



International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda

ICTR-99-50-T
23-06-2010
(33553-33546)

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OR: ENG

Before Judges: Khalida Rachid Khan, presiding
Lee Gacuiga Muthoga
Emile Francis Short

Registrar: Mr. Adama Dieng

Date: 23 June 2010

THE PROSECUTOR
v.
CASIMIR BIZIMUNGU
JUSTIN MUGENZI
JÉRÔME-CLÉMENT BICAMUMPAKA
PROSPER MUGIRANEZA

Case No. ICTR-99-50-T

JUDICIAL RECORDS ARCHIVES
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**DECISION ON PROSPER MUGIRANEZA'S FOURTH MOTION TO
DISMISS INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO TRIAL
WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY**

Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal

Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Paul Ng'arua

Counsel for the Defence:
Ms. Michelyne C. St. Laurent and Ms. Andrea Valdivia for **Casimir Bizimungu**
Mr. Ben Gumpert and Mr. Jonathan Kirk for **Justin Mugenzi**
Mr. Michel Croteau for **Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka**
Mr. Tom Moran and Ms. Cynthia Cline for **Prosper Mugiraneza**

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INTRODUCTION

1. By Motion filed on 6 April 2010, the Accused Prosper Mugiraneza ("Mugiraneza") alleges a violation of his right to trial without undue delay as guaranteed by Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal and requests the dismissal of the Indictment against him with prejudice.¹ The Prosecution opposes the Motion, arguing that there has not been any undue delay in this case.²

DISCUSSION

Law on Undue Delay

2. Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute provides:

In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

[...]

(c) To be tried without undue delay

3. The Chamber recalls that the Appeals Chamber has previously held that in determining whether there has been a violation of the right to be tried without undue delay, it is necessary to consider, *inter alia*, the following factors:

- (1) The length of the delay;
- (2) The complexity of the proceedings, such as the number of charges, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the volume of evidence, the complexity of facts and law;
- (3) The conduct of the parties;
- (4) The conduct of the relevant authorities; and
- (5) The prejudice to the accused, if any.³

4. The Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence indicates that there cannot be a determination of whether the right to trial without undue delay was violated without considering the totality of the above-mentioned five criteria.⁴ Furthermore, a finding of undue delay will depend on the circumstances of the case.⁵

¹ *Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al.*, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, "Prosper Mugiraneza's 11th Anniversary Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violation of Right to Trial Without Undue Delay", filed 6 April 2010 ("Motion"); *Bizimungu et al.*, "Prosper Mugiraneza's Reply to Prosecutor's Response to Prosper Mugiraneza's 11th Anniversary Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violation of Right to Trial Without Undue Delay", filed 15 April 2010, ("Mugiraneza's Reply").

² *Bizimungu et al.*, "Prosecutor's Response to Prosper Mugiraneza's 11th Anniversary (*sic*) Motion for Violation (*sic*) of Right to Trial Without Undue Delay", filed 12 April 2010, ("Prosecution Response").

³ *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Chamber II Decision of 2 October 2003 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Demand Speedy Trial and for Appropriate Relief," (AC), 27 February 2004 ("Appeals Chamber Undue Delay Decision"), page. 3. See also *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Third Motion to Dismiss for Indictment for Violation of his Right to a Trial Without Undue Delay," (TC), 10 February 2009 ("Third Undue Delay Decision"), paras. 12-23.

⁴ *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Second Motion to Dismiss for Deprivation of his Right to Trial Without Undue Delay," (TC), 29 May 2007, ("Second Undue Delay Decision") para 15, citing *Prosecutor v. Prosper Mugiraneza et al.*, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's



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Mugiraneza's Motion

5. This is the fourth Motion of such a nature to be filed by Mugiraneza⁶ who incorporates, by reference, the arguments he made in his earlier submissions on this issue.⁷ The Chamber denied all previous Motions, finding that there had not been a violation of Mugiraneza's right to a trial without undue delay.⁸

6. In this Motion as well as its predecessors, Mugiraneza relies on a number of authorities external to the Tribunal, including the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Supreme Court of the United States of America (US Supreme Court).⁹ The Chamber notes, once again, that it accepts the binding nature of the generally accepted norms of human rights on the Tribunal.¹⁰ It reiterates, however, that while the jurisprudence of these authorities may have a persuasive effect on a Trial Chamber, the Tribunal's own statutory instruments and jurisprudence remain its primary sources of law. Therefore, the Chamber considers that it should have recourse to such authorities only to the extent that the Tribunal's statutory instruments and jurisprudence are deficient.¹¹

7. In this respect, the Chamber notes that the fundamental guarantees afforded to Mugiraneza and other accused before the Tribunal are derived directly from the Tribunal's statutory instruments, particularly Articles 19 and 20 of the Statute. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber has already established clear criteria which must be taken into account in determining whether there has been undue delay. Therefore, in assessing Mugiraneza's request for the dismissal of the Indictment against him, the Chamber will follow the jurisprudence which is binding upon it.

Application for a Hearing or other Relief on his Motion for Dismissal for Violation of his Right to Trial without Undue Delay (TC), 3 November 2004, para. 28.

⁵ Second Undue Delay Decision, para 15, citing *Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi*, Case No. ICTR-96-15-1, Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and for Stoppage of Proceedings (TC), 23 May 2000 at para. 68.

⁶ See *Bizimungu et al.*, "Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of Article 20 (4)(C) of the Statute, Demand for Speedy Trial and for Appropriate Relief" ("First Motion"), filed on 18 July 2003; *Bizimungu et al.*, "Prosper Mugiraneza's Second Motion to Dismiss for Deprivation of his Right to Trial Without Undue Delay" ("Second Motion"), filed on 12 December 2006; and *Bizimungu et al.*, "Prosper Mugiraneza's Third Motion to Dismiss for Deprivation of his Right to Trial Without Undue Delay" ("Third Motion"), filed on 10 December 2008.

⁷ Motion, para. 4.

⁸ See Third Undue Delay Decision; Second Undue Delay Decision, generally, and particularly the findings at para. 39; *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Application for a Hearing or Other Relief on his Motion for Dismissal for Violation of his Right to Trial without Undue Delay," (TC), 3 November 2004, ("First Undue Delay Decision") generally, and particularly the findings at para. 34. See also *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of Article 20(4)(C) of the Statute, Demand for Speedy Trial and for Appropriate Relief," (TC), 2 October 2003. Note that certification to appeal the Trial Chamber's Decision of 2 October 2003 was granted and the Appeals Chamber subsequently vacated the Trial Chamber's Decision. It remanded the matter back to the Trial Chamber for reconsideration of its decision, see Appeals Chamber Undue Delay Decision. The Trial Chamber's subsequent reconsideration of its Decision of 2 October 2003 led to its Decision of 3 November 2004.

⁹ Motion, paras. 7-10.

¹⁰ Second Undue Delay Decision, para 20; Third Undue Delay Decision, para 10.

¹¹ *Ibid.*



8. Mugiraneza's principal argument in this fourth Motion is that the length of the delay should be the single most important factor in determining whether there has been a violation of his right to trial without undue delay. He urges the Chamber to "give the greatest weight to the length of the delay" and argues that this factor alone can outweigh all the others.¹²

9. The Chamber recalls the Appeals Chamber's ruling that in order to determine whether there has been undue delay, it is necessary to "conduct a full enquiry," taking all the factors into account.¹³ The Chamber will therefore consider each of the five factors enumerated by the Appeals Chamber in determining the issue.

Application of the Appeals Chamber Factors

(1) The length of the delay

10. Mugiraneza asserts that "the length of the delay standing alone should be sufficient to require dismissal of the indictment."¹⁴ He submits that, having been incarcerated for 4,018 days as at the date of filing the Motion,¹⁵ he has been denied his right to a trial without undue delay.

11. The Chamber disagrees with Mugiraneza's view that the Indictment ought to be dismissed solely on the basis of the length of his incarceration. The Chamber has heard all the evidence in Mugiraneza's case and is currently at the stage of deliberating and preparing its judgement. It reiterates its previously expressed view that the reasonableness of a period of delay cannot be translated into a fixed length of time and has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration all of the other factors articulated by the Appeals Chamber.¹⁶

(2) The complexity of the proceedings

12. Mugiraneza makes no new submission regarding the complexity of the case. The Prosecution, on its part, notes that Mugiraneza fails to appreciate the administrative complexities involved in running a trial at an *ad hoc* international tribunal.¹⁷

13. The Chamber observes that these proceedings, involving four co-accused, 171 witnesses, 404 trial days and several thousand pages of exhibits and court transcripts, are very

¹² Motion, paras. 9, 13..

¹³ Appeals Chamber Undue Delay Decision.

¹⁴ Motion, para. 9.

¹⁵ Motion, para. 5.

¹⁶ *Bizimungu et al.*, "Decision on Justin Mugenzi's Motion Alleging Undue Delay and Seeking Severance" (TC), 14 June 2007 para. 15; Second Undue Delay Decision, para 27; *See also, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi*, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, Decision on the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and For Stoppage of Proceedings (TC), 23 May 2000, para. 68; *Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi*, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defense Motion for the Provisional Release of the Accused (TC), 21 February 2001, para. 11; *Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba*, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-PT, Decision of Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings (TC), 3 June 2005, para. 26; *Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al.*, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza's Application for a Hearing or Other Relief on His Motion for Dismissal of His Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (TC), 3 November 2004, para. 31. In addition, as this Chamber has previously noted, *see*, Second Undue Delay Decision, para. 27: "the Strasbourg organs have deemed trials that lasted longer than 10 years to be compatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, on the other hand holding that undue delay has occurred in others which lasted less than one year."

¹⁷ Prosecutor's Response, para. 2. (c).



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complex indeed.¹⁸ The complexity of the factual allegations is exacerbated by the legal issues involved, including the Prosecutor's allegation of conspiracy and the various modes of liability attaching to the counts in the Indictment. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber, Judge Short dissenting, is not of the view that there has been undue delay.

(3) The conduct of the parties

14. Mugiraneza does not present any new evidence of delay caused by the Prosecution or any of the co-accused in this case and relies on arguments made in his prior submissions. The Chamber has previously considered these arguments and found that there was no undue delay in this case attributable to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).¹⁹ For the same reasons, the Chamber again rejects the arguments.

(4) The conduct of the relevant authorities

15. In his earlier submissions, Mugiraneza attributed the alleged undue delay to the failure of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to provide adequate resources to the Tribunal. He also blamed the perceived delay on the bureaucratic infighting between the OTP and the Registry, on the limited amount of courtroom space and on the practical realities of working simultaneously in three languages. In his latest submission, Mugiraneza suggests that "the creator of the court must give it the tools in terms of money, personnel and physical plant to conduct its business without undue delays."²⁰

16. In rejecting these arguments previously, the Chamber noted that Mugiraneza had failed to provide any details to support his assertion that the Tribunal lacks the personnel and facilities to perform its functions or to show how such issues have translated into undue delay.²¹ For the same reasons, the Chamber, Judge Short dissenting, cannot find that the conduct of the relevant authorities has resulted in undue delay in these proceedings.

(5) The prejudice to the Accused, if any

17. In addition to earlier submissions regarding, *inter alia*, the fading memories of witnesses and the loss of exculpatory evidence over time, Mugiraneza now submits that as a matter of international human rights law, after an 11-year delay, prejudice should be presumed and the Indictment against him should be dismissed.²² He further submits that his continued detention "carries with it prejudice such as oppressive incarceration, anxiety and concern."²³

18. The Chamber notes that Mugiraneza has now been in custody for 11 years. However, this matter must be considered in light of the totality of the criteria laid down by the Appeals Chamber. Furthermore, since the date of the previous Decision on this issue, the trial in this case has advanced significantly and the Chamber is now at the stage of deliberating and considering its judgement. Therefore, the Chamber is not of the view, Judge Short dissenting, that there has been undue delay in this case.

¹⁸ Second Undue Delay Decision, para. 30; Third Undue Delay Decision, para. 16. See also the "Trial statistics" provided in the Prosecution Response at paras 14-21.

¹⁹ First Undue Delay Decision, para. 32; Second Undue Delay Decision, para. 33.

²⁰ Mugiraneza's Reply, para. 17 b.

²¹ Second Undue Delay Decision, para. 36; Third Undue Delay Decision, paras. 19-20.

²² Motion, para. 9.

²³ Motion, para. 12.

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Conclusion


19. Mugiraneza requests the Chamber to dismiss the Indictment against him with prejudice as "the only remedy" for the undue delay he has suffered. Having considered the submissions of the Parties in light of the totality of the criteria established by the Appeals Chamber, and taking into account the current stage of the proceedings in the case, the Chamber finds, Judge Short dissenting, that Mugiraneza has failed to show that he has been denied his right to a trial without undue delay. Therefore, the Chamber, Judge Short dissenting, need not consider whether dismissing the Indictment is an appropriate remedy.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE CHAMBER, JUDGE SHORT DISSENTING,

DENIES the Motion.

Judge Emile Francis Short appends a partially dissenting opinion

Arusha, 23 June 2010



Khalida Rachid Khan
Presiding Judge



Lee Gacuiga Muthoga
Judge



Emile Francis Short
Judge

