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4 November 1948






ARAKI, Sadao, DOHIHARA, Kenji, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, HATA, Shunroku, HIMANUMA, Kiichiro, HIROTA, Koki, HOSHINO, Kaoki, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, KAYA, Okinori, KIDO, Koichi, KIKURA, Heitaro, KOISO, Kuniaki, MATSUI, Iwane, MATSUOKA, Yosuke, MINAMI, Jiro, MUTO, Akira, MAGANO, Osami, OKA, Takasumi, OKAWA, Shumei, OSHIMA, Hiroshi, SATO, Kenryo, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, SHIRATORI, Toshio, SUZUKI, Teiichi- TOGO. Shigenori, TOJO, Hideki, OMEZU, Yoshijiro




Sir William Webb, Edward Stuart McDougall, Major-General Mei Ju-ao, Henri Bernard, Radhabinod Pal, Professor Bert Röling, Erima Harvey Northcroft, Colonel Delfin Jaranilla, The Honourable Lord Patrick, John P. Higgins, Major-General Myron C. Cramer, Major-General I.M. Zaryanov

Perm. Link:
Citation: United States et al. v. Araki et al., Judgment (IMTFE, 4 Nov. 1948)
Publication: Pritchard and Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 22 (New York : Garland Pub., 1981)

  [p48413] Thursday, 4 November 1948


Court House of the Tribunal

War Ministry Building

Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.)


MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All of the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.



ARAKI, Sadao, DOHIHARA, Kenji, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, HATA, Shunroku, HIMANUMA, Kiichiro, HIROTA, Koki, HOSHINO, Kaoki, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, KAYA, Okinori, KIDO, Koichi, KIKURA, Heitaro, KOISO, Kuniaki, MATSUI, Iwane, MATSUOKA, Yosuke, MINAMI, Jiro, MUTO, Akira, MAGANO, Osami, OKA, Takasumi, OKAWA, Shumei, OSHIMA, Hiroshi, SATO, Kenryo, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, SHIRATORI, Toshio, SUZUKI, Teiichi- TOGO. Shigenori, TOJO, Hideki, OMEZU, Yoshijiro


THE PRESIDENT: I will now read the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The title and formal parts will not be read.


Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal

The Tribunal was established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st of December, 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July, 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of September 1945, and the Moscow Conference of the 26th of December, 1945.

The Cairo Declaration was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It reads as follows:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.
"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan [p48416] shall be stripped or all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

The Declaration of Potsdam (Annex No. A-1) was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and later adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its principal relevant provisions are:

"Japan shall be given on opportunity to end this war.
"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and [p48417] misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
"We do not intend that the Japanese people shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

The Instrument of Surrender (Annex No. A-2) was signed on behalf of the Emperor and Government of Japan and on behalf of the nine Allied Powers. It contains inter alia the following proclamation, undertaking, and order:

"We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.
"We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors, to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action [p48418] may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to the Declaration.
"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender. We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority."

By the Moscow Conference (Annex No. A-3) it was agreed by and between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the concurrence of China that:

"The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto."

Acting on this authority on the 19th day of January, 1946, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by Special Proclamation established the Tribunal for "the trial of those persons charged [p48419] individually or as member of organizations or in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace." (Annex No. A-4) The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were by the Proclamation declared to be those set forth in the Charter of the Tribunal approved by the Supreme Commander on the same day. Before the opening of the Trial the Charter was amended in several respects. (A copy of the Charter as amended will be found in Annex No. A-5).

On the 15th day of February, 1946, the Supreme Commander issued an Order appointing the nine members of the Tribunal nominated respectively by each of the Allied Powers. This Order also provides that "the responsibilities, powers, and duties of the Members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof. . ."

By one of the amendments to the Charter the maximum number of members was increased from nine to eleven to permit the appointment of members nominated by India and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. By subsequent Orders the present members from the United States and France were appointed to succeed the original appointees who resigned and the members from India and the Philippines were appointed.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 (c) of the Charter each of the accused before the opening of [p48420] the Trial appointed counsel of his own choice to represent him; each accused being represented by American and Japanese counsel.

On the 29th of April, 1946, an indictment, which had previously been served on the accused in conformity with the rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal, was lodged with the Tribunal.

The Indictment (Annex No. A-6) is long, containing fifty-five counts charging twenty- eight accused with Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity during the period from the 1st of January, 1928, to the 2nd of September, 1945. [p48421]

It may be summarized as follows:

In Count 1 all accused are charged with conspiring as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices between 1st January 1928 and 2nd September 1945 to have Japan, either alone or with other countries, wage wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose her purpose of securing the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighboring islands.
Count 2 charges all accused with conspiring throughout the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang (Kanchuria), and Jehol."
Count 3 charges all accused with conspiracy over the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of China.
Count 4 charges all accused with conspiring to have Japan, alone or with other countries, wage aggressive war against the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, the Netherlands, China, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to secure the complete domination of East Asia and the Pacific Indian Oceans and their [p48422] adjoining countries and neighboring islands.
Count 5 charges all accused with conspiring with Germany and Italy to have Japan, Germany and Italy mutually assist each other in aggressive warfare against any country which might oppose them for the purpose of having these three nations acquire complete domination of the entire world, each having special domination in its own sphere, Japan's sphere to cover East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Counts 6 to 17 charge all accused except SHIRATORI with having planned and prepared aggressive war against named countries.
Counts 18 to 26 charge all accused with initiating aggressive war against named countries.
Counts 27 to 36 charge all accused with waging aggressive war against named countries.
Count 37 charges certain accused with conspiring to murder members of the armed forces and civilians of the United States, the Philippines, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands and Thailand by initiating unlawful hostilities against those countries in breach of the Hague Convention No. III of 18th October 1907.
Count 38 charges the same accused with conspiring to murder the soldiers and civilians by initiating hostilities in violation of the agreement between the United [p48423] States and Japan of 30th November 1908, the Treaty between Britain, France, Japan and the United States of 13th December 1921, the Pact of Paris of 27th August 1928, and the Treaty of Unity between Thailand and Japan of 12th June 1940.
Counts 39 to 43 charge the same accused with the commission on 7th and 8th December 1941 of murder at Pearl Harbour (Count 39) Kohta Behru (Count 40) Hong Kong (Count 41) on board H. M. S. Petrel at Shanghai (Count 42) and at Davao (Count 43).
Count 44 charges all accused with conspiring to murder on a wholesale scale prisoners of war and civilians in Japan's power.
Counts 45 to 50 charge certain accused with the murder of disarmed soldiers and civilians at Nanking (Count 45) Canton (Count 46) Hankow (Count 47) Changsha (Count 48) Hengyang (Count 49) and Kweilin and Liuchow. (Count 50).
Count 51 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of Mongolia and the Soviet Union in the Khalkin-Gol River area in 1939.
Count 52 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in July and August 1938.
Counts 53 and 54 charge all the accused except [p48424] OKAWA and SHIRATORI with having conspired to order, authorize or permit the various Japanese Theatre Commanders, the officials of the War Ministry and local camp and labour unit officials frequently and habitually to commit breaches of the laws and customs of war against the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian internees of complaining powers and to have the Government of Japan abstain from taking adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.
Count 55 charges the same accused with having recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.

There are five appendices to the Indictment:

Appendix A summarizes the principal matters and events upon which the counts are based.
Appendix B is a list of Treaty Articles.
Appendix C specifies the assurances Japan is alleged to have broken.
Appendix D contains the laws and customs of war alleged to have been infringed.
Appendix E is a partial statement of the facts with respect to the alleged individual responsibility of the accused.

These appendices are included in Annex A-6. [p48425]

During the course of the Trial two of the accused, MATSUOKA and NAGANO, died and the accused OKAWA was declared unfit to stand his trial and unable to defend himself. MATSUOKA and NAGANO were therefore discharged from the Indictment. Further proceedings upon the Indictment against OKAWA at this Trial were suspended.

On the 3rd and 4th of May the Indictment was read in open court in the presence of all the accused, the Tribunal when adjourning till the 6th to receive the pleas of the accused. On the latter date pleas of "not guilty" were entered by all the accused now before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal then fixed the 3rd of June following as the date for the commencement of the presentation of evidence by the Prosecution.

In the interval the Defence presented motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and decide the charges contained in the Indictment. On the 17th of May, 1946, after argument, judgment was delivered dismissing all the said motions "for reasons to be given later." These reasons will be given in dealing with the law of the case in Chapter II of this part of the judgment.

The Prosecution opened its case on the 3rd of June, 1945, and closed its case on the 24th of January 1947.

The presentation of evidence for the Defence opened on the 24th of February, 1947, and closed on the [p48426] 12th of January 1948, an adjournment having been granted from the 19th of June to the 4th of August 1947, to permit defense counsel to co-orginate their work in the presentation of evidence common to all the accused.

Prosecution evidence in rebuttal and defense evidence in reply were permitted; the reception of evidence terminating on the 10th of February 1948. In all 4335 exhibits were admitted in evidence, 419 witnesses testified in court, 779 witnesses gave evidence in depositions and affidavits, and the transcript of the proceedings covers 48,412 pages.

Closing arguments and summations of prosecution and defense counsel opened on the 11th of February and closed on the 16th of April 1948.

Having regard to Article 12 of the Charter, which requires "an expeditious hearing of the issues" and the taking of "strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay", the length of the present trial requires some explanation and comment.

In order to avoid unnecessary delay which would have been incurred by adopting the ordinary method of translation by interrupting from time to time evidence, addresses and other matters which could be prepared in advance of delivery, an elaborate public address system was installed. Through this system whenever possible a simultaneous [p48427] translation into English or Japanese was given and in addition when circumstances required from or into Chinese, Russian, and French. Without such aids the trial might well have occupied a very much longer period. Cross-examination and extempore argument on objections and other incidental proceedings had, however, to be translated in the ordinary way as they proceeded.

Article 13(a) of the Charter provides that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall . . . admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. . ." The application of this rule to the mass of documents and oral evidence offered inevitably resulted in a great expenditure of time. Moreover, the charges in the Indictment directly involved an inquiry into the history of Japan during seventeen years, the years between 1928 and 1945. In addition our inquiry has extended to a less detailed study of the earlier history of Japan, for without that the subsequent actions of Japan and her leaders could not be understood and assessed.

The period covered by the charges was one of intense activity in Japanese internal and external affairs.

Internally, the Constitution promulgated during the Meiji Restoration was the subject of a major struggle [p48428] between the military and the civilian persons who operated it. The military elements ultimately gained a predominance which enabled them to dictate, not only in matters of peace or war, but also in the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs. In the struggle between the civilian and the military elements in the Government, the Diet, the elected representatives of the people, early ceased to be of account. The battle between the civilians and the military was fought on the civilian side by the professional civil servants, who almost exclusively filled the civilian ministerial posts in the Cabinet and the advisory posts around the Emperor. The struggle between the military and the civil servants was protracted one. Many incidents marked the ebb and flow of the battle, and there was seldom agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence as to any incident. Both the facts and the meaning of each incident were the subject of controversy and the topic towards which a wealth of evidence was directed.

Internally, also, the period covered by the Indictment saw the completion of the conversion of Japan into a modern industrialized state, and the growth of the demand for the territory of other nations as an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, a source [p48429] from which she might draw raw materials for her manufacturing plants, and a market for her manufactured goods. Externally the period saw the efforts of Japan to satisfy that demand. In this sphere also the occurrence and meaning of events was contested by the Defence, often to the extent of contesting the seemingly incontestable.

The parts played by twenty-five accused in these events had to be investigated, and again every foot of the way was fought.

The extensive field of time and place involved in the issues placed before the Tribunal and the controversy waged over every event, important or unimportant, have prevented the trial from being "expeditious," as required by the Charter. In addition, the need to have every word spoken in Court translated from English into Japanese, or vice versa, has at least doubled the length of the proceedings. Translations cannot be made from the one language into the other with the speed and certainty which can be attained in translating one Western speech into another. Literal translation from Japanese into English or the reverse is often impossible. To a large extent nothing but a paraphrase can be achieved, and experts in both languages will often differ as to the correct paraphrase. [p48430]

In the result the interpreters in Court often had difficulty as to the rendering they should announce, and the Tribunal was compelled to set up a Language Arbitration Board to settle matters of disputed interpretation.

To these delays was added a tendency for counsel and witnesses to be prolix and irrelevant. This last tendency at first was controlled only with difficulty as on many occasions the over-elaborate or irrelevant question or answer was in Japanese and the mischief done, the needless time taken, before the Tribunal was given the translation in English and objection could be taken to it. At length it became necessary to impose special rules to prevent this waste of time.

The principal rules to this end were the prior filing of a written deposition of the intended witness and a limitation of cross-examination to matters within the scope of the evidence in chief.

Neither these nor any other of the rules imposed by the Tribunal were applied with rigidity. Indulgences were granted from time to time, having regard to the paramount need for the Tribunal to do justice to the accused and to possess itself of all facts relevant and material to the issues. [p48431] Much of the evidence tendered, especially by the Defence, was rejected, principally because it had too little or no probative value or because it was not helpful as being not at all or only very remotely relevant or because it was needlessly cumulative of similar evidence already received.

Much time was taken up in argument upon the admissibility of evidence but even so the proceedings would have been enormously prolonged had the Tribunal received all evidence prepared for tendering. Still longer would have been the trial without these controls, as without them much more irrelevant or immaterial evidence than was in fact tendered would have been prepared for presentation.

Much of the evidence was given viva voce or at least by the witness being sworn and acknowledging his deposition which, to the extent that it was ruled upon as admissible, was then read by Counsel. The witnesses were cross-examined, often by a number of Counsel representing different interests, and then re-examined.

When it was not desired to cross-examine the witness, in most cases his sworn deposition was tendered and read without the attendance of the witness.

A large part of the evidence which was presented has been a source of disappointment to the Tribunal. An [p48432] explanation of events is unconvincing unless the witness will squarely meet his difficulties and persuade the Court that the inference, which would normally arise from the undoubted occurrence of these events, should on this occasion be rejected. In the experience of this Tribunal most of the witnesses for the Defence have not attempted to face up to their difficulties. They have met them with prolix equivocations and evasions, which only arouse distrust. Most of the final submissions of Counsel for the Defense have been based on the hypothesis that the Tribunal would accept the evidence tendered in defence as reliable. It could not have been otherwise, for counsel could not anticipate which witnesses the Tribunal was prepared to accept as witnesses of credit, and which witnesses it would reject. In large part these submissions have failed because the argument was based on evidence of witnesses whom the Tribunal was not prepared to accept as reliable because of their lack of candour.

Apart from this testimony of witnesses a great many documents were tendered and received in evidence. These were diverse in nature and from many sources including the German Foreign Office. The Tribunal was handicapped by the absence of many originals of important Japanese official records of the Army and Navy, [p48433}

Foreign Office, Cabinet the other policy-making-organs of the Japanese Government. In some cases what purported to be copies were tendered and received for what value they might be found to have. The absence of official records was attributed to burning during bombing raids on Japan and to deliberate destruction by the Fighting Services of their records after the surrender. It seems strange that documents of such importance as those of the Foreign Office, the Cabinet secretariat and other important departments should not have been removed to places of safety when bombings commenced or were imminent. If it should prove that they were, not thus destroyed but were withheld from this Tribunal then a marked disservice will have been done to the cause of international justice.

We have perforce to rely upon that which was made available to us, relating it by way of check to such other evidence as was received by us. Although handicapped in our search for facts by the absence of these documents we have been able to obtain a good deal of relevant information from other sources. Included in this other evidence of a non-official or at least of only a semi-official nature were the diary of the accused KIDO and the Saionji-Harada Memoirs.

KIDO's voluminous diary dirty is a contemporary [p48434] record covering the period from 1930 to 1945 of the transactions of KIDO with important personages in his position as secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, State Minister and later as confidential adviser of the Emperor while holding the Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Having regard to these circumstances we regard it as a document of importance.

Another document or series of documents of importance are the Saionji-Harada Memoirs. These have been the subject of severe criticism by the Defence, not unnaturally, as they contain passages the Defence consider embarrassing. We are of opinion the criticisms are not well founded and have attached more importance to these records than the Defence desired us to do. The special position of Prince Saionji as the last of the Genro provoked full and candid disclosure to him through his secretary Haradra. Harada's long period of service to the Genro in this special task of obtaining information from the very highest functionaries of the Government and the Army and Navy is a test of his reliability and discretion. Had he been unreliable and irresponsible, as the Defence suggest, this would soon have been discovered by Prince Saionji, having regard to his own frequent associations with the important personages from whom Harada received his information, [p48435] and Harada would not have continued in that office.

As to the authenticity of the Saionji-Harada documents presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is satisfied that these are the original memoranda as dictated by Harada and edited by Saionji. To the extent to which they are relevant the Tribunal considers them helpful and reliable contemporary evidence of the matters recorded.




In our opinion the law of the Charter is decisive and binding on the Tribunal. This is a special tribunal set up by the Supreme Commander under authority conferred on him by the Allied Powers. It derives its jurisdiction from the Charter. In this trial its members have no jurisdiction except such as is to be found in the Charter. The Order of the Supreme Commander, which appointed the members of the Tribunal, states:

"The responsibilities, powers, and duties of the members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof..."

In the result, the members of the Tribunal, being otherwise wholly without power in respect to the trial of the accused, have been empowered by the documents, which constituted the Tribunal and appointed them as [p48436] members, to try the accused but subject always to the duty and responsibility of applying to the trial the law set forth in the Charter.

The foregoing expression of opinion is not to be taken as supporting the view, if such view be held, that the Allied Powers or any victor nations have the right under international law in providing for the trial and punishment of war criminals to enact or promulgate laws or vest in their tribunals powers in conflict with recognised international law or rules or principles thereof. In the exercise of their right to create tribunals for such a purpose and in conferring powers upon such tribunals belligerent powers any act only within the limits of international law.

The substantial grounds of the defence challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and adjudicate upon the charges contained in the Indictment are the following:

(1) The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to include in the Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable "Crimes against Peace" (Article 5(a);
(2) Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy does not enlarge the [p48436a] morning of war crimes nor constitute war crime;
(3) War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under international law;
(4) The provisions of the Charter are "ex post facto" legislation and therefore illegal;
(5) The Instrument of Surrender which provides that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes as recognized by international law at the date of the Declaration (26 July, 1945) would be the only crimes prosecuted;
(6) Killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constitute violations of the rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not murder;
(7) Several of the accused being prisoners of war are triable by martial as provided by the Geneva Convention 1929 and not by this Tribunal. [p48437]

Since the law of the Charter is decisive and binding upon it this Tribunal is formally bound to reject the first four of the above seven contentions advanced for the Defence but in view of the great importance of the questions of law involved the Tribunal will record its opinion on these questions.

After this Tribunal had in May 1946 dismissed the defence motions and upheld the validity of its Charter and its Jurisdiction thereunder, stating that the reasons for this decision would be given later, the International military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg delivered its verdicts on the first of October 1946. That Tribunal expressed inter alia the following opinions:

"The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of Power on the part of the victorious nations but is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation.
"The question is what was the legal effect of this pact (Pact of Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed the pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it. After the signing of the pact any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the [p48438] opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.
"The principle of international law which under certain circumstances protects the representative of a state cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.
"The maxim 'nullum crimen sine lege' is not a limitation of sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.
"The Charter specifically provides . . . ‘the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from [p48439] responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.’ This provision is in conformity with the laws of all nations. . . The true test which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was in fact possible."

With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached this Tribunal is in complete accord. They embody complete answers to the first four of the grounds urged by the defence as set forth above. In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters of this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters anew in somewhat different language to open the door to controversy by way of conflicting interpretations of the two statements of opinions.

The fifth ground of the Defence challenge to the Tribunal's jurisdiction is that under the Instrument of Surrender and the Declaration of Potsdam the only crimes for which

it was contemplated that proceedings would be taken, being the only war crimes recognized by international law at the date of the [p48440] Declaration of Potsdam, are Conventional was Crimes as mentioned in Article 5(b) if the Charter.

Aggressive war was a crime at international law long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam, and there is no ground for the limited interpretation of the Charter which the defence seek to give it.

A special argument was advanced that in any event the Japanese Government, when they agreed to accept the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, did not in fact understand that those Japanese who were alleged to be responsible for the war would be prosecuted.

There is no basis in fact for this argument. It has been established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that before the signature of the Instrument of Surrender the point in question had been considered by the Japanese Government and the then members of the Government, who advised the acceptance of the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, anticipated that those alleged to be responsible for the war would be put on trial. As early as the 10th of August 1945, three weeks before the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, the Emperor said to the accused KIDO,

“I could not bear the sight . . . of those responsible for the war being [p48441] punished . . . but I think now is the time to bear the unbearable."

The sixth contention for the Defence, namely, that relating to the charges which allege the commission of murder will be discussed at a later point.

The seventh of these contentions is made on behalf of the four accused who surrendered as prisoners of war: ITAGAKI, KIMURA, MUTO and SATO. The submission made on their behalf is that they, being former members of the armed forces of Japan and prisoners of war, are triable as such by court martial under the articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to prisoners of war, particularly Articles 60 and 63, and not by a tribunal constituted otherwise than under that Convention. This very point was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the Yamashita case. The late Chief Justice Stone, delivering the judgment for the majority of the Court said:

"We think it clear from the context of these recited provisions that Part 3 and Article 63, which it contains, apply only to Judicial proceedings directed against a prisoner of war for offences committed while a prisoner of war. Section V gives no indication that this part was designated to deal with offences other than those referred to in Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3."

With that [p48442] conclusion and the reasoning by which it is reached the Tribunal respectfully agrees. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal wholly fails.


Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are in the power of the Government which captures them. This was not always the case. For the last two centuries, however, this position has been recognized and the customary law to this effect was formally embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners of war and of civilian internees (all of whom we will refer to as "prisoners") rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by conventions are to be prevented by the Government having responsibility for the prisoner.

In the discharge of those duties to prisoners, governments must have resort to persons. Indeed, the [p48443] governments responsible, in this sense, are those persons who direct and control the functions of government. In this case and in the above regard we are concerned with the members of the Japanese Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the first case by those persons who constitute the government. In the multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern government there is of necessity an elaborate system of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case of the duty of governments to prisoners held by them in time of war those persons who constitute the government have the principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners, even though they delegate the duties of maintenance and protection to others.

In general the responsibility for prisoners held by Japan may be stated to have rested upon:

(1) Members of the government;
(2) military or naval officers in command of formations having prisoners in their possession;
(3) Officials in those departments which were concerned with the well-being of prisoners;
(4) Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct and immediate control of [p48444] prisoners.

It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill treatment of prisoners if;

(1) They fail to establish such a system.
(2) If having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and efficient working.

Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he neglects to do so he is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application. An Army Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders in this respect as he would in respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance.

Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war crimes be committed unless:

(1) They had knowledge that such crimes [p48445] were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future or

(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge.

If such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not excused for inaction if his office required or permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not enough for the exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he accepted assurances from others more directly associated with the control of the prisoners if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of reports of such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should have been put upon further enquiry as to whether those assurances were true or untrue. That crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters to be considered in imputing knowledge.

A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal organs of the government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved from responsibility if, having knowledge of the commission [p48446] of the crimes in the sense already discussed, and omitting or falling to secure the taking of measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, he elects to continue as a member of the Cabinet. This is the position even though the department of which he has the charge is not directly concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill treatment of prisoners, is powerless to prevent future ill treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet thereby continuing to participate in its collective responsibility for protection of prisoners he willingly assumes responsibility for any ill treatment in the future.

Army or Navy Commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent ill treatment of prisoners. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. If crimes are committed against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurrence of which they had, or should have had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be shown that within the units under his command conventional war crimes have been committed of which he knew or should have known, a commander who takes no adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of such crimes in the future will be responsible for such future crimes. [p48447] Departmental officials having knowledge of ill treatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason of their failure to resign; but if their functions included the administration of the system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should have had knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future then they are responsible for such future crimes.


Under the heading of "Crimes Against Peace" the Charter names five separate crimes. These are planning, preparation, initiation and waging aggressive war or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances; to these four is added the further crime of participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. The indictment was based upon the Charter and all the above crimes were charged in addition to further charges founded upon other provisions of the Charter.

A conspiracy to wage aggressive or unlawful war arises when two or more persons enter into an agreement to commit that crime. Thereafter, in furtherance of the conspiracy, follows planning and preparing for such war. Those who participate at this stage may be [p48448] either original conspirators or later adherents. If the latter adopt the purpose of the conspiracy and plan and prepare for its fulfillment they become conspirators. For this reason, as all the accused are charged with the conspiracies, we do not consider it necessary in respect of those we may find guilty of conspiracy to enter convictions also for planning and preparing. In other words, although we do not question the validity of the charges we do not think it necessary in respect of any defendants who may be found guilty of conspiracy to take into consideration nor to enter convictions upon counts 6 to 17 inclusive.

A similar position arises in connection with the counts of initiating and waging aggressive war. Although initiating aggressive war in some circumstances may have another meaning, in the Indictment before us it is given the meaning of commencing the hostilities. In this sense it involves the actual waging of the aggressive war. After such a war has been initiated or has been commenced by some offenders others may participate in such circumstances as to become guilty of waging the war. This consideration, however, affords no reason for registering convictions on the counts of initiating as well as of waging aggressive war. We propose therefore to abstain from consideration of [p48449] counts 18 to 26 inclusive.

Counts 37 and 38 charge conspiracy to murder. Article 5, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Charter, deal with Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. In sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 occurs this passage:

"Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan."

A similar provision appeared in the Nuremberg Charter although there it was an independent paragraph and was not, as in our Charter incorporated in sub-paragraph (c). The context of this provision clearly relates it exclusively to sub-paragraph (a), Crimes against Peace, as that is the only category in which a "common plan or conspiracy" is stated to be a crime. It has no application to Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as conspiracies to commit such crimes are not made criminal by the Charter of the Tribunal. The Prosecution did not challenge this view but submitted that the counts were sustainable under Article 5(a) of the Charter. It was argued that the waging of aggressive war was unlawful and involved unlawful killing which is murder. From this it was submitted [p48450] further that a conspiracy to wage war unlawfully was a conspiracy also to commit murder. The crimes triable by this Tribunal are those set out in the Charter. Article 5(a) states that a conspiracy to commit the crimes therein specified is itself a crime. The crimes, other than conspiracy, specified in Article 5(a) are "planning, preparation, initiating or waging" of a war of aggression. There is no specification of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder by the waging of aggressive war or otherwise. We hold therefore that we have no jurisdiction to deal with charges of conspiracy to commit murder as contained in counts 37 and 38 and decline to entertain these charges.

In all there are 55 counts in the Indictment charged against the 25 defendants. In many of the counts each of the accused is charged and in the remainder ten or more are charged. In respect to Crimes against Peace alone there are for consideration no less than 756 separate charges.

This situation springs from the adoption by the Prosecution of the common practice of charging all matters upon which guilt is indicated by the evidence it proposes to adduce even though some of the charges are cumulative or alternative.

The foregoing consideration of the substance [p48451] of the charges shows that this reduction of the counts for Crimes against Peace upon which a verdict need be given can be made without avoidance of the duty of the Tribunal and without injustice to defendants.

Counts 44 and 53 charge conspiracies to commit crimes in breach of the laws of war. For reasons already discussed we hold that the Charter does not confer any jurisdiction in respect of a conspiracy to commit any crime other than a crime against peace. There is no specification of the crime of conspiracy to commit conventional war crimes. This position is accepted by the Prosecution and no conviction is sought under these counts. These counts, accordingly, will be disregarded.

In so far as the opinion expressed above with regard to counts 37, 38, 44 and 53 may appear to be in conflict with the judgment of the Tribunal of the 17th May 1946, whereby the motions going to the Tribunal's jurisdiction were dismissed, it is sufficient to say that the point was not raised at the hearing on the motions. At a much later date, after the Nuremberg judgment had been delivered, this matter was raised by counsel for one of the accused. On this topic the Tribunal concurs in the view of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Accordingly, upon those counts, it accepts the admission of the Prosecution which is favorable to the defendants. [p48452] Counts 39 to 52 inclusive (omitting count 44 already discussed) contain charges of murder. In all these counts the charge in effect is that killing resulted from the unlawful waging of war at the places and upon the dates set out. In some of the counts the date is that upon which hostilities commenced at the place named, in others the date is that upon which the place was attacked in the course of an alleged illegal war already proceeding. In all cases the killing is alleged as arising from the unlawful waging of war, unlawful in respect that there had been no declaration of war prior to the killings (counts 39 to 43, 51 and 52) or unlawful because the wars in the course of which the killings occurred were commenced in violation of certain specified Treaty Articles (counts 45 to 50). If, in any case, the finding be that the war was not unlawful then the charge of murder will fall with the charge of waging unlawful war. If, on the other hand, the war, in any particular case, is held to have been unlawful, then this involves unlawful killings not only upon the dates and at the places stated in these counts but at all places in the theater of war and at all times throughout the period of the war. No good purpose is to be served, in our view, in dealing with these parts of the offences by way of counts for murder [p48453] when the whole offence of waging those wars unlawfully is put in issue upon the counts charging the waging of such wars.

The foregoing observations relate to all the counts enumerated, i.e., counts 39 to 52 (omitting 44). Counts 45 to 50 are stated obscurely. They charge murder at different places upon the dates mentioned by unlawfully ordering, causing and permitting Japanese armed forces to attack those places and to slaughter the inhabitants thereby unlawfully killing civilians and disarmed soldiers. From the language of these counts it is not quite clear whether it is intended to found the unlawful killings upon the unlawfulness of the attack or upon subsequent breaches of the laws of war or upon both. If the first is intended then the Position is the same as in the earlier counts in this group. If breaches of the laws of war are founded upon then that is cumulative with the charges in counts 54 and 55. For these reasons only and without finding it necessary to express any opinion upon the validity of the charges of murder in such circumstances we have decided that it is unnecessary to determine counts 39 to 43 inclusive and counts 45 to 52 inclusive. [p48454] PART A -- CHAPTER III


Chapter III of Part A of the Judgment will not be read. It contains a statement of the rights which Japan acquired in China prior to 1930, together with a statement of Japan's obligations to other powers, so far as relevant to the Indictment. The principal obligations fall under the following descriptions and are witnessed by the documents listed under each description.

1. Obligations to preserve the territorial and administrative independence of China.

United States Declaration of 1901
Identic Notes of 1908
Nine-Power Treaty of 1922
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920.

2. Obligations to preserve for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of China, the so-called "Open Door Policy."

United States Declaration of 1900 to 1901
Identic Notes of 1908
Nine-Power Treaty of 1922.

3. Obligations to suppress the manufacture, traffic in, and use of opium and analogous drugs.

Opium Convention of 1912 [p48455] League of Nations of 1925
Opium Convention of 1931.

4. Obligations to respect the territory of powers interested in the Pacific.

Four-Power Treaty of 1921
Notes to Netherlands and Portugal of 1926
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920.

5. Obligations to keep inviolate the territory of neutral powers.

Hague Convention V of 1907.

6. Obligations to solve disputes between nations by diplomatic means, or mediation, or arbitration.

Identic Notes of 1908
Four-Power Treaty of 1921
Nine-Power Treaty of 1922
Hague Convention of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928.

7. Obligations designed to ensure the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Hague Convention of 1899
Hague Convention of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928.

8. Obligation to give previous warning before commencing hostilities. [p48456]

Hague Convention III of 1907.

9. Obligations relative to humane conduct in warfare.

Hague Convention IV of 1907
Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929
Geneva P.O.W. Convention of 1929.

Many of these obligations are general. They relate to no single political or geographical unit. On the other hand, the rights which Japan had required by virtue of the documents considered in this Chapter were largely rights in relation to China. Japan's foothold in China at the beginning of the China war will be fully described in the forefront of the Chapter of the Judgment relating to China.

(The following text of Chapter III, Part A, is copied into the record as follows:)



Before 1 January 1928, the beginning of the period covered by the Indictment, certain events had transpired and Japan had acquired certain rights and assumed certain obligations; an appreciation of these is necessary in order to understand and judge the actions of the accused. [p48457]


The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was concluded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, whereby China ceded to Japan full sovereignty over the Liaotung Peninsula. However, Russia, Germany and France brought diplomatic pressure to bear upon Japan, thereby forcing her to renounce that cession. In 1896 Russia concluded an agreement with China authorizing Russia to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria and operate it for a period of eighty years, with certain rights of administration in the railway zone. This grant was extended by another agreement between Russia and China in 1898, whereby Russia was authorized to connect the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin with Port Arthur and was granted a lease for a period of twenty-five years of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula with the right to levy tariffs in the leased territory.


The principal powers of the world assembled at The Hague for the first peace conference in 1899. This conference resulted in the conclusion of three conventions and one declaration.

The contribution of this first peace conference consisted less in the addition of new rules to the existing body of international law than in a restatement [p48458] in more precise form of the rules of customary law and practice already recognized as established. The same observation applies to the second peace conference at The Hague in 1907, as well as to the conventions adopted at Geneva on 6 July 1906 and 27 July 1929.

The first convention, that is to say, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Annex No. B-1), was signed on 29 July 1899 and was ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, together with twenty other powers, and was thereafter adhered to by seventeen additional powers; so that a total of forty-four of the leading powers acceded to the convention. The convention was, therefore, binding upon Japan before the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War on 10 February 1904 and at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, except in so far as it may have been superseded by the first convention later adopted at The Hague on 18 October 1907.

By ratifying the first convention concluded at The Hague on 29 July 1899, Japan agreed to use her best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international disputes and, as far as circumstances would allow, to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers before resorting to [p48459] force of arms.


The so-called Boxer Troubles in China of 1899-1901 were settled on 7 September 1901 by the signing of the Final Protocol at Peking. (Annex No. B-2). That protocol was signed by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, as well as Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium and Italy. By this protocol China agreed to reserve the section of Peking occupied by foreign legations exclusively for such legations and to permit the maintenance of guards by the powers to protect the legations there. She also conceded the right of the powers to occupy certain points for the maintenance of open communications between Peking and the sea, these points being named in the agreement.

By signing the protocol, Japan agreed, along with the other signatory powers, to withdraw all troops from the province of Chihli before 22 September following, except those stationed at the points mentioned under the agreement.


Following the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, which she concluded on 30 January 1902, Japan began negotiations with Russia in July 1903 concerning [p48460] the maintenance of the Open Door Policy in China. These negotiations did not proceed as desired by the Japanese government; and Japan, disregarding the provisions of the Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed by her at The Hague on 29 July 1899, attacked Russia in February 1904. In the fighting that raged in Manchuria, Japan expended the lives of 100,000 Japanese soldiers and 2 billion gold yen. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on 5 September 1905.


The Treaty of Portsmouth signed on 5 September 1905, terminated the Russo- Japanese War and was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. (Annex No. B-3). By ratifying this treaty, Japan and Russia agreed to abstain from taking any military measures on the Russo-Korean frontier which might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory. However, Russia acknowledged the paramount interests of Japan in Korea. Russia also transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, her lease upon Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, together with all her rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming a part of the lease, as well as all public-works and [p48461] properties in the territory affected by the lease. This transfer was made upon the express engagement that Japan as well as Russia would evacuate and turn over to the administration of China completely and exclusively all of Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease, and that Japan would perfectly respect the property rights of Russian subjects in the leased territory. In addition, Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, the railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, together with all its branches and all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto. This transfer was upon the engagement that Japan, as well as Russia, would exploit their respective railways exclusively for commercial purposes and in no wise

for strategic purposes. Japan and Russia agreed to obtain the consent of China to these transfers and not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria.

Russia ceded to Japan that part of the Island of Sakhalin south of the 50th degree of north latitude, as well as all adjacent islands below that boundary. This cession was upon the engagement that Japan as well as Russia would not construct on the Island of [p48462] Sakhalin or adjacent islands any fortifications or similar military works and would maintain free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tatary.

In the protocol annexed to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia and Japan as between themselves reserved the right to maintain railway guards not to exceed fifteen men per kilometer along their respective railways in Manchuria.


By the Treaty of Peking of 1905, China approved the transfer by Russia to Japan of her rights and property in Manchuria, but she did not approve the provision for maintenance of railway guards. By an additional agreement executed by Japan and China on 22 December 1905, which was made an annex to the Treaty, Japan agreed in view of the "earnest desire" expressed by the Chinese Government to withdraw her railway guards as soon as possible, or when Russia agreed to do so, or at any rate when tranquility should be re-established in Manchuria.


Japan organized the South Manchurian Railway Company in August 1906 as a corporation with its shareholders limited to the Japanese Government and its nationals. The company was organized as a successor [p48463] of the former Chinese Eastern Railway Company in the area traversed by the railroad from Changchun to Port Arthur. It was authorized to, and did, administer the railways and enterprises appertaining thereto, which had been acquired from Russia, together with any new railroads and enterprises established in Manchuria by Japan. In addition, it was vested with certain administrative functions of government in the leased territory and in the railway zone. In short, it was created as an agency of the Japanese Government to administer the interests of that government in Manchuria.

Contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the charter of this company provided that the commander of the Japanese Army in the leased territory should have power to issue orders and directives to the company in connection with military affairs and in case of military necessity to issue orders involving the business affairs of the company.


The Open Door Policy in China was first enunciated during the so-called Boxer Troubles of 1899-1901 by the Government of the United States of America in the following language:

"The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about [p48464] permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

The other powers concerned, including Japan, assented to the policy thus announced; and this policy became the basis of the so-called Open Door Policy toward China. For more than twenty years thereafter, the Open Door Policy thus made rested upon the informal commitments by the various powers; but it was destined to be crystalized into treaty form with the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington in 1922.


Japan recognized this Open Door Policy in China and in the region of the Pacific Ocean when her government exchanged Identic Notes on the subject with the government of the United States of America on 30 November 1908. (Annex No. B-4). The provisions of these notes were duly binding upon Japan and the United States of America at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. By this exchange of notes, the two powers agreed:

(1) That the policy of their governments for [p48465] encouragement of free and peaceful commerce on the Pacific Ocean was uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the Pacific region and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China;

(2) That they would reciprocally respect the territorial possessions of each other in that region;

(3) That they were determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire; and,

(4) That should any event occur threatening the status quo they would communicate with each other as to what measures they might take.


Japan annexed Korea in 1910, thereby indirectly increasing Japanese rights in China, since Korean settlers in Manchuria thereby became subjects of the Japanese Empire. The number of Koreans in Manchuria by 1 January 1928 amounted to approximately 800 thousand people. [p48466]


As was to be expected, the exercise by Japan of extra-territorial rights in China, in connection with the operation of the South Manchurian Railway and the enjoyment of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, gave rise to constant friction between her and China. Japan claimed that she had succeeded to all the rights and privileges granted to Russia by China in the Treaty of 1896, as enlarged by the Treaty of 1898; that one of those rights was absolute and exclusive administration within the railway zone; and that within that zone she had broad administrative powers, such as control of police, taxation, education and public utilities. China denied this interpretation of the treaties. Japan also claimed the right to maintain railway guards in the railway zone, which right also China denied. The controversies which arose regarding the Japanese railway guards were not limited to their presence and activities within the railway zone. These guards were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried on maneuvers outside the railway areas. These acts were particularly obnoxious to the Chinese, both officials and private persons alike, and were regarded as unjustifiable in law and provocative of unfortunate incidents. In addition, Japan claimed the [p48467] right to maintain consular police in Manchuria. Such police were attached to the Japanese consulates and branch consulates in all Japanese consular districts in such cities as Harbin, Tsitsihar, and Manchouli, as well as in the so-called Chientao district, in which lived large numbers of Koreans. This right was claimed as a corollary to the right of extra-territoriality.


In 1915 Japan presented to China the notorious "Twenty-one Demands." The resulting Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 provided that Japanese subjects would be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and engage in business and manufacture of any kind. This was an important and unusual right enjoyed in China by the subjects of no other nation, outside the treaty ports, and was later to be so interpreted by Japan as to include most of Manchuria in the term "South Manchuria." The treaty further provided that Japanese subjects in South Manchuria might lease by negotiation the land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade, manufacturing and agricultural enterprises.

An exchange of notes between the two governments, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, defined the expression, "lease by negotiation." According to the Chinese version this definition implied [p48468] a long-term lease of not more than thirty years with the right of conditional renewal; but according to the Japanese version, it implied a long-term lease of not more than thirty years with the right of unconditional renewal.

In addition to the foregoing, the treaty provided for the extension of the term of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory (Liaotung Peninsula) to ninety-nine years, and for prolongation of the period of Japanese possession of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to ninety-nine years.

The Chinese consistently claimed that the treaty was without "fundamental validity." At the Paris Conference in 1919, China demanded the abrogation of the treaty on the ground that it had been concluded "under coercion of the Japanese ultimatum threatening war." At the Washington Conference in 1921-2, the Chinese delegation raised the question "as to the equity and justice of the treaty and its fundamental validity." Again in March 1923, shortly before the expiration of the original twenty-five year lease of the Kwantung territory, China communicated to Japan a further request for the abrogation of the treaty and stated that "the Treaties and Notes of 1915 have been consistently [p48469] condemned by public opinion in China." Since the Chinese maintained that the agreements of 1915 lacked "fundamental validity," they declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria, except in so far as circumstances made it expedient so to do. The Japanese complained bitterly of the consequent violations by the Chinese of what they claimed were their treaty rights.


The first World War gave Japan another opportunity to strengthen her position upon the continent of Asia. The Russian Revolution broke out in 1917. In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia.


Russo-Japanese relations were eventually stabilized for a time by the conclusion of the Convention Embodying Basic Rules for Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was signed at Peking on 20 January 1925. The convention [p48470] was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. (Annex No. B-5). By concluding this convention, the parties solemnly affirmed:

(1) That it was their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a state to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental service for them, and all organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endanger the order and security in any part of the other's territories;
(2) That neither contracting party would permit the presence in the territories under its jurisdiction (a) of organizations or groups pretending to be the government for any part of the territories of the other party, or (b) of alien subjects of citizens who might be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organizations or groups; and,
(3) That the subjects or citizens of each party would have the liberty to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other and enjoy constant and complete protection of their lives and Property as well as the right and liberty to engage in commerce, navigation, industries and other peaceful [p48471] pursuits while in such territories.


World War I came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Versailles on 28 June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers as one party and Germany as the other party. (Annex No. B-6). With the deposit of instruments of ratification by Germany on 10 January 1920, the treaty came into force. The Allied and Associated Powers consisted of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 22 other powers, among which were included China, Portugal and Thailand. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers were described in the treaty as the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. This treaty was ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, except the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Netherlands.

The Versailles Treaty contains, among other things:

(1) The Covenant of the League of Nations, which is Part I consisting of Articles 1 to 26 inclusive;
(2) The renunciation by Germany in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions, which is Article 119;
(3) The mandate provisions for [p48472] government of the former German possessions so renounced, which is Article 22;
(4) The declaration prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, which is Article 171; and
(5) The ratification of the Opium Conventions signed at The Hague on 23 January 1912, together with provisions for general supervision by the League over agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, which are Articles 295 and 23 respectively.

Japan was bound by all the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, except in so far as she may have been released from her obligations thereunder by virtue of the notice given by her government on 27 March 1933 of her intention to withdraw from the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Covenant. Such withdrawal did not become effective before 27 March 1935 and did not affect the remaining provisions of the treaty.


By ratifying the Versailles Treaty, Japan ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations and became a member of the League. Twenty-eight other Powers also became members of the League by ratifying the treaty, including among them all the powers bringing [p48473] the Indictment except the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Netherlands. However, the Netherlands and twelve other powers, who had not signed the treaty, originally acceded to the Covenant; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics later became a member. At one time or another sixty-three nations have been members of the League after acceding to the Covenant.

Under the terms of the Covenant, Japan agreed, among other things:

(1) That maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and that she would cooperate in such reduction by interchange of full and frank information respecting armaments;
(2) That she would respect and preserve the territorial integrity and then existing political independence of all members of the League.
(3) That in case of dispute with another member of the League, she would submit the matter to the Council of the League or to arbitration and would not resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Council;
(4) That if she resorted to war, contrary to the Covenant, she would ipso facto be deemed to have [p48474] committed an act of war against all members of the League; and
(5) That all international agreements made by the members of the League would have no effect until registered with the Secretariat of the League.

With respect to colonies and territories, which as a consequence of the war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the vanquished nations, and were not then able to govern themselves, Japan agreed:

(1) That the well being and development of the inhabitants thereof formed a sacred trust;
(2) That those colonies and territories should be placed under the tutelage of advanced nations to be administered under a mandate on behalf of the League;
(3) That the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases should be prohibited in the mandated territories; and,
(4) That equal opportunities for trade and commerce of other members of the League with the mandated territories should be secured.


Germany renounced in favor of the powers described in the Versailles Treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely; the United States [p48475] of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions. Although the United States of America did not ratify that treaty, all her rights respecting these former German possessions were confirmed in a treaty between the United States of America and Germany, which was signed on 25 August 1921. The said four powers: the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan agreed on 17 December 1920 to confer upon Japan, under the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a mandate to administer the groups of the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator in accordance with certain additional provisions. Some of those provisions were:

(1) That Japan should see that the slave trade was prohibited and that no forced labor was permitted in the Mandated Islands; and,
(2) That no military or naval bases would be established and no fortifications would be erected in the Islands.

Japan accepted this mandate, took possession of the Islands and proceeded to administer the mandate, and thereby became bound, and was bound at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, to the terms of the mandate contained in the Covenant of the League and the [p48476] Agreement of 17 December 1920.


Since the United States had not agreed to this mandate of Japan over the former German Islands, but possessed an interest therein, Japan and the United States of America began negotiations regarding the subject in Washington in 1922. A convention was agreed upon and signed by both powers on 11 February 1922. (Annex No. B-7). Ratifications were exchanged on 13 July 1922; and thereby Japan, as well as the United States, was bound by this convention at all times mentioned in the Indictment. After reciting the terms of the mandate as granted by the said Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the convention provided, among other things:

(1) That the United States of America would have the benefits of Articles III, IV and V of that Mandate Agreement, notwithstanding that she was not a member of the League;
(2) That American property rights in the Islands would be respected;
(3) That existing treaties between Japan and the United States would apply to the Islands; and,
(4) That Japan would furnish the United States [p48477] a duplicate of the annual report of her administration of the mandate to be made to the League.

In a note delivered to the Government of the United States by the Government of Japan on the day of exchange of ratifications of the Convention, Japan assured the United States that the usual comity would be extended to the nationals and vessels of the United States visiting the harbors and waters of those Islands.


A number of treaties and agreements were entered into at the Washington Conference in the winter of 1921 and spring of 1922. This conference was essentially a Disarmament Conference, aimed to promote the responsibility of peace in the world, not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament, but also by solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated.


The Four-Power Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean was one of the treaties entered into at the Washington Conference. (Annex No. B-8). This treaty was signed on 13 December 1921 and was duly ratified by [p48478] Japan and the other powers signatory thereto, and was binding on Japan at all times mentioned in the Indictment. In that treaty, Japan agreed, among other things:

(1) That she would respect the rights of the other powers in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean; and
(2) That if a controversy should arise out of any Pacific question involving their rights, which could not be settled by diplomacy and was likely to affect the harmonious accord then existing between the signatory powers, she would invite the contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject would be referred for consideration and adjustment.

The day this treaty was signed, the contracting powers entered into a Joint Declaration to the effect that it was their intent and understanding that the treaty applied to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean. (Annex No. B-8-a).

At the Washington Conference, the powers signatory to this treaty concluded a supplementary treaty on 6 February 1922 (Annex No. B-8-b) in which it was provided as follows:

"The term 'insular possessions and insular [p48479] dominions' used in the foresaid Treaty (the Four-Power Treaty) shall, in its application to Japan, include only the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin, Formosa and the Pescadores and the Islands under the Mandate of Japan."


Having concluded the Four-Power Treaty on 13 December 1921, the powers signatory, including Japan, being anxious to forestall any conclusions to the contrary, each sent identical notes to the Government of the Netherlands (Annex No. B-8-c) and to the Government of Portugal (Annex No. B-8-d) assuring those governments that they would respect the rights of the Netherlands and Portugal in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.


Another of the interrelated treaties signed during the Washington Conference was the Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armament. (Annex No. B-9). This treaty was signed on 6 February 1922 by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and later was ratified by each of them. The treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment prior to 31 December 1936 when she became no longer bound by virtue of the [p48480] notice to terminate the treaty given by her on 29 December 1934. It is stated in the Preamble to that Treaty: that "desiring to contribute to the maintenance of peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament," the signatory powers had entered into the treaty. However, as an inducement to the signing of this treaty, certain collateral matters were agreed upon and those agreements were included in the treaty. The United States, the British Empire and Japan agreed that the status quo at the time of the signing of the treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified as follows:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States then held or might thereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
(2) Hongkong and the insular Possessions which the British Empire then held or might thereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand;
(3) The following insular possessions [p48481] of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to-wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan might thereafter acquire.

The treaty specified that the maintenance of the status quo implied that no new fortifications or naval bases would be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures would be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase would be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions named.

The signatory powers agreed that they would retain only the capital ships named in the treaty. The United States of America gave up its commanding lead in battleship construction; and both the United States and the British Empire agreed to scrap certain battleships named in the treaty. Maximum limits in total capital ship replacement tonnage were set for each signatory power, which they agreed not to exceed. A similar limitation was placed on aircraft carriers. Guns to be carried by capital ships were not to exceed 16 inches, and those carried by aircraft carriers were not to exceed 8 inches in caliber, and no vessels of [p48482] war of any of the signatory powers thereafter to be laid down, other than capital ships, was to carry guns in excess of 8 inches in caliber.


One further treaty signed at the Washington Conference which cannot be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity, nine of the powers at the conference entered into a treaty, which taken together with the other treaties concluded at the conference, was designed to accomplish that object. This treaty was signed on 6 February 1922 and later ratified by the following powers: The United States of America, the British Empire, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. (Annex No. B-10). This treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment.

By concluding this treaty, Japan, as well as the other signatory powers, agreed among other things [p48483] as follows:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
(3) To use her influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.
(5) To refrain from entering into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding with any power or powers, which would infringe or impair the foregoing principles;
(6) To refrain from seeking, or supporting her nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of her interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of [p48484] China any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or any local authority in any public enterprise or which would be calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity;
(7) To refrain from supporting her nationals in any agreement among themselves designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of China;
(8) To respect the neutrality of China; and
(9) To enter into full and frank communication with the other contracting powers whenever any situation should arise which in the opinion of any one of them involved the application of the stipulations of the treaty.

Thus the powers agreed in formal and solemn treaty to enforce the Open Door Policy in China. Japan not only agreed to, signed and ratified this treaty, but her Plenipotentiary at the Washington Conference declared that Japan was enthusiastically in accord with the principles therein laid down. He used the following words:

"No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to [p48485] work out her own great national destiny."


Another important agreement entered into by Japan, which is relevant to the issues, and which particularly applies to Japan's relations with China, is the Convention and

Final Protocol for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs, which was signed on 23 January 1912 at the International Opium Conference at The Hague. (Annex No. B-11). This Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment. Forty-six other powers also signed and ratified the Convention, and six additional powers later adhered to it. Being resolved to pursue progressive suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, and cocaine, as well as drugs prepared or derived from these substances giving rise or which might give rise to analogous abuse, the powers concluded the Convention. Japan, together with the other contracting powers, agreed:

(1) That she would take measures for the gradual and efficacious suppression of the manufacture, traffic in, and use of these drugs; [p48486]
(2) That she would prohibit the exportation of these drugs to the countries which prohibited the importation of them; and that she would limit and control the exportation of the drugs to countries, which limited the entry of them to their territories;
(3) That she would take measures to prevent the smuggling of these drugs into China or into her leased territories, settlements and concessions in China;
(4) That she would take measures for the suppression, pari passu with the Chinese Government, of the traffic in and abuse of these drugs in her leased territories, settlements and concessions in China; and,
(5) That she would cooperate in the enforcement of the pharmacy laws promulgated by the Chinese Government for the regulation of the sale and distribution of these drugs by applying them to her nationals in China. [p48487]


The Second Opium Conference of the League of Nations further implemented and reinforced the Opium Convention of 1912 by the signing of a Convention on 19 February 1925 (Annex No. B-12), which represented a comprehensive effort on behalf of the Signatory Powers to suppress the contraband trade in and abuse of opium, cocaine, morphine, and other harmful drugs. This Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing this Indictment, except the United States of America, the Philippines and China. The Convention was also definitely acceded to by forty-six additional Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers had provided in Article 295 of the Versailles Treaty that the ratification of that Treaty would be deemed to be ratification of the Opium Convention of 23 January 1912. The Covenant of the League of Nations, which is found in Part I of the Versailles Treaty, provided in Article 23 thereof that the Members of the League would thereafter entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. The Second Opium Conference was in response to these obligations; and the Convention of 19 February 1925 provided for the organization and [p48488] functioning of a Permanent Central Board of the League for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs. In addition, Japan, as well as the other signatory Powers, agreed among other things to the following:

(1) That she would enact laws to ensure effective control of the production, distribution and export of opium and limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use of opium and the other drugs named in the Convention; and
(2) That she would send annually to the Central Board of the League as complete and accurate statistics as possible relative to the preceding year showing: production, manufacture, stocks, consumption, confiscations, imports and exports, government consumption, etc., of the drugs named in the Convention.

The Privy Council of Japan decided on 2 November 1938 to terminate further co- operation with this Central Board of the League. The reason assigned for this action was that the League had authorized its [p48489] Members to invoke sanctions against Japan under the Covenent in an effort to terminate what the League had denounced as Japan's aggressive war against China. Notice of this decision was communicated to the Secretary General of the League on the same day.


A third Convention, which is known as the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs was signed at Geneva on 13 July 1931. (Annex No. B-13). This Convention was signed and ratified, or acceded to, by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, as well as fifty-nine additional Powers. This Convention was supplementary to and intended to make more effective the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1925 mentioned above. Japan, together with the other Contracting Powers, agreed:

(1) That she would furnish annually, for each of the drugs covered by the Convention in respect to each of her territories to which the Convention applied, an estimate, which was to be forwarded to the Central Board of the League, showing the quantity of the [p48490] drugs necessary for medical and scientific use and for export authorized under the Conventions;
(2) That she would not allow to be manufactured in any such territory in any one year a quantity of any of the drugs greater than the quantity set forth in such estimate; and,
(3) That no import into, or export from, the territories of any of the Contracting Powers of any of the drugs would take place, except in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.


The law governing the entrance of States into, as well as their conduct while in, belligerency received further restatement during the two decades immediately preceding the period covered by the Indictment and during the years of 1928 and 1929. In 1907, the second Peace Conference at The Hague produced thirteen Conventions and one Declaration, all signed on 18 October 1907. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) condemning aggressive war was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928. Then on 27 July 1929 two important Conventions were signed at Geneva, namely: the Convention Relative to the [p48491] Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field. These Agreements not only impose direct treaty obligations upon the Contracting Powers, but also delineate more precisely the customary law. The effectiveness of some of the Conventions signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907 as direct treaty obligations was considerably impaired by the incorporation of a so-called "general participation clause" in them, providing that the Convention would be binding only if all the Belligerents were parties to it. The effect of this clause is, in strict law, to deprive some of the Conventions of their binding force as direct treaty obligations, either from the very beginning of a war or in the course of it as soon as a non-signatory Power, however insignificant, joins the ranks of the Belligerents. Although the obligation to observe the provisions of the Convention as a binding treaty may be swept away by operation of the "general participation clause", or otherwise, the Convention remains as good evidence of the customary law of nations, to be considered by the Tribunal along with all other available evidence in determining the customary law to be applied in any given situation. [p48492]


The First Convention agreed upon by the Conference at The Hague in 1907 was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. (Annex No. B-14). The Convention was signed by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, and ratified by, or on behalf of, all of them, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand. Twenty-one other Powers also signed and ratified the Convention, and five additional Powers later acceded to it. The Powers bringing the Indictment, who did not ratify this Convention, remained bound, in so far as their relations with Japan were concerned, by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at The Hague on 29 July 1899; since that Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of these Powers. Neither of the Conventions mentioned under this title contained a "general participation clause"; they were, therefore, binding upon Japan as direct treaty obligations at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, Japan, as well as the other Contracting Powers, among other things agreed:

(1) That, in order to obviate as far as possible recourse to force in her re- [p48493] lations with other States, she would use her best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences; and,
(2) That in case of serious disagreement or dispute, before in appeal to arms, she would have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.


The Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris, which was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928, condemned aggressive war and restated the law evidenced by the First Hague Convention of 13 October 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. (Annex No. B-15). The Treaty was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and the Netherlands. Japan ratified the Treaty on 24 July 1929, and China adhered to the Treaty on 8 May 1929. The Netherlands adhered to the Treaty on 12 July 1929, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered on 27 September 1928. [p48494]

Therefore, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment had definitely acceded to the Treaty by 24 July 1929; in addition, eight other Powers had signed and ratified the Treaty; and forty-five additional Powers, at one time or another, adhered to it. The Treaty was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment.

The Contracting Powers, including Japan, declared that they condemn recourses to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

The Contracting Powers then agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which might arise among them, would never be sought except by pacific means.

Prior to ratification of the Pact, some of the Signatory Powers made declarations reserving the right to wage war in self-defense, including the right to judge for themselves whether a situation requires such action. Any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to force, is necessarily limited to the right of self- defense. The right of self-defense involves the right of the State threatened [p48495] with impending attack to judge for itself in the first instance whether it is justified in resorting to force. Under the most liberal interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the right of self-defense does not confer upon the State resorting to war the authority to make a final determination upon the justification for its action. Any other interpretation would nullify the Pact; and this Tribunal does not believe that the Powers in concluding the Pact intended to make an empty gesture.


The Third Convention concluded by the Powers in Conference at The Hague in 1907 was the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. (Annex No. B-16). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except China; but China adhered to the Convention in 1910. A total of twenty-five Powers signed and ratified the Convention, including Portugal and Thailand, and six Powers later adhered to it. This Convention does not contain a "general participation clause". It provides that it shall take effect in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers, it was binding upon Japan at all relevant times mentioned in [p48496] the Indictment. By ratifying this Convention, Japan agreed, among other things:

That hostilities between her and any other Contracting Powers must not commence without previous and explicit warning; in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.


The Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 was the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Person's in war on Land. (Annex No. B-17). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and China. However, China adhered to the Convention in 1910. A total of twenty-five Powers signed and ratified the Convention, including Thailand and Portugal; and three Powers later adhered to it. Great Britain and sixteen other Powers, who signed the Convention, have not ratified it.

This is one of the Hague Conventions which contains a "general participation clause"; although it ceased to be applicable in the recent war as a direct treaty obligation of Japan upon the entry of Great Britain into the war on. 8 December 1941, it [p48497] remained as good evidence of the customary law of nations to be considered along with all other available evidence in determining the customary law to be applied in any given situation, to which the principles stated in the Convention might be applicable.

By this Convention Japan agreed, among other things:

(1) That the territory of neutral Powers is inviolable;
(2) That Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power; and,
(3) That a neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the Belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.


The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 is the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. (Annex No. B-18). Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were annexed to and [p48498] made a part of this Convention. (Annex No. B-19). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the Powers bringing the Indictment, except China. Nineteen additional Powers, including Thailand and Portugal, also signed and ratified this Convention; and two other Powers later adhered to it.

This is another of the Hague Conventions which contains a "general participation clause". What we have said respecting this clause applies equally well here.

As stated in the Preamble to this Convention, the Contracting Powers were animated by the desire, even in the extreme case, to serve the interests of humanity and the needs of civilization by diminishing the evils of war and adopted the Convention and the Regulations thereunder which were intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for Belligerents. Realising that it was not possible at the time to concert regulations covering all circumstances that might arise in practice, the Powers declared that they did not intend that unforeseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders; and that until a more complete coda should be issued, they declared that in cases not included in the Regulations [p48499] the inhabitants and belligerents remained under the protection and principles of the laws of nations as they resulted from the usages of civilized peoples, the laws of humanity, and the dictate of the public conscience.

By this Convention Japan agreed, among other things:

(1) That prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them; that they must be humanely treated; and all their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property;
(2) That in case of capture of any of the armed forces of a Belligerent, whether they consisted of combatants or non-combatants, they would be treated as prisoners of war;
(3) That although she might utilize the labor of prisoners of war, officers excepted, the task would not be excessive and would not be connected with the operation of war; and that she would pay to the prisoners compensation for [p48500] all work done by them;
(4) That as regards board, lodging, and clothing, in the absence of a special agreement between the Belligerents; she would treat prisoners of war on the same footing as the troops who captured them;
(5) That prisoners of war in her power would be subject to the laws governing her own army and entitled to the benefits thereof;
(6) That she would institute at the commencement of hostilities an inquiry office. That it would be the function of this office to reply to all inquiries about the prisoners and to keep up to date an individual return for each prisoner of war in which would be recorded all necessary vital statistics and other useful information pertaining to such prisoner.
(7) That relief societies for prisoners of war would receive every facility from her for the efficient performance of their humane task and their agents would be admitted to places of internment for [p48501] the purpose of administering relief, etc;
(8) That it was forbidden: (a) to employ poison or poisoned weapons; (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile Nation or Army; (c) To kill or wound an enemy, who having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; (d) To declare that no quarter will be given; (e) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or of the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention; or (f) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(9) That in sieges and bombardments all necessary steps would be taken by her to spare buildings dedicated to religion, art, science and charitable purposes, historic monuments and hospitals and places where the sick and wounded [p48502] are collected;
(10) That the pillage of a town or other place, even when taken by assault was prohibited: and,
(11) That family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice would be respected by her during war.


The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929. (Annex No. B-20). Forty-seven Powers signed the Convention; and thirty-four Powers either ratified it or adhered to it. Excepting Australia, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, each of the Powers bringing the Indictment.

Japan sent plenipotentiaries, who participated in the Conference and signed the Convention; but Japan did not formally ratify the Convention before the opening of hostilities on 7 December 1941. However, early in 1942 the United States, Great Britain and other Powers informed Japan that they proposed to abide by the Convention and sought assurances from Japan as to [p48503] her attitude towards the Convention; Japan, acting through her Foreign Minister, who was the accused TOGO, declared and assured the Powers concerned that, while she was not formally bound by the Convention, she would apply the Convention, "mutatis mutandis" toward American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war. Under this assurance Japan was bound to comply with the Convention save where its provisions could not be literally complied with owing to special conditions known to the parties to exist at the time the assurance was given, in which case Japan was obliged to apply the nearest possible equivalent to literal compliance. The effect of this assurance will be more fully considered at a later point in this judgment.

This Convention is the "mere complete code of the laws of war" contemplated by the Powers signatory to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War concluded on 18 October 1907; and the Convention provides by its terms that it will be considered to be Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to that Hague Convention. The Convention does not contain a "general participation clause"; but it does contain a provision that it shall remain in force as between the Belligerents who are parties to it even though one of the Belligerents is not a Contracting Power: [p48504] The Convention provides, among other things:

(1) That prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured them; that they must be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity; that they have the right to have their person and honor respected; that women shall be treated with all regard to their sex; and that all prisoners of war must be maintained by the detaining powers;
(2) That prisoners of war shall be evacuated as quickly as possible to depots removed from the zone of combat; but that the evacuation, if on foot, shall only be effected by stages of 20 kilometers a day, unless the necessity of reaching water and food requires longer stages;
(3) That prisoners of war may be interned; but they may not be confined or imprisoned, except as an indispensible measure of safety or sanitation; that if captured in unhealthful regions or climates, they will be transported to a more favorable region; that all sanitary measures will be taken to insure cleanliness and healthfulness of camps; that medical inspections shall be arranged at least once a month to ensure the general health of the prisoners; that collective [p48505] disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited; that the food ration shall be equal in quantity and quality to that of troops in base camp; that prisoners shall be furnished facilities together with a sufficiency of portable water for preparing additional food for themselves; that they shall be furnished clothing, linen and footwear as well as work clothes for those who labor; and that every camp shall have an infirmary, where prisoners of war shall receive every kind of attention needed;
(4) That although prisoners of war are required to salute all officers of the detaining power, officers who are prisoners are bound to salute only officers of a higher or equal rank of that power;
(5) That belligerents may utilize the labor of able prisoners of war, officers excepted, and provided that noncommissioned officers are used only for supervisory work; that no prisoner may be employed at labors for which he is physically unfit; that the length of the day's work shall not be excessive, and every prisoner shall be allowed a rest of twenty-four consecutive hours each week; that prisoners shall not be used at unhealthful or dangerous work, and labor detachments must be conducted similar to prisoner of war camps, particularly with regard to sanitary condi- [p48506] tions, food, medical attention, etc.; that prisoners must be paid wages for their labor; and that the labor of prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with war operations, particularly the manufacture and transportation of munitions or the transportation of material for combat units;
(6) That prisoners of war must be allowed to receive parcels by mail intended to supply them with food and clothing; and that relief societies for prisoners of war shall receive from the detaining power every facility for the efficient performance of their humane tasks;
(7) That prisoners of war have the right to make requests and register complaints regarding the conditions of their captivity; that in every place where there are prisoners of war they have the right to appoint agents to represent them directly with the military authorities of the detaining powers; and that such agent shall not be transferred without giving him time to inform his successors about affairs under consideration;
(8) That although prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armies of the detaining power, punishments other than those provided for the same acts for soldiers of [p48507] the armies of the detaining power may not be imposed upon them; and that corporal punishment, imprisonment in quarters without daylight, and in general any form of cruelty, is forbidden, as well as collective punishment for individual acts or omissions;
(9) That escaped prisoners of war who are retaken shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment; and that the comrades who assisted his escape may incur only disciplinary punishment;
(10) That at the opening of judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war, the detaining power shall advise the representative of the protecting power thereof at least before the opening of the trial; that no prisoner shall be sentenced without having an opportunity to defend himself, and shall not be required to admit himself guilty of the act charged; that the representative of the protecting power shall be entitled to attend the trial; that no sentence shall be pronounced against a prisoner except by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of trial of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power, that the sentence pronounced shall be immediately communicated to the protecting power; and that in the case of death sentences, the sentence must not be executed before the expiration of three months [p48508] after such communication;
(11) That belligerents are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of rank or number, seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war, after having brought them to a condition where they can be transported;
(12) That belligerents shall see that prisoners of war dying in captivity are honorably buried and that their graves bear all due information and are respected and maintained;
(13) That upon outbreak of hostilities each belligerent shall institute a prisoner of war information bureau, which shall prepare and preserve an individual return upon each prisoner showing certain vital information prescribed, and which shall furnish such information as soon as possible to the interested power.

Japan also assured the belligerents that she would apply this convention to civilian internees and that in applying the Convention she would take into consideration the national and racial manners and customs of prisoners of war and civilian internees under reciprocal conditions when supplying clothing and provisions to them. [p48509]


The Geneva Red Cross Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field was also signed on 27 July 1929. (Annex No. B-21). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment as well as thirty-two other powers. It was binding upon Japan and her subjects at all relevant times mentioned in the Indictment, as a direct treaty obligation. The Convention contains a provision to the effect that it must be respected by the contracting powers under all circumstances; and if in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall remain in force between the belligerents who are parties to it.

By signing and ratifying the Convention, Japan as well as the other signatory powers, agreed, among other things:

(1) That officers, soldiers and other persons officially attached to the armies, who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances; and that they shall be humanely treated and cared for without distinction of nationality by the belligerent in whose power they are;
(2) That after every engagement, the [p48510] belligerent who remains in possession of the field of battle shall search for the wounded and dead and protect them from robbery and ill-treatment; and that those wounded and sick who fall into the power of the enemy shall become prisoners of war to whom the general rules of international law respecting prisoners of war shall be applicable;
(3) That all personnel charged exclusively with the removal, transportation and treatment of the wounded and sick, including administration personnel of sanitary formations and establishments and chaplains, shall be respected and protected, and when they fall into the hands of the enemy they shall not be treated as prisoners of war, and shall not be detained, but will be returned as soon as possible to their own army along with their arms and equipment.
(4) That mobile sanitary formations, and fixed sanitary establishments shall be respected and protected; and if they fall into the hands of the enemy they shall not be deprived of their buildings, transport and other equipment which may be needed for the treatment of the sick and wounded;
(5) That only those personnel, formations and establishments entitled to respect and protection under the Convention shall display the distinctive [p48511] emblem of the Geneva Convention; and,
(6) That it is the duty of commanders in chief of belligerent armies to provide for the details of execution of the provisions of the Convention, as well as unforeseen cases conformable to the general principles of the Convention.


The Tenth Convention agreed upon at the Conference at the Hague and signed on 18 October 1907 was the Convention for the Adaption to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 6 July 1906. (Annex No. B-22). The Convention was signed and ratified by, or on behalf of, Japan and each of the powers bringing the Indictment, except Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand. The Convention was signed and ratified by twenty-seven powers and later five other powers adhered to it. The indicting powers who did not ratify this Convention and also Japan are parties to the Convention which was signed at the Hague on 29 July 1899; and, therefore, as between them, they are bound by the Convention of 1899, which contains most of the provisions found in the later Convention of 1907.

This, also, is one of the Hague Conventions, which contains a "general participation clause," and, [p48512] therefore, it ceased to be applicable upon Japan as a direct treaty obligation when a non-signatory power joined the ranks of the belligerents. What we have said regarding this clause applies equally well here. The Convention provides, among other things:

(1) That after every engagement the belligerents shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded, and protect them and the dead from pillage and ill treatment; those falling into the power of the enemy shall become prisoners of war; the detaining power shall send to their country as soon as possible a description of those picked up by him, and shall treat the sick and wounded and bury the dead;
(2) That hospital ships shall be respected and cannot be captured; but these ships may not be used for military purposes and shall be distinguished by markings and flags displaying the emblem of the Geneva Convention; and that the distinguishing markings prescribed for hospital ships shall not be used for protecting any ships other than those entitled to protection under the Convention. [p48512(a)]


Thus for many years prior to the year 1930, Japan had claimed a place among the civilized communities of the world and had voluntarily incurred the above obligations designed to further the cause of peace, to outlaw aggressive war, and to mitigate the horrors of war. It is against that background of rights and obligations that the actings of the accused must be viewed and judged.




In dealing with the period of Japanese history with which this Indictment is mainly concerned it is necessary to consider in the first place the domestic history of Japan during the same period. In the years from 1928 onwards Japanese armed forces invaded in succession the territories of many of Japan's neighbors. The Tribunal must deal with the history of these attacks and with the exploitation by Japan of the resources of the territories she occupied, but its most important task is to assess the responsibility of individuals for these attacks, in so far as they were illegal. This responsibility cannot be measured simply by studying Japanese activities abroad. Indeed the answers to the [p48513] questions, "Why did these things happen?" and "Who were responsible for their occurrence?" will often only be found if the contemporaneous history of Japanese domestic politics is known.

Moreover, if we embarked in the first place on a study of Japanese activities abroad, we should find it impossible to comprehend these activities fully, while we were engaged in the study; for the timing of these activities, and the manner and extent of their development were often dictated, not alone by the situation abroad, but by the situation at home. It is for these reasons that we now consider in the first place the political developments in Japan which largely controlled and explain her actions overseas.

The outstanding feature of the period under review is the gradual rise of the military and their supporters to such a predominance in the government of Japan that no other organ of government, neither the elected representatives of the people, nor the civilian ministers in the Cabinet, nor the civilian advisers of the Emperor in the Privy Council and in his entourage, latterly imposed any effective check on the ambitions of the military. The supremacy of the influence of the military and their supporters in Japanese civilian administration and foreign affairs [p48514] as well as in purely military concerns was not achieved at once nor without the occurrence of events which threatened its accomplishment, but it was ultimately achieved. The varying fortunes of the protagonists in the political struggle which culminated in the supremacy of the military will be found to provide the explanation of many of the events abroad. Japanese warlike adventures and the preparations therefor ebbed and flowed with the varying fortunes of the political struggle in the Japanese homeland.


The reputed date of the foundation of the Empire of Japan is 660 B.C. Japanese historians ascribe to that date an Imperial Rescript said to have been issued by the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenno. In this document occur two classic phrases upon which there gradually accumulated a mass of mystical thought and interpretation. The first is "Hakko Ichiu" which meant the bringing together of the corners of the world under one roof, or the making of the world one family. This was the alleged ideal of the foundation of the Empire; and in its traditional context meant no more than a universal principle of humanity, which was destined ultimately to pervade the whole universe. The second Principle of conduct was the principle of "Kodo," a [p48515] contraction for an ancient phrase which meant literally, "The oneness of the Imperial Way." The way to the realization of Hakko Ichiu was through the benign rule of the Emperor; and therefore the "way of the Emperor" -- the "Imperial" or the "Kingly way" -- was a concept of virtue, and a maxim of conduct. Hakko Ichiu was the moral goal, and loyalty to the Emperor was the road which led to it.

These two ideas were again associated with the Imperial dynasty after the Meiji Restoration. That Emperor proclaimed them in an Imperial Rescript issued in 1871. They then represented a constitutional rallying-point, and an appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people.


In the decade before 1930, those Japanese who urged territorial expansion did so in the name of these two ideas. Again and again throughout the years that followed measures of military aggression were advocated in the names of Hakko Ichiu and Kodo which eventually became symbols for world domination through military force.

In 1924 a book was published by a Dr. Okawa who was originally one of the accused but who became mentally unstable in the course of the trial. He [p48516] stated that since Japan was the first state to be created, it was therefore Japan's divine mission to rule all nations. He advocated the Japanese occupation of Siberia and the South Sea Islands. In 1925 and thereafter, he predicted a war between East and West, in which Japan would be the champion of the East. He said, in 1926, that Japan should endeavor to fulfil that sublime mission by developing a strong spirit of nationalism. He had organized a patriotic society which advocated the liberation of the colored races and the moral unification of the world. He had often, at the invitation of the Army General Staff, lectured to them along these lines.


In April 1927 when Tanaka took office as Prime Minister, the expansionists gained their first victory. The new Cabinet was committed to a policy of peaceful penetration into that portion of China called Manchuria. But, whereas Tanaka proposed to establish Japanese hegemony over Manchuria through negotiation with its separatist leaders, elements within the Kwantung Army were impatient of this policy. The Kwantung Army was the Japanese unit maintained in Manchuria under the Portsmouth Treaty for the protection of Japanese interests including the South Manchurian Railway. In June 1928 [p48517] certain members of the Kwantung Army murdered Marshal Chang Tso-lin, with whom Tanaka was negotiating. Marshal Chang Tso-lin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armies in Manchuria.

Tanaka's efforts to discipline the Army officers responsible for this murder were successfully resisted by the Army General Staff, which had the War Minister's support. The Army had defied the government, and resistance among the Chinese had been greatly stimulated. The government had been gravely weakened by the alienation of the Army's supporters.

In April 1929 Okawa launched a public campaign designed to take the Manchurian question out of the government's hands. The Army General Staff, encouraged by Okawa's success, soon began to cooperate with him. Competent propagandists were sent to ventilate the question in the various parts of Japan.

In the face of this opposition and of continued disorders in Manchuria, the Tanaka Cabinet resigned on 1 July 1929.


When Hamaguchi became Prime Minister in succession to Tanaka, Baron Shidehara returned to the Foreign Ministry. In the governments before Tanaka had [p48518] taken office, Shidehara had been the foremost proponent of the liberal policy of friendly international relationships. His return to power constituted a threat to the Army's program of expansion through military force. In the face of this challenge, Okawa continued his propaganda campaign with the assistance of members of the Army General Staff. He maintained that Manchuria must be separated from China and placed under Japanese control. Thus would be ended the domination of the white races over Asia and in its place would be created a land founded upon the principle of the "kingly way;" Japan would assume the leadership of the peoples of Asia, and would drive out the white races. Thus, as early as the year 1930, Kodo had come to mean Japanese, domination of Asia, and a possible war with the West.

The military authorities had not been slow in following Okawa's lead. Military officers had launched a formidable campaign to spread the doctrine that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline; and that Japan should expand into it, develop it economically and industrially, and defend it against the Soviet Union. In June 1930, Colonel ITAGAKI, then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, favored the establishment, through military force, of a new state in Manchuria. He repeated after Okawa that such a development would be in accordance with the [p48519] "kingly way," and would lead to the liberation of the Asiatic peoples.


Throughout the year 1930 the Hamaguchi Cabinet followed a policy of retrenchment which sharpened the antagonism of the military faction. Smaller budgets were voted for the Army and Navy. The standing Army was reduced in size. The Treaty for Naval Disarmament was ratified in the face of strong opposition. Among young naval officers and in the patriotic societies there was considerable indignation. In November 1930 the Prime Minister was mortally wounded by an assassin, but the Cabinet carried on under the liberal leadership of Baron Shidehara.

Liberalism had therefore become the chief target of the Army's resentment, and in January 1931 a plot was hatched to overthrow it. This was the so-called "March Incident" and was a conspiracy engineered by Okawa and Lieutenant-Colonel HASHIMOTO to create an insurrection which would justify the proclamation of martial law, and would lead to the installation of a military Cabinet. It had the support of the Army General Staff. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Lieutenant-General KOISO, abetted the conspirators. It failed because Ugaki, who had been selected as the new [p48520] Prime Minister, refused to countenance the scheme.

HASHIMOTO had returned to Japan from Turkey in January 1930, imbued with a knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, the methods of European dictatorships. In September 1930 he had formed among his fellow senior officers of the Army General Staff a society designed ultimately to achieve a national reorganization, if necessary, by force. The abortive March Incident of 1931 was the result of this work.

HASHIHOTO's work was complementary to Okawa's. In his hands the "way of the Emperor" became also the way of military dictatorship. He confessed to Okawa that the Diet, which had aroused the Army's indignation, should be crushed. Okawa himself had told Ugaki that the ready-made political parties must be swept away, and the Imperial dignity uplifted under military rule. This would be the work of the "Showa restoration." "Showa" is the name given to the reign of the present Emperor.

Under the Japanese constitution the War and Navy Ministers enjoyed direct access to the Emperor upon a footing of equality with the Premier. The Chiefs of Staff also were directly responsible to the Emperor; so there was historical warrant for the claim that the way of Kodo was the Army's way. [p48521] Although the March Incident of 1931 failed, it had set the precedent for later developments. The Army had aroused great public resentment against the advocates of disarmament and liberalism. One such malcontent had assassinated the liberal Premier, Hamaguchi. In some quarters the naval and military reduction program was regarded as an unwarranted interference by the Cabinet with the affairs of the armed forces. The militarists had in a measure succeeded in diverting to their own ends the patriotic sentiment of loyalty to the Emperor.

We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48522]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.



Under Wakatsuki, who on 14 April 1931, succeeded Hamaguchi as Premier, Cabinet and Army pursued antithetical policies. While Shidehara, who remained Foreign Minister, laboured wholeheartedly to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian issue, the Army actively fomented trouble, which culminated in the attack at Mukden on 18 September 1931. This was the beginning of what came to be known as the Mukden Incident which eventually led to the establishment of the separate government of Manchukuo. This will be dealt with at a later point.

During the five intervening months resistance to the Cabinet's policy of armament reduction and budgetary economies increased. HASHIMOTO and his group of army officers, known as the "Cherry Society" and designed to bring about the rational reorganisation, continued to advocate the occupation of Manchuria by force. The Black Dragon Society, pledged to nationalism and an anti-Soviet policy, began to hold mass meetings. Okawa continued his campaign for popular support. The army, he said, was completely out of control; and it would only be a [p48523] matter of time before the Cabinet acquiesced in its wishes. Yosuke Matsuoka, who, like Okawa, was an official of the South Manchurian Railway Company, published a book in support of the familiar theme that Manchuria was, both strategically and economically, the lifeline of Japan.

Okawa, with HASHIMOTO and his Cherry Society, instigated the Mukder Incident. The Army General Staff approved the scheme, which was commended to them by Colonel DOHIHARA. DOHIHARA and Colonel ITAGAKI, both members of the Kwantung Army Staff, each played important parts in the planning and in the execution of the attack.

Lieutenant General MINAMI, Vice-Chief of the Army Staff under the Tanaka Cabinet had become War Minister in Wakatsuki's Cabinet. Unlike his predecessor, Ugaki, he took the Army's part against that of the liberal Cabinet in which he held office. On 4 August 1931, he talked to his senior officers of the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchuria and Mongolia; spoke disapprovingly of those who advocated measures of disarmament; and urged them to carry out their training conscientiously, so that they might serve to perfection the cause of the Emperor.

Lieutenant General KOISO, who, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, had been privy to the [p48524] planning of the March Incident of 1931, still occupied that position. War Minister MINAMI, though he took the Army's part, and favored the Army's scheme for the conquest of Manchuria, was disposed to pay some deference to the views of the Cabinet and the Emperor. The Wakatsuki Cabinet had continued the policy of seeking reductions in the budgets for the armed forces; and, by 4th September, 1931, War Minister MINAMI and Finance Minister Inoue had reached substantial agreement in this regard. MINAMI was immediately subjected to strong criticism by KOISO for agreeing to this step; and, as a result, the agreement reached between MINAMI and Inoue was rendered nugatory.

By 14 September 1931 the Army's schemes in Mongolia and Manchuria were known in Tokyo. On that day MINAMI was warned by the Emperor that these schemes must be stopped. This message he conveyed to a meeting of Army leaders and others in Tokyo. It was thereupon decided to abandon the plot. MINAMI also despatched a letter to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army ordering him to abandon the plot. This letter was not delivered until the Incident at Mukden had occurred. The messenger who was despatched to Mukden to deliver this important letter was General Tatekawa; and, as will appear in our discussion of the [p48525] Mukden Incident, he seems to have intentionally delayed presenting this letter until after the incident had occurred.

On 19 September 1931, the day after the Mukden Incident occurred, it was reported to the Cabinet by MINAMI, who characterised it as an act of righteous self-defence.


Wakatsuki gave immediate instructions that the situation must not be enlarged; and expressed concern at the Army's failure to carry out thoroughly the policy of the government. Five days later, on 24 September 1931 the Cabinet passed a formal resolution denying that Japan had any territorial aims in Manchuria.

The Army was indignant that the Emperor should have been induced to support the Cabinet's Manchurian policy; and almost daily MINAMI reported Army advances made in violation of his own assurances to the Premier. On 22 September 1931 he proposed a plan to send the Korean Army to Manchuria, but was rebuked by the Premier for the action taken. On 30 September 1931, MINAMI demanded the despatch of further troops, but the Premier again refused. One week after the Cabinet's [p48526] resolution was passed the Chief of the Army Staff warned Wakatsuki that the Kwantung Army might be compelled to advance further into the Yangtze area; and that it would brook no outside interference with its prerogatives.

During October 1931 a new conspiracy was planned by HASHIMOTO and his Cherry Society. He had confessed his part in the Mukden Incident, which, he said, was aimed, not only at the establishment in Manchuria of a new country founded on "the Kingly Way," but also at resolving the political situation in Japan.

The October plot was designed to accomplish this latter aim. It was planned to destroy the political party system with a military coup d'etat, and to establish a Cabinet in sympathy with Army policy.

The plot was exposed, and the scheme was then abandoned upon MINAMI's orders. But, during October and November 1931, military activity continued in Manchuria in direct violation of Cabinet policy. Rumors were circulated that, if the Cabinet continued to withhold cooperation, the Kwantung Army would declare its independence; and, in the face of this threat, the resistance of the moderate elements among the liberalists was broken.

On 9 December 1931 the War Minister reported to the Privy Council on the Manchurian situation. [p48527] Opposition to the Army's activities was now confined to the deleterious influence which they might exert upon Japanese relations with the Western Powers. MINAMI agreed that the conflict between Japanese official assurances and Army actions was unfortunate; but issued a sharp warning that there must be no interference by outsiders in matters of Army discipline.

Three days later, on 12 December 1931, Wakatsuki resigned, after admitting his Cabinet's inability to control the Army. The Manchurian Incident, he said, had continued to expand and spread in spite of the Cabinet's decision to prevent it. After abandoning the prospect of forming a coalition Cabinet which could control the Army, he had decided reluctantly that Shidehara's policy must be abandoned. As the Foreign Minister would not yield, he had been compelled to tender his Cabinet's resignation.

The Army had achieved its goal of a war of conquest in Manchuria, and had shown itself to be more powerful than the Japanese Cabinet.


It was now the turn of the Seiyukai party, which had been in opposition, to attempt to control the Army. When Inukai was given the Imperial Mandate, he was [p48528] instructed that the Emperor did not desire Japanese politics to be wholly controlled by the Army. His party contained a strong pro-military faction, led by Mori, who became Chief Cabinet Secretary under the new government. But Inukai adopted immediately a policy of curtailing the activities of the Kwantung Army, and of negotiating with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek a gradual Army withdrawal from Manchuria.

General Abe had been nominated for the post of War Minister in the new government; but many young Army officers had opposed this appointment upon the ground that Abe had no knowledge of, or sympathy for, their feelings. At their insistence Inukai had appointed Lieutenant General ARAKI as War Minister, believing that he would be able to control the Army.

General Honjo, commanding the Kwantung Army, which was already planning to create in Manchuria a new state under Japanese control, despatched Colonel ITAGAKI as his emissary to Tokyo, and received the support of War Minister ARAKI.

Inukai opened secret negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which, however, came to the knowledge of Mori and the military faction. Mori warned Inukai's son of the Army's indignation; and the negotiations, though promising well, were perforce abandoned [p48529] by the Premier. An Imperial Conference was held in late December 1931, two weeks after the Cabinet had taken office; and immediately afterwards a new offensive in Manchuria was planned by ARAKI, the War Ministry and the Army General Staff. Inukai was refused an Imperial Rescript sanctioning the withdrawal from Manchuria; and Colonel ITAGAKI threw out hints of the Kwantung Army's plan to install a puppet ruler and to take over the administration of the new state. The new Premier's plan to control the Army had been frustrated in a matter of weeks.

A new offensive in Manchuria began as the Army had planned, while in Tokyo War Councillor MINAMI advised the Emperor that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline, and that new state must be founded there. On 18 February 1932, the independence of Manchukuo was declared; on 9 March 1932, the first organic law was promulgated; and three days later the new state requested international recognition. One month afterwards, on 11 April 1932, the Inukai Cabinet, which had now accepted this fait accompli, discussed plans for the Japanese guidance of Manchukuo.


During the first quarter of 1932 HASHIMOTO and [p48530] Okawa were each preparing the way for the national reorganization or renovation which would rid Japan of democratic politics. On 17 January 1932, HASHIMOTO had published a newspaper article advocating the reform of the Japanese parliamentary system. He propounded the theme that democratic government was incompatible with the principles upon which the Empire was founded. It was, he said, necessary to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties, and to destroy them for the sake of constructing a cheerful new Japan.

Okawa was forming a new society, named after Jimmu Tenro, the legendary founder of the Empire and the legendary enunciator of "Kodo" and "Hakko Ichiu." The objects of the new society were to further the spirit of the Empire, to develop nationalism, and to inspire the Japanese to the leadership of East Asia; to crush the existing political parties and to achieve the realisation of a government constructed on nationalist lines; and so to plan the control of Japanese industrial development as to encourage expansion of the national power abroad.

Though the Inukai Cabinet had yielded on the question of Manchuria, the liberal elements within it still resisted the type of national renovation which Okawa and HASHIMOTO advocated. Inukai favoured a [p48531] reduction in the Army budget, and was opposed to the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan. Through his son he received repeated warnings from Mori that his opposition to the military faction was endangering his life. The cleavage between the militarists and those who still believed in Cabinet control affected both the Cabinet and the Army itself. The pro-military group was led by War Minister ARAKI and had become known as the "Kodo faction" -- the supporters of the "principle" of "the Imperial Way."

On May 1932 Inukai delivered a speech in which he extolled democracy and condemned fascism. A week later he was assassinated in his official residence. HASHIMOTO was a party to the plot, which was carried out by naval officers.

Prince Konoye, Baron Harada and others discussed the situation which had arisen. KIDO, Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, Lieutenant General KOISO, Vice- Minister of War, and Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI of the Military Affairs Bureau were present. It was agreed that Inukai's assassination was directly attributable to his championship of party government. SUZUKI considered that similar acts of violence would occur if new Cabinets were organised under political leadership, and he therefore favoured the formation of a coalition government. [p48532]


The Saito Cabinet, which took office on 26 May 1932, attempted to achieve a compromise in the conflict between Cabinet and Army. The Cabinet would control the military; and would affect general economies including a reduction in the army budget. On the other hand, the Cabinet accepted the Army policy in Manchukuo; and determined upon the promotion, under Japanese domination, of the economic and industrial development of that country. Lieutenant General ARAKI was still War Minister; and Lieutenant General KOISO, who had become War Vice-Minister in February 1932, retained that position.

It was inevitable that the new Cabinet policy in regard to Manchukuo should cause a deterioration in Japanese relations with the Western Powers. But the Army, unfettered by opposition within the Cabinet, was also preparing for war with the U.S.S.R., and for a further struggle with the central government of China. As early as December 1931 it had been planned to include in the new state the Chinese province of Jahol; and in August 1932 it was declared that this area formed part of Manchukuo. In the same month KOISO vacated his post in Tokyo to become Chief of [p48533] Staff of the Kwantung Army.

A month earlier, in July 1932, the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow had reported that the greatest stress must be laid upon preparation for war with the Soviet Union, as such a war was inevitable. He saw in the restraints of the League, in Chinese resistance, and in the attitude of the United States, further obstacles to the accomplishment of Japan's great task in Asia. War with China and with the U.S.S.R. he believed to be a foregone conclusion, and with the United States a possibility for which Japan must be ready. [p48534] Recognition of Manchukuo by Japan had been withheld for six months; but in September 1932 it was decided by the Privy Council that the international repercussions which this step would cause need not be feared. With the Council's approval, an agreement was concluded between Japan and the puppet regime which the Kwantung army had installed. It was considered to be an appropriate measure in ensuring the extension of Japanese interests on the Continent. Under its provisions the new state guaranteed all Japanese rights and interests, and undertook to provide every possible establishment which the Kwantung army might require. Japan undertook, at Manchukuoan expense, the defence of, and maintenance of order in, that country. The key positions in both central and local governments were reserved for Japanese; and all appointments were made subject to the approval of the Commander of the Kwantung army.

In pursuance of this agreement, KOISO, as Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung army, drew up a plan for the economic "co-existence and co-prosperity" of Japan and Manchukuo. The two countries would form one economic bloc, and industries would be developed in the most suitable places. The army would control ideological movements, and would not in the meantime permit political [p48535] parties to exist. It would not hesitate to wield military power when necessary.

Soon after the Saito Cabinet had taken office, War Minister ARAKI had announced that, in view of the establishment of Manchukuo, the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements previously made by Japan could no longer be considered binding upon her. The League of Nations in 1931 appointed the Lytton Commission to investigate the circumstances of Japan's intervention in Manchuria. After the report of the Lytton Commission had been received, the League had voiced strong disapprobation of Japanese activities in Manchuria, and in fostering new incidents elsewhere in China. In view of this opposition to her plans, the Saito Cabinet decided, on 17 March 1933, to give notice of Japan's intention to withdraw from the League of Nations; and, ten days later, that action was taken. Simultaneously steps were taken to exclude foreigners from Japan's mandated Pacific islands. Preparations for war in the Pacific could therefore be made in breach of treaty obligations, and freed from foreign surveillance.

Meanwhile military preparations upon the continent were aimed directly at the Soviet Union. In April 1933, Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Military Affairs [p48536] Bureau characterised the U.S.S.R. as the absolute enemy, because, as he said, she aimed to destroy the national structure of Japan.


The publicists heralded the events of this period as the foundation of Japan's "new order". HASHIMOTO took some of the credit, both for the conquest of Manchuria, and for secession from the League. It was, he said, in port the result of the schemes which he had devised upon his return from Europe in January 1930.

Okawa said that the Japanese-Manchukuoan Agreement had laid the legal foundation for the co-existence and co-prosperity of the two countries. The spirit of patriotism, he said, had been suddenly awakened in the hearts of the Japanese people. Democracy and Communism had been swept away, and in Japan the nationalistic tendency had reached an unprecedented climax.

Okawa also welcomed Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, which, in his view represented the old order of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Japan, he said, had at one stroke overcome her dependence upon Britain and America; and had succeeded in exhibiting a new spirit in her diplomacy.

In June 1933 War Minister ARAKI made a speech [p48537] of the utmost significance. In form it was an emotional appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people, exhorting them to support the Army in a time of crisis. But in it was clearly revealed a settled intention to achieve the armed conquest of East Asia, which ARAKI identified with the traditional goal of Hakko Ichiu.

In fostering a sentiment for war, he drew liberally upon the political philosophy which Okawa and HASHIMOTO had popularised. Japan, said ARAKI, was eternal, and was destined to expand. The true spirit of the Japanese race lay in finding order amid chaos, and in realising an ideal world, a paradise in East Asia.

Herein lay the distinction between the new order and the old; for, said ARAKI, under the leadership of the League of Nations, the whole world had opposed the fulfillment of Japan's holy mission. This, therefore, was the critical period for Japan. Recent events had shown that it was necessary to prepare for a nationwide general mobilisation.

Upon this interpretation of the international situation ARAKI based his appeal for popular support. He told his audience that the foundation of Manchukuo was a revelation from heaven, which had re-awakened the national spirit of the Japanese people. If the zeal [p48538] which the Mukdan Incident had engendered was sustained, the new order would be achieved. A revival of the national spirit would resolve the international difficulties which beset Japan; for the issue of wars depended ultimately upon the spiritual power of the people.

The path for the people to follow, said ARAKI, was the "way of the Emperor", and the Army of Japan was the Emperor's Army. It would therefore fight against anyone who opposed it in its task of spreading the "Imperial Way".

ARAKI also discussed the term "national defence", which was later to become the basic principle of Japanese preparations for war. It was, he said, not limited to the defence of Japan itself, but included also the defence of the "way of the country", which was Kodo. He therefore showed clearly that by "national defence" was meant the conquest of other countries through force of arms. In his writings of the same period ARAKI disclosed the Army's designs upon Mongolia, and reaffirmed once more his country's determination to crush any country which turned against the "Imperial Way".


In the months which followed, ARAKI's policy gained both popular support and Cabinet recognition. [p48539] By September 1933 an intense antipathy for the arms limitation treaties had been built up through the efforts of the military leaders. There was a universal demand for the revision, in Japan's favour, of existing naval ratios; and any Cabinet which resisted this popular clamour would have had to face an outraged public. Notice was given of Japan's intention to abrogate the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments.

Meanwhile the Saito Cabinet had made ARAKI's principle of national defence the over-riding consideration in its Manchukuoan policy. By December 1933 this policy was settled. The economies of the two countries would be integrated, and their military expenses would be shared. Manchukuoan foreign policy would be modelled upon that of Japan. The "national defence power" of the two countries would be increased to overcome the international crisis which before long Japan might encounter. The "open-door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty would be observed only in so far as they did not conflict with the requirements of "national defence."

In December 1933 the Kwantung Army was making operational and other preparations for the day upon which Japan would open hostilities against the Soviet Union. In the space of two years the "friendship" [p48540] policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara had been completely discarded.

In April 1934 a new policy in respect of East Asia was formulated in the "Amau statement." This unofficial declaration, released to the press by a Foreign Office spokesman, caused international alarm, and was quickly disclaimed by the Saito government. It was however, wholly consistent with the Cabinet decisions of 1933, and repeated, in less inflammatory language, much the same policy which War Minister ARAKI had ennunciated ten months earlier.

It was stated that, as Japan had a special position in China, her views might not agree on all points with those of other nations. It was this divergence of opinion which had necessitated Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Although she desired friendly relations with other countries, Japan would act on her own responsibility in keeping peace and order in East Asia. This responsibility was one which she could not evade; nor could she share it with countries other than China herself. Therefore any attempt by China to avail herself of foreign support in resisting Japan would be opposed. [p48541]


On 14 September 1933, in this atmosphere of increasing international tension, HIROTA had become foreign Minister of Japan. While Cabinet and Army were planning and preparing for the new order, he attempted to allay the misgivings of the Western Powers, and to minimise the aggressive nature of his country's national policy. In February 1934 he assured the United States of his firm belief that no problem existed between that country and Japan which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution.

On 25 April 1934, one week after the Amau statement had been published, HIROTA sought to discount its significance. He advised Hull, the American Secretary of State, that the declaration had been made without his approval, and that it had created a false impression. He gave a categorical assurance that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China in derogation of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. Yet his government had already decided to subordinate the "open-door" provisions of that very treaty to the needs of Japanese preparation for war in Manchukuo. [p48542]

Again in April and May 1934, similar assurances were given by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The Ambassador did, however, admit that his government claimed a special interest in preserving peace and order in China; but, in response to Hull's direct questioning, he denied that this phrase signified an over- lordship in the Orient, or even an intention to secure preferential trade rights as rapidly as possible.

By July 1934 no assurances could conceal the fact that a petroleum monopoly was being set up in Manchukuo; and Hull protested against the exclusion of American concerns in violation of Japanese treaty obligations. In August 1934, after Okada had succeeded Saito as Premier, Foreign Minister HIROTA advised Hull that Manchukuo was an independent state, and that Japan had no responsibility in the matter. Although Manchukuo was under the control of the Kwantung Army, and although the development of the petroleum monopoly was a direct result of the Saito Cabinet's "national defence" policy, further communications from the United States failed to elicit any acknowledgment of Japanese responsibility.

The disparity between HIROTA's professions and his country's actions was made even more apparent in December 1934. In that month the Manchurian Affairs [p48543] Bureau was created as an organ of the Japanese government to coordinate its policy in regard to Manchukuo.


While HIROTA denied that Japan's intentions were aggressive, the Army accelerated its preparations for war. In 1935 it took the initiative in preparing for military expansion on the continent of Asia; while the Okada Cabinet, which had taken office on 8 July 1934, gave its support to the Army's economic planning in Manchukuo.

Simultaneously with the creating of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau in December 1934, General MINAMI was appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo. Major-General ITAGAKI became his Vice-Chief-of-Staff.

With ITAGAKI's support, MINAMI made plans to foster the establishment of autonomous governments in Inner Mongolia and in the five provinces of North China. This would inflict a serious loss upon the national government of China, and would at the same time create buffer states between Manchukuo on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other. During May 1935 the North China Army under [p48544] Lieutenant-General UMEZU made a pretext to issue a virtual ultimatum to the Chinese forces in that area; and MINAMI mobilised the Kwantung Army to back up UMEZU's demands. Some units moved into the demilitarised zone of North China; and in June 1935 the Chinese capitulated, moving their armies and administration from the Tientsin area. As KIDO observed in Tokyo, this step against China was based upon the plans of ITAGAKI and others that the military, not the diplomats, should take the lead in dealing with China, as they had done in the case of Manchukuo.

During the same period the Kwantung Army manufactured an incident at Changpeh and Major-General DOHIHARA took charge of the intrigue with prospective puppet rulers, the aim being the formation of new autonomous governments. The Foreign Ministry took no hand in these developments, but HIROTA received full advice of their progress from the Peiping Embassy. On 2 October 1935, he was told that the Army intended to establish a virtually autonomous state for the sake of including North China in the Japanese-Manchukuoan economic bloc, and of promoting national defence. He was also told that the Army's Inner Mongolian scheme was making steady progress, and that DOHIHARA was no doubt engaged in promoting it. [p48545]

According to defence witness Kawabe the Changpeh Incident was settled on 27 June 1935, by the conclusion of the Ching-DOHIHARA agreement. The Army was now in control of local regimes in half of Inner Mongolia, and in substantial portions of the five provinces of North China.

Meanwhile, on 3 July 1935, the Privy Council, in the presence of Foreign Minister HIROTA, had met to consider closer economic cooperation with Manchukuo. The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council reported that, while measures of military diplomacy in Manchukuo were well advanced, no system had yet been devised to coordinate measures in the economic field. Therefore they recommended the conclusion of a pact to establish a Joint Economic Committee, which would provide the necessary machinery. The Privy Council approved the measure, after HIROTA had given an assurance that Japan would always be able to rely upon a preponderance of votes in the Committee; and the new agreement was signed on 15 July 1935.


During the last three months before the Okada Cabinet fell, Army policy and foreign policy under HIROTA were completely coordinated. In December 1935 [p48546] General MINAMI sent troops to aid the local goverment in Inner Mongolia in taking over from the Chinese the remaining portion of that area. General Tada, who on 1 August 1935, had succeeded UMEZU as Commander of the North China Army, made plans to place the railways in that area under his control, so that he might use them to achieve his military objectives.

During that month also the Kwantung Army communicated to the War Ministry its propaganda plan, which would be carried out in conformity with its military activity in North China. As soon as the advance into China proper should take place, a campaign would be launched to convince the whole world of the lawfulness of the Japanese cause. An attempt would also be made, by means of anti-Kuomintang and anti-Communist agitation to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the central authorities. This slogan of "anti-Communism" had been chosen by DOHIHARA, ITAGAKI and others, when the autonomous movement was first launched in 1935.

On 21 January 1936 HIROTA despatched to the Japanese Ambassador in China a precis of the plan which the Army had drawn up for dealing with North China. The Ambassador was instructed that the intention was gradually to build up self- government in the five provinces of North China. The Foreign Ministry was [p48547] determined to give support and guidance to the new political organisation and thus to expand and strengthen its functions. No measures would be taken which the world might understand as indicating a Japanese intention to set up in North China an independent government similar to that of Manchukuo. The various military organisations would be told to keep closely in touch with the Foreign Office and the Navy in carrying out the plans. A provisional organisation to handle the problems of self-government would be established under the Commander of the North China Army.

With this reconciliation between Foreign Ministry and Army the first period of military preparation was complete. The resources of Manchukuo were in course of development. The standing strength of the Army had risen from 250,000 men at the beginning of 1930 to 400,000 at the beginning of 1936. In the second period military planning would involve the whole nation in a general mobilisation for war.


Keisuke Okada, who was Prime Minister of Japan from 8 July 1934 to 8 March 1936, has testified that, during his tenure of office and that of his predecessor Saito, the power of the Army was increasing. Both [p48548] Cabinets, said Okada, had incurred the Army's resentment because it recognised in them an influence opposed to the Army's policy of using force in connection with the expansion of Japanese influence in Asia.

The power and the ruthlessness of "activist" circles within the Army had been evinced in July 1935, when the Inspector-General of Military Education had been forced to resign. In protest against this action, Lieutenant-General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, had been assassinated in his office by an Army officer of field grade. Although Okada, as Prime Minister had felt very strongly about this incident, he had been powerless to investigate the crime. The Army had conducted its own investigation, and had permitted no interference by Premier or Cabinet.

In consequence of this incident, and because he feared further trouble from the militarists, General Hayashi had tendered his resignation as Minister of War; and had been succeeded in that office by General Kawashima, whom all the generals agreed to try to protect. It was realised by the members of the Cabinet that, in accepting the appointment, Kawashima ran a considerable risk. [p48549]


Subsequent events proved that these fears were not without warrant; for, on 26 February 1936, Army resentment against the Okada Cabinet culminated in the attempted assassination of Okada himself by a group of young Army officers. Twenty-two officers and some fourteen hundred men, revolting against the government and seizing its principal administrative offices, terrorised Tokyo for three and a half days. During this period the government was carried on by the Minister of Home Affairs while the Premier war besieged in his residence. The Finance Minister, Takahashi, and Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, were assassinated by the terrorists. Ten days later Okada, being unable to control the military, tendered the resignation of his Cabinet.


During Okada's period of office many steps had been taken to place the Japanese nation in a state of preparation for war. HIROTA, as Foreign Minister, and Nagano, as Japanese delegate to the London Naval [p48550] Conference, played a major part in the policy which led Japan, in December 1934, to declare her intention of abrogating the Washington Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armaments, and to secede from the London Naval Conference in December of the following year. In the Mandated Islands during the same period, air bases and storage facilities were under construction at various points, and elaborate precautions were being taken to prevent foreign travellers from entering the area.

During the year 1935 also, a strict censorship of news had been instituted under the immediate supervision of the Home Ministry; and newspapers had become little more than vehicles for the dissemination of government-approved propaganda. The police had exerted a large measure of censorship and control over all media of expression of public opinion. In August 1935 the War Ministry had issued regulations designed to investigate the conditions of military training in schools and universities, contribute to its developments and to ensure that the potential military value of the qualifications of graduating students was assessed. Despite repeated pretests from the United States, an oil monopoly had been established in Manchuria by the Japanese; and machinery for the exploitation of the natural resources of that country had been provided. [p48551]

Since October 1935 at the latest the Army had taken an active and independent part in Japanese, foreign policy; for in that month the defendant OSHIMA, then Military Attache in Berlin, had begun negotiations for a Japanese-German Pact, and had expressed to Von Ribbentrop the desire of the Japanese Army General Staff for a general treaty between the two countries.

Notwithstanding all of these developments, and although the Kwantung Army had proceeded steadily towards the realisation of its aims in Manchuria and North China, the extremists were not satisfied. The Army regarded the Okada Cabinet as one formed by the Navy in an effort to control the militarists. It did not consider that it was receiving proper support for its policies in North China. By means of assassination and insurrection, the extremists within the Army had cleared from their path, first the more moderate influences within the War Ministry itself, and then the Cabinet, which, though it had provided no substantial resistance to pressure from the militarists, still represented a less violent policy. On 27 February 1936, the very day after the Army insurrection had begun in Tokyo, the Japanese consulate in Amoy, China, let it be known that the purpose of the insurrection was to replace the divided Cabinet by a military Cabinet. They said that the [p48552] young military group intended to take the whole of China at one stroke and to prepare for an immediate war against the Soviet Union so that Japan might be the only power in Asia.

This was the Army's design; and these were the circumstances in which HIROTA's government took office on 9 March 1936. As SHIRATORI had suggested to a friend in November 1935, if neither diplomats nor political parties could suppress the militarists, it was better to support their policy and to endeavour to carry it out.


When the new Cabinet took office on 9 March 1936 all of Okada's ministers were replaced with the sole significant exception of HIROTA himself. He had become Foreign Minister on 14 September 1933 during Saito's premiership, and had held that office for thirty months. As Japanese encroachment upon the continent of Asia continued, he had been required to deal with an increasing volume of protests from other powers whose interests were affected, and particularly from the United States. Although Japanese usurpation of sovereignty upon the continent and the wide- spread violations of the "open door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty had not been rectified, he had contrived to retain in a measure the confidence of the Western Powers. Now, in the moment of [p48553] the Army's ascendancy, when other Cabinet Ministers relinquished office, HIROTA became Prime Minister of Japan. Nagano, who had led the Japanese delegation which seceded from the London Naval Conference in December 1935, became his Navy Minister. Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had commanded the North China Army until 1 August 1935, became Vice-Minister of War. Vice-Admiral SHIMADA remained Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff. Arita replaced HIROTA at the Foreign Ministry; and Baron HIRANUMA, Vice-President of the Privy Council since October 1926, attained the Presidency of that institution.

Under this Cabinet the Army's scheme for a new order in East Asia became the settled policy of the Japanese government.


Two months after the formation of the new Cabinet, a measure was taken which established more securely the power of the Army over successive governments. On 18 May 1936 the new government promulgated an ordinance reviving an old rule that the Navy and War Ministers must be officers on the active list of the rank of Lieutenant-General or above. As events were soon to [p48554] prove, this placed in the hands of the military authorities a weapon which could make or break governments without recourse to the methods of intimidation which had led Okada to resign.


On 11 August 1936, at a conference of Five Ministers attended by Prime Minister HIROTA, Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister Terauchi, Navy Minister Nagano, and Finance Minister Baba, the fundamentals of Japan's national policy were decided. In this statement were set out in the utmost clarity the principles which were to guide Japan, both in her relationships with other nations and in completing her internal preparations for war. We may consider first the contents of the decision itself, and then the process which led to its adoption.


The fundamental principle of national policy was to be the strengthening of Japan, both internally and externally, so that the Japanese Empire would "develop into the stabilisation power, nominal and virtual, in East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind throughout the world." The next sentence left no room for [p48555] doubt as to the nature of the development contemplated. The establishment of the national policy would consist "in securing a steady footing of (the Japanese) empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic still and national defence."

The second part of the statement was devoted to considering the situations which this policy would entail, and the steps which would be taken to meet them. [p48556] In the first place, it was realised that the policy would lead to difficulties with other powers having interests in the Orient. Therefore, Japan would "exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers" and would follow her own policy based on the "co- existence and co-prosperity" principles. This policy was to find more concrete definition a year later in the Five-year Programme of Important Industries. It was then said that industries requisite for national defence would be pushed forward to the Continent as much as possible "according to the principle of right work in the right place," and that Japan "should pick out the most important resources, should ingeniously take the initiative in economic exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources." Such a policy was in open conflict with the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922.

The second principle laid down in August, 1936, was implicit in the first.

"In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safeguard its development so as to acquire the position of the real stabilisation power in East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament."

This statement also was to receive concrete definition in the Army's plans of 1937. [p48557] The third principle made clear the relation of the first two to practical policies. Japan "should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the North, in order to realise a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defence of both Japan and Manchuria." Japan "should also be prepared for Britain and America, attempting at the same time an economic development by the close cooperation of Japan, China and Manchuria." Nevertheless, in achieving her objects, Japan "should always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Power."

The same note of caution was sounded in the fourth and final principle.

"For the furtherance of our plan to achieve the social and economic development of our Empire toward the South Seas, especially in the outer South Seas Islands Areas, we should take a gradual and peaceful measure, always avoiding to stimulate other nations, and try to fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchuria."


In the final portion of the 1936 policy statement, the balance of military and diplomatic function was worked out. Defence armament would be completed. The measure of military strength would be that necessary [p48558] "to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish and employ in the Far East;" and especial attention would be paid to the completion of military strength in Korea and Manchuria so that Japan might "strike a hit at the very outset of the war upon the Russians." Naval armaments would be strengthened to an extent sufficient to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy.

Japan's diplomatic policy would be "to try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner," and the military authorities were charged with the duty of assisting the activities of the diplomatic organ, so that it might act fully and advantageously.

Lastly, internal policy would be determined in accordance with the basic plan. Steps would be taken to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's will to tide over Japan's extraordinary emergency. Measures would be taken to secure their livelihoods, to develop their physical strength, and to "foster sound and healthy minds and ideas." Japanese diplomacy would be revitalised; and her systems of overseas information and publicity would be completed. Drastic progress would be made in air and sea transportation. Administrative and economic agencies would be [p48559] created to advance and further trade and industry essential to the national policy. The establishment of a programme for self-sufficiency in important resources and materials would be expedited.


The statement of basic national policy which the Five Ministers adopted on 11 August 1936 expressed Japan's determination, not only to achieve the domination of East Asis, but also to extend her influence southwards. This expansion to the south would, if possible, be achieved peacefully; but the threat of military strength would be used to ensure diplomatic victories. It was recognised that Japan's designs upon the continent would lead to an almost certain collision with the U.S.S.R., and would also lead inevitable to disputes with other nations having interests in the Orient. Among such powers must be numbered all the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and most notably Great Britain and the United States. It is apparent that Japan's determination to substitute her own principles of "co-existence and co-prosperity" for the "existing military rule policy of the powers" meant merely that the rulers of Japan were bent upon the economic and industrial exploitation of Manchuria and [p48560] the rest of China in violation of Japan's obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty.

It was frankly acknowledged that this policy could succeed only if backed by a vast plan of mobilisation for war. It was agreed that the goal of naval expansion should be a force large enough to secure to Japan the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy; and that the goal of military expansion must be the creation of a fighting machine strong enough to inflict a crushing blow upon the strongest force which the Soviet Union could deploy upon its Eastern borders. It was recognised that these objectives in turn demanded the institution of a comprehensive programme for industrial development and self-sufficiency; and that every phase of the lives of the Japanese people must be so directed and controlled as best to prepare them to play their parts in a period of expected national emergency.


This basic national policy decision, which proved to be the cornerstone in the whole edifice of Japanese preparations for war, originated not with HIROTA's Cabinet as a whole, but in the War and Navy Ministries. On 30 June 1936, War Minister Terauchi [p48561] and Navy Minister Negano agreed in conference upon a draft proposal which corresponded in every material respect with the statement finally adopted by the Conference of Five Ministers on 11 August 1936. There were certain differences in emphasis; and in these cases the blunter wording of the two service ministers served to show more clearly the intentions of the policy-makers. Where the final draft spoke vaguely of securing a steady footing in Asia and developing in the South Seas, the service ministers had stated categorically that Japan's guiding principle must be to realize the spirit of the "Imparial way" by following a consistent policy of overseas expansion.

Upon the same day, 30 June 1936, Terauchi and Nagano laid their plan before HIROTA, Arita and Baba, their colleagues in the Five Ministers Conference. Finance Minister Baba, agreeing that the military rule policy of the Powers should be ousted from the continent of Asia, thought fit to remark that it was essential for Japan herself not to practice a militaristic despotism. Foreign Minister Arita laid stress upon the need, in existing international circumstances, for retaining the good will of Great Britain and the United States; but had otherwise no objections to the draft proposal, the sentiment of [p48562] which he found to be in keeping with his own concept of Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister HIROTA said that he had no fault to find with the proposal; and the meeting adjourned leaving it to the Army or Navy to draw up a detailed plan.

The Five Ministers met again on 7 August 1936, and approved the plan in its final form. Four days later, on 11 August 1936, these decisions were reiterated and embodied in an official statement signed by each of the five ministers concerned.


It may here be noted that, several months before the Five Ministers Conference of June and August 1936, another Army design of major importance had been adopted by HIROTA's government. In October 1935, informal discussions for a Japanese- German alliance had been instituted by OSHIMA, the Military Attache in Berlin, with the approval of the Army General Staff. In the spring of 1936, after HIROTA had become Prime Minister, Ambassador Mushakoji had returned to Berlin; and thenceforward had himself conducted the negotiations. After protracted discussions between von Ribbentrop and Mushakoji, the Anti-Comintern Pact was initialed by them in Berlin on 23 October 1936. On 25 November 1936 the treaty was [p48563] ratified by the Japanese Privy Council.


The transactions of the HIROTA Cabinet, both before and after the redefinition of the basic national policy, accorded closely with the principles set out in that decision. Great strides were being made in consolidating Japanese control of Manchuria and North China. While the Kwantung Army exercised control in Manchuria itself, in Japan the civil authorities were working towards the establishment of a nominally independent satellite state whose national policy Japan would dictate and whose natural resources Japan would be free to exploit. The Japanese-Manchukuoan Treaty, signed on 10 June 1936, marked the virtual attainment of this aim.

Two days later Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, advised a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the impression had been created that Japan sought absolute economic domination, first of East Asia, and then of such other areas as she thought fit. This, said Hull, would in the end mean political and military domination as well.

On 11 August 1936, at the very conference [p48564] which settled the fundamentals of Japanese national policy, the "Second Administrative Policy towards North China" was also approved. Its main purpose was to set up an anti-communistic, pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian area in which Japan would secure materials necessary for her programme of preparations for war, and in which she would also improve transportation facilities in case of war with the Soviet Union.

While the Army on the continent was securing new sources of materials and new avenues of industrial expansion, steps were being taken to develop a new war- supporting economy in Japan. The assassination of Finance minister Takahashi during the February 1936 Army insurrection, and the subsequent formation of HIROTA's Cabinet, marked a turning-point in the financial policy of the Japanese Government. The nation now embarked upon a series of financial measures emphasizing state control of the national economy for political purposes. The new policy was designed to accommodate a sweeping programme of industrial expansion. From this time onwards the government issue of National Loan Bonds was steadily increased to make provision for enormous budget outlays; and little consideration was paid to the principles of sound financing. In January 1937 the transactions involving [p48565] foreign exchange were made subject to government licence, and expenditure of foreign assets was virtually confined to the purchase of commodities essential to the war-supporting industries.

On 29 May 1936, a law was passed for the express purpose of establishing the production of automobiles "in order to adjust the national defence and the nation's industry." Prior to this date the automobile industry was virtually non-existent, nor was it an economically sound proposition. Yet its development under strict governmental control was now fostered with the aid of state subsides and sweeping tax exemptions.

Japan's merchant shipping fleet was also being rapidly increased under government subsidy. The third "scrap and build" programme was inaugurated during HIROTA's term of office. Together with the programme of the previous year, it produced 100,000 new gross tons of shipping, giving Japan at the end of 1936 the most modern merchant fleet, in proportion to size, of any nation in the world.

We will recess now until 1:30 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) [p48566}


The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: (Continuing)


On 20 May 1936, the War Ministry produced that portion of its General Mobilization Plan which dealt with intelligence and propaganda activities before the outbreak of war and during its initial phases. The plan provided that, if war became imminent, an Intelligence Bureau would be created to give effect to the Government's policy of publicity and propaganda. The scope of the activities of this bureau, and the methods of its functioning, were set out in minute detail. Its task would be to guide and to control every form of communication to the public, and to utilize every medium of public expression to promote the policy approved by the government. [p48567]


While HIROTA was Prime Minister, the Navy was not less active than the Army in promoting the national mobilization for war. The two service ministers had acted in conjunction in preparing their statement of basic national policy, and in supporting it before the Conference of Five Ministers. It was, indeed, the Navy Minister, Admiral Nagano, who sponsored the new statement of policy before the conference; and it appears from his remarks that the concrete plan, as finally approved on 11 August 1936, was drafted to the Navy Ministry.

This was the year of the Navy's emancipation from all obligation to limit her naval armaments; for the Washington Treaty expired on 31 December 1936.

With Japan's earlier expansionist schemes the Japanese Navy had had little direct concern. Now for the first time it was assigned a major role, namely, that of securing the command of the Western Pacific Ocean against the United States fleet. The policy of naval expansion to which Japan thus committed herself had commanded a grating volume of support since the year 1930. It is therefore appropriate to the topic of preparations for war to review at this point the steps by which Japan had abandoned the system of [p48568] limitation of naval armaments through international agreement.


The United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy were parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments signed at Washington on 6 February 1922. Articles IV and VII of that treaty had declared respectively the total tonnage of capital ships and of aircraft carriers which might be maintained by each of the signatory powers, the limitation being based upon the defensive needs of the power concerned. In both cases the upper limit for Japan was 60 per centum of that permitted to the United States or Great Britain. A limitation had also been placed upon the calibre of the guns which might be mounted on these and other classes of vessels -- 16" in the case of capital ships and 8" in the case of aircraft carriers. The treaty was not to expire before 31 December 1936, and was to remain in force until the expiration of two years from the giving of notice by one of the contracting powers of intention to terminate it. All the signatory powers were to meet within one year from the giving of such notice.

The United States, Great Britain and Japan, [p48569] together with India and the British dominions, were also parties to the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament signed at London on 22 April 1930. This treaty had not abrogated the Treaty of Washington, but had provided for a further reduction and limitation within the framework of the older treaty. Provision had been made for limitation of the permissible displacement of aircraft carriers and submarines, and of the calibre of the weapons carried by them. Detailed tables had also been provided, setting out the total tonnage of surface vessels, other than capital ships and aircraft carriers, which might be maintained by each of the signatory powers --the limit for Japan being approximately 70 per centum of that permitted for the United States or Great Britain. The third important provision had been that each signatory should communicate to the other signatories certain information upon the laying down and upon the completion of each vessel of war. In addition, the agreement had involved the scrapping of certain capital ships, and this provision had been manifestly favorable to Japan. The provisions as to aircraft carriers were to remain in force for the same period as the Treaty of Washington; but in other respects the treaty was definitely to expire on 31 December 1936. A new conference [p48570] was to be held between the signatory powers during the year 1935.

In evaluating the advantages which the London Treaty offered to Japan, weight must be given to the views of Takarabe, the Navy Minister during 1930. It had, he said, been considered essential for the Navy to have 70 per centum of the strength maintained by the probable potential enemy, and Japan had attempted to maintain this ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference. Finally this aim had been abandoned, and Japan had acceded to a ratio of 60 per centum. She had, however, attained her two other major aims, namely 70 per centum in strength of cruisers with 8" guns, and her present strength in submarines. At the London Conference every effort had been made to gain the third major aim, namely 70 per centum in total tonnage; and this aim had succeeded.

While it was indeed true that the ratio of Japanese to United States cruisers with 8" guns would, under the provisions of the London Treaty, fall from 70 per centum to 60 per centum, there were compensations in the increased ratio of less formidable ships allotted to Japan, Above all, said Takarabe, the treaty was a bid for friendly relations with the United States, and had saved Japan the possible predicament of an armament [p48571] race with that country. The Prime Minister, Hamaguchi, had echoed this sentiment, admitting that some aspects of the agreement were not entirely satisfactory, but pointing out that Japan would in any case be free to build again after 1936.

Although Prime Minister Hamaguchi, his Navy Minister and his Cabinet had championed the treaty, it had not been ratified without considerable opposition. Thirteen stormy sessions of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council had debated the question between 18 August and 26 September 1930. An open rift had developed between Cabinet and Privy Council; and also, it appeared, between Cabinet and the Naval General Staff, of which Nagano was then Vice-Chief. Hamaguchi, when taxed with disregarding the advice of his service chiefs, had answered pacifically that the views of the military had been considered, but that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. As the discussions had progressed it had become more apparent that there was a line of cleavage between those who placed reliance upon friendly international relations, and those who advocated armaments sufficient to confront the United States or any other power intervening in Sino-Japanese affairs with a Japanese preponderance of strength at the scene of conflict. The latter view had been well [p48572] represented by one Councillor who had said that the military system was characteristic of Japan; that the United States would attempt to drive Japanese influence out of China and Mongolia; and that military strength must therefore be supplemented. Japan's importance in the world, two Councillors had said, lay in her military power alone.

On 1 October 1930, the London Treaty had been ratified by the Privy Council, Hamaguchi and Takarabe expressing the views attributed to them above. Great public interest, speculation and unrest had been aroused. HIRANUMA, as Vice- President of the Privy Council, had attended every meeting.


The minority, which had in 1930 opposed the ratification of the London Treaty, in time became a majority; and under the two "navy" Cabinets of Saito and Okada, opposition to the treaty restrictions had gathered strength.

On 15 September 1933, while Saito was Premier, Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington a growing dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed by the London Treaty. Ever since its ratification, he said, and especially during the preceding twelve months, [p48573] Japanese naval leaders had insisted that Japan must demand parity, or at least a great increase in relative tonnage at the Conference to be held in 1935. They had built up a feeling of resentment and contempt for anything connected with the treaty.

The assassinations of Hamaguchi and Inukai and the intimidation of other statesmen were due in part to their defense of it. The retirement of Takarabe and other senior naval officers had been attributed to the support which they had given to the treaty.

Grew emphasized that public opinion in Japan was now bitterly opposed to any form of limitation of armament, and that the new policy of the United States in building towards the treaty limits had served only to incite the feeling aroused. Japanese naval leaders now faced the dilemma of entering with unequal resources upon a naval armament race, or of braving the public opinion which they themselves had fostered.

At this juncture the Saito Cabinet had held office for eighteen months. ARAKI, War Minister in this and the preceding Cabinet, had dealt cautiously with the question, conceding that the Washington and London Treaties had saved public money, and had prevented competitive rearmament and the development of new weapons. He had, nevertheless, made it clear [p48574] that Japan considered the provisions of these treaties outmoded, and that she would demand a change in ratios at the next conference.

The day before Grew's report was written, HIROTA became Foreign Minister of Japan, and a Supreme War Councillor. Just over a year later, on 17 September 1934, HIROTA informed Grew that Japan had definitely decided to give notice before 31 December 1934 of her intention to terminate the Washington Treaty. In the interval the Amau statement had been made and Saito's Cabinet had been replaced by that of Okada.


The London Treaty, 1930, had provided for a meeting of signatories in 1935 to frame a new treaty. In July or August 1933, Vice-Admiral Takahashi, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff under Prime Minister Saito, had said frankly,

"We are going to the Conference in 1935 with a demand for parity. If our demand is rejected, we shall return home."

In October 1934 when Japanese representatives met British and American delegates at London for preliminary discussions, this was the stand they adopted. They were convinced, they said, that a common upper [p48575] limit, within which all powers might build, but which no power might exceed, was the only way in which to secure equality of security. They would favor a limit fixed by agreement at as low a level as possible. In particular, they would favor total abolition or a radical reduction in the strength of aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers with 8" guns. These vessels they regarded as being peculiarly offensive in nature. Submarines, on the other hand, they regarded as essentially defensive weapons, owing to their comparative unseaworthiness and relatively short range. If the provision of the London Treaty prohibiting their use in attacking merchant vessels could be made universal, the offensive character of submarines would, they thought, be ended.

This proposal was designed to enhance Japan's naval power in comparison with that of the United States. In 1933 the United States had inaugurated a new naval policy, building towards, but still keeping considerably below, the limit prescribed by the Washington and London Treaties. The proposal for a general reduction to a relatively low common upper limit would have required the leading naval powers, having navies larger than the limit fixed, to scrap or sink many ships. Therefore, the practical effect [p48576] of the Japanese proposal would have been the sacrifice of a portion of the American fleet, and of the whole of the results achieved by its building program, with no corresponding sacrifice on the part of Japan.

Again, it has already been noted that, under the provisions of the London Treaty, Japan had successfully claimed an increased ratio in total displacement at some expense to her proportionate strength of cruisers with 8" guns. The provisions of the Washington Treaty still operated to keep her comparative strength in capital ships and aircraft carriers at the lower level. Therefore, the three types of naval vessels, the total abolition of which Japan was disposed to recommend, were those in which she was proportionately weakest.

Finally, it was apparent that since 1930 Japan had revised her views concerning the role of submarines. One Privy Councillor, vehemently opposing the ratification of the treaty, had then said that what the United States feared most was submarines; and that, as long as Japan possessed submarines, she had nothing to fear from the United States. Navy Minister Takarabe had made a special point of his government's success in retaining its submarine strength at the existing level. This had constituted one of the three [p48576-a] great principles of Japan's naval policy.

In October 1934 while the London discussions were in progress, the Japanese government had issued an official statement for the guidance of public opinion. It was there stated that Japan's experience with the League had shown that a just claim was not always recognized at an international conference. As the maintenance of Japan's naval strength was the basis of the peace of East Asia, her future depended upon the fortunes of her navy. Therefore the people must be put upon their guard against foreign propaganda. Even if the Japanese claim should not be accepted, and no agreement should be reached, this would not necessarily mean the beginning of a naval construction race; and even should such a race ensue, the authorities were confident that Japan's position could be maintained by independent measures.

The preliminary discussions had terminated on 19 December 1934 without achieving any measure of agreement. On the same day the Japanese Privy Council had unanimously approved the government's decision to abrogate the Washington Treaty, and on 29 December 1934 had given to the United States notice of Japan's intention so to do. An unsuccessful attempt had previously been made to persuade Great Britain to [p48576-b] join in this step, so that Japan might avoid the embarrassment of unilateral action. [p48577]


On 7 December 1935, a naval conference, called in pursuance of the Washington and London Treaties, and attended by the delegates from the five powers signatory to the Washington Treaty, had opened in London. The United States delegation had proposed an all-round quantitative reduction of 20 per centum in each category of naval vessels upon the basis of existing ratios, and had also been prepared to discuss qualitative limitations, particularly limitations in the calibre of weapons. The chief Japanese delegate, Nagano, had in reply reiterated that public opinion in Japan no longer supported the Washington Treaty, and had reaffirmed his country's insistence upon the common upper limit. The American delegation had pointed out that over-all parity would mean overwhelming Japanese superiority in the Pacific, while the existing treaty system provided equality of security for all signatory nations. Therefore the Japanese demands, if persisted in, could lead only to competitive naval construction. The Japanese delegation had made no substantial attempt to answer these objections, saying merely that, in their country's view, while the United States Navy was superior in strength, it menaced Japan's very [p48578] existence.

Despite an American suggestion that the provisions of the Washington Treaty should endure until a new agreement could be reached, and despite British attempts to reach an agreement on qualitative limitations, Japan had insisted that the parity issue must first be determined. Accordingly, on 15 January 1936, the principle of the common upper limit had been discussed in plenary session. As no other delegation had offered any support for the proposal, the Japanese delegation had formally withdrawn from the Conference.

Thus in 1934 and 1935, when Okada was Premier and HIROTA his Foreign Minister, the way had been cleared for naval rearmament. In August 1936, the Conference of Five Ministers had decided upon the creation of a navy sufficiently strong to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States fleet; and, in so doing, had confirmed American fears that the abandonment of the existing treaty system could lead only to competitive naval rearmament.


In December 1936, the month of the expiry of the Washington Treaty, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau was able to report -- in a speech which was not for publication -- that the armaments and materials of [p48579] the Japanese Navy were making rapid progress from day to day. Vice-Admiral Toyoda warned his audience that the new construction programme would involve heavy capital expenditure. Appropriations for this purpose should not, he said, be grudged, although detailed accounts would not be furnished. It would be unprofitable for Japan to let other powers know too early the future building policy of her Navy.

The new programme, which HIROTA's Cabinet had instituted, bore fruit in the following year; for in 1937 the increase in Japanese naval construction figures was the greatest for any year between 1931 and 1945.

But, to secure command of the Western Pacific, the Navy needed bases as well as fighting ships. Japan's Mandated South Seas Islands -- the Mariannas, the Marshalls and the Carolines -- which covered the whole area of the central western Pacific, became, on 20 January 1937, subject to naval administration.


Under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Japan received under Mandate from the League of Nations these three widely-scattered island groups, which she administered through the agency of the South Seas government with headquarters at Palau. [p48580] Under the provisions of the League Covenant there was imposed upon the mandatory the duty of preventing the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases; and by virtue of a treaty signed at Washington on 11 February 1922 relating to Pacific possessions, Japan had undertaken this same obligation in relation to the United States.

The Japanese Mandated Islands were served by the Nippon Yushen Kaisha Steamship Company, which, from the year 1933 onwards, had followed a policy of excluding foreigners from its service to the islands. On 28 March 1933, when the "navy" Cabinet of Saito was in power, this company had advised its Honolulu office that bookings should be refused to foreigners, and that persistent applicants would be given passage only after approval had been secured from the proper authorities in Japan.


There are indications that the building of naval installations in the mandated islands area was begun in 1932 or 1933, and that these beginnings were contemporaneous with the new policy of exclusion of foreigners. By 1935 at the latest, an airstrip and a naval air base were under construction upon the island [p48581] of Saipan in the Mariannas. This island, the largest of the Mariana group, is situated approximately 200 miles northward from the American island of Guam.

During the latter half of 1935, steps were taken to intensify the restrictions placed on foreign travel in the South Seas Islands. The Japanese steamship company on 14 October 1935 again advised its Honolulu branch that every effort was being made not to accept passengers for voyages into this area. In any exceptional case full details concerning the intended passenger should be furnished to the South Seas Islands government, which would reach a decision only after consultation with the Foreign and Navy Ministries. Experience had indicated that in most cases the application would be refused.

Twice more in October and November 1935 these instructions were repeated. It was stipulated that all problems concerning the South Seas line should be handled only by Japanese, and that correspondence should be written only in Japanese. Refusal of bookings would be attributed to poor standards of accommodation and irregularity in sailing times. Approval in any given case would rest with the Navy Minister and with Foreign Minister HIROTA. [p48582]


In June 1936, when HIROTA's government was three months old, the American Secretary of State advised Grew that grave suspicions were entertained as to harbour developments or fortifications in the Mandated Islands. It was pointed out that Japanese vessels had been permitted to visit closed ports in Alaska; and the American Ambassador was instructed to seek permission for a United States destroyer to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands. Grew made the request, as on his own initiative, to HIROTA himself. The Prime Minister professed to be well-disposed, but to have no knowledge of the question. It was later indicated to Grew that a decision rested with the Overseas Affairs and Navy Ministries. No permission was forthcoming, although Japan and the United States had, in 1922, agreed to extend to each other the usual comity in visiting the harbours and waters of their respective mandated islands.

On 28 July 1936, the Japanese steamship company again advised its Honolulu branch that passengers should not be accepted for travel on the South Seas line. Further communications dated 8 April 1937 and 13 March [p48582a] 1939 show that the restrictions imposed were not relaxed in subsequent years.

These facts, taken together, show that, both before and after the national policy decision of 11 August 1936, Japan was making preparations for war in the South Seas area, in breach of her obligations as a mandatory. The Foreign and Navy Ministries were throughout concerned to divert attention from these developments; and in these efforts HIROTA had a full share, both as Foreign Minister and as Premier. [p48583]


On 20 January 1937, while HIROTA's government was still in office, the Privy Council approved a measure permitting naval officers in active service to be appointed as administrative officials of the South Seas government without loss of seniority in the service. HIROTA himself and Navy Minister Nagano were among those who attended the Council meeting over which HIRANUMA presided. In the privacy of the Council meeting the true nature of Japan's interest in the mandated islands was declared. The reasons given for the measure were that the South Seas islands had come to hold an important position in the defence of the Empire; and that, in view of the international situation and of the many installations in the islands concerned with navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation and communications, special attention must be paid to the convenience and military circumstances of the Navy.


It has been seen that the period of HIROTA's premiership, which lasted from 9 March 1936 to 1 February 1937, was one of active planning and preparations for war, which originated with the War and Navy Ministries, and which involved the other principal departments of [p48584] government in the execution of the long-range planning.

Among the most important office-holders at this time was Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who became, on 23 March 1936, Vice-Minister of War. This office he retained during the Premierships of HIROTA, Hayashi and Konoye until 30 May 1938. Under HIROTA, he held, in addition, many subsidiary appointments, which might serve as an index of the Army's interests at that time. He was a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau, and of the Information Bureau. He was a member of the commission appointed to investigate the affairs of the automobile industry, and a member of the Council for Educational Reform. He was in charge of the War Ministry's affairs in the Imperial Diet.

KIMURA, appointed Major-General on 1 August 1936, was Chief of the Control Section of the Mobilization Plans Bureau. On 20 May 1936 his Bureau had produced the mobilization plan for control of public opinion in time of war or emergency. Lieutenant-Colonel MUTO was a staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau until 19 June 1936; and Colonel SUZUKI was attached to that office until 1 August 1936.

ITAGAKI, who was appointed Lieutenant-General on 28 April 1936, had been Vice- Chief-of-Staff of the [p48585] Kwantung Army since 10 December 1934. From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937, he was that Army's Chief-of-Staff, and, in addition, a Member of the Japanese- Manchukuoan Joint Economic Commit too. He was therefore intimately connected with the progress, during HIROTA's term of office, of Japanese military and economic preparations in Manchuria and in the provinces of North China. HOSHINO who, since 1 July 1934, had been a section chief in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo, became, on 9 June 1936, the Vice-Chief of that Ministry.

Vice-Admiral SHIMADA was Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff from 2 December 1935 to 1 December 1937, during which period the Navy had contributed to the national policy decision of August 1936, had achieved control of the mandated islands, and had instituted a new policy of naval expansion. Captain OKA was, until 1 December 1936, a member of the Naval General Staff, and an observer in the Navy Ministry.

During HIROTA's term of office, KAYA was in charge of the affairs of the Finance Ministry in the Diet, and was also a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. On 2 February 1937, when Hayashi replaced HIROTA, KAYA became Vice-Minister of Finance.


In August 1936, a few days after the basis of Japan's national policy had been decided, Colonel HASHIMOTO was placed on the Reserve List. He embarked immediately upon the task of founding a new society, the aims of which he expounded in speeches and in phaphlets during the latter half of 1936.

HASHIMOTO based his doctrines upon the two traditional precepts of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu. For, said HASHIMOTO, the first step in unifying the world was to unify the people of Japan itself directly under the Emperor. To achieve the renovation the blood and enthusiasm of young men were required; and it was the purpose of the Greater Japan Young Men's Society to supply this need. Young men would become the framework of the New Japan, and would unite the entire strength, moral and physical, of the Japanese race in the spirit of Kodo or loyalty to the Emperor.

It has been seen that in the period under review the history of the Army was one of defiance of the civil power. Statesmen and governments had been removed by intimidation, assassination and insurrection when their policies were in conflict with those of the Army. Now in 1936, with HIROTA as Premier, the Army had established a settled ascendancy over a Cabinet in office. HASHIMOTO had taken this process a further step, building for a [p48587] day when there would be one party only, the Army party; and when the rulers of the Army would no longer be encumbered by the forms of democratic government. The immediate goal of totalitarianism was symbolised in the idea of Kodo; the ultimate goal of world domination in the idea of Hakko Ichiu.

And here may be reviewed the steps which had already been taken to prepare the minds of the Japanese people for war and for military rule.


As early as 1886, military training and lectures had been instituted in the elementary, secondary and normal schools of Japan; and after the Japanese-Chinese War of 1896 regular Army officers had conducted the training. After the 1914-18, little attention was paid to the matter for some years; but from 1922 onwards the War Ministry detailed officers to supervise the teaching.

During 1925 and thereafter the War and Education Ministries worked in conjunction to ensure that male students received training. On 23 April 1925, it was ordained that military officers of active service status should be stationed in schools. They would, by agreement between the War and Education Ministries, be posted to teacher's training institutions, to all types of public [p48588] and governmental schools, and, upon request, to private schools. They would be under the supervision and orders of the school authorities; but they themselves remained the servants of the War Ministry, which was given the right to inspect the actual conditions of training in the schools. A year later, in September 1926, the War Ministry organised an inspectorate which was required to furnish reports upon the work being carried out.

In April 1926 the Education Ministry created a new teaching organization designed to cater for youths of seventeen to twenty-one years of age, who had received no formal schooling. The course, which was of four years duration, included subjects of general and vocational value; but one half of the total hours of instruction were specifically set aside for military training. In the month of their foundation, provision was made by the War Ministry for inspection of the military drills carried out at these youth schools.

By the year 1927, military training was compulsory throughout the whole school system; and from 1925 to 1930, the amount of school time devoted to this type of instruction was steadily increased.

In the universities, classes in military subjects were obligatory from the year 1925; though the obligation was not, at first, strictly enforced. [p48589]

Actual military training remained upon a voluntary basis; but, as university students who attended both classes and parades were subsequently exempted from two out of three years of compulsory military service, there was a strong inducement to secure attendance.

Shortly before the Mukden Incident occurred students were taught that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline, upon the control of which depended the establishment of a stable economic order. With the outbreak of war in Manchuria lingering opposition to the military training programme was lost in the new spirit of ultra-nationalism which the military teaching inspired. From 1931 onwards the military instructors, though nominally subordinate to the school and university authorities, achieved an increasing measure of independence and domination.

After the military operations in Manchuria had subsided, time devoted to military subjects decreased a little; but it received a new impetus in 1936, when HIROTA's government was in power. The training consisted of drilling, physical culture and war games. The textbooks used in the schools dealt with Japanese military history, and were designed to foster enthusiasm for the fighting services among the students.


Freedom of the press had always been limited in Japan. The enforcement of censorship under existing laws was a task for the Police Bureau, which was controlled by the Home Ministry. The police enforced the censorship laws in connection with every form of public expression; and they were particularly concerned to control expressions of opinion which were in conflict with governmental policy. All material for speeches and public entertainment was subject to their approval. Any material which was in their opinion objectionable was suppressed; any individual or society which disobeyed their ruling was punished under the provisions of the Preservation of Peace Law of 1925. There was, in addition, a security police organization, created in 1928 to watch over subversive elements of the extreme right and left. From 1931 onwards these "High Police" kept watch on everybody who opposed the policy of the government in power, and on every public expression of opinion. Enforcement of censorship became accentuated before the outbreak of war in Manchuria, and during the same period government-inspired propaganda was disseminated through the newspapers. Beginning in 1930, authors, speakers, and editorial writers were united in a concerted effort to prepare public opinion for war in Manchuria, and, by the end of that year, steps were being taken to suppress all who [p48591] opposed this policy.

From 1931 onwards the Army had exercised an unofficial censorship of its own. Any writer or publisher, whose work was deemed by the Army to be unsatisfactory, received personal visits from Army representatives, who advised him that he had incurred the Army's disfavour. Such threats and warnings were also issued by the various patriotic societies, whose activities have been mentioned in connection with the war in Manchuria.

After the Manchurian war, the government and the Army launched an organised campaign to justify Japan's position on the continent, and to stifle criticism at home. Material dealing with military matters could be printed only after it had been approved by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry. From 1935 onwards the press was completely under the domination of that Ministry.

At the instigation of the Army, and in contemplation of the outbreak of war, the Information Bureau was established by the HIROTA government during 1936. Its task was to coordinate, on behalf of all Ministries, the control of information and the dissemination of propaganda. It provided the government with a ready means for carrying out the 11 August 1936 national policy decision to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's determination to tide over "Japan's" [p48592] extraordinary "emergency."


HASHIMOTO, while engaged in founding his Greater Japan Young Men's Society, was, in all his writings and utterances, preparing Japanese public opinion for war. He advocated, in terms less guarded than those the Five Ministers had used, expansion in the south, and especially in the Netherlands East Indies. He recognized in the British Navy the chief obstacles to his plan; and warned Japan that great resolution would be needed. He extolled the superior qualities of the Japanese race, whose mission it would be to end the tyrannical rule and the oppression of the white race.

Later in 1936, HASHIMOTO published the declaration, which embodied the aims of his new society. In this document, he said that Japan should increase her armaments to the amount absolutely necessary for conquering other countries of different principles that tried to hinder her from achieving the "Imperial Way." The essence of rearmament, he added, should be the realization of an invincible air force. [p48593]


Meanwhile the program of economic and military expansion to which the HIROTA government was now committed had met with a mixed reception, and a struggle had developed between the militarists and their remaining opponents. The Cabinet had incurred, on the one hand, the opposition of the Seiyukai party, which accused it of bureaucratic tendencies, and of undue pandering to the military; and, on the other hand, that of the Army faction, which would now tolerate the expression of no viewpoint other than its own.

On 20 January 1937 a mass meeting of the Seiyukai party published a declaration criticizing the diplomatic and administrative policies of the HIROTA government. They expressed their intention of strengthening parliamentary institutions, and of subjecting all government measures to careful scrutiny. In particular they attacked the militarists, in whom they recognized the qualities of self-complacency and of a superiority complex. They declared that the military wished to interfere in every sphere of state function and said that if this evil were permitted to grow the people's will would be thwarted, constitutional government would become nominal, and the tyranny of a small group would [p48594] be introduced.

This challenge the Army authorities took up immediately in a statement no less extravagant in its terms than those which HASHIMOTO had used. The twin themes of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu formed the basis of their policy.

The political parties were accused of making it their sole business to attack the military authorities, without reflecting upon their own conduct. It was said that their policy could not satisfy the Japanese people, since it would confine them to the islands of Japan. It would mean that Japan could not become the stabilizing force in East Asia. It would be the end of the program of wholesale administrative reform. The statement recommended the abolition of the present state of Parliament, and a return to a form of constitutional government which would clarify the national polity, develop industry, complete national defence, stabilize living conditions, and steadily dispose of important questions.

In short, the Army recognized that everything it had achieved under HIROTA was now at stake. [p48595]


Two days later, on 22 January 1937, the War Minister, Terauchi, resigned from the HIROTA Cabinet saying that the views of some Cabinet members differed fundamentally from those of the Army. In the circumstances he believed it to be absolutely impossible to enforce military discipline, the completion of national defence, and the all-out administrative reform to which he had devoted his utmost efforts since taking office.

The terms of the War Minister's resignation implied clearly that no other general would accept that portfolio in the HIROTA Cabinet; and no time was spent in looking for one. On 24 January 1937, the Imperial Mandate to form a new Cabinet was offered to General Ugaki, who was ultimately forced to decline it. Before doing so he spent at least four days in a determined, but fruitless, attempt to find a War Minister.

By long-established practice the nomination of a new War Minister rested with a triumvirate composed of the outgoing War Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Inspector-General of Military Education. On 25 January 1937 Ugaki called upon General Terauchi, the outgoing War Minister, to nominate his successor. Terauchi told Ugaki that the Army would not [p48596] dare to prevent the formation of a Cabinet by him; but asked him to reconsider his own position in relation to the maintenance and control of the Army. The next day General Sugiyama, Inspector-General of Military Education called upon Ugaki, and after outlining the position in the Army, again tried to dissuade him from attempting the formation of a Cabinet. That afternoon the Triumvirate met, and submitted the names of three generals, each of whom declined appointment as War Minister. The Triumvirate thereupon decided that the other eligible generals would also refuse the position, and Terauchi advised Ugaki accordingly. All this was reported to ex-soldiers' associations by Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, who explained that, as General Ugaki did not command the Army's confidence, it was considered that no one was able, as War Minister in a Ugaki Cabinet, to bear the heavy responsibility of controlling the Army.

Two days later Ugaki had still not given up hope. On 27 January 1937 UMEZU gave a talk commenting upon the deadlock, and expressing the hope that Ugaki would decline the mandate peacefully. This, of necessity Ugaki did; and the Imperial Mandate was thereupon given to General Hayashi. The HIROTA Cabinet resigned on 1 February 1937, and Hayashi took office the following [p48597] day.

The protest of the Seiyukai party on 20 January 1937 against the increasing control of the military men over aspects of the government of Japan was almost the last serious attempt made by a political party in Japan to arrest this pernicious process. It had done no good. It had merely formed the occasion for a demonstration by the military of the fact that without their willing cooperation a cabinet could not continue to exist, nor could a new cabinet be formed. It had demonstrated also that the military now felt strong enough to refuse to cooperate in the government of Japan except with a cabinet which was agreeable to them.


After emerging victoriously from this trial of strength, the Army proceeded steadily with its industrial planning. Hayashi's term of four months as Prime Minister is remarkable for nothing but the steady fruition of the plans the Army had made in 1936. HIROTA himself went out of office; but Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had upheld the Army's standpoint during the Ugaki crisis, remained Vice-Minister of War. KAYA, who under HIROTA had been in charge of the affairs [p48598] of the Finance Ministry in the Diet, now became Vice-Minister of Finance. Vice- Admiral SHIMADA remained as Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff.

Some remnants of the liberalist faction must have remained in positions of influence; for, on 17 March 1937, HASHIMOTO returned to his attack upon politicians. There were in the Imperial Diet, he said, liberalists who stood for the maintenance of the status quo, and who were busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This he characterized as a subtle trick to spread anti-military thought among the people, and to obstruct the military movement for political renovation. From the point of view of national defense, it was, he said, the duty of the military to mix in polities.

Prime Minister Hayashi had, in July 1935 himself been out of favor with the Army; and had then felt obliged to tender his resignation as War Minister. Four months after the crisis which had brought his Cabinet to power, he relinquished office and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Prince Konoye. Again there was no perceptible pause or change in the progress of the Army's planning. UMEZU and SHIMADA again retained their offices HIROTA returned to power as Foreign Minister, the position he had held under Saito and [p48599] Okada until he himself had become Prime Minister. KAYA became Finance Minister, and thus achieved the topmost position of all in the busy field of economic and industrial planning, and of financial controls. Baron HIRANUMA, under both Hayashi and Konoye, continued to preside over the Privy Council.


On 20 February 1937, three weeks after taking office, the Hayashi Cabinet approved a new basic policy for North China, which reiterated and supplemented the Five Ministers' decision of 11 August 1936. It was now declared that Japan's principal aims in administering North China were to establish it as an anti-Soviet buffer state, and to provide a source of materials, particularly for munition industries.

Again during the Hayashi Cabinet's tenure of office, on 16 April 1937, Japanese policy in North China was restated. The new plan, which merely added emphasis to the old, declared that economic infiltration would be achieved by encouraging the investment of both Japanese and Chinese private capital. The availability of such vital mineral resources as iron and coal would thereby be secured. The establishment of communications, sources of electricity, and other industrial aids would [p48600] speedily be completed. Strict precautions would, however, be taken not to arouse unnecessarily the suspicions of foreign powers.


In January 1937 the Kwantung Army drew up a five-year plan for the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo. Ever since the beginning of the war in Manchuria, this Army had steadily been taking control of the public utilities and the financial organs of that country. During the five years from 1931 to 1936 the work of prospecting for raw materials, creating industrial plants and improving the communications system, had gone ahead hand in hand with purely military measures. During 1935 the Japanese-Manchukuoan Joint Economic Committee had been established; and in November of that year the integration of the currencies of the two countries had been achieved through the establishment of the yen bloc. On 10 June 1936, a new treaty had been signed which gave to Japanese subjects all the rights of native citizens in Manchukuo. Special laws were to be passed for their protection. They were given immunity from the local jurisdiction and certain taxation exemptions. [p48601]

The number of Japanese settlers, many of whom were also potential soldiers, increased rapidly, and was then in excess of 390,000. Natives were dispossessed of their holdings to provide good land for the newcomers at nominal purchase prices. In December 1936 the Industrial Bank of Manchukuo had been created to provide easy financing for preferred industries in accordance with Japanese Cabinet policy.

Over all of these developments the military authorities in Japan had exercised control through the agency of the Kwantung Army. Under the terms of the treaty of 10 June 1936, all legislation affecting Japanese subjects required the Kwantung Army Commander's approval; and, in addition, he exercised through his subordinates complete control over the internal administration of the country.

From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937 Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army; and, as the occupant of that position, he was also a member of the Joint Economic Committee. It was his avowed policy to realize in Manchukuo the political and economic conditions required by Japan, to integrate the military planning and preparations of the two countries, and at the same time to promote the prosperity of Manchukuo itself. He exercised in the name of General [p48602] Ueda, the Kwantung Army Commander, full powers over the country's internal affairs.

The position of Director of the Board of General Affairs of Manchukuo was also held by a Japanese. His was the key position in the shaping of internal policies. All appointments were made by his direction, subject to the approval of ITAGAKI as Army Chief of Staff. HOSHINO, who had then had six months' experience as Manchukuoan Vice-Minister of Finance, became Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National Affairs Board on 16 December 1936. He was regarded in Japan as an economic expert, and it was his task to promote the economic development of Manchukuo. In carrying out this duty he maintained a constant liaison with the Commander of the Kwantung Army.


Army planning in 1936 and 1937 was aimed directly at securing and developing the fruits of the Manchurian Incident. The five-year plan was designed to replace haphazard development with a concrete coordinated program. HOSHINO took part in its formulation, working with the representatives of the Finance and other Ministries of Manchukuo. ITAGAKI also took part in the work; and the right of final decision rested with General Ueda, the Commander of the Kwantung Army. On [p48603] 17 February 1937 the Manchukuoan government issued an official report, announcing that, with the inauguration of the new program that country was entering upon a period of epoch-making constructive activity.

So closely did the Manchukuoan plan resemble those which the Army was preparing for Japan itself, that both may be considered as a single program of industrial and economic development.


On 29 May 1937, while the Hayashi government was in power, the first major step was taken towards the achievement of the goals set in the basic policy decision of 11 August 1936. On that date the Army issued a document entitled "The Essentials of a Five-Year Programme of Important Industries.” This plan was designed systematically to promote the activities of important industries generally by 1941, so that by that year Japan, Manchukuo and North China might constitute a single sphere, self-sufficient in important materials. Thus would Japan's position of leadership in East Asia be secured.

Thirteen industries were selected for priority during this five-year period -- munitions, aircraft, automobiles, engineering machinery, iron and steel, [p48604] liquid fuel, coal, general machinery, aluminum, magnesium, electric power and railway rolling-stock. The basis of their selection was their importance in time of war. Separate plans were to be prepared by the Army for the aircraft and munitions industries within the framework of this general program. No radical change would be made in the existing capitalistic system of production; but the progress of the scheme would be secured by financial and price controls, direction of labor at the expense of less important industries, and control of foreign purchases. At the end of the five-year period, progress would be reviewed.


The Five-Year Plan for important Industries stated specifically that the industries selected for expansion would be located both in Japan itself and in Manchukuo, which would be regarded for that purpose as a single sphere. Furthermore, Japan would "ingeniously" (as it was translated) take the initiative in North China, and would make efforts to exploit its natural resources.

The five-year plan for Manchukuo had already shown the use which could be made of the resources of that country. Munitions industries for the production [p48605] of weapons of war, aircraft, automobiles and rolling-stock would be firmly established. Basic major industries, including those of iron, coal, liquid fuel and electric power would be developed. Efforts would be made to increase the quantities of those agricultural products needed as military stores. Railways and harbors would be provided with the facilities necessary for the industrial developments contemplated.

The object of the whole plan would be to open up those Manchurian resources which might be required in time of war; to establish a firm foundation for that country's industrial development; and so to order that development as to create self-sufficiency in Manchukuo, while supplying to Japan those materials which she lacked.


When on 4 June 1937 Konoye replaced Hayashi as Prime Minister there was no break in the continuity of Army planning.

On 10 June 1937 the Army produced a tentative draft of its program for putting into operation the Five-Year Plan for Important Industries. This program followed faithfully the aim of securing self-sufficiency in important material resources by 1941. Each of the [p48606] thirteen nominated industries was separately considered; but certain basic principles were common to the plan for each. Rigorous measures would be adopted to place each industry under the control and constant supervision of the government. Special juridical persons would be created, and systems of licensing would be adopted, as aids to the enforcement of governmental control. Production would be ensured through tax exemptions, through subsidies, and through governmental guarantees of operating losses.

Three weeks later, on 23 June 1937, the War Office produced a third plan entitled "Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials." Whereas the first two plans had dealt generally with the development of the war-supporting industries, the third was concerned with the Army's own role in this program of large-scale expansion. It was designed to coordinate military expansion and control with the achievement of self-sufficiency in the industries necessary to war potential. Certain industries, such as the munitions industry, fell primarily within the orbit of this plan. Others, more remotely connected with the Army's immediate needs, such as the supply of electric power, belonged more appropriately to the sphere of the major industries plan. Yet others, such [p48607] as the automobile, aircraft and machine tool industries, were equally within the orbit of each plan. But all phases of the planning were indisseverably connected.


In these three plans, produced by the Army in May and June 1937, were embodied the principles which the Five Ministers had laid down in the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. The fundamental aim was, in each case, the establishment of a steady footing on the Asiatic continent, and the domination of East Asia through military power.

The Plan for Important Industries, issued on 29 May 1937, and designed to achieve economic self-sufficiency, had as its object a "long-stride development, ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia." The more detailed program which the Army issued on 10 June 1937 had the same end in view. Self-sufficiency was to be achieved by 1941 "in order to be prepared for the epochal development" of Japan's destiny, which would "be attained in spite of all difficulties. In the third plan, which dealt with war materials, these aims were reiterated and amplified. Not only would there be a "speedy epoch-making expansion of war industries by 1941, but also the operation of [p48608] Japan's economy would be made to develop rationally by unifying the handling of affairs by military administration." Special attention would be paid to a speedy conversion from a peacetime to a wartime basis.

During the period in which these War Ministry plans were prepared and published, Lieutenant-General UMEZU was Vice-Minister of War. He had taken office on 23 March 1936, two weeks after HIROTA had become Premier, and three months before the important Five Ministers' conferences of that year. He had played an important part in the Army's refusal to countenance Ugaki as HIROTA's successor. He remained as War Vice-Minister under both Hayashi and Konoye until 30 May 1938.


The Army's 1937 planning was not directed wholly or principally towards the conquest of China. The defence witness Okada maintained that the plans were drawn up in emulation of the Soviet Five-Year plans, and were intended to ensure that Japan's strength compared favorably with that of the Soviet Union. He said that Japan's position was such that she had to take measures to cope with the phenomenal expansion of that country's national and military power.

Nevertheless, the planning was not, as Okada [p48609] maintained, defensive in nature. Both in the plans relating to major industries and in that dealing with the production of war materials, the goal set was the achievement of "national defence power"; and this was to be accompanied by the perfection of Japanese armaments. Ever since June 1933, when war Minister ARAKI had defined the term, "national defence" had signified expansion on the Asiatic continent through force of arms; and in the 1937 plans themselves was expressed unequivocally the Army's intention to achieve that result.

There is, however, no doubt that the Army regarded the Soviet Union as the inevitable enemy of her Asiatic policy. The Military Attache in Moscow had said so in July 1932: Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Army General Staff had repeated it in April 1933. The Kwantung Army had carried out consistently preparations for such a war, and had tested its strength against the Russians in border engagements. "Anticommunism" had been the slogan of Japanese encroachment upon North China and Inner Mongolia. In the basic policy decision of 11 August 1936 the Five Ministers had determined that the measure of military expansion would be that necessary to deal with all the forces which the Soviet Union could mobilize upon her Eastern [p48610] borders. The Anti-Comintern Pact of October 1936 had paved the way for such a conflict.

On 9 June 1937, before the last of the three Army plans had been produced, there was new proof that the Army intended to initiate a war against the Soviet Union. Lieutenant-General TOJO, who had, on 1 March 1937, succeeded ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, considered that this aim should be deferred and advised the Army General Staff accordingly. Taking into consideration the prevailing situation in China and the state of military preparations against the Soviet Union, he was convinced that Japan should first, if her military power permitted it, attack the Chinese national government's forces, which the Japanese regarded as a menace to the Kwantung Army's rear. A month later, when the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, it became apparent that the Army did consider her military power sufficient to permit the taking of such a step.


But the Army's 1937 planning was not exclusively directed against the Soviet Union; for it had long been recognized that, in achieving the conquest of East Asia, Japan would earn the enmity of the Western Powers. Nor [p48611] were her interests confined to the continent of Asia. In 1924 and 1925 Okawa had advocated the occupation of the islands of the East Indies, and had predicted a war between East and West in which Japan would emerge as the champion of the East. In July 1929 he had looked forward to the liberation of the Asiatic peoples, through the expulsion of the white races. Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933 had been heralded by Okawa as emancipation from Anglo-Saxon supremacy; and, in June 1933, ARAKI had told the Japanese people that the whole world, under League leadership, was opposed to the fulfilment of their country's destiny. He had spoken of the critical period ahead, and ever afterwards this had been a theme of the publicists and planners.

By September 1933 Japanese public opinion was bitterly opposed to any form of limitation of armaments through international agreement. In December of the same year the Saito Cabinet had decided that Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty would not be permitted to stand in the way of her aims upon the continent. In 1934 and 1935 Foreign Minister HIROTA had set the precedent for mollifying Western resentment with reassuring statements, while proceeding steadily to encroach upon established Western interests in [p48612] Manchukuo.

This was the policy adopted by the Five Ministers on 11 August 1936. The military rule of the Western Powers would be excluded from the continent; Japan would develop in the South Seas by gradual and peaceful measures, but would at the same time strive to maintain amicable relations with the powers.

Nevertheless, it had not been assumed that the policy of soft replies could do more than delay an open breach with the Western Powers. The Five Ministers had decided that naval armament must be strengthened sufficiently to secure command of the Western Pacific Ocean against the United States. During the same period EASHIMOTO had openly advocated expansion to the south and especially into the Netherlands East Indies. He had seen in the British Navy the chief obstacle to this scheme and had called for further rearmament, the essence of which would be the creation of an invincible air force.

This aim received Army recognition in the War Materials Plan of 23 June 1937, which provided for huge increases in the numbers of military and naval aircraft and designated 1942 as the first year in which required wartime capacity would be achieved.

A week later, on 1 July 1937, HASHIMOTO [p48613] published another article in which he warned the Japanese people that the powers were making desperate efforts to enlarge their air forces. He once more extolled the need for an invincible air force, which might not only be used against the U.S.S.R., but which would also serve as the mainstay of Japanese armaments.

The Army plans of May and June 1937 were similar to the national policy decision of 1936; and the keynote of the planning was that the goal of overseas expansion would be attained in spite of all difficulties. While it was not intended prematurely to provoke the Western powers to war, it was clearly recognized that they constituted such a difficulty. The Army, in its five-year plans, was making timely provision for the day when such difficulties could be resolved only by resort to war.

Meanwhile the Navy, unencumbered either by treaty restrictions or by participation in the Army's continental schemes, was assiduously preparing for war in the Pacific.


The year 1937 saw a large and abrupt increase in every aspect of Japanese naval strength and naval construction figures. Three heavy cruisers and one new [p48614] aircraft carrier were commissioned -- the first new cruisers since 1932 and the first new carrier since 1933. The strength of naval manning rose during the year by more than 25 per centum. Construction was begun upon a new capital ship of unprecedented dimensions and firepower. The total displacement of heavy cruisers, after being for some years relatively static, rose by 25,500 tons. Apart from destroyer strength, which had also been greatly augmented, the most marked increases were

in those very classes of vessels which the Japanese delegates to the London Naval Conference had labeled as peculiarly offensive weapons.

Throughout this period Vice-Admiral SHIMADA was Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. He had taken office under the Okada Cabinet on 2 December 1935, a few days before the London Naval Conference had opened. He held office continuously under three Navy Ministers during the premierships of HIROTA, Hayashi and Konoye until 30 November 1937. During this period Japan had withdrawn from the international agreements for naval disarmament; had planned to create a Navy which would rival the United States Pacific fleet; and had embarked upon a rapid but extensive program of naval construction. During this period also the Navy had been given charge of Japan's mandated South Seas Islands and had, [p48615] under cover of secrecy and in breach of treaty obligations, set about their fortification and equipment as naval bases. Construction of a naval air base on Saipan in the Marianas had been in progress at least since 1935. During 1937 ten-inch guns were imported and stored, and work was commenced under naval direction upon the installation of underground fuel tanks. In 1937 or earlier the work was extended to the Carolines, for in this year an airstrip was being made on Peleliu in the Palau group, and a thousand miles to the eastward military installations were in the course of construction upon the islands of the Truk atoll.


Even after Japan's withdrawal from the London Naval Conference on 15 January 1936, the Western powers had not abandoned hope of mitigating the evils of a naval rearmament race.

The United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had, on 25 March 1936, concluded a new treaty which renewed or preserved in modified form certain of the provisions of the two expiring treaties. The limitation of the calibre of guns mounted on capital ships was, under the provisions of the new treaty, to be reduced from 16" to 14", provided that a general agreement [p48616] to this effect was reached with nonsignatory powers before 1 April 1937. Although it was within Japan's power to make this provision effective, a British request that she do so drew a specific refusal from Hayashi's Foreign Minister.

On 4 June 1937, the day of the formation of Komoye's first Cabinet, the United States, expressing her earnest desire that the limitation should be carried into effect, made a direct appeal to Japan to give the requisite undertaking. It was explained that Japan's answer would determine whether 14" or 16" guns would be mounted upon United States capital ships then under construction. Two weeks later, on 18 June 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA conveyed Japan's refusal to Ambassador Grew and reiterated his country's adherence to the views which the Japanese delegation had expressed in London.

Thus, during the very months in which the Army was producing its large-scale plans for military preparation, new proof was given of Japan's intention to proceed steadily with those warlike preparations, which were directed primarily against the Western powers.


The evidence thus far considered establishes clearly the purposes towards which Japanese preparations for war and Japanese Army planning were directed in 1937. Striking corroboration is afforded by a very full newspaper report of a public address made on 11 March 1942 by Major-General SATO, then Chief of a Section of the Military Affairs Bureau, as an Army Day Commemoration Lecture. Although characterized by the defence as mere wartime propaganda the accuracy of the report was not contested.

"In 1936," said SATO, "our army formulated a national defence plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments and productive power in order to secure and develop the results of the Manchurian Incident. As the expansion of armaments and rearmament by the European powers were to be completed by 1941 or 1942, we anticipated an international crisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it necessary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period 1937 to 1942, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941." [p48618]

There will be occasion again to refer to this speech, for in it SATO reviewed the constancy with which the Army's ultimate purpose was kept in view, and the measure in which its efforts were attended by success. But first must be considered the new machinery which was provided to coordinate and direct Japanese governmental policy and planning during the expected period of economic and industrial expansion.


The Army, in its 1937 five-year plans, subordinated all other considerations to that of attaining “national defence power." A rapid expansion of the war-supporting industries would be achieved; and that expansion would be so planned and guided that the utmost attention would be paid to ease of conversion from a peacetime to a wartime basis. These aims in turn demanded a unification of industrial control under military supervision; but it was recognized that, without the cooperation of the industrialists, such a system would be fruitless.

Accordingly, the Army, in its War Materials Plan of 23 June 1937, aimed to combine the establishment of a new industrial hierarchy, responsible to governmental and Army control, with the maintenance of good [p48619] conditions for both the industrialist and his employees. Hours of work would not be lengthened. New machinery and technique would replace outmoded methods of production. Due regard would be paid to the danger of permitting the industrialist to sustain capital or operating losses. These precautions being taken, an increased measure of control would facilitate the achievement of the military goals of expansion and convertibility.

The specific measures by which it was planned to increase control over industry were all devoted to creating larger industrial units. Guidance would be given to industrial mergers and to the incorporation of enterprises; and a special institution to exercise general control over them would gradually be established. Organic production blocs would be formed linking together groups of inter-dependent producers. Unions of small manufacturers would be organized from a military point of view so that their full productive capacities might be harnessed for wartime purposes.

The 1937 plans did not constitute an altogether new departure in industrial policy, for the first steps had long before been taken. In 1929 a rationalization committee of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry had been formed; and in the following year [p48620] there was created a bureau, which took normal steps to simplify production processes and to eliminate waste. The Major Industries Control Law, passed in 1931, had been the first step towards a planned and controlled economy. Its effect was to increase the power of the great manufacturing interests, compelling smaller operators to group themselves together for self-protection. This tendency of small operators to form guilds or unions had received legislative encouragement in 1931 and again in 1932.

In 1936 more sweeping measures had been taken. An amendment to the Major Industries Control Law had enforced the formation of cartels in heavily capitalized industries. By legalizing agreements, made between producer and manufacturer, the formation of monopolies was encouraged. It the same time a similar development had been instituted among small manufacturers by granting increased banking facilities to guilds.

The 1937 plans were, nevertheless, a landmark. For the first time the planning was on a comprehensive, long-term scale; and for the first time its objects were directly related and subordinated to the requirements of the Army. [p48621]


On 14 May 1937, during Hayashi's premiership and immediately prior to the production of the Army's five-year plans, the Cabinet Planning Board was established. It replaced the Investigation Bureau which had in the past examined matters of national policy. The new board, like its predecessor, was a subdivision of the Cabinet itself, charged with the primary task of facilitating decisions on matters of national policy. Its staff of a hundred and fifty included technical experts, and senior cabinet officials were appointed as its councillors. The Imperial Ordinance creating the Board provided that it should, under the Premier's direction, make recommendations and give pertinent advice in regard to important national policies and their application. Its regular function would be to advise the Prime Minister so that adjustments might be made and conflicts avoided between the various ministries.

The other duties of the Board, which are listed in the Ordinance, indicate the major role it was to play during the period of economic and industrial expansion. It would investigate the policies proposed to the Cabinet by its members and would make appropriate recommendations concerning them. It would evaluate the [p48622] relative importance of the plans proposed by individual departments of government, with a view to their integration and coordination. Its decisions upon these matters would not be made public, but would be tendered in the form of advice to the Prime
Minister. It would also make recommendations concerning budget estimates.

A description of the manner of its functioning was given by the defendant HOSHINO, who, in July 1940, became President of the Board. It made its plans in collaboration with the other government departments, which submitted estimates of their requirements for the coming year. Its major task was to plan the economy of Japan proper; but this necessarily entailed a knowledge of industrial development in those parts of the continent which were under Japanese control, and particularly in Manchukuo. Hence, in the Board's estimates, plans for Manchukuo were included by agreement with the responsible Japanese officials in that country. Above all, it was the Board's duty to see that each ministry should get, as nearly as possible, what it wanted.

On 10 June 1937, a few days after the first Konoye Cabinet had taken office, Foreign Minister HIROTA received the additional appointment of President of the Planning Board.

We will recess now for fifteen minutes. [p48623]

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48624]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.



While Hayashi's government was in power, and before the Army's five-year plans had even been completed, major steps had been taken towards putting into practice the new policy of industrial expansion. During March 1937 a five-year plan was inaugurated to increase the indigenous production of finished steel.

In April 1937 the fourth period of Japan's "scrap and build" shipping replacement programme came into force. Since 1932, Japan had, by provision of subsidies, built approximately forty-eight fast cargo ships, giving her the highest proportion of tonnage, less than five years old, in the world. The new programme provided for subsidised construction of passenger and passenger-cargo liners with minimum specifications for tonnage and speed. The subsidy rate amounted in some cases to one-half of the building cost.

On 1 May 1937 legislative authority had been obtained for the Army's plans in Manchukuo. On that date there was enacted a Manchukuoan law, which gave to the state complete control of all industries, the products of which were deemed to be vital to preparation [p48625] for war.

The planning for Japan itself was not so far advanced. When, on 7 July 1937, the incident at Lukouchiao occurred, consideration of the five-year plans was for a time deferred. In the months which followed the immediate requirements of the war in China absorbed the attention of the Japanese government.

The Army's first plan, outlining the programme for important industries, had been submitted for approval to the first Konoye Cabinet. A brief summary of the Army's detailed programme for putting that plan into action reached President HIROTA of the Planning Board on 13 July 1937, six days after the fighting had begun. The third plan, dealing with the production of munitions, aircraft and other war materials, was produced only two weeks before the war commenced.

This third plan was temporarily abandoned because it was inadequate to meet the Army's needs: and the plans for important industries were altered to ensure production of the greatest possible amount of supplies for military consumption. Under the stimulus of a national emergency, industrial expansion was, between July 1937 and December 1938, developed piecemeal in greater measure than had been planned. [p48626] But, although during this period the Planning Board was required to deal with first things first, the original aim of large-scale planning for war was never lost to sight. Early in 1938 the mobilisation plan was reinstated as an annual measure limited to that year only. The National General Mobilisation Law, passed in February of that year, made it possible for the Japanese government to take far-reaching steps in preparation for war, without first submitting them to the Diet for approval. In June 1938 concern was expressed in governmental circles lest Japan's financial difficulties should imperil the success of the five-year plans.

In January 1939 the Planning Board issued a new and comprehensive programme based upon the experience gained in the intervening eighteen months of war, and setting new targets for the coming years. Basically, this plan, which received the approval of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, was the original programme propounded by the War Ministry in its 1937 planning.


The incident at Lukouchiao was the culmination of the Army's scheme for bringing North China under Japanese rule. In May 1935 KIDO had noted the [p48627] determination of elements within the Kwantung Army that the military should take the lead in dealing with North China, as they had done in the case of Manchukuo. In December of that year the Kwantung Army had despatched to the War Ministry a propaganda plan made in contemplation of that Army's advance into China proper. In the following month HIROTA, as Foreign Minister in the Okada Cabinet, had established the policy of diplomatic cooperation with the soldiery in carrying out the Army's plans for North China. The opening battle of this phase of the war in China, like the Mukden Incident, which had led to the conquest of Manchuria, was planned, instigated and carried out upon the initiative of the Army itself.

Less than a month before the fighting began, Lieutenant-General TOJO had placed the issue of peace or war squarely before the Army General Staff. As Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army he believed that the moment was propitious for an offensive against the Chinese government's forces; and that such a campaign should precede the initiation of a war with the Soviet Union. Whether or not Japanese military strength warranted the taking of such a step was a question of larger strategy to be decided by the General Staff.

The decision was a momentous one, for the [p48628] long-range economic and military planning, upon which the War Ministry was even then engaged, took no account of an immediate embroilment in China. All the factors in this complex situation must have been known to Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who had for the fifteen previous months occupied the position of Vice-Minister of War. The manner in which the first outbreak of fighting was permitted to assume the proportions of a full-scale offensive shows that the Army General Staff had made its election in favour of a war with China.

On the night of 7 July 1937, Japanese garrison troops at Lukouchiao held an unusual manoeuvre; and, alleging that a Japanese soldier was missing, demanded entry into the City of Wanping to conduct a search. Fighting broke out while the Japanese complaint was still under negotiation; and, on the afternoon of 8 July 1937, the Japanese issued an ultimatum for the surrender of the City. In the battle which ensued, the Japanese forces sustained substantial casualties; and, on 10 July 1937, a truce was agreed to upon the proposal of the Japanese commander.

The incident might then have been regarded as closed; but that was not the Japanese intention. Within twenty-four hours of the initial conflict, large [p48629] units of the Kwantung Army began to converge upon the scene of the fighting. Reinforcements having reached North China, new demands were made for the withdrawal of Chinese forces. On 13 July 1937, the Army General Staff decided that, if Chinese troops were sent to North China, resolute steps would be taken to meet the situation. In default of compliance with the new Japanese demands, fighting was resumed at Lukouchiao upon the following day.


Although the Army had chosen the time and place for the attack, war with China was a foreseen consequence of Japanese national policy. In February 1936, while Hayashi was Prime Minister, it had been decided to establish North China as an anti- Soviet buffer state, and to include it in the Japanese-Manchukuoan economic bloc. Now, in the months which followed the first onset at Lukouchiao, government and Army worked together, in the words approved by the Five Ministers on 11 August 1936, to achieve "a steady footing on the Asiatic continent", and "to become the stabilization power in East Asia".

When the first news of fighting was received, the Cabinet had resolved to seek a local settlement [p48630] of the matter; but had not countermanded orders for the movement of further troops to the area. Two days later, on 11 July 1936, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA and KAYA were members, reconsidered the situation which had arisen. Afterwards there was issued an official statement to the effect that the Japanese government, though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, intended to take all necessary measures for despatching troops to that region. Mobilisation within Japan itself was postponed; but units of the Kwantung Army were permitted to continue their advance. Simultaneously steps were taken to send to North China new diplomats and consular officials, who now once more came under the control of Foreign Minister HIROTA. A new Chinese offer to submit the quarrel to negotiation and an American tender of good offices, both of which followed the resumption of fighting, were alike unheeded. Although direct negotiation continued, preparations for an Army mobilisation within Japan went forward uninterruptedly after 17 July 1937, and received specific governmental sanction.

On 26 July 1937, a new Japanese ultimatum led to fighting at Beiping; and on the following day Prime Minister Konoye revealed in the Diet his government's determination to achieve the "new order" in Asia. He [p48631] protested, as other government spokesmen had protested before the conquest of Manchuria, that Japan did not covet Chinese territory. He said, in the language of the advocates of the Greater East Asia Sphere, that all Japan looked for was cooperation and mutual assistance -- a contribution from China to Far Eastern culture and prosperity. He added, more significantly, that he did not consider it sufficient to settle locally existing problems with China. Japan, he declared, must go a step further, and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations.

It was then clear that the Cabinet had reached the same conclusion as the Army General Staff; and that Japan was irrevocably committed to the conquest of China.


It is important to note that this decision was not merely in furtherance of the basic national policy; but that it also added an element which was lacking in the decision of the previous year. The Five Ministers, with HIROTA at their head, had decided that Japan would at all costs expend upon the Asiatic continent. They had realised that this process of expansion would make enemies of the Western Powers, and [p48632] would render war with the Soviet Union almost inescapable. They had recognised that nothing short of mobilisation for war on a national scale over a period of years would enable Japan to meet the consequences of her expansionist programme. But they had not determined at what stage in the programme of preparations it would be expedient to make a new major onslaught upon Chinese territory.

TOJO had assumed the conquest of China would be a minor affair, incidental to the coming trial of strength with the Soviet Union; and later events showed that the Japanese Cabinet also had underrated Chinese powers of resistance. In September 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA was still speaking in terms of a quick punitive blow against the nationalist armies. Furthermore, the whole area of North China was included in the plans for war-supporting economic and industrial development, and was therefore necessary to the success of the national mobilisation itself.

The essence of the decision which Konoye's government made was that the dangers of prematurely intensified international hostility did not outweigh the advantages already enumerated. The very circumstances in which this fighting in China broke but show that the conquest of China was regarded as ancillary [p48633] to the programme of preparation for a greater struggle.


This was, in later years, the view taken by the foremost Japanese publicists, who related the progress made upon the Asiatic continent to the earlier planning of the "new order", and to the principles of Kodo and Hakko Ichiu.

SHIRATORI, in a book published in December 1940, said that the classic phrase of Hakko Ichiu had been adopted as a national slogan to represent this movement, the ultimate object of which would be the establishment of a "new order" in East Asia. The conflict, both in Manchuria and in China, had represented the spirit of the "Imperial Way", and was directed against the democratic viewpoint. He added that the war between Germany and the Western Powers might be said to have arisen from essentially the same conflict.

Yosuke Matsuoka, when Foreign Minister in 1941, gave a similar description of his country's development. He denied, as Konoye and other statesmen had consistently denied, that Japan had desired to acquire new territories or to exploit other countries. He said that the Manchurian Incident was an exultation of the national spirit, which had, in a way, been [p48634] caused through the oppression of Japan's peaceful development by America and the European Powers.

He told his audience that Japanese diplomacy must play an important part in spreading the great spirit of Hakko Ichiu throughout the world. In executing her national policy, Japan would need to remember that she was a divine country which must go forward in accordance with the divine will. This, and no material constraint, had been the reason for the "China Incident".

HASHIMOTO, who published a new book in the same month as SHIRATORI, was even more explicit. He said that the "China Incident" might well be called the opening battle for the construction of a "new world order"; and that the achievement of that order was incompatible with any compromise with Great Britain and the United States. The China War he described as "a grand revelation of national polity".

He urged then, in December 1940, as he had urged in August 1936, that the whole force of the nation should be united in the principle of Kodo, which would make possible the achievement of the goal of world domination or Hakko Ichiu. The crisis of the European War would, he said, be turned into a golden opportunity, enabling Japan to lead the world to a "new world order". [p48635]


During the latter months of 1937 the war in China increased steadily both in scale and in intensity. Foreign policy statements were made in accordance with the Kwantung Army's plan for conducting, simultaneously with the advance into China, a propaganda campaign to convince the whole world of the lawfulness of Japan's actions.

On 1 September 1937, Horinouchi, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a radio address, in which he insisted that Japan had no wish to acquire Chinese territory; and that she desired merely the realisation of conditions permitting genuine cooperation between the two countries.

Four days later, on 5 September 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA developed the same theme in reviewing foreign policy in the Diet. He said that the basic policy of the Japanese government was aimed at stabilising relations between Japan, China and Manchukuo for their common prosperity and well-being. China, ignoring Japan's true motives, had mobilised vast armies, which Japan could not do otherwise than counter by force of arms. In self-defence and in the cause of rightcousness, Japan was deterwined to deal a decisive [p48636] blow to China, so that that country might reflect upon the error of its ways, and so that the Chinese armies might lose their will to fight.

A month later, however, on 6 October 1937, the League of Nations decided that Japan's military operations against China were out of all proportion to the incident which had occasioned the conflict; and could be justified, neither under existing treaty rights, nor upon the ground of self-defence.

Meanwhile HIROTA followed the principle laid down in the national policy decision, which stipulated that Japan, while attempting to maintain amicable relations with the Western Powers, would let nothing stand in the way of her schemes for expansion upon the Asiatic continent. On 29 July 1937, two days after Konoye had stated his cabinet's policy towards China, HIROTA advised the budget committee that he did not expect interference from third powers in regard to the China dispute. He assured the committee that, if any such proposal should emanate from a third power, the government would not hesitate to give a firm refusal.

On 10 August 1937, Ambassador Grow conveyed to HIROTA a new tender of good offices by the United States; and only then did HIROTA acknowledge Secretary [p48637] Hull's first pronouncement of 16 July 1937. In the reply, delivered to Hull on 13 August 1937, it was stated that, while the Japanese cabinet concurred in the principles which Hull had enunciated, for the maintenance of world peace, it believed that the object of those principles could be obtained in the Far East only by giving consideration to the particular circumstances of that region.

On 25 September 1937, HIROTA replied in similar terms to an invitation to participate in the work of the League of Nations Advisory Committee, which was then investigating the situation in China. He said that the Japanese Cabinet was convinced that an equitable and practical solution of their difficulties could be found only by China and Japan themselves.

The resolution of the League Assemby on 6 October 1937, showed the extent of the international resentment which Japanese activities in China had aroused. It was then resolved that the member states would refrain from taking any action which might weaken China's position, and that each should consider what steps it might take to offer her positive aid.

It was also agreed that, pursuant to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, a conference of the powers signatory to that treaty should be hold [p48638] to consider the situation of difficulty which had arisen in China. The United States expressed general concurrence in these findings and resolutions. [p48639]


During October 1937, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA, KAYA, and KIDO were now members, refused an invitation to attend the Nine-Power Conference, which was to be held in Brussels. The Cabinet, in conveying this decision, alleged that Japanese action in China was of a defensive nature, and expressed great resentment at the unfriendly findings and resolutions of the League Assembly. In the cabinet's view, the solution of the conflict lay in Chinese realisation of the need for cooperation with Japan; and only by comprehending this need could other nations contribute effectively towards the stabilisation of the Far East.

Whatever justification Japan might plead for her actions in China, her refusal frankly to discuss the situation was inconsistent with her obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. It was, however, wholly consistent with earlier pronouncements; for violation and repudiation of treaty obligations had long formed part of the general scheme of preparations for war.

Japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933 had been precipitated by just such an adverse finding [p48640] on that occasion in relation to the Manchurian Incident. In giving notice to the League of her intention to withdraw, Japan had changed that body with failure to grasp the realities of the Far Eastern situation, thus detracting from the stabilisation of East Asia. Her spokesmen had said that Japan could no longer cooperate with an organisation, the majority of the members of which "had attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of ensuring peace."

During the same year, the Navy Minister in the Saito Cabinet had been invited to expound the Japanese attitude toward the naval limitation treaties. In doing so, he stressed Japan's dissatisfaction with the existing ratios, and said that, if changes in the international situation should occur,

"there is no reason why a nation should remain forever content with a treaty which it had once signed. Only out of regard for the welfare of humanity, we signed the London Naval Treaty, but we did not do it unconditionally. As regards the Washington Agreement, it was signed twelve years ago and in our opinion is no longer adequate to guarantee the security of this empire, as the international situation has thoroughly altered in that period of time." [p48641]

When preliminary discussions for a naval disarmament conference were hold in London in 1934, the Okada Cabinet issued a statement for the guidance of public opinion at home.

"Japan," they said, "who resigned from the League of Nations with regard to the Manchurian Incident, experienced the fact that a just claim is not always recognized at an international conference."

Japan, it was added, would have nothing to fear, even though the agreement should not be concluded. In the following year, 1935, non-recognition of her "just claims" caused Japan to abandon the system of limitation of armament by international agreement. In 1937, the first year after the treaties expired, the Japanese programme of naval preparations for war took definite shape.

During December 1934, Sir John Simon had pointed out to Matsudaira, the Japanese delegate to the preliminary naval conference, that Great Britain, as a party to the Nine-Power Treaty, had rights and obligations in respect of China; and had asked what the Japanese policy was to be in regard to the independence of that country. No satisfactory or clear-cut reply was received. But in the 1936 policy decision and in the Army's 1937 five-year planning, the position was clarified. Japan would secure a steady footing of her Empire on the continent, [p48642] and would "ingeniously" exploit the resources of North China. The war in China was a consequence of that policy.


During the latter half of 1937, many facets of Japanese policy and planning were exemplified in the measures concerning Manchukuo. Steps were taken to develop the resources of that country and to promote the establishment of heavy industries. These measures were in general accordance with the Army's five-year planning, and involved the creation of larger industrial units, responsive to governmental control.

This policy in turn gave rise to further violations of the rights of the Western Powers under the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. While Japan exercised complete control over the development of Manchukuoan industry, some deference was still paid to the fiction that the two countries were entirely independent of each other; for, by this device, Japan might disclaim responsibility for the broken treaty obligations of which the Western Powers complained.

On 3 August 1937, the two governments concluded an agreement to establish, under their dual control, a joint stock company. Its objects were to promote Japanese immigration into Manchukuo, and to develop the [p48643] lands of that country.

On 22 October 1937, three days before Foreign Minister HIROTA ceased to hold the additional appointment of President of the Planning Board, the Cabinet met to consider new industrial measures for Manchukuo. Finance Minister KAYA and Education Minister KIDO were then among its members. The Cabinet was agreed that the situation in which Japan found herself demanded, in particular, the urgent expansion of heavy industries; and that, to achieve this result in Manchukuo, new measures of industrial control were necessary. It was decided that the two governments, acting in conjunction, should promote a new national policy company, which would establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo. Special attention would be given to the use of substitutes as raw materials. The Manchukuoan government would supply half the capital required; and the remainder would be subscribed privately. The management of the new venture would be entrusted to the most suitable Japanese civilian; and the products of the new enterprise would be treated in Japan as though they were not of foreign origin.

In Manchukuo itself, HOSHINO, who had held in succession the positions of Vice- Minister of Finance and Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National [p48644] Affairs Board, became, on 1 July 1937, the head of that board. As Chief of General Affairs of Manchukuo, all industries were under his control; and, as a Manchukuoan member of the Joint Economic Committee, his was the vote which enabled Japan to carry all decisions. HOSHINO used there large powers to place Japanese in charge of all industries, and to exclude the people of Manchuria from business enterprises.

On 1 December 1937, pursuant to an agreement made in the previous month, Japan released her extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. This measure, which had been contemplated in the Japanese-Manchukuoan Treaty of 10 June 1936, was used by the Japanese-dominated Manchukuoan government as a device for insisting that all foreign firms in that country be subjected to its jurisdiction. An immediate protest was made to Japan by the United States concerning this action, which constituted a violation of the rights secured by the "open door" provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty.


On 25 October 1937, the Planning Board was reorganized; and thereafter, HIROTA, whose office as President was abolished, was free to devote his whole attention to the conduct of foreign affairs. But, prior [p48645] to that date and immediately following the outbreak of war in China, measures were taken to promote within Japan itself the development of the war-supporting industries, and to make the Japanese economy subservient to the needs of war. Though the war in China undoubtedly prompted the measures taken, and determined their relative priorities, they were of that long-range character which the Army had planned.

An assured supply of oil and petroleum was the most crucial need of all, for Japan was itself able to supply only 10 per centum of normal civiliar needs. By building up a steadily increasing reserve of oil and oil products substantial provision had been made for such a contingency as a short war in China; but the Army, in its 1937 planning, had decided, in the interests of self-sufficiency, to develop a synthetic industry under government subsidy. New national policy companies were to be created to promote the production of synthetic petroleum.

During August 1937, the month after hostilities were renewed in China, legislation was passed giving effect to these long-range plans. It was decided to advance the production of synthetic petroleum, using coal as the raw material. New national policy companies, under governmental guidance and control, were [p48646] established to develop and finance the industry; and provision was made for a system of licensing, tax exemptions and governmental subsidies.

Japan was also poor in indigenous supplies of iron, and was therefore deficient in iron and steel industries. Since 1933, the industry had been under governmental control, and in the decade before 1937, local production had been trebled, but, in March 1937, while Hayashi's Cabinet was in office, new plans had been made setting increased production goals. On 12 August 1937, a new law was passed, giving effect to the Army's plans for the iron and steel industries, and designed to double local production within a five-year period. To encourage the production of these and other strategic materials, large subsidies were paid; and special encouragement was given to those industrialists who manufactured parts essential to the growing shipbuilding industry.

In its detailed plan of 10 June 1937, the Army had also stipulated that the government should strive completely to equip all railways, harbours and roads. On 1 October 1937, legislation was passed for the creation of a new and heavily capitalised national policy company, which would develop and control all transportation facilities within Japan. [p48647] But, even at this stage in the China War, long-range industrial preparations were not confined to measures affecting the specific industries and utilities most vital to the war effort. As in Manchukuo, so in Japan itself, effect was given to the Army's plan for regimenting heavy industry into larger units, more susceptible of governmental control. The Major Industries Control Law, passed in August 1937, encouraged the formation by industrial groups of new associations or cartels, which were given wide powers of self-government.


The Army, which had planned these things in its detailed programme of 10 June 1937, had also foreseen that they must be achieved in conjunction with a planned and regulated economy, which would require far-reaching measures of trade and financial control. The measures requisite to achieve this end had been set out at length and in detail; and had ended with this exordium:

"The success or failure of this programme is doubtless solely dependent upon the government's consistent and firm guidance under the national policy. The government should support various industries with all possible means from the standpoint of strengthening the nation's power, and it is especially of vital necessity that measures for financial aid should be [p48648] taken by the government."

The estimated amount of government assistance required for the war-supporting industries rose from 57 million yen in the remaining months of 1937 to 338 million yen in 1941. Much of the responsibility for the success of economic and industrial preparations for war therefore rested with Finance Minister KAYA. [p48649]

In August 1937, the month most productive of industrial legislation, special measures were passed to stimulate the production of gold as a means of acquiring foreign exchange; and the government took power to control the disposition of all gold reserves.

In this same month a first measure of import licensing was taken; and in the following month a more comprehensive measure was passed to adjust the balance of trade.

Under this law of September 1937, passed as a temporary expedient but never repealed, the government assumed complete control of imports, their selection, distribution and utilisation. These powers the Planning Board exercised through government-controlled export and import associations, one to each essential industry.

Restrictive legislation of this type was not entirely new, for Japan's exports had seldom been sufficient to pay for her imports; and on these she was dependent for her economic livelihood and position as an industrial nation. The rising tide of her programme of industrialisation, and the virtual extinction of her foreign credit since the time of the Manchurian Incident, had led to the adoption of a succession of measures for trade and financial control. Laws relating to foreign exchange control were passed [p48650] in 1932 and 1933. The Foreign Exchange Control Law, passed in March 1933, had given the cabinet wide powers to control and canalise all foreign exchange transactions.

These powers, however, had not been completely invoked until January 1937, when all exchange transactions involving more than thirty thousand yen per month were made subject to government license. By December 1937, the position had so far deteriorated that the exemption level stood at one hundred yen per month.

Under the Temporary Fund adjustment Law of 10 September 1937, complete authority over Japan's finances was centralised in the Bank of Japan, and made subject to the overriding discretion of Finance Minister KAYA.


Although the drastic financial controls imposed in 1937 were occasioned in part by the large subsidies paid in that year to encourage the development of the war- supporting industries, these were small in comparison with the demands made upon the national exchequer by appropriations for the Army and Navy. Ordinarily the budget of each Ministry was [p48651] comprised of a general account and a special account; but in 1937 a third account was set up to meet expenditure directly entailed by the war in China. This "War Expenditure Account," although originally a temporary measure occasioned by the emergency in China, was never closed. Total expenditure upon the Army alone rose from rather more than 500 million yen in 1936 to nearly 2,750 million yen in 1937.

This large expenditure had made possible an enormous increase in Japanese military strength. The League's Advisory Committee, in its report of 6 October 1937, found that Japan had not ceased to intensify her action; and that she was employing larger and larger forces, and more and more powerful armaments. The standing strength of the Army rose from 450,000 men on 1 January 1937, to 950,000 men on 1 January 1938. The Army, which had initiated the hostilities in North China, in part, upon Lieutenant-General TOJO's advice, still regarded them as a preliminary to the coming struggle with the U.S.S.R. While the fighting raged in China, TOJO, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, made other plans in preparation for an attack upon

the Soviet Union; and, in December 1937, he transmitted them to Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War. In the following month TOJO [p48652] suggested to UMEZU, and obtained, the passage of a regulation which increased the strength of the Kwantung Army; and, on 24 January 1938, General Ueda, then in command of that army, advised War Minister Sugiyama of the contribution which North China should make to the preparation for "the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia."


More important than the purely military preparations of 1937, was the degree in which the Army had achieved the realization of its broader scheme to mobilise the entire strength of the Japanese nation for war. By electing to renew the war in China the Army had undertaken a new commitment, the magnitude of which it had not fully realised. It had thereby interrupted the smooth progress of its long-range planning for the Japanese nation. But, on the other hand, in the first six months of war, the Army had seen its major schemes adopted by government and nation with a readiness scarcely possible of attainment in time of peace.

Already the basic steps to secure a planned and regimented war-supporting economy had been taken [p48653] both in Manchukuo and in Japan itself. Even the Navy, whose armaments were steadily increasing, had been brought to play an active part in the Army's all- embracing purpose.

In August 1937, when the Army attacked Shanghai, it was supported by a force of some thirty naval vessels, despatched to the scene by order of the Cabinet. Later in the same month, the Navy proclaimed a blockade of the China coast, with the object of preventing supplies from reaching Chinese troops.

In December 1937, a new step was taken to bring Chinese territory within the "co- prosperity sphere." In that month the Japanese established at Peiping, a new provisional Chinese government, one of the avowed purposes of which was to exploit the industries of the area it governed. A publicity organisation, created for the purpose of bolstering the new regime, was placed under the control of the Japanese military forces in North China. The Kwantung Army expected from this occupied area a contribution towards its preparations for war with the Soviet Union.


Major-General SATO, when Chief of a Section of the Military Affairs Bureau in March
1942, had [p48654] occasion to survey broadly the developments with which we had been dealing. In a speech, to which reference has already been made, he corroborated the conclusions which other evidence has established.

SATO pointed out that the Lukouchiao Incident, which revived the war in China, occurred during the first year of the Five-Year Plan for the Expansion of Productive Fower.

"What worried us most," he said, "was the fear that this incident might cause the breakdown of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five-Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident would not end in a war of attrition on our side. Accordingly, generally speaking, we spent 40 per cent of our budget on the Chinese Incident and 60 per cent on armament expansion. In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20 per cent on the Chinese Incident and 80 per cent on the expansion of armaments. As a result, the air force and mechanised units have bean greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese Army has been increased to more than three times what it was before the Chinese Incident. I believe that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China affair, must have perfected and expanded it fighting power. Of course, productive [p48655] power of the munition industry has been expanded seven or eight fold at a rough estimate."

This was a topic on which SATO could claim to speak with some authority, for from 24 June 1937 to 29 July 1938, he had been first an investigator, and then Secretary, of the Planning Board. During the same period he had served as a special member of the China Affair General Mobilisation Business Affairs Committee, and as a section staff member of the War Ministry's Bureau of Military Affairs. He had been released from his staff appointments in December 1938. In March 1941, he had assumed such important posts as Commissioner dealing with the affairs of the war Ministry in the Diet; secretary of the Liaison Committee of the Asia Developmant Board; and Secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Board. These and similar appointments he still held at the time he made this speech.


During this same period steps were taken which tended to increase the Army's influence over the cabinet, and to make effective its long-range planning. On 15 October 1937 there was created, as a temporary measure, a Cabinet Advisory Council, whose task it was [p48656] to render expert advice upon matters arising out of the "China Incident." The twelve members of this body, who were each accorded the privileges of a Minister of State, would represent the three principal aspects of the national mobilisation for war. Businessmen would join with military men and politicians in advising the cabinet, and in participating in the Cabinet's deliberations. Matsuoka and General ARAKI were appointed as Cabinet Councillors on the day of the Council's inception.

As Japan became more deeply embroiled in the war with China, members of Konoye's Cabinet discussed the setting up of Imperial General Headquarters. This was an organisation which functioned only in time of war or serious incident; and there was some debate as to whether the undeclared and unacknowledged war then being fought in China warranted its institution. On 3 November 1937 War Minister Sugiyama and Education Minister KIDO discussed the question in relation to the saving of the situation which then existed. On 19 November 1937, the Cabinet, of which HIROTA, KAYA, and KIDO were then members gave consideration to the matter; and, on the following day, Imperial General Headquarters was established.

It was a composite body, representative of the [p48657] Army and Navy Ministries and General Staffs. The Army and Navy Sections met separately in their own General Staff Offices; but, once or twice a week, joint sessions were held at the Imperial Palace. These joint meetings were concerned with questions of tactics and strategy. Questions of administrative policy were matters for the Cabinet to decide with the assistance of its Advisory Council; but Imperial General Headquarters was charged with the direction of military operations.

This was a sphere in which secrecy was held to be essential and in which the Cabinet was to have no part. Imperial General Headquarters was responsible only to the Emperor; and its staff members, while acting in that capacity, were under the direct control, not of the War and Navy Ministers, but of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.

There is little evidence to indicate the importance of the part played by Imperial General Headquarters in the events of subsequent years. It was a poorly coordinated body, which tended to resolve itself into the Army and Navy Sections of which it was composed. But, by its very establishment, the armed force were given the opportunity to make important decisions on military matters without the approval, or even the [p48658] knowledge, of the Cabinet of the day.

More important still was the power over Japan's finances; which the Army gained through the institution of the War Expenditure Account. Disbursements from that account might be made upon the authorisation of the War, Navy, or Finance Minister; and, in the years which followed, such disbursements were made, not only upon the authorisation of KAYA and his successors in the Finance Ministry, but also upon those of War Ministers ITAGAKI, HATA, and TOJO, and of Navy Minister SHIMADA.


As the Five Ministers had acknowledged in their national policy decision of 11 August 1936, their plans depended, in the last resort, upon the Japanese people's will to achieve its' "destiny," They had then decided that internal policies must be made to subserve the national plan of expansion; and that, therefore, steps would be taken "to lead and unify public opinion at home, and to strengthen the will of the people to tide over the extraordinary emergency of our country." On 20 May 1936, before that decision was made, the Army had issued a mobilisation plan which [p48659] described in detail the measures required to direct and control public opinion at the outbreak of war. Each ministry would establish its own intelligence and propaganda organs in every part of Japan. In the same year, a Bureau of Information had been created to centralise and coordinate the dissemination of propaganda by the various departments of government.

In September 1937, two months after the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, this body was reconstituted as a bureau of the Cabinet itself. Lieutenant-General

UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, became, on 25 September 1937, a member of the new Cabinet Information Bureau, upon which devolved the task of carrying out the Army's mobilisation plan for information and propaganda.

A more immediate result of the outbreak of war was the intensification of existing measures of censorship. The High Police, who watched over the activities of all who criticised the policy of the Japanese Government, now permitted no one to express opposition to the war in China. It became one of the principal functions of the Home Ministry to suppress such criticism; and the regular police force, which was under that ministry's control, saw that this policy was enforced. Anyone who spoke publicly and in a [p48660] critical vein of the Cabinet's policy was detained and interrogated. Persons found to have opposed it were arrested and imprisoned.

Nowhere was the control of public opinion better exemplified than in the schools and universities of Japan. Professors and teachers were expected to cooperate whole- heartedly in propagating the policy of the Cabinet. Expressions of thought in favour of the ideals of peace, or in opposition to the policy of preparations for war, were rigorously suppressed.

When, on 22 October 1937, KIDO became Minister of Education, he lent himself immediately to the enforcement of these measures of control. Teachers, whose attitude towards the national policy appeared to be critical, were either dismissed or forced to resign. Often they were arrested and charged under the Public Peace Law upon suspicion of being opposed to the political structure of the Empire of Japan. The facility with which these oppressive measures were carried out affords an indication of the success which had attended the efforts of soldiers, statesmen and publicists to prepare Japanese public opinion for war. The dismissal or forced resignation of these teachers raised no domestic issue at the time, for the general public looked upon them as isolated [p48661] sympathisers with liberalism.


Even before the Lukouchiao Incident had occurred, the Army, through its military instructors, had taken control of military teaching and training in the schools; and, after the fighting recommended in China, this control became so absolute that the military instructors dictated the manner in which the schools should be conducted. The Education Ministry well understood that teaching must subserve the government's aims; for, in May 1937 it issued to teachers, students and the public at large, a book entitled "The Fundamentals of National Polity".

In this year also the Educational Council was established to study and investigate the Japanese school system. It was to pursue its studies without regard to changes of Cabinet and to consider the manner in which the national qualities of the Japanese people might be enhanced. Although it was not created for the specific purpose of promoting military training and teaching in schools, that became its task when the China far broke out. The Educational Council's recommendations for [p48662] comprehensive changes in school curricula and in teaching methods did not become effective until 1940; but in 1937 the Council adopted as its fundamental aim the promotion of the cause of service to the country.

With KIDO's appointment as Education Minister on 22 October 1937, the reorganisation of the Japanese school system began to take effect. After 1937 teaching was designed to promote the warlike feeling of the nation. In the subjects of the ordinary school course, as well as in those periods set aside for purely military training, the spirit of Kodo, or ultra-nationalism, was instilled into school children. They were taught that Japan was strong, and that she must show to the world her special characteristics. In universities as well as in schools military training and academic teaching were both used to inculcate a spirit of militarism, until the idea of regarding Japan as supreme had permeated the whole nation. War was represented as glorious, productive, and necessary to Japan's future.


Luring the latter half of 1937, Foreign Minister HIROTA had striven unsuccessfully to gain German support for the conquest of China, representing that conflict, both to his own people and to the Germans, [p48663] as a struggle against Communism. Although, on 6 November 1937, the Privy Council had ratified a new treaty admitting Italy as third partner in the Anti-Comintern alliance, German disapproval of Japan's activities in China remained undiminished. Germany had important interests in China and considered the Kuomintang as a potential ally in her anti-Soviet policy. She had therefore elected to ignore the existence of hostilities and to regard herself as not bound by the rules of strict neutrality because neither China nor Japan had declared war.

In November 1937, the Konoye Cabinet was oppressed by problems arising out of the lengthening war in China. In spite of huge expenditure in materials and manpower, the war continued to assume greater proportions, and there was now no prospect of a speedy victory. The acute strain placed upon the nation's economy was giving rise to grove financial difficulties. The Mine-Power Conference, then meeting at Brussels, served only as a reminder that Japan was friendless among the nations. On 3 November 1937 War Minister Sugiyama and Education Minister KIDO discussed the manner in which the situation might be saved. [p48664]

The Japanese Army was, like the Germans, preoccupied with the coming war against the Soviet Union. So great did the embarrassment of the China War become, that the Army General staff sought German intervention to bring the fighting to a close. Major- General OSHIMA, military attache in Berlin, was instructed to use his influence to this end,

When, on 15 November 1937, Prime Minister Konoye told KIDO that he was thinking of tendering his Cabinet's resignation, KIDO was quick to see the repercussions which this development might entail. He thought that it would affect adversely financial and other circles, and that the rate of exchange would fall. This, in turn, would prejudice the outcome of the war in China. KIDO considered that an unsettled political situation at home and the changing of the war in China into a defensive operation were each possible results of a Cabinet resignation. He saw that, in either event, the unfriendly attitude of foreign countries, which, he acknowledged, "had

finally turned serious", would be strengthened. Such a development should be avoided at all costs.

On 16 November 1937, KIDO urged these views upon Konoye, and asked him to retain his office; and this for the present Konoye agreed to do. Four days [p48665] later, by establishing Imperial General Headquarters, the Cabinet displayed a new resolution in the prosecution of the China War.


But, in this same month of November 1937, there was an opportunity, had the Cabinet so desired, of bringing the war in China to an end. So unsatisfactory had Japan's position become, that even the Army General Staff had abandoned hope of a speedy victory. Under pressure of German disapproval, and through German intermediaries, Foreign Minister HIROTA presented, on 5 November 1937, the first of three peace offers to the Chinese. The negotiations thus begun continued through December 1937 and into January 1938; but HIROTA's vague and changing demands provided no basis for a concrete agreement. While the negotiations were proceeding, the Japanese continued their offensive in China with vigour.

By January the Cabinet had strengthened its opposition to any compromise peace. On 11 January 1938, an Imperial Conference, called to determine the disposition of the "China Incident", decided that, if the Kuomintang would not yield to Japan's demands, it must be crushed, or merged into a new, central regime. [p48666]

To the last of Japan's three peace offers the Chinese returned a conciliatory answer, asking that the Japanese proposal be stated more specifically. HIROTA, at whose instigation the proposals had been put forward in a very indefinite form, and who now feared that the Chinese might gain support from Great Britain and the United States, reacted angrily. On 14 January 1938, he told the German intermediaries that China was beaten, and must give a speedy reply. He emphasized that Japan would not permit the matter to because the subject of international discussion or mediation. The Germans, in reporting to their own government, made it clear that, in their opinion, Japan was not acting with candour.

On this same day, 14 January 1938, it was decided at a Cabinet Conference which Konoye, HIROTA and KIDO attended, that Japan would have no further dealings with the national government and would negotiate only with a new Chinese Government, the establishment of which was expected. This was not an empty expectation, for already, on 1 January 1938, the Japanese had inaugurated with some ceremony a new local government at Nanking. In an official statement, issued on 16 January 1938, the Japanese Cabinet reiterated its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity [p48667] of China, but this, now, had reference to a Chinese Government of Japan's creating. The same statement promised respect for the rights and interests of other powers in that country.

On 22 January 1938, both Konoye and HIROTA echoed these assurances in the Diet, while reaffirming once more that the Japanese Cabinet held fast to the principles set forth in the 1936 national policy decision.

"It is scarcely necessary for me to say", said Prime Minister Konoye on this occasion, "that Japan's immutable national policy aims at building the edifice of permanent peace for East Asia on the unshakable foundation of close cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and to contribute thereby to the cause of world peace."

He added that the end of the conflict was still far ahead; and that Japan's mission as the stabilizing force of East Asia was greater than ever.

Five days later the real design of exploitation and armed domination was once more revealed. On 27 January 1938, the Cabinet decided that the Japanese-sponsored Nanking regime should form the nucleus of a Central China Provisional Government. It was to be "a highly pro-Japanese regime", which would gradually free itself from dependence upon [p48668] Great Britain and the United States. Its naval and air forces would be included in Japan's defence plan. It would "smoothly amalgamate" with the existing puppet government of North China.

On 26 January 1938, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, being now convinced that Japan would conquer China, urged his Cabinet to accept the fait accompli. Ambassador TOGO in Berlin had offered to the Germans the additional allurement of economic participation in the new China which Japan was building, after this date Germany withdrew her support of China, and her opposition to Japan's designs upon that country. On 20 February 1938, Chancellor Hitler took the long-delayed steps of announcing German recognition of the state of Manchukuo, and his own preference for a Japanese victory in China.

In the space of two months, and in the face of the Premier's despondency, KIDO and HIROTA had succeeded in committing Japan once more to the pursuit of that "steady footing in the Eastern continent", which was to be achieved in spite of all difficulties.


In the opening months of 1938, while the Cabinet formed a new resolve to complete the conquest [p48669] of China, the Army continued to make preparations for war with the soviet Union. In December 1937, Lieutenant-General TOJO, as Chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, had communicated to UMEZU, the War Vice-Minister, a plan for meteorological installations in Inner Mongolia in preparation for a war with the U.S.S.R. On 12 January 1938, TOJO urged upon Lieutenant-General UMEZU the need for the speedy completion of this work, which he considered to be of vital importance in regard both to the "China Incident" and to anti-Soviet strategy. At the same time he referred to UMEZU, for decision, the question of extending the enlistment of soldiers serving with units in Manchukuo; and, on 29 January 1938, UMEZU informed him that such action would be taken. On 11 February 1938, TOJO sent to UMEZU the Kwantung Army's plan for the erection of anti-Soviet fortifications during the years 1938 and 1939.

The Army did not, however, confine its attention to purely military planning and preparation. The leaders of the Kwantung Army, standing upon the fringe of the fighting in China, regarded that conflict, and every other aspect of Japan's domestic and foreign policies, as so many factors to be considered in relation to the approaching struggle with the Soviet Union. [p48670] While TOJO and UMEZU settled the detailed military planning, General Ueda, then in command of the Kwantung Army, addressed his attention to a question of broader strategy. On 24 January 1938, he communicated to War Minister Sugiyama, his views upon the manner in which North China should be developed so that its people might best be made "to contribute to the preparation for the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia."

Measures taken during the same period for the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo and of the occupied provinces of North China were closely related to the Kwantung Army's planning. Until 20 December 1937, the promotion of all heavy industries in Manchukuo had been governed by the South Manchurian Railway Company -- the first of the great "national policy" companies. Under Matsuoka, it continued after that date to play an important part in the Kwantung Army's preparations for war, cooperating not only in the enforcement of domestic policies, but also in the Army's operational and other preparations for war with the Soviet Union.

But the South Manchurian Railway Company could not meet the additional strain of financing strategic developments in North China; and, on 20 December 1937, a new holding company was created by Manchukuoan [p48671] Ordinance. In this new "Manchurian Industry Development Corporation", set up pursuant to an agreement between the Japanese and Manchukuoan governments, was centered the control of industries in Manchukuo. The Manchukuoan General Affairs Board, under HOSHINO, assisted in drafting the laws which governed it, and which placed it under governmental supervision. The new corporation was established early in 1938.

After February 1938, when Manchukuo was accorded German recognition, the Army made plans to foster closer relations between that state and Germany. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, and a treaty of amity was signed. On 15 May 1938 TOJO expressed to the Army General Staff the Kwantung Army's wish that Manchukuo should, as soon as possible, become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. On 24 May 1938 UMEZU replied to the effect that the Japanese Cabinet would offer no objections, but desired to preserve the fiction of Manchukuoan independence. It was thought bost that the Manchukuoan government should take the first step, acting as if of its own volition, and requesting Japanese assistance. [p48672}


Meanwhile, in the areas of China which the Japanese had subdued, Japan's "new order" was in process of building. After the fall of Nanking in December 1937 various Japanese-controlled local governments were set up; and, on 28 March 1938, a new government for Central China was established upon the Manchukuoan pattern. The nominally independent "Renovation Government of the Republic of China" was bound by its constitution to exploit the resources of the areas it governed, and to promote their industrial development. It would also take anti-Communist measures, but would strive to maintain friendly foreign relations. As in the case of North China, a new propaganda society was formed to support the puppet government.

The official "Tokyo Gazette" proclaimed the inauguration of a new phase in Japanese relations with China, significant because it marked the progress made towards the goal of Hakko Ichiu. It was declared that the ideal of "the whole world as one family" had always constituted the basis of Japan's domestic and foreign policies; and that it explained the policy now adopted [p48673] towards China.

The article followed closely the tenor of the policy statements which Konoye and HIROTA had made before the Diet. Japan's first aim had been to deal China "a punishing blow", in the hope that she would abandon her anti-Japanese attitude. In January 1938 the Japanese Cabinet had expressed its irrevocable determination to have no further dealings with the Kuomintang, and to assist in development new governments in North and Central China. The ultimate purpose of Japan's present action, the article continued, was to eliminate all those causes of friction which imperiled the peace and security of East Asia. Thus would the countries of the Far East be enabled to enjoy among themselves "the ideals of co-existence and common prosperity."

In this manner Japan acquired a new field for the production of war materials and the expansion of war-supporting industries. On 8 April 1938, a new Japanese-financed company was promoted to develop and exploit the iron ore deposits of the Yangtse Valley.

On 30 April 1938, the two new "national policy" companies were created to serve the same purpose in China as similar companies had done in Manchukuo. [p48674] The North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were established to promote the development of heavy industries in the subjugated areas of China. Half the capital of each company was subscribed by the Japanese government; and Lieutenant-General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, was appointed as a member of the organizing committee of each. Konoye considered that the work of these two companies was vital, both to Japan's military operations, and to her political activities, upon the continent.

We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until 0930, Friday, 5 November 1948.)


Friday, 5 November 1943


Court House of the Tribunal

War Ministry Building

Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appemances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) [p48676]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that, they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.

I continue the reading of the Judgment of the Tribunal:


These developments in China reflected the policy of Foreign Minister HIROTA, who adhered steadfastly to the goal of the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. While the Army was obsessed with the prospect of a coming war with the Soviet Union, and looked to Germany as an ally, HIROTA took a broader and more cautious view. He aimed at the achievement of expansion on the continent and, at the same time at the completion of Japan's preparations for whatever conflicts that expansion might ultimately entail.

On 29 May 1938 HIROTA left the Foreign Ministry; but at some earlier date he laid down the principle which would govern German and Italian participation in the economic development of North China. The prime and [p48677] unchanging goal was the establishment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia; and relations, both with the Axis and with the Western powers, would be governed, not by professions made or pledges given, but solely by the criterion of expediency.

Ambassador TOGO in Berlin was instructed to solicit German assistance. He would propose that, in return for German recognition of Japan's special position in East Asia, Japan would endeavor to place Germany in a position not inferior to that occupied by other countries. Where possible, German interests would be preferred to those of other powers. In principle, Germany and Japan would occupy equal positions in the Chinese market -- though, in certain respects, a special position might accrue to Japan as the power actually responsible for the maintenance of the Chinese currency system. Nevertheless, in setting up any import and export control system, Germany's interests would certainly be preferred to those of any third power.

HIROTA, therefore, did not intend to respect the treaty rights of the Western powers, or to honor his assurances that they would be preserved. He was, however, careful to warn his subordinates that Germany and Italy could not be allowed a preferred position, equal or even inferior to that occupied by Japan, if [p48678] the preference given should threaten to out off entirely the future participation of Great Britain and the United States in the economic development of China. Therefore the modes prescribed for German participation were virtually limited to those most advantageous to Japan herself -- namely, the supply of capital, and of machinery upon credit, with provision for a sharing in the management of particular enterprises.


Despite this policy of duplicity, Foreign Minister HIROTA did not achieve the secondary aim of maintaining amicable relations with the western powers. In the latter months of 1937 Japanese statesmen had continued to deny that their country harbored any designs upon Chinese territory. The Cabinet had given repeated assurances that foreigners and foreign property would be protected, and that foreign treaty rights would be preserved. But, so great had been the discrepancy between these professions and the nature of Japan's activities upon the Asiatic continent that the rift between Japan and the Western powers had become perceptibly greater.

Nevertheless, efforts had still been made to allay Western suspicion and resentment and to discount the significance of Japan's association with the Axis. [p48679] In December 1937 it was proclaimed in the "Tokyo Gazette" that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not directed against any particular nation. The Cabinet complained that the pact had been misconstrued and subjected to unfair criticism.

During this period the conduct of the Japanese armies in China had served only to magnify Japan's estrangement from the West. In spite of frequent protests and renewed assurances, attacks continued to be made upon British and American citizens and property in China. So little did the Army value friendship with the Western powers that, in December 1937, an unprovoked attack was made upon their naval forces. A United States gunboat upon the River Yangtse was fired upon and sunk. Attacks were made upon a British gunboat and on British merchant ships. These acts of provocation were carried out by local military commanders and notably by Colonel HASHIMOTO, in pursuance of definite orders to attack all vessels proceeding in the vicinity of Nanking, regardless of their nationality.

In their policy speeches, made before the Diet on 22 January 1938, both Konoye and HIROTA again stressed Japan's desire to cultivate friendly relations with the Western powers; and HIROTA gave yet another categorical assurance that the rights and interests of those powers [p48680] in China would be respected to the fullest extent. Yet, during the first six months of 1938, in spite of continued representations made to HIROTA by the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, units of the Japanese Army committed frequent and wanton violations of American rights and interests in China.

This display of hostility cost Japan heavily, for on 11 June 1938 the United States placed a moral embargo upon the export to Japan of aircraft and other weapons of war.

HIROTA had been more astute than the military leaders. He had seen the value of Western assistance during the period of Japan's preparation for war; and he had therefore striven to gain it through false assurances and false professions of friendship. But, at the same time, Japan was making ready for war in the Pacific; and in the promotion of this aspect of his country's warlike preparations, HIROTA was playing a prominent part.


Under the veil of secrecy maintained by the Foreign and Navy Ministries, Japan continued during 1938 to prepare for war in the Pacific, by fortifying and provisioning as air and naval bases her mandated [p48681] South Seas Islands. Until 1937 these preparations had been virtually confined to the islands of the Marianas and western Carolines; but in that year, under naval supervision, construction activity was extended eastward across the Pacific to the Truk atoll. In 1938 work begin among the islands of the Marshall group, which, lying in mid-Pacific, constituted Japan's most advanced base for war with the Western Powers. From this time onward the task of constructing and fortifying airstrips in the Marshalls was pushed ahead with considerable urgency. The work, now proceeding secretly, and in breach of treaty obligation, throughout the whole of the widely- scattered mandated islands area, was consistent with no other purpose than preparation for a war in the Pacific, waged against some or all of the Western Powers.

In view of Japan's withdrawal from international agreements for naval disarmament, the United States had in 1936 embarked upon an extensive program of naval construction. Although in 1938 Japan maintained her own huge program launched in the previous year, her naval construction rate was soon outmatched by that of the United States. From 1939 onwards American construction figures were substantially greater than those of the Japanese. [p48682] This naval rearmament race was not of America's choosing. United States delegates to the London Naval Conference of 1935 had warned the Japanese that it would be the outcome of a failure to agree. The new treaty signed in 1936 between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had left the way open for Japanese
participation; but again in 1937 Japan had refused to agree to any terms except those which would give her a preponderance of naval power in the Pacific. In February 1938 the Konoye Cabinet declined a last American invitation to forestall competitive naval rearmament.


One result of the 1936 Treaty, in which Japan did not participate, had been the renewal of those provisions of the Washington Treaty which determined maximum permitted displacements for capital ships and cruisers, and limited the calibre of the guns which might be mounted upon each. This provision was, however, made subject to a right of escalation in the face of uncontrolled building by a nonsignatory power. On 4 November 1937 the Japanese had laid the keel of the "Yamato," a 64,000 ton capital ship designed to mount 18" guns. In February 1938 persistent rumours of {48,683] building by Japan, in excess of the 1936 Treaty limits, were causing concern in the United States. That country therefore brought the question to Japan's notice, explaining that, if satisfactory evidence of Japanese adherence to the treaty limits were not forthcoming, she must exercise the right of escalation which the treaty gave her. If, however, Japan had elected to exceed the limits set by other naval powers in 1936, the United States would, upon receipt of information as to the Japanese construction program, be prepared to discuss a new limitation as between herself and Japan.

This overture was met by a point blank refusal either to negotiate or to give information. On 12 February 1938, Foreign Minister HIROTA made the government's reply.

“Japan”, he said, “had no intention of possessing an armament which would menace other countries. Although his government was unable to comply with the American request for information, it saw no reason why the United States should conclude that Japan contemplated a naval construction program in excess of the limits prescribed by the 1936 Treaty.”

Within two weeks of this communication being sent, the keel of a second 64,000-ton capital ship was laid in Japan. [p48684]


In this dealing with the United States, HIROTA's policy as Foreign Minister is plainly revealed. The national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had decreed that Japan "should also be prepared for Britain and America"; and that her naval armaments would be strengthened to an extent sufficient to secure the command of the Western Pacific against the United States Navy. To that decision in which he had participated as Premier, HIROTA was, as ever, faithful. As in regard to Japanese aims in China, so in regard to Japan's naval construction program, he did not scruple to resort to deception in order to achieve his purpose. It was a cardinal principle of his policy to have Japan's preparations for war completed behind the facade of friendly foreign relationships.

Each essential feature of HIROTA's foreign policy is to be found in that basic national policy decision, the text of which the Army and Navy had prepared. It was therein declared that Japan, while consolidating her position in Manchukuo, should strive to complete her national strength. It would be her aim to exclude from the continent “the Military Rule Policy of the Powers," and to establish her own order based [p48685] "on the co-existence and coprosperity principle." Yet Japan "would try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner," and "would always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers."

Above all, HIROTA had been true to the basic aim of "securing a steady footing in the Eastern continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence." When Prime Minister Konoye had wavered in his resolution to complete the conquest of China, HIROTA had rallied the Cabinet to the pursuit of that unchanging goal.


The month of January 1938 had marked the reinstatement of the Army's long-range economic and industrial planning for in that month the Planning Board produced and secured Cabinet acceptance of a new program of industrial development and economic control, limited in duration to the year 1938.

After its reorganization in October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board's close association with the Army had been maintained. On 26 November 1937 Lieutenant- General UMEZU, Vice-Minister of War, was appointed a [p48686] Councillor of the Board; and Lieutenant-Colonel SATO, then a section staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau, became its Secretary. The Board's plan for 1938 related both to the development of the war-supporting industries and to the regulation of the supply and demand of essential materials.

In January 1938 the Konoye Cabinet's newfound resolve to complete the conquest of China, while continuing to make preparations for other wars, placed an additional strain upon Finance Minister KAYA. The Army's demand for manpower and materials was absorbing both the products of Japanese industry and the men who produced them. Expenditure entailed by war and by war-supporting industrial development was rapidly increasing. In the result Japan was experiencing great difficulty in acquiring foreign exchange with which to finance the imports that she needed.

The progress being made in securing and developing the natural resources of Manchukuo and of the occupied areas of China would serve in some degree to alleviate dependence upon importation from other countries. The development of synthetic industries was a second partial remedy. But these projects in turn demanded increased expenditure and continued reliance upon importation during the period of their development. [p48687]

The Planning Board's program which the Cabinet adopted on 18 January 1938 curtailed drastically Japan's import quota for the year. It made necessary a reduction in the importation not only of normal domestic supplies but even of those commodities considered requisite to preparations for war. New measures of economic and financial control were therefore demanded.

The remedy which the Cabinet adopted was designed to lessen the financial burdens of the Japanese people at the expense of those subject peoples whose territories Japan was exploiting. It was not a new development. Japan had long dominated the economies of Formosa and Korea through the Banks of Taiwan and Chosen respectively through the ownership of the vast majority of the companies doing business in those countries and through political control. The same methods had been used in Manchukuo. The Industrial Bank of Manchuria, established in December 1936 to secure funds for industrial development, had been authorized to issue debentures up to fifteen times its paid up capital. The facilities afforded by this Japanese-controlled bank had provided easy financing for the development of war- supporting industries in Manchukuo.

Now the Konoye Cabinet planned a similar development in China. In February 1938 the "Federal [p48688] Reserve Bank of China" was established upon the same pattern as the Manchurian Bank. The Governor and Vice-Governor of the new bank were nominated by the Japanese Government and the directorate was predominantly Japanese. The sphere of operation was North China, and in that area the currency which the new bank issued became the only legal tender. The Federal Reserve Bank of China was designed to stabilize the currency system, and to control the money market. Through such devices as the extension of preferred credits and the manipulation of foreign exchange, it greatly facilitated the economic and industrial exploitation of North China, and provided an instrument for carrying out the Japanese Government's industrial planning in that area.

Those industrial plans were already being put into effect; and the new war-supporting industries which the Japanese promoted were themselves of importance in establishing Japan's control of the North Chinese economy. In Manchukuo, industrial domination had been achieved through the device of the "national policy company," created by special legislation. Now, in the first six months of 1938 Japan was, by the same device, steadily acquiring control of the industries of occupied China.

The Federal Reserve Bank of China began to do [p48689] business in March 1938. In the same month the "yen bloc," which since November 1935 had included Japan and Manchukuo, was extended to include North China. By this means the way was paved for Japanese investment and for the exploitation of Chinese industries.

To maintain the value of Japanese currency, the practice of using Bank of Japan notes in occupied territories was discontinued. While the Federal Reserve Bank of China provided a new currency for North China, in Central and in South China worthless military script became the only permitted legal tender. Thus did Japan, while garnering the resources of the continent, bolster her own war-supporting economy at the expense of the peoples whose territories she had occupied. By September 1938 the practice of using Bank of Japan notes, backed by specie, had been discontinued in all the continental territories under Japanese domination.

Thus, also, was Finance Minister KAYA's control over the Japanese economy consolidated. Since September 1937 he had exercised through the Bank of Japan complete control over Japan's finances. The funds of that bank were now no longer liable to uncontrolled dissipation in Japanese ventures on the continent of Asia. Thus protected, they were available to support new measures, taken in the first four months of 1938, [p48690] to develop, under government subsidies and control, the war-supporting industries of Japan herself.


Notwithstanding its financial embarrassments, the Konoye Cabinet was determined to secure Japan's self-sufficiency in the materials of war, at whatever cost that process might entail. The Planning Board's interim program for 1938 had included a plan for the mobilization of commodities; and in the first four months of that year new measures were taken to promote and develop the war-supporting industries within Japan. Each such new measure had the effect of increasing the government's control over industrial development; and each had its counterpart in the Army's five-year plans of 1937. In every case, the government, by assuming an increased financial burden, planned to secure a rapid expansion of one or more of those industries which the Army had designated as vital to preparations for war.

The first steps taken were designed to safeguard and develop the synthetic petroleum industry, which had been created in the latter half of 1937. The Army, in its five-year planning, had decided to enforce a decisive subsidizing policy for this industry, so that Japan might reduce her dependence upon importation. A [p48691] special company would ensure the manufacture of the machinery which the new industry required; and in the meantime, industrial plants would be imported from Germany. Great emphasis would be placed upon the production of diesel oil and aviation spirit, Manchukuoan coal resources would be used in the development of the artificial industry. The search for substitute fuels would be stimulated, and the country would be prospected for further hidden resources. A new company would be established to secure an ample supply of funds and to foster the development of the uneconomic infant industry.

After the revival of the China war, no time had been lost in giving effect to these plans; and in January 1938 a new and heavily capitalized company was created by legislation to control the production of synthetic petroleum, and to provide a vehicle for government financing. It was just such a company as the Army had planned.

In March 1938 under a law designed to promote the exploitation of all mineral deposits, the government took power to control prospecting, to stimulate it by subsidies, and even to enter into the prospecting business on its own account.

In the same month, upon the Planning Board's advice, a system of rationing was introduced to limit [p48692] the amount of petroleum made available for civilian use; and, subsequently, a new national policy company was created to stimulate the production of substitute fuels. So great was the importance attached to the maintenance of oil and petroleum reserves that the government subsidized, through this new company, experimentation in the production and use of less efficient substitute fuels.

Although the quantity imported was smaller than in 1937, and despite the demands of the war in China, Japan's reserves of oil and petroleum continued to increase throughout the year 1938.


March and April 1938 were months of industrial legislation, through which the Army's plans were realized. The new industrial hierarchy, dependent upon state support and responsive to Cabinet control, became an established feature of the Japanese system of government. The Cabinet by placing each industry under the ultimate control of one or other of its Ministers assumed an increased measure of responsibility for the guidance of the nation's mobilization for war.

The electric power industry was among the first to be affected. This industry was vital to Japan's preparations for war because upon its expansion and coordination depended the development of other war-supporting [p48693] industries. The Army had therefore singled it out for inclusion in its 1937 plans and had accorded it a special priority in its program for the industrialization, of Manchukuo. The Army had envisaged a new national policy company which would, under governmental supervision, control the production of electric power in Japan and would promote its development in the manner needed to meet military requirements. To this plan effect was given in the Electric Power Control Law of March 1938. Until this time the production and supply of electric power had been in the hands of numerous undertakings; but, under the new law, all major companies were required to transfer control of their plant to one newly-constituted national policy company. The new company was placed under the government's direct control, and was accorded all the usual privileges of tax exemptions, subsidies and governmental guarantees. In March 1938 also legislation was passed to direct and stimulate production of aircraft which the Army had placed first in importance among the materials of war. Under the new law some aircraft production plants were placed under the direct control of the government and all were required to be licensed by the state. The usual steps were taken to relieve the industry of financial worries and so to ensure its [p48694] rapid expansion.

But the development of the aircraft industry was in turn dependent upon an increased supply of aluminum, for over 70 per centum of Japanese aircraft and aircraft parts were made of that metal. The 1937 five-year plans had therefore placed stress upon the development of the light metal industries. They were to be encouraged by the cheap supply of electric power and by increasing the scope of public demand for their product. The new industries were to be capable of quick conversion in time of war to the production of aircraft and aircraft parts.

Until 1932 there had been no aluminum industry in Japan; but its output, appreciable in 1936, had been doubled in the following year. On 28 April 1938, a new light metal manufacturing law was passed with the avowed object of contributing "towards the adjustment of national defence." It instituted the now familiar system of taxation and import duty exemptions, subsidies, and guarantees. All persons engaged in the industry were required to be licensed; and the government assumed control both of the technique of production and of the selection of the commodities to be produced. Thus the goal of wartime convertibility was kept in view.

During March 1938 there was one other new law [p48695] of major importance; and this has already been mentioned in connection with the petroleum industry. The Act for the Promotion of Production of Important Minerals, passed in that month, placed nearly all mining operations under the direct control of the government. Production was demanded under threat of expropriation, and subsidies were provided to sustain the losses incurred through uneconomic industrial development. This law, which affected the iron, steel, coal, petroleum and light metal industries, brought many submarginal producers into the field, and involved heavy governmental expenditure. That Japan at a moment of economic crisis should embark upon such a measure affords the clearest proof that the Cabinet was determined to subordinate every other consideration to that of achieving national preparedness for war.


This flood of new legislation had not been enacted without political incident. In February 1938 the Konoye Cabinet, strengthened in its resolve both to subdue China and to complete Japan's preparations for other wars, faced renewed opposition in the legislature. One group within the Diet was calling for the Cabinet's enforce resignation. Another group had focused upon the [p48696] electric power bill their opposition to the Cabinet's program of industrial legislation. This faction commanded the support of the industrialists themselves who, believing that Japan would not be long at war, were concerned lest the Cabinet's projected measures of uneconomic industrial expansion should involve them in ultimate loss. A third group within the Diet accused the Cabinet of half-heartedness in carrying out the Army's plans. In these circumstances, the whole program of mobilization for war was placed in jeopardy. Enormous quantities of materials were being used, and there was no immediate prospect of their replacement. The Army at this very moment was settling its plans and completing its military preparations for an early war with the Soviet Union. Well-knowing that the period of war would be a long one, the leaders of the Army were resolute in their determination that further stocks of war materials should be accumulated, even while the fighting in China continued.

During the period of nearly two years since HIHOTA's Cabinet had taken office, the Army had planned and promoted every aspect of the national mobilization for war. Lieutenant-General UMEZU, who, throughout this time, had occupied the position of War Vice-Minister, was now in even closer touch with the Progress of the [p48697] Army's plans for the expansion and regimentation of the war-supporting industries. In addition to the numerous subsidiary appointments which his office entailed he had become, on 26 November 1937, a Councillor of the Planning Board. The secretary of that Board, Lieutenant-Colonel SATO, was a section staff member of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau.

The plan which the Army now produced reflected the whole of its scheming and achievement during the two preceding years. On 20 May 1936, shortly after UMEZU had taken office as War Vice-Minister, the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry had produced its program for the control of information and propaganda in time of war. Now in early 1938 that Bureau produced a new plan which would bestow upon the Cabinet, once and for all, the powers needed to carry out every phase of the national mobilization for war. This Army plan was in the form of a draft "National General Mobilization Law," through the enactment of which the Diet would surrender any authority it had to control the Cabinet. Under this law the Cabinet would legislate by Imperial Ordinance. Once enacted, the provisions of the new law could be made operative at any moment which the Cabinet might choose.

The mobilization law was a necessity, not only [p48698] for the success of the Army's military preparations, but also to ensure that the industrialists should receive an adequate inducement to cooperate and security from ultimate loss. Each of these considerations was well-known to SATO. [p48699]


The situation which had arisen in the Diet provided a close parallel to that which had occurred in January 1937, when Hayashi succeeded HIROTA as Prime Minister. In each case the Cabinet, pursuant to the Army's planning, was engaged in putting into operation large-scale measures of industrial expansion and control. In each case the legislation necessary to achieve this purpose had met with strenuous opposition in the Diet. In each case the supporters of the Army, believing that the changes contemplated were not of a sufficient radical nature had concentrated their attacks upon political parties and upon the existing parliamentary system.

This impatience with political parties was not a new development; for it had been expressed by the advocates of military supremacy, whenever they had encountered opposition to their schemes. As early as March 1931 HASHIMOTO had stated his belief that the Diet, which had then aroused the Army's indignation, should be crushed. In January 1932 he had advocated the immediate abolition of political parties, characterizing the party system as a dangerous anti-national structure, which must be destroyed "for the sake of [p48700] the construction of a cheerful new Japan". In December 1936 the same sentiment had been voiced by the military faction when the Seiyukai party had criticized the HIROTA Cabinet's first measures of industrial mobilization. Now, in February 1938, Konoye, confronted with a Diet united only in its opposition to his Cabinet, was threatened with the same downfall which had overtaken HIROTA in January 1937.

The Cabinet, in this dilema, adopted the Army's plan. On 24 February 1938 Prime Minister Konoye presented to the Diet for enactment the National General Mobilization Bill; and called upon SATO to speak in its support. SATO has himself explained the difficulty and the delicacy of the situation in which he was placed. Upon the acceptance or rejection of this measure depended the goodwill of the industrialists, without whose assistance the plans for a national mobilization were impossible of achievement. SATO had earnestly desired the task of championing this bill; and, of those persons present before the Diet, he alone was capable of explaining its implications. He sincerely believed that his was the most powerful explanation given. In the result, opposition within the Diet was surmounted and the bill became law.

By adopting the Army's measure as his own [p48701] Konoye had silenced the criticism of that faction which had accused him of insufficient diligence in prosecuting the Army's schemes. The Cabinet's position had been consolidated and the acceptance of its industrial program was assured. The Amy had gained the support of the industrialists, and had eliminated a new threat to the progress of the nation-wide mobilization for war.

Furthermore, the Army had moved one stop nearer to the achievement of complete political supremacy in Japan. The Diet, in which the military faction had always seen a potential danger to the attainment of its aspirations, was now fettered. By passing this law, the legislature had thus deprived itself of any control over Cabinet measures relating to war and to preparations for war. From this time onward the Cabinet might, without recourse to the Diet, exercise the wide legislative and administrative powers which the new law gave.


The National General Mobilization Law, which was made operative by Imperial Ordinance on 5 May 1938, followed the pattern of war emergency legislation in all countries. Although ostensible intended solely [p48702] to facilitate the prosecution of the war in China, it was utilized to the full in giving legal sanction to Cabinet measures in furtherance of the General plans for economic and industrial development.

The law could be extended to cover any and every type of product, raw material and enterprise. It gave the Cabinet virtually unlimited powers to conscript materials, and to control industry and companies. Under its provisions the government might expropriate lands and buildings; authorize the payment of subsidies and compensation; enforce stabilization measures; prevent the publication of information; and direct the occupational training and education of the Japanese people. Above all, it might direct and conscript the manpower of the nation. At the time the law was enacted Konoye's Cabinet contained HIROTA as Foreign Minister, KAYA as Finance Minister, and KIDO is Education and as Welfare Minister.

The provisions of the mobilization law serve to emphasize the many-sidedness and all-embracing nature of Japanese preparations for war. It was not merely a matter of military or naval or economic pro-preparedness. Every aspect of the national life was to be so ordered and controlled as to produce the maximum pitch of warlike efficiency. The entire [p48703] strength of the Japanese-nation was to be harnessed and developed with this single end in view. The National General Mobilization Law provided the instrument through which that goal might be achieved.

The measure now taken had its counterpart in the national policy decision of 11 August 1936. It had then been determined that Japan's internal policies would be shaped in accordance with the basic plan; and this - in the words approved by the Five Ministers - consisted in "strengthening the foundation of our country both internally and externally." For that reason measures would be taken to safeguard the people's livelihoods, to develop their physical strength, and to direct their thinking. The people's will would be strengthened "to tide over the extraordinary emergency, which schemes of expansion and aggradisement were certain to precipitate.


On 19 Hay 1938, two weeks after the National General Mobilization Law had been put into operation, the Army published in the Japanese press a commentary upon its purposes. It vies explained that, although the full story could not yet be told, an attempt would be made to interpret the spirit end substance of the [p48704] law as a whole, so that the public might understand its relationship to national defense. Japan, they said, was a country small in area and lacking in natural resources. She faced not only the determined resistance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China but also Soviet armies, fully mobilized and bent upon aggression in the north. Moreover, she was surrounded by the powerful navies of the United States and of Great Britain. For these reasons great difficulties were entailed in planning Japan's defense, which was now based, not on her own shores, but upon the boundaries of Manchukuo, and of North and Central China.

The people of Japan were warned that the maintenance of these boundaries would call for great determination and very strenuous efforts for many years to come. Nothing less than complete mobilization of all resources of material and manpower would suffice. Military success would depend chiefly upon the systematic and effective mobilization of the "synthentic national strength". This the National General Mobilization Law was designed to achieve. [p48705] The remainder of the statement was devoted to telling the people of Japan what the realization of the "synthetic national strength" would entail. The first requirement was spiritual power, since the people themselves were the source of fighting strength. By mobilizing educational institutions and propaganda organs for a unified campaign, all possible efforts would be made to intensify the fighting spirit of the people, which would enable them to endure any amount of hardship and difficulties.

Manpower would be mobilised in order to adjust the demand and supply of labour; so that, as young men were called to the colours, their places in industry would be filled. This transition to a wartime economy would entail government plans for occupational training and direction of labour.

The plans for mobilisation of material resources other than manpower accurately forecast developments, the early progress of which has already been noted. While there was still time, vast quantities of materials for the Army and Navy would be acquired abroad. Production of war materials at home would be increased at the expense of peacetime industries. Therefore, all producing enterprises, as well as import and export businesses, would be unified under government direction. [p48706] The government would also take control of all financial credits. It would unify and develop all transportation facilities. It would mobilise science so that the pitch of efficiency might be raised. It would assume responsibility for the collection of information and the dissemination of propaganda at home and abroad, seeking to foster morale and to unify opinion in Japan, while creating a favourable impression in other countries.

The government would also equip itself with long-range flexible plans to meet the varying needs of a general mobilisation, so that the Army and Navy would always be adequately supplied with, the muniments of war. Private enterprises would be required to conform to the plans prepared. Control would, as a matter of convenience, be exercised by Imperial Ordinances, without recourse to the Diet. A National General Mobilisation Research Commission and various semi-official bodies would be created to administer the law. These, and some self-governing bodies, would assist the government both in the formulation and in, the execution of Cabinet policy.


In the period which was now ending the Army had made itself the master of Japan's destiny; and, at the Army's instigation, the nation had embarked upon a [p48707] programme of aggrandisement through expansion of military power.

Foreign Minister HIROTA, in whose term as Premier the Army's schemes had first been formulated as the national policy, left the Cabinet at the end of May 1938; and at this time also Lieutenant General UMEZU, whose work had for so long been complementary to HIROTA's, resigned his office. UMEZU had become War Vice- Minister on 23 March 1936, while HIROTA was Premier, and prior to the important Five Ministers' conferences which settled the basis of the national policy. He had remained in that position during the premierships of Hayashi and Konoye.

HIROTA and UMEZU had provided the most important links between Konoye's Cabinet and that of his predecessors for each had occupied a key position during a period that was remarkable for the steady development and fruition of the Army's planning. One by one the Army's detailed plans had gained acceptance, until at length all opposition within Japan had been overridden.

Japan's military and naval forces were undergoing continuous expansion. Her growing military strength was still engaged upon the conquest of China. On 19 May 1938 the Japanese forces in Central China captured the town of Hsuchow, thus removing an island of Chinese resistance in an area which had been brought under Japanese control. [p48708]

Although the battle for Hsuchow was not a decisive one, it stimulated Japan's long- deferred hope of crushing all resistance in China.

Meanwhile the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, in collaboration with the Army General Staff, was making its preparations for war with the Soviet Union. In Japan itself a new fleet was in course of construction; and in the Mandated Islands, naval bases were being established in preparation for a Pacific War.

Great efforts had been made to achieve the goal of economic and industrial self- sufficiency, which alone would enable Japan to sustain the burden of the wars which the Army had planned. In Japan itself, in Manchukuo, and in the occupied areas of North and Central China, new sources of vital raw materials were being developed, and new war-supporting industries were being established. The Cabinet had equipped itself with the legal powers required to mobilise for war the entire strength of the Japanese nation. Through regimentation and through propaganda the people of Japan had been made to identify their country's destiny with the schemes of aggrandisement which the Army had propounded.


The fulfilment of the Army's five-year planning [p48709] demanded that the maximum use should be made of the natural resources and industrial potential of the continental areas which Japan had occupied. In North and Central China the groundwork of such a development was already being laid; but as yet Japan could expect no substantial contribution from those areas.

In Manchukuo the situation was otherwise; for in February 1937 the Manchukuoan government had embarked upon a second five-year programme of industrial expansion. HOSHINO had shared in the formulation and in the execution of this programme, which formed an integral part of the Japanese Army's 1937 economic and industrial planning.

Even after the Lukuochiao Incident, which revived the China war, no pains had been spared in maintaining the objects of the planning. In November 1937 the Konoye Cabinet had resolved that the promotion of heavy industry in Manchukuo was essential to Japan's purpose; and the Manchurian Heavy Industry Corporation, a new national policy company, had been created to give effect to the Cabinet's decision.

In May 1938 the Japanese-dominated Manchukuoan government drew up an even more extensive programme of war-supporting industrial development. It was then decided to utilise the Manchurian heavy Industrial Corporation in achieving this new project. HOSHINO, as Chief of General [p48710] Affairs of Manchukuo, had a decisive voice in the inception of the new scheme, which was the outcome of the Konoye Cabinet's resolution of November 1937.

The new plan laid great stress upon the cultivation of even closer ties between Japan and Manchukuo. In the light of experience already gained, the original 1937 programme was radically revised, so that Manchukuo might bear an increased share in the burden of Japanese preparations for war. The need for revision was attributed to changes in the international situation.

The whole purpose of the new plan was to increase the output of those industries in which Japan was deficient, and which the Japanese Army had singled out as essential to the needs of war. The production of iron and steel would be greatly expanded for the express purpose of meeting Japan's increasing requirements. Mining operations would be extended to ensure Japan of coal supplies. Electric power facilities would be increased and production of machine tools would be promoted with the object of encouraging further industrial development. New chemical industries, ancillary to the production of aircraft and munitions, would be established. New aircraft manufacturing plants would be built in widely separated areas. Manchukuo would aim at the production of five thousand aircraft and thirty thousand automobiles [p48711] each year. Systematic efforts would also be made to increase the production of gold, for upon that commodity Japan's foreign purchasing power was in part dependent.

The revised plan required an estimated capital expenditure of nearly five thousand million yen, which was little less than twice the figure budgeted for in 1937. Rather less than half of the required amount was to be raised in Japan.

The Manchukuoan government would set up an Economic Planning Commission to superintend the execution of the scheme. This new body was to carry out in Manchukuo much the same functions which the Planning Board exercised in Japan. Under its auspices a new and complete survey of the country's natural resources would be made. Trade schools for training skilled labour would be established, and plans would be prepared for carrying cut the economic and administrative readjustment which the revised programme demanded.


The measures which had already been taken to give effect to the Army's planning had placed a steadily increasing burden upon the Japanese economy. Despite military victories and advances, the war in China was still a constant drain upon Japanese resources of material [p48712] and manpower. Furthermore, the Army had counted upon China as a vital source of raw materials, and as an area in which the war-supporting industries might be developed.

The Army, in disclosing the purposes of the Mobilisation Law, warned the Japanese people once again that the continuation of the war in China must not be permitted to obscure the basic objects of the national policy. North and Central China, together with Manchukuo and Japan itself, were represented as constituting a single sphere, the integrity of which must be maintained, not only against local resistance, but also against both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The principal object of the Army's planning, now as at all other times, was the accretion of armaments and of other war potential upon a scale sufficient to ensure victory over each of these formidable adversaries. The Army was at this time gravely concerned lest the struggle in China might cause the breakdown of its long-range planning.

Since the resumption of fighting at Lukouchiao, Japan had always been faced with the danger of economic collapse. Far-reaching measures of industrial, commercial and financial control had been taken in an attempt to avert this threat. The revised programme for industrial expansion in Manchukuo showed again the manner in which Japan was exploiting those continental areas which she [p48713] already controlled. The people of these territories had been made to bear an increasing share in the expansion of the industries of war, and in supporting the overtaxed economy of Japan.

Nevertheless, it became apparent during May and June 1938 that Japan was beset by a severe economic and financial crisis. The Army, having won control of the Japanese government and people, faced a new challenge to the achievement of its ambitions. The adoption of its mobilisation programme had been secured. The question now was whether the Japanese nation could withstand the rigours which the Army's policy entailed.

It was in these circumstances that, on 5 May 1938, the Cabinet had invoked the powers bestowed upon it by the National General Mobilisation Law. In its commentary upon the purposes of that law, the Army reaffirmed its determination to proceed with the national mobilisation for war, whatever difficulties might stand in the way of its achievement.


Ten days later the Cabinet was reorganised to meet the situation which had arisen. HIROTA left the Foreign Ministry; and KAYA, who, as Finance Minister, had guided and controlled the subordination of the Japanese economy to the requirements of the Army's mobilisation [p48714] plans, also resigned his post.

To meet the threatened breakdown of the Army's plans, the Cabinet was strengthened by the addition of two military men. Lieutenant General ITAGAKI succeeded Sugiyama as Minister of War. Since the Mukden Incident ITAGAKI had been prominently associated with the Army's schemes of expansion and aggrandisement through military power. From 23 March 1936 to 1 March 1937 he had served as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and since then he had taken part as a Divisional Commander in the conquest of China.

General ARAKI, who now became Education Minister, had been a leader of the military faction during the early years in the development of the Army's schemes. In July 1931, two months before the Mukden Incident occurred, he was recognised as a prominent member of the Kokuhonsha, a secret society designed to foster the spirit of nationalism. In December of the same year, when the Inukai Cabinet took office, ARAKI was appointed War Minister at the instance of the younger Army officers. This position he retained under Inukai's successor, Saito.

As War Minister during 1932 and 1933 ARAKI advocated the adoption of an emergency policy, which would enable Japan to perfect her preparations for war. He [p48715] was acknowledged as a leading representative of the powerful militarists. In his radio speech of June 1933 he was the first to reveal the full extent of the Army's long-range planning, and to exhort the Japanese people to cooperate in its fulfilment.

ARAKI's conduct during 1933 caused dissension within the Saito Cabinet; for it was realised that the policy which he represented was isolating Japan from the rest of the world. In December 1933 Finance Minister Takahashi attributed to the militarists of the Army and Navy the deterioration which had taken place in Japan's foreign relations; and in the following month ARAKI left the Cabinet. He continued, however, to lead the faction which had demanded the conquest of Manchuria, and which advocated further schemes of expansion through military power. Since 23 January 1934 ARAKI had held office as a Supreme War Councillor; and, since the institution of the Cabinet Advisory Council on 15 October 1937, he had been in addition a member of that body.

KIDO, under whose guidance the education system of Japan had been made to serve the purposes of the national mobilisation for war, remained in the Cabinet as Welfare Minister. He realised that it was essential to the achievement of the Army's planning that the war in China should be ended. He did not over-estimate the [p48716] importance of the victory at Huschow; but he did believe that already there was talk of peace among the Chinese. He considered, therefore, that Japan should now plan a new military offensive in the form of an advance upon the city of Hankow.


The economic and financial crisis was accentuated on 11 June 1938, when the United States, in view of Japan's repeated violations of treaty obligations in the conduct of the China war, placed a moral embargo on the sending of aircraft, armaments, engine parts, aerial bombs and torpedoes to Japan.

On 23 June 1938 the reconstituted Cabinet, of which ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were now members, met to decide what measures should be taken to maintain the goal of national preparedness for war. The decision made was a vindication of the forecast contained in the Army's commentary upon the purposes of the Mobilisation Law. Great emphasis was laid upon the Cabinet's determination to subordinate all other considerations to that of fulfilling the aims of the basic national policy. Measures vital to the national mobilisation for war would be enforced immediately.

The Cabinet's examination of the national [p48717] economy disclosed that during the current year Japan's exports had fallen off by one- third. For this and for other reasons her foreign trade balance was extremely precarious. If the situation should become worse, it would be very difficult, in case of emergency, to procure arms and other supplies, because of lack of foreign exchange with which to procure them. Even as the position now stood, it would be difficult to achieve the targets set in the 1938 plan for the mobilisation of commodities. The success of the five-year planning was already endangered.

The situation was, in the Cabinet's opinion, too grave to be met by day to day expedients. Such an approach to the problem would gravely hinder the efforts being made to meet immediate military requirements, while attaining the expansion of productive power which Japan's present situation demanded.

The drastic measures decided upon involved a further curtailment in non-military supplies. Even within the field of war-supporting industrial development there would be economies. In pursuance of this policy of retrenchment, measures would be taken to maintain the stability of the exchange rate, to keep up the supply of munitions, to promote exports, and to safeguard the people's livelihood. [p48718] The wide powers given by the National General Mobilisation Law would be utilised to this end. Prices would be fixed, and commodities would be rationed. Savings would be encouraged, war profits would be restricted, and waste materials would be salvaged. Funds in foreign countries would be conserved, and Japan would retaliate against boycotts of her foreign trade. The administration of foreign trade control would be unified in order to stimulate exportation. The production of munitions would be increased.

In particular, drastic steps would be taken to conserve essential materials through the regulation of supply and demand. By linking exports of finished products with imports of materials therefor, the government would ensure that commodities destined for ultimate export did not become absorbed in the home market. The minimum quantity of imports necessary to maintain the nation's livelihood, its exports and its barter trade, would be permitted. With this exception only those imports which were needed to meet military demands and to ensure the production of munitions would be allowed.

Each Ministry concerned was instructed to take its own steps to carry out the policy upon which the Cabinet had decided, and to treat the achievement of the national mobilisation as a matter of urgency. [p48719]


The two new members of the Cabinet were quick to lend their support to the programme of national mobilisation. On 26 June 1938, three days after the Cabinet had met, War Minister ITAGAKI, in an interview with the press, reflected the Cabinet's recognition of the economic difficulties which beset Japan, and his own determination that those difficulties should not stand in the way of the conquest of China. He said that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek did not count upon victories in the first line of battle, but hoped to overcome Japan by imposing a burden upon the country's resources over a lengthy period.

ITAGAKI urged upon his readers the necessity of a long preparedness for war, expressing his own conviction that Japan was able to withstand future hostilities over an indefinite period. He exhorted the Japanese people to enter into the spirit of the Cabinet's programme for the convservation of national reserves, and to extend unstinting cooperation towards the authorities.

In commenting upon the international situation, ITAGAKI said,

"It is natural that third powers are resorting to various manoeuvres, for the sake of protecting their interests in China. It should suffice for Japan to follow its own policy without fear or hesitation.” [p48720] On 7 July 1938, the first anniversary of the Lukouchiao Incident, Education Minister ARAKI made a speech in which he expressed the same views as ITAGAKI. In its general tenor this address differed little from the one which he had given as War Minister in June 1933; for, on each occasion, ARAKI looked forward from the difficulties of the moment to the attainment of the Army's ultimate goal of world domination.

"We must be prepared," he said on this occasion, "for the aggrandisement of national strength required to wage long-period war. With deep understanding of the national thought, we should clarify the absolute superiority of our national constitution, and the thought of Hakko Ichiu or the unification of the world under one roof should be pervaded to the whole world."

"National Mobilisation must be achieved both in the material and in the spiritual sense, which will promote the conspicuous ever-progressing prosperity of the nation, who must not be left as a power in East Asia only, but must be promoted to the world's Japan as the leader of the new era; and the proper magnanimity and full vigour of her people should be cultivated so that the mission given to her may be thoroughly fulfilled."

Despite the confident and aggressive tone which ITAGAKI and ARAKI had adopted, there was clearly [p48721] discernible in the statements of each an undercurrent of deep anxiety concerning the outcome of the campaign in China. While that issue remained unsettled the Army's long-range planning was in jeopardy.


When the Cabinet reorganisation of May 1938 took place, changes were also made in Army Staff appointments. Lieutenant General TOJO was recalled from service in the field to replace UMEZU as Vice-Minister of War. As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army since 1 March 1937, TOJO had been intimately connected with the Army's planning and preparations for war with the Soviet Union. It was he who had advised the Army General Staff to strike a blow at China before attacking the U.S.S.R. After the fighting in China had revived, military preparations for war against the Soviet Union had continued to absorb his attention; and, in carrying out that work, he had been in close touch with UMEZU.

On 18 June 1938 Lieutenant General DOHIHARA, who had commanded a division in the Japanese advance southward from Peiping, was recalled from China and attached to the Army General Staff. DOHIHARA, like ITAGAKI, had taken a prominent part in the planning and execution of the Mukden Incident, and in the subsequent development [p48722] of the Army's plans. He brought to Tokyo first-hand knowledge of the situation in China. [p48723] War Vice-Minister TOJO received during June 1938 many other appointments, each connected with some aspect of the national mobilization for war. Not even his predecessor UMEZU had held positions so numerous or so diversified. TOJO became a Councillor of the Planning Board, of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, and of the Information Bureau. He was appointed also to the new National General Mobilisation Council set up pursuant to the provisions of the Mobilisation Law. He became Chief of Army Air Headquarters, and a member of the Air Enterprise Investigation Committee. He joined committees concerned with the automobile, shipbuilding, electric power and iron industries; and became a member of the Scientific Council. The affairs of the Navy did not escape his notice, for he became also a member of the Naval Council.

Lieutenant-Colonel SATO continued to provide a second link between military preparations and other aspects of the general mobilisation for war. He had, since 26 November 1937, combined the functions of Secretary of the Planning Board with those of a section staff member of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau.


While the Cabinet took steps to maintain the [p48724] supply of war materials, the Army General Staff was engaged upon the scheme which KIDO had favoured. During June 1938 they drew up operational plans for a new major offensive in Central China. Approximately four hundred thousand experienced troops were to take part in this advance under General HATA's command. The city of Hankow was their objective. The campaign, if successful, would close the breach which separated the existing puppet regimes in the north and in the south.

The reconstituted Cabinet was determined that a supreme effort should be made to end Chinese resistance, so that the programme of mobilisation for war should no longer be imperilled.

"We will not lay down arms", said General ARAKI in his speech of 7 July 1938, "until anti-Japanese China is completely crushed to the extent that she cannot stand up again."

In July 1938 the offensive began, and during July and August minor victories were gained as more Chinese towns and villages were enveloped in the tide of the Japanese advance. There was, however, still no indication which would justify the hope of a Chinese capitulation.


While the new offensive in China was being launched, the Army continued to make ready for the expected war with the Soviet Union. On 19 June 1938, TOJO, the new War Vice-Minister, received an official communication concerning those military preparations with which he had been so closely concerned as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. The Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia was making a study of the strategic areas bordering upon the U.S.S.R. The Chief of Staff of that army also reported that the natural resources of Mongolia were under survey, and that the materials which had already been acquired were being examined.

While the Cabinet struggled to achieve the national mobilisation for war in the face of economic difficulties, an attack upon the Soviet Union was still the project uppermost

in the minds of the military faction. Both War Minister ITAGAKI and Education Minister ARAKI laid enormous stress upon the need for preparation for a long war.

"Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and Russia," said General ARAKI on 11 July 1938, "is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade."

With this determination in mind the Army took, upon its own initiative, a new and important step towards the attainment of its goals of military conquest. [p48726]

The programme of national mobilisation for war being now accepted and in course of achievement, the Army's attention was directed towards negotiating with Germany a closer alliance, which would reinforce Japan's own military strength. At the instigation of the Army General Staff Major-General OSHIMA, the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin, opened negotiations with the German government for a military alliance between the two countries. Such a conjunction of forces would complete the Army's preparations for war with the Soviet Union.

From this time onwards Japan's relations with Germany are of significance, not merely as one aspect of Japanese preparation for war, but as an essential factor in determining the course of events within Japan itself. The new Germany, which had arisen under Hitler since the year 1933, was, like Japan, engaged in preparing for wars of conquest and territorial expansion. The two nations, each intent upon the realisation of its own schemes, entertained little regard for each other, but harboured common designs upon the Soviet Union. These had found expression in the Anti- Comintern Pact, concluded in November 1936.

A military alliance with Germany had long held a place of importance in the Japanese Army's planning. [p48727] The need for it became more urgent as the time for attacking the Soviet Union appeared to draw near. In order that the origins and development of this phase in the scheming of the military faction may be understood, it is first necessary to survey broadly the progress of the Army's plan for making war on the Soviet Union.


Japan's antipathy towards the U.S.S.R., which led her to make common cause with Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact, was inherent in the very nature of the Army's ambitions. When, in 1924, Okawa first proposed schemes of territorial expansion, he had advocated the occupation of Siberia. HIROTA, as Ambassador in Moscow in 1931, was also of that opinion. He then expressed the view that, whether or not Japan intended to attack the U.S.S.R., she must have strong policies towards that country, being ready for war at any time. The main object of such preparedness was, in his opinion, not so much as a defence against Communism, but rather as a means of conquering Eastern Siberia.

Already there was a second reason for regarding the U.S.S.R. as an enemy. In 1930 military spokesmen, who were then campaigning for popular approval of [p48728] the Army's plan to conquer Manchuria, had stressed that Japan must defend that territory against the Soviet Union. In April 1932, when the new state of Manchukuo had been established, the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers were each acknowledged as enemies. Colonel ITAGAKI, then a member of the Kwantung Army Staff, received appointment to a new committee which would promote the interests of "the allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against Comintern aggression."

Some three months later the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow reported to his government that a Russo-Japanese war was in the future unavoidable. He urged a non-committal attitude in regard to the proposal for a non-aggression pact made to Japan some six months earlier by the Soviet Foreign Commissar. On 13 December 1932, after five further months of delay, Japan rejected this proposal upon the ground that differences outstanding between the two countries had rendered negotiations for such an agreement untimely. In February 1933 Japan again refused a renewed offer to discuss such an agreement. Two months later, Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI of the Army General Staff said that any such proposal must be denounced, since the Soviet Union was the absolute enemy, which aimed to destroy the [p48729] national structure of Japan. The Soviet Union was thus recognized by the military faction as the power which, above all others, stood between Japan and the achievement of the goal of supremacy in East Asia.

The steady progress made in military planning and preparation for war with the U.S.S.R. has been mentioned frequently in the course of this narrative. By December 1933 the Japanese Army in Korea was already making preparations "in consideration of the time then we open hostilities against Soviet Russia." General ARAKI even then had designs upon Mongolia as a steppingstone for such an attack.

In November 1935 SHIRATORI, the Minister in Sweden, told Arita that the time was ripe for an attack. He believed that Japan should immediately, by force or by threat of force, shut out the Soviet Union from East Asia.

On 23 March 1936, after HIROTA's Cabinet had taken office, ITAGAKI, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army had taken measures to bring Outer Mongolia within the orbit of Japan's "new order." After 11 August 1936, when the basis of Japan's national policy was decided, preparations directed against the Soviet Union were intensified to enable Japan "to cope with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilise in the Far [p48730] East."

It has been seen that the revival of the war in China was a part of the Army's plan of expansion which included an eventual attack upon the U.S.S.R. Before and after the fighting began at Lukouchiao, military preparations for war with the U.S.S.R. had been maintained and accelerated. The Kwantung Army in close collaboration with the Army General Staff, had made its dispositions for an immediate onslaught, to be launched at the earliest possible moment.

If the attack were left for ten years, SHIRATORI had said in November 1935, the Soviet Union might become too powerful to touch; but the chances of immediate success were good. There was at that time, he added, no other country on earth which could become a real menace to Japan. The cession of Sakhalin and of the Maritime Province of Siberia should be demanded at a reasonable price. The Soviet Union should be reduced to a "powerless capitalistic republic," the natural resources of which would be rigidly controlled.


With this compelling sense of urgency, the Army had fretted at Japan's increasing commitments in China, and at the precarious position into which her [p48731] economy had lapsed. Military leaders had resolutely maintained their programme of preparations for war with the U.S.S.R. and had turned to Nazi Germany for support. In July 1938, after ITAGAKI and TOJO had been installed in the War Ministry, the Army's impatience to launch an attack upon the Soviet Union found an immediate outlet.

At the beginning of July 1938 Japanese guards on the Soviet border in the region of Lake Khassan were strengthened; and in mid-July SHIGEMITSU was despatched to Moscow to secure acceptance of Japanese demands for certain territory in that area. The ground in dispute was an eminence of strategic value.

SHIGEMITSU adopted a peremptory attitude throughout these negotiations; and made, on 20 July 1938, a formal demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, upon the pretext of Japan's obligations to Manchukuo.

On the following day War Minister ITAGAKI, together with the Chief of the Army General Staff, attempted to obtain the Emperor's sanction to launch an attack at Lake Khassan, so that Japan's demands might be enforced. It was falsely represented to the Emperor that the Army's policy in this matter was supported by the Foreign and Navy Ministries. On the [p48732] next day, 22 July 1938, the scheme was disclosed to, and approved by, the Five Ministers' Conference.

On 29 July 1933 the Japanese forces at Lake Khassan attacked the Soviet border guards. The fighting thus begun continued until 11 August 1938, by which time the Japanese forces employed in the operation had been routed. Thereafter Japan negotiated terms of peace, leaving the Soviet Union in possession of the disputed area.

The fighting at Lake Khassan will be discussed fully in a later section of this judgment; but the circumstances in which the attack occurred are of importance in the present narrative. The scheme was promoted and put into effect upon the initiative of the Army. War Minister ITAGAKI had long believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. His Vice-Minister, TOJO, had supervised the detailed planning and preparation for such a war. The attack occurred at a time when the Army was negotiating with Germany for a new military alliance, directed principally at the U.S.S.R. It was a product of the Army's planning to crush the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

Japan's defect at Lake Khassan caused an abrupt revision of the Army's plans. On 25 August [p48733] 1938 Colonel SATO, as spokesmen of the Ministry, expounded the Army's policy to the assembled Chiefs of the Police Bureau. In a speech which discussed the Army's resolves and the nation's difficulties, he revealed a new attitude towards the projected war with the Soviet Union. He warned his audience that military preparations must be continued, for such a war might break out at any time; but he said emphatically that it would be disadvantageous for Japan to provoke such a war at the present time.

"If, however, a war with Russia is unavoidable," he added, "it will be necessary for Japan to seek a proper chance after her armament and production shall have been expended - - this should be after 1942."

A curb had been imposed upon the impetuousness of the Army and its supporters. The leaders of the Army had resolved once more to follow the principles laid down in the basic national policy decision, which demanded, first and foremost, the establishment of Japan's "new order" in China, and the completion of preparations for war.

The U.S.S.R. was, however, still regarded as a principal enemy; for that country stood between Japan and the attainment of the goal of supremacy in East Asia. SATO made it clear that Japan had not [p48734] abandoned its ultimate goal of forcing war on the Soviet Union. He urged that objective was a primary reason for completing the national mobilisation. He reaffirmed the Army's belief that the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy should be strengthened. But his speech disclosed that, as a result of its discomfiture at Lake Khassan, the Army was determined to achieve in greater measure the repletion of the national strength, before voluntarily undertaking any further liabilities.

We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48735]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT; The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.



Hitler came to power in Germany in 1935 and the Japanese Army, being then intent upon preparing for war with the Soviet Union, took an immediate interest in the new regime. In March 1934, while the Okada government was in office Colonel OSHIMA was appointed Military Attache in Berlin.

Upon instructions of the Chief of the Army General Staff, OSHIMA was ordered to watch and investigate the stability of the Nazi regime, the future of the German Army, the state of relations between Germany and the

Soviet Union and, in particular, the relations between the armies of those two countries. OSHIMA would also collect and report information relative to the Soviet Union. He would try to discover what would be the German attitude in case the U.S.S.R. should become involved in war. OSHIMA took up his new appointment in May 1934 and in the spring of 1935 he learned from Ribbentrop of German willingness to conclude an alliance with Japan. This information he conveyed to the Army General Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Wakamatsu, sent to Germany to invest- [p48736] igate the proposal, arrived in Berlin in December 1935.

Already some, at least, of the military faction were confident of German support in case of war with the Soviet Union.

"Since the relationship of Germany and Poland with Russia are in a same position as ours," wrote SHIRATORI to Arita in his letter of 4 November 1935, "there is no need for us to try to specifically weave understanding with them. Once the war breaks out they will surely rise on our side. The only trouble is England."

In Berlin Wakamatsu and OSHIMA held discussions with the German authorities, and advised them that the Army General Staff was in favor of a general alliance between the two countries. This stage in the negotiations having been reached, the proposal was referred by the Army to the Cabinet. Meanwhile, HIROTA, who had five years earlier advocated the seizure of Soviet territory, had become Premier; and Arita, the recipient of SHIRATORI's confidences, was his Foreign Minister. In the Spring of 1936, several months before the basis of the national policy was finally decided, HIROTA's Cabinet took up the Army's proposal. Ambassador Mushakoji, newly arrived in Berlin, was able to confirm that Germany eagerly desired cooperation with Japan. Protracted negotiations resulted in the signing [p48737] of the Anti-Comintern Pact and a secret military agreement, both of which were ratified by the Japanese Privy Council on 25 November 1936.


The Anti-Comintern Pact was not the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed, and which the Army General Staff had favored. Although the August Conference of Five Ministers had already committed Japan to a forthright anti-Soviet policy, the pact was framed as a purely defensive measure, designed to prevent advance of the Soviet Union into East Asia Foreign Minister Arita explained it in this light to the Privy Councillors, and was careful to disavow approval of German domestic policies. Public opinion in Japan was not yet prepared for an alliance with the Germans, and this fact had imposed a limitation upon the Cabinet's contractual powers.

Yet, in effect, this agreement furthered Japan's aggressive policy against the U.S.S.R. HIROTA had obtained assurances from the Germans the spirit of the secret agreement would alone be decisive in [p48738] determining their attitude towards the Soviet Union. If occasion should arise, that agreement was to provide a basis for a further development of the relationship between the two countries.

Furthermore, Arita himself belied the contention that the pact was defensive in nature, for he assured the Privy Councillors that the Soviet Union was behaving reasonably in all of its transactions with Japan. He did not himself believe that the U.S.S.R. would initiate any affair, even though Japan's preparations for war should not be adequate. Arita hoped also that the pact would strengthen Japan's position in her dealings with China.

In reality the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded in an attempt to obtain the advantage of German support against the Soviet Union and in China, without alienating public opinion in Japan, and with the minimum possible degree of commitment on Japan's part.

These same considerations governed the subsequent development of Japan's relationship with Germany. After the fighting had begun at Lukouchiao, Japan attempted unsuccessfully to justify her actions in China as a struggle against Communism, carried out in pursuance of the objects of the Anti-Comintern Pact. [p48739]


On 27 October 1937 TOGO was sent to Berlin to replace Mushakoji as Ambassador. Some days later, on 6 November 1937, the Japanese Privy Council ratified a new treaty with Germany and Italy, by virtue of which each of the three signatories exchanged the undertakings contained in the Anti-Comintern Pact. HIRANUHA, the President, Foreign Minister HIROTA and Finance Minister KAYA attended the meeting.

It was TOGO's task to convince Germany that Japan would certainly succeed in the conquest of China; and that, by supporting Japan, Germany might assure herself of a preferred position in the new China which Japan would create. This view the Germans accepted with reluctance in January 1938.

Nevertheless, HIROTA had realized that Japan was dependent upon Great Britain and the United States for assistance in the economic development of China. He did not mean to offer to Germany more than the shadow of a special advantage. He intended in return to obtain from the Germans supplies and technical assistance which were needed in China. Therefore, HIROTA had [p48740] closely circumscribed the limits within which TOGO might make promises to the Germans.

During May, June and July 1938, while the economic crisis deepened in Japan, Ambassador TOGO wrestled with this difficult task in the face of growing German dissatisfaction. The fact that the German government, in July and August 1938 negotiated with OSHIMA, the Military Attache, to the Ambassador's complete exclusion, provides an indication of the measure of TOGO'S failure.

During May and June 1938 there had been repeated discussions between Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and TOGO concerning German economic participation in the reconstruction of China. Von Ribbentrop had claimed, in return for Germany's recognition and assistance, especially generous treatment in regard to her own foreign trade in China. TOGO had replied, cordially but guardedly, within the narrow limits HIROTA had allowed him. Pressed by von Ribbentrop, TOGO had explained that Japan could not assure Germany in treaty form of better treatment than other third powers. The German Foreign Minister, though he expressed dissatisfaction, had concluded that Japan was prepared to offer in practice what she would not concede in categorical treaty form. [p48741] At length, von Ribbentrop was disillusioned; for on 24 July 1938 the German Foreign Ministry received from its representative in China a detailed report upon conditions in the occupied areas of that country. It was there in disclosed that the Japanese authorities in China were practising systematic discrimination against German interests. Established German concerns were suffering serious injury through the preferences given to Japanese firms.

The receipt of this information intensified the dissatisfaction felt in Germany. On 27 July 1938 TOGO was advised that reports from China had confirmed von Ribbentrop in his earlier decision. The vaguely-formulated Japanese offer of "especially favorable treatment" was regarded as inadequate; for it appeared to the German government that Japan had embarked upon a ruthless suppression of foreign trade - including German trade - in China. Disagreement between the two countries as to the terms of economic cooperation in China remained as wide as ever. Nor had any change in the situation occurred when, on 8 September 1938, TOGO was replaced as Ambassador in Berlin by his Military Attache, Major-General OSHIMA. [p48742]


The revival of the war in China at Lukouchiao had at first incurred severe censure from Germany. Despite this estrangement, the Army, ever mindful of the coming struggle with the Soviet Union, had turned to Germany for assistance. In the latter months of 1937 the Army General staff, already apprehensive of Japan's increasing commitments in China, had sought German intervention to negotiate a settlement with the Chinese authorities.

The German Foreign Minister, being then dissatisfied with the state of his country's relations with Japan, had approached, not the Japanese Ambassador, but his Military Attache. In January 1938 von Ribbentrop conveyed to OSHIMA his belief that Japan and Germany should collaborate more closely. OSHIMA passed this information on to the Army General Staff, which agreed in principle, provided that the U.S.S.R. was made the primary object of the new alliance.

In the same month Germany, for reasons of expediency, had acquiesced in Japan's attempted conquest of China; and in the following month German recognition was accorded to the state of Manchukuo. The Army used this [p48743] event to strengthen the ties between Germany on the one hand and Japan and Manchukuo upon the other. Diplomatic relations were established between Manchukuo and Germany; and a treaty of amity between the two countries was signed.

Lieutenant-General TOJO had there expressed the Kwantung Army's wish that Manchukuo become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact; and UMEZU had conveyed the Army General staff ready acceptance of this suggestion. Those transactions had taken place at time when the Japanese Army in occupation of Manchukuo was making its dispositions for the "East approaching war with the soviet Russia".


In early July 1938, shortly after ITAGAKI and TOJO had become respectively Minister and Vice-Minister of War, the Army had for the second time taken steps to promote a military alliance with Germany. OSHIMA made the proposal to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in a general form, stating that, in the Japanese Army's opinion, the time had come for Japan to conclude a general defensive alliance with Germany and Italy.

The Army sought an agreement directed princip- [p48744] ally, if not wholly, against the Soviet Union; but von Ribbentrop, stressing the need for a strong alliance, refused to consider a mere agreement for consultation in the event of an attack by the U.S.S.R. OSHIMA, acting upon the German view, himself outlined the terms of the proposed pact, which was in form a mutual agreement to provide military assistance in case of any unprovoked attack upon a signatory power. It made provision also for consultation, and for mutual economic and political support.

OSHIMA settled with von Ribbentrop the text of the proposed agreement, and dispatched the draft by special emissary to the Army General Staff. The draft agreement, accompanied by a note of von Ribbentrop's views upon the international situation, was treated in Tokyo as a proposal of German origin. The military leaders signified their general approval of OSHIMA's work by conveying the draft to Foreign Minister Ugaki, who immediately summoned a conference of Five Ministers to consider the new German proposal.

On 9 August 1938 Prime Minister Konoye reported the proposal to the Cabinet as a whole. The Navy, in particular, was opposed to an agreement which definitely committed Japan to rendering military assistance; and KIDO also regarded it as a serious matter. But, after [p48745] the proposal had been discussed, the Chief of the General staff advised OSHIMA that Cabinet and Army favored the proposed alliance. Japan was willing to conclude a pact in which military aid was promised in case of unprovoked aggression; but it was desired that the agreement should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union, and secondarily against other powers.

So secretly had the negotiations been conducted that Ambassador TOGO know nothing of them until after they had reached Konoye's hands. Ambassador Ott in Tokyo was not informed until eight further months had elapsed. Konoye received the draft proposal, believing that it had originated with von Ribbentrop, though, in substance at least, it contained the provisions which OSHIMA had first suggested to the Germans.

Although the Konoye Cabinet took no new step during its five remaining months of office towards the conclusion of the proposed alliance, during that period relations

within the Axis were strengthened; the first indications of a Japanese advance southward arose out of circumstances connected with the China War; and Japan's relations with the Western Powers continued to deteriorate. [p48746]


The revision of Army policy which followed the fighting at Lake Khassan was disclosed in two speeches made by SATO in August 1938. During the preceding month SATO had been promoted to the rank of Colonel, and had become a member of the Cabinet Information Bureau. In that month also he was relieved of his additional post as Secretary of the Planning Board. He retained his principal appointment as a member of the Military Affairs Bureau and assumed the duties of Chief of the War Ministry's Press Section.

On 25 and 29 August 1938 SATO expounded the Army's policy for dealing with the China war to a conference of the Chiefs of the Hope Ministry's Police Bureau. These speeches, made to a group of responsible government officials by the War Ministry's spokesman, constitute an authoritative expression of Army policy at this time.

The main theme which ran throughout SATO's discursive address was that the Army was determined upon crushing the resistance of the Chinese National Government's forces, while at the same time completing the [p48747] national mobilization for war. The Cabinet was still uncertain in its policy for dealing with the war in China; but the Army, having sacrificed its long-cherished plan for an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union, was the more determined that the main goals of the basic national policy decision should be achieved.

SATO considered the possible outcome of the present drive towards Hankow, and showed that the Army was itself doubtful whether the capture of that city would put an end to Chinese resistance. Whatever might transpire, the Army was resolved that the fall of Hankow should be the occasion for establishing a new pro-Japanese central government of China.

In the new China, said SATO, Japan would do her utmost in the role of leadership; but, unlike the case of Manchukuo, no government office would be held by a Japanese. North China and Inner Mongolia would form two areas each similar in status to Manchukuo. While the chief reason for securing Inner Mongolia was its value in preparing for war with the Soviet Union, North China would form an area in which economic and industrial expansion could be pushed ahead. Its resources would be developed to meet the needs of "national defence"; and Central China also would form a base for the expansion of Japan's economic power. [p48748]

In justifying the Army's attitude towards China, SATO employed all the arguments which Konoye and HIROTA had advanced. He attempted to imbue his audience with the Army's enthusiasm for completing the conquest of China and for achieving the national mobilisation. Japan, he said, must surmount her difficulties, not sue for peace. The Army was determined that lack of resolution within the Cabinet must be overcome; and that foreign mediation in China should not be permitted.

SATO expressed confidence that the Cabinet would not entertain the peace proposals which an emissary of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was now reported to be making. He was himself convinced, said SATO, that the establishment of a new regime in China was a condition which could not be modified.


General Ugaki, who had succeeded HIROTA as Foreign Minister, was himself of the view that immediate steps must be taken to link together the two pro-Japanese regimes already established in the north and in the south.

In August 1938 Lieutenant-General DOHIHARA, recently attached to the Army General Staff, was sent [p48749] to China to see what could be done to settle the war. Being firmly committed to the view that there should be no compromise with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, DOHIHARA set about to find other leaders who would collaborate with the Japanese. During September 1938, the work of establishing a new central government with which Japan could make peace upon her own terms proceeded.

On 11 September 1938, the Chinese National Government, in face of this new development, appealed once more to the League of Nations. Japan was invited by the League to join the committee which was set up immediately to investigate the dispute.

On 22 September 1938 Foreign Minister Ugaki conveyed to the League the Cabinet's refusal so to do. The Japanese Government, he said, was convinced that such a proceeding could not "provide a just and adequate solution of the present conflict." On the same day a committee of Chinese, formed under Japanese auspices to facilitate the creation of a new central government, was established at Peiping.


The need for reaching a speedy conclusion to the war in China was a matter upon which all were [p48750] now agreed. Cabinet and Army were equally resolved that China should constitute an area which would bolster Japan's precarious economy, and which would contribute to the achievement of the national mobilisation for war.

But SATO had made it clear that there was within the Cabinet a difference of opinion whether compromise would be effective in attaining the main result. Foreign Minister Ugaki and some other members of the Cabinet had inclined to the view that the Army's goal of military conquest should be abandoned, and that direct negotiations for peace should be reopened.

Nor was this disagreement confined to the Cabinet. By September 1938 there was a strong feeling in Japan that peace in China should be brought about, even if it should prove necessary to reopen negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Among the members of the Army General Staff this was the prevailing opinion.

But, as SATO had shown, there was an influential faction within the Army which took the opposite view, and was determined to resist any attempt to compromise the war in China. Lieutenant-General TOJO, Vice-Minister of War, was the champion of this [p48751] standpoint; and War Minister ITAGAKI shared TOJO's views. ITAGAKI and TOJO were the arbiters of Army policy, and Colonel SATO was their spokesman. In his speeches of August 1938, SATO had launched an attack upon those who did not share the uncompromising views which he attributed to the Army as a whole.

There were, said SATO, many doubtful points in the Cabinet's policy towards the war in China. The highest authorities were themselves not very clear what measures should be taken. He contrasted the indecision of the Cabinet with the firm determination of the military leaders; and charged those who supported Ugaki with hampering the execution of the Army's policy.

As always when the Army encountered opposition to its schemes, there came from the military faction a prompt demand for the revision of the organs of government, and for the abolition of political parties. SATO spoke of the need for "renovation" within the government itself, so that the Army's policy in China might be carried out. He hinted also at new measures for dealing with "political party problems." There was a movement afoot to promote the formation of a "One Party System" of government which could deal resolutely with Japan's difficulties [p48752] at home and abroad.


Prime Minister Konoye, fortified by knowledge of the German proposal for a general military alliance, was of the opinion which admitted no compromise in China. On 7 September 1938 he discussed with Welfare Minister KIDO and others the situation which would arise upon the capture of Hankow. KIDO, himself a staunch supporter of Japanese domination in China, expressed the view that if indications of a Chinese capitulation did not eventuate it might be necessary to reopen negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Konoye then replied that if he should be forced to take that step he would resign, for the responsibility would be too great for him to bear. He spoke bitterly of the criticism to which he had been subjected by Foreign Minister Ugaki; and expressed his belief that the faction which had gathered round Ugaki would attempt to force the resignation of his Cabinet.

KIDO, as he had done in the political crisis of November 1937, immediately took the side of Konoye and the military faction. He said that if the political [p48753] situation should be dealt with according to Ugaki's policies, there might be disturbances within Japan which would lead to defeat at the hands of the Chinese. He therefore urged Konoye to muster up his courage and remain in office. KIDO's remarks on this occasion reveal his knowledge of the public approval which Ugaki's policy commanded.

Konoye, being now assured of KIDO's support, disclosed that he was privy to the Army's plot for establishing a dictatorship. He said he thought it possible that the proposed merger of political parties might place him at the head of a determined "one party system," so that the national policy might be pursued without further opposition in Japan. Konoye had not committed himself to any view upon this question, but he remained in office to see what would transpire.

The forces of the military faction ranged behind ITAGAKI, KIDO and Konoye, proved too strong for the Ugaki group. In this same month of September 1938 Ugaki left the Cabinet and Konoye himself assumed the duties of the Foreign Minister. The Government of Japan was once more committed to the steady pursuit of the aims set out in the national policy decision. [p48754]


At this point it is appropriate to review and analyse the changes in Army policy which had occurred since the attack at Lukouchiao. The war in China had been revived upon the initiative of the Army General Staff acting on TOJO's advice. It was the first step towards the achievement of the Army's plans for making war on the Soviet Union. In the last quarter of 1937 the Army General Staff became increasingly concerned lest the growing war in China should frustrate the major aims of the Army's planning. So alarmed did the military leaders become that, again acting upon their own initiative, they sought German mediation of the dispute.

In the result Chinese peace offers had been submitted through German agency in November and December 1937. They failed because Foreign Minister HIROTA was determined that there should be no compromise in dealing with China. Prime Minister Konoye, supported by KIDO and HIROTA, remained in office and pledged his Cabinet to have no further dealings with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This decision was taken at an Imperial Conference held on 11 January 1938.

Even at that late date General Tada, the [p48755] Vice-Chief and virtual head of the Army General Staff, was strongly in favour of seeking an immediate settlement of the China war. On 15 January 1938 a Liaison Conference, lasting eleven hours, was held to consider what new action should be taken against China. So vehemently did the Army Central Staff oppose the Cabinet's China policy that Tada attempted to have the decision of the Imperial Conference recalled. The Army was prepared to make any sacrifice which would end the fighting more quickly, so that preparations for war with the Soviet Union should no longer be impeded. Konoye and KIDO resolutely opposed the Army's view, and HIROTA's policy prevailed.

By May 1938 the economic and financial crisis which had threatened Japan since November 1937 had become more acute. Nor had Chinese resistance weakened. Although the Army had in the meantime secured the passage of the Mobilisation Law, the long-range programme of preparations for war and the plans for an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union were both gravely imperilled. Foreign Minister HIROTA, the man most responsible for this development, resigned his office, as did Finance Minister KAYA, who had not succeeded in averting an economic crisis. ITAGAKI and ARAKI, both leaders of the military faction, became members [p48756] of the Cabinet. TOJO, well versed in Japanese preparations for war against the U.S.S.R., succeeded UMEZU as War Vice-Minister.

At this tine also General Ugaki joined the Cabinet as HIROTA's successor in the Foreign Ministry. Ugaki had for many years held views which were in marked contrast to those of the military faction. So little did he enjoy their confidence that, in January 1937, the leaders of the Army had foiled his attempt to form a Cabinet. Nevertheless, on one particular matter, Ugaki's views accorded with those of the military leaders. He was known to favour the early settlement of the China war, even if that settlement could be obtained only by negotiation with the Chinese National Government.

TOJO, the new Vice-Minister of War, although he supported the Army's plans for an early attack upon the Soviet Union, maintained the view that the Army's aims in China must not be sacrificed through compromise. Prime Minister Konoye and Welfare Minister KILO, though they also desired an early settlement of the war in China, were committed to the view that Chinese resistance must first be crushed.

In July and August 1938 Japanese troops attacked the Soviet forces at Lake Khassan, and were [p48757] repulsed. After this experience the Army postponed its plans for forcing immediate war upon the Soviet Union.

In view of the intended delay, prompt settlement of the China war became less imperative. Although most members of the Army General Staff still favoured a negotiated peace in China, War Minister ITAGAKI agreed with TOJO that there should be no compromise with the Chinese National Government. Prime Minister Konoye adhered steadfastly to that opinion and found support in KIDO.

Once more the views of Foreign Minister Ugaki were in direct opposition to those of the military faction whose confidence was increased by the prospect of a closer military alliance with Germany and Italy. Ugaki left the Cabinet, and the Army's policy was again unchallenged.

The Army, by reconciling itself to the postponement of the attack on the Soviet Union, had secured the retention of the major aims of the 1936 national policy decision. The war in China would be ended only with the establishment of a new pro-Japanese central government, with which Japan could arrange peace upon her own terms. The new China would make a major contribution to the Japanese national mobilisation programme. [p48758]

In the meantime Japan would negotiate a military alliance with Germany, and would hasten the completion of her internal preparations for war. [p48759]


On 19 May 1938 the Army, in its commentary upon the purposes of the National General Mobilisation Law, had announced that the first requirement of the mobilisation was that of "spiritual" power, since the people themselves were the source of the nation's fighting strength. With this end in view educational institutions and propaganda organs would be mobilised for a unified campaign. In the Cabinet reorganisation which took place a week later General ARAKI, a soldier and a leader of the military faction, became the new Education Minister.

The very substantial measures of censorship and propaganda which had already been taken to prepare public opinion for war had been instituted by the Army in the years following the conquest of Manchuria; and for that development ARAKI was in large measure responsible. He became War Minister in December 1931, and held that appointment in the Inukai and Saito Cabinets until January 1934. During that period the Army's control over the expression of public opinion became firmly entrenched. Newspapers published the views which were acceptable to the military faction, and any adverse comment upon the Army's policy was met with threats or reprisals. [p48760] Statesmen, who ventured upon any criticism of the Army and its supporters, were also threatened. Political leaders, and even members of the Cabinet, were constantly shadowed by the police, who, though responsible to the Home Minister, acted in this matter upon the direction of War Minister ARAKI.

This close association between the Army and the police was maintained in subsequent years. From 1935 onwards the press was completely subject to police domination. When HIROTA's Cabinet took office in 1936 the police permitted no one to criticise the policy of the government; and after the Lukouchiao Incident all opposition to the war in China was rigorously suppressed. It is indicative of the close liaison which existed between Army and police that when, in August 1938, the Army's planning was revised, the new policy was at once expounded by SATO, the War Ministry's spokesman, to the assembled Chiefs of the Home Ministry's Police Bureau.

In the field of education the influence of ARAKI and the military faction had been no less great. Even before he became War Minister ARAKI had attempted to introduce in the universities the system of military training and instruction already established in Japanese schools. As War Minister in 1932 and 1933 he encouraged the extension of such training. The military instructors, [p48761] supplied by the War Ministry, gained an increased measure of control over the school authorities, and students were were taught to support the Army's expansionist aims.

The pressure exerted by the military faction during 1932 and 1933, and the constant intervention of the Army in matters of domestic and foreign policy, caused dissension within the Saito Cabinet. In January 1934 ARAKI left the War Ministry. Thereafter rather less importance was attached to military training, and instruction in schools until, in March 1936, HIROTA's Cabinet came to power.

After the revival of the war in China on 7 July 1937 all forms of control over public opinion were strengthened. The military instructors in schools acquired complete independence from the school authorities. Five months later, in November 1937, it was decided that the fundamental aim of all education should be that of promoting the cause of service to Japan. In the same month KIDO became Education Minister, and a start was made in converting the educational system to the task of fostering the warlike spirit of the Japanese nation. The police and Education Ministry authorities worked together to ensure that all university teachers should actively cooperate in preparing the minds of their students for war.

The Army's commentary upon the purposes of the Mobilisation Law stressed the need for the intensification [p48762] of this work; and ARAKI, being appointed Education Minister, was on 26 May 1938 given charge of it.


On 29 June 1938, one month after ARAKI's appointment as Education Minister, a new instruction was issued to school and local government authorities. This new Education Ministry Ordinance reflected the wishes expressed by the Army on 19 May 1938. By mobilising educational institutions for a unified campaign, all possible efforts would be made to intensify the fighting spirit of the Japanese people.

"It is the students and pupils," the Ordinance proclaimed, "which are the source of energy for national activities as well as the backbone of the nation. They must realize how great and important are their duties to the state."

It should therefore, the Ordinance continued, be the primary aim of the whole educational system to foster and develop the spirit of the nation.

"Every effort should be made to lay into the minds of youths the true significance of loyalty and patriotism, as well as to establish a spirit of self-sacrifice and public service."

Students should be given a clear understanding of Japan's "national structure," and of the "special characteristic" of her "national culture." [p48763] Training of a purely military nature was to be given a place of prominence. It would be used not only to develop the military abilities of the student, "so that he might do his part as a subject of the Imperial Empire," but also to instil the spirit of patriotism and implicit obedience to authority.

ARAKI continued the work which KIDO had begun. He held office as Education Minister from 26 May 1938 to 29 August 1939, when the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned. During this period the Japanese school system came completely under the domination of the military instructors whom the War Ministry had provided. Military training, as well as lectures, became compulsory in Japanese universities; and in both schools and universities all teaching was made to further the fundamental aim of cultivating a warlike spirit in the Japanese nation.


In September 1938 the Cabinet set out with renewed determination to achieve the objects of the Army's long-range economic and industrial planning. Already the programme of industrial regimentation within Japan was well advanced. In large measure it had been achieved through the device of national policy companies, organised under special [p48764] legislation for a specific governmental purpose. These companies were directly managed and controlled by the government and had very broad powers within their respective fields of enterprise. Approximately half of their capital was provided by the government, which also subsidized them and exempted them from taxation. KAYA, who as Finance Minister from 4 June 1937 to 26 May 1938, had superintended the creation of the new industrial hierarchy, was on 1 July 1938 appointed as adviser to the Finance Ministry.

In his August speeches SATO had warned the Chiefs of the Police Bureau that this process must go on.

"When we put into consideration the possible war with Russia," he had said, "our war production at the present is very inadequate."

Therefore the Army was insistent that the change from free to controlled industrial management should be permanent and should be obtained through the enforcement of the National General Mobilisation Law. In particular, SATO had indicated, this process would be used to meet the related problems of Japan's dependence upon importation, and of her precarious foreign exchange position.

Notwithstanding the exploitation of her subject territories and the drastic measures taken to repair the Japanese economy and to adjust her trade [p48765] balance, subsidies upon a steeply increasing scale were being paid to the war-supporting industries within Japan itself. The Cabinet's determination to pursue the objects of the national mobilization for war is well illustrated by the new measures taken at a time of grave financial embarrassment. On 16 September 1938 a new national policy company with a capital of fifty million yen was formed to exploit the gold resources of Japan and of the continental areas under her control.

New steps were also taken to conserve those war materials the supply of which depended upon importation. On 21 November 1938 regulations were made for the collection and utilization of scrap iron and steel. A control company, having a monopoly over the distribution and sale of scrap, was established and placed under governmental control.

In the latter half of 1938, however, the main expenditure was upon the development of China into an economic and industrial asset, as well as upon military operations in that country. The budget for the War Ministry alone increased from 2,750,000,000 yen in 1937 to 4,250,000,000 yen in 1938. The 1938 budget for the armed forces as a whole was three quarters of the total national budget for that year. The object of this vast expenditure was to complete the national [p48765-a] mobilization for war and, by subduing Chinese resistance, to open up new fields of natural resources and war-supporting industrial potential. It was an Army policy which had found its latest expression in the speeches of Colonel SATO. [p48766]


On 29 July 1938 Ambassador TOGO, making his last bid for German economic assistance, had admitted to von Ribbentrop that Japan proposed to extend her dominion until it embraced the whole of China. This aim, which was again stressed in SATO's August speeches, became the cardinal feature of Japanese policy during the last four months of 1938. In Central and in South China the Army gained victories, which placed the Japanese in control of substantially larger portions of Chinese territory. In North and Central China the Japanese system of political control and economic domination was strengthened and extended. Although Chinese resistance was not ended, Japan achieved in a considerable degree that "steady footing in the Eastern continent" which the 1936 national policy decision had demanded.

After Foreign Minister Ugaki's resignation in September 1938, the Army's goal of conquest in China received unqualified support from the Konoye Cabinet, of which ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were members. Since 20 July 1938 General MATSUI had been a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council. Earlier in the China war, from 30 October 1937 to 5 March 1938, he had commanded [p48767] the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Central China. The military offensives, which began in July 1938, after the Cabinet reorganization had taken place, were continued during September and October 1938.

On 20 October 1938, Canton, the principal city of Southern China, was captured by the Japanese. Five days later, on 25 October 1938, the Japanese forces in Central China attained their objective by taking the city of Hankow. This success they exploited by advancing further into Central China.

In south China, where Japanese influence was smallest, a start was to be made in aiding the reconstruction and development of the territory subdued. The Planning Board announced that immediate action was necessary to consolidate the achievements of Japan's military triumph in that area. In North and in Central China a Japanese-controlled political and administrative system had already been established. The Army's planning for those areas called for reconstruction, economic exploitation and the expansion of the war-supporting industries.

On 3 November 1938 Prime Minister Konoye made a radio speech, in which he heralded the advent of a new phase in Japanese policy towards China. He spoke of "economic collaboration," which would be achieved [p48768] through the development of China's natural resources. This, said Konoye, was the basic step in achieving Japan's purpose of a "new, ideal order" in East Asia. Reconstruction measures were as vital and urgent as military operations and political activities. Through these measures the Kuomintang government would be crushed, and the new pro-Japanese China would be consolidated.


On 16 December 1938 permanent machinery was established to secure Japan's political and administrative control of China; for on that date a new bureau of the Cabinet was created to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of that country. The Asia Development Board (Ko-A-In) would have a permanent staff of one hundred and fifty persons, but this number might be increased at the Prime Minister's pleasure. The Premier himself would be its President by virtue of his office. Similarly the War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers would be its Vice-Presidents. The permanent secretariat would be heeded by a Director-General and four section chiefs.

The new board would guide the political, economic and cultural development of China. It would also coordinate all those aspects of Chinese [p48769] administration which were to be conducted by departments of the Japanese government.

The significance of the Asia Development Board is twofold. In the first place it provided a means of bringing the affairs of subjugated China within the immediate purview of those five Cabinet Ministers whose offices were most vital to the conduct of the national mobilisation for war. It was the conference of Five Ministers which had, in 1936, settled the basis of the national policy. It was this same group to which the German proposal for a military alliance had first been referred by Foreign Minister Ugaki in August 1938. It was this "inner Cabinet" which was now to control the development of China, both as an integral portion of Japan's "new order," and as a contributory to her preparations for further armed expansion.

In the second place there was provided a permanent secretariat, whose exclusive function it was to watch over developments in China, to regulate and administer Japan's conduct of Chinese affairs, and to ensure that no matter of importance affecting China escaped the attention of the Japanese Cabinet.

On the day of its inception, Major-General [p48770] Depot, became one of the four section chiefs of the Asia Development Board.


As SATO had pointed out, military successes in China were merely the stepping- stones to the achievement of political and economic aims. After the victories of October 1938 had been gained, the Konoye Cabinet devoted its attention to achieving in China those economic and industrial developments which had been foreshadowed in the Army's 1937 planning. The new programme was to follow the same pattern of regimentation which had been adopted in Manchukuo and in Japan itself.

In his radio speech of 3 November 1938 Prime Minister Konoye had described the manner in which this result would be obtained. The chief agencies for the economic development of North and Central China would be the two great national policy companies which had been created on 30 April 1938. The North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, said Konoye, had been established to carry out Japan's policy. He explained that these two holding corporations would finance the subsidiary [p48771] companies directly engaged in particular aspects of reconstruction and industrial development. The Central China company would undertake the reestablishment of an area which had been ravaged by warfare; but the North China company would make an immediate contribution to the needs of Japan's preparations for war. For in North China the destruction caused by fighting had not been so great; and in that area was an abundance of iron, coal and other natural resources, the development of which would be exploited.

The political and economic, as well as the military, measures carried out in China were the product of the Army's planning. Lieutenant-General TOJO's determination to conquer China and to exploit its resources was in a great degree responsible for what had been achieved. When War Minister ITAGAKI was irresolute, TOJO had been firm; and ultimately ITAGAKI had come to share his views.

As Vice-Minister of War since 30 May 1938, TOJO had held appointments which brought him into intimate contact with each major aspect of the mobilisation for war. He had been, in addition, a member of the organisating committee of the two national policy companies which were to control and [p48772] dominate the economies of North and Central China. On 10 December 1938, when the Army's plans for China were already in course of achievement, TOJO resigned his principal office and became Inspector-General of the Army Air Forces.


After the meeting on 9 August 1938, at which the German proposal for a general military alliance had been considered, the Cabinet was content to leave the matter in the hands of the military. OSHIMA was advised by the Army General Staff that both Cabinet and Army were in favour of the proposal which von Ribbentrop had made. It was desired, however, that the new alliance should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union.

The Cabinet's acquiescence in this proposal shows the extent of the influence which the Army had gained over Japanese foreign policy. The relationship which had grown up between Japan and Germany had been developed and maintained by the Army through the agency of Kajor-General OSHIMA.

OSHIMA had first taken up his post as Military Attache in Berlin in May 1934. His instructions then [p48773] were to appraise the stability of the Nazi regime, the potential worth of the German Army, and the attitude which would be taken in Germany, should the Soviet Union become involved in war. OSHIMA had become a confidant of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and through this association the Army had contrived to maintain its relationship with Germany. This connection the Army had used as on indirect means of influencing Japanese foreign policy.

The Anti-Comintern Pact, concluded in Berlin in November 1936, had arisen out of discussions hold between von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA with the approval of the Army General Staff. In November 1937 the Army General Staff resorted to the same method in an attempt to change the Konoye Cabinet's policy towards China. Foreign Minister HIROTA reluctantly accepted a German tender of "good offices" in settlement of the China war, which had caused an estrangement between the Anti- Comintern partners. This attempt at mediation, which appeared to be made upon German initiative, was also prompted by OSHIMA at the instance of the Japanese Army General Staff, Finally, the German proposal for a general military alliance, conveyed to the Konoye Cabinet on 9 August 1938, was itself the outcome of an undisclosed arrangement between the German authorities [p48773a] and members of the Army General Staff.

In the formulation of this last proposal OSHIMA had himself taken the initiative In the early months of 1938 he had received advice from the division of the Army General Staff directly concerned with such matters that, in their opinion the time was opportune for a general military alliance between Japan and Germany. Although his informants had made it clear that they did not speak for the Army General Staff as a whole, OSHIMA had advised the Germans that the Japanese Army desired to conclude such an alliance. OSHIMA himself had outlined its contents, and, together with von Ribbentrop, had settled the text of the draft proposal. Only then had the Army General Staff approved it, and handed it to Foreign Minister Ugaki as a proposal made upon German initiative. The negotiation between von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA had been carried on without TOGO's knowledge during the very months in which the Ambassador was discussing, on his government's behalf, the terms of German economic participation in the occupied areas of China. [p48774]


In September and October 1938, following Foreign Minister Ugaki's resignation, changes in diplomatic representation were made. These changes revealed that the Cabinet, though yet unwilling to make a positive commitment, shared the Army's eagerness for a closer alliance with Germany.

Since immediate war with the Soviet Union was not now contemplated, there was need for a more conciliatory attitude towards that country. During August 1938 Japan's defeat at Lake Khassan had caused the abandonment of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU's bluntly worded demands for the cession of Soviet territory on the Manchukuoan border. On 22 September 1938 SHIGEMITSU was relieved of his appointment as Ambassador in Moscow, and was sent to London in a similar capacity. He was succeeded in Moscow by TOGO, whose experience as Ambassador in Berlin fitted him to carry out a less aggressive policy. During the preceding year he had laboured to convince the Germans of the sincerity of promises which Japan did not intend to keep.

TOGO'S removal to Moscow served a double purpose for he was now discredited with the Germans. On 8 October [p48775] 1938 he was succeeded as Ambassador in Berlin by OSHIMA, his Military Attache. Already OSHIMA's activities had in large measure usurped TOGO'S diplomatic functions and undermined his authority. In 1937, while TOGO was giving assurances of Japan's determination to complete the conquest of China, von Ribbentrop had learnt from OSHIMA of the Japanese Army's desire to negotiate a settlement of the China war. In 1938 TOGO, in pursuance of HIROTA's policy, had offered Germany a preferred position in the occupied areas of China, while OSHIMA's advice had raised German hopes of concluding a military alliance among the three Axis powers. In August 1938 the emptiness of TOGO'S promises had been fully revealed, and in the same month OSHIMA's work had received the Konoye Cabinet's general approval.

OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador was therefore an event of great significance. It set the seal of the Cabinet's approval upon negotiations for a military alliance made in contemplation of war with the Soviet Union. It placed a soldier, who enjoyed the complete confidence of the Army, in a position until then occupied by a professional diplomat. It was a triumph for the Army in the field of Japanese foreign policy, and a step forward in the Army's preparations for war. [p48776]

OSHIMA's preferment was an assurance to the Germans that Japan now genuinely desired to act in concert with Germany and Italy. OSHIMA himself, with enhanced status and prestige, was free to work with von Ribbentrop for the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance.

This work was also to be carried out in Italy. On 22 September 1938, two weeks before OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador in Berlin, SHIRATORI, who had long desired war with the Soviet Union, was appointed Ambassador in Rome. He himself regarded it as his principal task to achieve the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers.

SHIRATORI's appointment provides another important illustration of the triumph of the Amy's policy in foreign affairs. His association with the military faction had been a long one. From 31 October 1930 to 2 June 1933 he was Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department; and during this period he showed himself to be a strong supporter of the Army's programme of conquest and expansion. In May 1932, a few weeks before the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai, there was a cleavage within the Cabinet and civil service between those who supported the liberal policy of the Premier, and those who adhered to the "Kodo" or military [p48777] faction which was led by War Minister ARAKI. SHIRATORI was at this time prominent among the group of Foreign Ministry officials who joined the Army in clamouring for Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. In his view, membership of that body was inconsistent with Japan's position following the conquest of Manchuria.

Four months later, when the Saito Cabinet was in office, SHIRATORI again voiced the views of the military faction. He maintained that Japan's difficulties were due to the lack of a strong government. He therefore urged the appointment of War Minister ARAKI as Premier, saying that ARAKI, as a "representative of the powerful militarists", would proceed with an unwavering policy for the next five or six years.

SHIRATORI regarded his own presence in Tokyo as important to the maintenance of the views he advocated and was therefore unwilling to accept an overseas appointment. Nevertheless, on 2 June 1933, he became Minister to the countries of Scandinavia, and, during his term of office abroad, supported the Army view that Japan should launch an attack upon the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment.

On 28 April 1937, three months before the Lukouchino Incident occurred, SHIRATORI was recalled to Tokyo and assigned to temporary duty with the Foreign [p48778] Ministry.

During the early months of 1938 he toured North and Central China, and found that his views upon foreign policy accorded well with those of Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI.

In June 1938, within two weeks of his appointment as War Minister, ITAGAKI urged Konoye to appoint SHIRATORI as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. This request was soon afterwards supported by the younger Foreign Ministry officials in a petition presented by Okawa to Foreign Minister Ugaki. Konoye considered the proposal to be politically expedient, but Ugaki and senior Foreign Ministry officials were opposed to it, and the appointment was not made.

In August 1938 the Cabinet accepted the proposal for a military alliance with Germany and Italy, while the Army revised its plans for war with the U.S S.R. Ugaki's resignation in September 1938 represented a triumph for the Army and its supporters, both in domestic and in foreign policy. In that month OSHIMA became Ambassador in Berlin and SHIRATORI was sent as Ambassador to Rome.


With this assistance from the Cabinet, the Army [p48779] made new efforts to consolidate its friendship with the Germans. On 2 October 1938 War Minister ITAGAKI sent to Hitler a telegram expressing the Army's deep admiration for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue in Czechoslovakia. He prayed that Germany's national fortunes might continue to rise, and that "the friendship of the German and Japanese Armies, united on the anti- Comintern front", would "be strengthened more than over".

In Berlin Ambassador OSHIMA was furthering the aim of closer cooperation between the German and Japanese Armies. In September or October 1938 he sent out espionage agents across the Soviet frontier, and negotiated with German military leaders for the exchange of information relating to the Soviet forces.

Meanwhile the scheme for a tripartite alliance was receiving attention both in Rome and in Berlin. The Germans had discussed the plan with Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Ciano. Mussolini, though not yet ready to conclude an alliance, had expressed fundamental agreement with the scheme.

The text of the proposed alliance was worked out by OSHIMA, von Ribbentrop and Ciano as a result of direct consultation. The period of its duration was set at ten years. A new provision, in the form of a "no separate [p48780] peace" pact, was added; and a draft protocol, providing for immediate consultation when the obligation to furnish assistance arose, was also prepared.

In December 1938 OSHIMA, with permission from Japan, visited Rome, but found that Mussolini was still not ready to consider the immediate conclusion of the alliance.

We will recess until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200 a recess was taken.) [p48781]


The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment:


In November 1936, when the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded, a secret military agreement was made between Japan and Germany. The Germans had then declared that the spirit of this latter agreement would alone be decisive in determining their attitude towards the Soviet Union and that that agreement would also, if occasion should arise, form the basis of a further development in German-Japanese relations. It was this development upon which the Army was now engaged.

During October 1938 Arita became Foreign Minister, taking over an appointment which Prime Minister Konoye had himself assumed after Ugaki's resignation in the previous month. None was better acquainted than Arita with the Army's plans for he had held office as Foreign Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet. In that capacity he had attended the important series [p48782] of Five Ministers' conferences at which the basis of the national policy was decided. As Foreign Minister during that period Arita had directed the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the secret military agreement between Germany and Japan. When, in November 1936, that pact had come before the Privy Council for ratification, Arita had acted as the Cabinet's spokesman.

On 22 November 1938 an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany was ratified by the Privy Council. HIRANUMA presided at the Council meeting and ITAGAKI and ARAKI, Ministers of War and Education respectively, were in attendance. Once more Arita was the spokesman for a measure designed to strengthen the relationship between Japan and Germany.

The agreement, which recited that cultural relations between the two countries should be based upon their respective national spirits, had been approved by the Council's Investigating Committee. This body reported that the agreement might strengthen ties of friendship and the "promotion of the cause," as well as contributing to the attainment of the general aims of Japanese diplomacy.

As had been the case when the Anti-Comintern Pact was ratified, some Councillors were still [p48783] apprehensive of the real significance of the Cabinet's pro-German policy. Arita gave assurances that the new agreement had no political implications but these did not satisfy one Councillor, who remarked that "the tendency to go with the German stream is not at all deniable in this country of late. In view of this fact," he added, "I repeat and hope that there should be some means to guard against all possible mistakes on the part of our nation before the agreement is ratified."

The considerations which, two years earlier, had governed the Cabinet's policy towards Germany, still obtained. The record of this Privy Council meeting makes it clear that public opinion in Japan did not yet contemplate a close alliance with Germany and Italy. Arita had discounted the significance of the cultural treaty because the Cabinet was not ready to admit that such an alliance was intended. Furthermore, KIDO and others had expressed the fear that the form of alliance which Germany had proposed might prove an onerous commitment. Subject to these two limiting factors, the Konoye Cabinet had done everything possible to hasten the time when Japan's internal preparations for war would be reinforced by a tripartite military alliance of the three Axis powers. [p48784]


Although the proposed military alliance with Germany and Italy was at Japan's insistence to be directed primarily against the Soviet Union, it was inevitable that the new proposal should affect adversely Japan's relations with the Western powers. When in August 1938 Prime Minister Konoye first received the German proposal for a general military alliance, he was advised also of Germany's views upon the international situation. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop considered that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable; that Hungary and Czechoslovakia were potential allies, and that Roumania would remain neutral. It would not, he thought, be possible to separate France and Great Britain, and he implied that these countries were potential enemies by remarking that the United States would aid them financially, but not militarily. It was known to the Japanese that von Ribbentrop had discussed the proposed alliance at length with Hitler himself before submitting it for their approval.

It was therefore apparent to the Cabinet and Army that Germany contemplated an alliance directed in part against the Western powers. The Cabinet had acquiesced in that proposal by agreeing to the negotiation [p48785] of a treaty which would be directed, not only against the U.S.S.R. but also against all other countries.

In this same month of August 1938 the Army had reviewed its plans for launching an immediate attack upon the Soviet Union, and had concentrated its efforts upon establishing Japan's "new order" in China. By December 1933 the expansionist aims of the 1936 national policy decision had in large measure been attained. The existence of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" was openly proclaimed and Japan's position in that area demanded, in the words of the national policy decision, that she should "exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers."

"Britain and Russia," said Colonel SATO on 25 August 1938, "are in the back of China, aiding her directly and indirectly, greatly hampering our field of operations."

There occurred during these latter months of 1938 a pronounced deterioration in Japan's already strained relations with the Western powers. The execution of the Army's long-range planning had reached a stage at which protestations of friendship and respect for treaties were no longer plausible. Although the leaders of Japan were not yet ready for war, they were prepared to speak and act more boldly. The mobilization was partially achieved, and there was now the promise of [p48786] German assistance. The occupation of China appeared to be making steady progress and the existence of Japan's new empire could no longer be denied.

These developments, which have now to be examined in more detail, did not indicate any change in policy. Japan, while completing her preparations for war, would still "strive to maintain amicable relations with the Powers"; but the aims of the national policy decision were to "be attained in spite of all difficulties." The new attitude towards the Western powers is indicated by SATO in his August speeches to the police chiefs.

"We shall recognize the rights and interest of Britain to a limited degree," he said, "and have them cut all relations with Chiang Kai-shek."


Since the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao on 7 July 1937 there had been a steadily lengthening list of Japanese violations of the rights and interests of the Western powers in China. Frequent attacks had been made upon British and American citizens and property in China and these had formed the subject of repeated diplomatic protests.

Equally damaging to Japan's relations with the [p48787] Western powers had been the systematic violation of her treaty obligation to maintain the "open door," or equality of commercial opportunity, in China. The clearest substantiation of these practices came from German sources. On 24 July 1938 the German representative in China advised their government that the Japanese military authorities were striving to subjugate the economies of China and Inner Mongolia. Japan, they said, intended that the economies of these countries should benefit her exclusively and that all foreign interests should be eliminated.

In response to foreign protests the Japanese authorities had professed a regard for treaty obligations, expressing regret for incidents which had occurred and pleading the exigencies of war. But in June 1938 when ITAGAKI and ARAKI had joined KIDO as members of the Konoye Cabinet there appeared gradually a new spirit of assertiveness.

At the end of July 1938 the British Ambassador in Tokyo presented a summary of his country's outstanding grievances. Foreign Minister Ugaki, while expressing his willingness to settle these claims, told the Ambassador that a settlement would be reached more easily if Great Britain would be more friendly towards Japan and would cease to support Generalissimo Chiang. [p48788] As Japan had made no declaration of war upon China, there was no justification for complaint that other countries should offer assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government's forces. Furthermore, Great Britain and other countries which were members of the League of Nations were pledged to support the resolution passed by the League on 6 October 1937. It had then been resolved that, in view of the aggressive nature of Japanese activities in China, all member states should refrain from taking any action which might weaken Chinese resistance and that each state should consider what steps it might take to offer China positive aid.

The real significance of Ugaki's statement is the implication that Japan was determined to exert pressure in order to gain the acquiescence of the Western powers in the subjugation of China. This policy was made clear in the following month.

In August 1938 the Japanese demanded that Great Britain and France should suppress pro-Chinese activities within their respective concessions at Tientsin. These activities afforded Japan no ground for complaint in international law nor would their suppression have been in keeping with the tenor of the League's resolution. Yet the British and French authorities were threatened with the evacuation of areas which their [p48789] countries rightfully occupied, should they fail to comply with Japanese demands.

After Ugaki's resignation in September 1938 the new spirit of defiance became more pronounced. During the last quarter of 1938 after Arita had taken office as Foreign Minister, there was for the first time an open acknowledgment of Japan's intention to violate her treaty obligations. It is therefore necessary to examine with some particularity the frequent interchange of diplomatic communications which occurred during this period.


On 3 October 1938 Joseph C. Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, presented a summary of his country's complaints. He said that assurances as to the observance of the "open door" principle and the protection of United States interests in China had not been kept. He emphasized that there could be no "open door" as long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax and prohibit trade was in Japanese hands.

Three days later Grew supported this protest in a detailed communication which pointed out that [p48790] Japanese companies in Manchukuo had been placed in a specially favored position, that restrictions upon the movement of goods had imposed upon foreign traders a handicap not shared by their Japanese competitors, and that already there was evidence that these measures would be applied in the rest of China also. In that country United States citizens were being kept away from their properties upon the pretext of military necessity. American ships had been denied passage on the lower reaches of the Yangtse, although Japanese merchant vessels continued to use them. The port at Tsingtao was in Japanese hands.

At first these complaints evoked only a conciliatory answer from a Foreign Office spokesman who said that such conditions were due to the exigencies of the war situation and that other nations should understand Japan's position. But gradually there emerged the doctrine of the "new order" in East Asia. On 3 November 1938 Premier Konoye announced that Japan would cooperate with any Third Power which appreciated her real intentions and adopted a policy that conformed to the new state of affairs.

On 18 November 1938 Arita made a general reply to these complaints, pointing again to the exigencies of the war situation and stating that the principles of the [p48791] pre-incident regime could not be applied now that Japan was striving for her "New Order in East Asia." The United States representative told Arita that this reply represented a wholesale denial of American demands and the Foreign Minister responded that it was extremely illogical to apply the principle of the "open door" to China only. Ambassador Grew again emphasized the adherence of the United States to treaty obligations and to the "open door" principles; and, by so doing, he elicited from Arita a more explicit reply. It was difficult, said Arita, for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of the "open door" principle at the present time though she wished to cooperate with Third Powers. Measures necessary for fostering the closer relations of China and Japan might at times necessitate the elimination of the practice of such principles but there would still be considerable room left for the economic activities of other countries. He could give no assurance upon the Yangtse question.

Two days later after this exchange of views was completed, Ambassador Grew complained that earlier in November 1938 the Maritime Customs at Canton had been taken over by Japanese consular and military authorities, constituting yet another violation of the "open door" principle. This time Arita made the Japanese standpoint [p48792] quite clear. He said that the application, in their original form, of the various treaties for preventing international disputes in the Orient "rather hampered the bringing about of Peace and Universal Prosperity." Japan, he said, agreed in principle with the "open door" policy, but must be allowed "most favored relations" with China and Manchukuo, as was the case within the British Empire. Monopolies would be sanctioned to attend to vital defence needs, but in general no special discrimination would be practised against Third Powers.

Grew stated that his government could not recognize any unilateral alteration in a treaty obligation; and on 30 December 1938 presented a further reply to Arita insisting that any alteration in the status quo should be effected at a conference of the powers. Thereafter conversations were suspended for a considerable period.


During the last quarter of 1938 there was a further development in Japanese policy calculated to intensify difficulty with the Western powers. On 17 July 1937, ten days after the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao, France had contracted to supply through [p48793] Indo-China arms and munitions for the Chinese National Government's forces. This contract constituted no breach of the law of neutrality, for Japan at no time made a declaration of war upon China. Nevertheless Japan had lodged repeated protests with the French authorities, and as a result of this pressure France had undertaken in October 1937 to cease the delivery of war supplies upon the completion of the existing contract.

On 26 October 1939, after Arita's assumption of office as Foreign Minister, Japan complained that weapons were still being transported through French Indo-China to the Kuomintang forces. The French authorities denied that the Yunnan railway was being used for this purpose and refused to adopt the measures demanded by the Japanese.

Nevertheless Japan continued to maintain that the Yunnan railway was being used to transport military supplies to China. On 9 December 1938 the Japanese Naval General Staff was, with Arita's approval, advised that the Foreign Ministry saw no objection to the bombing of the railway within Chinese territory in so far as operational circumstances might require it. It had previously been decided that the operational and political effects of this action would be very great, but that it would not cause "too much" alarm in France, [p48794] Great Britain or the United States.

In keeping with this policy was a decision taken two weeks earlier at a conference of Five Ministers. On 25 November 1938 it was resolved by this body, of which War Minister ITAGAKI was a member, that the island of Hainan would, on case of necessity, be captured by military action. This Chinese island lay opposite to and dominated the coast of northern French Indo-China.


During this same period Japan severed her remaining connections with the League of Nations. On 22 September 1938 Foreign Minister Ugaki had conveyed Japan's refusal to join the League committee set up to investigate the situation in China. A week after receipt of this reply the League had resolved that individual nations should apply sanctions against Japan and should give all possible assistance to China.

On 2 November 1938, immediately following the announcement of the League resolution to apply sanctions, a Privy Council meeting was held. Among those in attendance were HIRANUMA, President of the Privy Council, Prime Minister Konoye, Education Minister ARAKI, Welfare Minister KIDO and War Minister ITAGAKI. [p48795] The Investigating Committee reported that since Japan's withdrawal from the League she had voluntarily continued to participate in various subsidiary organizations and activities. However the League had championed China's cause and had now resolved to apply sanctions against Japan. Although no concrete action had yet been taken, Japan and the League would be in complete opposition as long as the resolution stood. Therefore Japan must sever all relations with the League but would continue to rule the South Sea Islands in conformity with the provisions of the League covenant and the Mandatory Rules. She would as before furnish an annual report of her administration as a mandatory power. The Privy Council adopted the Investigating Committee's report, resolving unanimously that relations with the League of Nations be severed.

This decision coincided with the first acknowledgments of Japan's intention to dominate East Asia. The Army's program of expansion through military power was by its very nature a denial of the rights of the community of nations; and, as the scheme progressed, this fact was inevitably becoming more apparent. In the year 1933 the League's condemnation of the conquest of Manchuria had prompted Japan to renounce her membership [p48796] of that body. In subsequent years the leaders of Japan had consistently avoided any international commitment which was incompatible with the execution of the Army's plans. Now that the objects of that planning had been in part attained, the leaders of Japan took the final step of withdrawal from the international community.

Nevertheless, the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China and the provisions of the League covenant relating to the islands of the South Seas constituted two substantial commitments which were still binding upon Japan. These obligations Japanese spokesmen had professed to respect for it was a principle of the national policy decision that Japan, while preparing for war, should "strive to maintain amicable relations with the powers." The events of recent months in China had compelled Foreign Minister Arita to admit that his country no longer intended to observe the strict letter of treaties relating to the Orient. This new declaration of policy was attributed to the changed situation in the Far East, although Japanese aggression was responsible for the changes which had occurred.

Under the League covenant from which Japan derived her authority as a mandatory, the erection of military fortifications was forbidden in the South Seas [p48797] area. The work of fortification, started three or more years earlier, was now proceeding at increased speed throughout the Japanese Mandated Islands. It was, however, still a closely guarded secret; and, where deceit was still practicable, the leaders of Japan resorted to it. The Privy Council reaffirmed Japan's intention to administer these islands in accordance with the provisions of the League covenant.


On 3 November 1938 the Konoye Cabinet issued an official policy statement concerning the future of "Greater East Asia." This declaration, made upon the day following the decision to sever relations with the League of Nations, described the advent of Japan's "new order" in the vague and grandiose terms which Okawa and other publicists had popularized.

It was inevitable, as those who framed the basic national policy decision had realized, that those developments would incur the enmity of the Western powers. Already Japan was mobilizing her entire resources for the time when further expansion could be achieved only by recourse to war with these countries. Under cover of secrecy a new navy was being built and naval bases were being prepared for war in the Pacific. [p48798] Nor was this preparation a mere defensive precaution against foreign intervention in the new empire which Japan was building upon the continent of Asia for Japan had designs upon the territories of countries other than China and the Soviet Union. The

basic national policy decision had set a second goal - that of "developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence."

Already Japan was making preparations for a southward advance. Between May and December 1938 officials of the Japanese government were preparing to conduct a propaganda campaign in the Netherlands East Indies. It was planned to publish a newspaper in the Malay language with the avowed intention of preparing for Japan's "march to the south."

These ultimate aims of Japanese policy are reflected in a speech made at this time by Education Minister ARAKI. On 7 November 1938, four days after the Cabinet had issued its proclamation upon the future of "Greater East Asia," ARAKI gave a radio address which marked the fifteenth anniversary of an Imperial Rescript upon the "Awakening of the National Spirit." ARAKI reviewed Japanese successes in China, which he characterized as one phase in the fulfilment of this Rescript; but he warned his audience that the fundamental [p48799] question did not lie in the China Incident, which was merely a sign of the "new world peace." He expressed his belief that Japan was in a position to play an important role in the coming new world and that she must therefore be prepared for any emergency.

"Whatever Chiang Kai-shek or the world may say about us," he continued, "we must push forward, slowly but steadily, towards the construction of a new world, ever storing up the national strength, ever reflecting upon our own essence and ever eradicating the roots of evils, as the subjects of a glorious country who is holding a heavy responsibility upon themselves at this dawn of a new world."


The achievement of these ultimate aims demanded that Japan should consolidate her hold upon China and redouble her efforts to achieve the national mobilization for war. In the pronouncements of November and December 1938 these immediate tasks were emphasized. The Konoye Cabinet, in its proclamation of 3 November 1938, announced that the National Government of China had been reduced to a local regime. As long as that government retained its pro-Communist anti-Japanese policy, the [p48800] statement continued, Japan would not lay down her arms until it had been utterly destroyed for Japan intended to establish her "new order" through collaboration with Manchukuo and the new China. On 29 November 1938 Foreign Minister Arita, in making a review of Japanese policy towards China, repeated these aims and intentions.

From these declarations it is apparent that the Cabinet still regarded the Soviet Union as the most immediate obstacle to the achievement of her ambitions. War with the Western powers was now an ultimate probability but the U.S.S.R. was the proximate enemy, whose growing strength was a constant challenge to the Japanese goal of supremacy in East Asia.

On 22 December 1938, six days after the Asia Development Board had been established, Prime Minister Konoye issued an official statement which made the Cabinet's policy even more explicit. He reiterated once again his Cabinet's firm resolve "to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti- Japanese Kuomintang government," while "proceeding with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia." Konoye went on to say that the existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia could not be tolerated and that an agreement, in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact, must be concluded with the new [p48801] China and with Manchukuo. Japan, he said, would demand the right to station troops in the new China, in Manchukuo, and in Inner Mongolia, as an anti-Communist measure. China would also be expected to extend to Japan facilities for the development of her natural resources, particularly those in the areas of North China and Inner Mongolia.


There was nothing of irresolution in the tenor of Konoye's speech. Yet, two days later, on 24 December 1938, the Prime Minister was once more talking of tendering his Cabinet's resignation. His period of office since 4 June 1937 had been marked by recurrent political crises, which had on several occasions prompted him to threaten to resign. Each threat had served only as a stimulus to the military faction, which had prevailed upon him to remain in office. On each occasion opposition to the development of the Army's plans had been overridden. While Konoye was Premier those plans had come to fruition. Japan had founded her "new order" on the Asiatic continent, and the national general mobilization for war had been undertaken wholeheartedly. [p48802]

Konoye, himself a consistent supporter of the Army's program of conquest and preparation for war, had encountered little opposition to the execution of the general scheme; but the detailed measures taken to achieve the Army's aims had been subjected to recurrent criticism from within the Cabinet and without. In August 1938 Konoye had hoped to be placed at the head of a pre-party system of government in which the military faction would speak with one unchallenged voice. That hope, however, had not been realized.

It would seem that discontentment must again have been voiced by those who doubted the wisdom of some aspect of the Cabinet's present policies. As before, Konoye was urged to retain the premiership. HIRANUMA, the President of the Privy Council, advised him that in view of the existing situation in China he should remain in office. Welfare Minister KIDO and War Minister ITAGAKI met the Premier to discuss "the development of the scheme." Major-General SUZUKI, the newly appointed head of the Political Affairs Section of the Asia Development Board, believed that Konoye should carry on. This time, however, their solicitations were of no avail. On 4 January 1939 Konoye tendered the resignation of his Cabinet.

The ensuing change was a change in leadership [p48803] only. The coterie of important political leaders, who had worked with Konoye to accomplish the aims of the basic national policy decisions, without exception remained in office. Konoye became President of the Privy Council and HIRANUMA, whom he succeeded in that office, became the new Prime Minister.

War Minister ITAGAKI, Foreign Minister Arita, and Education Minister ARAKI retained their respective offices. KIDO became Home Minister in the new Cabinet, and SUZUKI retained his recently acquired positions as a member of the Information Bureau and as a section chief of the Asia Development Board.

Prime Minister HIRANUMA had held the presidency of the Privy Council from 13 March 1936 during the whole period since HIROTA's Cabinet first embarked upon the development of the Amy's schemes. On 25 November 1936 he had attended the Council meeting held in the Emperor's presence, at which the ratification of the Anti-Comintern Pact was unanimously approved. On 6 November 1937 he had presided over the Privy Council meeting which admitted Italy to participation in that treaty. On 20 January 1937 HIRANUMA had presided over the meeting which resolved that the Japanese mandated Islands might be placed under naval administration, because they had come to hold an important place in the [p48804] defence of the Empire.

In January 1938 HIRANUMA expressed his approval of the long-range foreign policy formulated by Foreign Minister HIROTA and supported HIROTA'S view that the war in China must be fought to a finish. On 29 November 1938, little more than a month before HIRANUMA accepted the premiership, Foreign Minister Arita had explained in detail to the Privy Councillors his policy towards China, which, in all essential respects, embodied HIROTA's planning and the principles of the basic national policy decision.

On 2 November 1938 HIRANUMA, as President, presided over the Privy Council meeting which resolved unanimously to sever Japan's remaining connections with the League of Nations, and on 22 November 1938 he attended the Council meeting in the Emperor's presence at which the agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany was approved.

Even before the conquest of Manchuria HIRANUMA had achieved a position of pre- eminence among the leaders of the military faction. During the decade before HIROTA's Cabinet came to power he had held office as a Vice-President of the Privy Council. In July 1931 he was also the President of the Kokuhonsha, a secret society pledged to foster and exalt the spirit [p48805] of the Japanese nation. Among the directors of this organization was Lieutenant- General KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, who three months earlier had been a party to an Army plot to overthrow the liberal Wakatsuki Cabinet.

This month of July 1931 was a critical time in the development of the Army's schemes. Already there was a sharp cleavage between the advocates of Army leadership and those who supported the Wakatsuki Cabinet. Two months later the Mukden Incident occurred. In December 1931 ARAKI became, as War Minister, the active leader of the movement for military supremacy in Japan and military domination In Manchuria.

In July 1931 ARAKI was recognized by the liberals as a man whose presence near the Emperor was dangerous. He also was a director of the Kokuhonsha, over which HIRANUMA presided. It is indicative of HIRANUMA's importance as a leader of the military faction that, at the very outset of Japan's career of conquest and expansion the most prominent members of that faction should look to him for leadership. Among the liberals, and even within the ranks of the Army, ARAKI was then regarded as a follower of HIRANUMA. [p48806]


On 5 January 1939 when HIRANUMA became Prime Minister Japan had embarked upon a program of conquest and territorial expansion which could not readily be halted. The basic national policy decision required that the goal of self-sufficiency should be attained and that the entire strength of the nation should be mobilized for war. The resentment and apprehension which Japanese aggression in China had aroused in other nations made the completion of preparations for war more imperative than ever before, and this, in turn, called for the perfection of a war- supporting economy, freed from reliance upon foreign sources of materials. The vital need for self-sufficiency demanded the fulfillment of the second stage in the Army's planning, an advance to the south. The national policy decision had decreed that this step would be taken "under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence."

The growing impetus of the events which led, on 7 December 1941, to war between Japan and the Western powers have yet to be considered. But the origins and pre- disposing causes of Japan's embroilment in the Second World War are to be found in the sequence of events which ended with the establishment of Japan's "new order" in the occupied areas of China. [p48807] On 29 November 1933, in the month in which the existence of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" was officially proclaimed, Foreign Minister Arita explained to the Privy Council Japan's policy towards China. There would, he said, be no peace with the Kuomintang, unless it should abandon its resistance and merge itself with the "New Central Government of China." No proposal for mediation would be accepted. When the time came, the settlement with the government of the "new China" would be based upon three principles which Prime Minister Konoye had enunciated.

These principles of "neighbourly friendship", of "joint defence against the Comintern" and of "economic cooperation," were derived from Konoye's earlier statements in justification of the action which Japan had taken In China. The consequences which flowed from them became basic issues in the 1941 diplomatic discussions between Japan and the United States. During these negotiations, which ended with the outbreak of the Pacific War, the three principles were never satisfactorily explained; yet Arita, in November 1938, was able to define with some degree or clarity the significance of each.

Using Arita's exposition as a basis, there may be traced the consistent development of the policy [p48808] which guided Japan during the period which began before the conquest of Manchuria and which ended in war with the Western Powers.


By the first principle of "neighbourly friendship" was meant simply the mutual recognition of Japan, Manchukuo and the "new China," stress being laid upon positive cooperation and the removal of all causes of friction among the three countries. This principle was, in short, merely the familiar concept of the "new order in East Asia." There was implicit in this statement the fundamental assumption of Japan's superior role in East Asia, and of her special rights and responsibilities in that area. This principle had formed the basis of every important Japanese policy declaration since the "Amau statement" of 17 April 1934. The failure of the United States to recognise the "reality of this situation" was, on the day the Pacific War began, alleged by the Japanese Government as the fundamental cause of hostilities between the two countries.

Arita cited as a corollary to this principle Japan's refusal to permit foreign mediation of the war in China, and her withdrawal from international [p48809] obligations. It has been seen that this long-standing policy had found expression only three weeks earlier, when Japan had severed her remaining connections with the League of Nations.

Arita now advised the Privy Council that, in view of the attitude of Great Britain, the United States and France "in interfering with Japan's policy towards China," Japan would endeavour to reject the idea of disposing of "the Chinese problem by the Nine Power Treaty and other collective machinery." The powers mentioned would, he said, be forced "individually to understand the facts of Japan's policy towards China, and either voluntarily to support our country's attitude or at least to stand by idly," while relations between the Axis powers were strengthened and the China war disposed of rapidly.


The second of the Konoye Principles was that of "joint defence against the Comintern." It involved, said .Arita, the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and the "new China" which Japan had created. They would conclude a military alliance and take measures for "joint defence." The needs of "joint defence" demanded [p48810] the retention of Japanese military and supervisory rights over all transport and communication facilities, and the stationing of Japanese troops in North China and Mongolia. Other Japanese troops would be withdrawn, but a garrison force would be kept in specified areas of South China, for the purpose of maintaining public peace and order. China would be required to contribute to their financial support.

Here was the first formulation of a claim which, in substantially the form in which Arita now presented it, became one of the three fundamental sources of disagreement in the 1941 discussions between Japan and the United States.

Arita cited an obvious corollary to the principle of "joint defence against the Comintern." He said that "every possible measure" would be taken "for making the Soviet Union refrain from actively participating in the present affair." This consideration again served to emphasize the need for stengthened relations among the Axis powers.

Although the Tripartite Pact, which was to provide the second major source of disagreement in the 1941 discussions between Japan and the United States, was not concluded until 27 September 1940, the broad principles of such a treaty had already received the [p48811] general approval of the Konoye Cabinet.

During the negotiations of 1941 Japan declined to indicate the nature or extent of her obligations as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. Japanese leaders maintained, however, that their alliance with Germany and Italy was a defensive one. Yet, in this policy speech, made on 29 November 1938, Foreign Minister Arita spoke of the conclusion of a closer alliance among the three Axis powers as being one of the "great diplomatic measures" which Japan would take against Great Britain, the United States and France. By such measures these countries would be made to acquiesce in the establishment of Japan's "new order" upon the Asiatic continent.


"Economic cooperation" was the third of Konoye's principles. Arita explained it as meaning reciprocity between Japan, Manchukuo, and the "new China" in making good deficiencies in the natural resources of each country. Special emphasis would be placed upon securing from North China those resources, especially mineral, in which Japan and Manchukuo were lacking; and for this purpose the Chinese were to offer every facility. Japan would assist China in her programme of industrialisation, [p48812] in establishing economic and financial policies, and in adopting a uniform system of customs. This policy, already in operation, had been clearly expressed in the Army's Plan for the Expansion of Important Industries, issued on 29 May 1937. Japan, it had then been stated, "should pick out the most important resources, should take the initiative in the exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources."

Arita now proceeded to define, in substantially the same terms which HIROTA had used six months earlier, Japan's policy towards third powers in carrying out the principles of "economic cooperation." Some restrictions in the operation of the "open door" principle had, he said, been imposed by military necessity. The guiding principles would now be substantial control by Japan of the natural resources of North China and Mongolia; and the establishment, through control of China's currency and customs system, of a Japanese-Chinese-Manchukuoan bloc.

"So long as the powers' rights and interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing two objects," he added, "we will not purposely exclude and restrict them."

Further than that, Japan would settle "harmless individual cases" not affecting the superior position which she occupied in East Asia. It [is] [p48813] Japan's policy, Arita said, to influence the Western Powers, not by unnecessary frictions, but by the "great diplomatic measures" already outlined. Moreover, Japan would welcome the participation of powers which, like Germany and Italy, showed a friendly attitude towards her. The guarantee of rights and interests in China would provide a second means of influencing the Western Powers. Here, in fully-developed form, was the last of the three great obstacles to an agreement between Japan and the United States in 1941.


The basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had demanded, first and foremost, the achievement of two related aims. Japan, being already in possession of Manchukuo, would extend her dominion upon the Asiatic continent. Secondly, by using the resources of China to supplement her own, Japan would make ready for war by augmenting her military strength, by expanding the production of war- supporting industries, and by eliminating reliance upon foreign sources of supply.

The military successes gained in China during the latter half of 1938 had brought about the substantial achievement of the aim of territorial expansion in China. By providing a new field for economic exploitation and [p48814] industrial development, and by reducing Japan's immediate military commitments, they had also enabled Japan to concentrate once more upon the attainment of the national mobilisation for war.

In 1936 the Army had planned that this mobilisation should be completed by 1941. With that purpose in view the Army had made elaborate plans for the expansion of armaments and of war-supporting industries during the ensuing five-year period.

In February 1937 a five-year plan for Manchukuo was adopted and put into operation. In May and June 1937 the Army produced similar programmes for the repletion of armaments and for the development of war-supporting industries within Japan itself. It was then planned that the whole economy and industry of Japan should be subjected to governmental control in order to achieve the complete mobilisation of Japan's resources in preparation for war. The Cabinet Planning Board, created in May 1937, had been charged with the supervision of this development.

With the revival of the China war at Lukouchiao on 7 July 1937, adoption of the Army's long-range mobilisation plans for Japan had been deferred. Under the Planning Board's supervision, production was developed piecemeal to meet the immediate demands of the [p48815] Japanese armies in China. But the Army had adhered to its determination that the aims of the mobilisation programme should not be sacrificed. Of the vital materials which the Army controlled, only one-fifth were allocated to the prosecution of the war in China.

During 1937 and 1938, in spite of the increasing scale and intensity of military operations in China, the aims of the Army's long-range plans were steadily pursued. In January 1938 the Planning Board reinstated the five-year programme by producing an interim plan for that year only. In the following month the Army secured the passage of the National General Mobilisation Law, which equipped the Cabinet with power to direct the entire resources and energies of the Japanese people to the achievement of preparedness for war.

When, in May 1938, a severe financial crisis endangered the success of the mobilisation programme for Japan itself, the five-year plan for Manchukuo was revised, and its production goals were increased. The powers conferred by the Mobilisation Law were invoked, and the Army, in commenting upon the purposes of the law, reaffirmed its determination to proceed at all costs with the mobilisation programme.

Nevertheless, in July 1938, the objects of that programme were once more deferred to the need for [p48816] consolidating Japan's position in China. The less urgent measures of war-supporting industrial expansion were postponed in order to ensure the supply of munitions and other materials vital to the success of a new military offensive. In October 1938, when Japanese control over the greater part of North and Central China was consolidated, the Konoye Cabinet had again given its full attention to the programme of economic self-sufficiency and the expansion of the industries of war. In the subjugated areas of China there was instituted a programme of economic exploitation and industrial development similar to that which was already in operation in Manchukuo.

The speeches made by Konoye, Arita and ARAKI during November and December 1938 reflected the Cabinet's determination to devote every effort to achieving the completion of the national general mobilisation.

The way was thus prepared for the reinstatement of the Army's five-year programmes of war-supporting industrial expansion. They had never been abandoned. In spite of the demands made upon the Japanese economy by the war in China, the production goals established in the Army's 1937 planning had been exceeded. In January 1939, the month in which the HIRANUMA Cabinet succeeded that of Konoyo, the Planning Board produced [p48817] a new plan which embodied and brought up to date the aims of the Army's 1937 planning.


In January 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet, of which Arita, ITAGAKI, ARAKI and KIDO were also members, approved the plan for the expansion of productive power which the Planning Board had prepared. Thus, for the first time, the aims and principles of the Army's 1937 economic and industrial planning received specific sanction from the Cabinet.

The new programme was designed expressly to secure the repletion of the national power of Japan. It demanded the continued exploitation of Japan's subject territories through the establishment of an integrated production expansion plan for Japan,

Manchukuo and the rest of China. Like the 1937 plans it aimed at the achievement within the area under Japanese domination of self-sufficiency in natural resources, so that Japan might, as far as possible, avoid dependence upon third powers in time of emergency.

As in the Army's 1937 planning, the greatest importance was attached to achieving self-sufficiency in materials and repletion of armaments by the year [p48818] 1941, so that Japan might be prepared for the "epochal development" of her destiny in the future.

In the plan which the Army had produced on 29 May 1937 certain industries, considered essential to the requirements of war, had been selected for rapid expansion under governmental subsidy and control.

The 1939 programme, which was also restricted to those vital industries deemed to require rapid expansion under a unified plan, increased the production goals set in the earlier long-range programmes.

The ship-building industry, essential to lines of communication in time of war, had already undergone enormous expansion through the provision of subsidies ranging up to one-half of the building cost; but the new programme called for a further increase of more than 50 per cent in gross tonnage by the year 1931. The infant light metal industries, vital to aircraft production, were singled out for further rapid and uneconomic expansion. The production of machine tools, for which Japan had depended largely upon importation from the United States, was to be more than doubled.

The five-year programme for Manchukuo had already placed great emphasis upon the exploitation of that area's coal resources; but the new programme demanded a further substantial increase, which could [p48819] be achieved only by the payment of huge subsidies to submarginal producers. In the quest for iron and steel Japan had already resorted to submarginal production. Nevertheless the Planning Board's programme of January 1939 aimed at total increases in indigenous production of over 50 per cent in the case of steel and over 100 per cent in the case of iron ore. The automobile industry, already producing uneconomically 15,700 units a year, was required to increase that figure to 30,000 units annually by the year 1941.

Special attention was paid to the production of oil and petroleum, for which Japan was almost wholly reliant upon importation. A synthetic petroleum industry had already been established, and had proved very costly. Nevertheless the new plan provided for increases of more than 600 per cent in the production of aviation spirit, 900 per cent in artificial heavy oil, and 2900 per cent in the case of artificial motor spirit.


The "Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power" which the HIRANUMA Cabinet approved in January 1939 gave effect to measures which the Army had demanded on 19 May 1938 in its commentary upon the purposes of [p48820] the National General Mobilisation Law. The Army had then proclaimed that the government should be equipped with long-range plans to meet the varying needs of the national mobilisation, so that the Army and Navy should always be adequately equipped with the munitions of war.

Industrial and military preparations were inter-related; and military successes would depend chiefly upon the systematic and effective mobilisation of the entire strength of the nation.

For this reason production of war materials within Japan was to be increased at the expense of other industries, and all essential industries were to be unified under governmental direction. A National General Mobilisation Commission would administer the Mobilisation Law, and would assist the government in the formulation and execution of its plans.

The method of execution which the 1939 production expansion plan prescribed reflected the Army's planning. Circumstances, it was stated, demanded that the future expansion of productive power should be both rapid and intensive. Therefore the government would make effective use of the measures already taken for the promotion and control of essential industries; and would devise new measures for those industries selected for rapid expansion. It would supply skilled and [p48821] unskilled labour, funds and raw materials, as they were required. For these purposes the Cabinet would, when necessary, utilise the powers conferred by the National General Mobilisation Law, or enact new legislation. The new plan was therefore a very important step towards the mobilisation of the Japanese nation in preparation for future wars.

During the first eight months of 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet gave effect to the measures which it had approved. On 25 March 1939 an effort was made to ensure the secrecy of the programme of war-supporting industrial expansion upon which Japan was then engaged. A law was passed which aimed "at the prevention of leakage of information to foreign nations concerning matters respecting the manpower and material resources which are to be employed for military purposes." Three days later, on 28 March 1939, Education Minister ARAKI became the President of the National General Mobilisation Commission.

In April 1939 there was passed a new law which provided further subsidies and exemptions for losses sustained in ship building. New measures were taken to increase governmental control over this industry, and to standardise its products. The production and distribution of electric-power was made completely [p48822] subject to governmental control and direction. Control over the iron and steel industry was increased, and the flow of production was directed to especially favoured industries. All bulk sales of coal were made subject to government licence. The subsidies paid for the production of petroleum products and to other artificially created industries were increased.

In June 1939 it was reported in the official "Tokyo Gazette" that the five year programme for Manchukuo had yielded excellent results in the increased production of the iron and steel, coal and other war-supporting industries. In the same month a new national policy company was created to exploit the magnesite resources of Korea.

While production for war purposes was expanded, the strength of the Army was increased. On 8 March 1939 the Military Service Law was amended, lengthening the period of supplementary service required of both Army and Navy reservists. The Army and Navy were also given a further measure of control over war-supporting industry, as the Army's rearmament programme of 23 June 1937 had demanded. In July 1939 an Ordinance was promulgated empowering the War and Navy Ministers, each acting upon his own initiative, to commandeer selected types of business enterprise, which were vital to [p48823] production for war. Through these and other measures effect was given to the Army's plans for mobilising the manpower and resources of Japan in preparation for war. [p48824]


The programme of economic and industrial preparation for war demanded above all other things the consolidation of Japan's dominion over China. In the speeches made by Foreign Minister Arita and other members of the first Konoye Cabinet during November and December 1938, the greatest emphasis had been placed upon Japan's determination to complete the conquest of China and to promote the development of the Japanese-dominated "Greater East Asia Sphere." The success of the programme for the expansion of war-supporting industries, approved by the HIRANUMA Cabinet in January 1939, called for the complete integration of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China.

The pursuit of this design, while the first Konoye Cabinet was still in power, had brought about a marked deterioration in Japan's relations with the Western Powers. The provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty had consistently been flouted and measures had been adopted to bring pressure to bear upon French Indo-China.

When, on 5 January 1939, the HIRANUMA Cabinet took office, these policies were maintained. On 21 January 1939 the new Prime Minister explained his Cabinet's policy before the Diet. HIRANUMA said that [p48825] his Cabinet was determined at all costs to proceed to the achievement of Japan's final purpose in China. Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China must, he said, be speedily united, so that a "new order" might replace the old. These Chinese who persisted in their opposition to Japan would be exterminated. The new Cabinet, said HIRANUMA, had taken the various measures necessary to ensure the achievement of this aim.

Thus under the new Cabinet the policies which had deepened the estrangement between Japan and the Western Powers were maintained. The continuation of the war in China during the first six months of 1939 was accompanied by further instances of violence directed against the persons and properties of United States subjects.

Within the regions of China which had been subjugated, Japan continued to practice discrimination against the rights and interests of the Western Powers in violation of her obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty.

On 10 February 1939 Japanese naval forces surprised and seized the Chinese island of Hainan. This abrupt action which had been approved by the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 November 1939, caused representations to be made immediately by France, Great Britain and the United States. It constituted a threat to French [p48826] Indo-China, a country which the Japanese had repeatedly accused of offering assistance to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, the Japanese forces completed their occupation of the island; and six weeks later Japan moved further southward.

On 31 March 1939 the Japanese Foreign Ministry proclaimed the annexation of the Spratley Islands, a group of small reefs in the South China Sea. These islands, seven hundred miles to the south of Hainan, were far removed from the sphere of Japanese activity in China. They were, however, situated within four hundred miles of Saigon, in French Indo-China.


Since 1934, when OSHIMA was first sent to Berlin as Military Attache, the Army regarded collaboration with Germany as essential. The policy of the military at this time was that an early attack on the U.S.S.R. was essential before the military power of the U.S.S.R., which was rapidly increasing under her successive Five-Year Plans, became too great. For the purposes of such an attack: an alliance with Germany against the U.S.S.R. was obviously desirable.

After the reorganisation of the first Konoye-Cabinet, which occurred in May and June 1938, the Army [p48827] controlled Cabinet policy, which was now directed towards completing the conquest of China, launching an attack on the U.S.S.R. before she became too strong, and hastening the completion of the national mobilisation for war. These were foremost aims of the basic national policy decisions. After the Japanese defeat at Lake Khassan in August 1938, War Minister ITAGAKI and other Army leaders decided that the projected war against the U.S.S.R. must be postponed. The Amy's efforts were then centred for a time upon the conquest of China, on which in turn depended the fulfilment of the programme of economic and industrial preparations for war.

During the latter months of 1938 the work of conquering Chinese resistance and of developing China into an economic asset was attended by a considerable measure of success. This was achieved at the expense of a pronounced deterioration in Japanese relations with Western Powers which was inevitable.

The fixed determination of Cabinet and Army to violate the rights and interests of the Western Powers it China could no longer be concealed or excused. Japan's remaining connections with the League of Nations were severed. The establishment of the Greater East Asia Sphere was announced. Japan was inciting the opposition of the Western [p48828] Powers and a section of the military faction became more than ever insistent on a general military alliance with Germany and Italy.

In July 1939 OSHIMA, then Military Attache in Berlin, proposed a new alliance between Germany and Japan Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at once made it clear that Germany desired a general military alliance, not an alliance directed solely or mainly against the U.S.S.R. Ribbentrop accompanied his statement with a note of his views on foreign policy which made it clear that Germany contemplated the likelihood of war between Great Britain and France and herself. OSHIMA, accepting Ribbentrop's view of the scope of the proposed alliance, himself outlined the provisions of the proposed alliance, which he thereupon transmitted to the Army General Staff. At the end of August 1938 OSHIMA was advised that both the Army and the Navy were in substantial agreement with the terms proposed. They wished, however, to make changes which would limit Japan's liability under the proposed treaty, which would be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and would be directed chiefly against the Soviet Union. OSHIMA was warned that care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the Western Powers were the principal enemies, and that Japan would not undertake an obligation to provide [p48829] instantaneous or unconditional military aid. This would safeguard Japan from becoming automatically embroiled in a European war.

OSHIMA, however, interpreted this instruction by declaring to the Germans that Japan was ready to conclude a general military alliance. He ignored the instructions he had received that the proposed treaty should be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and should be directed principally against the U.S.S.R., and gave the Germans to understand that the Japanese military leaders were in full accord with the proposal which Germany had made. The draft of the proposed military alliance which was settled by agreement between Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop and OSHIMA, was directed impartially against all third powers. Late in October 1938, OSHIMA who had recently been appointed Ambassador in Berlin, conveyed this draft to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, of which Arita had recently assumed control. The Cabinet, without making a definite commitment, expressed general approval of the proposal but stated Japan's desire that the new treaty should be directed principally against the U.S.S.R.

The Konoye Cabinet took no further positive, steps to bring about the conclusion of such a treaty.

In September and October 1938 SHIRATORI and [p48830] OSHIMA were appointed Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin respectively. These two were in favour of a general military alliance with Germany and Italy.

Foreign Minister Arita desired a strengthened military relationship with Germany and Italy, but he wished also to maintain the semblance of friendly relations with the Western Powers. The Foreign Ministry advised OSHIMA that the proposed treaty would facilitate a settlement of the China war, would reinforce Japan's position against the U.S.S.R. thereby releasing troops for use elsewhere, and would strengthen Japan's position internationally. Arita did not, however, signify his acceptance of the German draft. He advised OSHIMA that Japan would submit a counter-proposal.

On 25 November 1938 Arita told the Privy Council that it was Japan's policy to take every possible measure to make the U.S.S.R. refrain from intervening in Japan's activities in China. For this reason primarily Japan desired to strengthen her relationship with Germany and Italy.

On 29 November 1938 the Konoye Cabinet's policy was clearly set forth by Arita. Japan would consolidate her position in China proper and Mongolia. Within the area she dominated Japan would take all necessary steps to create a state of military preparedness for war with [p48831] the Soviet Union. It was not, however, intended to seek to initiate an early war with the Soviet Union. Arita thus adhered to the position set forth in the basic national policy decision - namely, that the Soviet Union was the foremost enemy of Japan's schemes upon the Asiatic continent, which would almost inevitably lead in the end to war.

But Arita had also been obliged to take a stronger stand against the Western Powers. He said that, since Great Britain, the United States and France had interfered with Japan's policy towards China, Japan would avoid the use of international agencies in settling the dispute in China. Treaty obligations would be observed only in so far as they did not conflict with Japan's policy in China. The Western Powers would be made to acquiesce in and voluntarily to support Japan's policy in China, or at least to stand by idly while that policy was carried out.

For this reason, as well as in preparation for war with the U.S.S.R., relations between the Axis powers would be strengthened. It would mean, on the one hand, that the U.S.S.R. would be faced with the prospect of war on two fronts; and on the other hand, it would be a great diplomatic measure which would avert the risk of interference from the Western Powers in China. Arita [p48832] did not, however, want an alliance which would embroil Japan in war with Great Britain and France at Germany's election. Such a war might also involve Japan in a Pacific War with the United States. Throughout the period in which the HIRANUMA Cabinet held office, the Navy strongly supported Arita, for the Navy was not ready for Pacific War.

Therefore Arita formulated the policy of closer relations with the Axis, which the Cabinet desired, as a strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, not as a general military alliance which was unnecessary for his limited purposes. Between November 1938 and March 1939 he made efforts to strengthen the substance of that pact, and to make other countries party to its provisions.


During the first four months of 1939 the gulf between Japan and the Western Powers was widening. Foreign Minister Arita himself had sanctioned the bombing of the Yunnan railway. Hainan and the Spratley Islands were occupied by Japanese forces. Preparations for the domination of the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea were

being made. The need for oil and other raw materials indigenous in these areas was increasing. The interference [p48833] with the treaty rights of the Western Powers in China was also growing. To make matters worse the actions of the Army in China were deliberately aggravating the tension which existed with the Western Powers. For all of these reasons the members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet now became anxious to conclude some sort of military alliance with Germany and Italy, and Arita by April 1939 dropped his limited plan for a mere strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. But the Cabinet still wished the alliance to forestall a war with the Western Powers, not to precipitate one.

We will adjourn for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows) [p48834]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.



The issue which divided the HIRANUMA Cabinet was the degree of commitment which Japan should undertake in order to secure the conclusion of an alliance which all members of the Cabinet latterly came to desire.

During November and December 1938 OSHIMA continued to work for the conclusion of a general military alliance to be directed against the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers alike. SHIRATORI likewise worked for the conclusion of such an alliance. In Japan Arita's policy of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact was followed.

In December 1938 Arita advised OSHIMA that the Foreign Ministry still desired the proposed alliance to be directed principally against the Soviet Union. A commission headed by Ito, a Foreign Ministry representative, was despatched to Italy and Germany for the express purpose of seeing that Japan should not be irrevocably committed to participation should Germany become involved in war with the [p48835] Western Powers. Both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI protested because this policy was contrary to the commitment which OSHIMA had already made to Germany. On 7 February 1939, after the Ito Commission had visited Rome, SHIRATORI warned the Italians that Japan would submit a new proposal - presumably in line with Arita's policy - which Italy should reject.

When the HIRANUMA Cabinet took office on 5 January 1939, it soon became apparent that ITAGAKI, who remained War Minister, supported SHIRATORI and OSHIMA in their demands for the conclusion of the general military alliance which Germany desired.

On 7 February 1939 Foreign Minister Arita reported to the Emperor that the Army General Staff had warned OSHIMA not to exceed his prerogative in dealing with the Germans; but, on the same day, the Army showed its unwillingness to submit to the Emperor's suggestion that the treaty be directed solely against the Soviet Union. This was a reversal of the attitude of the Army as set forth in the instructions to OSHIMA in August 1938. It had then been stated that both the Army and the Navy wished the proposed treaty to be regarded as an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and to be directed against the Soviet Union. Now the Army declared itself in favour of a general military [p48836] alliance.

Both SHIRATORI and OSHIMA refused to communicate officially the proposals of the Ito Commission, which arrived in Berlin during February 1939. The two Ambassadors did, however, convey the Commission's instructions confidentially to Foreign Ministers Ciano and von Ribbentrop, and threatened to resign unless the German proposal was accepted by Japan.

Foreign Minister Arita was now acutely anxious as to the outcome of SHIRATORI's and OSHIMA's activities. On 13 February 1939 he complained indignantly that Ambassador OSHIMA had reported directly to the Amy concerning the proposed alliance, and that the Foreign Ministry had not even been notified. Arita said that if he did not succeed in the strong stand which he had been driven to take against the Army Japan's foreign policy would be a total failure.

At the Privy Council meeting of 22nd February 1939, which Prime Minister HIRANUMA and War Minister ITAGAKI attended, Foreign Minister Arita made clear his adherence to the policy that strengthened relations among the Axis Powers should be directed primarily against the Soviet Union. Arita said that not only would the Anti-Comintern Pact be strengthened quantitatively by increasing the numbers of [p48837] participating countries, but also it would be strengthened qualitatively by changes in the substance of the Pact, made by agreement among the three Axis Powers.

Arita's statement shows why neither the first Konoye nor the HIRANUMA Cabinet up to this point had taken any positive step to conclude the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed in August 1938. Germany desired a general military alliance directed against both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The official policy of Japan at this time was an alliance directed principally, if not exclusively, against the U.S.S.R., and for this purpose no new alliance was required. It was sufficient for Arita's purpose that the provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact should be strengthened.

There now developed a struggle within the HIRANUMA Cabinet. Foreign Minister Arita maintained the policy of the first Konoye Cabinet, and, while welcoming a treaty with the Axis directed against the Soviet Union, opposed the attempt being made to commit Japan to participation in a war between Germany and the Western Powers. War Minister ITAGAKI, on the other hand, championed the view that Japan should conclude the general military alliance which the Germans had proposed. It had now become clear that there was [p48838] among the military a faction which placed the conclusion of a general military alliance with Germany above all other considerations, and that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were acting with the knowledge and support of War Minister ITAGAKI in the interests of this faction.

On 10 March 1939 Arita expressed his willingness to accept the proffered resignations of Ambassador OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, who had shown that their allegiance was to the Army rather than to the Foreign Minister. Arita believed that Prime Minister HIRANUMA would support him in so doing; but no such decision was made.

On 17 March 1939, ITAGAKI and Yonai, though completely at variance over the question of the proposed general military alliance with Germany and Italy, had made a joint declaration of Japanese policy before the Diet. The War and Navy Ministers were agreed that Japanese policy for the new period in Asia would undoubtedly cause friction with third powers. They resented the attitude of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France towards the China war, and stated that unless these powers were ejected from China settlement of that conflict would be impossible.

It was about this time, April 1939, that even Arita, under the stress of the deterioration of [p48839] Japan's relations with the Western Powers, dropped his proposal that nothing but an agreement extending the Anti-Comintern Pact should be concluded.

During April 1939 Japan made a new counterproposal to Germany and Italy which contained concessions to the view which the military faction advocated. The German draft was in port accepted, but it was stipulated that it should be given a limited interpretation so that the suspicions of the Western Powers should not be unduly aroused.

OSHIMA and SHIRATORI again refused to communicate this proposal officially, though once more they advised the Germans and Italians that if those countries should wage war against Britain and France, Japan would join in the war against the Western Powers.

Germany and Italy rejected the limited Japanese proposal above noted.


During this period the members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet continued to hold many conferences in an attempt to settle their policy. OSHIMA's and SHIRATORI's declaration that Japan would join Germany and Italy in war against the Western Powers [p48840] intensified the opposition of Foreign Minister Arita, who reported to the Emperor that the two Ambassadors should be made to recant this assurance. The Emperor, agreeing with Arita, reprimanded War Minister ITAGAKI, who was resentful that the Emperor had been advised of his attitude.

HIRANUMA was placed in a dilemma between the views of the military faction, led by War Minister ITAGAKI, and those of Foreign Minister Arita, who was supported by the Emperor's advisers. HIRANUMA himself inclined to the Army's view and wished to support it. Home Minister KIDO had advised him that it was desirable that the Emperor's views should correspond more closely with those of the Army. The whole Cabinet, desiring to strengthen Japan's relationship with Germany, was disposed to make concessions within the bounds which prudence dictated. The Army maintained

that it did not desire Japan to become involved in an European War; but there was evidently no sincerity in this contention for the Amy wished to abrogate the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was this agreement which limited Japan's obligation to render military assistance to the event of war against the Soviet Union. The deadlock within the Five Ministers' [p48841] Conference continued, Finance Minister Ishiwata supporting War Minister ITAGAKI, and Navy Minister Yonai supporting Foreign Minister Arita.

In these circumstances it was resolved, on 22 April 1939, that the Cabinet would adhere to the stand taken in its latest proposal. OSHIMA would continue to be used as the channel of communication with the Germans; and, if the negotiations should end unsatisfactorily, the Cabinet would resign.

Meanwhile Germany and Italy had reached an agreement to wage war in Europe. On 16 April 1939 Goering and Mussolini had met in Rome. They had then decided that their two countries would await a favourable opportunity for initiating war against Great Britain and France. In the meantime each nation would arm itself to the utmost extent, and would maintain a state of mobilisation for war. In the same month von Ribbentrop warned both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI that, if the discussions for a pact between Germany and Japan were too prolonged, Germany might be forced to effect some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As it turned out the HIRANUMA Cabinet continued to be unable to agree on the conclusion of a general military alliance with the Axis Powers and Germany concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. [p48842] in August 1939.

After it became known that SHIRATORI and OSHIMA had refused to present the Japanese counterproposal of April 1939, Home Minister KIDO's attitude had changed. Although he had previously advised HIRANUMA that every effort should be made to conclude an alliance with Germany, by 24 April 1939 KIDO considered that there was no alternative but to recall the two Ambassadors because of their continued support of a general military alliance and their disregard of contrary instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office. On the following day urgent requests were received from OSHIMA and SHIRATORI themselves, demanding that they be recalled.

The situation was now critical. If the Cabinet did not succeed in strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy, it would have failed in its purpose. If, on the other hand, the Cabinet acceded to Germany's demands, Japan would be committed to participation in any war which might eventuate between Germany and the Western Powers which some members of the Cabinet did not at this time desire.

In these circumstances the Cabinet decided to make a supreme effort to obtain an acceptable agreement with Germany and Italy. On 26 April 1939 [p48843] it was decided that, in view of the insubordination of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, HIRANUMA should make a direct approach to Hitler and Mussolini through the medium of the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo. Prime Minister HIRANUMA would make a general appeal for collaboration among the Axis Powers.

Foreign Minister Arita would explain to the Ambassadors the particular problems with which Japan was faced.


This personal message, which became known as the "HIRANUMA Declaration," was delivered by Arita with obvious reluctance to the German Ambassador in Tokyo on 4 May 1939.

In this declaration HIRANUMA expressed his admiration for Hitler's work in Germany, and advised that he was similarly engaged in the work of maintaining Japan's "New Order in East Asia." HIRANUMA expressed his satisfaction with the effect of the Anti- Comintern Pact in making possible the execution of the tasks which Germany and Japan had before them. He said that he now had in view the conclusion of an agreement which would strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and make closer the cooperation of Germany, Italy and Japan.

"As far as the strengthening of our [p48844] relations is concerned," he continued, "I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even, if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union, and to afford then political and economic aid and, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance."

HIRANUMA then added the saving clause which represented Arita's policy.

"Japan is ready," he said, "in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement, to take up the military support of Germany and Italy. However, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should became possible through a change of circumstances."

HIRANUMA asked for express confirmation that this reservation was acceptable, and asked also for caution in explaining the objects of the proposed alliance.

The HIRANUMA declaration conceded something to Germany and the military faction in Japan, but the [p48845] provision that Japan should not be bound to give immedieta military aid to Germany if she became engaged in war against the Western Powers was important. The declaration was ignored, not only by the Germans and Italians, but also by Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI.

The situation within the Cabinet was one of unresolved conflict. Foreign Minister Arita and Navy Minister Yonai were vehemently opposed to the conclusion of an alliance which would commit Japan to fighting the Western Powers whenever Germany might elect to initiate such a war. War Minister ITAGAKI and Finance Minister Ishiwata wanted complete solidarity with the Axis. Among the other members of the Cabinet there were all shades of opinion. Home Minister KIDO sympathized with the Army's whole-hearted attempt to conclude a tripartite military alliance, but saw the dangers into which such an alliance might lead Japan. Overseas Minister KOISO, although a staunch supporter of the Army's schemes of aggrandisement, inclined to Arita's view, believing that when Japan's relationship with Germany had been strengthened in a limited manner, Great Britain could be induced to arrange a satisfactory settlement of the China war.

The decisive voice was that of Prime Minister HIRANUMA, who was disposed to favour the Army's policy, [p48846] and to excuse the disobedience of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. His declaration of 4 May 1939 revealed his Cabinet's eagerness to conclude an alliance which would supplement Japan's own preparations for war and make possible the achievement of the goal of expansion through military power.

But the formula which HIRANUMA adopted revealed also a continuing fundamental difference of opinion as to the form which the proposed alliance should take, and the purposes which it might be expected to fulfill. [p48847]


In the Japanese proposal of April 1939, and again in the HIRANUMA declaration of 4 May 1939, the Cabinet made new concessions to the German demand for a general military alliance. But the military faction continued to support Germany in demanding nothing less than full Japanese participation in an alliance which was now known to be directed in the first instance against the Western Powers.

The HIRANUMA declaration had not eliminated the essential difference between Arita's policy and that of War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction. Both factions within the Cabinet acknowledged that the national policy of domination in China, and penetration into the countries of South-East Asia, would stiffen the opposition of the Western Powers. Arita, still regarding the Soviet Union as the principal enemy of Japan's "new order" in East Asia, desired an alliance directed primarily against that country, believing that such an alliance among the Axis Powers would also deter the Western Powers from interfering with the execution of the above-mentioned national policy.

But the military faction, no longer obsessed with the prospect of immediate war with the U.S.S.R., had come to believe that the success of all the Army's [p48848] expansionist aims depended, not only upon the mobilisation of Japan for war, but also upon complete unity of purpose among the Axis Powers. The Western Powers stood between Japan and the goal of expansion southwards. They were relentlessly opposed to the aggressive war in China which the Army had waged. They controlled the vital raw materials upon which the success of the mobilisation for war depended. They must, in the view of the military faction, be restrained from opposing Japan's national policy of expansion by the threat which a general alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy would constitute.

Von Ribbentrop had pointed out the advantages which Japan would gain, if the Western Powers should be defeated by Germany and Italy in the coming year. It had therefore become the cardinal feature of Army policy to demand a complete and unconditional military alliance. Since German policy had changed, and an attack on the Western Powers had now been determined on, the military faction was content that such an alliance should in the first instance be directed, not against the Soviet Union, but against the Western Powers. [p48849]


During the month of May 1939, immediately after the HIRANUMA declaration had been made, the Army faction renewed its efforts to achieve the conclusion of a general military alliance. Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, reported that HIRANUMA had made his declaration in an attempt to counteract any doubts which might have arisen in Rome and in Berlin concerning Japan's readiness to go as far as possible in reaching a satisfactory compromise. He undertook to attempt to ascertain the Army's attitude towards the declaration.

Two days later, on 6 May 1939, Ott was able to report the view of Army General Staff officers who were acting in direct accordance with the policy of War Minister ITAGAKI. The Army considered that HIRANUMA's declaration represented the best offer that could be hoped for in prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, the Army intended that the wording of the declaration, which made effective Japanese military aid against the Western Powers conditional upon an unspecified "change in circumstances", should be clarified and strengthened.

The War Vice-Minister had told Ott that the [p48850] treaty would definitely bind Japan to the Axis powers, though Japan's relative isolation would place her at a disadvantage in offering direct cooperation. The Navy, however, had maintained its opposition to the policy expressed in the HIRANUMA declaration, and throughout the entire government a deep cleft had formed between friends and enemies of the alliance.

Von Ribbentrop said that, although Japanese procrastination had made necessary a separate agreement between Germany and Italy, negotiations for a tripartite alliance would be in no way prejudiced. He also made it clear to OSHIMA that the immediate use of the new alliance would be against the Western Powers, saying that Germany and Italy had been compelled to act because they were directly face to face with France and Great Britain.

On 6 May 1939, the day after the HIRANUMA declaration reached Germany, OSHIMA again defied Foreign Minister Arita's instructions. Von Ribbentrop, then on his way to Italy to discuss the bilateral alliance, had asked whether, in the event of Germany or Italy going to war with a third nation, it would be permissible to regard Japan also as being in a state of war, even if no military aid should be forthcoming from that country. OSHIMA, without referring to the [p48851] terms of the HIRANUMA declaration, informed Arita that be had replied affirmatively. Arita was exceedingly indignant that such an assurance should have been given without authority, and was the more distressed because he realised that Prime Minister HIRANUMA was disposed to support the Army, rather than to assume a neutral attitude.

On the following day, 7 May 1939, the Five Ministers conference, now almost continuously in session, met to consider OSHIMA's report. As expected, Prime Minister HIRANUMA supported War Minister ITAGAKI, and upheld OSHIMA's answer to von Ribbentrop.

Meanwhile, on 6 May 1939, an official of the German Foreign Ministry had made a new unofficial proposal, containing the demands which Japan had previously rejected, and making no reference at all to the HIRANUMA declaration. Foreign Minister Arita found, upon investigation, that the draft of this proposal had been submitted by the Japanese Army to the German Foreign Ministry. Arita disclaimed responsibility for the consequences of this military conspiracy, but Prime Minister HIRANUMA persisted in his support for the military faction.

On 9 May 1939, two days after the meeting at which HIRANUMA had upheld OSHIMA's assurance of Japanese [p48852] participation in any war in which Germany or Italy was engaged, the Five Ministers Conference met to consider the unofficial German Foreign Ministry proposal, which was known to have been instigated by the military faction in Japan.

Navy Minister Yonai strenuously objected to this proposal, saying that it had not been made officially, and that no reply to the HIRANUMA declaration had been received. HIRANUMA waived this objection, and maintained that the German attitude was sufficiently explained by the report of OSHIMA's assurance that Japan would participate, though perhaps not actively, in any war involving Germany and Italy.


HASHIMOTO was the first to expound these aims publicly. While the conflict within the Cabinet continued, he wrote a series of newspaper articles, designed to rally public support for the Army's policy. In these articles, six of which were published between 1 May 1939 and 20 July 1939, HASHIMOTO revealed the changed policy of the military faction. Although he regarded both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers as the enemies of Japanese policy in China, it was his constant theme that Great Britain was Japan's foremost enemy. [p48853]

HASHIMOTO said that the China war would not be ended until Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., the countries which supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had been destroyed. He regarded Great Britain as the chief opponent of Japanese aims in China, and advocated an attack on that country, saying that when Britain was overthrown, the Soviet Union would be left isolated.

Therefore, HASHIMOTO insisted that Japan must defend herself against the Soviet Union, while advancing southward against the Western Powers. He insisted that Japan's destiny lay in the south, and that there, as in China, it was Great Britain which blocked the progress of Japanese expansion. Again and again HASHIMOTO exhorted Japan to attack Great Britain, saying that in the existing circumstances it would be easy for Japan to vanquish that country. He advocated the capture of Hongkong, and the seizure of the British concessions at Shanghai and Tientsin. He expressed his belief that the Japanese Air Force could annihilate the British fleet before it was able to reach Singapore. In the last of this series of articles, published on 20 July 1939, HASHIMOTO observed with satisfaction that public opinion in Japan had at length taken an anti-British turn. [p48854]

For the reasons he had given, HASHIMOTO demanded the conclusion of the tripartite alliance which the military faction had demanded. He said that, although HIRANUMA and Arita desired to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy, they had, through fear of Great Britain, hesitated to conclude a general military alliance. He therefore urged the formation of a strong wartime Cabinet which would not hesitate to act.

HASHIMOTO believed that Japan's schemes of aggrandisement through military power should be achieved by acting in concert with Germany and Italy. He said that, since it was the policy of those countries to destroy Great Britain, the interests of the Axis Powers were identical. Therefore he demanded that Japan should immediately expand and strengthen her relations with Germany and Italy, so that democracy as well as communism would be included as an object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, he said, it will be easy to put an end to Great Britain and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy would destroy both democracy and communism; and in the East, extended at least as far as India, Japan would destroy the countries which were founded on these principles. [p48855]


Japan's failure to agree to the German proposal for a general military alliance gave rise to grave dissatisfaction in Germany and Italy.

On 15 May 1939 von Ribbentrop cabled Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, instructing him to bring the need for a quick decision to the Ambassador's confidants in the War Ministry; and, if possible, to War Minister ITAGAKI himself. Ott was to say that the conclusion of the alliance which Germany and Italy desired would be the best way to keep the United States from making war on the side of Great Britain and France. He would also point out that it must be understood by Japan that her supremacy in East Asia, and particularly in China, depended first on the superiority of the Axis powers over the Western Powers.

Von Ribbentrop told OSHIMA that, although Germany and Italy would conclude a bilateral agreement, the way would still be open for Japanese participation. He impressed upon OSHIMA the desirability of formulating secretly an agreed version of the proposed tripartite alliance simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement between Germany and Italy. [p48856]

War Minister ITAGAKI was determined that the alliance should be concluded immediately in the manner which OSHIMA and the Germans desired. On 20 May 1939 he promised von Ribbentrop, through OSHIMA, that Germany should have a positive new decision from the Japanese Cabinet by the following day at the latest.

On 20 May 1939 the Five Ministers Conference again met, after War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai had made separate reports to Premier HIRANUMA. Foreign Minister Arita proposed that OSHIMA should be made to retract his affirmative declaration that Japan would participate in any Axis war. HIRANUMA, however, was evasive and declined to make him retract it. Although the Prime Minister was asked repeatedly to rescind Ambassador OSHIMA's words, he maintained the attitude that OSHIMA's statement of the position was satisfactory. When the conference adjourned, matters stood as they had before. The difference of opinion was unresolved. ITAGAKI'S undertaking to reach a positive new decision had not been fulfilled. Two days later, on 22 May 1939, the German-Italian alliance was concluded. [p48857]

After the conference on 20 May 1939, Foreign Minister Arita sent specific instructions to OSHIMA that the Japanese government wished to reserve its right of entrance into a state of war in case of a European conflict. OSHIMA refused to communicate this information and told Arita so in a bluntly-worded telegram. SHIRATORI, in Rome, pursued the same course as OSHIMA. The dispute now hinged upon the real meaning of the HIRANUMA declaration. The Army said that it included participation in war; Foreign Minister Arita and the Navy said it did not. The Emperor supported Arita and protested against the Army's policy. But on 22 May 1939 Prime Minister HIRANUMA again supported the Army's interpretation, saying that the matter should be conducted in the way the Army wanted it done.


War Minister ITAGAKI was now firmly resolved to right the matter out quickly even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow. Although OSHIMA, as Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, was responsible to the Foreign Ministry, ITAGAKI instructed OSHIMA to send no further communications to Foreign Minister Arita. ITAGAKI desired that the factions within the Cabinet should be left to settle among themselves [p48858] the question of the proposed military alliance. These developments OSHIMA explained confidentially to von Ribbentrop.

On 28 May 1939 von Ribbentrop passed this information on to Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, instructing him to treat OSHIMA's information as confidential. Ott was required to bring further pressure to bear in order to secure a quick decision. He was instructed to convey to the appropriate authorities Germany's and Italy's dismay that ITAGAKI's promise of a definite reply by 21 May 1939 had not been kept. On 5 June 1939 Ott reported to von Ribbentrop information on which be had received from Foreign and War Ministry officials. The Army and Navy were said to have come to an understanding, the Army having prevailed upon all issues. HIRANUMA and Arita were stated to have acquiesced in this understanding which was shortly to be communicated to Berlin and Rome through diplomatic channels. According to Ott's informats, Japan had agreed to participate in the war against Great Britain and France, though she wished to reserve the right to enter the war at a favourable time.

The communication which Ott had heralded was not forthcoming, because the agreement, which the Army's supporters claimed had been reached, was not a real one. Whatever concessions the Navy had made, it remained opposed [p48859] to the essentials of the Army's plan. The alleged agreement had been obtained with the support of HIRANUMA in part through the forcefulness and in part through the duplicity of War Minister ITAGAKI.

The Emperor had continued to support the policy of Foreign Minister Arita. ITAGAKI had attempted to overcome that obstacle in the same manner in which, in July 1938, he had attempted to obtain the Emperor's consent to the use of force at Lake Khassan. He had falsely represented to the Emperor that Foreign Minister Arita had come to favour the alliance which the Army desired. The Emperor, however, had discovered that he had been tricked, and on 7 July 1939 he taxed ITAGAKI with deliberate falsehood and severely rebuked him.

Throughout June and July 1939 no new Japanese communication reached Germany. The alliance which the military faction desired could not be concluded as long as the Emperor, the Navy and the Foreign Minister maintained their opposition to it. ITAGAKI recognized this, for on 23 July 1939 he enquired of Konoye, the President of the Privy Council, whether the Emperor's mind could not be changed. Konoye replied that he considered that it would be very difficult to accomplish this.

ITAGAKI did not, however, relinquish his aim. On 4 August 1939 he advised Home Minister KIDO that he [p48860] would resign, if the Cabinet did not agree to the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance.


Meanwhile the Army's activities in China and upon the Manchukuoan border had increased the Cabinet's difficulties. Both factions within the Cabinet had maintained their determination to consolidate Japan's position in China, and to resist any country which opposed that aim. On 6 July 1939 War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai once more expressed their firm determination to put an end to Chinese resistance. The two service Ministers said that the interference of third powers, which supported the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, must be crushed, and exhorted the Japanese people to spare no pains in striving for the attainment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia.

An attempt was being made to establish a new puppet government for the whole of occupied China, and the Army, in carrying out this policy, had abandoned all pretence in its attacks upon the rights and interests of the Western Powers.

Furthermore, the Army, in accordance with plans [p48861] made in the latter half of 1938, was endeavouring to include Outer Mongolia within the sphere of Japanese domination. Since January 1939, when the HIRANUMA Cabinet had taken office, Japanese armed detachments had on several occasions carried out skirmishing raids across the Outer Mongolian border.

More important than these border raids was the action which began at Nomonhan during May 1939. While the leaders of the military faction were striving for the conclusion of a general military alliance with Germany and Italy, units of the

Kwantung Army once more attacked the Soviet forces stationed upon the Manchukuoan border. This action, which will be described more fully in a later section of this judgment, developed into a campaign of considerable magnitude, and ended during September 1939 in the defeat of the Japanese forces engaged.

There is no evidence before this Tribunal to show whether the attack at Nomonhan was made upon the instructions or with the connivance of the Army General Staff, or whether, as on earlier occasions, the initiative was taken by the Kwantung Army itself. The Cabinet, preoccupied with the question of the proposed military alliance with Germany and already hopelessly divided, appears to have regarded the campaign as an Army matter, and to have made no attempt at intervention. [p48862] It is, however, certain that this conflict with the Soviet Union brought about no change in the views of either faction within the HIRANUMA Cabinet. During the whole period that the fighting continued, War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction strove to conclude an alliance with Germany, aimed primarily against Great Britain and France. Foreign Minister Arita, Navy Minister Yonai and their supporters struggled with equal determination to avoid the conclusion of an alliance which would commit Japan to immediate participation in war against the Western Powers.

These military activities increased the sense of urgency which attended the Cabinet's deliberations. The whole situation was summed up in the words used by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on 7 July 1939, on the occasion when the Emperor reprimanded ITAGAKI. The Lord Keeper then said, "The Army is confused and everything is lost." He regarded the position as tragic and lamented that the Army was going to destroy the nation. The members of the Cabinet were still agreed that the situation demanded some kind of an alliance with Germany and Italy.


Nevertheless, throughout June and July 1939, the continued disagreement between the military faction and those who supported Foreign Minister Arita prevented any new step being taken, and from June to August 1939 there was no new development in the negotiations with Germany, or in the unresolved conflict within the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

In August 1939 ITAGAKI knew that war in Europe was imminent. He was also apprehensive lest Arita's policy should gain a measure of success which would preclude any possibility of obtaining the HIRANUMA Cabinet's agreement to an unconditional tripartite alliance of the Axis Powers.

Arita, fearful of the consequences of such an alliance, attached great importance to concluding with Great Britain an arrangement which would secure Japan's position in China. He was making overtures to the British Ambassador, Craigie, with that and in view. ITAGAKI knew that the suggestion that Japan might conclude a tripartite alliance was being used by Arita as an inducement to secure British cooperation in his alternative policy. [p48863-a]


To counteract this effort ITAGAKI made a further attempt to secure the Cabinet's agreement to the German proposal for an unconditional military alliance. He recognized the danger of a popular reaction in Japan in favor of an economically tempting settlement with Great Britain. On 4 August 1939 ITAGAKI discussed the position with Home Minister KIDO, who, while disapproving the open manner in which OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had subordinated Japan's interests to those of Germany and Italy, had consistently favored the Army's viewpoint, and had attempted to induce the Navy to abandon its opposition.

ITAGAKI told KIDO that he would resign if the Cabinet did not agree to the conclusion of the military alliance with Germany and Italy. This would inevitably result in the downfall of the Cabinet. KIDO was apprehensive of any Cabinet change in the existing circumstances, and convinced ITAGAKI that any attempt to form a military administration should be resisted. ITAGAKI agreed that a solution to the deadlock between Army and Navy should once more be sought.

Accordingly, on 8 August 1939, after the Five [p48864] Ministers had again discussed the question, the Cabinet met to consider what action should be taken. Prime Minister HIRANUMA had withdrawn somewhat from his position of complete acquiescence in the Army's plans. He pointed out that his Cabinet had all along been making efforts to conclude an alliance among the Axis Powers. He said that War Minister ITAGAKI had the day before claimed that the Army too had merely been making efforts to bring to fruition the prearranged plan; but HIRANUMA, for his part, could not think that that was the case. The Premier then invited other Cabinet members to speak.

The consensus of opinion within the Cabinet was that changes in the situation necessitated an alliance which was both offensive and defensive. Although Japan would first try to conclude a defensive alliance, as had originally been planned, if that could not be done, an offensive and defensive alliance would be concluded. No attempt was made to define what limitations would be placed upon the offensive and defensive alliance; but Foreign Minister Arita considered that the Cabinet's agreement fell short of the unconditional alliance which ITAGAKI had demanded. Either the War Minister would have to resign, or the Cabinet would have to reach a further [p48865] agreement.

ITAGAKI, for his part, made at this moment of general anxiety and disillusionment a confession of the role which he himself had played. He said that he was both War Minister and a member of the Cabinet. In the latter role he had concurred in the plan which the whole Cabinet approved; but as War Minister he had acted independently in accordance with the consensus of opinion within the Army.


The Cabinet meeting of 8 August 1939 did not produce the positive decision which War Minister ITAGAKI and the military faction desired. The Cabinet, while recognizing the need for an offensive and defensive alliance, declined to make any greater commitment than that made by ITAGAKI on 5 June 1939, that Japan would reserve the right to enter any war between Germany and the Western Powers at a favorable time, nor indeed did the Cabinet specifically endorse this previous offer.

ITAGAKI thereupon determined to attempt once more a tour de force. He told Ott the position and said that circumstances were so compelling that he had [p48866] resolved as a last resort to risk his resignation. This would almost certainly entail also the resignations of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. It was hoped that these resignations would in the long run produce the alliance which Germany and the Japanese Army wanted, but it was recognized that their immediate result would be a violent setback to those plans.

On 10 August 1939 ITAGAKI asked Ott to advise Germany and Italy of the serious state of tension which prevailed, and to ask them to help by making concessions. Specifically, ITAGAKI proposed that Germany and Italy accept the proposal of 5 June 1939 together with a guarantee that there were no mental reservations behind the condition made by Japan as to choosing her moment of entry into the war. ITAGAKI would then obtain express confirmation of the guarantee given. The agreement would be reached without advising the Foreign Ministry. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI would act upon ITAGAKI's instructions, and the Cabinet would be confronted with an arrangement which fell within the decision tentatively reached on 8 August 1939.

Ott transmitted all the foregoing information to Germany and urged his government to accede to ITAGAKI's request. Ott pointed out that it was of prime importance to Germany to buttress the Army's [p48867] domestic political position, since the Army was the foremost advocate of the alliance which Germany desired. Furthermore, Ott felt that such a concession would restore the whole government to its decision to seek a German alliance, and would avoid the Cabinet's overthrow. On 18 August 1939 Ott reported that the conflict between ITAGAKI and Arita was still raging. ITAGAKI's position was reinforced by the pressure of junior military officers who were demanding an unconditional military alliance, but the Five Ministers' Conference would go no further than the offer transmitted unofficially to Germany on 5 June 1939. The Army was pursuing its alliance policy independently of the outcome of Arita's negotiation with Great Britain.

Five days later, on 23 August 1939, the German-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed. On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland; and on 3 September 1939, in consequence of this action, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Germany had not made the concessions which ITAGAKI had asked, and the opportunity for the War Minister's attempted tour de force had failed. But the occasion called for more than the resignation of the War Minister. The Cabinet's policy also had been completely discredited. Cabinet [p48868] and nation had looked to Germany as an ally against the U.S.S.R. The Cabinet had from its very inception been pledged to achieving a more intimate relationship between Japan and the Axis powers. After meeting on 28 August 1939 and acknowledging the failure of their policy, the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned en bloc.

The collapse of the Cabinet's pro-German policy made possible the pursuit of a modus vivendi with the Western Powers — the policy which ITAGAKI had feared.


The Emperor summoned General Abe to form a new Cabinet and gave him certain instructions. Either HATA or UMEZU was to be the new War Minister. Discretion was to be used in appointing Home and Justice Ministers as the [p48869] maintenance of public order was of supreme importance. The foreign policy of the new Cabinet was to be that of cooperation with Great Britain and the United States.

Obedience to this last instruction demanded the reversal of the foreign policy pursued by the first Konoye and HIRANUMA Cabinets; and this fact explains the necessity for the other instructions which the Emperor gave. The new War Minister would need to be someone who enjoyed the confidence of and was able to control the Army, and the success of the new policy would depend primarily on the ability of the Home and Justice Ministers to control the confused reactions of the Japanese public to the sudden reversal of their country's foreign policy.

Abe in some perplexity reported the Emperor's instructions to Konoye, then President of the Privy Council, who in turn informed KIDO, the outgoing Home Minister. Kido advised Konoye, who agreed, that if Abe were to follow the Emperor's choice as to the selection of a War Minister, there was danger of a clash with the military. The Emperor should therefore convey this instruction to the Army itself or to the outgoing War Minister, and should allow the three Army Chiefs to select the new War Minister in the accustomed manner. As to the other Imperial instructions, KIDO considered that Abe might use his own discretion. These opinions KIDO [p48870] The Abe Cabinet, which was formed on 30 August 1939, contained no member of the out-going administration. HATA became the new War Minister. SHIRATORI was, at his own request recalled from Rome. On 5 September 1939 the Kwantung Army announced the termination and failure of the frontier war against the U.S.S.R. at Nomonhan. Two days later UMEZU, the Emperor's other candidate for the post of War Minister, became Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. The conduct of foreign affairs, at first assumed by Abe himself, was assigned to Admiral Nomura.

Under Nomura's direction, the Cabinet's foreign policy attempted to improve Japan's relations with the Western Powers. No effort was made to seek a rapprochement with Germany and Italy. No steps were taken for a Japanese incursion into Southeast Asia. A bombing incident in French Indo-China, which had occurred during the last days of HIRANUMA's premiership, was settled and an indemnity paid by Japan.

But the desire for better relations with the Western Powers implied no abandonment of the good of Japanese domination of China. This was the basic tenet of Japanese national policy. The Abe Cabinet desired the acceptance by the Western Powers of the "new order" in East Asia which Japan had created. [p48871]

This policy is illustrated by the conversation held between Foreign Minister Nomura and the French Ambassador on 30 November 1939. Nomura told Ambassador Henri that Japan shared France's desire to restore friendly relations between the two countries. He expressed appreciation for the concessions which France had recently

made. Nomura pointed out, however, that, while Japan was straining every effort to overthrow Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, France was continuing to support Chinese resistance. Furthermore, French territories in the Pacific, and particularly French Indo-China, were maintaining economic barriers against Japan. If France really desired a rapprochement with Japan, she should said Nomura, abandon equivocal action, sever relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and adopt an attitude in sympathy with Japan's attempt to settle the "China Incident".

Nomura told Henri that large quantities of ammunition were still reaching the Chinese National Government's forces through French Indo-China, and that that French colony had become a base of pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese activities, and for the provisioning of the Chinese forces. Nomura desired to dispatch to Hanoi in Northern Indo-China a Foreign Ministry official accompanied by a military export to explain on the spot [p48872] the reasons for Japanese military activity in China close to the border of French Indo- China which was arousing French suspicions. Nomura suggested that in this manner French suspicions might be allayed, and the way be paved for an agreement.

On 12 December 1939 Ambassador Henri presented a French reply which denied the transportation of munitions through French Indo-China, and expressed regret that Japan should have renewed this complaint. Henri said that France could see no justification for the despatch of a mission to Hanoi, since a Japanese Consul-General was stationed in that city. He expressed France's willingness to confer on all other differences outstanding between the two countries, and desired an explanation of Japanese military activities upon the border between China and French Indo-China.

Nomura replied that the continued transportation of munitions was a plain fact which could not be contested. He acknowledged that France was under no legal obligation to suspend supplies to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces since war between Japan and China had not been openly declared, but he expressed his Cabinet's hope that France would take steps to suspend traffic which tended to help the forces of Chinese resistance.

The Abe Cabinet's policy is also well exemplified [p48873] in the approach made to the U.S.S.R. immediately after the Cabinet came to power. The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, TOGO, had been instructed to propose a settlement of the war at Nomonhan; and within a few days such a settlement had been reached. TOGO was also instructed to propose the establishment of a general commission for settling border disputes, and the conclusion of a trade treaty with the Soviet Union. If the U.S.S.R. should propose a non-aggression pact between the two countries, TOGO would ask first whether the Soviet Union was prepared to deny help to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.


Despite the Cabinet's new policy of seeking a modus vivendi with the Western powers, the military faction maintained the policy of seeking complete solidarity with Germany and Italy. The German-Soviet Pact had come as a severe blow to the HIRANUMA Cabinet and to public opinion in Japan. Even OSHIMA had been surprised and resentful that such an agreement had finally been reached. Yet OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had had ample warning of Germany's intentions.

OSHIMA enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler and the German Army. During the year preceding the [p48874] conclusion of the Neutrality Pact, he had been kept fully advised of German policy by von Ribbentrop. For a long time von Ribbentrop had been convinced that both Germany and Japan must reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. He now said that he would have striven for this result even if a tripartite alliance had been concluded. This policy von Ribbentrop had disclosed to OSHIMA more than a year before. On 16 June 1939 he had given OSHIMA and SHIRATORI a specific warning that, since Japan had not agreed to Germany's proposals, Germany would herself conclude a pact with the Soviet Union. SHIRATORI had realized that this was the German intention, but OSHIMA, believing such a rapprochement to be out of the question, had regarded the warning as a spur to induce Japan to conclude the German alliance.

After the conclusion of the Soviet-German Neutrality Pact on 23 August 1939, SHIRATORI and the pro-German group to which he belonged had laboured to counteract the reaction which that event had produced in Japan. Since that aim had not been attained, he had insisted upon being recalled to Japan, where he could work more effectively for rapprochement among the Axis Powers.

The HIRANUMA Cabinet had made a protest to the Germans concerning the conclusion of the Soviet-German [p48875] Neutrality Pact, which was regarded in Japan as a breach of the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact; but Ambassador OSHIMA was dissuaded from presenting this protest by the German Foreign Ministry official to whom he sought to deliver it. SHIRATORI, too, had advised him that the protest should not be delivered. OSHIMA nevertheless reported that he had complied with the Cabinet's instructions; but not until 18 September 1939, when the German invasion of Poland was completed, did he deliver the HIRANUMA Cabinet's protest. This OSHIMA did apologetically, and was satisfied that the German Foreign Ministry should accept the document unofficially and for their own information.

Meanwhile SHIRATORI in Rome had made it clear that he did not share the indignation felt in Japan concerning the conclusion of the German-Soviet Neutrality Pact. On 4 September 1939 he spoke to the German Ambassador in Rome of the effect of the secret agreement annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact. That agreement was intended to prevent either country from concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which at the time the Pact was concluded appeared to be the chief enemy of both Germany and Japan. Since that time, said SHIRATORI, circumstances had entirely changed, and it would be unreasonable to expect any country to encompass its own [p48876] downfall for a treaty's sake. Great Britain had now become the chief enemy of both countries, and simply had to be beaten. In short, SHIRATORI recognized the

German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact for what it really was --a device on the part of Germany to avoid having to fight a war on her Eastern and Western frontiers simultaneously.

On 2 September 1939 SHIRATORI had received official notification of his recall to Japan. He particularly desired an opportunity to urge his own pro-German views upon von Ribbentrop, and when it proved impossible for him to go to Berlin, he arranged to convey his sentiments through OSHIMA.

In Tokyo, ITAGAKI, the outgoing War Minister, expressed his continued belief in Axis solidarity. On 6 September 1939, at a reception given to the German Army and Air Attaches, both ITAGAKI and HATA, the new War Minister, made speeches which were markedly cordial to Germany. ITAGAKI pointed out to Ambassador Ott his most sincere efforts to strengthen the bonds between Japan and Germany. These, he said, had failed because of developments in Europe. ITAGAKI emphasized, however, that his successor HATA completely shared his views. HATA referred to the Abe Cabinet's declaration on nonintervention, in the European War, but assured Ott that, [p48877] as a soldier, he fully understood the action which Germany had taken.


Other members of the military faction made efforts to secure the continuation of close relationships between Japan and Germany; and these efforts the Germans encouraged and reciprocated. General Terauchi, War Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet and one of the men most responsible for the basis national policy decision of August 1936, arrived in Germany upon a goodwill mission shortly after the downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. He had been sent to attend the Nazi Party Conference at War Minister ITAGAKI's instigation. The Navy had opposed this mission, but ITAGAKI had advised the Emperor that Terauchi must be sent in order to strengthen the bond created by the Anti-Comintern Pact.

On 2 September 1939 SHIRATORI had told the German Ambassador in Rome that he believed there was a good change of continuing with success the thwarted rapprochement with the Axis Powers. He said that public opinion in Japan in favour of a settlement with the U.S.S.R. was growing, and might lead to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Japan, freed from a Soviet threat, would be able to minimize the possibility of United States [p48878] intervention in the European War.

On 4 September 1939 SHIRATORI advised the German Ambassador that in his opinion the only way to conclude Japanese-Soviet Pact was through German mediation. SHIRATORI had therefore urged OSHIMA to request German "good offices" with the U.S.S.R., without awaiting any instruction from Tokyo. He believed that the Axis power should unite against Great Britain, and hoped that a world war right be averted by reaching an acceptable armistice with France and Great Britain, after the Polish campaign had been completed.

The views which von Ribbentrop urged upon OSHIMA two days later corresponded closely with those expressed by SHIRATORI. Von Ribbentrop told OSHIMA that Japan's fate was as over linked with Germany's. Should Germany be defeated a

coalition of the Western Powers would prevent further Japanese expansion and would take away Japan's position in China; but should Japan maintain and enhance her relationship with Germany, Japan's position would ultimately be secured by German victories. The idea of close cooperation between the three Axis powers was, he added, not in the least dead. The three countries, having an understanding with the U.S.S.R., would, in accordance with the world situation, direct their activities directly against Great Britain. [p48879] This was in the real interest of all parties concerned. Von Ribbentrop would himself, above all else, work for an understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and he trusted that the same policy would prevail in Tokyo. The understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Japan would require to be achieved quickly, for Germany's conflict with Great Britain would be decisive for all world politics in the future.

With all these statements OSHIMA expressed agreement. He said that the Japanese Army would doubtless appreciate the need for an understanding with the Soviet Union, and that there was certainly a prospect that these ideas would be embodied in Japanese foreign policy in the near future. SHIRATORI also would work for this result.

Both von Ribbentrop and Hitler lost no opportunity of impressing these views upon OSHIMA and upon Terauchi. Ambassador Ott was instructed to talk quite openly with Kanin, the Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, upon the same lines. He was also to intimate the importance of OSHIMA's remaining in Berlin as Ambassador, for OSHIMA commanded the complete confidence of the German government and Army.

OSHIMA, however, decided that he could work more effectively in Tokyo than in
Berlin. On 27 October 1939, von Ribbentrop advised Ott that OSHIMA, upon his [p48880] projected return to Tokyo, would work for German-Japanese friendship. Ott was instructed to provide OSHIMA with a special channel of communication through the German Embassy to Berlin.

We will adjourn now until half-past nine on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Monday, 8 November 1948, at 0930.) [p48881]

Monday, 8 November 1948

Court House of the Tribunal

War Ministry Building

Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with the exception of HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from the Government of India, not sitting from 1100 to 1200.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMFE.) [p48882]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.

I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment.


Von Ribbentrop, in urging Axis solidarity, sought to encourage Japan to move to the south. He impressed upon both OSHIMA and Terauchi that Japan's vital interests lay in that direction. If an understanding between Japan and the Soviet Union was reached through German mediation, Japan might freely extend her power in East Asia towards the south, and penetrate further than had been planned. Terauchi agreed, and said that it was in Japan's best interests to bring the China war to an end by a tolerable compromise, and to utilize the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy in the south, where greater economic successes were to be gained.

OSHIMA not only agreed, but was enthusiastic. [p48883] He said that Japan would be perfectly ready for an advance in South-East Asia, which would include the capture of Hong Kong. This he had already proposed by telegraph. In OSHIMA's opinion Japan should penetrate deeply into South-East Asia. She needed tin, rubber and oil from the Fatherlands East Indies, cotton from British India, and wool from Australia. If all of these requirements were obtained, Japan would be very strong.

He thought at this time that Japan should make a non-aggression pact with the Netherlands East Indies, at the same time reaching an agreement which would enable Japan to exploit the raw materials of the Indies in accordance with the agreement obtained. By the same device the Netherlands would be estranged from Great Britain.


During Abe's tenure of office as Premier, neither War Minister HATA nor other members of the military faction are shown to have made any overt attempt to secure the adoption of their views. As SHIRATORI had pointed out, the accession to power

of the Abe Cabinet promised certain advantages. The goal of Japanese policy was, as before, the establishment of a "new order" in [p48884] China. As a result of the Cabinet change the public illfeeling engendered by the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact had been considerably mitigated. There was in Japan a growing desire for a settlement with the U.S.S.R. which, if carried through in stages, might lead to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. With a new Cabinet in power, SHIRATORI considered that there was a well-founded opportunity for continuing the repair of German-Japanese relations. Both SHIRATORI and OSHIMA returned to Tokyo to make the most of this opportunity.

The policy of the Abe Cabinet and the circumstances in which it was formed, themselves provide the reasons for its downfall. No Cabinet which renounced the aim of establishing Japan's "new order" in China could hope to remain in power. Yet the maintenance of that aim was incompatible with the reestablishment of friendly relations with the Western Powers. This was the foreign policy which the Abe Cabinet had been formed to promote. The impossibility of carrying out that policy was, however, soon recognised.

Members of the military faction regained positions of influence. On 28 September 1939 DOHIHARA became a Supreme War Councillor. On 1 December 1939 ARAKI became again a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council. [p48885] Foreign Minister Nomura's negotiations in regard to French Indo-China did not lead to friendship with France; nor did Japan obtain the concessions for which Nomura had striven. On 5 December 1939 the United States lodged new complaints concerning damage done to United States property in China by the Japanese forces; and, ten days later, the United States extended the list of materials upon the export of which to Japan a moral embargo had been placed. Supplies of raw materials, which Japan had to import, would be withheld.

On 12 January 1940 Japan advised the Netherlands of her intention to abrogate the arbitration treaty between that country and Japan. That treaty would thus expire in August 1940. Three days later the Abe Cabinet resigned, and, with its resignation, the policy of fostering more friendly relations with the Western Powers was abandoned.

On the following day Yonai, who, as Navy Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had supported Arita's efforts to avoid a definite commitment that Japan would enter a war between Germany and the Western Powers, became the new Premier. HATA remained War Minister. KOISO, who, as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had lent general support to Arita's policy, resumed his previous post. Arita, who had been Foreign Minister in the [p48886] HIROTA Cabinet when the basis of the national policy was decided, and who had held that office again in the first Konoye and HIRANUMA Cabinets became once again Foreign Minister. With the outbreak of the European War circumstances had changed, but Arita's policy had not. He has himself testified before this Tribunal that the foreign policy of the Yonai Cabinet was to maintain good relations with Germany, in so far as that aim was not seriously harmful to Japan's major interests.


Arita was influential during the term of office of the Yonai Cabinet in maintaining Japan's adherence to the principle of the national policy decision. To the primary goal of securing Japan's domination of China, each succeeding Cabinet had remained faithful. It was the cornerstone of Japanese policy.

During 1939, while HIRANUMA was Premier, preparation had been made for establishing a puppet government for the whole of occupied China, excluding Manchukuo, under the leadership of the renegade Wang Ching-wei. This man had visited Tokyo in June 1939, and in the following month, on 7 July 1939, War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Yonai had made a joint statement to the Diet regarding China, and had expressed Japan's [p48887] determination to resist any interference, either from the Western Powers or from the Soviet Union, with the attainment of Japan's ambitions in that country. It had been the vain hope of the leaders of the Abe Cabinet that they could win the acquiescence of the Western Powers in Japan's established position in China, and upon that basis restore good relationships with Great Britain, France and the United States.

Before the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned, Wang Ching-wei, with the assistance of Japanese Army leaders in China, had begun to organise a Central Political Council, from which would be developed the new pro-Japanese Central Government of China. On 12 September 1939, twelve days after the downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet in which he served as War Minister, ITAGAKI had become Chief of Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. After Abe's accession to power, Japanese military operations in China were continued. On 30 November 1939, in pursuance of Japanese aims in China, Foreign Minister Nomura had renewed pressure upon the French to cease forwarding supplies to the National Government of China.

When, on 16 January 1940, Yonai became Prime Minister and Arita returned to the Foreign Ministry, place for the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei [p48888] government were well advanced. During that month a meeting was held at Tsingtao for the purpose of amalgamating the existing puppet regimes in the occupied areas of China.

The second principal goal of the national policy decision was that of achieving the mobilisation of the Japanese nation in preparations for war. In November 1938, shortly after he became Foreign Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet, Arita had laid stress upon the fact that this goal and that of achieving a position of supremacy on the Asiatic continent were interdependent. In January 1939, when HIRANUMA was Premier and Arita his Foreign Minister, the Cabinet had approved a new Planning Board programme for economic and industrial expansion. The objectives of the Amy's long-range economic and industrial planning, settled in the first half of 1937 before the revival of the war in China at Lukouchiao, then received for the first time specific Cabinet approval. In the light of the experience already gained, higher levels of production were demanded, so that the repletion of Japanese armaments might be completed by 1941. This was the year originally planned, but the war in China after 1937 had created a drain on Japan's military resources which for a time threatened to postpone the date of completion of armament. [p48889]

The basic national policy decision, of 11 August 1936, which declared the consolidation of Japanese power in China and the mobilisation of the Japanese nation for war to be two principal aims of Japanese policy, declared also that in the pursuit of these aims, Japan should strive to maintain amicable relations with the Western Powers. Arita and Yonai, as members of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, had resisted steadfastly the attempt of the military faction to embroil Japan in the European War. The outbreak of that war in September 1939 had imposed upon Japan no new obligation, and had rendered less probable any intervention from the Western Powers in Japanese activities in China.

Therefore the Yonai Cabinet was united in maintaining the Abe Cabinet's policy of non-intervention in the European War. It was this principle which constituted the factor limiting Foreign Minister Arita's desire to maintain good relations with Germany.

Nevertheless it was also a goal of the national basic policy decision that Japan should strive to develop her interests in the South Seas, under the "joint efforts of national defence and diplomatic skill." The first major development in Japanese foreign policy after the Yonai Cabinet had taken office shows that in this regard also Arita adhered to the principles set out in the [p48890] national policy decision.

The continuation of the war in China and the increased demands made upon the Japanese economy by the programme of economic and industrial preparations for repletion of armaments had increased Japan's reliance upon foreign sources of supply for vital raw materials. In December 1939 Foreign Minister Nomura's attempt to obtain by agreement increased supplies from French Indo-China had, in the absence of a general understanding, come to nothing. On 12 January 1940, three days before the downfall of the Abe Cabinet, Japan had advised the Netherlands of her intention to abrogate the Arbitration Treaty between that country and Japan.


On 2 February 1940 a new proposal was made through the Japanese Minister at the Hague to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. In form it was a reciprocal agreement which would govern Japan's relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Japan would undertake not to adopt restrictive measures in regard to the entry into that country of the employees of Netherlands firms, and the Netherlands would undertake to abolish or modify their existing restrictions upon employment of foreign labour in the Netherlands East Indies. There would be [p48891] granted to Japan facilities for new enterprises and extended facilities for existing enterprises in the Netherlands East Indies. In return for this concession, there would be afforded opportunities for new Netherlands investments in Japan, and the grant of similar facilities by the governments of Manchukuo and China would be "recommended" by Japan.

The Netherlands, furthermore, would undertake to abolish or modify existing restrictive measures effecting the importation of Japanese goods into the

Netherlands East Indies; and would take the necessary steps to render easier the flow of goods between the two countries. Japan, for her part, would take appropriate steps to increase her importation from the East Indies, and would, subject to her own economic difficulties and as far as circumstances permitted, refrain from restricting or prohibiting the exportation to the Netherlands East Indies of the principal commodities required by that country.

Finally, the press of each country would, by strict measures of control, be made to refrain from comment unfriendly to the other.

Japan, more than a year earlier, had made plans to secure the resources of these important Netherlands possessions. During the latter half of 1938, while the first Konoye Cabinet was in power, officials of the [p48892] Japanese government were engaged in conducting a propaganda campaign in the Netherlands East Indies, in preparation for Japan's "march to the south."

The new proposal followed closely upon the abrogation by Japan of the existing treaty regulating her relationship with the Netherlands. Although it purported to be made upon a basis of reciprocity, it is apparent that the advantages offered by Japan to the Netherlands East Indies were nugatory. Japan, upon the other hand, stood to gain unrestricted access to the vital warsupporting raw materials produced in the East Indies. A suitable reply to this Japanese proposal was still under consideration by the Netherlands when, on 9 May 1940, that country was attacked by Germany.


During the first half of 1940 the Yonai Cabinet adhered to the policy of non- intervention in the European War, so that the full strength of the nation might be directed to the task of securing Japan's position in China, and of completing Japan's measures for war. This policy was maintained in the face of considerable opposition within Japan itself.

On 23 February 1940 Stahmer, newly arrived from Germany upon a special mission, reported to von Ribbentrop [p48893] that in Japan dommestic problems were paramount. He found that the attitude of OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, Terauchi and other members of the military faction which had supported an unconditional alliance with Germany was unchanged; and that they were ready to give every support. The Cabinet, he said, was trying to prevent Japan from being drawn into the European War, and to maintain a friendly relationship with Great Britain and the United States; but public opinion was definitely pro-German and anti-British. The influence of the Army, which had been gravely weakened while Abe was in power, was steadily increasing. Under Abe well-known pro-German officials of the Foreign and War Ministries had been systematically transferred to overseas posts; but now the contrary policy was being pursued. A further increase in Army influence might be counted upon.

Japan's economic difficulties and shortages of essential materials had been increased and prolonged by the continuation of the war in China. Resentment against the opposition of the Western Powers to Japan's aims in China caused some Diet members openly to advocate the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty, and Japanese participation in the European War. During March 1940 Arita's policy of non- intervention was assailed in the Diet. The Foreign Minister was urged to strengthen [p48894] Japan's relations with the Axis. Arita in reply emphasized the friendly relationship which existed between Japan and the other Axis powers, but maintained that the settlement of the war in China precluded Japan from intervening in the European War.

On 7 February 1940, at a meeting of the Diet Budget Committee attended by Yonai and Arita, one committee member advocated the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty, which he characterised as a scheme devised by Great Britain and the United States to restrain the continental policy of Japan. It was, he said, a serious obstacle to the achievement of the "new order," and it would cause great difficulties in the settlement of the China war, after the Wang regime had been established.

At another meeting of this committee, held on 28 March 1940, one member mentioned reports that Hitler and Mussolini had met to consolidate their alliance against England and France, and inferred that Japan should not refuse an invitation to join such an alliance. Foreign Minister Arita in reply reaffirmed his conviction that the Cabinet's firm policy of non-intervention in European affairs was in the existing circumstances the most prudent one. He emphasized his adherence to the principles set out in the national policy decision by saying that, as long as Japan acted according to her own [p48895] just policies with Japan itself as the focal point, the fear that she might have to stand alone was unnecessary. War Minister HATA supported Arita.

The Foreign Minister's reply prompted another committee member to raise the main question whether it was desirable that Japan should make a complete change in her foreign policy. He visualised the situation which might arise should the European War end sooner than was expected. He said that Great Britain and France would never cease to aid the forces of Chinese resistance. He feared that, if Japan maintained her present policy, even Germany and Italy, who now took the lead in supporting Japan's position in China, might turn against her. He pointed out that, when the Abe Cabinet was formed, the outcome of the war in Europe could not be foreseen; but he believed that now the situation had changed. He stressed the fact that the Cabinet's tendency to show partiality towards Great Britain and the United States was inviting the strong displeasure of the Japanese people, as well as German dissatisfaction. He therefore urged the Cabinet to abandon completely the policy of non-participation in the European War, and to enter into an alliance with the other Axis powers. He suggested that the establishment of the Wang regime would provide a suitable occasion for such a change in policy. [p48896]


War Minister HATA's statements at the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940 show that the Army was determined to uphold the policy of non-intervention in Europe, until Japan's own position had been consolidated. He said that Japan was concentrating upon the settlement of the war in China, and that therefore it was necessary to harmonize skilfully her politics and tactics in order to meet changes in the international situation. In order that the war in China might be settled there would be no change in Japan's policy, which was to concentrate her whole strength upon excluding any third power which interfered persistently with the establishment of Japan's "new order" in East Asia.

HATA also made it clear that the Army regarded the policy of non-intervention purely as a matter of expediency. He stated that the Army regarded the policy which Yonai and Arita had so often expounded as one which preserved Japan's complete freedom of action.

Two days later, on 30 March 1940, the new puppet government for the whole of China, established under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei, was formally inaugurated. At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March [p48897] 1940, War Minister HATA had said that this event would utterly ruin Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's position. The Army, said HATA, would give as much help as possible to the new regime and would continue the fight against the Chinese National Government's forces. HATA repeated that the object of the China war was to crush thoroughly the forces of Chinese resistance. The establishment of the Wang regime, he added, was therefore only a stage in the disposition of the China War.

HATA's statements on this occasion showed also that the Army hoped, by exploiting the resources of China, to relieve the pressure of Japan's economic difficulties and to provide new sources of raw materials. He told the Budget Committee that the Army was making the maximum use of commodities obtained in the occupied areas of China; and that it was expected in the future to do this in greater degree. Self- sufficiency in vital materials was to be obtained simultaneously with the execution of the Army's pacification activities. [p48898]


In striving to attain the goal of self-sufficiency in war-supporting raw materials, Japan was placed in a dilemma. The exploitation of the resources of China, now to be undertaken in greater measure than ever before, was being carried out in violation of Japan's obligations as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty. The very reasons which led Japan to seek new sources of essential raw materials restrained her from provoking an immediate breach with the Western Powers from whose territories she was deriving important supplies of these materials. It was admitted in an official document, prepared on 3 March 1940, that Japan was intensely reliant upon the United States as a source of materials vital to her preparations for war. For this reason, it was stated, Japan could not assume a resolute attitude towards that country.

Ever since the outbreak of the war in China, the United States and other Western Powers had condemned Japanese aggression in that country, and had demanded the observance of the Nine-Power Treaty, Persistent violations of that treaty had caused the United States, on 11 June 1938, to place a moral embargo upon the

{48,899] export of certain war materials to Japan. During the last months of 1938, while Arita was Foreign Minister, Japan had at last admitted that she did not intend to observe treaty obligations when they conflicted with her own vital interests.

During 1939, following further complaints concerning the misconduct of the Japanese forces and the violation of Japanese treaty obligations in China, the United States had taken new measures to restrict the flow of supplies to Japan. On 26 July 1939, she had notified Japan of her intention to terminate that Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which, since 1911, had governed trade relations between the two countries. It had latterly proved inadequate to procure Japanese respect for American interests in China; and American fidelity to its provisions prevented the United States from taking economic measures which might induce Japan to desist from her policy of aggression. On 15 December 1939 molybdenum and aluminum were added to the moral embargo list.

On 26 January 1940, pursuant to the notification already given, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation expired. In March 1940 legislation to prohibit the supply of war materials to Japan was under consideration in the United States. [p48900] These events caused the question of repudiating the Nine-Power Treaty to become a vital issue in the Diet Budget Committee's discussions of February and March 1940. At the meeting of 7 February 1940 one committee member drew attention to the restrictive measures imposed by the United States, and urged Arita to renounce the Nine-Power Treaty, pointing out that it would be a great obstacle to the achievement of Japan's further aims in China, after the Wang regime had been established. Arita agreed that the basic principle of that treaty was not applicable to the new situation in the Far East. On the one hand, he said, its repudiation was favourable to the establishment of Japan's "new order", and to the amelioration of conditions in Japan. On the other hand, however, there was the possibility that its renunciation would cause international repercussions. Therefore the problem required careful consideration. After the Wang regime had been set up, consultations would be held over this question.

At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940, Arita reiterated that the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty might produce good results or bad results. He did not deny that such a step was desirable, but emphasized that the time for repudiation and the means to be employed required to be studied carefully. [p48901] War Minister HATA, who had pointed out that the establishment of the Wang government was only one step towards the realisation of Japan's aims in China, said that the Army would follow the Cabinet's policy in dealing with the Nine-Power Treaty. HATA gave it as his own view that the question was purely one of expediency. He considered that the existing situation in China was quite beyond the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty, and that that treaty should not be permitted to hamper the carrying out of Japanese military operations. The Army, he added, had decided for the moment to reopen the Yangtse River; but this, he said, was a question to be decided purely in a voluntary manner.


On 3 March 1940 there was formulated a policy which, taking cognisance of Japan's dependence upon the United States, set out measures through which Japan could eliminate her reliance upon that country, particularly in regard to the supply of materials essential for carrying out what the document calls "The Divine War". This secret Foreign Ministry document discloses an intention to revise the whole programme of economic and industrial expansion in order to achieve self- [p48902] sufficiency in the essential materials of war and in order to establish an economic system which would make Japan independent of the goodwill of the United States. The new plan called for a vast expansion in the manufacture of machine tools, for experimentation with substitute materials for the production of "special steel", and for alternative sources for the supply of scrap iron, petroleum and other war materials. Facilities for manufacturing finished steel and electrolytic copper, for refining crude oil, and for producing petroleum synthetically, were to be rapidly expanded.

This costly and uneconomic policy would be financed by the temporary diversion of military funds to meet industrial needs. Greater emphasis was to be placed upon the nationalisation of industry, and upon the integration of the economies of Manchukuo and of the rest of China with that of Japan. So imperative was the new plan considered that funds allocated to the war in China and to military preparations for war with the Soviet Union were to be diverted to the realisation of the aims of this plan. For this reason Japan could endeavour to achieve a temporary adjustment of her relations with the U.S.S.R.

It was intended that, as a result of the measures already described, Japan would be enabled to [p48903] adopt a firm attitude towards the United States; and it was expected that that country, confronted by the threat of war and under the pressure of the public opinion of its own people, would acquiesce in Japanese actions and remove embargoes upon the supply of raw materials.


The same considerations which restrained the Yonai Cabinet from openly repudiating the Nine-Power Treaty led Japan to disguise her aggressive intentions in the south; but plans for a move southward were prepared and developed during the first half of the year 1940.

On 17 March 1940 the Budget Committee met to consider the huge estimated expenditure of the Overseas Ministry for that financial year. One committee member, seeking to discover the purposes of this expenditure, urged the view that Japan could obtain greater rewards by expanding southward than by concentrating upon the development of Manchukuo and the rest of China. He pointed out that Japan could find a treasure-chest of raw materials in the south, and took as instances the island of Mindanao in the Philippines and Celebes in the Netherlands Last Indies. He [p48904}

advocated the seizure of these areas, though recognizing that this step could not at present be taken. Nevertheless he urged a fundamental change in national policy, saying that Japan must have both the North and the South as her objectives, and that her greatest exertions should be directed towards the south.

In the present circumstances he believed that Japan should formulate a twofold plan, one phase being for defence and one for attack. He expressed the Committee's pleasure that Overseas Minister KOISO had stated similar opinions at several recent Cabinet meetings.

KOISO in reply fully endorsed the opinion that Japan must regard both the North and the South as her objectives, and advised the Committee that this was the policy of the Overseas Ministry. In planning the future development of Manchukuo and the rest of China the movement of population was the primary task, and economic development the subsidiary goal. But in planning Japanese expansion to the south economic exploitation was the principal aim, and colonisation a means to that end.

In conformity with the principles of the basic national policy decision, and within the limits which the Cabinet's desire to avoid an open breach with the [p48905] Western Powers imposed, Foreign Minister Arita supported the development of Japan's southward policy.

At a press conference held on 15 April 1940 he made a statement concerning Japanese policy towards the Netherlands East Indies. There had in the meantime been no reply from the Netherlands to the Japanese proposal for a trade agreement, which had been delivered on 10 February 1940.

Arita said on this occasion that Japan, in common with the other countries of East Asia, was intimately related with the regions of the South Seas, and especially with the Netherlands East Indies. The economic bonds between these countries were such that the prosperity of East Asia depended upon their mutual aid and inter- dependence.

Arita said in response to questions that, if the war in Europe should effect the Netherlands East Indies, not only would these economic relationships be interfered with, but also there would arise a situation which threatened the peace and stability of East Asia. For these reasons, Arita added, Japan would be deeply concerned over any development arising out of the war in Europe which might affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. On the following day, 16 April 1940, this statement was published by [p48906] the Japanese Embassy in Washington.


During the first five months of the year 1940 the measures taken by the Yonai Cabinet produced no settlement of the China conflict. Within Japan itself distress and discontentment were wide-spread; and the pro-German sympathies of the Japanese public, already well-defined in February 1940, were strengthened.

On 3 April 1940, in the presence of the Japanese Ambassador, a German-Japanese Cultural Committee was established in Berlin. Minister Director Weiszaecker of the German Foreign Ministry referred in his welcoming speech to the gratifying manner in which relations between Japan and various Nazi Party societies had developed during the preceding years. He described the new committee as an effective instrument for strengthening the traditionally close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan, and expressed his conviction that the political friendship which united the two countries would be increased.

As the tide of German victories in Europe rose those who advocated the repudiation of the Nine-Power Treaty became more outspoken. This view was urged [p48907] not only at the meetings of the Diet Budget Committee, but openly in the Diet itself.

On 23 March 1940 Ambassador Ott reported to von Ribbentrop that political events in Japan indicated a further deterioration in relations between that country and the Western Powers. The United States and Great Britain had maintained their opposition to the establishment of the Wang regime in China. The British Ambassador had lodged a protest against the formation of the new puppet government. The United States Ambassador, had presented two further complaints concerning violations of the "open door" policy in China.

Diet members of several parties had simultaneously urged the Foreign Minister to strengthen Japan's connection with Germany and Italy, the countries friendly to her policy. At the Budget Committee meeting of 28 March 1940, one committee member regarded Germany's victory as certain, and advocated Japan's participation in the European War. [p48908] Arita's declaration of 15 April 1940 concerning the Netherlands East Indies produced an immediate reply from the United States. On 17 April 1940 the State Department issued a press release in which it was declared that any interference with the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies would prejudice the peace and stability of the whole Pacific area.

On 9 May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands; and on the following day Stahmer, the German Foreign Ministry's special emissary, who had recently returned to Tokyo from the United States, reported to von Ribbentrop upon the situation in Japan. He said that recent German successes had created a deep impression in Japan, and had diminished the importance of Great Britain in the Far East. Within the Army and among the people of Japan, anti-British sentiment was markedly stronger. In view of the attitude which the United States had adopted, Stahmer was confident that the Yonai Cabinet's attempt to reach an understanding with that country and with Great Britain would be unsuccessful.

Stahmer said that the difficulties of the Yonai Cabinet, the economic policies of which were inadequate, had again increased. He considered that the unrest and discontent which these policies had [p48909] engendered would lead eventually to the formation of a new Cabinet favorable to Germany; and hoped that, when the time came, Konove might be the new Premier. In any case, he added, the tension between Japan on the one hand and the United

States and Great Britain on the other was bound to increase or at least to continue undiminished. He warned von Ribbentrop, however, that until the China war had been settled, and until urgent measures of domestic relief had been taken, Japan would be unable to change her policy,


In spite of the increasing clamor for closer relations with Germany, and for Japanese participation in the European War, Foreign Minister Arita had maintained his policy of non-intervention in the European War, and of seeking to avoid a definite cleavage in Japanese relations with the United States. In his despatch of 10 May 1940 Stahmer reported that the Yonai Cabinet was still striving to obtain a further measure of agreement with Great Britain and the United States. One Foreign Ministry official who had consistently urged this policy upon Arita was SHIGEMITSU, the Japanese Ambassador in London. During July and August 1939, prior to the [p48910] downfall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, Foreign Minister Arita had explored the possibilities of obtaining Great Britain's acquiescence in Japan's position in China. During the latter months of 1939, while the Abe Cabinet was in office, this had been the aim of Japanese foreign policy. After Yonai had become Premier and Arita his Foreign Minister, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU had striven to secure the maintenance of that aim. It was his contention that the objects of Japanese national policy should be pursued through establishing in China a government to which the Western Powers would not take exception.

On 13 March 1940, less than three weeks before the Wang Ching-wei regime was established in China, SHIGEMITSU reported to Arita the efforts he had recently made to remove Great Britain's objections to Japan's provisions for the settlement of the conflict in China. He had spoken to Mr. R. A. Butler, the British Under-Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, of Japan's intention to set up the Wang Ching-wei regime as the new central government of China. Using the "Konoye principles" and other declarations of Japanese policy as the basis of his explanation, he had described Japan's intentions towards China in the most favorable light. He had said that it was Japan's policy to establish peace and order in China, and also cooperation [p48911] between the new Chinese government and foreign countries. Under the new regime, he had added, only those elements which plotted civil strife would be excluded. He hoped that, upon this basis, an opportunity for compromise with the National Government of China would be found.

SHIGEMITSU strove to impress upon Arita that, if this policy were followed, there was the opportunity of reaching an agreement with Great Britain which would be advantageous to both countries. Butler, said SHIGEMITSU, had stated that, although Great Britain could not immediately change her policy of recognising only the National Government of China, he hoped that SHIGEMITSU's forecast of the situation would prove correct. As an earnest of Great Britain's willingness to make concessions which involved no sacrifice of principle, the British government had taken steps to resolve the dispute with Japan over the British concession at Tientsin.

SHIGEMITSU told Arita that Great Britain's apprehension concerning the actions of the U.S.S.R. provided the basis for a more fundamental agreement with Japan. Butler had spread that there were reasons for a better understanding between their

two countries both in regard to China, and, more generally, in regard to the world situation. [p48912] SHIGEMATSU had assured Butler that Japan was determined to maintain a position of strict neutrality in regard to the European war, and had expressed the hope that barriers to trade between the two countries might be removed. Butler had replied that Great Britain was ready to make every effort to reach that result.

On 13 May 1940, four days after Germany had invaded the Netherlands and Belgium, SHIGEMITSU again reported to Arita. He said that it was evident that Hitler had resolved to stake everything upon this campaign, but he stressed the fact that Germany had by no means beaten France and Great Britain. He emphasized that Japan must be ready for every contingency, and that therefore it should be the guiding principle of her national policy to achieve a situation of stability in East Asia.

SHIGEMITSU attempted to provide Arita with a formula which, falling within the principles of the basic national policy decision of 1936, would yet involve no resort to further measure of aggression.

He said that, in view of the international situation, it was a matter of great urgency that Japan's position of leadership in East Asia should be established firmly. Regardless of the outcome of the European War, Japan would be placed at a disadvantage, if the conflict [p48913] in China were not first settled. He therefore stressed the need for conciliatory measures, suggesting that, whatever the sacrifices entailed, Japan should attempt to bring about a reconciliation with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, either directly or through the Wang regime.

SHIGEMATSU urged Arita that Japan's policy towards the whole of the South Seas area should be based upon that already adopted towards the Netherlands East Indies. Japan, he said, should declare that she had no intention of changing the status quo of the South Seas area; that neither belligerents nor neutral powers should intervene in that area; and that the interests of the native peoples of the South Seas should be the first consideration.


Foreign Minister Arita's policy towards the Netherlands East Indies was governed in part by his desire to avoid an open breach with the Western Powers and in part by the wish to take advantage of German victories in Europe to achieve Japan's ambitions of expansion in the South. Arita's statement of 15 April 1940, expressing Japan's especial interest in the [p48914] maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies, had brought a prompt reassurance from the Netherlands. On 16 April 1940, the day after the statement was made, the Netherlands Foreign Minister had informed the Japanese Minister at the Hague that the Netherlands had not sought and would not seek any power's protection over or intervention in the Netherlands East Indies. Two days later, on 18 April 1940, this statement was confirmed by the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo.

Nevertheless, on 11 May 1940, two days after Germany had attacked the Netherlands, Arita once more drew the attention of the Soviet Union, the United States, Italy and all belligerent countries to Japan's especial concern in the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. On the same day the United States Department of State announced that a number of governments had already made clear their intention of maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. In the State Department's opinion such declarations could not be too frequently reiterated. Great Britain advised Japan that she did not intend to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies, and France gave a similar assurance. On 15 May 1940 the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo informed Arita that his [p48915] government believed that neither Great Britain, France nor the United States would intervene.

Despite these assurances, the controversy was kept alive in Japan. On 16 May 1940 Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, expressed his concern to the Japanese Ambassador, saving that every day [one] or two new aspects of the situation were being discussed in Japan, as though no pledges to preserve the status quo had been given by other nations. In view of such pledges, said Hull, it was difficult to understand Japan's insistence upon the existence of some supposed special Japanese interests in the Netherlands East Indies. He suggested that Japan, having made clear her intention to dominate the vast area of China, and to eliminate equality of trade with that country, might have similar designs upon the Netherlands East Indies. This the Ambassador denied, and expressed Japan's satisfaction with the position, provided that Great Britain and France did not attempt to land troops there.

On the same day, 16 April 1940, the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies informed Arita that it was intended to maintain existing economic relations with Japan, and that no restrictions would be placed upon the exportation of mineral oil, rubber and other raw materials of vital importance to that country. [p48916] Arita was, however, still unsatisfied. On 20 May 1940 he informed the Netherlands Minister that there were many other commodities of equal importance to Japan. He required a definite assurance that a stipulated quantity of specified materials would be exported to Japan annually, and demanded written confirmation that these requirements would be met.


During 1939, while the HIRANURA Cabinet was in power, Foreign Minister Arita had continued to regard the Soviet Union as Japan's foremost enemy. After the downfall of that Cabinet, which was caused by the conclusion on 23 August 1939 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had agreed with von Ribbentrop that they would work for reconciliation between Japan and the U.S.S.R. They planned that, once an understanding with the Soviet Union had been reached, the three Axis nations would be free to direct their activities exclusively against the Western Powers. Thus, the way would be made clear for Japan's advance to the south. OSHIMA and SKIRATORI returned to Tokyo in order to achieve their purpose.

{48,917] During the last four months of 1939 the moderate policies of the Abe Cabinet paved the way for a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. The conflict at Nomonhan was quickly ended, and the antagonism of the Japanese public towards the Soviet Union was in some degree allayed. TOGO, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, was instructed to negotiate with the Soviet government a general settlement of border disputes and a new commercial treaty. He was told also that the negotiation of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. would depend upon Soviet willingness to abandon the support of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

After 5 January 1940, when Arita again took office as Foreign Minister in the new Yonai Cabinet, the fear of Soviet interference with Japan's ambitions in China continued. On 10 May 1940 the Yonai Cabinet was still striving for a greater measure of agreement with Great Britain and the United States. Japan and the U.S.S.R. were mutually distrustful. The German Embassy, assisted by OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other members of the military faction, was still endeavoring to promote a reconciliation between their two countries.

Nevertheless, under pressure from the military faction and public opinion, the Yonai Cabinet's policy had shown a gradual change. The continued opposition [p48918] of the Western Powers to Japan's aggressive actions had increased the need for new sources of raw materials. In March 1940 the allocation of funds and materials for military preparations against the U.S.S.R. had been in part diverted to industrial production aimed at eliminating Japanese dependence upon the United States. The Overseas Ministry under KOISO had prepared plans for a Japanese advance into South-East Asia.

German victories in Europe seemed to present the opportunity for carrying out these plans. When, on 9 May 1940, Germany attacked the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Arita invited German support, by intimating that a declaration of Germany's attitude towards the Netherlands East Indies would be welcome in Japan. At the Foreign Minister's press conference and in Japanese newspapers it was noticed that, while the Western Powers had each expressed their views in regard to the Netherlands East Indies, no word had been received from Germany.

Thus was Germany presented with an opportunity to direct Japan's aggressive aims against the Western Powers. Ambassador Ott was instructed by von Ribbentrop to inform Arita that the German invasion of the Nether| lands was concerned only with the prosecution of the European War. Germany had herself no interest in the [p48919] Netherlands East Indies, but understood thoroughly Japan's anxiety over developments in that area. The activities of the Western Powers, said von Ribbentrop, had provided occasion for such misgivings, but Germany had always followed a policy of friendship towards Japan. Ott was to convey this message verbally to Arita, making it clear that Germany had declared definitely her disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies.

On 22 May 1940 Ott told Arita of Germany's recent military successes, and conveyed to him von Ribbentrop's message, for which Arita expressed gratitude. A communique was issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, stating that Germany had declared herself to be disinterested in the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese

press gave great publicity to this announcement, heralding it as complete acquiescence in Japanese policy for that area, and as a promise of future German support. The German attitude was contrasted with that adopted by the Western powers.


On 25 May 1940, immediately after Germany's declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU sent Arita another warning. [p48920] Once more he stressed that Japan should be prepared for all contingencies because the issue of the European War was still in doubt. He said that, although Germany had won the battle for the low countries, Great Britain and France were still firmly resolved to continue the fight. He urged again that Japan should maintain a policy of strict neutrality, and should end the China conflict by taking conciliatory measures.

SHIGEMITSU pointed out that, as a result of events in Europe, Japan had, willy-nilly, become the stabilisation power in East Asia. Whatever the outcome of the European War, Japan's position would be strengthened by reaching through conciliation a settlement with China. If this were done Japan would be ready to take her place in the international arena. Otherwise the Western Powers, if victorious, would again intervene in the China affair.

SHIGEMITSU's advice involved the abandonment of the plans for a southward advance by military force under cover of German victories in Europe. He urged Arita to declare formally a policy of conciliation in China, at the same time requesting the withdrawal of the forces of the European belligerents from that country. Japan, said SHIGEMITSU, should also consider the declaration of a zone of neutrality extending [p48921] three hundred miles seaward from the coastlines of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. Believing that the spread of the European War to the Pacific could in this way be prevented, he urged Arita to act without regard to the pressure of public opinion or of the military faction. There was, however, no change in Japanese policy.

During late May and early June 1940 the British and French armies were driven back by the weight of the German attack. On 9 June 1940 the Soviet Union and Japan settled by agreement the frontier line dividing Mongolia from Manchuria. On 10 June 1940 Italy declared war upon Great Britain and France. On 17 June 1940 France was forced to seek an armistice.

On 10 June 1940 Arita complained of the retention of the bulk of the United States fleet at Hawaii. Although Ambassador Grew assured him that the presence of the fleet at one of its normal stations constituted no threat to Japan, Arita maintained that its continued stay there implied a suspicion as to Japan's intentions in the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere in the South Seas. He once more assured Grew that Japan had no intention of acquiring new territories.

Meanwhile, the German Embassy in Tokyo used its influence with the press and with leading politicians to [p48922] stir up ill-feeling against the United States. Ambassador Ott himself suggested to Konoye and to other men prominent in Japanese politics that a conflict between Japan and the United States was in the long run inevitable. OSHIKA, SHIRATORI and other members of the military faction collaborated with the Germans in this agitation.


June 1940

As the fall of France impended, French Indo-China replaced the Netherlands East Indies as the next intended victim of Japanese aggression. In March 1940 Japan's demands, for the discontinuance of supplies to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been permitted to lapse in face of France's rejection of the demands. On 4 June 1940 strong representations were again made to the French Ambassador in Tokyo, and were again refused.

Japanese policy towards French Indo-China was governed by her determination "to pipe out, at any cost, all obstructions to the building of a new order" in East Asia. Every avenue through which the forces of Chinese resistance might derive assistance would be closed. For that reason it bad been resolved that French Indo- China should be brought under Japanese control.

On 12 June 1940 Japan strengthened her position [p48923] by concluding a pact of non-aggression and friendship with Thailand, whose territories were adjacent to the eastern frontier of French Indo-China. On the same day the Japanese South China armies, stationed near the northern frontier of Indo- China, announced that the greater part of the weapons and war materials which China purchased abroad were still being transported to Chunking via the Yunnan railway. The announcement stated that such action, taken by the French Indo- Chinese authorities in aid of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, could not be overlooked. Four days later, on 16 June 1940, Japan demanded that France put an end to the allegedly hostile activities of the colonial authorities in Indo-China. On 17 June 1940, the day on which France sought an armistice from Germany, the Governor-General of French Indo-China capitulated to these demands. He agreed to suspend the supply of all munitions and war materials to China, and consented also to the despatch of a Japanese military mission to northern French Indo-China.

On the following day, 18 June 1940, Prime Minister Yonai, Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister HATA and Navy Minister Yoshida decided in conference to make further demands. Japan would require the French Indo-Chinese authorities to suppress all pro-Chinese [p48924] activities; and, if that requirement were refused, force would be employed. It was debated whether force should not be used immediately, but the Army advised against this policy, believing that the threat of force might be sufficient.

Japan required and received further undertakings from the government of France, which was now subject to German domination. The prohibition placed upon the supply of certain war materials to China was, at Japanese instigation, extended to include a wide variety of other commodities. The French authorities undertook to enforce this blockade, by preventing smuggling activities.

On 22 June 1940 France agreed formally to the sending of a Japanese mission. On 29 June 1940 this mission, comprising forty representatives of the Japanese Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry, landed in French Indo-China at Hanoi, and found that the blockade had been enforced in accordance with the undertakings given.


Furthermore, Germany and Italy were informed that Japan was gravely concerned about the future of [p48925] French Indo-China, both from the political and from the economic standpoints. It now became clear that the Yonai Cabinet intended to act in concert with Germany against the Western Powers, provided that Germany did not drive too hard a bargain. On 19 June 1940, the day after Japan's policy towards French Indo-China had been decided by the conference of Four Ministers, Ambassador Kurusu broached the subject generally in an interview with an official of the German Foreign Ministry.

Kurusu began by stressing Japan's desire for closer and more cordial relations with Germany. He said that even to those who had previously opposed this policy had now come the knowledge that Japan's future depended, not on the Western Powers, but upon an approach to Germany. As an indication of Japan's desire for the betterment of her relations with Germany, Kurusu referred to the approaching visit of Sato, Naotake, a former Foreign Minister of Japan.

Kurusu went on to discuss Japan's position, and the Japanese view of the form which cooperation between the two countries should take. He no longer regarded Japan's shortage of raw materials as critical, because, in view of German pressure, the Western Powers were not in a position to impose an effective boycott upon exportation to Japan. The expansion of heavy [p48926] industry was now, he said, Japan's most important task. If Germany would cooperate in that development, Japan, being no longer dependent upon the United States, would gain freedom of action. In view of the unfriendly attitude which the United States had shown, Japanese industrialists would gladly exchange German for American sources of supplies.

Japan's hostility towards the U.S.S.R. and Japan's failure to provide substantial economic assistance to Germany were obstacles to close collaboration between the Axis countries. Kurusu indicated that both would be overcome. He said that both Ambassador TOGO in Moscow and he himself were working feverishly for the betterment of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. He declared that in Japan it was becoming more and more clearly recognised that that country's future lay in the South, and that the enemy in the North must be made a friend. There were, he admitted, certain military groups which opposed this re-orientation, but OSHIMA, he said, would convince them of the need for it. [p48927] Kurusu intimated also that Japan should now be prepared to facilitate the shipment to Germany of raw materials from Japan's own sphere and from other overseas areas. He indicated that, in view of the present situation of the Western Powers, there was no longer need for insistence upon the strict letter of the law of neutrality. He visualised that, after the European War was over, there would remain four spheres of influence, dominated respectively by Germany and Italy, by the Soviet Union, by the United States, and by Japan and China. He considered that the close relationship between the German and Japanese blocs would then be of mutual advantage to the two countries, and suggested that Germany should assign to Japan an ample position in her post-war economic planning.


On 19 June 1940 Ambassador SHIGEMITSU, having noted the latest developments in the Yonai Cabinet's policy, sent a specific warning to Arita. He said that, if it were decided to resort to force in French Indo-China or elsewhere, Japan should first consider carefully the attitude of the United States. Full attention should be paid, not only to economic questions, [p48928] but also to the naval strengths of the United States and of Great Britain, and to the condition of France. SHIGEMITSU thought that, if the surrender of France was completed, Australia might intervene in French Pacific possessions. In that case he considered that Japan might seize the opportunity to take positive action. He made it clear, however, that he did not share the Cabinet's confidence in the certainty of German victory. He advised Arita that, though France's fall should be complete, Great Britain would continue the fight and would not easily be beaten.

Despite the setbacks which the Western Powers had sustained, SHIGEMITSU urged once more upon Arita the cardinal principles of the policy which he had advocated in earlier despatches. He considered that Japan should take advantage of the situation in Europe to strengthen her own position in East Asia. Japan, he said, should announce her grave concern for the stability of East Asia, including the islands of the South Seas. She should affirm her resolve to prevent the extension of the European War, and her determination that East Asia should no longer constitute a field for European exploitation. Having regard to the possibility of an Axis victory in Europe, Japan should also be ready to forestall a German incursion into [p48929] South-East Asia, lest such an encroachment should drive Japan to risk war with Germany.

From this and earlier despatches, SHIGEMITSU's policy emerges clearly. He believed that, though the Western Powers should win the war in Europe, their influence in the Far East would be greatly weakened, and that Japan's position would therefore be enhanced. He pointed out that if, through conciliation, a settlement with China had been reached, there would in the future be no occasion for the Western Powers to intervene. By pursuing a policy of neutrality Japan would have qualified herself to take her place in the international arena.

Furthermore, by opposing Western influence in Asia and in the islands of the East Indies, Japan would gain the favour and support of the peoples of the Orient, and would make reconciliation with China more easy of achievement. Thus by peaceful measures Japan would gain the very objects for which she was now preparing to make war.

Even though the Axis Powers should prove to be victorious in Europe, similar considerations would apply. Japan, with unimpaired strength and with enhanced prestige among the peoples of Asia, would be ready to resist any German attempt to dominate the East. [p48930]


Japan's policy had, however, been decided on 18 June 1940 at the conference which Yonai, Arita, HATA and Yoshida had attended. The whole question of Germany's willingness to afford cooperation on acceptable terms was being explored. Japan's especial interest in French Indo-China had been intimated to Germany and to Italy on 19 June 1940. It was resolved that Japan's policy towards the United States and Great Britain would depend upon the replies to this intimation.

While these replies were being awaited the United States made another attempt to reach an understanding with Japan, and to test that country's sincerity. Ambassador Grew was instructed to suggest to Arita that Japan and the United States should exchange notes declaring their common desire to maintain the status quo in regard to the Pacific possessions of the belligerent European Powers, except in as far as that status might be changed by peaceful means. Grew was to suggest also a provision for consultation between the two countries in case there should arise any issue which, in the opinion of either country, rendered consultation desirable. [p48931] On 24 June 1940 Grew made this proposal to Arita in strict confidence, making it clear, however, that the United States had not retreated from the stand taken upon other specific issues. The new United States proposal was intended as a means of discovering some method of improving relations between the two countries.

Arita, being uncertain of Germany's attitude towards Japan, regarded this United States proposal as an extremely delicate matter. He saw in the proposal a revival of the Nine-Power Treaty system. Although that treaty was still binding upon Japan, that country had made every effort to escape and to renounce the obligations it involved. Arita did not wish new restrictions to be placed upon Japan's freedom of action, especially in regard to the Netherlands East Indies.

Arita therefore told Grew that, in view of the many outstanding differences between Japan and the United States, it might be difficult to accept the new proposal, unless these differences were first reconciled. He referred to the pro-German trend of public opinion in Japan, and said that, although he was himself in favour of a rapprochement with the United States, that view had exposed him to [p48932] severe criticism. Nevertheless he undertook to give the proposal careful consideration.

On 28 June 1940 Foreign Minister Arita made Japan's reply to the United States proposal. He told Ambassador Grew that, in view of the existing international situation, he doubted whether consideration could be given to a formal exchange of notes on the basis which the United States had suggested. Japan, said Arita, was greatly concerned with the effect which the European War would have upon the status of the Pacific possessions of the European belligerents. Japan, therefore, did not consider it desirable to conclude any sort of agreement during the present transitionary period. Arita said that he was himself endeavouring to prevent the extension of the European War to the Far East, and suggested that it might be timely to discuss those problems which affected only Japan and the United States.


On 29 June 1940, the day after he had rejected the United States proposal, Foreign Minister Arita made a policy speech which gave great prominence to the Yonai Cabinet's desire to act in concert with [p48933] Germany.

He made it apparent that the two nations shared a common philosophy, saying that Japan's ideal since the founding of the Empire had been that all nations should be able to find their proper places in the world. Japan's foreign policy, said Arita, had been based upon this ideal, for which she had not hesitated to fight, even by staking her national existence. It was therefore a natural step that countries in the same part of the world, being linked also by close racial, economic and cultural ties, should first form a sphere for their own "co-existence and co-prosperity."

The conflict in Europe, said Arita, had shown that war was usually due to failure to remedy the injustices of the existing order. It was for this reason that Japan had undertaken the task of constructing a "new order" in East Asia. It was, he said, extremely regrettable that, Japan's purpose being misunderstood, it had been obstructed by those who supported the forces of resistance in China. Japan was determined to eradicate all such opposition.

The remainder of Arita's speech amounted to a declaration of Japanese suzerainty over the whole area of East and South-East Asia and the islands of [p48934] the East Indies. He said that the countries of East Asia constituted a single sphere destined to cooperate with each other and to minister to each other's needs. At the outset of the European War, he continued, Japan had proclaimed a policy of non- intervention in Europe and had stated her desire that the European conflict should not be permitted to extend to East Asia.

Arita concluded his speech by admonishing the Western Powers against interference in his country's schemes. Japan, he said, trusted that the Western Powers would do nothing to extend the war to the Pacific. He stated that Japan, while carrying out the task of constructing a "new order" in East Asia, was paying serious attention to developments in Europe, and to the repercussions of the European War in the various regions of East Asia and the South Seas. The destiny of these regions was, he declared, a matter of grave concern to Japan "in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing power in East Asia."


In the foreign policy pronouncements and communications of May and June 1940 it had been made [p48935] clear that Japan, though desiring German cooperation, did not intend to enter into the European War. Yet since January 1940, when the Yonai Cabinet had taken office, popular clamour for intervention against the Western Powers had grown continuously, and had been cultivated assiduously by the members of the German Embassy, working in collaboration with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other leaders of the pro-German group in Japan.

In August 1939, when the Abe Cabinet had replaced that of HIRANUMA, there had been grave obstacles to close cooperation between Japan and Germany. Public resentment against Germany had been aroused by the conclusion of the Soviet- Japanese Non-Aggression Pact. Among certain groups within the Army, and among the Japanese public at large, the Soviet Union was still looked upon as Japan's foremost enemy. The Abe Cabinet was pledged to seek a rapprochement with the Western Powers.

When, in January 1940, the Yonai Cabinet took office, public opinion again favoured cooperation with Germany, and hostility towards the U.S.S.R. had in some measure diminished. But the struggle in China had not been ended, and in political circles the principle of non-intervention in the European War was firmly established. The pro- German group in Japan, [p48936] and even the German Ambassador himself, had recognised that Japan could not intervene in Europe, until the China conflict had been settled and internal political dissension resolved.

The Army had therefore cooperated with the Cabinet. Although War Minister HATA shared ITAGAKI's desire to commit Japan to an unconditional alliance with Germany, he had not opposed the policies of either the Abe or the Yonai Cabinet. Gradually the obstacles to Japan's entry into the European War were overcome. With the stimulus of German victories in Europe and with the promise of rich rewards in the South, the Yonai Cabinet's policy had undergone an opportunist change. The Manchukuoan frontiers on the north had been settled by agreement with the Soviet Union, and plans and preparations for a southward advance had been made. The Western Powers had replaced the Soviet Union as the first of the intended victims of Japanese aggression. The Army had reopened negotiations for a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Since March 1940 it had been widely contemplated that the Yonai Cabinet would be replaced when a suitable moment occurred. In May 1940 the German Ambassador had looked forward to the formation of a new Cabinet of the pro-German group, probably under the [p48937] leadership of Konoye. Since that time Ambassador Ott, in continued collaboration with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and other prominent Japanese, had worked to bring about Japanese intervention in the European War -- a step to which the Yonai Cabinet was resolutely opposed.

With the fall of France in mid-June 1940, some members of the pro-German group felt that the time was fast approaching when the Yonai Cabinet should be replaced. On 18 June 1940 SHIRATORI addressed the members of a political society, the objects of which were the readjustment and reinforcement of the Japanese political system, and the establishment of a strong foreign policy. SHIRATORI told the meeting that, although as a civil servant he could not advocate the Cabinet's overthrow, he felt that, in view of Germany's successes, an opportunity had already been missed. He considered that there was no prospect of accord with Germany as long as those who were opposed to a tripartite Axis alliance retained office in the Cabinet.

Germany, having already accorded Japan complete freedom of action in the Netherlands East Indies, did not respond to the new overtures made by the Yonai Cabinet in pursuance of Japan's designs upon French Indo-China. The new concessions asked for gave Germany the opportunity to drive a bargain. One German Foreign [p48938] Ministry official commented upon the economic sacrifices which Germany had made in deference to Japanese policy towards China, and pointed out that, since the European War had begun, Japan, insisting upon her neutral role, had not even facilitated the repatriation from the United States of German sailors or the despatch through Japan of supplier consigned to Germany.

We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [p48939]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment.


While the Yonai Cabinet waited for Germany's reply to the message about French Indo-China sent on 19 June 1940, members of the pro-German faction took steps to remove two important obstacles to their plans.

Major General MUTO, who since 26 October 1939 had held office as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and Secretary of the National General Mobilization Committee, approached the German Military Attache. He said that should occasion rise the Army would welcome it if Germany would act as mediator in the already extended conciliatory talks between Japan and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, so that the war might be concluded in a manner acceptable to Japan. MUTO declared also that Japan was very much interested in French Indo-China because of her desire to settle the China war. In response to the Attache's inquiry MUTO informed him that the Army believed conciliation with the Soviet Union to be necessary. [p48940] On 23 June 1940 SHIRATORI, whose name was being mentioned frequently as Arita's successor in the Foreign Ministry, advocated in a press interview the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Overseas Minister KOISO, whose Ministry was directly concerned with the planning of Japan's advance to the south, approached Ambassador Ott directly, and asked him what Germany's attitude would be, should Japan take military action in French

Indo-China and in parts of the Netherlands East Indies. Ott referred to Germany's declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies, but indicated that in regard to French Indo-China Germany would make conditions. He said that Germany would probably raise no objection provided that Japan undertook to tie down the United States in the Pacific area, perhaps by promising to attack the Philippines and Hawaii if the United States should enter the European War.

KOISO said that he would give this proposal further consideration, and went on to discuss the other obstacles to concerted action among the Axis Powers. Referring to the question of a possible Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, KOISO thought that the U.S.S.R. would probably demand certain territorial concessions [p48941] in Mongolia and in Northwestern China. These, he said, could be discussed. We admitted that even after the realization of her colonial aims in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies Japan would only gradually become economically independent of the United States. We considered, however, that the attainment of Japan's aims in Indo-China and the conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union would provide the expected Konoye Cabinet with a promising starting-point in reaching a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.


The preparation for a change in Cabinet had been long and thorough. Konoye's first Premiership had been marked by frequent political crises arising from differences of opinion among members of his Cabinet, and from conflict between Army policy and Cabinet policy. Then as in earlier years, when the Army encountered opposition to its plans, there had arisen an immediate demand for the abolition of political parties. In the political crises of September 1936 which led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Ugaki, there had been a strong demand for the formation of [p48942] a one-party system, which would replace the existing political parties, and which would "deal resolutely" with Japan's problems at home and abroad. Konoye, then Prime Minister, had hoped that he might be placed at the head of such a unified regime. The Army's policy would then be the Cabinet's policy, and no opposition or dissension would be possible.

In 1938 the "one-party system" had not been realized; but during 1940, while the Yonai Cabinet was in office, the movement for "reinforcement of the domestic political system" grew simultaneously with the demands for a change in Cabinet, and the adoption of a "strong foreign policy". On 19 March 1940, after War Minister HATA had parried questions concerning the Army's part in politics, Major-General MUTO, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, made a forthright statement. He quoted with approval the dictum that the guiding principle of the Japanese nation "should be totalitarianism completely nationalist in principle and faith". He added that in this way the full power of the state would be displayed. The Army, said MUTO, favored the dissolution of political parties if they sought only to further their own interests in the current emergency.

By 10 May 1940 it was settled that there should [p48942a] be a new political party of which Konoye would be President and KIDO a Vice- President. KIDO gave an assurance that he desired Konoye to be the leader, and would support him as lone as Konoye remained in public life.

On 26 May 1940 Konoye and KIDO discussed their plans for the expected change in Cabinet, and for the establishment of their new political party. They agreed that when the Cabinet change occurred a few Ministers only would be chosen. The establishment of the New Party would then be announced, and the dissolution of all existing parties would be requested. The few Cabinet members already chosen would be required to join the new party, and the other cabinet members would be chosen only from among those who had already joined it.

It was intended that the new Cabinet should give special consideration to the desires of the Army and Navy concerning national defense, Foreign affairs and finance. For this purpose it was proposed to establish a supreme national defense council of which the Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs as well as the Premier, War Minister and Navy Minister would be members. [p48943]


On 1 June 1940 KIDO was offered the position of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He was urged strongly to refuse the appointment, because of the importance of the part which he was expected to play as a leader of the new Konoye political party. Nevertheless, after consultation with Konoye, who had joined in recommenging his appointment, KIDO accepted the post.

It was the duty of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, whose tenure of office was independent of changes in Cabinet, to act as the Emperor's regular adviser upon matters of state, and as the recognised intermediary between Emperor and Cabinet. The Lord Keeper's position was, therefore, one of great influence.

On 24 June 1940, while the Yonai Cabinet waited for Germany's response to its proposals for cooperation among the Axis countries, Konoye resigned the presidency of the Privy Council. Ambassador Ott reported to Germany that this resignation indicated the continued progress of a political scheme which aimed the formation of a new Cabinet and a new [p48944] unified party under Konoye's leadership.

Ott advised his government that leading members of the Konoye circle were obviously trying to communicate with him, and asked for authority to discuss with them the ideas which MUTO and KOISO had propounded. In this way he would be able to assess what results might be expected through German cooperation with the Konoye circle.

In these circumstances it was not in Germany's interest to afford any encouragement to the Yonai Cabinet. On 1 July 1940 Ott reported that Foreign Minister Arita's policy speech of 29 June 1940 was an attempt to move in sympathy with internal political developments by announcing the adoption of a more positive foreign policy. Arita had hoped thereby to strengthen the position of the Yonai Cabinet.

In connection with this speech opposition to the Yonai Cabinet became manifest. Arita had planned to declare categorically the Cabinet's determination to consolidate friendship with Germany and Italy, saying that it had never been intended to deviate from the line of Axis policy. The opposition, led by the Army, had protested against this sudden change in policy, upon the ground that Arita's statement of [p48945] sympathy with the Axis Powers was inconsistent with the policy which the Cabinet had hitherto pursued. The Army, desiring the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, was jealous of Arita's attempt to gain credit for the Cabinet at the expense of the opposition which had collaborated closely with Germany. At the Army's insistence the original text of Arita's speech was substantially modified. Thus his plan had been frustrated.

The Army's influence, which had been reduced before the Yonai Cabinet took office, had once again grown very strong. A threatening military attitude had been adopted towards both French Indo-China and Hongkong. Internal political developments, said Ott, showed typical signs that pressure was being exerted and that a change of Cabinets would soon occur.

On the following day fuel was added to the flames. The Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Bureau disclosed the original undelivered text of Arita's speech and the fact that the Army had successfully objected to it. The Press Chief was thereupon arrested and subjected to interrogation by the military police.

After this disclosure a plot against the lives of Prime Minister Yonai and others who had opposed the aims of the military faction was hatched. On 5 July 1940 [p48945a] the conspirators were arrested and later on the same day KIDO, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, reported the circumstances to the Emperor. KIDO told the Emperor that, although the actions of the conspirators were blameworthy, their motives demanded the Cabinet's serious consideration. He then discussed with Konoye their plans for changing the political structure, and the measures to be taken in case a change of Cabinets occurred. [p48946]


Nevertheless the Yonai Cabinet maintained its efforts to conclude with Germany an agreement which would secure the Cabinet's retention of office. Sato, Japan's special envoy to Germany, had reached Berlin. On 8 July 1940 Sato and Ambassador Kurusu explained Japan's position to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.

Sato stressed the common interests of Germany and Japan, which, he said, were each engaged in the construction of a "new order" within their respective spheres of influence. He pointed out that since both countries were for the moment obliged to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, they might co-operate in this regard also. Sato explained that since the beginning of the war in China the task of establishing the "new order" in that country had been Japan's paramount task. This, he said, explained the seemingly perplexing changes in Japanese policy, which had all been dictated by the circumstances of the China war. Japan was not making a determined effort to settle that war so that she might gain freedom of action.

Sato drew von Ribbentrop's attention to the [p48947] services which Japan had rendered to Germany. For the three preceding years, he said, Japan had in some measure held the attention of the British, French and United States governments, and had thereby made Germany's task easier. The constant threat of Japanese action now kept the United States fleet from leaving the Pacific. It was, he added, Japan's policy that the United States should not be permitted to intervene in the Far East or elsewhere in the world outside the two American continents.

Sato explained, however, that Japan could not afford to provoke the United States too much, lest that country should impose more severe economic sanctions, which would compel Japan to seek new sources of supply in the South Seas. Thus both Germany and Japan would be exposed to the danger of war with the United States, and this both countries were anxious to avoid.

Sato therefore stressed the need for cooperation between Germany and Japan in economic as in other matters. He assured von Ribbentrop that Japan wished to allow Germany economic opportunities in China, saying that it was Japan's policy to be the host in China and other countries her guests. It was this policy, he added, which had for years caused Japan [p48948] to struggle against the influence of such countries as Great Britain, France and the United States. With German economic assistance Japan would succeed in her revolt against the Nine-Power Treaty system, settle the China war, and eliminate her dependence upon the United States. The essence of Sato's argument was that, by strengthening Japan's position in the Far East, Germany would be strengthening her own position in Europe. He, therefore, invited a declaration of Germany's policy in regard to Japanese aims in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies.

Von Ribbentrop, being aware of political development within Japan, replied cautiously. He welcomed Japan's desire for co-operation with Germany, but gave the impression that Germany, being now confident of victory in Europe, no longer attached great importance to assistance from Japan. He declared that new opportunities for co-operation would arise in the future, but declined to say anything more definite upon the grounds that he was unfamiliar with Japan's political aims. He asked pointedly whether Japanese offers of co-operation were to be confined to the economic sphere, and gave no new indication of Germany's attitude in regard to French Indo-China or other Pacific areas. [p48949]


The reports of this conference increased Foreign Minister Arita's difficulties. On 13 July 1940, three days before the Yonai Cabinet fell, Arita revealed his deep suspicion of German intentions. He inquired of Sato whether it was Germany's aim to force Japan's entry into the European War; and whether Germany did not herself hope to dominate the French and Netherlands colonies in the Far East.

As KOISO and MUTO had ascertained from Ott on 24 June 1940 the very conditions which von Ribbentrop had received with reserve when presented to him by Sato on behalf of the Yonai Cabinet were acceptable to the Germans, who no longer felt the need for Japan's immediate intervention against Great Britain and the countries of the British commonwealth. The greatest obstacle to the conclusion of a tripartite Axis alliance had, therefore, been removed. What Germany most desired was a strong Japanese Government which would align Japan with Germany and Italy against the Western Powers. Germany believed that such a diversion in the Far East would ensure the continued neutrality of the United States. [p48950]

On 12 July 1940, while Foreign Minister Arita speculated concerning Germany's real intentions, Foreign Ministry officials presented to Army and Navy representatives the first draft of a new plan, the principles of which governed Japanese policy from that time onward until Japan attacked the Western Powers. In all essentials it was the plan which Sato revealed to von Ribbentrop four days earlier.

On both occasions it was recognized that since the occurrance of the Mukden Incident in September 1931 Japan's activities had been continuously directed towards the achievement of the same goal of conquest and aggrandisement. Notwithstanding frequent changes in policy and administration, it had throughout been Japan's aim to establish her dominion over the countries and territories of East Asia and the South Seas. It was now intended to utilize the conditions created by the European War in order to accomplish that purpose.

Japan on the one hand and Germany and Italy upon the other would act in concert and in close co-operation within their respective spheres of influence. It would be agreed among the Axis countries that in South East Asia and in the South Pacific area Japan should enjoy the same freedom of action which Germany and Italy had arrogated to themselves in Europe. [p48951]

Japan would undermine British influence and interests in the Far East and would serve as a deterrent to the entry of the United States into the war against Germany. The coalition between the two countries would provide each with added security against Soviet interference with their aggressive schemes. German economic assistance would enable Japan to reduce her dependency upon the United States, and Japan would ensure that Germany received from East Asia those raw materials of which she stood most urgently in need. For the present, however, any German tendency to importune Japan's entry into the European war would be steadfastly resisted.


The Yonai Cabinet lacked the resolution and singleness of purpose necessary to bring this plan to fruition. The Army demanded the "strong foreign policy" which Konoye and KIDO had decided that the new Cabinet would offer. During the Yonai Cabinet's tenure of office demands for the adoption of a pro-Axis policy had been persistently resisted. In 1939, while the HIRANUMA Cabinet was in power, Yonai and Arita had been instrumental in frustrating the military faction's schemes for a tripartite [p48952] military alliance. Now, when the Army had revived its demand for the speedy conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy, Arita was hesitant and Yonai was opposed to it. SHIRATORI had said that, while such people remained in office there was no prospect of accord between Japan and Germany. The question of the conclusion of a tripartite military alliance had become a fundamental issue between the Cabinet and those who demanded its resignation. [p48953] The second fundamental issue concerned the establishment of a new nation-wide political organization which was named the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" In times of political crisis, when the Army's plans were threatened or disputed, the military faction had always demanded the abolition of political parties. In March 1940 Major-General MUTO had revived this demand, saying that Japan needed a totalitarian regime, through which the full power of the state might be displayed. At their meeting of 26 May 1940 Konoye and KIDO had planned to promote a new party which would replace all existing political parties. They had planned also that the Army and Navy would be given a prominent part in determining the foreign and domestic policies of the new Cabinet. There would therefore be no opposition to the policies of the military faction, which Konoey's government would represent.

These were the purposes which the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was designed to achieve. It would give full effect to a principle of the basic national policy decision which had been reiterated in May 1938 in the Army's commentary upon the purposes of the National General Mobilization Law. By stifling all opposition it would enhance the fighting strength of the nation and regiment the Japanese people in support [p48954] of the Army's policy.

Prime Minister Yonai realised that this meant in effect the establishment of a dictatorship responsive to the wishes of the military faction. He knew that all existing political organizations would be abolished and that the Diet would lose the last vestige of freedom of deliberation. His Cabinet was therefore opposed to the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

War Vice-Minister Anami and MUTO, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, took the lead in demanding the Yonai Cabinet's resignation. They informed Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishiwata that, if the Cabinet refused to resign, it would be necessary to force the War Minister's resignation. When questioned by Yonai concerning this threat, War Minister HATA had answered evasively that he thought in the long run it was better that the Cabinet should resign.


The officers of the Army General Staff were resolved that, both from the military and from the political standpoints, the Yonai Cabinet was incapable of dealing with the existing world situation. When these views had been expressed, Kanin, the Chief of the Army General Staff, conveyed them to HATA, who was expected to inform [p48955] Yonai of the Army's attitude. Before doing so, HATA would discuss the position with

On 8 July 1940 KIDO was informed of these developments by War Vice-Minister Anami and by the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. Anami told KIDO that the Yonai Cabinet was wholly unsuitable to conduct negotiations with Germany and Italy, and that its direction of affairs might even lead to a fatal delay. He said that a change of Cabinet was therefore inevitable, and that it might be expected to take place within the next four or five days. KIDO was given to understand that the Army was waiting to see what action the Yonai Cabinet would take, when confronted with the Army's views.

Anami's interview with KIDO is indicative of the commanding attitude which the Army had assumed. The War Vice-Minister told KIDO that the Army would unanimously support Konoye's candidacy for the premiership. When KIDO pointed out the difficulty of choosing a new Foreign Minister, Anami assured him that the Army was prepared to leave that question entirely to Konoye.

As KIDO had been advised, a memorandum of the Army's opinions was prepared and submitted to Yonai. On 16 July 1940 the Prime Minister summoned HATA, and told him that the Army's opinions were not those of the Cabinet. He asked the War Minister to resign if he [p48956] disagreed with the Cabinet's policy. HATA thereupon submitted his resignation, and, when asked by Yonai to name a successor undertook to present a reply to this request upon the same day. After consulting the other two "Chiefs" of the Army, HATA informed Yonai that the Army was unable to make any recommendation.

In this way the Army encompassed the downfall of the Yonai Cabinet. On 16 July 1940, the same day on which the War Minister resigned, the Premier, having no alternative, tendered his Cabinet's resignation to the Emperor.

On the following day, 17 July 1940, Ambassador Ott reported to Berlin, that in view of the Cabinet change which the Army had forced, a speedy transition to a more actively anti-British policy was to be expected. The Army had already mobilized siege guns for an immediate attack on Hongkong, in case that policy should be ordained.

War Minister HATA is not shown to have taken any active part in the plotting which led to the Yonai Cabinet's downfall. He had supported that Cabinet's policy, which was itself an aggressive policy designed to further the national aims of aggrandisement through military power. He had held office because the members of the pro-German faction had realised that Japan's [p48957] internal differences must be resolved before their own plans could succeed. He had shown that he regarded the Cabinet's cautious attempts to conceal its aggressive aims merely as a question of expediency. When the moment was opportune, he had permitted himself to be used in order to bring about the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, and the accession to power of a new Cabinet, responsive to the wishes of the military faction.


After his appointment on 1 June 1940 as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, KIDO had maintained his close association with Konoye, and had consistently furthered the aims of those who advocated the replacement of the Yonai Cabinet. On 27 June 1940 he had discussed the procedure which should be adopted at the time of the Cabinet change, and had exchanged views with Finance Minister Sakurauchi on the strengthening of the political structure. When, on 5 July 1940, a plot to assassinate the Premier and other prominent men had been discovered KIDO, in reporting the matter to the Emperor, had supported the motives of the conspirators. He had thereafter been privy to the Army's scheme to bring about the Yonai Cabinet's downfall and Konoye's accession to power. KIDO knew that, although the Emperor had come [p48958] to believe Yonai's resignation to be inevitable, he still had faith in Yonai and regretted the necessity for a change of Cabinets. When, on the morning of 16 July 1940, it became apparent that Yonai might be forced to resign immediately, KIDO reported the circumstances of HATA's resignation to the Emperor, and explained to him the method of selecting a new Premier.

It had been the practice that certain of the Elder Statesmen, known as the "Genro", should advise the Emperor upon the appointment of a new Premier; but only one of them, Prince Saionji, survived. In the past Saionji's influence had been great; and largely through his advice and knowledge of the political situation, the court circle had at times been prompted to impose some restraint upon the activities of the military faction.

Baron Harada, Saionji's secretary and confidant, was, with Yonai, marked down for assassination by the plotters whose motives KIDO upheld.

In November 1939 KIDO had been engaged, at Konoye's request, upon the task of devising a new system of selecting a Premier. He had suggested that the "Genro" should be replaced by a body constituted of the President of the Privy Council, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and all former Premiers. The opinions of the members of this body of "Senior Statesmen" would be [p48959] conveyed to the Emperor.

On 10 November 1939 KIDO had discussed this plan with Konoye, who desired it to be put into effect as soon as possible. Both Konoye and KIDO clearly regarded the new system as a means of eliminating Saionji's influence in political affairs; for KIDO expressed to Konoye the fear that the plan would be difficult to put into practice while Saionji was living.

When, in January 1940, Yonai replaced Abe as Premier, the plan was not invoked; but, when, in July 1940, the Yonai Cabinet resigned, Saionji was infirm and out of touch with political affairs. KIDO's influence as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was therefore greatly enhanced.

The Emperor accepted KIDO's explanation of the new system and, after the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet had been received, asked KIDO to summon a meeting of the Senior Statesmen. At this meeting Konoye was the only person suggested for the office of Premier. HIRANUMA, ten days earlier, had declared himself to be in favour of Konoye's candidacy. KIDO himself urged Konoye's appointment, saying that the Army was known to favour it, and that he believed one of the Army's recent actions to have been based on the assumption that Konoye would assume office. So the matter was settled. An emissary sent to inform [p48960] Saionji of this decision reported that the Prince, being sick and unfamiliar with the political situation, had declined to take the responsibility for advising the Emperor.

KIDO then reported the Senior Statesmen's recommendation to the Emperor, who desired that Saionji should once more be consulted, before a final decision was made. KIDO, however, dissuaded him upon the ground of Saionji's infirmity, Konoye was then summoned, and received the mandate to form a new Cabinet.


Konoye proceeded to construct his Cabinet in the manner which KIDO and he had planned on 26 May 1940. Konoye, after accepting the mandate to form a new Cabinet, told KIDO that he would ask the outgoing War and Navy Ministers to select successors who would each be willing to cooperate with the other arm of the service. When the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers had been selected, Konoye would discuss fully with them the questions of national defence, diplomacy, cooperation between Army and Navy, and the relation between the Supreme Command and the Cabinet. Not until the Four Minister's Conference had reached agreement on these questions would he begin to select the other Cabinet [p48961] Ministers. This plan Konoye carried out.

Navy Minister Yoshida retained his office in the new Cabinet. Lieutenant-General TOJO was chosen as War Minister.

After the Yonai Cabinet's downfall, HATA, the outgoing War Minister, had taken the unprecedented step of recommending secretly to the Emperor that TOJO should succeed him. From 30 May 1938 to 10 December 1938 TOJO had held office as Vice-Minister of War, and since that time he had served as Inspector-General of the Army Air Forces. Since 24 February 1940 he had been in addition a Supreme War Councillor. [p48962] The choice of a Foreign Minister had been recognized by KIDO as one of difficulty. SHIRATORI, an extremist in his advocacy of complete collaboration between Japan and Germany, had been favored for the post but Konoye chose Matsuoka. Even before his appointment had been announced the new Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador confidentially of this fact and expressed his desire for friendly cooperation with Germany.

Throughout this period Germany was kept closely informed of developments in Japanese politics. On 20 July 1940 Ambassador Ott advised his government that Matsuoka's appointment would certainly lead to a reorientation of Japanese foreign policy.

On 19 July 1940 Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Yoshida held a lengthy conference at which the principles of the new Cabinet's policy were settled and agreement was obtained. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin informed the German Foreign Ministry that through this unusual procedure the four ministers who would occupy the key positions in the new Cabinet had drawn up an authoritative foreign policy program which included a rapproachement with Germany and Italy.

These matters of policy being settled, Konoye proceded with the selection of the other memebers of [p48963] his Cabinet. The formation of the new Cabinet was announced on 22 July 1940. HOSHINO, who had earlier controlled the economic and industrial development of Manchukuo, became a Minister of State and President of the Planning Board. This appointment was an important one for the new Cabinet placed great stress upon the acceleration of the national mobilization and upon the closer integration of the economies of Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China. Financial controls were to be strengthened, armaments were to be greatly increased, and war-supporting industries were to undergo further rapid expansion.

Major-General MUTO retained his position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and HATA became a Military Councillor. Ohashi, a recognized leader of the pro-German faction, was appointed Foreign Vice-Minister. SHIRATORI informed Ott in confidence that he had refused this appointment. It was now expected that he would become permanent adviser to Foreign Minister Matsuoka. SHIRATORI believed that in that position he could exercise a far-reaching influence on Japanese foreign policy. On 28 August 1940 he became a Diplomatic Councillor to the Foreign Ministry. On 26 July 1940, four days after its formation, [p48964] the new Cabinet, of which TOJO and HOSHINO were now members, defined its policy. The basic principles of the new declaration were those of the national policy decision of 11 August 1936. It was stated that the world was now on the threshold of an historic change, and that new political, economic and cultural orders were in process of creation. Japan also was faced with an ordeal unparalleled in her history.

It was declared that, if Japan were to act in accordance with the great ideal of Hakko Ichiu, the system of government must be fundamentally revised and the "national defence" structure of the state completed. It was Japan's aim to achieve the construction of a "new order in Greater East Asia." For that purpose she would increase her armaments and would mobilize the entire strength of the nation. Japan would first concentrate upon a successful settlement of the war in China.

By adopting a flexible policy she would plan and prepare to take advantage of changes in the world situation in order to advance her own national fortunes.


It has been seen that, on 26 May 1940, Konoye and KIDO had planned to form a new Cabinet which, by acting in accordance with the wishes of the military [p48965] and by suppressing all political groups which might oppose its policy, would become the government of a totalitarian state. Thus the leaders of the military faction would be, in fact, the undisputed rulers of Japan.

As early as September 1930, HASHIMOTO had advocated the formation of such a military Cabinet and from that time onward it had been an ultimate goal of the military faction's planning. The national policy decision of 11 August 1936 had decreed that steps would be taken to lead and unify public opinion, and to strengthen the people's will to carry out the aggressive policy which had been adopted. The enactment, in February 1938, of the National General Mobilization Law had brought those objects within reach. The Army, in commenting upon the purposes of the law, had indicated that every aspect of the nation's life would be directed to the achievement of the maximum pitch of warlike efficiency.

In the economic and industrial fields these results had in large degree already been obtained. Public opinion also had been rigidly controlled and attuned to the desires of the Army and its supporters. When the second Konoye Cabinet came to power the ultimate steps were taken to complete the military domination [p48966] of Japan.

The new Cabinet owed its existence to Army support. In order that its policy should be founded firmly, Konoye had secured the prior agreement of the new War and Navy Ministers. It remained to carry out the measures necessary to ensure the unification of military policy and Cabinet policy, and to complete the regimentation of the Japanese nation in preparation for future war. When, on 26 July 1940, the new Cabinet, of which TOJO and HOSHINO were members, met to approve the policy already settled, these aims were given great prominence.

It was then decided that all branches of government would be remodelled in accordance with the fundamental principle of the basic national policy decision. The education system would continue to be used for this purpose, and the Japanese people would be imbued with the idea that service to the state was the paramount consideration.

The Cabinet, by setting up a new national political structure, would strive for a co- ordinated unity of government. The Diet system would be altered to conform to this plan. The nation would be reorganized upon the basis of service to the state and of cooperation between the people and their autocratic government. [p48967] These aims were attained through the collaboration of Army and Cabinet. Of the new means employed the most important were the "liaison conference" and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.


The purpose of the Liaison Conference was to ensure the unity of military and Cabinet policy. Its establishment had been foreshadowed by Konoye and KIDO at their meeting of 26 May 1940, when it was decided to set up a supreme national defence council of which the Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs as well as the Premier and the War and Navy Ministers would be members.

The new body was larger than Konoye and KIDO had originally intended. It came to include, not only the members already specified, but also the Foreign and Finance Ministers, the Vice-Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs and the Chiefs of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus. Sometimes it was attended also by the President of the Planning Board and the Chief Cabinet Secretary.

The Liaison Conference met on 27 July 1940, the day after the new Konoye Cabinet had agreed upon the [p48968] principles of its future policy. At this meeting similar decisions were made covering every important aspect of the nation's domestic and foreign policy.

The new conference, which for the first time enabled the leaders of the Army and Navy to take a direct part in the formulation of Cabinet policy, became itself a very important policy-making body. It tended further to diminish the influence of the Court circle by assuming the deliberative functions of the Imperial Conference. This latter body, which was summoned only to decide the gravest matters of state, after this time did little more than accord formal approval to decisions already reached by the Liaison Conference.

The decisions of the new body represented the combined authority of the Army, Navy and the five most important Cabinet Ministers. They were therefore difficult to change. During the year 1941 Liaison Conferences were held frequently and came more and more to usurp the functions of the Cabinet meeting.

The Liaison Conference served also to strengthen the position of the Premier. Previous Cabinets had been overthrown through the disaffection of the Army. Frequently decisions of the Four and Five Ministers' Conferences had been nullified because the [p48969] War Minister, after consultation with other Army and War Ministry officials, had withdrawn his agreement. Now that the service chiefs had themselves become party to important decisions, the settled policy could not afterwards easily be disrupted.

The Army had planned to use Konoye as a mere instrument of its policy; but, through the careful manner in which he had constructed his Cabinet around a predetermined policy, and through the institution of the Liaison Conference, Konoye had achieved a commanding position as the leader of an authoritarian regime. The Cabinet and Army worked together to complete the military domination of Japan by regulating the political activities of the Japanese people and by eliminating political opposition.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was formally established on 10 October 1940, is discussed more fully in a later chapter of this judgment. It became a nation-wide organization heavily subsidized by the Japanese government. After its establishment all other political organizations disappeared. In this manner the revision of the Diet system was achieved, and the idea of service to the state was instilled into the minds of the Japanese people.

The Army had intended through this new [p48970] association to drive out all existing political parties and to establish a new "pro-Army" party, subservient to the wishes of its own leaders. But Konoye, as he had planned with KIDO, had attracted to the new organization the members of existing parties. He had proclaimed that the military, the government authorities and the people must unite in order to construct a country with powerful "national defence."

In August 1940 MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and one of the Army's most prominent leaders, conceded that the situation had changed. He pointed out that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was not a movement to which the people themselves had given rise, but something which had been imposed upon them. He believed that strong political powers should be delegated to the new organization. He recognized that Army and Cabinet should work together to lead and spread the movement, and so to promote the aggressive national aims which Army and Cabinet now held in common.


When on 16 July 1940 Konoye received the mandate to form a Cabinet, a tentative plan of Japan's new foreign policy had already been prepared. The [p48971] Foreign Ministry had at length determined upon the policy of close collaboration with Germany and Italy, which the members of the pro-German faction, and most notably SHIRATORI, had urged incessantly during the preceding year. Spurred on by von Ribbentrop's refusal to disclose Germany's intentions until Japan's own aims were clarified, the Foreign Ministry had drafted a proposal designed to secure Germany's cooperation without committing Japan to participation in the European War.

The discussions of this proposal by Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives on 12 July 1940 and again on 16 July 1940 revealed the fear that events were passing Japan by. It was assumed that Germany would conquer Great Britain. It was believed that the European War might be ended in the near future. It was realized that, if Japan were not prepared to act quickly, the opportunity for conquests in the South might vanish.

Japan feared that, once the war in Europe was over, Germany would resist Japan's attempts to extend her own domination throughout East Asia and the South Seas, and that Germany and Italy might then act in conjunction with other nations to frustrate a Japanese advance. On the other hand, as Foreign Minister Matsuoka [p48972] said later, it was believed that at this time "Japan has such a strength as she is able to tip the balance of the world as she likes."

Encouraged by Germany's successes in Europe, Japanese leaders no longer spoke merely of the establishment of a "new order in East Asia. The phrase now commonly used was the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." At this moment when Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were in eclipse, it was decided that Japan should seize control of all British, French, Netherlands and Portuguese possessions in the areas of East and Southeast Asia and of the Pacific Ocean.

On 16 July 1940 Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives agreed that the ultimate goal of Japanese expansion should include all the territory lying between Eastern India and Burma on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. As a more immediate objective Japan would aim at the domination of on area which included Hongkong, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and New Guinea.

To achieve these aims it was thought imperative that Japan should make a definite proposal as a basis for her collaboration with Germany and Italy. Japan would not undertake to intervene in the European War, [p48973] but rather she would declare her intention of undertaking separately a war against Great Britain when it was felt that the opportune moment had arrived. Japan would, however, undertake to assist Germany in conquering Great Britain by all means short of a declaration of war. Japan would take steps to undermine Great Britain's influence in the Far East, and to foster separatist movements in India and Burma. Japan would offer Germany her support and cooperation in regard both to the United States and to the Soviet Union. Japan would minimize the possibility of United States intervention in the European War, because her actions would constitute a constant threat to American interests in the Pacific and in the Far East. Japan in turn would gain protection against the possibility of United States or Soviet interference with her plans.

Japan would recognize the exclusive rights of Germany and Italy in Europe and in Africa, and would ask in exchange for an acknowledgment of her own right to political supremacy and economic freedom in East Asia and the South Seas. She would ask also for German cooperation in the war against China, and for German economic and technical assistance. She would promise in exchange to supply, both from China and from the South Seas, those raw materials of which Germany stood [p48974] in need. Japan and Germany would arrange for reciprocity in trade between the two vast spheres of influence which they expected to control when the European War was over.

This plan became the basis of the second Konoye Cabinet's foreign policy.


Although Japan had decided upon the conquest of Southeast Asia and the East Indies, there was great uncertainty as to the nature and timing of the actual measures to be taken. In part this element of indecision arose from the differing viewpoints of the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Ministry; but the principal reason for it was uncertainty as to Germany's real aims.

There was great apprehension lest Germany herself might have designs upon French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, and other areas in the South Seas. It was felt that Japan must adopt a firm attitude upon this question, and must move quickly while Germany was preoccupied in Europe. On the other hand it was determined to present Japan's exclusive claim in the form most easy of German acceptance. Japan would conceal her aims of conquest saying only that she desired political leadership and economic [p48975] opportunity.

Concern was also felt about Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union and with the United States. It was expected that, when the European War was over, these two countries, together with Germany and Japan, would emerge as the four remaining world powers. It was desired that, when this happened, Japan should continue to cooperate with Germany and Italy; but it was feared lest a change in German policy should leave Japan unsupported. It was agreed that Japan should negotiate with the United States solely for the purpose of furthering the achievement of her own aims in conjunction with these of Germany and Italy. It was recognized that the policy of fostering better relations with the U.S.S.R. should be followed only as long as it suited the plans of Germany and Japan.

Lastly, there was uncertainty lest the degree of cooperation which Japan was prepared to offer should prove unacceptable to Germany. It was debated whether Japan should not immediately take stronger measures against Great Britain or should promise to attack Singapore when the war in China had been ended; but it was decided to make no definite commitments.

These were uncertainties which it became the task of the new Cabinet to resolve. There was no such [p48976] doubt about the basic principles of Japanese foreign policy. The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry representatives were agreed that Japan should, in spite of all difficulties, establish her dominion over the whole of East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area. For this purpose Japan would, if necessary, make war on any nation which opposed her purpose. Since expediency demanded it, she would first reach agreement with Germany and Italy.

When on 19 July 1940 Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Yoshida met to formulate the policy of the new Cabinet, they adopted the plans which had already been made. They resolved to strengthen Japan's relationship with Germany and Italy so that the "new order" might be established quickly. In pursuance of this plan they determined to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, making Manchukuo and Mongolia parties to the new agreement. They decided that British, French, Netherlands and Portuguese territories should be included within the framework of Japan's "new order." If the United States did not interfere with these plans, Japan would not seek to attack her; but if the United States should attempt to intervene, Japan would not hesitate to resort to war. [p48977]


Although when the second Konoye Cabinet took office Arita's conduct of foreign affairs gave place to the "strong" foreign policy of Konoye and the military faction, the central feature of Arita's policy was maintained. The new Cabinet was determined that Japan's longstanding national ambitions, which were again described as the ideal of Hakko Ichiu, should not be subordinated to those of Germany and Italy. While the terms of Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy were yet unsettled, the new Cabinet placed renewed emphasis on the unchanging aims of the Army's planning, which had been settled in the basic national policy decision of 11 August 1936. As in 1936, so on 26 July 1940, the foremost goals of Japanese policy were stated to be those of conquering China and of promoting every aspect of the national mobilization for war. While these settled aims were being carried out, Japan would adopt flexible policies so that she might take advantage of changes in the international situation to further her own interests.

It was, however, stated clearly in the Cabinet decision of 26 July 1940 that Japan would construct a "new order in Greater East Asia," of which Japan, [p48978] Manchukuo and the rest of China would form merely the foundation. On 1 August 1940 this decision was published by the Foreign Ministry as a government announcement. On this occasion Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a statement in which he referred to Japan's mission as the task of spreading "Kodo" throughout the world. He said that it was the immediate aim of Japanese foreign policy to establish, in accordance with that spirit, a great East Asia chain of common prosperity with Japan, Manchukuo and the rest of China as one of its links. For this purpose Japan would be prepared to surmount all obstacles, both material and spiritual, lying in her path. In concert with those friendly powers who were prepared to cooperate with her, Japan would strive with courage and determination for the fulfillment of the ideal and the heaven-ordained mission of her country.

Meanwhile, at the Liaison Conference of 27 July 1940, the Army and Navy had signified their acceptance of the Cabinet's policy, and had resolved in the meantime "to settle the southern problem within limits, so as not to cause a war against a third power." While Japan sought to arrange the terms of collaboration with Germany and Italy and to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Japan would maintain a [p48979] firm, yet moderate attitude towards the United States. The Liaison Conference resolved that, "although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan," the resolution continued, "even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction."

In this respect also the Cabinet adhered to that principle of the national basic policy decision which stated that Japan should extend her influence "in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defence," while attempting to avoid the needless aggravation of other nations. [p48980]


The Liaison Conference, acting in accordance with this principle, decided in detail the measures which should be taken immediately in pursuance of Japan's policy of advancing southward. Already northern French Indo-China was under Japanese control. Japanese forces had been mobilized in preparation for a possible attack on Hong Kong. Japan had made demands upon the Netherlands East Indies for a guaranteed supply of raw materials; and, on the day on which the new Cabinet took office, it had been announced that Japan would send an economic commission to the Netherlands East Indies to reach a settlement upon this matter.

The Liaison Conference decided that these policies would be continued. For the time being Japan would attempt to secure the vital resources of the Netherlands East Indies by diplomatic means. She would negotiate for Germany's consent to Japan's occupation of French Pacific possessions, and for the retention of those formerly German islands, which Japan now administered under mandate. Japan would also try to foster the support of other [p48981] countries in the South Seas.

In regard, however, to French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the settlements of the Western Powers in China, Japan would take stronger measures to prevent assistance to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to root out the feeling of enmity towards Japan. From French Indo-China Japan would demand the use of airfields, and the right of passage for her troops. She would require French Indo- China to provision her troops, and would also take steps to secure raw materials from that country.

Those measures did not satisfy War Minister TOJO. On 31 July 1940 Ambassador Ott reported to Germany that TOJO was bringing about an acute deterioration in Japan's relations with Great Britain. By doing so he hoped further to undermine the influence of the pro-British groups in Japan, and to hasten the time when Japan would take action against British possessions in East Asia.


On 5 August 1940, when the second Konoye Cabinet's policies had been decided, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU sent Matsuoka a message in which he con- [p48982] gratulated the new Foreign Minister upon his appointment, and upon the establishment and enforcement of the "Greater East Asia policy".

While the Yonai Cabinet was in office SHIGEMITSU had urged Foreign Minister Arita to resist the demands of the military faction. He had contended that, as a result of the war in Europe, the influence of the Western Powers in East Asia was being steadily contended. He had believed that the position of Far Eastern supremacy which Japan coveted could best be achieved by maintaining a policy of strict neutrality. The military faction had, however, come to power, and there was no longer any prospect that a policy of strict neutrality would be followed.

SHIGEMITSU now lent his support to the aims of the new Cabinet, saying "In order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying then out at the direct expense of small nations, and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one". He instanced France and Portugal as countries at which these measures should be directed, remarking that in this way progress might [p48983] be made at the indirect expense of Great Britain and the United States.

SHIGEMITSU, however, made it clear that he still believed in the likelihood of the ultimate victory of the Western Powers over Germany and Italy. He showed himself to be opposed to the cardinal principles of the Konoye Cabinet's policy, which was based upon the assumption that Germany would certainly conquer Great Britain.

The new Cabinet had determined to intensify Japan's campaign to crush the resistance of the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; but SHIGEMITSU, as on earlier occasions, advocated the adoption of a liberal-minded attitude towards the settlement of the war in China.

The Cabinet had also adopted a policy for southward expansion which contemplated attacks upon British possessions in the Far East. The Army and War Minister TOJO were eager to hasten the time when hostilities would begin. The Cabinet had resolved that the advance to the South would be carried out, even if war between

Japan and the United States should ensue. SHIGEMITSU emphasized that it was necessary for Japan "to proceed with scrupulous consideration and prudence" in her relations with [p48984] Great Britain and the United States. He once more pointed out that Great Britain's influence in the Far East was diminishing, and claimed that even the United States was retreating from its position in East Asia. He adhered to the view that, if Japan acted with moderation in carrying out her East Asia policy, it could be expected that British and United States obstructions to that policy would in due course be removed.

The second Konoye Cabinet had decided to foster Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy. The Army had renewed its demands for the inclusion of a tripartite alliance of the Axis Powers. SHIGEMITSU stressed the dangers entailed in taking any steps which bound Germany and Japan to the pursuit of a common policy. He warned Matsuoka that powerful movements were afoot to draw Japan into a Pacific conflict with Great Britain and the United States. He implied that this was Germany's policy; and that among certain circles in Great Britain it was desired that Japanese expansion in East Asia should be prevented by such a war. During the latter months of 1940 SHIGEMITSU, as Ambassador in London, encouraged members of the British government to soak a new basis for resuption of friendly relations with [p48985] Japan.

In this dispatch of 5 August 1940 SHIGEMITSU urged that Japan should push forward with an independent policy, parallel to that of Germany and Italty. He draw attention to the Soviet Union's relationship with Germany as a model for Japan to follow. The U.S.S.R., he said, was maintaining strongly a policy of neutrality which left room for compromise with Great Britain. At the same time, SHIGEMITSU alleged, the Soviet Union was building up her power over small countries unconnected with the European War. This was the policy which SHIGEMITSU considered that Japan should follow in order to attain her main object of establishing "a powerful political and economic position in East Asia."


Nevertheless, even before the terms of Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy had been arranged, an ultimate warlike advance into South-East Asia and the East Indies was already regarded as settled policy. Early in August 1940 Fushimi, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, advised the Emperor that the Navy wished for the pre- [p48986] sent to avoid the use of force against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He said that, after the decision for war was made, a further eight months at least would be required for preparations. He considered, therefore, that the later war came the better it would be.

Already Foreign Minister Matsuoka had taken the first step towards reaching agreement with Germany and Italy. On 1 August 1940 he informed Ambassador Ott that both the government and people of Japan desired their country's relations with Germany and Italy to be strengthened. He said that he himself had always supported such a policy, but made it clear that the Cabinet's decision would depend upon the terms of co-operation which Germany offered.

At the conference of July 1940 it had been decided that Japan would not undertake to intervene in the European War. Instead, Matsuoka invited Germany to take a broad view of the world situation. He pointed out that, even after Germany had conquered Great Britain, the destruction of the remaining countries of the British Commonwealth would prove no easy matter. Ott agreed that this was the case. Matsuoka said that Germany would be opposed both by the Soviet Union and by an Anglo-Saxon block consisting [p48987] of the United States and the surviving British countries, Japan would then be in a very strong position.

Japan, said Matsuoka, was determined to continue the war in China until Chinese resistance had been crushed. This could be accomplished without German assistance. Japan, he continued, was also determined to realize her ambitions in the South. In Matsuoka's opinion, Japan would first concentrate upon the countries not further south than Thailand, but her objectives would change with changing world conditions. In order to secure German cooperation Matsuoka told Ott that Japan intended neither to subjugate nor to exploit the territories over which she would establish her control.

Having thus taken the initiative, Matsuoka desired to know Germany's attitude towards Japan's policy, and what support Germany was prepared to offer. He wished also to find out Germany's policy in regard both to the Soviet Union and the United States, and what Germany desired of Japan in her relationships with these two countries.

Upon the same day on which this conversation took place Ambassador Kurusu made similar overtures to an official of the German Foreign Ministry. The Germans concluded that, if Xurusu and Matsuoka correctly [p48988] represented their country's aims in East Asia and the South Seas, it was in Germany's interest to collaborate upon the terms which the Japanese had suggested. Accordingly, on 23 August 1940, Stahmer was despatched by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop as Germany's special emissary to Japan.

Meanwhile Matsuoka conducted a thorough purge of all diplomats and Foreign Ministry officials who favored cooperation with the Western powers. SHIRATORI became the representative for foreign political matters on a commission established to "adjust state affairs upon an authoritarian model." The new commission demanded constantly a policy of cooperation with the Axis powers.

We will adjourn until half-past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200 a recess was taken.) [p48989]


The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I continue reading the Tribunal's judgment.


On 4 September 1940 Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, War Minister TOJO and the Navy Minister met to plan the strategy of Japanese negotiations with Germany. It was felt that this was the opportune moment for initiating conversations with that country. Stahmer, the German special envoy, was on his way to Tokyo, and the desire for strengthening Japanese collaboration with Germany and Italy had become very pronounced.

At this Four Ministers' Conference there was no departure from the policies already decided upon; but the Japanese attitude towards all aspects of the negotiations with Germany and Italy was defined and set out with great particularity. It was decided [p48990] that Japan, Germany and Italy would reach a fundamental agreement so that the three powers might cooperate by all means, including recourse to war, in establishing their aims of domination in Asia and in Europe respectively. The three countries would agree upon the manner in which they would support each other in achieving these aims, and as to the policies which they would jointly adopt towards Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.

After the shortest possible period spent in negotiations, the agreement reached would be published in the form of a joint declaration. This would provide the basis for a more detailed military agreement, the terms of which would not necessarily be made public. This latter agreement would define the obligations of each contracting power to furnish military, economic and other kinds of mutual support.

The four Ministers planned in detail the forms which Japan considered this support should take, and settled the principles upon which Japan would negotiate for a tripartite military alliance.

In the first place it was agreed that Japan's sphere of influence should include the Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific, French Indo-China and other French Pacific possessions, Thailand, Malaya, British [p48991] Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India and other countries. In conducting negotiations with Germany, however, Japan would speak only of the area from Burma eastward and from New Caledonia northward, including the Netherlands East Indies. If Germany should make reservations, Japan would express her intentions in such a way as to secure German recognition of her aim of predominance in the whole of East Asia, including the South Seas. Japan would maintain that her ultimate goal was to establish the independence of French Indo- China and the Netherlands East Indies, but that she desired first to gain a political and economic ascendancy over those countries.

In the second place the three countries would adopt common policies in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States. It would be their aim to maintain friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., but they would agree also to act in concert in case it became likely that one of the contracting powers would be involved in war with the Soviet Union. Japan would cooperate with Germany and Italy in restraining the U.S.S.R. on the east, west and south, thus endeavouring to induce that country to align itself with the Tripartite Powers.

The contracting powers would also set in [p48992] conjunction in restraining the United States by measures short of war. In accordance with this policy, the Philippines were not included among the countries which it was Japan's immediate intention to dominate. Their inclusion would depend upon the attitude of the United States. By political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy pressure would be brought to bear upon the United States, thus enabling the attainment of Japan's ambitions.

In the third place the nature of the economic assistance to be rendered by each contracting power would be made the subject of a separate agreement. Japan would furnish from the areas under her control the raw materials needed by Germany for the prosecution of the war against Great Britain. Germany in turn would cooperate with Japan in facilitating the prosecution of the war in China; and would furnish technical assistance and materials of war for which Japan had in the past been largely dependent upon the United States.

In the fourth place, Japan would take such steps as the situation might require to eliminate the political and economic interests of Great Britain in the Far East. By means of economic assistance to Germany, by political and economic pressure upon British [p48993] interests in China, by propaganda and by encouraging independence movements in British territories, Japan would assist Germany and Italy in the war against Great Britain. If Germany desired it, Japan would, as a matter of principle, declare her willingness to afford military cooperation against Great Britain. If not, her chief objective would be the United States.

Nevertheless, concerning the possible use of armed force against Great Britain and the United States, Japan would reserve the right to make her decisions independently. If the war in China should be nearing settlement, Japan would use armed force, choosing as favourable an occasion as possible for this purpose. While the conflict in China continued Japan would not resort to war against the Western Powers, unless the situation should be such as to permit no further delay.

The essence of the proposed alliance was that which Matsuoka had suggested to the Germans. When Germany had emerged victoriously from the war against Great Britain the world would be divided into four spheres of influence, dominated respectively by Germany and Italy, by Japan, by the Soviet Union and by the United States. Both before and after this situation had come about, Japan would act in conjunction with Germany and Italy so that each might realise fully its [p48994] aims of conquest and aggrandisement.


Five days later, on 9 September 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka met Stahmer and commenced negotiations with Germany. Stahmer, who spoke under the German Foreign Minister's direct instructions, revealed that Germany was no less eager than Japan to conclude the proposed tripartite alliance. In all material respects Germany's views corresponded closely with those which Matsuoka had expressed to Ambassador Ott on 1 August 1940.

Germany, said Stahmer, desired to end the European War quickly, and did not at the present juncture require Japan's military assistance. Germany particularly wished Japan to restrain and prevent the United States from entering the war. The conclusion of the proposed alliance and the adoption of a strong foreign policy was considered to be the surest way of preventing war between the United States and either Japan or Germany. Germany and Italy, said Stahmer, would do everything possible to restain the United States, and would supply Japan with such war equipment as they could reasonably spare.

In other respects also Germany's proposals [p48995] accorded well with Japanese aims. Germany, declared Stahmer, recognized and respected Japan's political leadership in East Asia. All that Germany required in that area was of an economic nature. She would collaborate with Japan, and would expect Japan to meet her economic needs. Germany would also assist in bringing about a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan, and believed that this would present no insuperable difficulty.

Although Germany for the present desired Japan's neutrality, Stahmer made it clear that Germany regarded Japan as an ally in the coming struggle for world supremacy. The present war, he said, may end quickly, but the great struggle will go on, in one form or another, for decades. In the meantime Germany would do everything possible to prevent war between Japan and the United States, and even, if possible, to improve their relations. Nevertheless, said Stahmer, the tripartite powers must be prepared for the worst contingency. Germany believed that in the long run war between Japan and the United States could scarcely be avoided.

Stahmer told Matsuoka that the war in Europe was destined in the end to develop into a struggle against the whole Anglo-Saxon world. Germany regarded the proposed alliance as a long-term arrangement for [p48996] cooperation in this struggle, and therefore desired that Japan should join the Axis quickly before the war with Great Britain was ended.

Stahmer and Matsuoka met on 9, 10 and 11 September 1940. At the third meeting they settled between them the draft of the proposed tripartite alliance. At Germany's express desire, Italy was not invited to participate in these negotiations. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, received his first intimation of the proposed alliance from von Ribbentrop on 19 September 1940. The German Foreign Minister then expressed his belief that the alliance would have a double edge -- against the Soviet Union and against the United States.


After Matsuoka and Stahmer had settled the draft of the proposed tripartite alliance, no time was lost in securing its conclusion. On 16 September 1940 the proposal was first submitted to an Imperial Conference which took the form of a meeting of the Privy Council in the Emperor's presence. Foreign Minister Matsuoka traced the course of the negotiations with Germany, and explained each clause of the proposed draft. The Navy, however, did not agree to the [p48997] proposal.

Three days later, on 19 September 1940, the question was considered by the Liaison Conference, and, on 24 September 1940, agreement was finally reached. On 26 September 1940 this was reported to the Privy Council which again met in the Emperor's presence. Konoye, Matsuoka, TOJO and Oikawa, who had now replaced Yoshida as Navy Minister, were in attendance. The spokesmen for the alliance included HOSHINO, the President of the Planning Board, MUTO, the Chief of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau, and representatives of the Finance and Navy Ministries.

So great was the need for urgency now considered that the Privy Council departed from the usual practice of deputing an Investigating Committee to consider the draft and to submit a written report. Instead those present at the Privy Council meeting constituted themselves a committee of the whole under the chairmanship of the Council's Vice-President. Konoye and Matsuoka first explained the proposal. The ensuing discussions lasted all day and into the evening. The Investigating Committee of the whole then unanimously recommended the conclusion of the proposed alliance, and added a warning. It was resolved that the government should improve Japan's relations with [p48998] the Soviet Union, and should avoid any action which might incite Great Britain and the United States, but it was demanded that the government, while taking these measures, should prepare for the worst.

The conference was then once more convened as a meeting of the full Privy Council, hold in the Emperor's presence. The Chairman of the Investigating Committee reported orally the recommendations decided upon, and, after some further discussions, the conclusion of the alliance was unanimously approved.

On the following day, 27 September 1940, the Tripartite Alliance was concluded. An Imperial Rescript was issued, announcing that the new alliance was an instrument of peace, which enabled each nation "to have its proper place in the world." Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a speech declaring that Japan's responsibilities as the leader of the "new order" in East Asia had increased. He said that, although Japan intended to fulfill those responsibilities by peaceful means, occasions and circumstances might arise which called for a momentous decision. Japan's future, he added, was beset with countless difficulties which no ordinary effort would be sufficient to surmount.

OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were more explicit. [p48999]

SHIRATORI, writing in December 1940, described the Tripartite Alliance as a means of achieving the "new world order," and as the climax of a movement which had first found expression in the conquest of Manchuria.

In OSHIMA's view the Konoye Cabinet was at this time certain that the "Greater East Asia Sphere" could be achieved only through an advance to the south by military force. The only question, he said, was "when things should start."

KIDO, too, understood clearly the full significance of the Tripartite Alliance. On 21 September 1940 he informed the Emperor of his belief that, if the alliance was concluded, Japan would eventually have to oppose Great Britain and the United States. He therefore considered that the war in China should be settled speedily.

The Emperor had said that he would never give his consent to the proposed alliance. The Elder Statesman, Prince Saionji, upon whose advice the Emperor had greatly relied, was known to oppose it strongly. After the Navy's agreement had been obtained, the Konoye Cabinet had still this difficulty to overcome. It was surmounted through KIDO's connivance.

As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal it was KIDO's duty to advise the Elder Statesman of the course of the [49,000] negotiations. Though fully aware of the gravity of the decision which was being made, KIDO left Saionji in complete ignorance of what was afoot. When taxed with this failure of duty he replied only that it was due to consideration for the Elder Statesman's ill-health. Saionji, upon learning that the alliance had been concluded, was greatly aggrieved, and felt that the Emperor had been deserted.


The preamble to the Tripartite Alliance recited the resolve of the contracting powers to establish "new orders" in Europe and in Asia respectively; and their determination to assist one another in so doing. The instrument provided that Germany and Italy would respect Japanese leadership in Asia, and that Japan would respect German and Italian leadership in Europe. The three countries pledged their mutual cooperation, the details of which were to be settled by a specialized joint commission appointed for the purpose. If any contracting power should be attacked by any country not presently engaged in the European War or in the war in China, the other parties to the alliance would render political, economic and military assistance. Germany [49,001] and Italy would confirm that the alliance would have no effect upon the present relations between the Soviet Union and any signatory power. The alliance would remain in force for ten years, and provision was made for its renewal.

On 27 September 1940, the day upon which the Tripartite Alliance was concluded, further assurances between Japan and Germany were effected by exchange of letters. It was agreed that Japan should retain those former German Pacific Islands which she now administered under mandate from the League of Nations. Other former German colonies in the South Seas, presently under the control of other powers, would automatically return to German ownership when the war against Great Britain was won. Gemany, however, pledged her willingness to negotiate for their transfer to Japan.

Matusoka set out Japan's desires in a letter to the German Ambassador. Japan, he said, shared German and Italian hopes that the European War would remain limited in scope and that it would be ended speedily. Japan would spare no effort to achieve such a result. He added, however, that "the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere" were such that there was danger of a war between Great Britain and Japan. His government was confident, [49,002] Matsuoka delared, that in such an event Germany would aid Japan by all means in her power.

Ott acknowledged receipt of this letter and said that the circumstances in which aid would be given would be determined by consultation among the three powers. Germany pledged her own assistance and her good offices with the Soviet Union. She undertook also to give Japan such industrial and technical assistance as was possible.

Germany, said Ott, was convinced that the tripartite powers were about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history, in which it would be their task to assume the roles of leadership in Europe and in "Greater East Asia" respectively.


The Tripartite Alliance was concluded as a necessary step in Japanese preparations for a military advance into South-Last Asia and the South Seas. At the numerous discussions and conferences of September 1940 it was recognised by all who took part that the conclusion of the alliance would commit Japan to waging war against France, the Netherlands, and the countries of the British Commonwealth; and that it implied also Japan's willingness to wage war against the United States [49,003] should that country seek to stand between Japan and the attainment of her aggressive aims. It was acknowledged that Japan was not yet self-sufficient in the materials of war; but it was considered that, when the new alliance had been concluded, the advantage of securing new sources of materials in the south outweighed the dangers of war with the Western Powers.

It was, however, also clearly understood that the alliance had broader aims. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka said at the Privy Council meeting of 26 September 1940, "The Pact now under review forms the basis of the future foreign relations of the Empire."

It was expected that, when Germany had conquered Great Britain, there would remain as world powers the parties to the alliance, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contracting powers agreed that as a matter of expediency, they would in the meantime attempt to avoid war with both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The terms of the alliance, which were to be published to the world, were in form defensive. The obligations of the contracting powers to support one another were represented as arising only if an attack was made upon one or more of their number. Nevertheless, the whole tenor of the discussions before the Privy Council and elsewhere shows clearly that the three powers [49,004] were determined to support one another in aggressive action whenever such action was considered necessary to the furtherance of their schemes. Because the United States was recognised as the immediate obstacle to Japanese plans for advancing to the south, Matsuoka said that the alliance was directed principally against that country.

Similarly, because it suited the purposes of the contracting parties, it was agreed that they should make every effort to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Yet it was recognised that the Tripartite Alliance was directed against that country also. Matsuoka did not contemplate that any improvement in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union would be of a permanent nature. He said that such an improvement could hardly last more than two or three years, and that after that time it would be necessary for the tripartite powers to review the position. In answer to a question put to him at the Privy Council meeting of 26 September 1940, Matsuoka said specifically that, notwithstanding the expressed terms of the alliance and the existence of a non- aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, the tripartite powers would aid each other in case one of them should become engaged in war with the U.S.S.R. [49,005] In summary, the Tripartite Pact was a compact made between aggressor nations for the furtherance of their aggressive purposes. Its true character was well revealed when one Privy Councillor asked how the statement contained in the Preamble of the Pact that each nation should have its proper place in the world could be reconciled with Hitler's principle that only the strongest should survive. Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and War Minister TOJO answered jointly that only the strong nations were worthy of survival. If Japan, they said, should fail in her "grand mission of spreading the Imperial Way," it could not even be helped if Japan herself went out of existence. [49,006]

The decisions of the leaders of Japan, which followed the downfall of the Yonai Cabinet, are of outstanding importance, and have therefore been set forth in detail. They show that the conspirators were determined to extend the domination of Japan over a huge area and population and to use force, if necessary, to accomplish their aims. They show by plain admission that the purpose of the conspirators in entering into the Tripartite Pact was to secure support for the accomplishment of these illegal aims. They show that notwithstanding the seeming defensive terms of the Tripartite Pact, which were designed for publication, the obligations of the parties to support are another were expected to come into force if one of the parties became engaged in war whether defensive or aggressive. They wholly refute the contention of the defence that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to promote the cause of peace.

The conspirators now dominated Japan. They had fixed their policy and resolved to carry it out. While the aggressive war in China was continuing with undiminished vigor, their preparations for further wars of Aggression which its execution would almost certainly involve were far on the way to completion. In the Chapter of the Judgment which deals with the Pacific War we shall see these preparations completed and the attacks [49,007] launched which the conspirators hoped would secure for Japan the domination of the Far East.




The war which Japan waged against China, and which the Japanese leaders falsely described as the "China Incident" or the "China Affair," began on the night of 18 September 1931 and ended with the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. The first phase of this war consisted of the invasion, occupation and consolidation by Japan of that part of China known as Manchuria, and of the Province of Jehol. The second phase of this war began on 7 July 1937, when Japanese troops attacked the walled city of Wanping near Peiping following the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident," and consisted of successive advances, each followed by brief periods of consolidation in preparation for further advances into Chinese territory. Some of the Accused were active in this war from the very beginning, some participated as the war progressed. SHIRATORI stated during the course of his lecture, "The Trend of the Great War," which was published in the Diamond Magazine for June 1940, "It is not too much to say that the fuse of the European War [49,008] was first attached by the China Incident."


The position of Japan in Manchuria as at 18 September 1931 is described by the Lytton Commission in terms with which the Tribunal entirely agrees:

"These treaties and other agreements give to Japan an important and unusual position in Manchuria. She governed the leased territory with practically full rights of sovereignty. Through the South Manchuria Railway, she administered the railway areas, including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun; and in these areas she controlled the police, taxation, education, and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in many parts of the country: the Kwantung Army in the Leased Territory, Railway Guards in the railway areas, and Consular Police throughout the various districts. This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighboring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges. A situation of this kind could possibly [49,009] be maintained without leading to incessant complications and disputes if it were freely desired or accepted on both sides, and if it were the sign and embodiment of a well-considered policy of close collaboration in the economic and in the political sphere. But, in the absence of these conditions, it could only lead to friction and conflict."

The situation was not "freely desired and accepted on both sides," and the friction inevitably followed. By the use of force or the threat of force, Japan had secured concessions from China in the days of her weakness; the resurgent nationalism of China resented the losses which the decadent Empire of China had been unable to avoid. A more powerful factor, and ultimately the decisive factor in producing the friction, began to emerge as Japan, no longer satisfied with the rights she had gained, sought their enlargement on a scale which in the and involved the conquest of Manchuria. This policy on the part of Japan to sock enlargement of her rights and interests in China was first authoritatively announced in the time of the Tanaka Cabinet.


The political atmosphere had been tense in Japan before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, which came into power in 1927 advocating the so-called [49,010] "Positive Policy" toward China. The military group attributed what they termed the weakened condition of Japan at that time to the liberal tendencies of the Government as evidenced by the "Friendship Policy" advocated by Foreign Minister Shidehara. The "Friendship Policy," which was thus displaced, had been in force since the Washington Conference of 1922. The "Positive Policy," advocated by Premier Tanaka, was to expand and develop the special rights and privileges, which Japan claimed to have acquired in Manchuria, through collaboration with Manchurian authorities, especially Marshal Chang Tao-lin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese North-Eastern Frontier Army and Chief of the Administration of Manchuria and Jehol. Premier Tanaka also declared that although Japan would respect the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and would do everything possible to enforce the "Open Door Policy" in China, she was fully determined to see that no state of affairs arose in Manchuria which would disturb the local tranquility and put Japan's vital interests in jeopardy. The Tanaka Government placed great emphasis upon the necessity of regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China and declared that, if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia from other parts of China, Japan would defend her interests in these districts by force. The policy [49,011] thus involved an expressed intention to secure further rights in a foreign country and an implied claim of right to preserve internal peace and order in that foreign country.


Such organizations as the Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) and the Kokuhonsha (Foundation of the State Society) as well as such writers as Dr. Okawa (the former Accused) agitated strongly in Japan for the enforcement of Japan's special rights and privileges in China by force of arms if necessary.

The Black Dragon Society had been formed on 3 February 1901 at Kanda, Japan, to promote nationalism and anti-Russian and anti-Korean sympathies. It had advocated annexation of Korea, and in general supported the expansionist aspirations of Japan.

The Foundation of the State Society had been formed on 20 December 1920 to foster the spirit of nationalism and disseminate propaganda. It kept in close touch with the military and published a magazine to present its ideas to the public. HIRANUM was President and KOISO and ARAKI were Members of the Society.

Dr. Okawa was a trusted employee of the South Manchurian Railway Company, and had been a Director of the East Asia Research Institute established by the [49,012] Railway Company to study the economic situation in Manchuria. He had published several books before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet. "Sato Shinen's Ideal State," published by him in 1924, stated: that according to Sato, Japan being the first country in the world to be created, it was the foundation of all nations and therefore had the divine mission to rule all nations. The book advocated the occupation of Siberia to prevent the southward advance of Russia, and the occupation of the South Sea Islands to prevent the northward advance of Britain. He published, "Asia, Europe and Japan," in 1925. In that book, he maintained that the League of Nations was organized to maintain eternally the status quo and further domination of the World by the Anglo-Saxons. He predicted that a war between the East and the West was inevitable. Providence was trying to elect Japan as the champion of Asia, he asserted. Japan should endeavor to fulfill that sublime mission by developing a strong spirit of nationalism, he advised. Dr. Okawa had been the organizer of many societies including the Kochisha, one principle of which was the liberation of the colored races and the unification of the World. The political philosophy of Dr. Okawa had appealed to certain of the Military who had adopted him as their spokesman among the civilians and often invited him to [49,013] deliver lectures at the Army General Staff meetings. Dr. Okawa became intimately acquainted with the Accused KOISO, ITAGAKI, DOHIHARA and other Army leaders.


Marshal Chang Tso-lin, having declared Manchuria independent of the Central Government of China at the time of the Washington Conference and made himself master of Manchuria, decided to extend his authority further into China proper and moved his headquarters to Peking. The policy of the Tanaka Cabinet, being based on the plan of collaboration with the Marshal, depended on the success of the Marshal in maintaining his leadership in Manchuria. Premier Tanaka repeatedly advised the Marshal to abandon his ambitions to extend his authority outside Manchuria; but the Marshal resented and refused this advice. Civil war between Chang Tso-lin and the Nationalist Government of China followed. In the spring of 1928, when the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were marching on Peking and Tientsin to drive out the army of Chang Tso-lin, and force it back into Manchuria, Premier Tanaka issued a declaration to the effect that Japan would maintain peace and order in Manchuria and was prepared to prevent a state of affairs which would endanger the interests of Japan in Manchuria. The Premier then sent a message [49,014] to the Chinese generals in effect telling them that the Japanese would oppose any invasion of Manchuria, including the definite statement that the Japanese would prevent defeated troops or those in pursuit from entering Manchuria. Even before the civil war spread to Manchuria, Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan in Shantung Province. A conflict ensued known as the Tsinan Incident, which aroused public opinion in Japan in favor of protection of Japanese rights in Manchuria. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings all over Japan in an effort to fan national resentment against China to the war pitch.


Marshal Chang Tso-lin had not only disregarded the advice of Premier Tanaka in attempting to extend his authority south of the Great Wall, but had shown increasing unwillingness to allow Japan to exploit China by the privileges she derived from various treaties and agreements. This attitude of the Marshal had caused a group of officers in the Kwantung Army to advocate that force should be used to promote the interests of Japan in Manchuria and to maintain that nothing was to be gained by negotiating with the Marshal; however, Premier Tanaka continued to collaborate with the Marshal, relying upon the threat of force rather than its actual use to attain [49,015] his objectives. This resentment of the Marshal by certain officers of the Kwantung Army became so intense that a senior staff officer of that army, Colonel Kawamoto, planned to murder the Marshal. The purpose of the murder was to remove him as the obstacle to the creation of a new state in Manchuria, dominated by Japan with the Marshal's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, as its nominal head.

In the latter part of April 1928, the Marshal was defeated by the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Premier Tanaka advised him to withdraw into Manchuria behind the Japanese lines before it was too late. The Marshal resented this advice, but was forced to follow it. The Kwantung Army, in accordance with Tanaka's declaration, that Japan would prevent defeated troops from entering Manchuria, was engaged in disarming Chinese troops retreating toward Mukden from Peiping, The Marshal, with his bodyguard, boarded a train for Mukden. The Japanese 20th Engineer Regiment, which had arrived at Mukden from Korea, mined the railroad with dynamite and a Japanese Captain placed his soldiers in position around the mine. On 4 June 1928, when the Marshal's train reached the mine, which was located at the point where the Peking-Mukden Railway passes underneath the South Manchurian Railway, there was an [49,016] explosion. The Marshal's train was wrecked and Japanese soldiers began firing upon the Marshal's bodyguard. The Marshal was killed as planned, an attempt was made to obtain an order to muster the entire Kwantung Army into action and exploit the incident and attain its original purpose but the effort was thwarted by a staff officer who apparently did not understand the real purpose of those desiring the issuance of the order.

The Tanaka Cabinet was taken by surprise and greatly embarrassed as it saw its program endangered by this murder of the Marshal. Premier Tanaka made a full report to the Emperor and obtained his permission to court-martial those responsible. Upon his return from the palace, he summoned the Minister of War and other members of his Cabinet and stated that he was determined to discipline the Army. Those present agreed, but when the Minister of War took the matter up with his Ministry, he suggested that strong opposition on the part of the General Staff should be encouraged. Thereafter, the Minister of War reported to the Premier that the opposition of the Army General Staff was based on the idea that to court-martial those responsible would force the Army to make public some of its military secrets. This was the first time, according to the testimony of former Navy Minister Okada, that the Army had projected itself [49,017] into the formulation of government policy.

It was at this time that DOHIHARA appeared upon a scene in which he was to play an important part. He had spent approximately eighteen years in China prior to the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin as aide to General Benzai, who had acted as advisor to various Chinese leaders. On 17 March 1928, DOHIHARA had requested and received permission from the Emperor to accept an appointment as aide to Matsui, Nanao, who was advisor to the Marshal. DOHIHARA reported for duty under the appointment and was present in Manchuria when the Marshal was killed. [49,018]


The young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded his father; but be proved to be a disappointment to the Kwantung Army. He joined the Kuomintang Party in December 1928; and anti-Japanese movements began to be promoted on an organized scale and gained greatly in intensity. The movement for the recovery of Chinese national rights gained strength. There was a demand for the recovery of the south Manchurian Railway and in general for the limitation of the Japanese influence in Manchuria.

In July 1928, soon, after the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin,Premier Tanaka had sent a personal representative had been instructed to inform the Young Marshal that Japan regarded Manchuria as her outpost and that the Japanese Government would like to cooperate with him "behind the scenes" and was prepared to spare no sacrifice under the Cabinet's "Positive Policy" to prevent an invasion of Manchuria by the Chinese Nationalist Armies. The Young Marshal's answer was to join the Fuomintang as related.


Japanese-Chinese relations in Manchuria became extremely aggravated. The Japanese claimed several violations of the "Trade Treaty" with China The [49,019] Chinese proposal to construct a railroad parallel to the Nouth Manchurian Railroad, the claim that there was illegal taxation of Japanese in Manchuria, the claim of expression of Koreans, and the denial of the right of Japanese subjects to lease land in Manchuria, were all Manchurian Problems according to the Japanese agitators. The Military advocated Japanese occupation of Manchuria. They maintained that diplomatic negotiations were useless and that armed force should be used to drive the Chinese from Manchuria and set up a new regime under Japanese control. ITAGAKI, who had been appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army in law 1929, was one of those who advocated the use of force. Dr. Okama, who had visited Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and attempted to negotiate with him on behalf of the South Manchurian Railway, returned to Japan and engaged in a tour of over fifty prefectures in April 1929, giving lectures and showing pictures. The Army General staff, of which MINAMI was Vice-Chief began to cooperate with Dr. Okawa and to aid him in his propaganda program to instigate the people to take action against China. The Army General staff also began to study plans for operations in Manchuria and to declare that Manchuria was the "lifeline" of Japan. [49,020]


The efforts of the Tanaka Cabinet to punish those responsible for the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin had alienated the Military. This group had joined with Dr. Okawa to create opposition among the civilians to the Cabinet, and had seized upon the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15), which they claimed violated the Japanese Constitution, as well as the terms approved by the Cabinet for the settlement of the Tsinan Incident, which they claimed were a disgrace to Japan, as opportunities to embarrass the Cabinet. The pressure became so great that on 1 July 1929 the Cabinet resigned.

The resignation of the Tanaka Government was a distinct victory for the Military and their civilian spokesman, Dr. Okawa. From this time on, the influence of this element on government policies was to become stronger, and their insistence that Japan should occupy Manchuria by force and establish a puppet government there was to bear fruit. Dr. Okawa became recognized as a political leader; and the South Manchurian Railway Company officials, realizing his value to them, divorced the East Asia Research Institute from the Company and created a Foundation in July 1929 to assist him in his work of investigating and molding public opinion in [49,021] support of the Army's plan to occupy Manchuria.


The Hamaguchi Cabinet, which followed the Tanaka Cabinet, was formed on 2 July 1929; and Baron Shidehara, who continued to advocate the "Friendship Policy" toward China, was selected by Premier Hamaguchi as his Foreign Minister. The "Friendship Policy" rested upon good will and friendship as distinguished from the "Positive Policy" of the Tanaka Cabinet, which rested upon the threat of military force. As a result of the "Friendship Policy", Chinese boycotts of Japanese trade steadily decreased and normal peaceful relations might have prevailed but for violent agitation on the part of the Military.


In his book, "The Road to the Reconstruction of the World", HASHIMOTO, in discussing his tour of duty of three years in Istanbul as Military Attache, discussed the political condition of other countries and said.

"I was clearly conscious that Japan was the only country within the whirlpool of world movement that stood within the bounds of liberalism. I considered if Japan goes on under the present condition, she would drop from the ranks in the community of nations. At this time, fortunately, I was ordered to go back [49,022] (to Japan). During my thirty days' voyage, I pondered on how to reform Japan and as a result, I succeeded in drawing a definite plan to a certain degree. On returning to the Army General Staff Office, my former haunt, I devised several schemes in order to put my ideas into execution."

HASHIMOTO was attached to the Army General Staff on 30 January 1930.

Between 1-10 September 1930, a score or more of army captains who had recently graduated from the Army Staff College, met at the Army Club in Tokyo under the sponsorship of Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and decided to organize a research organization to study Manchurian and Mongolian questions and the internal reorganization of the country. The Society's ultimate objective was later announced to be national reorganisation, by armed force, if necessary, in order to settle the so- called "Manchurian Problem" and other pending issues. The name "Sakurakai" (Cherry Society) was given to the organisation; and its membership was limited to army officers on the active list with rank of Lt. Colonel or under, who were concerned about national reorganisation.


Dr. Okawa, with the aid of the East Asia Research Foundation and the officers of the Army General [49,023] Staff, had his propaganda campaign in full blast when HASHIMOTO returned to the General Staff Office. Propaganda was being disseminated through the newspapers and other media to establish the idea that Manchuria was Japan's "Lifeline", and that a stronger policy in connection therewith should be adopted. The military leaders issued instructions that all editorial writers, ultranationalistic speakers, etc., should unite to establish public opinion for more aggressive action in Manchuria. The Military argued that Manchuria was Japan's "Lifeline" and that Japan must expand into Manchuria, develop it economically and industrially, set it up as a defence against Russia, and protect the rights of Japan and is nationals there as Japan was entitled to do under existing treaties. An appeal to emotion was made; it being said that Japanese blood had been shed in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese war, and that by reason of that sacrifice, Japan was entitled to control Manchuria. The railroad question was still a burning issue; and Dr. Okawa insisted that Manchuria should be separated from Manking and placed under Japanese control to create a land founded on the "Kingly Way".

HASHIMOTO in his book, "The Inevitability of Renovation", has explained well the meaning of the term "Kingly-Way" He said:

"It is necessary to have [49,024] politics, economies, culture, national defence and everything else, all focused on one, the Emperor, and the whole force of the nation concentrated and displayed from a single point. Especially the political, economic and cultural lines which had been organised and conducted by liberalism and socialism in the past should be reorganised according to the principle of oneness in the Imperial Way, that is to say, 'Kodo Ittai Shugi'. This system is the strongest and the grandest of all. There are many countries in the world, but there is absolutely no nation that can compare with our national blood solidarity which makes possible a unification like ours with the Emperor in the center."

It was Okawa's idea that after an independent Manchuria had been established on the "Kingly Way", with an inseparable relation between Manchuria and Japan, Japan could assume the leadership of the peoples of Asia.

A General Investigation Section was created in the General Staff on 1 April 1930, as the Investigation Section of the Kwantung Army was considered insufficient to probe into the resources of Manchuria, the sentiments of the people and other kindred subjects of investigation.

Around the headquarters of the Kwantung Army [49,025] at Port Arthur, the chief topic of conversation among the staff officers in those days was the "Manchurian Problem". ITAGAKI, who was one of those staff officers, had some definite ideas for solving the problem, which he expressed to a friend during the month of May 1930. ITAGAKI said that there were many unsolved problems between China and Japan, that they were so serious that they could not be solved by diplomatic means, and that there was no alternative but to use force. He expressed the opinion that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be driven from Manchuria so that a new state might be established in accordance with the principles of the "Kingly Way".


On 4 November 1930, Premier Hamaguchi was on the platform of the Tokyo Railway station when, in the words of Foreign Minister Shidehara, "He was shot by a silly young man." The Premier was not killed instantly; but his wound was such that it was necessary for foreign Minister Shidehara to act as Prime Minister until the Hamaguchi Cabinet resigned on 13 April 1931. The Premier succumbed to his wounds and died on 26 August 1931. Acting Prime Minister Shidehara caused an investigation to be made and determined that the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi was caused by [49,026] dissatisfaction with the Premier's Naval Disarmament Policy.

The London Naval Limitations Treaty had been signed on 22 April 1930. This treaty was in line with the policy of national economy and reduction of armaments which accompanied the Premier's "Friendship Policy". Also in line with this policy was the reduction of the Army from 21 divisions to 17 divisions. The signing of the London Treaty made the young Navy officers indignant. The Black Dragon Society began to hold mass meetings in protest. The Privy Council, of which HIRANUMA was Vice- President, was strongly against the Treaty and was taking the attitude that the Cabinet had usurped the powers and prerogatives of the Military in concluding the Treaty. It was in the midst of this violent political argument that the assassination had occurred.


A military coup d'etat was planned to occur on 20 March 1931. The affair came to be known as the “March Incident". The continual agitation and dissemination of propaganda by the Army General Staff had its effect; and, as testified by Baron Okada, who was a member of the Supreme war Council at that time, it was generally understood that it was only a question of [49,027] time until the Army would undertake the occupation of Manchuria. Before the Army could move into Manchuria, it was thought necessary to place in power a Government favorable to such action. At the time, the Hamaguchi Cabinet was in power; and due to the attempted assassination of the Premier, the chief exponent of the "Friendship Policy", namely Foreign Minister Shidehara, was acting as Premier. HASHIMOTO's plan, which was approved by his superior officers of the Army General Staff, including Ninomiya, who was Vice-Chief of the Staff, and Tatekawa, who was Chief of the Second Division of the staff, was to start a demonstration as an expression of disapproval of the Diet. It was expected that a clash would occur with the police during the demonstration and that this clash could be expanded until the disorder would justify the Army in establishing martial law, dissolving the Diet and seizing the Government. KOISO, Ninomiya, Tatekawa and others called upon War Minister Uraki at his Official Residence and discussed their plans with him, leaving with the impression that he was a ready tool for their scheme. Dr. Okawa was instructed to proceed with the mass demonstration; and HAISHIMOTO delibered to him 300 practice bombs, which KOISO had secured for use on that occasion. They were to be used to spread alarm and [49,028] confusion in the crowd and increase the appearance of riot. However, Dr. Okawa in his enthusiasm addressed a letter to War Minister Ugaki in which he stated that the time was just ahead for a great mission to descend upon Minister Ugaki; the War Minister now realized the full import of the plot. He immediately called in KOISO and HASHIMOTO and instructed them to stop all further plans to use the Army to carry out this revolution against the Government. The projected coup d'etat was averted. KIDO, who was then the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was fully informed of the plot beforehand by a friend, who suggested that the Imperial Household should be advised.


Although the "March Incident" hastened the fall of the Hamaguchi Cabinet, which was followed on 14 April 1931 by the formation of the Wakatsuki Cabinet, it did not succeed in displacing the "Friendship Policy" fostered by Baron Shidehara for he was retained as Foreign Minister by Premier Wakatsuki. General MINAMI, who had been a War Councillor since his relief as Commander of the Korean Army, was selected as War Minister. He replaced General Ugaki, who was in disgrace with the Army for having reduced the size of the Army [49,029] and for having refused to take part in the "March Incident". Ugaki resigned from the Army and went into retirement.


The "Friendship Policy" was destined to be put to further tests, by two "Incidents", which had far-reaching effect upon opinion in Japan. The first of these "Incidents" occurred at Wanpaoshan, a small village located some 18 miles north of Changchun, in Manchuria. The village is located in a law marshy area alongside the Itung River. A group of Koreans leased a large tract of land near Wanpaoshan and prepared to irrigate the land by digging a ditch several miles long, extending from the Itung River across a tract of land not included in their lease, and occupied by Chinese farmers. After a considerable length of the ditch had been constructed, the Chinese farmers arose en masse and protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, who dispatched police and ordered the Korean, to cease construction at once and leave the area occupied by the Chinese. The Japanese Consul at Changchun also sent police to protect the Koreans. On 1 July 1931, after negotiation had produced no results, the Chinese farmers took matters into their own hands and drove the Koreans from their lands and filled the ditch. During this operation, Japanese [49,030] Consular Police opened fire on the Chinese farmers and drove them away, while the Koreans returned and completed their irrigation project under the protection of the Japanese police. No, casualties resulted from this "Incident", but the sensational accounts of it printed in the Japanese and Korean Press caused a series of anti- Chinese riots in Korea in which Chinese were massacred and their property destroyed, which, in turn, caused a revival of the anti-Japanese boycott in China.

About this time, the War Ministry invited officials of the South Manchurian Railway Company to discuss "Manchurian Problems". At the discussions, MINAMI represented the Army and stated that he had long recognized the necessity of increasing the number of divisions in Korea.


The killing of a Japanese army captain by the name of Nakamura, Shintaro, on 27 June 1931 by soldiers under the command of Kuan Yuheng, Commander of the Third Regiment of the Chinese Reclamation Army in Manchuria, which killing did not become known to the Japanese until about 17 July 1931, gave rise to the second "Incident". Captain Nakamura, a regular Japanese army officer, was on a mission under orders of the Japanese Army. According to the Chinese, he was armed and carried patent [49,031] medicine, which included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes. He was accompanied by three interpreters and assistants and represented himself as an "Agricultural Expert". When he reached a point near Taonan, he and his assistants were captured and shot; and their bodies were cremated to conceal the evidence of the deed. This "Incident" greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese Military against the "Friendship Policy"; and the Japanese Press repeatedly declared that "Solution of the Manchurian Problem ought to be by force!"


The Army stiffened its attitude in regard to reduction of armaments and the plan of the Finance Department to economize, and threatened to appeal to the Throne. The Foreign Minister was bitterly assailed in the Press and by ultra-nationalists and the militarists for "Shidehara's weak-kneed foreign policy". The Cherry Society continued its agitation for the use of force. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings. Dr. Okawa stepped up the tempo of his propaganda. He was conducting a campaign of public speeches and publications to build up sentiment in support of the movement to occupy Manchuria. He made a speech along this line at the Naval Academy. The Army was completed out of control and could not be restrained. The Chiefs [49,032] of Staff held a conference and decided that since one could not tell what Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang would do, he should be smashed firmly and without hesitation. Dr. Okawa confided in a friend that he and Colonel ITAGAKI and certain other army officers would bring about an "Incident" in Mukden later on that would solve all “Manchurian Problems". KIDO admits that Baron Harada informed him of a plot to this end on the part of the military officers in Manchuria as early as 23 June 1931. On 4 August 1931 MINAMI addressed a conference of Army Commanders and Commanding Generals. He said,

"some observers, without studying the conditions of neighboring foreign countries, hastily advocate limitation of armaments and engage in propaganda unfavorable to the nation and the Army, Manchuria and Mongolia are very closely related to our country from the viewpoint of our national defense as well as politics and economics. It is to be regretted that the recent situation in that part of China is following a trend unfavorable to our Empire. In view of the situation I hope you will execute your duty in educating and training the troops with enthusiasm and sincerity so that you may serve the cause of His Majesty to perfection."

The Citizens Disarmament League took issue with [49,033] MINAMI on this speech and addressed a letter to him in which they accused him of spreading propaganda in the Army in violation of the Military Criminal Code.

Lt. Colonel HAISHIMOTO and Lt. Colonel Shigeto, who was also a member of the Cherry Society, dined at the home of a friend, Fujita, in Tokyo, during August 1931. During the course of the meal, the “Manchurian Problem" was discussed and the two Lt. Colonels agreed that positive action should be taken in Manchuria. A few days later, Lt. Colonel Shigeto appeared at the home of Fujita and deposited a large sum of money for safekeeping. During the following days this fund was drawn upon by Shigeto in varying amounts. After the "Mukden Incident", Fujita called at the home of Shigeto and exclaimed, "You have accomplished what you were contemplating in Manchuria!" Shigeto replied, "Yes!" and smiled; he then added, "We will expel Chang Hsueh-liang from Manchuria and bring Pu Yi to Manchuria and install him as Governor of the Three Eastern Provinces!"

Upon questioning HASHIMOTO, Fujita received the reply, "Yes things have come to pass where they should come!"


Colonel DOHIHARA, who had been attached to the Army General Staff since his return from China in March 1929, was sent by the Chief of the General Staff to [49,034] investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. Although his mission was ostensibly to investigate Captain Nakamura's death, his real mission appears to have been to determine the strength, state of training and condition of the Chinese armies and the efficiency of their communication system. He departed from Tokyo in July, 1931 and traveled by way of Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping and Tientsin before reporting to Mukden. He admits that the investigation of the Nakamura Incident was only one of the missions that took him to China. Although the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army was in Port Arthur, the Headquarters of the Special Services Organization of that Army was in Mukden. DOHIHARA arrived in Mukden on 18 August 1931 and took command of the Special Services Organization.


Foreign Minister Shidehara, anxious to enforce his "Friendship Policy" in Manchuria and give the Army no occasion to capitalize on the "Nakamura Incident", dispatched Consul-General Hayashi from Tokyo on 17 August 1931 with instructions to investigate and settle the affair. The Consul-General called upon the Chinese Governor of Liaoning Province, who appointed a [49,035] commission to investigate and report upon the "Incident". This commission reported on 3 September 1931; but its report was unsatisfactory to the Chinese authorities. On the 4th of September, Consul-General Hayashi was informed by General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, that the report of the Commission was indecisive and unsatisfactory and that it would be necessary to conduct a second enquiry. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who was sick in a hospital at Peiping, was advised of the situation; and he immediately ordered a new commission to be appointed and instructed to investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. At the same time, he sent Major Shibayama to Tokyo to confer with Foreign Minister Shidehara and make it clear that he desired to settle the case amicably. In the meantime, he had sent a high official to Tokyo to confer with Baron Shidehara and ascertain what common ground could be found for the settlement of various Sino-Japanese issues then outstanding. [49,036]


Colonel DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo early in September to report to the Army General Staff. After his return, the Press freely published references to the fact that it had been decided to use force to settle all pending issues in Manchuria as recommended by Colonel DOHIHARA. The Press also stated that conferences were being held between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff to arrange definite instructions to be given to Colonel DOHIHARA. These publications may or may not be factually accurate. They were not officially denied. They fanned the rising flame of Japanese opinion in favoring the use of force against China. It is established that Colonel DOHIHARA disagreed with Consul-General Hayashi regarding settlement of the Nakamura Incident and continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the case. War Minister MINAMI later confided in a friend that at the time he had advocated decisive settlement of the "Manchurian Problem" in line with Army opinion. KIDO, as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, noted in his diary on 10 September 1931 that he agreed with the theory that "self-defensive" action might be unavoidable in connection with Manchuria according to future [49,037] developments.


Rumors were current in Tokyo that the Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden, and these rumors were heard by Foreign Minister Shidehara. In fact Shidehara stated,

"Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, as Foreign Minister, I received confidential reports and information that the Kwantung Army was engaged in amassing troops and bringing up ammunition and material for some military purpose, and knew from such reports that action of some kind was contemplated by the Military Clique."

It now appears from the evidence adduced before this Tribunal -- though these facts were not known to Shidehara at the time -- that Lieutenant, or Captain Kawakami, who was stationed at Fushun in command of a detached company of the Second Battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army which involved the absence of himself and his company from Fushun. The remaining companies of this battalion were stationed at Mukden and took part in the attack on the Chinese barracks at Mukden on the 18th of September, The full content of the orders [49,038] which Kawakami had received from the Commander-in-Chief is not established, but they involved that Kawakami and his company should entrain and leave Fushun upon the occurrence of a certain emergency. Thereupon Kawakami assembled the Japanese police, ex-servicemen, and civilians at Fushun and asked them what they would do if on the 18th September 1931 an event occurred in Mukden which required him and his company to leave Fushun. He is said to have been anxious about defense at Fushun should he and his company leave that city. He also assembled the officials of the Railway at Fushun. He told them that some acute situation might arise after the 17th of September and that arrangements ought to be made about trains at Fushun. It appears that up till that time no arrangement had been made for having a night train standing by at Fushun to move troops in case of emergency, and Kawakami desired that such provision should be made.

The case for the defence in regard to this most significant affair is that Kawakami had no orders which related specifically to the 18th of September; that his orders were general, to take certain action if and when an emergency occurred; that upon a review of the situation Kawakami speculated that the emergency might occur about the 18th of September; and that [49,039] this guess of his alone accounts for his mention of that data when speaking to the people at Fushun. Thus, according to the defence, Kawakami guessed the exact date on which the Chinese would deliver a surprise attack on the Japanese troops at Mukden. Upon a consideration of all the facts relating to the incident of 18th September the Tribunal unhesitatingly rejects this explanation and holds that Kawakami had orders to take certain action in an emergency, which would occur on the night of the 18th of September, and was concerned since there was no provision for leaving a train available at Fushun at night.

Upon receiving the report from Hayashi, Shidehara called upon War Minister MINAMI and strongly protested against the report. In the meantime, SHIGEMITSU was holding conferences with Mr. T. V. Soong, who was Finance Minister of the Republic of China, and they had agreed to meet in Mukden on 20 September 1931 and confer with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Count Uchida, who was President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, in an effort to settle all outstanding differences between Japan and the Marshal.


The Kwantung Army had begun carrying out night maneuvers on 14 September 1931 in the vicinity of the [49,040] barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade. These barracks were located near the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway, a short distance north of Mukden. The maneuvers involved vigorous rifle and machinegun fire, and the 10,000 men of the 7th Brigade had been confined to barracks on orders of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang in order to avoid a clash between them and the Japanese. These maneuvers continued up to and including the night of 16 September 1931.

Mr. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Consulate who had been working with Hayashi in an attempt to settle the Makamura Incident, learned that the Kwantung Army Units stationed at the important coal mining district of Fushun would execute a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun at about 11:30 p.m. on the night of 18 September 1931.


Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Commission, which had been investigating the Nakamura Incident, returned to Mukden on the morning of 16 September 1931. The Japanese Consul-General called upon General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, on the afternoon of 18 September 1931, and the latter stated that Commander [49,041] Kuan Yuhang had been brought to Mukden on 16 September 1931 charged with the responsibility for the murder of Captain Nakamura and would be immediately tried by a court-martial. It appeared that the case would be settled. However, the conference between the Consul and General Yung was adjourned at about 8 p.m. because it was felt that since a member of the military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Kwantung Army before any further representations could be made to the Chinese officials.

Mr. Morshima of the Consulate was detailed to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference, which was to be held later in the evening. He endeavored to contact Colonel DOMIHARA and Major Hanaya; however, he was unable to locate either of them or any other officer of the Special Service Office, although he sought them at their respective hotels, offices, billets and other places which they frequented. He reported this to the Consulate and retired to his quarters.


General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff arrived in Mukden via the Antung- Mukden Railway at 1:00 p.m. on 18 September 1931. He had been sent to [49,042] Manchuria to make an inspection for the Army General Staff; and War Minister MINAMI, acting on Foreign Minister Shidehara's protest against the rumor that the Army planned an "Incident" at Mukden for the 18th, had instructed Tatekawa to stop that plot. MINAMI's denial that he gave this order to Tatekawa is disproved by the subsequent statements of MINAMI and by other statements of Tatekawa. The Kwantung Army Commander Honjo, who had just completed an inspection of his troops and installations, was delivering an address to the 2d Division at Liaoyang when he received a telegram from his Chief-of-Staff, Miyake, in Port Arthur, informing him of Tatekawa's visit and suggesting that Staff Officer ITAGAKI or Staff Officer Ishihara be detailed to meet Tatekawa and escort him on his inspection tour.

Colonel ITAGAKI was detailed and proceeded from Liaoyang to Mukden; and upon his arrival went to the Shinyokan Inn. DOHIHARA's assistant, Major Hanaya, of the Special Service Office in Mukden, met General Tatekawa and escorted him to join Colonel ITAGAKI at the Inn, where Colonel ITAGAKI and he dined that evening. According to ITAGAKI, General Tatekawa complained that he had not been able to rest on his trip and was not inclined to discuss business immediately, but did

{49,043] state that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. To this ITAGAKI replied that there was no need to worry about that, and that he would hear the General at leisure the next day. After dinner, ITAGAKI took his leave of General Tatekawa and went to the Special Service Office, arriving there about 9 p.m. General Tatekawa later told a friend that he had no desire to interfere with any proposed "Incident" and had allowed himself to be decoyed to the Inn, where he was entertained by geisha girls while he listened to the sound of firing in the distance and later retired and slept soundly until called in the morning.


At 9 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Officer Liu, at the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade, reported that a train composed of three or four coaches, but without the usual type of locomotive, had stopped on the South Manchurian Railway opposite the barracks. At 10 p.m. the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. The Japanese account is that Lieutenant Kawamoto of the Kwantung Army, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty, practising defense exercises along the track near the place where the explosion occurred, [49,044] that he heard the explosion; that his patrol turned and ran back about 200 yeard and found that a portion of one of the rails had been blown out; that while on the site of the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the tracks; that Lieutenant Kawamoto called for reinforcement; that at that moment the regular southbound train, due in Mukden at 10:30 p.m., was heard approaching; and that the train passed over the damaged rail without mishap to arrive in Mukden on time. Captain Kawashima and his company arrived at 10:59 p.m. and the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, commanding the Second Battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison, ordered two more companies to proceed to the spot. They arrived about midnight. Another company at Fushun, which was an hour and a half away, was ordered to proceed to the spot also. This was the Company of Kawakami, who had long ago announced that he and his Company would have to leave Fushun on the night of the 18th. The barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade were glittering with electric lights, but the Japanese attacked the barracks without hesitation at 11:30 p.m., employing artillery as well as rifles and machineguns. Most of the Chinese soldiers escaped from the barracks and retreated Erhtaitze, to the northeast; however, the [49,045] Japanese claim they buried 320 Chinese soldiers and captured 20 wounded. The loss to the Japanese was two privates killed and 22 wounded. Colonel Hirata, commanding the 29th Regiment, received a telephone message at 10:40 p.m. from Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto informing of the explosion on the railroad and the plan to attack the barracks. Colonel Hirata immediately decided to attack the walled city of Mukden. His attack commenced at 11:30 p.m. No resistance was offered. The only fighting that occurred was with the police, of whom approximately 75 were killed. The 2d Division and part of the 16th Regiment left Liaoyang at 3:30 a.m. of the 19th and arrived at Mukden at 5 a.m. The arsenal and aerodrome were captured at 7:30 a.m. Colonel ITAGAKI later admitted that heavy guns, which had been secretly installed in the Japanese Infantry Compound on the 10th, had proven useful in the bombardment of the airfield after the fighting got under way. After ITAGAKI took leave of General Tatekawa, he went to the Special Service Office. There, according to him, he was informed by Colonel Shimamoto of his decision to attack the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade and by Colonel Hirata of his decision to attack the walled city of Mukden. ITAGAKI says that he accepted their decisions and took steps to report [49,046] to the Commander-in-Chief at Port Arthur. We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,047]

MARSHAL, OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's Judgment.


In the meantime, at 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Mr. Morishima of the Japanese Consulate, received a telephone call from the Army Special Service Office in Mukden advising him that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that he should report to the Special Service Headquarters in Mukden. He arrived at 10:45 and found ITAGAKI and Major Hanaya and some others there. ITAGAKI stated that the Chinese had exploded the railroad, that Japan must take appropriate military action, and that orders had been issued to that effect. Mr. Morishima tried to persuade ITAGAKI that they should rely upon peaceful negotiations to adjust the matter. ITAGAKI then reprimanded him and wanted to know if the office of the Consul-General intended to interfere with the right of military command. Mr. Morishima insisted that he was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations. At that point, Major Hanaya unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if Morishima insisted, he should be prepared to suffer the consequences. Hanaya also stated that he would kill [49,048] anyone who endeavored to interfere. That broke up the conference.

The Japanese Consulate received many requests during the night from the Supreme Advisor for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang imploring the office of the Consul-General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks. All these representations were communicated to the military but to no avail and the fighting continued. The Consul- General talked over the telephone a number of times during the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th with Colonel ITAGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting, but Colonel ITAGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul- General that he should cease interference with the right of military command. Consul- General Hayashi on the morning, of 19 September 1931 cabled Foreign Minister Shidehara, "In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I phoned to Staff Officer ITAGAKI and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and that, moreover, as China had declared that she would act upon the nonresistance principle absolutely, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavor to prevent the aggravation of the 'Incident' unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic [49,049] channels, but the above mentioned Staff Officer answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army, it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly."


The evidence is abundant and convincing that the "Mukden Incident" was carefully planned beforehand by officers of the Army General Staff, officers of the Kwantung Army, members of the Cherry Society, and others. Several of the participators in the plan, including HASHIMOTO, have on various occasions admitted their part in the plot and have stated that the object of the "Incident" was to afford an excuse for the occupation of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army, and the establishment of a new State there based on the "Kingly Way" and subservient to Japan. In Japan General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff was the leader. This was the same Tatekawa whom MINAMI on Shidehara's complaint sent to Mukden to stop the plot, the same Tatekawa who had no desire to interfere with any proposed incident. In Manchuria, ITAGAKI was the principal figure. The case which has been presented to the Tribunal as a general defence of the actions of the Japanese on the night of 18th September and as a particular defence of those who, like ITAGAKI, were in action on that night is this: it is said that previous to that night [49,050] Chinese troops in Manchuria had increased so that the Japanese troops in Manchuria who numbered only some 10,000 men, then faced a hostile army which numbered some 200,000 men and was superior in equipment to the Japanese; it is said that the disposition of the Chinese troops had recently been changed so that the Japanese troops, widely dispersed in groups along the railway line, faced concentrations which threatened their annihilation; it is said that the behavior of the Chinese troops towards the Japanese troops was provocative and insulting; it is said that all indications pointed to an unprovoked attack by the Chinese troops upon the Japanese troops, in which the latter would be overwhelmed, unless decisive countermotion was promptly taken. Therefore, it is said, a plan was drawn up whereby, if the Chinese attacked, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the enemy, would settle the matter within a short period. It was a part of this plan that two heavy guns should be secretly set up in the Mukden Independent Garrison Barracks. Such is the testimony of ITAGAKI. When therefore, says ITAGAKI, he heard on the night of the 18th September of the blowing up of the railway and the fighting outside the Chinese Barracks, it was [49,051] apparent that, this was a planned challenge on the part of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese Army and he approved of the decisions to attack the Chinese Barracks and the walled city of Mukden, because it was absolutely necessary and in line with the plan of operations of the Army drawn up in case of emergency.

The picture thus painted is that of a planned attack by the Chinese Army, overwhelmingly superior in numbers, upon some 1500 Japanese troops in the vicinity of Mukden; of a surprise attack upon an unanticipated occasion and of a swift counter-attack by the Japanese troops at the nucleus of the superior forces whereby they were routed. The picture is false save in the one particular, that Mukden was captured and the Chinese troops driven away.

The Chinese troops had no plan to attack the Japanese. They were caught unprepared. In the attack on the Barracks, where there were thousands of Chinese troops, the Japanese fired from the darkness upon the brightly lit Barracks and met with trifling resistance, mainly from some Chinese troops who were cut off in their attempt to escape. In their capture of the city of Mukden, they met only negligible resistance on the part of some police.

There is no question of the Japanese being surprised by the events of that night, For some time before 8 September 1931, rumors were current in Japan that the [49,052] Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden. Lieutenant Kawakami at Fushun had revealed that an "event" might occur in Mukden on 18 September 1931. Consul- General Hayashi had telegraphed to the Foreign Minister the news that the Company Commander of a Japanese Unit at Fushun had said that within a week a big "Incident" would break out. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate at Mukden, had learned that Kwantung Army units stationed at Fushun could execute a manoeuvre which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun about 11:30 on the night of 18 September 1931. The Foreign Minister attached so much credence to the information he had that he complained to the War Minister and persuaded the latter to dispatch General Tatekawa to Manchuria to "stop the plot," a General who, having no desire to interfere with any proposed "Incident" failed to fulfill his mission, And when, as the Japanese allege, a patrol of a Lieutenant and six men was fired on in the dark of the night of 18 September 1931, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria were brought into action almost simultaneously on that night over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, a distance of approximately 400 miles. [49,052a] The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Japanese Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in these places and the units of [49,053] the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. ITAGAKI was at the Special Service Office at Mukden to approve the initial attacks by the Japanese and to resist all efforts by the Japanese Consul- General Hayashi and the Japanese Consul Morishima to persuade him to stop the fighting, notwithstanding that the Consul-General informed him that China had declared that she would act on the principle of nonresistance. Even among the Japanese there were those who believed that the "Incident" was planned by the Japanese. A year after it happened, we find the Emperor inquiring if the "Incident" was the result of a Japanese plot, as rumored. The Tribunal rejects the Japanese contention and holds that the so-called "Incident" of 18 September 1931 was planned and executed by the Japanese.

Preparation for war in China was not confined to the Kwantung Army. In Japan an unusual shift of personnel occurred on 1 August 1931 as if in anticipation of coming events. Such trusted officers as OSHIMA, KOISO, MUTO, UMEZU, HATA and ARAKI, were included in this personnel shift. OSHIMA was appointed a Chief of Section in the Army General Staff, a Member of the Military Technical Council, and Liaison Officer to the Navy General Staff; KOISO was appointed a Lt. General; MUTO was relieved as an Instructor in Strategy at the Military Staff College and made available [49,054] to the Army General Staff; UMEZU was made Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff Office; HATA was promoted to Lt. General and assigned as Inspector of Artillery and Commander of the 14th Division; and ARAKI was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Office of the Inspector- General of Military Education.


Colonel ITAGAKI, who, as senior staff officer on the spot had been in active command at Mukden during the "Incident", was relieved by General Honjo, who arrived at Mukden at noon on 19 September 1931 and rapidly expanded the "Mukden Incident" into what came to be known as the "Manchurian Incident".

Honjo had returned to Port Arthur, after delivering his address to the 2nd Division, the Division which attacked Mukden, arriving at Port Arthur about 9 p.m. on 18 September 1931. Honjo had received the first news of the fighting at Mukden at about 11 p.m. from a newspaper agency. He immediately went to Kwantung Army Headquarters in Port Arthur, where he issued orders that action should follow the operational plans already established. It is stated in evidence that a few minutes after midnight on the 18th a second telegram from the Special Service Office at Mukden was received at the Kwantung Army Headquarters [49,055] reporting that the fighting had become more widespread and that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. If a telegram to this effect was received, there was no basis in fact for the statement that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. They were in full retreat from the Japanese attack. Honjo's staff advised that he should "mobilize the whole of the Japanese military might to seal the fate of the enemy in the "shortest possible time." Honjo replied, "Yes, let it "be done." Orders were immediately issued bringing into action all Japanese forces in Manchuria; the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea was asked to send reinforcements in accordance with the pre-arranged plan; and the Second Overseas Fleet was requested to sail for Yingkow. Under these orders, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of 18 September 1931 over the whole area of the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur.

Upon arriving at Mukden, General Honjo set up a command post at the railway station and declared to the world his intention to wage a punitive war.


War Minister MIHAMI sanctioned the action of the Kwantung Army and acted as a buffer between that Army and [49,056] the Cabinet to prevent effective interference by the Government, He received information of the situation at Mukden in a telegram from the Special Service Office there at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 1931. Premier Wakatsuki first heard of the fighting when he received a telephone call from MINAMI sometime between 6 and 7 o'clock on the morning of 19 September 1931. The Premier called a meeting of the Cabinet for 10 a.m. MINAMI sent Lt. General KOISO, who was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, to act as Liaison Officer between the Army General Staff and the Cabinet. At the Cabinet meeting, MINAMI reported that the Chinese troops had fired on the Japanese troops at Mukden and that their fire had been returned, He characterized the action of the Japanese as "an act of righteous self-defense". The Cabinet expressed a desire that the affair be terminated at once. MINAMI stated that he would investigate and report to the Cabinet. The Cabinet then resolved upon a policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". The Premier called upon the Emperor a 1:30 o'clock that afternoon and informed him of the situation and the decision of the Cabinet. The Emperor agreed that the Army should not try to enlarge the situation but should stop further action as soon as it found itself in an advantageous position. MINAMI dispatched Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and two other officers of the Army General Staff to Mukden for the announced purpose or communicating to [49,057] the Kwantung Army Commander the decision of the Government to prevent the expansion of the "Incident".

The Army was not to be controlled; and the Premier cast about desperately, but without success, far assistance in enforcing this policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". In an effort to find a way to control the Army, the Premier held a meeting at 8:30 of the evening of 19 September 1931 at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household; Senior Statesman Prince Saionji's Secretary Baron Harada, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, the Grand Chamberlain, the Vice-Grand Chamberlain, and the Military Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, among others, were present. The only suggestion came from KIDO, who proposed daily meetings of the Cabinet. This suggestion proved to be of no effect, since War Minister MINAMI reported at each of these meetings that for "strategic and tactical" considerations it had been necessary for the Japanese forces to pursue the Chinese troops a certain distance further into Chinese territory, but that such action was only "protective" and would in no sense be expanded. However, at this very time, the Chinese had proposed through Minister T. V. Soong that a powerful commission be organized consisting of both Japanese and Chinese in an effort to prevent further expansion of the conflict. SHIGEMITSU, in [49,058] reporting this proposal to Foreign Minister Shidehara suggested that it be accepted, if for no other reason than to strengthen the position of the Japanese in regard to the "Incident." Although Imperial Sanction was required under existing regulations for the Korean Army to commence operations outside Korea, the 39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division consisting of 4,000 men and artillery which had concentrated at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria on 21 September 1931 and arrived at Mukden around midnight of the same day, without having received the Imperial Sanction; nevertheless, the Cabinet decided on 22
September 1931 that the expenses incurred in this move should be defrayed and later the Imperial Sanction for this move was obtained. This had not been reported to the Cabinet by MINAMI. At the Cabinet meeting of 22 September 1931, MINAMI made further excuses for allowing the Army to continue its aggression. As Premier Wakatsuki says:

"Day after day expansion continued; and I had various conferences with War Minister MINAMI. I was shown maps daily on which MINAMI would show by a line a boundary which the Army would not go beyond, and almost daily this boundary was ignored and further expansion reported, but always with assurances that this was the final move."

KIDO recorded in his diary, that during a discussion [49,059] by a group at the residence of Baron Harada it was mentioned that although the Emperor had approved the Cabinet policy of non-expansion, the Army had been indignant that the Emperor had been induced by his personal attendants to form such an opinion. It was decided by this group that the Emperor had better say no more about the Cabinet's policy; and that Elder Statesman Prince Saionji had better remain out of Tokyo to avoid intensifying the antipathy held for him by the Military Clique. In this manner, MINAMI's effective cooperation with the Army General Staff through his Liaison Officer KOISO, prevented the Government from enforcing its decision to halt further expansion of the "Mukden Incident". This is confirmed by an admission made by MINAMI after the surrender that he had been in favor of the action taken by the Kwantung Army.


Colonel DOHIHARA had completed his report to the Army General Staff, recommended the solution of all pending "Manchurian Questions" by the use of force as soon as possible, and was on his way back to his Special Service Office in Mukden to play the principal role in the organization of the new State in Manchuria based on the "Kingly way", when the "Incident" occurred there. DOHIHARA's extensive knowledge of China and its people, gained over some eighteen years spent in active partici- [49,060] pation in local politics as a Military Aide under successive Chinese military leaders, qualified him more than any other Japanese Army officer to act as over-all advisor and coordinator in the planning, execution and exploitation of the "Mukden Incident". There can be no doubt that such was the part played by DOHIHARA. His reconnaissance trip through China, with a brief pause in Mukden before reporting to the ,.Army General Staff, and his return to Mukden on the eve of the "Incident", together with his actions thereafter, leave us with no other conclusion.


The organization of a provincial government for Liaoning Province had proven to be a difficult one, because Mukden was the canter of the Province, and during the fighting, most of the influential Chinese had fled to Chinchow where they were continuing to carry on the provincial administration. Chinese General Tsang Shih-yi who was Governor of the Province and had remained in Mukden, refused to cooperate with the Japanese in the organization of a new provincial government; for this, he was immediately arrested and confined in prison. Being thus hindered by lack of cooperation from the Chinese, the Japanese Army issued a proclamation on 21 September 1931 installing Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden; he [49,061] proceeded to rule the city with the aid of a so-called "Emergency Committee" composed mostly of Japanese. By 23 September 1931 DOHIHARA had made himself complete master of the city and was found by visiting journalists in the Japanese Army Headquarters, where he was acting as political representative and spokesman for the Army. From this point on the organization of provisional governments for the three Eastern Provinces made headway. On 23 September 1931, Lt. General Hsi Hsia was invited to form a provisional government for Kirin Province, and the next day, it was announced that a provisional government had been formed for Liaoning Province with Mr. Yuen Chin-hai as Chairman of the "Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order". The Japanese Press hailed this as the first step in a separatist movement.


The Self-Government Guiding Board was organized by the Japanese Army in Mukden during the last half of September 1931. The purpose of the Board was to start an independence movement and spread it throughout Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI was in charge of the Staff Section having supervision over the Board; and Colonel DOHIHARA, as head of the Special Service Office, supplied the Board with all necessary confidential information regarding the Chinese. Although the Chairman of the [49,062] Board was Chinese, approximately 90 per cent of the personnel employed by the board were Japanese residents in Manchuria.

General Hsi Hsia accepted the Japanese invitation, called a meeting of government organization and Japanese advisors and on 30 September issued a proclamation establishing a provisional government for Kirin Province under protection of the Japanese Army.

General Chang Ching-hui, Administrator of the Special District, also called a conference in his office at Harbin on 27 September 1931 to discuss the organization of an "Emergency Committee of the Special District." [49,063] General Honjo took advantage of some minor disturbances in the town of Chientao, in Kirin Province, to announce that Japan would no longer recognize the government of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and would not cease operations until his power was completely broken.


China lodged a protest with the League of Nations against the action of Japan in Manchuria. The protest was filed on 23 September 1931. The Council of the League was assured by the Japanese Government that Japan had started withdrawing her troops to the railroad zone and would continue the withdrawal; upon this assurance, the Council adjourned to meet again on 14 October 1931.

The United States of America also protested against the fighting in Manchuria and on 24 September 1931 called the attention of both Japan and China to the provisions of the existing treaties. After a Cabinet meeting that day, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Secretary of State of the United States a Note in which it was stated among other things, "It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria."


These assurances given to the League and to the [49,064] United States indicated that the Cabinet and the Army did not agree upon a common policy in Manchuria. It was this disagreement which caused the so-called "October Incident". This was an attempt on the part of certain officers of the Army General Staff and their sympathizers to organize a coup d'etat to overthrow the Government, destroy the political party system, and establish a new Government which would support the Army's plan for the occupation and exploitation of Manchuria. The plot centered around the Cherry Society; and the plan was to "cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere" by assassinating the government leaders. HASHIMOTO was the leader of the group and gave the necessary orders for the execution of the scheme. HASHIMOTO admitted that he originated the plot in early October 1931 to bring about a Government headed by ARAKI. KIDO was well informed of the proposed rebellion and his only concern seems to have been to find a way to limit the disorders so as to prevent widespread damage and sacrifices. However, a certain Lieutenant Colonel Nemoto informed the Police of the plot and War Minister MINAMI ordered the leaders arrested, thereby breaking up the plot. SHIRATORI criticized MINAMI for opposing the coup and declared that it was necessary to take prompt action so as to create a new regime in Manchuria; [49,065] and that if MINAMI had given his tacit approval to the scheme, it would have facilitated a solution of the "Manchurian Problem".

After the failure of the "October Incident" rumors were heard to the effect that if the Central Authorities in Tokyo did not support the Kwantung Army in the execution of its plan to occupy all Manchuria and establish a puppet State there, that Army would declare itself independent of Japan and proceed with the project. This threat appears to have been effective in producing a change in the Government and its attitude.

The War Ministry began censoring the news; and army officers called upon writers and editors, who wrote or published anything unsatisfactory to the War Ministry, and advised them that such writings were displeasing to the War Ministry. Violent organizations threatened editors and writers when they expressed views contrary to that of the War Ministry.


After this change of attitude by the Japanese Government, Colonel ITAGAKI and Colonel DOHIHARA decided to return Henry Pu Yi, the deposed Emperor of China, and enthrone him as Emperor of Manchuria as an emergency measure to combat the influence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, which was growing progressively stronger with the [49,066] unity between the Young Marshal and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The new provisional government operating under the protection of the Japanese Army had succeeded in taking over all tax collection and finance institutions and had further strengthened its position by reorganization, but it was having considerable difficulty due to the Marshal's continued popularity. The Kwantung Army General Staff became fearful that the provisional government set up by them would conspire with the Marshal; therefore, it was decided by Colonels ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA to proceed at once with the organization of an independent State by uniting the Three Eastern Provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning under the nominal leadership of Henry Pu Yi, the dethroned Emperor of China.


DOHIHARA was dispatched by ITAGAKI to Tientsin to return Pu Yi to Manchuria. ITAGAKI made all necessary arrangements and gave DOHIHARA definite instructions. The plan was to pretend that Pu Yi had returned to resume his throne in answer to a popular demand of the people of Manchuria and that Japan had nothing to do with his return but would do nothing to oppose the popular demand of the people. In order to carry out this plan, it was necessary to land Pu Yi at Yingkow [49,067] before that port became frozen; therefore, it was imperative that he arrive there before 16 November 1931.

Foreign Minister Shidehara had learned of the scheme to return Pu Yi to Manchruia and had instructed his Consul-General at Tientsin to oppose the plan. On the afternoon of 1 November 1931, the Consul-General contacted DOHIHARA as instructed and tried every means at his disposal to persuade him to abandon the plan, but DOHIHARA was determined and stated that if the Emperor was willing to risk his life by returning to Manchuria, it would be easy to make the whole affair appear to be instigated by the Chinese, he further stated that he would confer with the Emperor; and if the Enperor was willing, he would go through with the scheme; but if the Emperor was not willing, then he would leave with a parting remark that there would be no such opportunity in the future for the Emperor, and dispatch a telegram to the military authorities at Mukden to the effect that he would consider an alternative as the present plan was hopeless of success. [49,068] During the evening of 2 November 1931 DOHIHARA visited Pu Yi and informed him as follows: Conditions were favorable for Pu Yi's enthronement and the opportunity should not be missed. He should make an appearance in Manchuria by all means before 16 November 1931. If he did so appear, Japan would recognize him as Emperor of an independent state and conclude a secret defensive and offensive alliance with the new state. If the Chinese Nationalist Armies should attack the new state, Japan's armies would crush them. Pu Yi appeared willing to follow DOHIHARA's advice upon being told that the Japanese Imperial Household favored his restoration to the Throne.

The Consul-General continued his efforts to dissuade DOHIHARA but without results. On one occasion DOHIHARA threatened that it would be outrageous for the government to take the attitude of preventing Pu Yi's return; and that if this should occur, the Kwantung Army might separate from the government and no one could say what action it might take.

Some difficulty was encountered by DOHIHARA in arranging the terms upon which Pu Yi was to return, and a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, under a Tientsin date line for 2 November 1931, published a complete account of the scheme and alleged that Pu Yi had refused [49,069] DOHIHARA's offer. To hasten Pu Yi's decision, DOHIHARA resorted to all kinds of schemes and intrigues. Pu Yi received a bomb concealed in a basket of fruit; he also received threatening letters from the "Headquarters of the Iron Blood Group," as well as from others. DOHIHARA finally caused a riot to occur in Tientsin on 8 November 1931 with the assistance of certain underworld characters, secret societies and rogues of the city, whom he supplied with arms furnished by ITAGAKI. The Japanese Consul-General, in a further attempt to carry out Shidehara's orders, warned the Chinese police of the impending riot; being forewarned, they were able to prevent the riot from being a complete success but it served to throw Tientsin into disorder.

This disorder continued and during the riot on the night of 10 November 1931 DOHIHARA secretly removed Pu Yi from his residence to the pier in a motor car guarded by a party equipped with machine guns, entered a small Japanese military launch with a few plainclothes men and four or five armed Japanese soldiers and headed down the river to Tang-ku. At Tang-ku, the party boarded the ship "Awaji Maru" bound for Yingkow. Pu Yi arrived at Yingkow on 13 November 1931 and on the same day was taken to Tang-kang-tzu where he was held in protactive custody in the Hotel Tai Sui Haku by the [49,070] Japanese Army. An attempt was made to cause it to appear that Pu Yi had fled for his life as a result of threats and the riots in Tientsin. No doubt, these served to hasten Pu Yi's agreement with the terms offered by DOHIHARA.


In an effort to prevent further aggravation of Japan's position in the League and keep Japan's representative in a favorable position before the Council during its deliberations, MINAMI advised the Kwantung Army to delay the enthronement of Pu Yi. On 15 November 1931 he sent a telegram to General Honjo in which he said:

"Especially, to commit such hasty actions when we have just begun to see the signs of favorable results of our efforts to improve the atmosphere of the League of Nations is by no means a wise policy. Therefore, for the time being we would like to have you lead the general public in such a way so as not have Pu Yi connected in any way, whether it be active or passive, with political problems. Naturally, in establishing a new regime, if our Empire takes the wrong attitude we must expect either an intervention by the United States based upon the Nine-Power Treaty or a council of the World Powers. Moreover, under the present conditions in Manchuria, it is an internationally recognized fact that an establishment [49,071] of the new regime would not be possible without the understanding and support of the Imperial Army. Therefore, when Pu Yi unexpectedly enters into the picture of the establishment of the new regime, and even if it is ostensibly performed according to the wishes of the people, there would be fear of arousing world suspicion. It is essential that our Empire lead world situations so that we can at least and at any time conduct a legal argument against the powers. I would like to have you keep this point in mind."

The Army moved Pu Yi on 20 November 1931 to Port Arthur and installed him in the Yamato Hotel with explanation that he was receiving too many undesirable visitors at Tang-kang-tzu. DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI arranged secretly for the Emperor's wife to join him at Port Arthur.


An expedition to the Nonni River Bridge, which succeeded in defeating General Ma Chan-shen, the Military Governor of Heilungkiang Province, and driving him toward the northeast upon Hailun during the first half of November 1931, had also resulted in the occupation of Tsitsihar and the elimination of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's authority from all of Manchuria, except for a fragment of Southeast Liaoning Province surrounding [49,072] the city of Chinchow. The occupation of Chinchow was all that remained to make the subjugation of Manchuria complete.

The Chinese Provincial Government, which had fled from Mukden, had established itself in Chinchow soon after the Mukden Incident and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had moved his headquarters from Peiping to Chinchow in the early days of October 1931, so that the city had become the center of opposition to the Japanese occupation. Japanese observation planes made frequent flights over the city and on 8 October 1931 six scouting and five bombing planes flew over the city and dropped some eighty bombs.

The disturbances and riots organized by Colonel DOHIHARA gave the staff officers of the Kwantung Army an excuse to send troops to Tientsin to reinforce the Japanese garrison and protect the Japanese concession there. The first of these riots occurred on 8 November 1931 as heretofore related, but on 26 November 1931 a new series of disorders began. Colonel DOHIHARA had employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese plain-clothes men and formed them into operating gangs within the Japanese concession in order to start trouble in the Chinese section of Tientsin. On the evening of the 26th, a terrific explosion was heard, immediately [49,073] followed by firing of cannon, machine-guns and rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese concession were put out and plain-clothes men emerged from the concession firing upon the police stations in the vicinity.

The most practical route for reinforcements to take in moving from Manchuria to Tientsin would have been by sea; but the route by land had distinct strategical advantages as it lay through the city of Chinchow; and any movement through Chinchow would afford an excuse for making an attack upon that city eliminating the concentration of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's army there.

Neutral observers had expected an advance on Chinchow, and on 23 November 1931, during a conference on the subject, Foreign Minister Shidehara assured the American Ambassador in Tokyo that he, the Premier, the Minister of War, MINAMI, and the Chief of the Army General Staff had agreed that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow. However, DOHIHARA's riot on the night of the 26th precipitated such an advance on the morning of 27 November 1931; and a troop train and several airplanes crossed the Liao River, ostensibly for the purpose of relieving the Japanese garrison which was alleged to be beleaguered at Tientsin, but actually intending to drive Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow. [49,074]

The Japanese met little or no resistance as Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had already begun withdrawal of his troops south of the Great Wall in order to remove all excuse for further advances by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the advance proceeded and Japanese planes repeatedly bombed Chinchow. The American Secretary of State protested the violation of the assurance so recently given the American Ambassador that no hostile action would be taken toward Chinchow; and on 29 November 1931 this assurance was reluctantly and belatedly honored by the Chief of the Army General Staff ordering Honjo to recall his troops to a position in the vicinity of Hsinmin.


The Council of the League of Nations had been in session for approximately four weeks considering the dispute between Japan and China, when it resolved on 10 December 1931 to accept the suggestion of the Japanese representative and send a Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria to make a study of the situation "on the spot." The Council's resolution provided that the Commission should consist of five members from neutral countries with the right of China and Japan to appoint one "Assessor" each to assist the Commission.

Paragraph 2 of the Resolution was in these terms:

"(2) Considering that events have assumed an [49,075] even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

Japan in accepting the Resolution made a reservation concerning paragraph (2) stating that she accepted it

"On the understanding that this paragraph was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria."

China accepted the resolution with the reservation that China's rights of sovereignty in Manchuria would not be impaired.

With regard to the undertaking and injunction contained in paragraph (2), quoted above, China stated:

"It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now preva- [49,076] lent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities."

Despite this counter-reservation of China, the Japanese maintained that their reservation gave Japan the right to maintain her troops in Manchuria and made her responsible for the suppression of banditry. Under the pretext of suppressing banditry Japan proceeded to complete the conquest of Manchuria. In the words of the Lytton Commission,

"The fact remains that, having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans."

The membership of the Commission was not completely made up until 14 January 1932. The Rt. Honorable, the Earl of Lytton (British) was elected Chairman of the Commission, and the Commission has come to be known as the Lytton Commission. [49,077]


The continued efforts of Premier Wakatsuki and his Foreign Minister Shidehara to enforce the "Friendship Policy" and the "Policy for Non-Expansion" generated so much opposition from the military and their sympathizers that the Cabinet was forced to resign on 12 December 1931. Premier Wakatsuki testified as follows:

"It is true that in spite of the fact that the Cabinet had decided on the policy of stopping the 'Manchurian Incident,' it continued to spread and expand. Various methods were tried, and one of these was a coalition cabinet, which I hoped might be able to stop the action of the Kwantung Army. However, because of certain difficulties, this did not materialize, and that is why my Cabinet resigned."


The Inukai Cabinet was formed on 13 December 1931 with ARAKI as Minister of War. The three Army Chiefs, that is: the outgoing War Minister, MINAMI, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Education, whose duty it was under the Japanese Constitution to select the succeeding War Minister, had selected General Abe to be War Minister; but ARAKI was popular with the radical elements in the [49,078] Army, and they approached Inukai and demanded his appointment. General ARAKI received the appointment. Although Premier Inukai announced to Elder Statesman Prince Saionji that he intended to carry out the Emperor's wish that Japanese politics should not be controlled solely by the Army and although he adopted a policy to terminate the aggression of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, War Minister ARAKI was not in accord with this policy. ARAKI favored Commander Honjo's plan that the four provinces formerly under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be occupied and pacified. He admitted that this was so during an interrogation at Sugamo Prison after the surrender. His first act was to secure approval in the Cabinet and the Privy Council of an appropriation to carry out this scheme.


The formation of the Inukai Cabinet, with ARAKI as War Minister and favorable to the Honjo plan to occupy and pacify the four provinces, was the signal to the Kwantung Army to execute the plan. ITAGAKI moved quickly to strengthen the provisional government of Liaoning Province; a concentration of troops west of Mukden, poised for a drive on Chinchow and Tientsin, was begun; and ITAGAKI prepared to visit Tokyo to assist ARAKI in making detailed arrangements for carrying out [49,079] the plan.

General Tsang Shih-yi, who had been incarcerated in prison on 21 September 1931 because of his refusal to cooperate with the invading Japanese Army, was starved into submission and forced to agree to accept the appointment as Governor of the Provincial Government, ad interim, of Liaoning Province. He was released from prison on the night of 13 December 1931; and after an interview with ITAGAKI, he was duly inaugurated as Governor on 15 December 1931. He was in such a nervous, weakened condition as a result of having been starved in prison that he fainted during his inauguration when a photographer exploded a flash bulb in making his picture. The inauguration of General Tsang Shih-yi was in preparation for a conference of all the Manchurian Provincial Governors, and the Kwantung Army was hastening preparations for the meeting.

The concentration of troops for the advance on Chinchow had begun on the 10th; and by 15 December 1931 it was complete. However, the advance could not begin until approval of War Minister ARAKI had been obtained and funds provided.

All preparations being complete, Commander Honjo dispatched ITAGAKI to Tokyo to convey to the government his opinion that Manchuria should be made [49,080] independent of China. War Minister ARAKI immediately supported Honjo's plan and said that complete independence was the only way in which the "Manchurian Incident" could be solved, but considerable opposition to the plan was found to exist and he was not able to obtain approval of the plan without difficulty. The question was finally presented to the Throne at an Imperial Conference on 27 December 1931 and ARAKI states:

"We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending troops for the operation."

At least a part of ITAGAKI's mission had been accomplished.

On the very day that this decision to advance against Chinchow was made, the Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs handed the American Ambassador in Tokyo a memorandum in which it was stated that Japan was determined to remain loyal to the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties, and would abide by the two resolutions adopted by the Council of the League regarding the Manchurian situation.


The Kwantung Army pointed to the reservation made at Geneva, as already referred to, and continued [49,081] to deal with Manchuria according to plan. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, knowing that the attack on Chinchow was imminent, had made a last minute appeal to prevent further fighting by offering to remove all remaining Chinese troops south of the Great Wall, but nothing came of this appeal, and the Kwantung Army actually began its movement on 23 December 1931. The Chinese Army was forced to give up its position. From that day the advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met any resistance at all as the Chinese General had ordered a retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the morning of 3 January 1932, and the Kwantung Army continued its advance right up to the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan.


KIDO records in his diary for 11 January 1932 that ITAGAKI had obtained approval of the plan to set up a puppet state in Manchuria; the entry is in part as follows:

"At 10:30 o'clock this morning in the antechamber connected with the lecture hall of the Imperial Palace, I, together with persons close to the Emperor, heard from Colonel ITAGAKI the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia. Colonel ITAGAKI first explained the situation concerning the progress of the campaign against soldier bandits in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the [49,082] progress in establishing a new state In Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI gave hint that Manchuria would be placed under a new ruler, and the Japanese Army would take charge of the national defense of the new Manchurian state. He further explained that Japanese people would participate in the management of the new state as high government officials."

It will be noted that ITAGAKI followed the usual practice of referring to all Chinese soldiers as "bandits." The pretense of invoking the reservation made at Geneva was again employed.

On his way back to Mukden, Colonel ITAGAKI called upon the new ruler mentioned in his conversation with KIDO. During his visit with Pu Yi at Port Arthur, ITAGAKI stated to Pu Yi,

"In order to get rid of Chinese militarists and secure social welfare for the people of the Northeastern Provinces, we are willingly prepared to put up a new political regime in Manchuria."

ITAGAKI proposed that Pu Yi should become the head of the new regime but demanded that as soon as the Manchurian regime was set up Japanese should be employed as advisers and officials.


After the fall of Chinchow, the independence movement made progress, especially in North Manchuria where DOHIHARA was on duty as Chief of the Special [49,083] Services in Harbin. After the Japanese occupied Tsitsihar on 19 November 1931 and drove the forces of General Ma toward Hailun, a Self-Government Association of the usual type was established in Heilungkiang Province; and General Chang Ching-hui was inaugurated as Governor of the province on 1 January 1932. General Chang Ching-hui, upon learning of the complete defeat and expulsion of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow, acceded to the requests of the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden and declared the independence of Heilungkiang Province. The declaration was issued on 7 January 1932. On the same day the Self- Government Guiding Board issued a Proclamation which it had prepared on 1 January but had been holding until an opportune time for publication. The Proclamation appealed to the people to overthrow Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and join the Self-Government Association. The Proclamation ended with these words:

"Organizations of the Northeast, Unite!"

Fifty thousand copies were distributed. Mr. Yu Chung-han, the Chief of the Board, and Governor Tsang Shih-yi of Liaoning Province were making plans for a new state to be established in February. This idea of Independence from China had received no popular support in Manchuria before the "Mukden Incident" of 18 September 1931. It is apparent that it was conceived, organized and carried through [49,084] by a group of Japanese civil and military officials, of whom Colonels ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA were leaders. The presence of Japanese troops to enforce their authority, the control of the railways by the South Manchurian Railway, the presence of Japanese Consuls in all of the important urban centers, and the coordinating effect of the Japanese controlled Self-Government Guiding Board, afforded the group a means of exercising an irresistible pressure to bring about this so-called independence and later to control the new puppet state. The independence movement and the Chinese collaborators were sustained by Japanese military might alone.


On 7 January 1932, the day that General Chang Ching-hui proclaimed the independence of Heilungkiang Province, the American Secretary of State instructed the American Ambassador in Tokyo to deliver a note to the Japanese Government. The Secretary of State stated in that note that the Government of the United States deemed it a duty to notify both Japan and China that it would not admit the legality of any de facto situation nor recognize any treaty or agreement entered into so as to impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China or violate the conventional policy of the "Open Door" in China or impair the obligations of [49,085] the Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15).

This note was not answered until 16 January 1932. The Japanese note stated that Japan was aware that the United States could be relied upon to do everything to support Japan's efforts to secure full and complete fulfilment of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15). This Japanese note went on to say that in so far as Japan could secure it the policy of the "Open Door" in China would always be maintained. Having regard to the Japanese military action in Manchuria which we have just described, this Japanese note is a masterpiece of hypocrisy.


The next day HASHIMOTO published an article in the Taiyo Dai Nippon, apparently in protest against this policy of observing treaties and maintaining the "Open Door" in China. The title of the article was, "The Reform of Parliamentary Systems." In the article HASHIMOTO said:

"Responsible government -- Party Cabinet System -- runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is the democratic government which ignores the 'Tenno' government, . . . which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the Constitution granted by the Emperor. When we consider their dangerous anti- national [49,086] structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan."


After General Ma had been driven from Tsitsihar by the Japanese and had set up his capital at Hailun, from which he was attempting to govern Heilungkiang, Colonel DOHIHARA began carrying on negotiations with the General from his Special Service Office at Harbin. The General's position was somewhat ambiguous; although he continued negotiating with DOHIHARA, he continued to support General Ting Chao. General Ting Chao had never approved of the puppet government set up in Kirin Province by the Kwantung Army under the nominal leadership of General Hsi Hsia and had organized an army to oppose General Hsi Hsia. Not only did General Ma continue to support General Ting Chao, but these two Generals maintained some contact with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who gave them assistance.

In an effort to force General Ma to terms, Colonel DOHIHARA requested General His Hsia to advance on Harbin and drive in the direction of Hailun. General [49,087] Hsi Hsia at the beginning of January 1932 prepared an expedition to the North with a view to occupying Harbin. General Ting Chao was between him and Harbin. General Hsi Hsia advanced to Shuangchong on 25 January; but Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang instructed Generals Ma and Ting Chao not to negotiate further; and fighting began on the morning of the 26th. DOHIHARA had failed in his attempt to intimidate Generals Ma and Ting Chao; and what was still worse, his ally, General Hsi Hsia, was meeting serious reverses at the hand of General Ting Chao. Thereupon, DOHIHARA was forced to call upon the Kwantung Army to assist General Hsi Hsia. To justify this, Colonel DOHIHARA created another of his "Incidents" in Harbin -- an engineered riot -- during which it is said that one Japanese and three Korean subjects of Japan were killed. Most of the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Northern Manchuria in order to use them in the Chinchow drive, but the 2d Division had returned to Mukden for a rest. Although the 2d Division was ordered to go to the rescue of General Hsi Hsia and entrained on 28 January, some delay was experienced because of transportation difficulties. This gave General Ting Chao time to seize the municipal Administration in Harbin and arrest General Chang Ching-hui, who had been acting as puppet Governor of Heilungkiang Province. [49,088] While the reinforcements were entraining to go to the aid of General Hsi Hsia, War Councillor MINAMI was delivering a lecture before the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo. His subject was, "The latest Situation in Manchuria". KIDO was present and recorded the lecture. MINAMI's conclusions as expressed to the Emperor were:

(1) Japan would take over the national defense of the new state to be created in Manchuria, complete the Kirin-Kwainei Railway, and make the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into North Manchuria, thereby revolutionizing Japan's defense plans.
(2) The joint management by Japan and the new State of economy of the area would make Japan self-sufficient in the World forever.
(3) This arrangement would solve Japan's population problem, provided she established a colonial trooping system to the new State.

KIDO further recorded that he thought the three or four Japanese organs in Manchuria should be united under one head when the new State was formed. This idea was to be carried out later.


After MINAMI had finished his lecture on the afternoon of 28 January 1932, fighting broke out in [49,089] a new place in China. At 11:00 p.m. fighting commenced in the first invasion of Shanghai. The commencement of the "Incident" is typical. The anti-Chinese riots in Korea following the "Wanpaoshan Incicent" led to a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in Shanghai, which had been intensified after the "Mukden Incident" and increased in intensity as that "Incident" grew into the "Manchurian Incident". Tension increased so that serious clashes occurred between Chinese and Japanese. The Japanese residents of Shanghai requested the dispatch of Japanese troops for their protection. The Japanese Consul-General presented five demands to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai; and the Admiral in command of Japanese naval forces at Shanghai announced that unless the Mayor's reply was satisfactory he would take action. On 24 January 1932 Japanese naval reinforcements arrived. The Chinese reinforced their garrison in Chapei, which is the native section of Shanghai. On 28 January the Municipal Council of the International Settlement met and declared a state of emergency as of 4:00 p.m.; at that hour the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular Body that a satisfactory reply had been received from the Chinese Mayor; and that no action would be taken. At 11:00 p.m. [49,090] on the same day, the Japanese Admiral announced that the Japanese Navy was anxious as to the situation in Chapei where numerous Japanese nationals resided and had decided to send troops to that sector and occupy the Shanghai-Woosung Railway Station and that he hoped the Chinese would speedily withdraw to the west of the railway. These Japanese troops sent to the Chapei section came into contact with Chinese troops which would not have had time to withdraw even had they wished to do so. This was the beginning of the battle of Shanghai.


The next morning, 29 January 1932, the alarming situation caused China to submit a further appeal to the League of Nations under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. The Council of the League was in session when the fighting started at Shanghai and it received the new Appeal from China the next day.


In Mancuria, Colonel DOHIHARA was continuing his negotiations in an effort to obtain the support of General Ma in the formation of a new State in Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI had recognized General Ma as "a man of real worth possessing his own troops", and had attempted to arrange a truce with him after [49,091] the battle of Tsitsihar. General Ma continued to co-operate with General Ting Chao until the latter's defeat by the combined forces of General Hsi Hsia and the Japanese on 5 February 1932. After General Ting Chao's defeat General Ma resumed negotiations with Colonel DOHIHARA while his army escaped through Russian territory into China. With his army safe in China proper General Ma, it is said, accepted the one million dollars in gold offered by DOHIHARA. In any event, he now agreed on 14 February 1932 to become Governor of Heilungkiang Province and cooperate with the Japanese.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Tuesday, 9 October 1948, at 0930.) [49,092]

Tuesday, 9 November 1948


FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all members sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the
Language Section, IHTFE.) [49,093]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by counsel. The Sugamo Prison Surgeon certifies they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.

I continue the reading of the Judgment:


According, to ARAKI, General Honjo conceived the idea of having the Governors of the Provinces organize a "Supreme Administrative Council" to make recommendations for the organization of the new State in Manchuria. He forwarded his plan to ARAKI and requested permission to set up a new State for the government of Manchuria with Henry Pu Yi as its head. During his interrogation at Sugamo Prison, ARAKI admitted that, since he had no better suggestion, and thought the General's plan would solve the "Manchurian Problem", he had approved the plan. ARAKI then sent additional experts into Manchuria to assist the Self- Government Guiding Board in carrying out General Honjo'a plan.

General Ma having reached an agreement with DOHIHARA, the Self-Government Guiding Board called a [49,094] meeting of the Governors of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Special District to meet at Mukden on 16 February 1932 for the announced purpose of "laying the foundation" for the new State. The meeting was attended in person by General Ma, as Governor of Heilungkiang; General Chang Ching-hui as Governor of the Special District; General Hsi Hsia, as Governor of Kirin; and General Tsang Shih-yi, as Governor of Liaoning; but General Tang Ju-lin, the Governor of Jehol, was not present. The legal advisor for the meeting was Dr. Chao Hsin-po, the Tokyo University trained Doctor of Laws, who had relieved Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden.

These five men decided that a new State should be established, that a North-Eastern Supreme Administrative Council should be organized which would exercise temporarily the supreme authority over the Provinces and the Special District, and that this Supreme Council should without delay make all necessary preparations for the founding of the new State.

On the second day of the Conference, the Supreme Administrative Council was duly organized, to consist of seven members, namely: the Governors of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning, Jehol and the Special District, and the two Mongol Chiefs who had joined the Conference on the morning of the second day. The new [49,095] Supreme Council immediately proceeded to business and decided:

(1) to adopt the Republican system for the new state;
(2) to respect the autonomy of the constituting provinces; (3) to give the title of "Regent" to the Chief Executive; and (4) to issue a Declaration of Independence.

That night, General Honjo gave an official dinner in honor of the "Heads of the New State". He congratulated them on their success and assured them of his assistance in case of need.


The next morning after General Honjo's dinner party, that is to say, on 18 February 1932, the Declaration of Independence of Manchuria was published by the Supreme Administrative Council. Dr. Okawa in his book, "2600 Years of Japanese History", published in 1939, in commenting on this declaration, has this to say:

"The Chang Hsueh-liang Regime was swept completely away from Manchuria in one swoop through the quick and daring action of the Japanese troops."

The Tribunal finds upon the evidence that there was no popular movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and its creature, the Self- Government Guiding Board, with its Japanese Advisors. [49,096]


The Declaration of Independence having been issued, Governors Ma and Hsi Hsia returned to their Provincial Capitals, but they designated representatives to meet with Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor Chang Ching-hui and Mayor Chao Hsin-Po for the purpose of working out the details of the plan for the new State. On 19 February 1932, this group decided that the form of the new government should be that of a Republic with a constitution drawn on the principle of the separation of powers. The group then agreed upon Changchun as the Capital of the new State, fixed the design of the new national flag, and agreed that Pu Yi should be asked to act as "Regent" of the new State.

The Self-Government Guiding Board immediately began holding mass-meetings and demonstrations in the Provinces at which the Kwantung Army paraded its might and fired artillery salutes to impress the Manchurians with the power of Japan. After the proper foundation had been laid by these demonstrations, the Board took the lead in convening an All-Manchurian Convention, which was held in Mukden on 29 February 1932. At this Convention, speeches were delivered; a declaration denouncing the previous regime of General Chang Hsueh-liang was unanimously adopted; and resolutions welcoming [49,097] the new State with Pu Yi as its Chief Executive were approved.

The Supreme Administrative Council met immediately in urgent session and elected six delegates to proceed to Port Arthur to convey their invitation to Pu Yi to head the new government. Pu Yi did not respond to the first invitation from the Supreme Administrative Council, so a second delegation was appointed on 4 March 1932 to induce Pu Yi to accept. Upon the advice or Colonel ITAGAKI, Pu Yi accepted the second invitation. After an audience with the Delegates on 5 March, Pu Yi left Port Arthur on the 6th for Tangkang-tze, and after two days, began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the "Regent of Manchukuo". Inauguration ceremonies were held at the new capital, Changchun, on 9 March 1932. Pu Yi declared the policy of the new State to be founded upon morality, benevolence and love. The next day he appointed the list of principle officials suggested by the Japanese.

Prior to the arrival of Pu Yi, a number of laws and regulations, on which Dr. Chao Hsin-Po had been working for some time, had been made ready for adoption and promulgation. They came into effect on 9 March 1932 simultaneously with the law regulating the organization of the Government of Manchukuo. [49,098]

Public announcement of the new State of Manchukuo was made on 12 March 1932 in a telegram to the foreign Powers, requesting that they recognize the new State. Dr. Okawa stated that Manchukuo was a result of the plan of the Kwantung Army approved by the Japanese Government, and the establishment of the State progressed smoothly, because it had been well planned and prepared beforehand. Pu Yi says that Manchukuo was under the complete domination of Japan from the beginning.


ARAKI was right when he said that the Honjo plan was approved by the Cabinet; but it was not so approved until 12 March 1932, after the plan had been executed and after the new State of Manchukuo had come into existence. It was on 12 March 1932, the day that the telegram announcing the formation of Manchukuo to the foreign Powers was sent out, that the Cabinet met and decided upon an "Outline for the Disposition of Foreign Relations Accompanying the Establishment of the New State of Manchukuo". It was decided to render "all sorts of aid" to the new State short of recognition under international law, and "lead her to fulfill the substantial conditions for an independent State step by step" in the hope that the Powers would ultimately [49,099] recognize her independence. To avoid intervention of the Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact (Annex No. B-10) it was thought best to have Manchukuo declare a policy consistent with the policy of the "Open Door" and in harmony with the principle of equal opportunity guaranteed by the Treaty. The Cabinet also decided that Manchukuo should seize the custom houses and salt-tax collecting organs; but that this should be done in such a way as not to "bring about trouble in foreign relations". One method agreed upon for doing this was to bribe the customs officials and replace them with Japanese. It was planned to seize military power in Manchukuo under the guise of subjugating banditry in line with the reservation made at Geneva. In short, the Cabinet fully realized that the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of an independent State there by Japan was a direct violation of existing treaty obligations; and it was trying to evolve a plan whereby the reality of the breach could be concealed by an appearance of compliance with the obligations.


On the day that the All-Manchurian Convention was being held in Mukden, that is to say, on 29 February 1932, the Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo, where they [49,100] were received by the Emperor and commenced a series of daily conferences with the Government, including Premier Inukai, War Minister ARAKI, and others. Although these daily conferences continued for eight days, none of these government officials informed the Commission that Japan was forming a new State in Manchuria; and the Commission first learned of this after it had left Tokyo and arrived at Kyoto on its way to China.

On the day that the Commission arrived in Tokyo KOISO was elevated by ARAKI from Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to the high position or Vice-Minister of War.


The battle which had started at Shanghai on 28 January 1932 had developed to such an extent that the Navy Minister was forced to call upon War Minister ARAKI for reinforcements. The Chinese 19th Route Army was giving a Rood account of its fighting ability. Large numbers of Japanese destroyers were anchored in the Hwangpu and Japanese airplanes were bombing Chapei. The Japanese Marines were using their permanent garrison in Hungkow as a base of operations; and barricades erected between this garrison and Chapei served as the front line between the ground forces. The Japanese destroyers, firing point blank, bombarded the forts at [49,101] Wu-sung; this fire was not returned by the forts, for they had no guns capable of answering. The Japanese Marines had invaded areas adjacent to the International Settlement, disarmed the police and paralysed all city functions; a veritable reign of terror was in full swing when the Navy Minister requested these reinforcements. ARAKI states that he conferred with the Cabinet and it was decided to send

supporting forces quickly; 10,000 men were dispatched the following day aboard fast destroyers. These reinforcements landed in the International Settlement fully equipped with tanks and artillery. The Navy drew up heavy ships and began shelling the city. However, this attack, which began on 20 February 1932, brought no marked success despite the fact that it continued for several days. Following this attack, ARAKI, claiming that General Ueda had suffered such great losses that it was necessary to send further reinforcements, sent the 11th and 14th Divisions to oppose the Chinese Army which had been defending the city.


The League of Nations was aroused to action. The members of the Council, other than China and Japan, addressed an urgent appeal to the Japanese Government on 19 February 1932 calling attention to Article 10 of [49,102] the Covenant (Annex No. B-6); and the Assembly was convened to meet on 3 March 1932.

The American Secretary of State advised the American Consul-General at Shanghai that the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah on the China situation was being released to the Press. In this letter the Secretary stated that the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex Ho. B-10) formed the legal basis upon which the "Open Door Policy" rested. He set forth a long history of the Treaty. He commented that the Treaty represented a carefully matured International policy designed to assure to all parties their nights in China and to assure the Chinese the fullest opportunity to develop their independence and sovereignty. He recalled that Lord Balfour, Chairman of the British Delegation, had stated that he understood that there was no representative present at the signing of the Treaty who thought that spheres of interest were advocated or would be tolerated. The Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15) was intended to reinforce the Nine- Power Treaty. The two Treaties were interdependent, he said, and were intended to align world conscience and public opinion in favor of a system of orderly development through international law, including the settlement of all controversies by peaceful means instead of arbitrary force. He said that in the past the [49,103] United States had rested its policy upon the abiding faith in the future of China and upon ultimate success in dealing with China upon principles of fair play, patience and mutual good will.

The British Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, as one of the many attempts to secure a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai through the good offices of friendly Powers, held a conference on board his flagship on 28 February 1932. An agreement on the basis of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal was proposed; but the conference was unsuccessful, owing to the differing opinions of the parties. As though in resentment of this interference, the Japanese troops occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by the Chinese, and the Wu-sung forts and fortifications along the Yangtze were again bombed from the air and shelled from the sea, as bombing-planes operated over the whole front including the Nanking Railway and the airfield at Hungjao.

Before the Assembly of the League could meet, the Council proposed a roundtable conference on 29 February to make local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai; both parties agreed to this conference, but it was not successful because of the conditions imposed by the Japanese. [49,104] General Shirakawa, who had been appointed to the Japanese supreme command arrived with reinforcements on 29 February. His first order directed the bombing of the airfield at Hangchow, which was approximately 100 miles away. General Shirakawa gained ground slowly as a result of heavy naval bombardment; and after a flank attack on 1 March, he was able to drive the Chinese beyond the 20 kilometer limit originally demanded by the Japanese as terms for cessation of the hostilities.

This "face-saving" success permitted the Japanese to accept the request of the Assembly of the League of 4 March 1932 calling upon both Governments to make a cessation of hostilities and recommending negotiations for conclusion of the hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The opposing commanders issued appropriate orders and the fighting ceased; negotiations began on 10 March 1932.

The Assembly continued its investigation of the dispute; and on 11 March 1932, it adopted a resolution to the effect that the provisions of the Covenant (Annex B-6) were applicable to the dispute, especially the provisions that treaties should be scrupulously respected, that members should respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence [49,105] of all the members of the League against external aggression, and that the members were obligated to submit all disputes between them to procedures for peaceful settlement. The Assembly affirmed that it was contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the dispute should be settled under stress of military pressure, affirmed the resolutions of the Council of 30 September and 10 December 1931, as well as its own resolution of 4 March 1932, and proceeded to set up a "Committee of Nineteen" to settle the dispute at Shanghai.

Contrary to their obligation, the Japanese took advantage of the truce to bring up reinforcements, which were landed at Shanghai on 7 and 17 March 1932. It was not until 5 May 1932 that a complete agreement was ready for signature. SHIGEMITSU signed for the Japanese. The fighting at Shanghai had been characterized by extreme cruelty on the part of the Japanese. The needless bombing of Chapei, the ruthless bombardment by naval vessels, and the massacre of the helpless Chinese farmers whose bodies were later found with their hands tied behind their backs, are examples of the method of warfare waged at Shanghai. [49,106] This Incident furnishes another example of the Japanese determination to use military force against the Chinese and to impress the Chinese with the might of Japan, using any pretext for the purpose. The ostensible reason for the use of force in this case was the request from some Japanese residents of Shanghai for protection. The Tribunal has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the force used was out of all proportion to the existing danger to Japanese Nationals and property.

There is no doubt that at the time feeling was running high and the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods induced at least in part by Japanese action in Manchuria, was being felt. In the light of all the facts the Tribunal is of the opinion that the real purpose of the Japanese attack was to alarm the Chinese by indication of what would follow if their attitude toward Japan continued, and thus break down resistance to future operations. The Incident was a part of the general plan.


Manchukuo was definitely a totalitarian State, because of the power vested in the Regent; and those who controlled the Regent controlled the State. Ordinance No. 1, which was promulgated on 9 March 1932, [49,107] prescribed the organic law for Manchukuo. In formal expression, the position was as follows: the governmental power was divided into four divisions: the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial and the Supervisory: the Regent as the Chief Executive was the head of the State; all executive power as well as the power to override the Legislative Council was vested in him: the functions of the Executive Department were performed, under the direction of the Regent, by the Premier and the Minister of State, who formed a State Council or Cabinet: the Premier supervised the work of the Ministries through the powerful General Affairs Board, which had direct charge of their confidential matters, personnel, accounting and supplies; subordinate to the State Council were various bureaux, such as the Legislative Bureau; but, following the Japanese Constitution, the Regent had authority, when the Legislative Bureau was not in session to promulgate ordinances upon advice of his Privy Council; and the Supervisory Bureau supervised the conduct of officials and audited their accounts.

The Legislative Council was never organized and legislation was therefore enacted by ordinance of the Regent.

The General Affairs Board, the Legislative Bureau and the Advisory Bureau in practice by way of [49,108] contrast to form, constituted a Premier's Office. Upon establishment of the State, the Self-Government Guiding Board was abolished and its personnel were transferred to the Advisory Bureau, which continued the work of the Board through the Self- Government Committees previously established in the Provinces and Districts. The General Affairs Board, more than any other, was the agency of the Japanese for effective practical control and domination of every phase of the government and economy of Manchukuo.

The Ministers of State were generally Chinese, but each Minister had a Vice-Minister, who was Japanese. There existed a committee in the Government of Manchukuo not provided for in the Constitution which was known as the "Tuesday Meeting." Each Tuesday there was a meeting of the various Japanese Vice-Ministers, presided over by the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board, and attended by the Chief of a Section of the Kwantung Army General Staff. At these meetings all policies were adopted, all rescripts, ordinances and other enactments approved; the decisions of the "Tuesday Meeting" were then passed on to the General Affairs Board to be officially adopted and promulgated as an act of the Government of Manchukuo. It was in this manner that Manchukuo was completely dominated [49,109] by the Kwantung Army. In a telegram sent by General Honjo to War Minister ARAKI on 3 April 1932, Honjo said:

"I believe you have no objections that the execution of our policies regarding the whole of Manchukuo should, in so far as it involves negotiations with Manchukuo, be left chiefly to the Kwantung Army. In view of the recent conduct of the Japanese Government Offices and various other representing organs in Manchukuo, however, I fear that unless we make it thoroughgoing, confusion might arise."

To this ARAKI replied:

"I agree in principle to your opinion regarding unification in the execution of our Manchurian policies."

At first Japanese "Advisors" were appointed to advise all the important government officials of Manchukuo; but shortly after the formation of the State, these "Advisors" became full government officials on the same basis as the Chinese. Over 200 Japanese were holding office in the Central Government alone, not including those in the War Ministry and Military Forces, during the month of April 1932 -- one month after the formation of the State. In most bureaux there were Japanese advisors, councillors, and secretaries. All important posts in the Supervisory Bureau were held by Japanese. Finally, most of the important [49,110] officials of the Regency, including the Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the Regent's Bodyguard, were Japanese. Even the Regent was "supervised" by General Yoshioka, who was appointed by the Kwantung Army for that purpose. In short, as for the Government and public services, although the titular heads were usually Chinese, the main political and administrative power was held by Japanese officials as advisors, councillors, supervisors, secretaries and vice-officials.

The Japanese Cabinet at a meeting on 11 April 1932 considered methods for "guiding" Manchukuo and approved the method outlined above. ARAKI was a member of the Cabinet as War Minister at that time. The decision was:

"The new State shall employ authoritative advisors from our country and make them the highest advisors in connection with financial, economic and general political problems. The new State shall appoint Japanese nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new State."

The Cabinet then listed the offices of the government of Manchukuo which should be filled by Japanese. These included the Chief of the General Affairs Board and the Chief of each of that Board's sections, councillors and Chief Secretary of the Privy [49,111] Council, and offices in the Revenue, Police, Banking, Transportation, Justice, Customs, and other Departments. This measure was found to be necessary so that the new State would manifest the "very characteristics that are important factors for the existence of the Empire in relation to politics, economy, national defense, transportation, communication and many other fields," and so that "a single self- sufficient economic unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo will be realized."


The Concordia Society (Kyo-Wa-Kai) was organized by a committee composed of ITAGAKI and others in Mukden during April 1932. The Kwantung Army Commander was made ex-officio Supreme Advisor of the Society. The special mission of the Concordia Society was to spread the spirit and ideology of the State, the "Kingly Way", and to strengthen Manchukuo so that she could subserve Japan in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon World and the Comintern. The policy of the Government of Manchukuo was expressed in proclamations issued on 18 February 1932 and 1 March 1932; it was to rule in accordance with the fundamental principle of the "Kingly Way". In this manner, the consolidation of Japan's conquest of Manchuria was accomplished in the sphere of ideological propaganda. [49,112] No political party other than the Society was allowed in Manchuria. The titular head of the Society was the Prime Minister of Manchukuo; but actually, the leader was a member of the Kwantung Army General Staff.


The Lytton Commission arrived in Manchuria in April 1932 and began its work of penetrating the veil of secrecy thrown over the situation by the intimidation of the inhabitants and obstruction of the Committee's efforts by the Kwantung Army and Japanese officials of Manchukuo. Under the excuse of offering "protection" to members of the Commission and prospective witnesses, the Army and the Gendarmes "supervised" their activities and movements. Pu Yi testified that,

"We were all under the supervision of the Japanese Military Officers; and wherever Lord Lytton went, he was under the supervision of Japanese Gendarmes. When I interviewed Lord Lytton, many of the Kwantung military officers were beside me supervising, if I had told him the truth, I would have been murdered right after the mission left Manchuria."

Pu Yi delivered to Lord Lytton a statement prepared by Colonel ITAGAKI, which Pu Yi now declares did not reflect the true facts. People who spoke Russian or English were carefully supervised during the Commission's stay in [49,113] Manchuria; some were arrested.

The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army suggested, in a telegram sent to the War Ministry on 4 June 1932, that Japan show her contempt of the Lytton Commission by taking over the customs during the visit of the Commission. He said:

"It is rather advantageous to take this action during the stay of the League's Inquiry Commission in order to display the independence of Manchukuo, and to indicate the firm resolution of Japan and Manchukuo in respect to the ‘Manchurian Incident.’”


The opposition of Premier Inukai to the establishment of Manchukuo as an independent State cost him his life. The Premier had consistently opposed the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan, maintaining that such recognition would be a violation of the sovereign rights of China.

Within a few days after assuming office as Premier, Inukai sent a secret emissary by the name of Kayano to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to arrange terms of peace. Generalissimo Chiang was highly satisfied with Kayano's proposals and negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily when one of Kayano's telegrams to premier Inukai was intercepted by the War Ministry. [49,114] The Secretary of the Cabinet informed Inukai's son that, "Your father is carrying on negotiations with Generalissimo Chiang. Concerning this, the War Ministry is highly indignant."

Although the negotiations were abandoned, the friction continued between the Premier and War Minister ARAKI.

The conflict between Premier Inukai and the "Kodo" or "Imperial Way" faction, of which ARAKI was leader at that time, reached the explosion point on 8 May 1932, when Inukai delivered an anti-militaristic and pro-democratic speech at Yokohama. On 15 May 1932, the Premier was ill and temporarily alone in his Official Residence, when serveral naval officers forced their way into his home and assassinated him. Dr. Okawa furnished the pistols for the killing; and HASHIMOTO admitted in his book, "The Road to the Reconstruction of the world," that he was implicated in the murder.

Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI, who was an official in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry at that time, warned that if a new Cabinet should be organized under the leadership of political parties, a second or third assassination would occur. He made this warning at a dinner attended by KIDO, KOISO and SUZUKI at Baron Harada's house two days after the [49,115] murder. The opposition to the expansionist policy had come largely from representatives of the political parties in Japan.


ARAKI and KOISO retained their positions as War Minister and Vice-War Minister respectively in the new Cabinet; and under their leadership Manchukuo was recognized by the Government of Japan as an independent State. In replying on 4 June 1932 to a telegram from the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, the War Minister said, regarding the question of recognition:

"It has a very delicate bearing on various circles at home and abroad, and therefore we are now determined and ready to effect the recognition whenever opportunity offers."

He also revealed the plan to rule Manchukuo through the Kwantung Army; he said:

"As regards unification of various organs in Manchuria, we are planning to establish a coordinating organ with the Army as its center, among other things aiming at the industrial development of Manchuria to meet with requirements for speedy stabilization of Manchukuo and national defense. Should such underlying motive by chance leak out at home or abroad, and especially in foreign countries, it would be extremely disadvantageous from the point of view of the direction of Manchukuo. [49,116] Therefore, we hope that you will be very circumspect even in the study of the matter in your own office."

About the middle of June 1932, ARAKI stated before the Supreme War Council that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo could no longer be considered binding on Japan.

The Kwantung Army assisted ARAKI in forcing the Government to recognize Manchukuo by sending a so-called "Peace Mission" to Tokyo in June 1932. The purpose of this mission was to urge the immediate recognition of the new State; it worked in conjunction with the Black Dragon Society, which held conferences at Hibiya Toyoken to assist this "Mission."

In view of the change of Cabinets, the Lytton Commission returned to Tokyo on 4 July 1932 and held a series of conferences with the officials of the new Government

in an effort to learn the views of the Cabinet regarding the situation in Manchuria. ARAKI was present at these conferences. [49,117] After the Commission returned to Peiping, that is to say on or about 8 August 1932, the "coordinating organ with the Army at its center", mentioned by ARAKI in his telegram to the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, was established as planned. The "Four-in-One" system was replaced by the "Three-in-One" system; under this new system, the Commander of the Kwantung Army became the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and at the same time Ambassador to Manchukuo. The new system took effect on 20 August 1932. A change of personnel was made to put this system in effect. Muto, Nobuyoshi, replaced Honjo as Commander of the Kwantung Army. ITAGAKI remained on the Staff of the Kwantung Army, and was promoted to the rank of Major General. Vice-Minister of War KOISO was sent to Manchuria as Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army with the concurrent assignment as Chief of the Kwantung Army Special Service Organization, or Intelligence Service.

After the surrender, ARAKI stated:

"At the conference of the Big Three (Foreign, Navy and War Ministers), when discussing recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state, I suggested that we exchange Ambassadors since Manchukuo was an independent state. The question came before the Cabinet at a meeting in August 1932. The discussion was as to when Manchukuo should receive recognition - now or later. The Kwantung Army put in a request that we [49,118] recognize immediately. I set the data of 15 September 1932 as the date to formally recognize Manchukuo. At this meeting we discussed the contents of the Treaty to be entered into with Manchukuo, and I approved the contents agreed upon."

HIRANUMA, as Vice-President of the Privy Council, called a meeting of the Council on 13 September 1932 to consider the question of "Signing of the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo." HIRANUMA, who had also been appointed a Member of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, read the report of the Committee to the full Privy Council. The report stated, among other things,

"Our Imperial Government firmly believed that it would be advisable to recognize that country without delay. Nevertheless, in order to use prudence and caution, our Government watched for half a year the developments in Manchukuo as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other countries. Indications are that our country's recognition of that country although it will as may be easily imagined cause for a time no small shock to the world, it will not bring about an international crisis. With the object of co-existence and co-prosperity, our country intends to take measures for recognizing Manchukuo by concluding an arrangement through this Protocol and the Notes exchanged between the two countries". [49,119] HIRANUMA was referring to four Notes as follows:

1) The first Note consisted of a letter and the reply thereto. The letter, which was dated 10 March 1932, the day after Pu Yi's inauguration, was addressed by Pu Yi to Honjo. In this letter, Pu Yi stated that he appreciated the efforts and sacrifices of Japan in establishing Manchukuo, put that the development of Manchukuo could not be expected without the support and guidance of Japan Pu Yi then requested that Japan agree, among other things, to the following

(A) Japan to undertake, at the expense of Manchukuo, the national defence of the new State and the maintenance of order within the country, with the understanding that Manchukuo would furnish all military facilities required by the Kwantung Army;
(B) Japan to undertake to control all existing railroads and other transportation facilities and to construct such new facilities as may be deemed desirable and
(C) Japanese nationals to serve as government officials in all branches of the Government of Manchukuo, subject to appointment, removal and replacement at will by the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Honjo's reply to the letter was simply that Japan had no objection to Pu Yi's proposals.

(2) The second Note was an agreement between the Prime Minister of Manchukuo and Honjo dated 7 August 1932 relating to the control of transportation facilities and making the Japanese control more absolute.

(3) The third Note was another agree- [49,120] ment between the Prime Minister of Manchukuo and Honjo dated 7 August 1932. It related to the establishment of the Japan Air Transportation Company. This Company was authorized by a Cabinet decision of 12 August 1932 to take over the air-routes which had already been established in Manchuria by the Kwantung Army under the pretext of military communications.
(4) The fourth Note was an agreement between Commander Muto and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo dated 9 September 1932 relative to mining concessions in Manchuria.

According to the report read by HIRANUMA, these Notes were to be retroactive to the dates of their signing and were to be deemed international agreements, but were to be strictly secret.

The Protocol, which was to be made public, provided that Japan had recognized Manchukuo; that Manchukuo affirmed all rights and interests possessed by Japan and her subjects in Manchuria at the time of the formation of Manchukuo; and that both parties agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of their national security, recognizing that a threat to either was a threat to both and giving Japan the right to maintain troops in Manchukuo. The investigation Committee recommended approval of the Protocol and Notes.

The discoussion that followed the reading of the report of the Investigation Committee reveals that the member of the [49,121] Privy Council fully realized that the proposed Protocol and Notes violated the Nine- Power Pact (Annex No. B-10) and other treaty obligations of Japan. Privy Councillor Okada raised the question. The Foreign Minister had explained to the Diet that Japan would not be violating the Nine-Power Pact by recognizing Manchukuo, because Manchukuo had become independent, and Japan had not agreed to prevent the independence of the Chinese people. Okada expressed the opinion that the United States and others would not be satisfied by that explanation. As he explained, "The Americans might say that it would be all right if Manchukuo had become in- "dependent by the free will of her own people, but that it "was a violation of the Pact and a disregard of China's sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintain that in- dependence." The foreign Minister replied; "Of course, in this respect, various views are held in the United States and other countries, but these are their own views."

ARAKI explained, "The national defense of Manchukuo is at the same time the national defense of our country".

Councillor Ishii states:

"I feel very uneasy about Japan's contention in regard to the connection between the 'Manchurian Problem' and the League of Nations",

and he further observed:

"It was almost an established view of a large number of the people of the United States and other countries that our action in Manchukuo violated the Pact of Paris [49,122] (Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-Power Pact."

However, Councill or Ishii added:

"Now that Japan has concluded an alliance with Manchukuo, for joint national defense I believe that there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese troops in Manchuria, this will make the League's past resolution a dead letter."

He then observed:

"It was rather strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian races had started no independence movement up to now!"

The vote was taken, the Protocol and Notes were approved by unanimous vote and the Emperor withdrew. Ambassador Muto presented the Protocol to the Manchukuoan Prime Minister with the remark,

"Here it is. This is the agreement that you have to sign".

Although Pu Yi testified that he did not know of the existence of the Protocol up until the day it was presented for signing, he signed it on 15 September 1932.


Efforts to persuade General Tang Ju-lin, who was Governor of Jehol Province, to declare his Province independent of China and place it under the jurisdiction of Manchukuo proved to be of no avail; therefore, with the conquest and consolidation of the Three Eastern Provinces completed, the Japanese Army began to prepare for the conquest of Jehol. After the surrender, ARAKI tried to explain the decision to invade Jehol by saying, in speaking of the Privy Council meeting of 17 December 1931 where it was decided - according to him - to [49,123] appropriate funds for the subjugation of Manchuria,

"It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hauch-liang's territory required pacification; but a statement by Chang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four provinces expended the scene of activities to Jehol".

At the organization of the Supreme Administrative Council by the puppet Governors of the provinces on 17 February 1932, it was provided that Jehol should be represented on the Council; however, Governor Tang Ju-lin ignored the invitation and continued to rule the Province, although the -ongols of the various Leagues within the Province attempted to collaborate with the new State and were claimed as subjects by Manchukuo.

The Japanese, having made their reservation at Geneva needed only to find an excuse to proceed with their plan for the incorporation of Jehol into Menchukuo. The first excuse was presented when an official by the name of Ishimoto, who was attached to the Awantung Army, staged a "disappearance" while traveling between Peipiao and Chinchow on 17 July 1932. The Japanese immediately claimed that he had been kidnapped by Chinese Volunteers and sent a detachment of the Kwantung Army into Jehol on the pretext of rescuing Ishimoto. Although the detachment was equipped with artillary, it was repulsed and failed in its purpose, after occupying a village [49,124] on the frontier of the Province. During this encounter, Japanese planes dropped bombs on the town of Chaoyang; and through the month of August 1932, Japanese planes continued to demonstrate over this part of Jehol Province, On 19 August 1932, a Kwantung Army staff officer was sent to Nanling, a small village situated between Peipiao and the boundary of Jehol ostensibly to negotiate for the release of Mr. Ishimot. He was accompained by an infantry detachment. He claimed that on his return journey, he was fired upon and in self-defence returned the fire. On the arrival of another infantry detachment, as if by prearrangement, Nanling was occupied.

Shortly after the engagement at Nanling, a declaration was issued to the affect that Jehol Province was the territory of Manchukuo, thus laying the foundation for its annexation through the action of the Kwantung Army. Military action continued upon one pretext or another, mostly along the Chinchow-Peipiao branch line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, which is the only means of access to Jehol from Manchuria by railway. This was to be expected as the main lines of communication at that time between China proper and the Chinese forces remaining in Manchuria ran through Jehol. [49,124a] It was evident to casual observers that an invasion of Jehol was imminent and the Japanese Press freely admitted that fact. In September 1932, the 14th Mixed Brigade arrived in Manchu- [49,125] ria with the announced mission of "mopping up" bandits in the Tung Pientao, which is the district on the north side of the Yalu River between Manchuria and Korea. The real mission of this brigade was to prepare for the invasion of Jehol.


In Geneva, the Council of the League met on 21 November 1932 to consider the report of the Lytton Commission, which had been received on 1 October 1932. During the deliberations the Japanese Delegate, Matsuoka, declared, “We want no more territory!" However, due to the fact that Matsuoka refused to agree to any basis for settlement of the dispute, the Council was forced on 28 November 1932 to transmit the report of the Lytton Commission to the Assembly for action.

The Lytton Commission in its report stated:

"It is a fact that, without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. . . [49,125a] The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Convenant of the League of Nations (Annex No. B-6), the Kellogg Pact (Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington (Annex No. B-10), all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind. The justification in this case has been that all the [49,126] military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defense."

However, the Commission further stated in discussing the events at Mukden on the night of 18 September 1931:

"The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of ligitimate self-defense.”

The Assembly of the League met on 6 December 1932; and after a general discussion, adopted a resolution on 9 December 1932 requesting the Committee of Nineteen, which it had appointed on 11 March 1932, to bring about a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, study the report, draw up proposals for settlement of the dispute, and submit those proposals to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment.

The Committee of Nineteen drew up two draft resolutions and a statement of reason indicating generally the basis on which it thought it possible to continue its endeavors. On 15 December 1932 the two draft resolutions and the statement of reasons were submitted to the parties. The Chinese and the Japanese Delegates proposed amendments; and the Committee adjourned on 20 December 1932 to permit discussion of the proposed amendments, between the Delegates, the Secretary-General of the League and the President of the Committee. [49,127]


Before this discussion proceeded very far, the serious "Shanhaikwan Incident" occurred on 1 January 1933. Situated at the extremity of the Great Wall, halfway between Peiping and Mukden, this city has always been regarded as of great strategic importance. It is on the route followed by invaders, who coming from Manchuria wish to penetrate into what is now the Province of Hopei. Moreover, from Hopei is the easiest route into Jehol.

After Chinohow had been taken, the Japanese had advanced to Shanhaikwan - up to the Great Wall - and taken possession of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway. The railway continues from Shanhaikwan to Peiping, where Marshal Chang-Hsueh-liang was maintaining his headquarters. Although the railway station at Shanhaikwan is just south of the Great Wall, the Japanese trains from Mukden ran to the station; therefore, the Japanese maintained troops at the station under the pretense of guarding the trains. The Chinese trains from Peiping also ran into this station, and the Chinese maintained troops there. The Chinese Commander reported that all had been well at the station until this "Incident" occurred.

The fact that this "Incident" occurred during the discussion of the proposed amendments to the two draft [49,128] resolutions submitted by the Committee of Nineteen strongly suggests that it was planned in order to stimulate justification of the action of the Japanese Government in rejecting all efforts of the Committee to arrive at a basis of settlement between China and Japan.

On the afternoon of 1 January 1933, the Japanese claimed that some Chinese had thrown a land grenade. That was the excuse for a forthright assult on the walled city of Shanhaikwan. Smaller towns nearby were machine-gunned, American missionary property was bombed, and the fighting developed into old-fashioned trench warfare so that the North China Plain between Peiping and the Great Wall became criss- crossed by hundreds of miles of trenches. Thousands of peaceful citizens were slaughtered; and the Chinese Government addressed an appeal on 11 January 1933 to the signatories of the 1901 Protocol (Annex No. B-2).


The Committee of Nineteen met pursuant to adjournment on 16 January 1933; and submitted to the parties a number of questions and requests for information in an effort to arrive at a basis of settlement between China and Japan. To all of its requests, the Committee received [49,129] unsatisfactory replies from Japan; and on 14 February 1933, the Japanese Government informed the Committee that it was convinced that the maintenance and recognition of the independence of Manchukuo were the only guarantees of peace in the Far East, and that the whole question would eventually be solved between Japan and China on that basis. This put an end to the Committee's deliberations and it immediately reported to the Assembly.


The Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 February 1933 adopted the report prepared for it by the Committee of Nineteen condemning Japan as the aggressor in the war between her and China and making recommendations for termination of that war. The Assembly reported that for more than sixteen months the Council of the Assembly had continuously tried to find a solution for the Sino-Japanese dispute; however, the situation tended constantly to grow worse and the "war in disguise" continued. It declared that

"Through all its wars and periods of 'independence', Manchuria remained an integral part of China, and that a group of Japanese civil and military officials conceived, organized, and carried through the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of 18 September 1931; and, with this object made use of the [49,130] names and actions of certain Chinese individuals and took advantage of certain minorities and native communities that had grievances against the Chinese administration."

The Assembly decided that it could not regard as measures of self-defense the military operations carried out on the night of 18 September 1931 by the Japanese troops at Mukden and other places in Manchuria; and that this applied as well to the military measures of Japan as a whole, developed in the course of the dispute. It also stated that the main political and administrative power in the "Government" of "Manchukuo" rested in the hands of Japanese officials and advisors, who were in a position restfully to direct and control the administration. It found that the vast majority of the population did not support this "Government", but regarded it as an instrument of the Japanese. The Assembly declared that

"It is indisputable that, without any declaration of war, a large part of Chinese territory has been forcivly seized and occupied by Japanese troops and that in consequence of this operation, it has been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China."

The Assembly found as a matter of fact:

"While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before 18 September 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for [49,131] the development of events since 18 September 1931."

This was a finding of aggression against Japan and a warning that similar conduct would meet similar condemnation in the future. Therefore, no person in Japan could rightly say thereafter that he honestly believed that conduct of this kind would be condoned. This Tribunal finds no basis for disagreement with the report adopted by the Assembly of the League on 24 February 1933.

The Accused SHIRATORI, who in his public announcements was one of the foremost assertors of the legitimacy of Japan's actions in Manchuria, expressed the truth in a private letter to Arite, then Japanese Minister to Belgium. Writing in November 1935, and speaking of Japanese diplomats who favored conciliation in international affairs, he said:

"Have they enough courage to return Manchuria to China, to get reinstated in the League of Nations, and to apologize to the world for the crime?" [49,132]


Rather than fulfill her obligations under the Covenant (Annex No. B-6), Japan gave notice on 27 March 1933 of her intention to withdraw from the League. The notice stated her reason for withdrawal to be:

"That there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan and these Powers (The majority of the Members of the League) concerning the application and even the interpretation of various international engagements and obligations including the Covenant of the League and the principles of international law."


One day after the Assembly adopted its resolution condemning Japan as the aggressor in China, she openly defied the League by invading Jehol Province. Key points along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkou, fell into the hands of the Japanese as a result of the fighting that followed the "Shanhaikwan Incident", and the strategical situation of Jehol became very critical prior to 22 February 1933. On that date, the Japanese Army, in the name of the puppet State of Manchukuo, sent an ultimatum to China, stating that Jehol was not Chinese territory and demanding that Chinese forces in Jehol Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. The ultimatum was not satisfied and the advance of the Japanese Army [49,133] began on 25 February 1933. The Japanese advanced in three columns from their bases at Tungliao and Sui-Chung, and did not stop until all the territory north and east of the Great Wall was occupied and all the strategic gates along the Great Wall were captured. ITAGAKI and KOISO as staff officers of the Kwantung Army assisted in the completion of the occupation of all Manchuria by 2 March 1933.


As a result of its advance to the Great Wall, the Japanese Army was in a favorable position to invade China proper; but time was needed to consolidate and organize its gains preparatory to the next advance; to gain this time, the Tangku Truce was signed on 31 May 1933. Commander MUTO (not the accused) sent representatives, vested with plenary power and armed with a draft of the Truce, which was prepared by the Kwantung Army, to negotiate with the Chinese representatives at Tangku. The Truce as signed provided for a demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall. The terms were that the Chinese forces would first withdraw to a specified line. The Japanese were authorized to observe by airplane from time to time whether the withdrawal was complete; on being satisfied with the withdrawal, the Japanese Army was to withdraw to the line of the Great Wall; and the [49,134] Chinese forces were not to again re-enter the demilitarized zone.


The successful conquest of all Manchuria by the Japanese forces made War Minister ARAKI a popular figure among certain groups in Japan; and he was constantly in demand as a writer and public speaker. In a motion picture adaptation of one of his speeches trade in June 1933 and entitled, "The Critical Period of Japan", he stated the ideals of the Military and revealed their plan to wage wars of aggression in order to dominate all of Asia and the islands of the Pacific. Among other things, he said:

"Has peace reigned in Asia during the last fifty years? What is the situation in Siberia, Mongolia, Tibet, Singkiang, and China: Are the waves of the Pacific really calm? Can we expect the waves of the Pacific of tomorrow to be as calm as they are today? It is the holy mission of Japan, the Yamato race, to establish peace in the Orient with its ideals and power. The League of Nations does not respect this mission of Japan. The siege of Japan by the whole world under the leadership of the League was revealed by the 'Manchurian Incident'. The day will come when we will make the whole world look up to our national virtues."

(On the screen was shown Japan and Manchuria in the center, then China, [49,135] India, Siberia and the South Seas).

"Manchukuo, which was founded by the revelation of Heaven in the form of the ’Mukden Incident’, and Japan will work together and will secure permanent peace in Asia."

He then defines national defence as follows:

"I would not adopt such a narrow view that defence of the nation may be defined in terms of geographic position. It is the mission of the Army to defend the 'Imperial Way', in space, in time, in enlargement and development, in eternity and continuity. Our troops have fought with the everlasting spirit of the song: 'The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor.' Our Country is destined to develop in space. It is of course expected of the Army to fight against those who oppose us in spreading the 'Imperial Way'. Compatriots! Let us look at the situation in Asia. Is it to be left unamended forever? Our supreme mission is to make a paradise in Asia. I fervently beseech you to strive onwards united."

(On the screen appeared the words: "Light comes from the East!")


After the signing of the Tangku Truce, Manchukuo was reorganized so as to strengthen Japan's control over that puppet State and to facilitate the economic [49,136] exploitation of Manchuria in preparation for continuation of the war of aggression against China and the waging of wars of aggression against other Nations, who might oppose her domination of Asia and the Islands of the Pacific.

The Japanese Cabinet decided on 8 August 1933 to "develop Manchuria into an independent Nation possessing indivisible relations with the Japanese Empire.” Control of Manchukuo was to be "executed by Japanese officials under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Kwantung Army." The aim of the Manchurian economy was to be "the unification of Japanese and Manchurian economies in order to establish securely the foundation for the expansion of the Empire's economic powers to the whole world." "Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and Manchuria" were to be "restricted by the demands of the national defense of the Empire." ARAKI, who was a member of the Cabinet at the time this decision was made, had defined national defense in no uncertain terms. The concrete plan for the execution of this policy was to be approved by the Cabinet only after careful investigation, it was decided.

The investigations were not completed until after DORIHARA had been assigned to the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army on 16 October 1933, and HIROTA had [49,137] become Foreign Minister on 14 September 1933.However, on 22 December 1933, the Cabinet, with ARAKI and HIROTA present, decided that:

"It seems that the Manchurian Government is considering a swift reformation to Monarchy as soon as possible. It must be made clear the the enforcement of the Monarchy is not the restoration of the Tsing Dynasty, but the foundation of a constitutional monarch; and all causes of hindrances to the development of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long."

It was decided; that the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo should be strengthened that basic reformation of the internal structure of the Government of Manchukuo should be exercised, especially upon the personnel; and that the "existing conventions and agreements between Japan and Manchukuo should be acknowledged by the Monarchy."

This, be it noted, was the Cabinet of Japan formulating its decisions as to the manner in which Manchukuo would be governed, a country which it was proclaiming to the World as independent, The astounding thing is that the pretence was still maintained before us and supported by hundreds of pages of evidence and [49,138] argument.

No better proof that this dependent status of Manchukuo did not change can be found than the telegram from Foreign Minister TOGO to the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU dated 4 December 1941, which was only three days before the attack upon Pearl Harbor. In that telegram, TOGO gave the following instructions:

"On the fourth, in a Joint Conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my telegram No. 873, our policy was changed as follows:

'When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Changchun will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly'."

The next step in the reorganization was the enthronement of Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo. After the Cabinet decision of 22 December 1933 General Hishikari, who had succeeded General Muto (not the accused) as Commendor of the Kwantung Army, called upon Pu Yi and told him that he planned to convert Manchukuo into an [49,139] Empire. A new set of Organic Laws was promulgated for Manchukuo on 1 March 1934. These laws provided for an Emperor to rule Manchukuo and prescribed his powers, however they did not materially change the general construction of the Government. Japanese continued to hold important positions in the Government; the "Tuesday Meeting" was retained as the policy making organ; and General Yoshioka continued with his assignment of "supervising" the Emperor, even to the day of his capture after the surrender. On the day that the new laws were promulgated, Pu Yi, after paying obeisance to Heaven at a temple in Changchun, was enthroned as Emperor of Manchukuo. However, he had no power. Although he was allowed to give audience to his Ministers once a year, that audience was carefully supervised by the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board.

Having installed Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo and revised the laws of that State to facilitate its economic exploitation, the Cabinet met on 20 March 1934 to discuss the policy to be followed in carrying out that exploitation. Although ARAKI had resigned as War Minister on 23 January 1934 to become a Supreme War Councillor, Foreign Minister HIROTA was present at this Cabinet meeting. It was decided that fundamental policy would be "based on developing Manchukuo as an independent [49,140] Nation possessing an indivisible relationship with Japan, establishing securely the base of Japan's worldwide economic expansion, and strengthening Manchukuo's economic powers." Transportation, communication and other enterprises in Manchukuo were to be developed by special companies directly or indirectly under the supervision of Japan so as to contribute to the "national defense" of the Empire.

As though to remove all doubt regarding Japan's intentions toward China, HIROTA's Foreign Office issued a statement on 17 April 1934, which has come to be known as the "Hands Off China Statement" or the "Amau Statement", deriving the first name from its contents and the second name from the official who gave the statement to the Press. Amau was not only an official of the Foreign Office but also its official spokesman. On 25 April 1934, Foreign Minister HIROTA during an interview with the American Ambassador in Japan on his own initiative referred to the "Amau Statement"; he stated that under questioning of newspaper men Amau had given out the statement without his approval or knowledge and that the World had received a wholly false impression of Japanese policy. HIROTA added that the policy of Japan was complete observance and support of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) [49,141] in every respect. HIROTA's statement to the American Ambassador was a private statement, not a public statement. The "Amau Statement" was never publicly repudiated. Amau was regarded by the expansionists as a hero for having issued the Statement; and Foreign Minister HIROTA never disciplined him for having issued the Statement without authority of the Foreign Ministry. This Statement conforms closely to subsequent developments in Japanese foreign policy; and the Tribunal finds upon the evidence that it was an official declaration by the Foreign Ministry of Japan's policy toward China at the time and was issued for the purpose of warning the Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact that the Japanese Government would not tolerate any interference with her plans in China.

This Statement contained, among other things, the following:

"Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree with those of foreign Nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia. We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist [49,142] Japan. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the 'Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents' are bound to acquire political significance. Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle."


The Kwantung Army received a new Commander and a new Vice-Chief-of-Staff on 10 December 1934, namely: MINAMI and ITAGAKI respectively. These appointments heralded the completion of the reorganization of Manchukuo and the machinery for its control by Japan. By Imperial Ordinance the Japanese Government created the Manchurian Affairs Bureau to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo in all Ministries. The Bureau was organized to correspond to the new "two-in-One" organization in Manchuria. The Commander of the Kwantung Army became Ambassador to Manchukuo as before, but the office of Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory was abolished and its duties were taken over by the Director of the newly created Kwantung Bureau, which was placed under the Ambassador. Thus MINAMI became Commander of the Kwantung Army; and at the same time as Ambassador, he controlled the Government of the Leased Territories, the Embassy and the South Manchurian Railway Company. Although the [49,143] Manchurian Affairs Bureau came under the Premier, the War Minister held the post of President of the Bureau, so that the effective control of Manchukuo remained with the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry. MINAMI stated on interrogation that as Ambassador his prime duty was "to preserve the independence of Manchukuo." At that time he advised the Government "on such matters as agriculture, transportation, education, etc." Upon being asked the question: "In fact, your advice in substance was a direction; was it not?", he replied: "You might say so -- yes." MINAMI was succeeded as Ambassador and Kwantung Army Commander by General Ueda on 6 March 1936, who served until he was replaced by General UMEZU on 7 September 1939. UMEZU held the post until 18 July 1944.


As mentioned, the Manchurian Affairs Bureau was organized to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo in all Ministries and set as the connecting link between the Japanese Government and the "Two-in-One" Administrator in Manchuria. It took charge of all matters concerning the Kwantung Bureau, the foreign affairs of Manchukuo, the corporations organized to exploit the economy of Manchuria, the colonization of Manchuria by the Japanese, cultural works for Manchukuo - which probably included the opium trade -, and any other matters concerning [49,144] Manchuria or the Kwantung Territory. By virtue of their positions as War Minister the following Accused served as President of this Bureau: ITAGAKI, HATA and TOJO. Also OKA and SATO each served as Secretary of this Bureau. The following served as Councillors to the Bureau at one time or another: KAYA, MUTO, SATO, SHIGEMITSU, OKA, UMEZU and TOJO.


In order to control the news coming out of Manchuria and direct propaganda, the Kwantung Army Commander, or "Two-in-One" control organ, organized all the Press and news agencies in Manchuria. All the agencies, which up to that time had been under the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government or the Manchurian Railway Company, were organized into an association, which was known as the Koho Association. This association was charged with the duty of rigidly supervising all domestic and foreign news releases, and deciding the policy and means of propaganda as well as enforcing that policy upon its member agencies and those agencies not members.

We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) [49,145]

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Continuing reading of the Tribunal's judgment:


Under the new organization of Manchukuo, HOSHINO became the undisputed ruler of the economy of Manchuria. He began his training for this work when he left Japan on 12 July 1932 at the instance of the Japanese Minister of Finance to accept an appointment as a Commissioner in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo. He was told at that time that he was considered competent for the position as Chief of the General Affairs Board, the all-powerful agency of the Kwantung Army for control of the Manchukuoan Government. He was advanced by successive promotions to the position promised. Just before the completion of the reorganization of Manchukuo, he was appointed on 1 July 1934 as Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo. Then on 9 June 1936 he became Vice-Minister of Finance for Manchukuo. On 16 December 1936 he became Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the General Affairs Board, where he served until his elevation to the high office of Director of the Board on 1 July 1937. He continued in this [49,146] office until relieved to become President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau in Tokyo on 21 July 1940. Any exposition of the economic exploitation of Manchuria is essentially a story of HOSHINO. When he left Tokyo in July 1932 to become a Commissioner in the Manchukuoan Finance Ministry, he took with him a trained staff to assist him in his duties; and he soon became recognized in Manchuria as the Japanese official in charge of economic affairs under the authority of the Kwantung Army.


At the very outset of the military occupation the Japanese seized control of the economy of Manchuria. The first public utility seized was the railroads. All the Chinese-owned railways north of the Great Wall and the monies standing to their credit in banks in Manchuria were seized. All railroads were coordinated, connected with and placed under the management of the Japanese Government agency known as the South Manchurian Railway Company. Electrical supply and distribution systems were quickly taken over. All sources of revenue were taken by force and the revenues expended to finance the new Government. The customs were seized on the pretense that Manchukuo was an independent state. The Central [49,147] Bank of Manchukuo was established on 14 June 1932 to replace the old provincial banks and the Frontier Bank, whose funds were used to capitalize the new organization. A new currency was issued by the Central Bank beginning on 1 July
1932. The telephone, telegraph and radio systems, being state owned, were seized and placed under Japanese control. On 14 April 1932 special officers were appointed to take charge of the Postal Administration; they had taken complete charge of this service by 26 July 1932. In all of these public services Japanese officials and advisors were placed in the main political and administrative offices and exercised effective control of the organizations. The Japanese Cabinet confirmed this practice in its decision of 11 April 1932. It was soon after this decision that HOSHINO was sent to Manchuria. He was a recognized authority on fiscal and economic problems and was sent to Manchuria to organize its economy.


On 3 November 1932, after HOSHINO's arrival in Manchuria in July, Chief-of Staff KOISO of the Kwantung Army sent a telegram to the Japanese War Ministry outlining his plan for "guiding" Manchukuo. He said:

"The administration shall be backed for the time being [49,148] by inner leadership of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and shall be carried out with officials of Japanese lineage as its leaders. Economically, co-prosperity and co-existence shall be the basic principle. In the future the systems accompanying the establishment of a unit for an economic 'bloc' between Japan and Manchukuo shall be kept according to the race co- ordinate to Japan and Manchukuo. In order to realize the organization of the economy of Japan and Manchukuo into a single 'bloc' we must realize industrially the idea of 'Fit Industry for Suitable Locality' both in Japan and Manchukuo with the aim of abolishing the mutual customs barriers."

11 plans adopted thereafter by the Japanese Cabinet for the control and exploitation of the Manchurian economy were based upon these ideas.


The day before the conquest of Jehol was completed, that is to say, on 1 March 1933, the Government of Manchukuo promulgated on "Economic Construction Program for Manchukuo". The Japanese Cabinet approved the essential features of this "Program" in its decision of 8 August 1933 as related. In the announcement of the "Program" it was stated:

"Efforts will be made to promote a healthy and vigorous development [49,149] of the whole national economy by applying to capital such State control as may be necessary in view of the evils of uncontrolled capitalistic economy and by making the most of the uses of capital".

It was announced that economic development was to proceed upon the following basic principles:

(1) "To apply State branches of economic activity in order effectively to open up the various national resources with which his country is endowed and to promote a co-ordinated development in all fields of economic endeavor;
(2) To aim at the co-ordination and rationalization of the East Asian economy, to place the emphasis on co-ordination with the good neighbor Japan in view of the economic relationship of mutual dependence between the two countries, and to make increasingly closer this relationship of mutual helpfulness".

In accordance with basic principles it was announced that the Government proposed "to make it a guiding principle that important enterprises of the nature of national defense or public utilities should be managed by public bodies or special companies".

At the Japanese Cabinet meeting of 20 March 1934, which was after the re- organization of Manchukuo and the installation of Pu Yi as Emperor, this "Program" received further sanction of the Cabinet and it was de- [49,150] cided that those industries necessary for "national defense" should be operated by special companies, which should hold a dominant position in the business in Manchukuo, so that rapid development might be expected. The organization and operation of these special companies created monopolies in favor of the Japanese and effectively defeated the "Open Door Policy" in Manchuria. The United States and other Powers protested this unwarranted violation of existing treaty obligations intended to insure "equal opportunity" for trade in China. However, the Japanese Government disclaimed all responsibility for the violation of treaties by Manchukuo on the theory that Manchukuo was an independent State.


A joint Economic Committee was established in 1935 by an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo. The agreement provided that the Committee was to consist of eight members, four from each country. Japan's members were to be: Chief-of- Staff of the Kwantung Army; the Councillor of the Embassy in Manchukuo; the Chief of the Kwantung Bureau; and one member specially appointed by the Japanese Government. It is to be noted that the Commander of the Kwantung Army automatically controlled three votes by this [49,151] arrangement. Manchukuo's members were to be: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Finance, and the Japanese Director of the General Affairs Board. All questions before the Committed were to be decided by majority vote. In answer to a question put to him at the Privy Council meeting on 3 July 1935 during discussion of the question of ratification of the Agreement, HIROTA said:

“I ask him (Councillor Motoda) to consider the fact that three out of the four members of the Committee from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one is the Director of the General Affairs Board, who is, and will be a Japanese forever, I am confident. Although he is an official of Manchukuo, he is a central organ assuming leadership of that country. Therefore, in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan".

The Committee was to deliberate on all questions concerning the economic tie between the two countries and supervise the Joint Holding Company to be organized by Japan and Manchukuo later to control the industries of Manchukuo, however, it was provided that matters important to the economic power would not be discussed by the Committee; and because they were [49,152] not to be deliberated by the Committee, those matters were to be made into unilateral contracts binding only upon Manchukuo. HOSHINO became a member of this Committee upon his appointment as Director of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo. MINAMI was a member from the time of the creation of the Committee in 1935 until he was relieved as Commander of the Kwantung Army on 6 March 1936. UMEZU served on the Committee while Kwantung Army Commander from 7 September 1939 to 18 July 1944. ITAGAKI, who became Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army on 23 March 1936, became ex-officio a member of the Committee on that date. Thus, ITAGAKI was one of the foremost figures in the construction of Manchukuo. Others who served on this Committee while Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army were: TOJO, who served from 6 March 1937 to 30 May 1938, when he became Vice-Minister of War; KIMURA, who served from 7 November 1940 to 21 April 1941. Upon being appointed Vice-Minister of War, TOJO retained his post as a member of the Committee, but in the capacity as the Government Representative rather than as Chief-of-Staff. [49,153]


One of the first acts of this Joint Economic Committee was to integrate the currencies of the two countries. In November 1935 the yen bloc was established and Manchukuo's currency was no longer based on silver and was stabilized at par with the yen.


The next important economic arrangement made by this Joint Economic Committee was a treaty which was signed between Manchukuo and Japan on 10 June 1936. The purpose of the treaty appears to have been to give Japanese all the benefits of Manchukuoan citizenship without imposing on them the corresponding obligations. The treaty recited that its purpose was to abolish by progressive stages the rights of extra-territoriality enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan. However, it recited that

"Japanese subjects shall be free within the territories of Manchukuo to reside and travel and engage in agriculture, commerce and industry, and to pursue callings and professions, and shall enjoy all the rights relating to land."

A supplementary agreement went much more into detail and set out at great length the rights of Japanese in Manchukuo. One of these provisions was,

"The Government of Manchukuo shall speedily take necessary steps in order that the rights [49,154] of lease by negotiation hitherto possessed by Japanese subjects shall be converted into land- ownership or other rights relating to land."

Thus was settled the highly controversial question involving the right to lease land growing out of the notes attached to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915. This was very important for Japan was colonizing Manchuria at a rapid rate. Between 1936 and 1940 approximately 221,000 Japanese migrated to Manchuria. By 1945 this number exceeded 1,000,000. Most of the Japanese men settling in Manchuria were fit soldiers and were used to man new divisions of the Kwantung Army. The land for settlement of these Japanese was requisitioned at a nominal price and the Chinese farmers so dispossessed were moved and allotted undeveloped lands.


The Industrial Bank of Manchukuo, which was organized in December 1936, with a capital of 60 million yen, served as an easy means of financing preferred industries to be developed under the Japanese Cabinet Policy. This bank handled all loans made for industrial purposes in Manchukuo. The Manchurians were permitted to make deposits in the Central Bank of Manchukuo and its branches, but they were not allowed to borrow from the Industrial Bank; only Japanese were allowed to borrow from that [49,155] bank. A law of savings was enacted to force the people to save money and deposit it in the Central Bank for the Japanese. At the time of the surrender, approximately 600 Billion dollars were in this bank -- all the result of the compulsory savings law.


HOSHINO said during his interrogation that instead of the haphazard development of the first five-year period from 1931 to 1936, it was deemed necessary that a concrete coordinated plan be formulated for the development of Manchukuo. HOSHINO, working with various Ministries of Manchukuo, the Cabinet Planning Bureau, the South Manchurian Railway Company, and ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, drew up an "Outline of Five Year Plan for Industrial Development of Manchukuo," which was completed in January 1937. HOSHINO says that the Commander of the Kwantung Army had the "final say" on all questions involving this plan. This Second Five-Year Plan followed the basic principles underlying the First Five-Year Plan and laid emphasis on opening up resources in Manchukuo and making them available for "national defense," that is to say, "war." The outline of the plan declared the policy with regard to mining and industries to be, "that munition industries for weapons [49,156] of war, airplanes, automobiles, and rolling-stock will be firmly established, and basic major industries such as those of iron, liquid fuel coal and electric power will be developed, and emphasis will be laid especially on the development of iron and liquid fuel industries, which materials are necessary for national defense."

This plan was adopted at a conference of provincial governors and the Chiefs of the General Affairs Bureau of the various ministries in Manchukuo in January 1937. On 17 February 1937 the Government of Manchukuo issued its "Official Report on the Result of the First Period Five-Year Administration and Outline of the Second Period Construction Plan." The outline stated:

"Five years have elapsed since Manchukuo founded her country. In this period, the administrative and economic system have been rearranged, and the second Five Year Plan will be inaugurated in 1937, with which epoch-making construction activity will be commenced dashingly."

In effect, the second plan of the Kwantung Army for the exploitation of the economy of Manchuria was to be adopted without change.

The Industrialist Aikawa was sent to Manchuria to help direct the five-year plan. He favored a huge holding company to control all industries in Manchuria, especially the heavy industries such as coal and steel. [49,157]


On 1 May 1937 Manchukuo promulgated a "Law Controlling Important Industries," which was so drawn as to provide for the licensing of "Important Industries," practically all industries being classified as "Important" under the law. The law was promulgated in order to coordinate the economy of Manchuria with that of Japan. The "Essentials of the Five Year Program for Important Industries" released by the Japanese War Ministry on 29 May 1937 contained the following:

"We plan systematically to promote the activity of important industries generally, so that by 1941, if anything happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying the important materials in Japan, Manchuria and North China."

The plan then went on:

"In promoting important industries for national defense, the requisite industries should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of 'Fit Industry for Suitable Locality'."

It was in order to enforce this rule of "Fit Industry for Suitable Locality" that the "Law Controlling Important Industries" was promulgated by the puppet government in Manchukuo.


The Cabinet decided on 22 October 1937 to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development [49,158] Corporation "in order to secure and advance the developing policy of Manchurian Industry and to establish synthetically and speedily the heavy industry of Manchukuo." This was to be a huge holding company; and its shares were to be held only by Manchukuo, Japan and their nationals. The original issue of stock was to be sold one-half to the Government of Manchukuo and one-half to Japanese private interests. The management of this company was to be "entrusted to a powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians. The powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians is prearranged as Aikawa Gisuke, the present President of Nissan." The directors and the president of the company were to be appointed by the two governments. Pursuant to this Cabinet decision an agreement was entered into with Manchukuo for the establishment of the company.


The economic organization completed by Japan with the organization of the Heavy Industry Development Corporation proved to be of benefit only to Japan and the Japanese. Its sole purpose was to make of Manchuria a work-house for the production of war goods for use by Japan. The effectiveness with which this purpose was realized is vividly expressed by HOSHINO, the one man more responsible than any other for such success; [49,159] he stated that Japan took everything out of Manchuria which could be obtained. Since Chinese business men were not allowed to enter important industries and were not allowed to make loans, most of them went into bankruptcy. The Chinese farmers lost their lands to Japanese immigrants. The savings law reduced the Chinese laborer to working for mere subsistence. The monopolies on rice and cotton deprived the Chinese of adequate food and clothing in order to furnish the best rice and cotton for Japan's Army. A labor and civil service law was put into effect by UMEZU while he was Commander of the Kwantung Army, which required all persons between 18 and 45 to render labor service to the Japanese Army in opening highways, digging mines, and constructing public works. These laborers were kept in concentration camps where they were fed short rations and furnished no medical attention whatever. Heavy penalties were imposed for escape. In the result a system was developed whereby the Japanese came first, Koreans second, and Chinese last.


In order to finance her operations in Manchuria and also in order to weaken the power of resistance of the Chinese, Japan sanctioned and developed the traffic in opium and narcotics. As early as 1929, the National [49,160] Government of China was making an effort to fulfill its obligations under the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1925. (Annex No. B-11 & B-12). That government had issued its Laws for the Prohibition of Smoking Opium, effective as of 25 July 1929. The plan was gradually to suppress the production and consumption of opium by 1940. Japan as a signatory to the above opium conventions was obligated to assist the Chinese Government in the eradication of the drug habit by limiting the manufacture and sale of the drugs within her territory and by preventing smuggling of the drugs into China.

The principal source of opium and narcotics at the time of the Mukden Incident and for some time thereafter was Korea, where the Japanese Government operated a factory in the town of Seoul for the preparation of opium and narcotics. Persian opium was also imported into the Far East. The Japanese Army seized a huge shipment of this opium, amounting to approximately 10 million ounces and stored it in Formosa in 1929; this opium was to be used later to finance Japan's military campaigns. There was another source of illegal drugs in Formosa. The cocaine factory operated at Sinei by Finance Minister Takahashi of Japan until his assassination in 1936, produced from 200 to 300 kilos of cocaine per month. This was one factory that was given [49,161] specific authority to sell its produce to raise revenue for war.

Wherever the Japanese Army went in China, Korean and Japanese drug peddlers followed closely upon its heels vending their merchandise without hindrance from the Japanese authorities. In some cases, these traffickers were sent ahead of the invading Army to prepare a way for it by engaging in intrigue, espionage and sabotage; such seems to have been the case in North China and also in Fukien Province, where the Genki Plot was perpetrated. Even the Japanese soldiers and their officers at times indulged in this lucrative business of vending opium and narcotics. The Japanese Special Service Organization was charged with the duty of regulating the opium and narcotic traffic in territories immediately following their capture; and this organization in the Kwantung Army became so involved in the illicit traffic under KOISO that it was necessary for MINAMI, when he became Commander of the Kwantung Army in December 1934, to abolish the organization to prevent it from destroying all discipline in that Army. DOMIHARA was one of the foremost officers of this organization; and his connection with the drug traffic has been fully shown.

The general principle of gradual suppression of [49,162] the traffic in and use of opium and narcotics was the underlying principle not only of the drug laws promulgated by China, but also of the international Opium Conventions of 1912, 1925 and 1931 (Annexes No. B-11, B-12, B-13). Japan, having ratified those Conventions, was bound by them. Using this principle of gradual suppression to their advantage, the Japanese promulgated Opium Laws in the territories occupied by them in China; these laws ostensibly followed the principle of gradual suppression by licensing known addicts to smoke in licensed shops. However, these laws were merely a blind or cover for Japan's real intention and operations. These laws created government controlled monopolies for the distribution of opium and narcotics to licensed shops; and these monopolies were nothing more than revenue collection agencies, which encouraged the use of the drugs in order to increase the revenue therefrom. In all areas occupied by the Japanese the use of opium and narcotics increased steadily from the time of such occupation until the surrender.

This was the procedure followed in Manchuria. In the fall of 1932 the Opium Law was promulgated by Manchukuo and the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration was created as the administrative agency to enforce the laws. This agency was under the general supervision [49,163] of the Director of the General Affairs Board and became one of the important sources of revenue for Manchukuo. The reliability of the revenue from these sources is attested by the fact that the Industrial Bank of Japan was willing to underwrite the 30 million yen founding bond issue secured by the opium revenue of Manchukuo and negotiated by HOSHINO soon after his arrival in Manchuria.

This procedure was repeated in North China and again in South China; however, the administrative agency in those places was the Ko-A-In or China Affairs Bureau, which maintained its main offices in Tokyo with branch offices all over North, Central and Southern China. These organizations created such demand for opium that the Cabinet was forced from time to time to authorize the farmers of Korea to increase their acreage devoted to growing poppies. The trade became so lucrative that Japanese trading companies, such as the Mitsubishi Trading Company and Mitsui Bussan, were induced by the Foreign Ministry to sign a contract limiting their trade areas and the amount of opium to be supplied by them.

Japan's real purpose in engaging in the drug traffic was far more sinister than even the debauchery of the Chinese people. Japan having signed and ratified [49,164] the Opium Conventions was bound not to engage in the drug traffic, but she found in the alleged but false independence of Manchukuo a convenient opportunity to carry on a world-wide drug traffic and cast the guilt upon that puppet state. A large part of the opium produced in Korea was sent to Manchuria. There opium grown in Manchuria and imported from Korea and elsewhere was manufactured and distributed throughout the world. In 1937 it was pointed out in the League of Nations that ninety percent of all illicit white drugs in the world were of Japanese origin, manufactured in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, Dairen and other cities of Manchuria, Jehol and China, always by Japanese or under Japanese supervision. [49,165]


Japan' s occupation of Manchuria and Jehol was completed when the Tangku Truce was signed in the spring of 1933. Jehol, facing another Inner Mongolian Province of Chahar on the west and the North China Province of Hopeh on the south, became the frontier of the newly formed puppet state of Manchukuo. If Japan were to advance further into China from the territory she had already occupied, her advance would be from Jehol westwards into Chahar or southwards into Hopeh, besides the other route which linked Manchuria with the rest of China through the narrow corridor of the Liaoning Province around Shanhaikwan on the eastern end of the Great Wall.

On 17th April 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "Amau Statement" warning the Powers who subscribed to the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) that the Japanese Government would not tolerate any interference with her plans in China. Although HIROTA later explained, upon inquiries, to the American Ambassador Grey, that the "Amau Statement" had been issued without his approval or knowledge, the fact remains that the "Amau Statement" truly represented Japan's policy towards China. Already, it appeared possible that Japanese ambitions in regard to China had not been satisfied by her occupation [49,166] of Manchuria and Jehol. Very shortly thereafter in May and June 1935 there took place two incidents, of trifling importance when compared with the demands based by the Japanese upon their occurrence, which resulted in the position of the National Government of China on both the Hopei and the Chahar fronts being substantially weakened.


In the middle of May 1935 two Chinese newspapermen were assassinated by unidentified assailants in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. The journalists were said to have been pro-Japanese in sentiment. UMEZU was then Commander of the North China Garrison Forces and with his approval certain demands were presented by his Chief of Staff to General Ho Ying-Chin, head of the Chinese military organization in Peiping. On the 10th of June 1935 the incident was settled, the Chinese authorities agreeing to withdraw the Chinese 51st Army from the province of Hopei; to close the party offices and to ban all party activities of the Kuomintang in that province and to ban all anti-Japanese activities in that province.

The above settlement is the so-called "Ho-UMEZU Agreement."

The defense submit that no pressure of any kind was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to [49,167] agree to the above major limitations on their sovereignty over the great province of Hopei. They say that the Japanese made no more than some "suggestions" which might improve future relations between the nations. In this connection the evidence of the defense witness, Kuwashima, should be noticed. He was then Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs in the Japanese Foreign Office, and Sino-Japanese relations were his direct concern. He testified that he learned from the Japanese Legation at Peiping that the Japanese had made "a considerably strong demand" upon the Chinese. A consideration of the whole of his evidence makes it plain that Kuwashima understood that the Chinese had been presented with an ultimatum. There is also an entry in the Harada-Saionji Diaries in which Okada, the then Premier of Japan, is recorded as having said that "in the beginning only an exceedingly light, friendly warning" had been intended "from which such a serious thing had resulted." When on 30th May 1935 KIDO drew the attention of SHIGEMITSU, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a report in the morning newspaper that the Japanese Garrison in North China had lodged a momentous claim, against the Chinese Government, SHIGEMITSU did not deny the report, but rather speculated as to the personalities in the Japanese army who were responsible for such action. [49,168]


In June 1935, about the time when the Hopei incident was being settled by the "Ho- UMEZU Agreement," four members of the Japanese Army entered the Changpei District of Chahar province. This is in the southwestern part of Chahar, a little to the north of the Great Wall. As they did not have the required permits from the Chahar Provincial Government, they were taken to the headquarters of the Chinese Divisional Commander, who communicated with the general in command of the Chinese 29th Army. The latter ordered their release and that they be allowed to continue on their projected journey to Kalgan and Peiping, but with the warning that the appropriate permits must be obtained in future. The matter was at first taken up by the Japanese Consul at Kalgan, who represented to General Ching, Deputy Commander of the Chinese 29th Army, that the Chinese Guards had insisted on searching the Japanese personnel, had pointed rifles at them, had detained them some four or five hours at Divisional Headquarters, and had thus insulted the Japanese Army. Very shortly thereafter the consul stated that the matter was very grave and was beyond his power to settle. The matter had been transferred to the army. In December 1934 MINAMI had become Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and ITAGAKI had become his vice-chief of Staff. [49,169]

DOHIHARA, then attached to the Kwantung Army, was appointed to negotiate with General Ching. In the end it was agreed that the commander of the regiment concerned and the judge advocate of the division concerned should be dismissed and punished. These measures, one would have thought, should have amply met the occasion, if these officers had been in the wrong. By far the most important provisions of the agreement, however, are those which followed, and they are largely, if not wholly unconnected with the incident. All units of the Chinese 29th Army were to be withdrawn from the districts north of Changpei, that is to say, from substantially the whole of Chahar province. The maintenance of peace and order there was to be entrusted to the Peace Preservation Corps, an organization of the nature of a police force. In the future no Chinese were to be permitted to migrate to and settle in the northern part of Chahar province. No activities of the Kuomintang were henceforth to be permitted in Chahar province. All anti-Japanese institutions and acts in Chahar province were to be banned. This is the so-called "Ching-DOHIHARA Agreement."

Again the defense submit that no pressure of any kind was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to submit to the above major restrictions on the sovereignty of China over the great province of Chahar. [49,170] General Ching in his evidence calls it a "temporary settlement" accepted by the Chinese Government "in order to secure peace and under pain." Thus by June 1935, in less than two months, and nominally in settlement of two incidents of trifling importance in international affairs, the Japanese right flank in Jehol had been freed from any immediate threat of attack from Chahar; two Chinese armies, thought to be hostile to the Japanese, had been removed from Chahar and Hopei, and all activities of the Chinese National Party and all anti-Japanese activities had been banned in both provinces.


In the beginning of 1935 Prince Teh, the leader of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, was striving to set up an autonomous Mongolian Government there. The subsequent history of this movement is taken from the evidence of General Tanaka Ryukichi, a witness whom both prosecution and defense adduced from time to time, as occasion demanded, and whom both prosecution and defense cross-examined as a witness of no credit, again as occasion demanded. In this matter of the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regime there is no reason to distrust his account and he was certainly in a position to be familiar with the details. Tanaka' s account of this matter follows. [49,171] MINAMI and ITAGAKI gave earnest support to the establishment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government which they intended to be subservient to the wishes of Japan. In April 1935 MINAMI sent Tanaka and another officer to interview Prince Teh with a view to establishing such a government, and Prince Teh did not at this time come to terms. It should be noticed that there now followed the so-called "Ho-UMEZU" and Ching-DOHIHAKA Agreements of June 1935, the latter of which substantially affected the northern part of Inner Mongolia, the province of Chahar. According to Tanaka in August 1935 MINAMI had an interview with Prince Teh at which the Prince promised close cooperation with Japan and MINAMI promised financial assistance to the Prince. In December 1935 MINAMI sent two battalions of cavalry to assist Prince Teh in taking over the northern part of Chahar province. On 11th February 1936 Prince Teh transferred the seat of his autonomous regime from Pailinmiao, in Suiyuan province, to West Sunito, and Japanese civilians were sent there to act as advisers to him.

There is a significant cable, dated 2 October 1935, from the Secretary General of the Japanese Embassy at Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA inter alia to the following effect:

"the Japanese Forces' Mongolian Policy is making steady progress as I and Consul at [49,172] Changchiakou repeatedly reported to you. The other day Fajor Gereral DOHIHARA made a trip from Changchiakou to Chengte and back and saw the Governor of Chahar Province and Prince Teh; his mission was no doubt to promote the Inner Mongolian self-government."

References will also be found in the Japanese Army plan for dealing with North China, transmitted to the Japanese forces in China on 13 January 1936, which make it plain that this Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government was supported and controlled by the Kwantung Army. This document will be considered more fully a little later.


General Tanaka testified that in September 1935 MINAMI sent DOHIHARA to Peiping with orders to set up an autonomous regime in North China. Tanaka was then a staff officer with the Kwantung Army and he stated that he had a hand in the drafting of DOHIHARA's instructions. He also said that DOHIHARA, ITAGAKI, and Sasaki considered that "Anti-Communism" should be added as a slogan to the objective of creating an autonomous regime in North China. We accept this evidence, for it fits in with what followed and its statement as to the real authors of the so-called autonomous movement in North China is confirmed by various documents from Japanese sources which will be [49,173] noticed hereafter.

We have little evidence as to the events of the next two months. This is not surprising, for they were presumably months of intrigue, of dangerous intrigue. Negotiations on such matters are seldom recorded or made public.

DOHIHARA first tried to persuade Wu Pei-Fu to become the head of a North China Autonomous Government and failed. DOHIHARA thereafter tried to induce General Sung Che-Yuan, then Garrison Commander of the Peiping-Tientsin Area, to lead such a government, and failed. DOHIHARA and Takahashi, who was Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy, then passed from persuasion to demands that a North China Autonomous Government should be formed and DOHIHARA and Matsui, who was Chief of the Japanese Special Services Board, further demanded that special economic concessions should be granted to the Japanese in North China.

It is proved that when inducements failed to produce an autonomous government, DOHIKARA in November 1935 betook himself to threats of force, and even to the issue of an ultimatum for the purpose of procuring the establishment of such a government, and that the Kwantung Army backed up his threats by concentrating a striking force of tanks, mobile troops, and airplanes at [49,174] Shanhaikwan at the eastern end of the Great Wall, ready to advance into the Peiping-Tientsin area.

About the end of the year 1935 there emerged two new forms of government in North China. One, which was set up directly as a result of DOHIHARA's effort, was called the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." It was established about the end of November 1935 with Yin Ju-Keng as its chairman. He had been administrative commissioner of the demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall in East Hopei. It proclaimed itself independent of the National Government of China. Its capital was Tungchow in the demilitarized zone, northeast of Peiping. The Japanese maintained garrison troops there. Its control extended over many districts of the demilitarized zone. The witness Goette travelled in this area many times after the establishment of this government, saw the Japanese garrison troops, and saw the Chinese gendarmerie of the new government, recruited, trained, and officered by Japanese. Being in the demilitarized zone, this new government was beyond the reach of the forces of the National Government of China. That government protested to the Japanese against the existence of this so-called autonomous government, but without effect.

Another new governmental organ which made its [49,175] appearance in North China about this time was the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. It was created by the National Government of China as a result of pressure exerted by DOHIHARA and ostensibly to conform to his wishes. According to the Japanese Year Book it was a new political organ which had power to negotiate with Japan and Manchukuo for the maintenance of amicable relations.

DOHIHARA's hopes of these regimes can be gathered from his report made to MINAMI in Tanaka's presence in the end of 1935. DOHIHARA reported that the Hopei-Chahar regime and the East Hopei regime, though unsatisfactory, had been established and would more or less obey the Kwantung Army, and that the North China regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime as its core.

Similar hopes were entertained by the Japanese Army at home at this time. On 13 January 1936 it transmitted to the Japanese forces in China a plan for dealing with North China. The object of the plan was stated to be the realization of self- government in the five northern provinces of China. This it will be recalled was the object for which MINAMI had dispatched DOHIHARA to Peiping in September 1935. The plan suggested that Japanese advice and guidance should be given to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; that East Hopei independence should be upheld so long as the Hopei-Chahar Political [49,176] Council remained unsatisfactory, but, when it was established so as to justify confidence, a merger should be introduced; that measures should be avoided which might lend to Japan being misunderstood as if she were setting up a separate state like Manchukuo; that accordingly Japanese advisers should be limited in number; that measures towards Inner Mongolia should be continued as before, but measures which had become obstacles to the self-government power of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council should be held back for the time being; that management of North China should be the duty of the Commander of the Japanese troops in China; and that as a rule he should execute this informally by direct contact with the Hopei- Chahar and East Hopei Governments,


About the time when DOHIHARA was expressing to MINAMI, commanding the Kwantung Army, his expectation that the Hopei Chahar Political Council would more or less obey the Kwantung Army, and that an independent North China regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime as its core, the Kwantung Army sent to Tokyo a Propaganda Plan which is most significant as to Japanese intentions towards North China. It was dispatched by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of [49,177] War on 9 December 1935. Certain passages in it merit quotation in full. As to the time of execution it is stated

"Prior to the advance of our military forces into China proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly to support from the side the propaganda of the Japanese Government and the Japanese forces stationed in China. After the advance of our forces into China proper it shall be performed so as to facilitate our military activities."

The general principle is stated to be

"We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into China proper takes place. We shall launch out on a movement to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the Central Government by fomenting anti-Kuomintang and anti-communism agitation among them. As for the Chinese people and army of the rest of China we shall take a measure to form an anti-war atmosphere."

We quote also the types of propaganda which are to be used.

"1. The Central Government has regarded North China as a colony in a sense and has long made it the object of exploitation. The inhabitants in North China therefore have been cherishing a strong desire to establish a separate government of their own in order to shake themselves from the fetters of the Central Government. Burning, with strong aspiration for independence [49,178] the people concerned have expressed their firm resolution to establish an independent country.
"2. The enactment of the nationalization of silver has made the Central Government the object of resentment and as a result of it the movement to establish a new independent government in North China is making rapid progress.
"3. It is the greatest desire of the Japanese Government to form an anti-Communist front with the North China independent government, for it may be considered the first ray of hope for the establishment of lasting peace in the Orient by the harmonious cooperation among Japan, China and Manchuria. We therefore shall assume a definite attitude to support wholeheartedly the establishment and development of the independent government in North China.
"4. The Chinese Central Government has violated the agreement of cessation of hostilities in North China and other military agreements; they have been disturbing the pence of Manchuria; instigating a boycott of Japanese goods and an anti-Japanese sentiment; and has become a great menace to the Japanese interests and residents in North China and the existence of the Manchurian Empire; therefore we have to make it clear that we shall be obliged to resort to arms if the Chinese Government [49,179] continues such underhanded tactics.
"5. It must made clear that when we do dispatch our forces to China in the future. We do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military, and not the Chinese people at large.
"6. We shall try to enhance an anti-war sentiment among the people by propagandizing extensively that the employment of military forces by the Chinese Central Government or other military lords will reduce the people to the greatest misery and will lead to the destruction of the country.
"7. As for the Chinese forces, we will take a measure to promote antagonism between them and to increase their admiration for the strength of the Japanese military power, thus depriving their fighting spirit.
"8. Our propaganda for Manchuria will be that the appearance of the independent government in north China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their longing for the fine administration of the Manchurian Government, and it will brighten the future of Manchuria." [49,180] We have quoted from this document so fully in order that its proposals, advanced on 9 December 1945 may be contrasted with the contention proposed by the defense in general, and by MINAMI, UMEZU, ITAGAKI, and DOHIHARA in particular, that the so-called North China independence movement was a spontaneous movement on the part of the people of North China, neither initiated nor furthered by Japan.

Relevant also to the question of the attitude and intention of the Japanese towards the so-called autonomous movement in North China is a "Draft of Outline for the military Disposal of Various Railways in North China" sent by General Tada, then Commander of the Japanese garrison forces in North China, to the Ministry of War in Tokyo on 2 December 1935.

This document contains detailed plans for the working of certain railways in North China on behalf of Japanese troops engaged in military operation in North China. The document does not specifically mention the nature of this proposed military operation. The operation is described in such vague terms as the "military objective", "military operations", and "when the army find it inevitable to settle the issue by armed force." A critical examination of the whole document, however, reveals that the Japanese Army [49,181] proposed to move from about the line of the Great Wall, driving before it the military forces of the National Government of China, and clearing Shantung, Hopei and Shansi, the three southern provinces of the five northern provinces of China. It is clear also that the operation was to be embarked on to support the proposed North China Autonomous Regime. Thus the Chinese employees of the railways were to be made to "understand the spirit of the North China Autonomous Movement," and General Tada expresses a private and strictly confidential opinion as to the disposal of the railways when normal political condition is restored. He says

"When the situation in North China is restored to its normal condition after the military operations are over, the railways will be turned over to the North China Regime. Under the management of the Communication ministry of the North China Regime Japanese advisers and/or some railway employess will be employed.

"Addenda. The following demands will be made of the North China Regime on the occasion of the abolition of the headquarters of the 'Japanese' Railway Corps.
"1. Employment of adivsers and high-ranking officials by each railway.
"2. The right of guarding the railways and of posting troops at the principal places along the [49,182] railway lines.
"3. Cession of the Shantung Railway and the section of the Lunghai Railway east of Suchow. "4. The right of constructing new railways."

Moreover the document shows that certain steps had already been taken in North China to pave the way for the operation. Thus

"2. We shall endeavor to check the southward transfer of rolling stocks in counter opposition to the Nanking Government's policy of carrying away rolling stocks and other materials to the south. For this purpose we shall do our best in applying all possible indirect means, but in the case of Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway we shall check it even by might if necessary. In case such forcible measure is taken, we shall give as the nominal reason self-defense and protection of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway against the anti-Japanese military operations of the Making Government. (This is being enforced by the dispatch of military police under an agreement made with the Peiping-Shanhaikwen Railway Co.)"

Thus during the latter half of the year 1935 the Kwantung Army and the North China Garrison Army with the support of and at times as directed by, the Japanese Ministry of War, were engaged in an attempt [49,183] to detatch the five northern provinces of China from allegiance to the National Government of China, and to set up an autonomous regime or regimes there, which would be subservient to Japan. The plan contained the two essential elements which had been present in the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol, namely, (1) military domination by Japan, and (2) a declaration of independence by such for Chinese figures as could be induced to serve Japan's purpose. In the Manchurian case, however, military conquest had preceded the artificially engendered declaration of independence. In the case or North China the Japanese military had hoped to avoid the appearance of military conquest, and had tried hard to induce the establishment of an artificially engendered North China Autonomous Government at first by persuasion and later by threat of the use of force. By the end of the year 1935 the Japanese military had evolved the plans for invasion which we have just considered. The efforts of the Japanese military were known to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and were resented by it, but only because they were regarded as an attempt by the Army to encroach on the Foreign Ministry's domain -- the conduct of the foreign relations of Japan. [49,184]


While Japan's armies in China were formulating plans in anticipation of military operations in North China, the Japanese Cabinet was working on a program of subjugating China through diplomatic measures. On 5 August 1935, Foreign Minister HIROTA sent to the diplomatic and consular officials in China a plan prepared on his instructions by the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office, as a result of the reinvestigation of Japan's policy towards China which had been made by that Bureau in collaboration with the Army and Navy authorities. Three general principles were stated in the plan, as follows:

(1) China should carry out strict control over all anti-Japanese speeches and activities, and both Japan and China should make efforts to promote friendship and cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual respect of independence, cooperation and mutual assistance, and should work for the development of relations between Manchukuo and China;
(2) While the ultimate aim of the development of relations was that China would give formal recognition to Manchukuo and that Japan, Manchukuo and China would conclude an agreement to regulate the new relations among the three countries, China for the time being should not deny the fact of [49,185] Manchukuo's existence, at least in North China and in the Chahar district which bordered the Manchukuo territory, and should enter into actual relations of interdependence and cooperation with Manchukuo in the economic and cultural fields;
(3) Japan and China should cooperate in Chahar and other districts bordering Outer Mongolia, with a view to removing the communist menace.

In a subsequent telegram dated 28 September 1935, addressed to Japanese diplomatic and consular officials in China and Manchukuo, HIROTA reiterated the three principles as the basis of Japan's foreign policy to stabilize East Asia and to work for common prosperity by means of cooperation and mutual assistance between Japan, Manchukuo and China, putting Japan as its center. In substance the three principles were recited as follows:

(1) China should carry out strict control of all anti-Japanese speeches and activities and should cooperate with Japan on concrete questions, putting an end to her policy of depending upon European and American countries;
(2) China must ultimately give a formal recognition to Manchukuo, but for the time being China should give tacit consent to the independence of Manchukuo and enter into relations of interdependence and cooperation with Manchukuo in the economic and cultural fields, at least in North China which is an [49,186] area bordering Manchukuo territory;
(3) China should cooperate with Japan in removing the communist menace in areas bordering
Outer Mongolia.

The telegram appended the additional instruction that in the event the above- mentioned principles were carried into execution steadily and China's sincerity sufficiently manifested, a general agreement would be concluded for the regulation of the new relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. One material alteration in this statement of the three principles as compared with the statement of 5 August 1935 is that the later version omits the statements that Japan and China should cooperate on the basis of the principle of mutual respect of independence.

After considerable discussion with the Army and the Navy, the plan as set out in the second version of 28 September 1935 was adopted on 4 October 1935 by the Premier, the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers. Japanese diplomatic officials abroad were again notified and instructed to keep the matter strictly secret. On 21 January 1936, the three principles were made known to the public through HIROTA'S address to the Diet. On the part of China , however, no enthusiasm was shown for their acceptance inasmuch as these principles would involve China's recognition of the de facto status of Manchukuo. Thus the diplomats of [49,187] Japan would have secured for Japan the fruits of her conquest of Manchuria.

While HIROTA, on 21 January 1936, was announcing his three principles, of Japanese policy towards China, the Japanese Foreign Office was fully aware of the Army's plan to set up an autonomous government in the five northern provinces of China, for on that same day, 21 January 1936, it had transmitted a copy of that plan to the Japanese Ambassador in China.


The February Incident was an outburst of the Army's resentment against the government under the premiership of Okada which was known as a Navy Cabinet and reputed to be opposed to the Army's policy of expansion on the continent of Asia by military force. The Incident occurred on 26 February 1936. Earlier, when Okada was Navy Minister in the Saito Cabinet, great difficulties were experienced by the Cabinet because the Cabinet was pursuing a policy of reducing the Army budget against vigorous opposition of the Army. When Okada became Premier in 1934, the power of the Army was increasing. There were already indications, while the Cabinet was being formed, that the Army would bring about disturbances and trouble with the new government. [49,188] On 26 February 1936, some 22 officers and 1400 men revolted against the Government, terrorized Tokyo for three and a half days, seized the Premier's official residence, the Diet Building, the Home and War Offices, the Metropolitan Police Building and the General Staff Building, assassinated Finance Minister Takahashi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saito and General Watanabe and attempted to assassinate Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Okada himself. As a result of the incident, the Okada Cabinet resigned on 8 March 1936, and HIROTA succeeded as Premier.

The purpose of this Incident was to replace the Okada Cabinet by another with stronger policies which would fit into the policy of the Army for further expansion on the continent. Okada testified that he supposed the Incident was a spontaneous outburst of resentment on the part of a group of young officers against the Government's lack of sympathy with the ambitions of the military.

We will adjourn until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)


The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the Tribunal's judgment.


On 9 March 1936, as a result of the February Incident, HIROTA succeeded Okada as Premier of Japan. Instead of taking measures to enforce military discipline and eradicate the interference of the Army in political affairs, some dire effects of which had just been exhibited, already in the formation of his Cabinet he yielded to Army demands as to the choice of some of his ministers. Moreover, in May 1936, shortly after he assumed the premiership, the organization of the Army and Navy was changed to require that Army and Navy ministers should be of rank now lower than lieutenant-general and vice-admiral, and vice-ministers of rank not lower than major-general and rear-admiral, and that they should all be on the active list. Since 1913 the organization had in form permitted the appointment of reserve officers as Ministers of War and of the Navy. While the change [49,190] did, in fact, make the law conform to the existing practice of appointing War and Navy ministers from senior officers on the active list, it was done in compliance with the demand of the Army, who were thereby assured that whoever became War Minister, whether on the active list or recalled from the reserve list, would be subject to Army discipline and command and thus to control by the Army.


On 30 June 1936, the War and Navy Ministries agreed upon a "Basis of National Policy." The fundamental policy was to consist in advancing toward and developing the South Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Asiatic Continent for stabilizing Japan's national defense. The principles stated were:

(1) Japan must strive to correct the aggressive policies of the great powers and to realize the spirit of the "Imperial way" by a consistent policy of overseas expansion;
(2) Japan must complete her national defense and armament to secure the position of the
Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia;
(3) Japan expects the sound development of Manchukuo and thus hopes to stabilize Japan- Manchukuo national defense; in order to promote economic development, Japan intends to be rid of the menace of the U. S.S.R. [49,191] to prepare against Britain and the United States and to bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo and China; in the execution of this continental policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers;
(4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economical development in the South Seas, and without rousing other powers will attempt to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan may expect full development of her natural resources and develop her national defense.

These plans were adopted on 11 August 1936 as the "Basic Principles of National Policy" by the Five Ministers Conference, consisting of the Premier, HIROTA, and the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers. While HIROTA contends that they were to be achieved by peaceful means and were defensive in nature, the contents of these principles speak for themselves. Japan proposed to assume the role of the leader of East Asia, thus bringing the entire sphere under her domination through expansion on the continent and to the South Seas, to the exclusion of the influence of western power. As has been previously observed the use of the words "national defense" in this document should be noted. They occur in many statements of [49,192] Japan's policy. They are never confined to defense by Japan against the aggressive acts of other nations. They always mean military support by Japan of her own policies, aggressive or not.


While the HIROTA Cabinet was formulating its expansionist foreign policy under the name of national defense, the Kwantung Army had its attention directed toward Mongolia in the north. Earlier, on 28 March 1936, five days after ITAGAKI was promoted to Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he had an interview with Ambassador Arita, expounding his views on the strategic impertance of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. ITAGAKI said:

"Outer Mongolia is of importance from the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today, because it is the flank defense of the Siberian Railroad which is a connecting line between Soviet territory in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed without fighting. Therefore, the Army aims to extend Japanese-Manchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand." [49,193] In connection with Inner Mongolia, he said:

"Western Inner Mongolia and the zone to the west of these are of great value for executing the continental policy of Japan. Should the said zone be placed in the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influence, it means that will be a base for pacification of their brothers of the same race in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, that the influence of Soviet Russia which comes from Province of Sinkiang, as well as a land link between Soviet Russia and China will be blocked. . . . From the above standpoint, the Imperial Army has been furthering its work with regard to Western Inner Mongolia for several years. The Imperial Army is resolved to further its work, overcoming all sorts of obstacles."

This statement made by ITAGAKI shows what the Kwantung Army had done and would continue to do in those areas in line with Japan's "continental policy." It is to be recalled that a part of Inner Mongolia had already been brought under Japanese sway by the establishment of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime under Prince Teh through the efforts of DOHIHARA and others of the Kwantung Army in 1935. All that was left to be done was to extend the Japanese influence further west and to Outer Mongolia. This explains why the seat of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime, under [49,194] Prince Teh was moved from Pallingmiao to east Sunito in February 1936, and again to Teh-Hua in June of the same year.


As a result of the adoption of a positive Mongolian policy by Japan, the autonomous movement in Inner Mongolia made steady progress. In April 1936, Prince Teh and Li Shou-Hsin met with the Japanese Special Service Chief Tanaka, Hisshi, at West Wuchumuhsin. Representatives of Mengchenhui, Hsilinkuolemeng, Tsaknarmen, Ulanchapmeng, Tumotechi, Alashan, Koshimouchi, Ikochiamang, Tsinghai and Outer Mangolis also attended this meeting, which was called the State Founding Conference, lasting from 21 to 26 April 1936. The principal matters decided at the conference were:

(1) A plan to found the Mongolian State by amalgamating Mongolia and Tsinghai;
(2) A plan to set up a monarchy, with a committee system to serve the purpose for the time being;
(3) A plan to found a Mongolian Congress;
(4) A plan to organize a military government; and
(5) A plan to conclude a mutual assistance agreement with Manchukuo.

In June 1936, the seat of the regime was moved to Teh-Hua and an independent Mongolian government was set up there. In July 1936, an agreement between [49,195] this government and Manchukuo was concluded, providing for mutual political and economic aid. After the conclusion of this treaty, Prince Teh set out to equip his army. The object was to increase cavalry divisions which had hitherto numbered three to nine. Both MINAMI and ITAGAKI gave their earnest support for the creation of the Mongolian State. The Army's policy was carried out in utmost secrecy. Preparations were made by the Japanese Army to recognize the independence of Inner Mongolia.


On 11 August 1936, "The Second Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided by the appropriate ministries in the HIROTA Cabinet. The main purpose of the policy was stated to be to assist the people in North China to procure perfect independence in administration, to set up an anti-Communist, pro-Japanese and pro- Manchukuoan area, to secure necessary materials for Japan's national defense and to improve the facilities of transportation against the possible invasion of Soviet Russia, thus making North China a base for cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China. The five provinces in North China should finally be put under self- government. Advice should be given to the East Hopei regime to reform their internal administration [49,196] so as to serve as an example throughout Hopei and Chahar. The object of economic development in North China was stated to be to create an inseparable connection between China and Japan based on the mutual economic interest promoted by free investment and also to make it contribute toward the preservation of friendly relations between Japan and North China, both in time of war or peace. Iron, coal and salt in the North China provinces should be utilized for Japan's national defense and for the promotion of transportation facilities and electric power. The same plan provided in detail for the unification and improvement of transportation facilities and the methods of developing natural resources in North China. There is internal evidence in this plan that the hopes entertained by Japan at the end of 1935 that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council would prove subservient to Japan had been disappointed. This plan says a fair and square attitude is required for the guidance of the leaders of Hopei and Chahar. It says the system should be improved, the personnel purged and changed, and efforts made to abolish the financial, economic and military administration of the Chinese military clique.

The content of the self-government which Japan now proposed for North China was that the new regime [49,197] should have control of finances, industry and transportation and should be free of the anti-Japanese interference of the National Government of China. The plan at the same time provided that acts must be avoided which would make it appear as if Japan was infringing China's territorial rights or establishing an independent country, or making North China an extension of Manchukua. A similar provision, it will be remembered, appeared in the first plan, or Army plan, for North China forwarded by the Foreign Office to the Japanese Ambassador to China on 13 January 1936. The framers of Japan's policies still believed that black could be made to look white in the eyes of the world. The expose by the League of Nations of Japan's duplicity in regard to Manchuria had taught them nothing.

Subsequently, on 20 February 1937, "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided upon by the appropriate ministries of the Hayashi Cabinet. There was no substantial change in contents. Again, on 16 April 1937, "The Plan for Guiding North China" was decided upon by the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers of the same Cabinet. The essence of the plan was to make the Chinese Government recognize the special position of North China and to carry out eccnomic measures. Both the Third Administrative [49,198] Policy Toward North China and the Plan for Guiding North China decided upon by the Hayashi Cabinet will be treated in more detail later.


In May 1936, as a result of negotiations conducted between the Japanese forces and the Chinese authorities in North China, one Japanese battalion was permitted to be stationed at Fengtai, a town west of Peiping. On 18 September 1936, an incident occurred when a company of Japanese soldiers carried out maneuvers in Fengtai. As they passed through the garrison line of the Chinese troops there, the Chinese patrols attempted to halt them and a clash ensued. Although it was immediately settled, the Japanese used this incident as a pretext for reenforcement and occupied Fengtai. With the occupation of Fengtai, the Japanese were in a position to control the communications of the Peiping-Hankow railway line and to cut off North China from Central China. This was the stage-setting for the Lukouchiao Incident, sometimes referred to as the Marco Folo Bridge Incident which occurred on 7 July 1937. The bridge is on the railway from Fangtai to Peiping and if the Japanese could gain control of the bridge, their control of Peiping from the west would be facilitated. The Japanese forces stationed at Fengtai then [49,199] repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Lukouchiao and also from Chang-Sin-Tien, another strategic point on the railway leading to Peiping. In the winter of 1936, the Japanese intended to reenforce their gar