camps other than the following:" Then followed twelve general names such as Tokyo, Korea, Borneo, etc. The mail which prisoners of war were allowed to send was restricted almost to the point of prohibition. Prisoners in some camps, such as those at Singapore, were told by their guards that unless they reported [49,760] favorably on conditions at the camp their cards would not be sent. This appears to have been the general rule. When it became apparent that Japan would be forced to surrender, an organized effort was made to burn or otherwise destroy all documents and other evidence of ill- treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees. The Japanese Minister of War issued an order on 14 August 1945 to all Army headquarters that confidential documents should be destroyed by fire immediately. On the same day, the Commandant of the Kempeitai sent out instructions to the various Kempeitai Headquarters detailing the methods of burning large quantities of documents efficiently. The Chief of the Prisoner of War Camps under the Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau sent a circular telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army on 20 August 1945 in which he said: "Documents which would be unfavorable for us in the hands of the enemy are to be treated in the same way as secret documents and destroyed when finished with." This telegram was sent to the Korean Army, Kwantung Army, North China Army, Hong Kong, Mukden, Borneo, Thailand, Malaya and Java. It was in this telegram that the Chief of Prisoner of War Camps made this statement: "Personnel who ill-treated prisoners of [49,761] war and internees or who are held in extremely bad sentiment by them are permitted to take care of it by immediately transferring or by fleeing without trace." We will recess now until half-past one. (Whereupon, at 1100, a recess was taken.) [49,762] AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment. PART C -- CHAPTER IX FINDINGS ON COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT In Count I of the Indictment it is charged that all the defendants together with other persons participated in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy. The object of that common plan is alleged to have been that Japan should secure the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein or bordering thereon, and for that purpose should, alone or in combination with other countries having similar objects, wage a war or wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose that purpose. There are undoubtedly declarations by some of those who are alleged to have participated in the conspiracy which coincide with the above grandiose [49,763] statement, but in our opinion it has not been proved that these were ever more than declarations of the aspirations of individuals. Thus, for example, we do not think the conspirators ever seriously resolved to attempt to secure the domination of North and South America. So far as the wishes of the conspirators crystallized into a concrete common plan we are of opinion that the territory that they had resolved Japan should dominate was confined to East Asia, the Western and Southwestern Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and certain of the islands in these oceans. We shall accordingly treat Count I as if the charge had been limited to the above object. We shall consider in the first place whether a conspiracy with the above object has been proved to have existed. Already prior to 1928 Okawa, one of the original defendants, who has been discharged from this trial on account of his present mental state, was publicly advocating that Japan should extend her territory on the continent of Asia by the threat or, if necessary, by use of military force. He also advocated that Japan should seek to dominate Eastern Siberia and the South Sea Islands. He predicted that the course he advocated must result in a war between the East and the West, in [49,764] which Japan would be the champion of the East. He was encouraged and aided in his advocacy of this plan by the Japanese General Staff. The object of this plan as stated was substantially the object of the conspiracy as we have defined it. In our review of the facts we have noticed many subsequent declarations of the conspirators as to the object of the conspiracy. These do not vary in any material respect from this early declaration by Okawa. Already when Tanaka was premier, from 1927 to 1929, a party of military men, with Okawa and other civilian supporters, was advocating this policy of Okawa that Japan should expand by the use of force. The conspiracy was now in being. It remained in being until Japan's defeat in 1945. The immediate question when Tanaka was premier was whether Japan should attempt to expand her influence on the continent beginning with Manchuria by peaceful penetration, as Tanaka and the members of his Cabinet wished, or whether that expansion should be accomplished by the use of force if necessary, as the conspirators advocated. It was essential that the conspirators should have the support and control of the nation. This was the beginning of the long struggle between the conspirators, who advocated the attainment of their object by force, and [49,765] those politicians and latterly those bureaucrats, who advocated Japan's expansion by peaceful measures or at least by a more discreet choice of the occasions on which force should be employed. This struggle culminated in the conspirators obtaining control of the organs of government of Japan and preparing and regimenting the nation's mind and material resources for wars of aggression designed to achieve the object of the conspiracy. In overcoming the opposition the conspirators employed methods which were entirely unconstitutional and at times wholly ruthless. Propaganda and persuasion won many to their side, but military action abroad without Cabinet sanction or in defiance of Cabinet veto, assassination of opposing leaders, plots to overthrow by force of arms Cabinets which refused to cooperate with them, and even a military revolt which seized the capital and attempted to overthrow the government were part of the tactics whereby the conspirators came ultimately to dominate the Japanese polity. As and when they felt strong enough to overcome opposition at home and latterly when they had finally overcome all such opposition the conspirators carried out in succession the attacks necessary to effect their ultimate object that Japan should dominate the Far East. In 1931 they launched a war of aggression [49,766] against China and conquered Manchuria and Jehol. By 1934 they had commenced to infiltrate into North China, garrisoning the land and setting up puppet governments designed to serve their purposes. From 1937 onwards they continued their aggressive war against China on a vast scale, overrunning and occupying much of the country, setting up puppet governments on the above model, and exploiting China's economy and natural resources to feed the Japanese military and civilian needs. In the meantime they had long been planning and preparing a war of aggression which they proposed to launch against the U.S.S.R.. The intention was to seize that country's eastern territories when a favorable opportunity occurred. They had also long recognized that their exploitation of East Asia and their designs on the islands in the Western and Southwestern Pacific would bring them into conflict with the United States of America, Britain, France and the Netherlands who would defend their threatened interests and territories. They planned and prepared for war against these countries also. The conspirators brought about Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy, whose policies were as aggressive as their own, and whose support they desired both in [49,767] the diplomatic and military fields, for their aggressive actions in China had drawn on Japan the condemnation of the League of Nations and left her friendless in the councils of the world. Their proposed attack on the U.S.S.R. was postponed from time to time for various reasons, among which were (1) Japan's preoccupation with the war in China, which was absorbing unexpectedly large military resources, and (2) Germany's pact of non- aggression with the U.S.S.R. in 1939, which for the time freed the U.S.S.R. from threat of attack on her western frontier, and might have allowed her to devote the bulk of her strength to the defence of her eastern territories if Japan had attacked her. Then in the year 1940 came Germany's great military successes on the continent of Europe. For the time being Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were powerless to afford adequate protection to their interests and territories in the Far East. The military preparations of the United States were in the initial stages. It seemed to the conspirators that no such favorable opportunity could readily recur of realizing that part of their objective which sought Japan's domination of Southwest Asia and the islands in the Western and Southwestern Pacific and Indian Oceans. [49,768] After prolonged negotiations with the United States of America, in which they refused to disgorge any substantial part of the fruits they had seized as the result of their war of aggression against China, on 7 December 1941 the conspirators launched a war of aggression against the United States and the British Commonwealth. They had already issued orders declaring that a state of war existed between Japan and the Netherlands as from 00.00 hours on 7 December 1941. They had previously secured a jumping-off place for their attacks on the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies by forcing their troops into French Indo-China under threat of military action if this facility was refused to them. Recognizing the existence of a state of war and faced by the imminent threat of invasion of her Far Eastern territories, which the conspirators had long planned and were now about to execute, the Netherlands in self-defence declared war on Japan. These far-reaching plans for waging wars of aggression and the prolonged and intricate preparation for and waging of these wars of aggression were not the work of one man. They were the work of many leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the achievement of a common object. That common object, that they [49,769] should secure Japan's domination by preparing and waging wars of aggression, was a criminal object. Indeed no more grave crimes can be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a war of aggression or the waging of a war of aggression, for the conspiracy threatens the security of the peoples of the world, and the waging disrupts it. The probable result of such a conspiracy and the inevitable result of its execution is that death and suffering will be inflicted on countless human beings. The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider whether there was a conspiracy to wage wars in violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances specified in the particulars annexed to Count I. The conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal in the highest degree. The Tribunal finds that the existence of the criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression as alleged in Count I, with the limitation as to object already mentioned, has been proved. The question whether the defendants or any of them participated in that conspiracy will be considered when we deal with the individual cases. The conspiracy existed for and its execution occupied a period of many years. Not all of the [49,770] conspirators were parties to it at the beginning, and some of those who were parties to it had ceased to be active in its execution before the end. All of those who at any time were parties to the criminal conspiracy or who at any time with guilty knowledge played a part in its execution are guilty of the charge contained in Count I. In view of our finding on Count I it is unnecessary to deal with Counts 2 and 3, which charge the formulation or execution of conspiracies with objects more limited than that which we have found proved under Count I, or with Count 4, which charges the same conspiracy as Count I but with more specification. Count 5 charges a conspiracy wider in extent and with even more grandiose objects than that charged i in Count I. We are of opinion that although some of the conspirators clearly desired the achievement of these grandiose objects, nevertheless there is not sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the conspiracy charged in Count 5 has been proved. For the reasons given in an earlier part of this judgment we consider it unnecessary to make any pronouncement on Counts 6 to 26 and 37 to 53. There remain therefore only Counts 27 to 36 and 54 and 55, [49,771] in respect of which we now give out findings. Counts 27 to 36 charge the crime of waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances against the countries named in those counts. In the statement of facts just concluded we have found that wars of aggression were waged against all those countries with the exception of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Count 30) and the Kingdom of Thailand (Count 34). With reference to the Philippines as we have heretofore stated, that Commonwealth during the period of the war was not a completely sovereign state and so far as international relations were concerned it was a part of the United States of America. We further stated that it is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was waged in the Philippines, but for the sake of technical accuracy we consider the aggressive war in the Philippines as being a part of the war of aggression waged against the United States of America. Count 28 charges the waging of a war of aggression against the Republic of China over a lesser period of time than that charged in Count 27. Since we hold that the fuller charge contained in Count 27 has been proved we shall make no pronouncement on Count 28. [49,772] Wars of aggression having been proved, it is unnecessary to consider whether they were also wars otherwise in violation of international law or in violation of treaties, agreements and assurances. The Tribunal finds therefore that it has been proved that wars of aggression were waged as alleged in Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36. Count 54 charges ordering, authorizing and permitting the commission of Conventional War Crimes. Count 55 charges failure to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of conventions and laws of war in respect of prisoners of war and civilian internees. We find that there have been cases in which crimes under both these Counts have been proved. Consequent upon the foregoing findings, we propose to consider the charges against individual defendants in respect only of the following Counts: Numbers 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 36, 54 and 55. [49,773] PART C -- CHAPTER X VERDICTS The Tribunal will now proceed to render its verdict in the case of each of the accused. Article 17 of the Charter requires that the judgment shall give the reasons on which it is based. Those reasons are stated in the recital of facts and the statement of findings, the reading of which has just been completed. Therein the Tribunal has examined minutely the activities of each of the accused concerned in relation to the matters in issue. Consequently, the Tribunal does not propose in the verdicts now to be read to repeat the many particular findings on which the verdicts are based. it will give its reasons in general terms for its findings in respect of each accused, such general reasons being based on the particular statements and findings in the recital already referred to. [49,774] ARAKI, Sadao The defendant ARAKI, Sadao is charged under Count 1 with conspiracy to wage aggressive wars and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances. He is charged also under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 with waging such wars. Under Counts 54 and 55 he is charged with responsibility for war crimes committed in China. At all material times he was a military officer of high rank. He became a Lieutenant-General in 1927 and a General in 1933. Throughout he was prominent in the hierarchy of the Army. He was an energetic proponent of the Army policy of political domination at home and of military aggression abroad. He was in fact and was recognized as being one of the prominent leaders of that Army movement. As a member of different Cabinets he advanced the Army policy to prepare for wars of aggression by stimulating the warlike spirit of the young men of Japan, by mobilizing Japan's material resources for war and by speeches and by control of the press, inciting and preparing the Japanese people for war. Both in and out of political office he helped to formulate and was a vigorous advocate of the policy of the military party to enrich Japan at the expense of her neighbors. He [49,775] both approved and actively supported the policies undertaken by the Japanese Army in Manchuria and Jehol to separate that territory politically from China, to create a Japanese-controlled government and to place its economy under the domination of Japan. The Tribunal finds him to have been one of the leaders of the conspiracy set out ion Count 1 and he is adjudged guilty under that Count. ARAKI assumed office as Minister of War in December 1931 after the aggressive war against the Republic of China in Manchuria had commenced. He continued as Minister or War until January 1934. Throughout that period he took a prominent part in the development and the carrying out of the military and political policies pursued in Manchuria and Jehol. He gave all possible support to the successive military steps taken for the occupation of that portion of the territories of China. ARAKI from May 1938 until August 1939 was Minister of Education, in which capacity he approved and collaborated in military operations in other parts of China. We have found that the war in China was from 1931 onwards a war of aggression and we find that this defendant participated in the waging of that war. Accordingly we find him guilty under Count 27. There is no evidence that he took any active [49,776] part in the wars referred to in Counts 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36, on all of which we find him not guilty. As to war crimes there is no evidence of his responsibility for such crimes and we find him not guilty under Counts 54 and 55. [49,777] DOHIHARA, Kenji The dependent DOHIHARA, Kenji is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. At the commencement of the period under review DOHIHARA was a Colonel in the Japanese army and by April 1941 had attained the rank of General. Before the Manchurian Affair he had been in China for about eighteen years and had come to be regarded in the Army as a specialist on China. He was intimately involved in the initiation and development of the war of aggression waged against China in Manchuria and in the subsequent establishment of the Japanese-dominated state of Manchukuo. As the aggressive policy of the Japanese military party was pursued in other areas in China DOHIHARA took a prominent part in its development by political intrigue, by threat of force and by the use of force. DOHIHARA acted in close association with other leaders of the military faction in the development, preparation and execution of their plans to bring East and South East Asia under Japanese domination. When his special knowledge of China and his capacity for intrigue there were no longer required he was employed as a General Officer in the field in pursuit of the aims for which he had conspired. He [49,778] took part in the waging of aggressive war not only against China but also against the U.S.S.R. and against those countries against whom also Japan waged aggressive war from 1941 until 1945 excepting the Republic of France. As to the wars waged against the U.S.S.R. in 1938 and 1939, DOHIHARA was a Lieutenant General on the General Staff which had overhead control of the Lake Khassan fighting. At Nomonhan elements of the Army he commanded took part in that fighting. As to the waging of war against the Republic of France (Count 33) the decision to wage this war was made by the Supreme Council for the Direction of War in February 1945. The accused was not a party to that decision and the evidence does not establish that he took part in the waging of that war. We find him to be guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive war under Court 1 and of waging aggressive wars as charged under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 35 and 36. He is not guilty under Count 33. DOHIHARA commanded the 7th Area Army from April 1944 until April 1945. This command included Malaya, Sumatra, Java and for a time Borneo. The evidence as to the extent of his responsibility for protecting prisoners of war within the area of his command from murder and torture is conflicting. At [49,779] least he was responsible for their supplies of food and medicine. The evidence is clear that they were grossly ill-treated in respect of these supplies. Prisoners were starved and deaths from malnutrition and food deficiency diseases occurred at an appalling rate. These conditions applied only to prisoners of war and did not occur among their captors. It was urged in defence that the deterioration of Japan's war position in these areas and the severance of communications made it impossible to maintain better supplies for prisoners. The evidence shows that food and medicine was available which could have been used to relive the terrible conditions of the prisoners. These supplies were withheld upon a policy for which DOHIHARA was responsible. Upon these findings of fact DOHIHARA'S offence falls rather within Count 54 than Count 55. Accordingly he is found guilty under Count 54 and we make no finding under Count 55. [49,780] HASHIMOTO, Kingoro HASHIMOTO is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. He was an Army office and early joined the conspiracy. He thereafter furthered the achievement of its objects by all the means in his power. None of the conspirators held more extreme views than he did; none was more outspoken in his statement of these views. In the beginning he advocated the expansion of Japan through the seizure of Manchuria by force of arms. As time went on he advocated the use of force against all Japan's neighbors for the accomplishment of the aims of the conspirators. He was an ardent admirer of government by military dictatorship. He detested the political parties, which played some part in the government of Japan and opposed the schemes of conquest which the conspirators were determined to effect. He was a principal in many of the activities by which the conspirators came ultimately to suppress the opposition of the democratic elements in Japan and to control the government. Without this control their aggressive schemes could not have been accomplished. Thus, for example, he was one of the principals in the plots of March and October 1931 which were designed to overthrow the existing [49,781] cabinets and to establish cabinets in their place which would support the conspirators. He was also a party to the plot of May 1932 of which the object and result was the assassination of Premier Inukai who had championed democracy and opposed the policies of the conspirators. His publications and the activities of the societies he founded or supported were largely devoted to the destruction of democracy and the establishment of a form of government more favorable to the use of war for achieving the expansion of Japan. He played some part in planning the occurrence of the Mukden Incident so as to give the Army a pretext for seizing Manchuria. He claimed some of the credit for the seizure of Manchuria and for Japan leaving the League of Nations. After its early years it was mainly as a propagandist that he figured in the execution of the conspiracy. He was a prolific publicist and contributed to the success of the conspiracy by inciting the appetite of the Japanese people for the possessions of Japan's neighbors, by inflaming Japanese opinion for war to secure these possessions, by his advocacy of an alliance with Germany and Italy which were bent on similar schemes of expansion, by his denunciation of treaties by which Japan had bound herself to refrain [49,782] from the schemes of aggrandisement which were the aims of the conspiracy, and by his fervent support of the agitation for a great increase in the armaments of Japan so that she might secure these aims by force or the threat of force. He was a principal in the formation of the conspiracy and contributed largely to its execution. As to Count 27, having first plotted the seizure of Manchuria by force of arms he thereafter played some part in the planning of the Mukden Incident so that it might serve as a pretext for the seizure of Manchuria. Being thus fully apprised that the war against China was a war of aggression and being one of those who had conspired to bring about that war he did everything within his power to secure its success. For a time he was, in fact, a military commander in the field. He thereby waged a war of aggression against China as charged in Count 27. There is no evidence directly connecting HASHIMOTO with any of the crimes charged in Counts 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. The Tribunal finds him not guilty on these Counts. The Tribunal finds HASHIMOTO guilty on Counts 1 and 27. [49,783] HATA, Shunroko HATA is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54, and 55. On the formation of the Abe Cabinet in August 1939 HATA assumed the post of War Minister which he held continuously until July 1940 when the Yonai Cabinet fell. Though holding Cabinet rank for less than one year HATA contributed substantially to the formulation and execution of the aggressive plans. As War Minister he exerted considerable influence on the Government policy. The war in China was waged with renewed vigor; the Wang Ching Wei Government was established at Nanking, the plans for control of French Indo-China were developed and the negotiations with the Netherlands in relation to matters concerning the Netherlands East Indies were conducted. HATA favored Japanese domination of East Asia and the areas to the South. To achieve this object he, for example, approved the abolition of political parties to be replaced by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and in collaboration with and after consulting other high military authorities he precipitated the fall of the Yonai Cabinet, thereby making way for the full alliance with Germany and the establishment of a virtual totalitarian state in Japan. [49,784] Thereafter from March 1941 as Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary forces in China he continued to wage war in that country until November 1944. He continued to wage war against China and the Western Powers as Inspector General of Military Education, one of the highest active military posts in the Japanese Army. When the Lake Khassan hostilities occurred HATA was in Central China and at the time of the Nomonhan Incident he was Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, becoming War Minister a little more than a week before the conclusion of that Incident. The Tribunal is of the opinion that HATA did not participate in the waging of either of these wars. War Crimes In 1938 and again from 1941 to 1944 when HATA was in command of expeditionary forces in China atrocities were committed on a large scale by the troops under his command and were spread over a long period of time. Either HATA knew of these things and took no steps to prevent their occurrence, or he was indifferent and made no provision for learning whether orders for the humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians were obeyed. In either case he was in breach of his duty as charged under Count 55. [49,785] The Tribunal finds HATA guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31. 32, and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 35, 36, and 54. [49,786] HIRANUMA, Kiichiro HIRANUMA is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. He became a member of the conspiracy if not at the beginning, shortly afterwards. He was a member and from 1936 President of the Privy Council until 1939, when he became Prime Minister; later he served in succession as Minister Without Portfolio and Home Minister in the second and third Konoye Cabinets. During the period when he was a member of the Privy Council he supported the various measures coming before that body which involved the carrying out of the aggressive plans of the militarists. As Prime Minister and as Minister he continued to support these plans. From 17 October 1941 until 19 April 1945, the accused was one of the Senior Statesmen. At the meeting of Senior Statesmen held on 29 November 1941 to advise the Emperor on the question of peace or war with the Western Powers, the accused accepted the opinion that war was inevitable and advised the strengthening of public opinion against the possibility of a long war. At the meeting of the Senior Statesmen held on 5 April 1945 the accused strongly opposed any overtures for peace and advocated that Japan should fight to the end. [49,787] At all times covered by the Indictment HIRANUMA was not only a supporter of the policy of the domination of Japan in East Asia and the South Seas by force when necessary, but he was one of the leaders of the conspiracy and an active participant in furthering its policy. In carrying out that policy he waged war against China, the United States of America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Netherlands, and in 1939 against the U.S.S.R. The Tribunal finds the accused HIRANUMA guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 36. There is no evidence directly connecting him with the crimes charged in Counts 33, 35, 54 and 55. We, therefore, find him not guilty on these counts. [49,788] HIROTA, Koki HIROTA is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54, and 55. HIROTA was Foreign Minister from 1933 until March 1936 when he became Prime Minister. From the fall of his Cabinet in February 1937 for four months he held no public office. He was Foreign Minister again in the First Konoye Cabinet until May 1938. From that time forward his relation with public affairs was limited to attending meetings of the Senior Statesmen (Jushin) from time to time to advise on the appointment of Prime Ministers and on other important questions submitted. From 1933 to 1938, when HIROTA held these high offices, the Japanese gains in Manchuria were being consolidated and turned to the advantage of Japan and the political and economic life of North China was being "guided" in order to separate it from the rest of China in preparation for the domination by Japan of the Chinese political and economic life. In 1936 his cabinet formulated and adopted the national policy of expansion in East Asia and the Southern Areas. This policy of far-reaching effect was eventually to lead to the war between Japan and the Western Powers in 1941. Also in 1936 the Japanese aggressive policy with regard to the U.S.S.R. was reiterated and advanced, culminating in [49,789] the Anti-Comintern Pact. From the 7th of July 1937 when the war in China was revived, throughout HIROTA's tenure of office, the military operations in China received the full support of the Cabinet. Early in 1938, also, the real policy towards China was clarified and every effort made to subjugate China and abolish the Chinese National Government and to replace it with a government dominated by Japan. In early 1938 the plan and legislation for mobilization of man power, industrial potential, and natural resources was adopted. This plan with little change in essentials was the basis on which the preparations to continue the China War and for waging further aggressive wars were carried out during the succeeding years. All these plans and activities were fully known to and supported by HIROTA. Thus during his tenure of office HIROTA, apparently a very able man and a forceful leader, was at times the originator and at other times a supporter of the aggressive plans adopted and executed by the military and the various Cabinets. On his behalf Counsel in final argument urged the Tribunal to consider HIROTA's consistent advocacy of peace and peaceful or diplomatic negotiation of [49,790] disputed questions. It is true that HIROTA, faithful to his diplomatic training, consistently advocated attempting firstly to settle disputes through diplomatic channels. However, it is abundantly clear that in so doing he was never willing to sacrifice any of the gains or expected gains made or expected to be made at the expense of Japan's neighbours and he consistently agreed to the use of force if diplomatic negotiations failed to obtain fulfilment of the Japanese demands. The Tribunal therefore cannot accept as exculpating this accused the defense offered on this point. The Tribunal consequently finds that at least from 1933 HIROTA participated in the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive wars. As Foreign Minister he also participated in the waging of war against China. As to Counts 29, 31 and 32 HIROTA's attitude and advice as one of the Senior Statesmen in 1941 is quite consistent with his being opposed to the opening of hostilities against the Western Powers. He held no public office after 1938 and played no part in the direction of the wars referred to in these Counts. The Tribunal holds that the evidence offered does not establish his guilt on these Counts. As to Counts 33 and 35, there is no proof of HIROTA's participation in or support of the military [49,791] operations at Lake Khassan, or in French Indo-China in 1945. With regard to War Crimes there is no evidence of HIROTA's having ordered, authorized, or permitted the commission of the crimes as alleged in Count 54. As to Count 55 the only evidence relating him to such crimes deals with the atrocities at Nanking in December 1937 and January and February 1938. As Foreign Minister he received reports of these atrocities immediately after the entry of the Japanese forces into Nanking. According to the Defence evidence credence was given to these reports and the matter was taken up with the War Ministry. Assurances were accepted from the War Ministry that the atrocities would be stopped. After these assurances had been given reports of atrocities continued to come in for at least a month. The Tribunal is of opinion that HIROTA was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented while hundreds of murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amounted to criminal negligence. [49,792] The Tribunal finds HIROTA guilty under Counts 1, 27 and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, and 54. [49,793] HOSHINO, Naoki HOSHINO is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54 and 55. Until the accused HOSHINO went to Manchuria in 1932 he was employed in the Japanese Department of Finance. He was sent to Manchuria by his Government to become a Senior Official of the Manchukuo Finance Ministry and of the Manchukuo General Affairs Bureau. By 1936 he had become Vice Chief of the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo and Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National Affairs Board of Manchukuo. In these positions he was able to exercise a profound influence upon the economy of Manchukuo and did exert that influence towards Japanese domination of the commercial and industrial development of that country. He operated in close cooperation with the Commander of the Kwantung Army, the virtual ruler of Manchukuo. In effect, if not in name, he was a functionary of that Amy whose economic policy was directed to making the resources of Manchukuo serve the warlike purposes of Japan. Although he was nominally a servant of the Government of Manchukuo and had been so for eight years he was recalled to Japan in 1940 to become a Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board. In this position he was the leader in the special steps [49,794] then being taken to equip Japan for the continuation of the aggressive war then being waged in China and for wars of aggression then contemplated against other countries with possessions in East Asia. From April 1941, when he left the Cabinet, his official functions in connection with warlike preparations were reduced but not entirely abandoned. Upon the accession of the accused TOJO as Prime Minister in October 1941 HOSHINO became the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and soon after a Councillor of the Planning Board. From this time he was in close association with all the preparations for the aggressive war already determined upon and now shortly to be waged against those countries attacked by Japan in December 1941. Throughout all the period from 1932 to 1941 he was an energetic member of the conspiracy alleged in Count 1 of the Indictment and is accordingly adjudged guilty under that Count. Not only did he conspire to wage aggressive war but in his successive official positions he took a direct part in the waging of aggressive wars as set out in Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32, under all of which also he is adjudged guilty. He has not been proved to have participated in [49,795] the wars charged in Counts 33 and 35 and of those is found not guilty. There is no evidence connecting him with the crimes charged in Counts 54 and 55 and of those also he is found not guilty. [49,796] ITAGAKI, Seishiro The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. By the year 1931 ITAGAKI, then a Colonel on the Staff of the Kwantung Army, had joined the conspiracy the immediate object of which then was that Japan should seize Manchuria by force of arms. He fanned the agitation in support of this aim: He helped to engineer the so-called "Mukden Incident" as a pretext for military action: he suppressed several attempts to prevent that military action: he authorised and directed that military action. He next played a principal part in the intrigues which fostered the sham movement for the independence of Manchuria and which resulted in the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. He became Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in December 1934 and thereafter was active in setting-up puppet regimes in Inner Mongolia and North China. He wished to extend Japan's military occupation into Outer Mongolia to serve as a threat to the territories of the U.S.S.R. He was one of the coiners of the phrase "Anti-Communism" to serve as a pretext for Japanese aggression in North China. When fighting broke out at Marco Polo Bridge [49,797] in July 1937 he was sent from Japan to China where he took part in the fighting as a Divisional Commander. He favoured the expansion of the area of aggression there. He became Minister of War in the Konoye Cabinet in May 1938. Under him the attacks on China were intensified and extended. He was a party to the important ministerial conferences which decided to attempt to destroy the National Government of China and to set up a puppet regime in its stead. He then was largely responsible for the preliminary arrangements which resulted in the setting-up of the puppet regime of Wang Ching-Wei. He took part in the arrangements for the exploitation of the occupied areas of China for the benefit of Japan. As Minister of War in the HIRANUMA Cabinet he was again responsible for the prosecution of the war against China, and for the expansion of Japan's armaments. In the Cabinet he was a strong advocate of an unrestricted military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy. As War Minister he tried by a trick to obtain the consent of the Emperor to the use of force against the U.S.S.R. at Lake Khassen. Subsequently at a Five Ministers Conference he obtained authority [49,798] to use such force. He was still War Minister during the fighting at Nomonhan. He was a strong supporter of the declaration of Japan's so-called "New Order" in East Asia and the South Seas. He recognised that the attempt to set up the New Order must lead to war with the U.S.S.R., France and Great Britain who would defend their possessions in these areas. From September 1939 to July 1941 he carried on the war against China as Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army. From July 1941 to April 1945 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Korea. From April 1945 to the date of the Surrender he commanded the 7th Area Army with Headquarters in Singapore. His subordinate armies defended Java, Sumatra, Malaya, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Borneo. Having conspired to wage wars of aggression against China, the United States of America, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands, and the U.S.S.R. he took an active and important part in waging these wars which he knew were wars of aggression. The Tribunal finds ITAGAKI guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35 and 36, He is not guilty under Count 33. [49,799] War Crimes The area which ITAGAKI commanded from April 1945 to the Surrender included Java, Sumatra, Malay, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Borneo. Many thousands of prisoners of war and internees were held in camps in these areas during the above period. According to the evidence which he adduced these camps, save those in Singapore, were not under his direct command but he was responsible for the supply of food, medicines and hospital facilities to them. During this period the conditions in these camps were unspeakably bad. The supply of food, medicines and hospital facilities was grossly inadequate. Deficiency diseases were rampant and as a result many persons died every day. Those who survived to the date of the Surrender were in a pitiable condition. When the camps were visited after the Surrender no such conditions prevailed among the guards. ITAGAKI's excuse for this atrocious treatment of the prisoners and internees is that the attacks of the Allies on Japanese shipping had made the transportation of supplies to these areas very difficult and that he did the best he could with the supplies he had. After the Surrender, however, supplies of [49,800] food and medicine were made available by ITAGAKI's Army to the camps in Singapore, Borneo, Java and Sumatra. The explanation tendered in evidence and argument for ITAGAKI is that the Japanese were expecting a long war and were conserving supplies. This amounts to a contention that ITAGAKI was justified under the prevailing circumstances in treating the prisoners and internces with gross inhumanity. The Tribunal has no hesitation in rejecting the defense. If ITAGAKI, being responsible for supplies to many thousands of prisoners and internees, found himself unable to maintain them for the future, his duty under the Laws of War was to distribute such supplies as he had and meantime to inform his superiors that arrangements must be made, if necessary with the Allies, for the support of the prisoners and internees in the future. By the policy which he adopted he is responsible for the deaths or sufferings of thousands of people whose adequate maintenance was his duty. The Tribunal finds ITAGAKI guilty on Count 54. As in the case of DOHIHARA, the Tribunal makes no finding on Count 55. [49,801] KAYA, Okinori The accused KAYA is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. KAYA was a civilian. In 1936 he was appointed a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau and in February 1937 he became Vice Minister of Finance. In June 1937 he was appointed Finance Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet, which position he held until May 1938. In July 1938 he became Adviser to the Finance Ministry. In July 1939 he was appointed a member of the Asia Development Committee, and in August of that year President of the North China Development Company, in which position he remained until October 1941, when he became Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet. He resigned as Finance Minister in February 1944, but again became Adviser to the Finance Ministry. In these positions he took part in the formulation of the aggressive policies of Japan and in the financial, economic and industrial preparation of Japan for the execution of those policies. Throughout this period, particularly as Finance Minister in the first Konoye and TOJO Cabinets, and as President of the North China Development Company, he was actively engaged in the preparation for [49,802] and the carrying out of aggressive wars in China and against the Western Powers. He was an active member of the conspiracy alleged in Count 1 and is adjudged guilty under that Count. In the various positions held by him KAYA took a principal part in the waging of aggressive wars as alleged in Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32 of the Indictment. He is, therefore, adjudged guilty under those Counts. The evidence does not disclose KAYA's responsibility for war crimes and accordingly he is found not guilty under Counts 54 and 55. [49,803] KIDO, Koichi The accused KIDO, Koichi is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. From 1930 until 1936 KIDO was a member of the Emperor's household in the position of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. During this period he was aware of the true nature of the military and political ventures in Manchuria. At this time, however, he was not associated with the conspiracy which had been instituted by the military and their supporters. In 1937 KIDO joined the first Konoye Cabinet as Education Minister and for a period was Welfare Minister. On the accession of HIRANUMA as Prime Minister in 1939 KIDO continued as a member of the Cabinet until August 1939 with the portfolio of Home Affairs. In this period from 1937 to 1939 KIDO adopted the views of the conspirators and devoted himself wholeheartedly to their policy. The war in China had entered into its second phase. KIDO was zealous in the pursuit of that war, even resisting the efforts of the General Staff to shorten the war by making terms with China. He was intent on the complete military and plitical domination of China. Not only did KIDO thus support the plans of [49,804] the conspirators in China but as Education Minister he applied himself to the development of o strong warlike spirit in Japan. Between August 1939 and June 1940 when he became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, KIDO was active with Konoye in the development of a scheme to replace the existing political parties by a single party of which Konoye was to be President and KIDO Vice President. This one party system was expected to give Japan a totalitarian system and thus remove political resistance to the plans of the conspirators. As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO was in a specially advantageous position to advance the conspiracy. His principal duty was to advise the Emperor. He kept in close touch with political events and was on terms of intimate political and personal relationship with those most concerned. His position was one of great influence. He used that influence, not only with the Emperor but also by political intrigue so as to further the aims of the conspiracy. He shared those aims which involved the domination of China and the whole of East Asia as well as the areas to the South. As the time approached for the commencement [49,805] of war against the Western Powers KIDO displayed some degree of hesitation because doubts of complete success were entertained within the Navy. Even in this state of timidity KIDO was determined to pursue the aggressive war against China and lent himself, although now with less confidence, to the projected war against Great Britain and the Netherlands and in case of need against the United States of America. When the doubts of the Navy had been overcome KIDO's doubts seem also to have been removed. He resumed his pursuit of the full purposes of the conspiracy. He was largely instrumental in securing the office of Prime Minister for TOJO who until now had been a determined advocate of immediate war with the Western Powers. In other ways he used his position in support of such a war or purposely refrained from action which might have prevented it. He refrained from advising the Emperor to take any stand against war either at the last or earlier when it might have been more effective. The Prosecution has tendered no evidence pointing to guilt in KIDO for the wars referred to in Counts 33, 35 and 36. As to war crimes KIDO was a member of the Cabinet when the atrocities were committed at Nanking. The evidence is not sufficient to attach him with [49,806] responsibility for failure to prevent them. During the war against the Western Powers in 1941 and thereafter KIDO's position was such that he cannot be held responsible for the atrocities committed. KIDO is found guilty of the charges in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32, and not guilty under Counts 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. [49,807] KIMURA, Heitaro KIMURA is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. KIMURA, an army officer, during the greater part of the period under consideration was engaged in administrative work in the War Ministry, culminating in his becoming Vice-Minister of War in April 1941. Later he was appointed Councillor of the Planning Board and Councillor of the Total War Research Institute. In March 1943 he was relieved of the post of Vice War Minister and in August 1944 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army which post he held until the surrender of Japan in 1945. During his service as Vice War Minister in almost daily contact with the War Minister and other Ministers, Vice-Ministers, and Bureau Chiefs he was in a position to learn and was kept fully informed of all government decisions and action during the crucial negotiations with the U.S.A. He had full knowledge of the plans and preparations for the Pacific War and the hostilities in China. Throughout, he collaborated and cooperated with the War Minister and the other Ministries from time to time giving advice based on his wide experience, wholeheartedly supporting the aggressive plans. [49,808] Though not a leader, he took part in the formulation and development of policies which were either initiated by himself or proposed by the General Staff or other bodies and approved and supported by him. In this way he was a valuable collaborator or accomplice in the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars. Concurrently with his activities as one of the conspirators as Commander of a division in 1939 and 1940, then as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and later as Vice War Minister he played a prominent part in the conduct of the war in China and in the Pacific War. Possessed with full knowledge of the illegality of the Pacific War, in August 1944 he took command of the Burma Area Army and so continued until the Surrender. In a positive way he was a party to breaches of the Rules of War in that he approved the employment of prisoners in many instances in work prohibited by the Rules and in work under conditions resulting in the greatest hardship and the deaths of thousands of prisoners. An example of the latter case is the employment of prisoners in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, the orders for which were approved and passed on by KIMURA. Furthermore with knowledge of the extent of the [49,809] atrocities committed by Japanese troops in all theaters of war, in August 1944 KIMURA took over command of the Burma Area Army. From the date of his arrival at his Rangoon Headquarters and later when his headquarters was moved to Moulmein the atrocities continued to be committed on an undiminished scale. He took no disciplinary measures or other steps to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under his command. It has been urged in KIMURA's defence that when he arrived in Burma he issued orders to his troops to conduct themselves in a proper soldierly manner and to refrain from ill-treating prisoners. In view of the nature and extent of the ill-treatment of prisoners, in many cases on a large scale within a few miles of his headquarters, the Tribunal finds that KIMURA was negligent in his duty to enforce the rules of war. The duty of en army commander in such circumstances is not discharged by the mere issue of routine orders, if indeed such orders were issued. His duty is to take such steps and issue such orders as will prevent thereafter the commission of war crimes and to satisfy himself that such orders are being carried out. This he did not do. Thus he deliberately disregarded his legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent breaches of the laws of war. {49,810] The Tribunal finds KIMURA guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. [49,811] KOISO, Kuniaki KOISO is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54, and 55. He joined the conspiracy in 1931 by participating as one of the leaders of the March Incident, the purpose of which was to overthrow the Hamaguchi Government and put in office a government favourable to the occupation of Manchuria. Thereafter he played a leading role in the development of the Japanese plans for expansion from August 1932 when he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from August 1932 to March 1934 he prepared or concurred in proposals and plans submitted to the Government through the War Ministry for the political and economic organization of Manchukuo according to the policy of the conspirators as adopted by the Japanese Government. It is urged in his defence that in forwarding proposals and plans to Tokyo he did so merely as Chief of Staff and that such action did not import his personal approval, In view of his knowledge of the aggressive plans of Japan the Tribunal cannot accept this plea. He went beyond the scope of the normal duties of a Chief of Staff in advising on political and economic natters to further these plans. [49,812] While he was Chief of Staff there also occurred the military invasion of Jehol and renewed fighting in Manchuria. Later as Overseas Minister in the Hiranuma and Yonai Cabinets KOISO supported and took part in the direction of the war in China, the beginning of the occupation of French Indo-China and the negotiations intended to obtain concessions from and eventual economic domination of the Netherlands East Indies. During the same period he advocated the plan for Japan to advance "in all directions." In July 1944 KOISO was recalled from his post of Governor of Korea to become Prime Minister. In that capacity he urged and directed the waging of the war against the Western Powers. He retired as Prime Minister to make nay for the Suzuki Cabinet in April 1945 when it became clear that the war was lost for Japan. There is no evidence that he played any pert in the hostilities at Nomonhan either by organizing or directing them. War Crimes When KOISO became Prime Minister in 1944 atrocities and other war crimes being committed by the Japanese troops in every theater of war had become [49,813] so notorious that it is improbable that a man in KOISO's position would not have been well-informed either by reason of their notoriety or from interdepartmental communications. The matter is put beyond doubt by the fact that in October 1944 the Foreign Minister reported to a meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, which KOISO attended, that according to recent information from enemy sources it was reported that the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war "left much to be desired." He further stated that this was a matter of importance from the point of view of Japan's international reputation and future relations. He asked that directions be issued to the competent authorities so that the matters might be fully discussed. Thereafter KOISO remained Prime Minister for six months during which the Japanese treatment of prisoners and internees showed no improvement whatever. This amounted to a deliberate disregard of his duty. The Tribunal finds KOISO guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 36 and 54. [49,814] MATSUI, Iwane The accused MATSUI is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55. MATSUI was a senior Officer in the Japanese Army and attained the rank of General in 1933. He had a wide experience in the Army, including service in the Kwantung Army and in the General Staff. Although his close association with those who conceived and carried out the conspiracy suggests that he must have been aware of the purposes and policies of the conspirators, the evidence before the Tribunal does not justify a finding that he was a conspirator. His military service in China in 1937 and 1938 cannot be regarded, of itself, as the waging of an aggressive war. To justify a conviction under Count 27 it was the duty of the prosecution to tender evidence which would justify an inference that he had knowledge of the criminal character of that war. This has not been done. In 1935 MATSUI was placed on the retired list but in 1937 he was recalled to active duty to command the shanghai Expeditionary Force, He was then appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, which included the shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth Amy. With these troops he captured the city of Nanking [49,815] on 13th December 1937. Before the fall of Nanking the Chinese forces withdrew and the occupation was of a defenseless city. Then followed a long succession of most horrible atrocities committed by the Japanese Army upon the helpless citizens. Wholesale massacres, individual murders, rape, looting and arson were committed by Japanese soldiers. Although the extent of the atrocities was denied by Japanese witnesses the contrary evidence of neutral witnesses of different nationalities and undoubted responsibility is overwhelming. This orgy of crime started with the capture of the City on the 13th December 1937 and did not cease until early in February 1938. In this period of six or seven weeks thousands of women were raped, upwards of 100,000 people were killed and untold property was stolen and burned. At the height of these dreadful happenings, on 17 December, NATSUI made a triumphal entry into the City and remained there from five to seven days. From his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have been aware of what was happening. He admits be was told of some degree of misbehavior of his Army by the Kempeitai and by Consular Officials. Daily reports of these atrocities were made to Japanese diplomatic representatives in Nanking who, in turn, reported them to Tokyo. The Tribunal is satisfied that NATSUI knew what [49,816] was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors. Hp did issue orders before the capture of the City enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as is now known, and as he must have known. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this time he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the military operations of his command not to prevent his visiting the City for days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the Army responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking, He must be hold criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty. The Tribunal holds the accused MATSUI guilty under Count 55, and not guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54. [49,817] MINAMI, Jiro MINAMI is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 12, 54 and 55. In the year 1931 MINAMI was a general and from April to December he was Minister of War. Prior to the Mukden Incident he had already associated himself with the conspirators in their advocacy of militarism, of the expansion of Japan, and of Manchuria as "the lifeline of Japan". He was forewarned of the likelihood of the incident occurring. He was ordered to prevent it. He took no adequate steps to prevent it. Then the incident happened he described the action of the Army as "righteous self-defense". The Cabinet at once decided that the incident must not be expanded and MINAMI agreed to put the policy of the Cabinet into effect, but day after day the area of the operations expanded and MINAMI took no adequate steps to restrain the Army. In the Cabinet he supported the steps taken by the Army. He early, advocated Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, if that body should oppose the actions Japan had taken in China. The Cabinet decided that there should be no occupation of Manchuria and no military administration. MINAMI I knew that the Army was taking steps to carry both those measures into effect but did nothing to stop it. His failure to support the Premier and Foreign minister [49,818] by taking steps to control the Army led to the downfall of the Cabinet. Thereafter he advocated that Japan should take over the defense of Manchuria and Mongolia. He had already advocated that a new state must be founded in Manchuria. From December 1934 to March 1936 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, completed the conquest of Manchuria, and aided in the exploitation of that part of China for the benefit of Japan. He was responsible for setting up puppet governments in North China and Inner Mongolia under the threat of military action. He was in part responsible for the development of Manchuria as a base for an attack on the U.S.S.R. and for plans for such an attack. He became Governor-General of Korea in 1936 and in 1938 supported the prosecution of the war against China, which he called "the Holy War", and the destruction of the National Government of China, The Tribunal finds MINAMI guilty on Counts 1 and 27. He is not guilty of the charges contained in Counts 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. {49,819] MUTO, Akira The accused is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 54 and 55. He was a soldier and prior to holding the important post of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of war he held no appointment which involved the making of high policy. Further, there is no evidence that in this earlier period he, alone or with others, tried to affect the making of high policy. When he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau he joined the conspiracy. Concurrently with this post he held a multiplicity of other posts from September 1939 to April 1942. During this period planning, preparing and waging wars of aggression on the part of the conspirators was at its height. He played the part of a principal in all these activities. When he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau the fighting at Nomonhan was over. He had no par in the waging of this war. He was Chief-of-staff in the Philippines when Japan attacked France in French Indo- China in March 1945 He had no part in the waging of this war. The Tribunal finds MUTO guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 33 and 36. [49,820] War Crimes MUTO was an officer on the staff of MATSUI from November 1937 to July 1938. It was during this period that shocking atrocities were committed by the Army of MATSUI in and about Nanking. We have no doubt that MUTO knew, as MATSUI knew, that these atrocities were being committed over a period of many weeks. His superior took no adequate steps to stop them. In our opinion MUTO, in his subordinate position, could take no steps to atop them. MUTO is not responsible for this dreadful affair. From April 1942 to October 1944 MUTO commanded the Second Imperial Guards Division in Northern Sumatra. During this period in the area occupied by his troops widespread atrocities were committed for which MUTO shares responsibility. Prisoners of war and civilian internees were starved, neglected, tortured and murdered, and civilians were massacred. In October 1944 MUTO became Chief-of-Staff to Yamashita in the Philippines. He held that post until the Surrender, His position was now very different from that which he held during' the so-called "Rape of Nanking". He was now in a position to influence policy. During his tenure of office as such Chief-of-Staff a campaign of massacre, torture and other atrocities was [49,821] waged by the Japanese troops on the civilian population, and prisoners of war and civilian internees were starved, tortured and murdered. MUTO sharps responsibility for these gross breaches of the Laws of War. We reject his defense that he knew nothing of these occurrences. It is wholly incredible. The Tribunal finds MUTO guilty on Counts 54 and 55. [49,822] OKA, Takasumi OKA is charged in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54, and 55 of the Indictment. OKA was an officer in the Japanese Navy. In October 1940 he was promoted to Rear Admiral and became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. OKA was an active member of the conspiracy during his tenure of office as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau from October 1940 to July 1944. In this office he was an influential member of the Liaison Conference at which the policy of Japan was largely decided. He participated in the formation and execution of the policy to wage aggressive war against China and the Western Powers. War Crimes There is some evidence tending to show that OKA knew or ought to have known that war crimes were being committed by naval personnel against prisoners of war with whose welfare his department was concerned but it falls short of the standard of proof which justifies a conviction in criminal cases. The Tribunal finds OKA not guilty on Counts 54 and 55, and guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32. [49,823] OSHIMA, Hiroshi OSHIMA is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. OSHIMA, an Army officer, was engaged during the period under review in the diplomatic field. He was first Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, later being promoted to the post of Ambassador. Holding so diplomatic post for about one year from 1939 he returned to Berlin as Ambassador where he remained till the Surrender of Japan. A believer in the success of the Hitler Regime, from his first appointment in Berlin OSHIMA exerted his full efforts to advance the plans of the Japanese military. At times, going over the head of the Ambassador, he dealt directly with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in an endeavour to involve Japan in a full military alliance with Germany. Upon his appointment as Ambassador he continued his efforts to force the acceptance by Japan of a treaty which would align Japan with Germany and Italy against the Western Powers and thus open the way for putting into execution the MIROTA policy. In furtherance of the aggressive policy of the Army faction he repeatedly pursued a policy in opposition to and in defiance of that of his Foreign Minister. The Soviet-German Neutrality Pact temporarily [49,824] blocked his schemes. He then returned to Tokyo and there supported the proponents or war by articles in newspapers and magazines end by closely cooperating with the German Ambassador. OSHIMA was one of the principal conspirators and consistently supported and promoted the aims of the main conspiracy. He took no part in the direction of the war in China or the Pacific War and at no time held any post involving duties or responsibility in respect of prisoners. OSHIMA's special defence is that in connection with his activities in Germany he is protected by diplomatic immunity and is exempt from prosecution. Diplomatic privilege does not import immunity from legal liability, but only exemption from trial by the Courts of the State to which an Ambassador is accredited. In any event this immunity has no relation to crimes against international law charged before a tribunal having jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejects this special defence. The Tribunal finds OSHIMA guilty under Count 1. He is not guilty under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. [49,825] SATO, Kenryo The accused SATO, Kenryo, is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. In 1937 SATO, then a member of the Military Affairs Bureau, was promoted to, the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, In that year he was appointed an Investigator of the Planning Board. Thereafter in addition to his duties in the Military Affairs Bureau he had other duties, not only with the Planning Board, of which for a time he was Secretary, but also with other bodies in greater or less degree connected with Japan's war in China and its contemplated wars with other countries. The Konoye Cabinet presented the General Mobilization Law to the Diet in February 1938. SATO was employed as an "explainer" and made a speech before the Diet in support of the measure. In February 1941 SATO was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. He was promoted to Major Genenal in October 1941. In April 1942 he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, a position of considerable importance in the Japanese Army. This position he held until 1944. Concurrently he held a variety of other appointments mostly concerned with other departments of state whose activities he linked with the Ministry of War. [49,826] It was thus not until 1941 that SATO attained a position which by itself enabled him to influence the making of policy, and no evidence has been adduced that prior to that date he had indulged in plotting to influence the Making of policy. The crucial question is whether by that date he had become aware that Japan's designs were criminal, for thereafter he furthered the development and execution of these designs so far as he was able. The matter is put beyond reasonable doubt by e speech which SATO delivered in August 1938. He states the Army point of view on the war in China. He shows complete familiarity with the detailed terms, never revealed to China, upon which Japan was prepared to settle the war against China. These on the face of then plainly involved the abolition of the legitimate government of China, recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo whose resources had been by this largely exploited for Japan's benefit, regimentation of the economy of China for Japan's benefit, and the stationing of Japanese troops in China to ensure that these illicit gains would not be lost. He states that North China would be put completely under Japan's control and its resources developed for national defence, i.e. to aid in Japan's military preparations. He predicts that Japan [49,827] will go to war with the U.S.S.R., but says she will select a chance when her armaments and production have been expanded. This speech shows that SATO did not believe that Japan's actions in China had been dictated by the wish to secure protection for Japan's legitimate interests in China as the Defence would have us believe. On the contrary he knew that the motive for her attacks on China was to seize the wealth of her neighbour. We are of opinion that SATO, having that guilty knowledge, was clearly a member of the conspiracy from 1941 onwards. Thereafter in important posts in the Government and as an Army Commander he waged wars of aggression as charged in Counts 27, 29, 31, and 32. War Crimes There is no doubt that SATO knew of the many protests against the behaviour of Japan's troops, for these protests came to his Bureau and they were discussed at the bi-weekly meetings of Bureau Chiefs in the War ministry. TOJO presided at these meetings and he it was who decided that action or inaction should be taken in regard to the protests. SATO, his subordinate, could no initiate preventive action against the decision of his chief. The Tribunal finds SATO guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 54 and 55. [49,828] SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54, and 55. As to Count 1, his actions are challenged when he was Minister to China in 1931 and 1932; when he was Councillor of the Board of Manchurian Affairs; when he was Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. from 1936 to 1938; when he was Ambassador to Great Britain from 1938 to 1941; and when he was Ambassador to China during the years 1942 and 1943. There is no evidence that he played any part in the making of policy as Councillor of the Board of Manchurian Affairs. For the rest we find that SHIGEMTSU, as Minister and Ambassador, never exceeded the functions proper to these offices. During the years above mentioned he was not one of the conspirators. Indeed he repeatedly gave advice to the Foreign Office which was opposed to the policies of the conspirators. By the year 1943, when he became Foreign Minister, the policy of the conspirators to wage certain wars of aggression had been settled and was in course of execution. Thereafter there was no further formulation nor development of that policy. The Tribunal finds SHIGENITSU not guilty on Count 1. In 1943 his country was engaged in the war in the [49,829] Pacific. He was fully aware that so far as Japan was concerned that war was a war of aggression; for he knew of the policies of the conspirators which had caused the war and indeed had often advised that they should not be put into effect. Nevertheless he now played a principal part in waging that war until he resigned on 13th April, 1945. The Tribunal finds SHIGEMITSU guilty on Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, and 33. He is not guilty on Count 35. War Crimes During the period from April 1943 to April 1945, when SHIGEMITSU was Foreign Minister, the Protecting Powers transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office protest after protest which it had received from the Allied. These were grave protests forwarded to the Protecting Powers by responsible agencies of state and in many cases accompanied by a wealth of detail. The matters of protest were (1) inhumane treatment of prisoners, (2) refusal to permit the Protecting Powers to inspect all save a few prisoners camps, (3) refusal to permit the representatives of the Protecting Powers to interview prisoners without the presence of a Japanese witness, and (4) failure to provide information as to the names and location of prisoners. The protests were dealt with in the Foreign Ministry in the first place. [49,830] Where necessary they were passed to other ministries with requests for information to enable the Foreign Minister to reply to them. One cannot read the long correspondence between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Protecting Powers without suspecting that there was a sinister reason for the failure of the Japanese military to supply their Foreign Office with satisfactory answers to these protests, or at the least that there was a case for an independent inquiry by an agency other than the military, whose conduct was in question. Protest after protest went unanswered or was only answered after months of unexplained delay. Reminder after reminder by the Protecting Powers went unnoticed. Those protests which were answered were met without exception by a denial that there was anything to complain of. Now it was the highest degree unlikely that every one of the complaints made by responsible people and accompanied by circumstance and detail was completely unjustified. Moreover the refusal of the military to permit inspection of camps, their refusal to permit the representatives of the Protecting Powers to interview prisoners without the presence of a Japanese witness, and their failure to provide details of the prisoners in their hands gave rise to the suspicion that they had [49,831] something to hide. We do no injustice to SHIGEMITSU when we hold that the circumstances, as he knew them, made him suspicious that the treatment of the prisoners was not as it should have been. Indeed a witness gave evidence for him to that effect. Thereupon he took no adequate steps to have the matter investigated, although he, as a member of the government, bore overhead responsibility for the welfare of the prisoners. He should have pressed the matter, if necessary to the point of resigning, in order to quit himself of a responsibility which he suspected was not being discharged. There is no evidence that SHIGEMITSU ordered, authorized, or permitted the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Tribunal finds SHIGEMITSU not guilty on Count 54. The Tribunal finds SHIGEMITSU guilty on Count 55. In mitigation of sentence we take into account that SHIGEMITSU was in no way involved in the formulation of the conspiracy; that he waged no war of aggression until he became Foreign Minister in April 1943, by which time his country was deeply involved in a war which would vitally affect its future; and in the matter of war crimes that the military completely controlled Japan while he [49,832] was Foreign Minister so that it would have required great resolution for any Japanese to condemn them. [49,833] SHIMADA, Shigetaro The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. Until October 1941 SHIMADA played nothing but the role of a naval officer carrying out his duties as such and until that date had no part in the conspiracy. In October 1941, he was a Senior Naval Officer eligible for the post of Navy Minister. He became Navy Minister in the TOJO Cabinet and held that office until August 1944. For a period of six months from February to August 1944 he was also Chief of the Navy General Staff. From the formation of the TOJO Cabinet until the Western Powers were attacked by Japan on 7th December 1941 he took part in all the decisions made by the conspirators in planning and launching that attack. He gave as his reason for adopting this course of conduct that the freezing orders were strangling Japan and would gradually reduce her ability to fight; that there was economic and military "encirclement" of Japan; that the United States of America was unsympathetic and unyielding in the negotiations; and that the aid given by the Allies to China had raised bitter feeling in Japan. This defence leaves out of account the fact that the gains to retain which he was determined to fight were, to his [49,834] knowledge, gains Japan had acquired in years of aggressive war. The Tribunal has already fully examined this defence and rejected it. After war was declared he played a principal part in waging it. The Tribunal finds SHIMADA guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32. War Crimes Some most disgraceful massacres and murders of prisoners were committed by members of the Japanese Navy in the islands of the Pacific Ocean and on the survivors of torpedoed ships. Those immediately responsible ranged in rank from Admirals downwards. The evidence, however, is insufficient to justify a finding that SHIMADA is responsible for these matters, that he ordered, authorized or permitted the commission of war crimes, or that he knew they were being committed and failed to take adequate steps to prevent their commission in the future. The Tribunal finds SHIMADA not guilty on Counts 54 and 55. [49,835] SHIRATORI, Toshio The accused is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He entered the Japanese diplomatic service in 1914. He first comes into prominence as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, which post he held from October 1930 to June 1933. In that position he justified Japan's seizure of Manchuria to the Press of the world. No doubt it was dictated to him that he should do so, but it is characteristic of the accused's activities then and thereafter that he was not content to perform whatever might be his duties at the moment. Thus early he was expressing views on matters of policy, views which received consideration in high quarters. He early advocated that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations. He supported the setting-up of a puppet government in Manchuria. From this period dates his support of the aims of the conspiracy, a support which he continued to afford for many years and by all the means in his power. He was Minister to Sweden from June 1933 to April 1937. Certain letters of his show his views at this tine. In his opinion Russian influence should be expelled from the Far East by force, if necessary, and before she became too strong to be attacked. He was further of opinion that such foreign influences as night be thought to be [49,836] harmful to Japanese interests should be excluded from China, and that Japanese diplomats should support the policy of the militarists. He showed himself a whole- hearted believer in aggressive war. Returning to Japan he published articles advocating a totalitarian form of government for Japan and an expansionist policy for Japan, Germany and Italy. When the negotiations for an alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy had commenced he was appointed Ambassador to Rome in September 1938. In those negotiations he collaborated with the accused OSHIMA, then Ambassador to Berlin, in support of the conspirators, who insisted on a general military alliance among these countries. He went so far as to refuse to comply with the instructions of the Foreign Minister, who wished a more limited alliance only. He and OSHMA threatened to resign if the wishes of the conspirators were not met. When Japan delayed too long and Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the U. S. S. R. the negotiations broke down, for Japanese opinion commonly regarded this as a breach of the Anti-Comintern Pact. SHIRATORI returned to Japan where he carried on propaganda designed to excuse Germany's action and to prepare the way for the general military alliance with Germany and Italy which he still thought necessary to support Japanese expansionist aims. [49,837] In his propaganda at one time or another he advocated all the objects of the conspirators: that Japan should attack China, that Japan should attack Russia, that Japan should ally herself with Germany and Italy, that she should take determined action against the Western Powers, that she should establish the "New Order," that she should seize the chance offered by the European War to advance to the South, that she should attack Singapore, and so on. This propaganda was continued while he was advisor to the Foreign Office from August 1940 to July 1941. He became ill in April 1941 and resigned the position of advisor to the Foreign Office in July of that year. Thereafter he plays no important part in events. The Tribunal finds SHIRATORI guilty on Count 1. He never occupied such a position as would justify a finding that he waged any war of aggression. The Tribunal finds SHIRATORI not guilty on Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32. [49,838] SUZUKI, Teiichi SUZUKI, Teiichi, is charged in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55 of the Indictment. SUZUKI was a soldier. As a Lieutenant Colonel and Member of the Military Affairs Bureau in 1932, he was an active member of the conspiracy. After the assassination of Premier Inukai in May 1932 he said that similar acts of violence would occur if new Cabinets were organized under political leadership and he favored the formation of a coalition government. The object was to secure a government which would support the schemes of the conspirators against China. During his service with the Bureau he insisted that the U.S.S.R. was the absolute enemy of Japan and assisted in the preparations then being made to wage aggressive war against that Power. There is no evidence that SUZUKI participated in waging war against the U.S.S.R. at Lake Khassan and there is no evidence that he participated in waging war against the U.S.S.R. or the Mongolian People's Republic at Nomonhan. In November 1937, SUZUKI became a Major-General. He was one of the organizers and head of the political and administrative division of the Asia Development Board. As such he actively furthered the [49,839] exploitation of the parts of China occupied by Japan. When the Second Konoye Cabinet was formed to complete the military domination of Japan, and to prosecute the move to the South, SUZUKI became Minister Without Portfolio and one of the Councillors of the Total War Research Institute. Konoye replaced HOSHINO by SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board. SUZUKI continued in that position until the fall of the TOJO Cabinet on 19 July 1944. As President of the Planning Board and Minister Without Portfolio, SUZUKI regularly attended the meetings of the Liaison Conference the virtual policy making body for Japan. SUZUKI was present at most of the important conferences leading to the initiating and waging of aggressive wars against the Allied Powers. At those conferences he actively supported the conspiracy. There is no evidence that the accused was responsible for the commission of atrocities. We find SUZUKI guilty as charged in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32, and not guilty of Counts 35, 36, 54 and 55. [49,840] TOGO, Shigenori The accused TOGO is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54 and 55. TOGO's principal association with the crimes charged against him was as Foreign Minister in the TOJO Cabinet from October 1941 until September 1942 when he resigned and later in the Suzuki Cabinet of 1945 in which he also acted as Foreign Minister. During the interval between his resignation and reappointment he played no part in public life. From the date of his first appointment until the outbreak of the Pacific War he participated in the planning and preparing for the war. He attended Cabinet meetings and conferences and concurred in all decisions adopted. As Foreign Minister he played a leading role in the negotiations with the United States immediately preceding the outbreak of the war and lent himself to the plans of the proponents of war. The duplicity employed in those negotiations has been dealt with earlier. After the outbreak of the Pacific War he collaborated with other members of the Cabinet in its conduct as well as in the waging of the war in China. In addition to the defence common to all the [49,841] accused of encirclement and economic strangulation of Japan, which has been dealt with elsewhere, TOGO pleads specially that he joined the TOJO Cabinet on the assurance that every effort would be made to bring the negotiations with the United States to a successful conclusion. He states further that from the date of his taking office he opposed the Army and was successful in obtaining from them concessions which enabled him to keep the negotiations alive. However, when the negotiations failed and war became inevitable, rather than resign in protest he continued in office and supported the war. To do anything else he said would have been cowardly. However his later action completely nullifies this plea. In September 1942 he resigned over a dispute in the Cabinet as to the treatment of occupied countries. We are disposed to judge his action and sincerity in the one case by the same considerations as in the other. There is no proof of any criminal act on TOGO's part as alleged in Count 36. His only part in relation to that count was to sign the post war agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Japan settling the boundary between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. [49,842] War Crimes Up to his resignation in 1942 TOGO appears to have endeavored to see to the observance of the Rules of War. He passed on such protests as came to him for investigation and in several instances remedial measures were taken. At the time of his resignation atrocities committed by the Japanese troops had not become so notorious as to permit knowledge to be imputed to him. In the spring of 1945 when he returned as Foreign Minister there was then an accumulation of protests which he passed on to the proper authorities. The Tribunal is of opinion that there is not sufficient proof of TOGO's neglect of duty in connection with war crimes. The Tribunal finds TOGO guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 36, 54, and 55 [49,843] TOJO, Hideki The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 54 and 55. TOJO became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in June 1937 and thereafter was associated with the conspirators as a principal in almost all of their activities. He planned and prepared for an attack on the U.S.S.R.; he recommended a further onset on China in order to free the Japanese Army from anxiety about its rear in the projected attack on the U.S.S.R.; he helped to organize Manchuria as a base for that attack; never at any time thereafter did he abandon the intention to launch such an attack if a favorable chance should occur. In May 1938 he was recalled from the field to become Vice-Minister of War. In addition to that office he held a great number of appointments so that he played an important part in almost all aspects of the mobilization of the Japanese people and economy for war. At this time he opposed suggestions for a peace of compromise with China. He became Minister of War in July 1940 and thereafter his history is largely the history of the successive steps by which the conspirators planned and [49,844] waged wars of aggression against Japan's neighbors, fr for he was a principal in the making of the plans and in the waging of the wars. He advocated and furthered the aims of the conspiracy with ability, resolution and persistency. He became Prime Minister in October 1941 and continued in that office until July 1944. As War minister and Premier he consistently supported the policy of conquering the National Government of China, of developing the resources of China in Japan's behalf, and of retaining Japanese troops in China to safeguard for Japan the results of the war against China. In the negotiations which preceded the attacks of 7 December 1941 his resolute attitude was that Japan must secure terms which would preserve for her the fruits of her aggression against China and which would conduce to the establishment of Japan's domination of East Asia and the Southern Areas. All his great influence was thrown into the support of that policy. The importance of the leading part he played in securing the decision to go to war in support of that policy cannot be overestimated. He bears major responsibility for Japan's criminal attacks on her neighbors. In this trial he defended all these attacks [49,845] with hardihood, alleging that they were legitimate measures of self-defense. We have already dealt fully with that plea. It is wholly unfounded. As to Count 36 there is no evidence that TOJO occupied any official position which would render him responsible for the war in 1939 as charged in Count 36. The Tribunal finds TOJO guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 33, and not guilty on Count 36. War Crimes TOJO was head of the War Ministry which was charged with the care of prisoners of war and of civilian internees in the theatre of war and with the supply of billets, food, medicines and hospital facilities to them. He was head of the Home Ministry which was charged with a similar duty towards civilian internees in Japan. Above all he was head of the government which was charged with continuing responsibility for the care of prisoners and civilian internees. The barbarous treatment of prisoners and internees was well known to TOJO. He took no adequate steps to punish offenders and to prevent the commission of similar offences in the future. His attitude towards the Bataan Death March gives the key to his conduct towards these captives. He knew in 1942 something of the conditions of that march and that many prisoners [49,846] had died as a result of these conditions. He did not call for a report on the incident. When in the Philippines in 1943 he made perfunctory inquiries about the march but took no action. No one was punished. His explanation is that the commander of a Japanese Army in the field is given a mission in the performance of which he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo. Thus the head of the Government of Japan knowingly and wilfully refused to perform the duty which lay upon that Government of enforcing performance of the Laws of War. To cite another outstanding example, he advised that prisoners of war should be used in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, designed for strategic purposes. He made no proper arrangements for billeting and feeding the prisoners, or for caring for those who became sick in that trying climate. He learned of the poor condition of the prisoners employed on the project, and sent an officer to investigate. We know the dreadful conditions that investigator must have found in the many camps along the railway. The only step taken as a result of that investigation was the trial of one company commander for ill-treatment of prisoners. Nothing was done to improve conditions. Deficiency diseases and starvation continued to kill off the [49,847] prisoners until the end of the project. Statistics relative to the high death rate from malnutrition and other causes in prisoners of war camps were discussed at conferences over which TOJO presided. The shocking condition of the prisoners in 1944, when TOJO's Cabinet fell, and the enormous number of prisoners who had died from lack of food and medicines is conclusive proof that TOJO took no proper steps to care for them. We have referred to the attitude of the Japanese Army towards Chinese prisoners of war. Since the Japanese Government did not recognize the "Incident" as a war, it was argued that the Rules of War did not apply to the fighting and that Chinese captives were not entitled to the status and rights of prisoners of war. TOJO knew and did not disapprove of that shocking attitude. He bears responsibility for the instruction that prisoners who did not work should not eat. We have no doubt that his repeated insistence on this instruction conduced in large measure to the sick and wounded being driven to work and to the suffering and deaths which resulted. We have fully referred to the measures which were taken to prevent knowledge of the ill-treatment of [49,848] prisoners reaching the outside world. TOJO bears responsibility for these measures. The Tribunal finds TOJO guilty under Count 54. We make no finding under Count 55. [49,849] UMEZU, Yoshijiro The accused UMEZU is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54 and 55. UMEZU was an Army officer. While he was in command of Japanese troops in North China from 1934 to 1936 he continued the Japanese aggression in that country against the northern provinces, he set up a pro-Japanese local government, and under threat of force compelled the Chinese to enter into the Ho-UMEZU Agreement of June 1935. This for a time limted the power of legitimate government of China. UMEZU was Vice-Minister of War from March 1936 to May 1938 while the National Policy Plans of 1936 and the Plan for Important Industries of 1937 were decided upon. These were Army plans and were one of the prime cuases of the Pacific War. In January 1937, when the Imperial Mandate to form a new Cabinet was given to General Ugaki, UMEZU played an important part in the Army's refusal to countenance Ugaki as HIROTA's successor. Because of this opposition Ugaki was unable to form a Cabinet. When the fighting in China broke out anew in July 1937 at Marco Polo Bridge this accused knew and approved of the plans of the conspirators to carry on the war. UMEZU was a member of the Cabinet Planning [49,850] Board as well as of many other boards and commissions which largely contributed to the formulation of the aggressive plans of conspirators and to preparations necessary for the execution of these plans. In December 1937, TOJO, as Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, sent to UMEZU plans for preparation for the attack on the U.S.S.R. and later plans for the strengthening of the Kwantung Army and plans for installations in Inner Mongolia which TOJO stated were of vital importance both in the preparation for war with the U.S.S.R. and in connection with the war with China. While UMEZU was Co mander of the Kwantung Army from 1939 to 1944 he continued the direction of the economy of Manchukuo so as to serve the purposes of Japan; plans were made for the occupation of Soviet territories, and plans were also made for th e military administration of the Soviet areas to be occupied and officers were sent to the occupied areas in the south to study the military administration there with a view to using the information thus obtained in the Soviet territories. The evidence is overwhelming that the accused was a member of the conspiracy. With reference to Count 36, the fighting at [49,851] Nomonhan had began before he took command of the Kwantung Army. He was in command only a very few days before the fighting ceased. UMEZU served as Chief of the Army General Staff from July 1944 until the Surrender. He thereby played principal part in the waging of the war against China and the Western Powers. War Crimes There is not sufficient evidence that UMEZU was responsible for the commission of atrocities. The Tribunal finds UMEZU guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 36, 54, and 55. [49,852] Under the Charter the Judgment I have read is the Judgment of the Tribunal. The Member for India dissents from the majority Judgment and has filed a statement of his reasons for such dissent. The members for France and the Netherlands dissent as to part only from the majority Judgment and have filed statements of their reasons for such dissents. The Member for the Philippines has filed a separate opinion concurring with the majority. Generally, I share the view of the majority as to the facts, but without recording any dissent, I hare filed a brief statement of my reasons for upholding the Charter and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and of some general considerations that influenced me in deciding on the sentences. These documents will be part of the Record and will be available to the Supreme Commander, to Defense Counsel and to others who may be concerned, Defense Counsel have applied for a reading in court of these separate opinions, but the Tribunal had already considered this matter and decided that they would not be so read. The Tribunal adheres to this decision. The accused will be removed from the dock and then returned singly for sentence in the order in which [49,853] their names appear in the title of the Indictment. The three accused who are too ill to attend the trial today will be sentenced in their absence after those accused who are present have been sentenced. To enable the accused who are present to be presented for sentence in the order stated, we will adjourn for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1530, a recess was taken until 1555, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,854] MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 15-h of the Charter, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East will now pronounce the sentences on the accused convicted on this Indictment. Accused ARAKI, Sadao, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused DOHIHARA, Kenji, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused HATA, Shunroku, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. [49,855] Accused HIROTA, Koki, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused HOSHINO, Naoki, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused ITAGAKI, Seichiro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused KIDO, Koichi, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused KIMURA, Heitaro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused KOISO, Kuniaki, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. [49,856] Accused MATSUI, Iwane, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused MINAMI, Jiro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused MUTO, Akira, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused OKA, Takazumi, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused OSHIMA, Hiroshi, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused SATO, Kenryo, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. [49,857] Accused SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for seven years as from the date of arraignment. Accused SHIMADA, Shigetaro, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused SUZUKI, Teiichi, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for life. Accused TOCO, Shigenori, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to imprisonment for twenty years as from the date of arraignment. Accused TOJO, Hideki, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. [49,858] The Tribunal sentences the accused KAYA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU on the Counts on which they have been convicted to imprisonment for life in each case. The Tribunal adjourns. (Whereupon, at 1612, 12 November 1948, the Tribunal adjourned.) |
||||||||||||||||||||
Home | Terms & Conditions | About
Copyright © 1999- WorldCourts. All rights reserved.