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Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTR-00-55A-AR73
24th March 2009
{35/H – 45/H}

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Fausto Pocar, Presiding
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen
Judge Liu Daqun
Judge Theodor Meron
Judge Carmel Agius

ICTR Appeals Chamber
Date: 24th March 2009
Action: R. Jumet
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Decision of: 24 March 2009

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THE PROSECUTOR

v.

THARCISSE MUVUNYI

Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-AR73

DECISION ON THE PROSECUTOR'S APPEAL CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF EVIDENCE TO BE ADDUCED IN THE RETRIAL

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Hassan Bubacar Jallow
Charles Adeogun-Phillips
Ibukunolu Alao Babajide
Thembile M. Segoete

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda
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SIGNATURE: DATE: 24 March 2009

Counsel for Tharcisse Muvunyi:

William E. Taylor III
Abbe Jolles
Dorian Cotlar

1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January and 31 December 1994 ("Appeals Chamber" and "Tribunal", respectively) is seized of an appeal, filed on 5 February 2009 by the Prosecution,[1] against a decision of Trial Chamber III concerning the scope of evidence it is permitted to adduce during the retrial of Tharcisse Muvunyi.[2] Mr. Muvunyi filed his response on 13 February 2009,[3] and the Prosecution filed its reply on 17 February 2009.[4]

BACKGROUND

2. On 12 September 2006, Trial Chamber II convicted Mr. Muvunyi of three counts of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment.[5] The Appeals Chamber reversed these convictions on 29 August 2008 and ordered a retrial limited to the allegation under Count 3 of the Indictment that Mr. Muvunyi is responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on a speech he purportedly gave at the Gikore Trade Center.[6]

3. Three witnesses testified on this event at trial: Prosecution Witnesses YAI and CCP and Defence Witness MO78.[7] The Appeals Chamber stated that: "From the discussion of the evidence in the Trial Judgement, [it] cannot conclude whether a reasonable trier of fact could have relied on the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP to convict [Mr.] Muvunyi for this event."[8] The Appeals Chamber also considered that the Trial Chamber did not provide sufficient reasons for preferring the evidence of the two Prosecution witnesses over that of the Defence and found that the Trial

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[1] Prosecutor's Appeal of the Decision of Trial Chamber III Limiting the Scope of the Evidence the Prosecutor Is Entitled to Adduce in a Retrial Pursuant to Rule 118(C), 5 February 2009 ("Appeal").
[2] *The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-PT, Oral Decision, T. 14 January 2009 p. 3 ("Impugned Decision"). Certification to appeal was granted on 29 January 2009. *See The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-R73(B), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Certification to Appeal the Limitation of the Scope of the Retrial (Rule 73(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), 29 January 2009, p. 2.
[3] Accused Tharcisse Muvunyi's Response to Prosecutor's Appeal of the Decision of the [*sic*] Trial Chamber III Limiting the Scope of the Evidence the Prosecutor Is Entitled to Adduce in a Retrial Pursuant to Rule 118(C), 13 February 2009 ("Response").
[4] Prosecutor's Reply to Tharcisse Muvunyi's Response to Prosecutor's Appeal of the Decision of Trial Chamber III Limiting the Scope of the Retrial Pursuant to Rule 118(C), 17 February 2009 ("Reply").
[5] *Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement and Sentence, 18 September 2006, paras. 531, 545 ("*Muvunyi* Trial Judgement"). The Trial Judgement was pronounced on 12 September 2006, and the written judgement was filed with the Registry on 18 September 2006.
[6] *Tharcisse Muvunyi v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgement, 29 August 2008, paras. 148, 171 ("*Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement").
[7] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, paras. 142-148; *Muvunyi* Trial Judgement, paras. 191-211. The Trial Chamber also referred to Defence Witness MO30 in its recitation of the relevant evidence, but did not discuss his evidence in its deliberations.
[8] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 144.

Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on this point.[9] In particular, it noted that the Trial Chamber did not point to any inconsistencies in Witness MO78's account of the meeting or any other reasons for doubting his credibility whereas it did expressly recognize the need to treat the evidence of the two Prosecution witnesses with caution.[10] Given the aggregate errors in addressing the apparent inconsistencies between the accounts of the witnesses, the Appeals Chamber was not in a position to determine whether the Trial Chamber exhaustively and properly assessed the entire evidence on this point.[11] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber quashed the conviction and "order[ed] a retrial"[12] on this issue "to allow the trier of fact the opportunity to fully assess the entirety of the relevant evidence and provide a reasoned opinion."[13] It further concluded that, if a new Trial Chamber were to enter a conviction on this charge after retrial, any sentence could not exceed the 25 years of imprisonment imposed by the first Trial Chamber.[14]

4. At a status conference on 28 November 2008, the Prosecution expressed that the scope of evidence to be presented during the retrial should not be limited to the witnesses who testified in the original trial.[15] In its Pre-Trial Brief, filed on 4 December 2008, the Prosecution listed five factual witnesses as well as the expert witness heard during the original trial to be called during the retrial.[16] With respect to the event at Gikore Trade Center, the factual witnesses include only one of the two witnesses who testified on the event in the initial proceedings, namely Witness CCP, and three other witnesses who were not previously heard (Witnesses FBX, AMJ, and CCS), but whose statements the Prosecution had disclosed to the Defence during the original trial.[17]

5. During a status conference on 14 January 2009, Judge Byron of Trial Chamber III orally issued the Impugned Decision. He held that the scope of the retrial was limited to the evidence adduced during the initial proceedings as the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not provided sufficient reasons in its assessment of the evidence. He decided that the retrial was limited to correcting the Trial Chamber's failure and that the Prosecution could therefore not call new witnesses, namely Witnesses FBX, AMJ, and CCS.[18]

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[9] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 147.
[10] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 147.
[11] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148.
[12] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 171 (emphasis omitted).
[13] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148.
[14] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 170.
[15] T. 28 November 2008 pp. 2, 3. *See also* Appeal, paras. 13, 14, 17.
[16] *The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-PT, The Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, 4 December 2008, Annex 1 ("Pre-Trial Brief"). *See also* Impugned Decision, p. 3; Appeal, para. 16; Response, para. 3.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

6. In its Appeal, the Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by equating retrial, as provided for in Rule 118(C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal ("Rules"), with a remittance to consider a narrow issue and requests the Appeals Chamber to reverse the Impugned Decision limiting the scope of evidence it may adduce in the retrial.[19] In its view, the retrial in the instant case is a trial *de novo,* giving the Prosecution the right to expand or reduce the scope of the evidence to be presented to the extent that it does not cause material prejudice to the accused.[20] In this respect, it relies on the definition of retrial in Black's Law Dictionary and the Criminal Procedure Code of Malaysia which indicate that a retrial is to be conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.[21] Similarly, the Prosecution also refers to the interpretation of the term "rehearing" made by Trial Chamber III in the *Karemera et al.* case, in which the Chamber decided that prior orders and decisions related to the evidence in that case no longer had any effect once proceedings had restarted.[22]

7. The Prosecution also contends that narrowing the scope of the retrial runs contrary to the language of the Appeals Chamber's express intention "to allow the trier of fact the opportunity to fully assess the entirety of the relevant evidence and to provide a reasoned opinion."[23] It submits that, as it is impossible to empanel the original Bench, the Appeals Chamber's order cannot be construed solely as a corrective measure to remedy the deficiencies in the Trial Chamber's reasoning.[24] According to the Prosecution, even if the Trial Chamber were composed of the same Judges, restricting the Prosecution to calling the same witnesses who appeared in the initial trial would frustrate the purposes of retrial in the event that they were no longer available.[25]

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[17] Appeal, para. 16; Response, para. 7; Pre-Trial Brief, Annex 3 (disclosure chart). The Prosecution also intends to call Witness NN, who appeared in the initial trial, as a factual witness in order to provide a contextual overview of the prevailing situation in Butare prefecture at the time. *See* Pre-Trial Brief, para. 12, Annex 1.

[18] Impugned Decision, p. 3.

[19] Appeal, paras. 2-10, 23-36; Reply, para. 6. The Prosecution also refers to paragraph 15 of the partial dissenting opinion of Judge Wald in *Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić*, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, 5 July 2001 in which she distinguishes between retrial and remittance.

[20] Appeal, paras. 6-8; Reply, paras. 5, 7-14.

[21] Appeal, para. 33, citing Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition 1990), p. 1317; Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593)(revised – 1999) §316 (reprinted in the Annotated Statutes of Malaysia, Volume 5, Part (2)1, (Malayan L. J. Sdn. Bhd. 2001)).

[22] Appeal, paras. 34-36, citing *The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al.*, Case No. ICTR-98-44-PT, Decision on Severance of André Rwamakuba and Amendments of the Indictment, 7 December 2004, para. 14.

[23] Appeal, para. 39, quoting *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148. *See also* Appeal, paras. 8, 26, 37-48; Reply, para. 15.

[24] Appeal, paras. 46-48.

[25] Appeal, para. 47.

8. Finally, the Prosecution argues that the inclusion of new witnesses in the Prosecution witness list could cause no possible prejudice to Mr. Muvunyi, since the proposed evidence is drawn from materials disclosed to the Defence during the initial trial.[26]

9. Mr. Muvunyi responds that the Impugned Decision properly determined that the scope of the retrial ordered by the Appeals Chamber is limited to the witnesses heard during the original proceedings in order to correct the initial Trial Chamber's failure to issue a reasoned opinion.[27] He observes that, contrary to what is suggested by the Prosecution, the inclusion of new witnesses would result in allowing the Prosecution "to correct its mistakes – to the extreme detriment of the Accused".[28]

10. Mr. Muvunyi submits that trying an accused for the same charges constitutes an inadmissible violation of the *non bis in idem* principle and that allowing the Prosecution to present new evidence would place him in double jeopardy.[29] As a corollary, he submits that the Prosecution should be bound by the initial list of witnesses offered at the first trial.[30] Furthermore, he appears to observe that, pursuant to Rule 73*bis*(E) of the Rules, the Prosecution may vary its witness list if it demonstrates that such a variation is "in the interest of justice".[31] He submits that, in the present case, the Prosecution failed to provide such a demonstration, considering that the addition of new witnesses would not be the consequence of newly discovered evidence nor a mechanism to expedite the proceedings.[32]

11. Finally, Mr. Muvunyi argues that there is no logic in the Prosecution's argument that, because the Trial Chamber is no longer composed of the same Judges, the Prosecution is to be allowed to present new evidence.[33] He submits that "[t]here is no impediment in the law to having another Trial Chamber hear the evidence considered by the initial Trial Chamber and making a proper analysis".[34]

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[26] Appeal, para. 6.
[27] Response, paras. 5, 6, 8-25.
[28] Response, para. 6.
[29] Response, para. 15.
[30] Response, para. 15.
[31] Response, para. 21. Mr. Muvunyi incorrectly refers to Rule 78*bis*(E) of the Rules, which does not exist. He appears to mean Rule 73*bis*(E) of the Rules.
[32] Response, para. 21.
[33] Response, para. 23.
[34] Response, para. 23.

DISCUSSION

12. Rule 118(C) of the Rules provides that "[i]n appropriate circumstances the Appeals Chamber may order that the accused be re[-]tried before the Trial Chamber." This rule does not specify the scope of any retrial that the Appeals Chamber may order; indeed, that scope is given by the Appeals Chamber in a particular instance. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber has the inherent power to remit limited issues to either the original or to a new Trial Chamber.[35]

13. The Appeals Chamber considers that a retrial pursuant to Rule 118(C) of the Rules inherently includes the possibility of hearing evidence that was not presented during the initial proceedings.[36] Neither the Rules nor the Tribunal's jurisprudence prohibit a Trial Chamber from hearing the testimony of new witnesses when a retrial is ordered. Whether new evidence should be allowed at the retrial is a determination to be made within the Trial Chamber's discretion which is guided by the same criteria governing the admission of evidence at trial. In contrast, a remittance to consider limited issues is not a new trial on the remitted questions; as such, it does not allow for the possibility of new evidence in the absence of express authorization.[37] The Appeals Chamber considers that its inherent power to remit limited issues to a Trial Chamber also allows it to impose restrictions on the scope of a retrial under Rule 118(C) of the Rules, including the admission of new evidence. However, such restrictions must be explicit.

14. In the present case, in quashing Mr. Muvunyi's conviction under Count 3 of the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber expressly found that the circumstances were appropriate for retrial pursuant to Rule 118(C) of the Rules on the allegation related to the Gikore Trade Center. If the Appeals Chamber had wished to further narrow the scope of subsequent proceedings in this case, it would have acted instead under its discretionary power to remit the original Trial Chamber's assessment of the evidence for additional consideration or explicitly limited the retrial to the original evidence. There is nothing in the Appeals Chamber's disposition of the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement or its

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[35] *Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić et al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-A*bis*, Judgement on Sentence Appeal, 8 April 2003, paras. 9, 10, 16, 19 (*Mucić et al.* Appeal Judgement").

[36] *See, e.g., Patterson v. Haskins*, 470 F.3d 645, 669 (6th Cir. 2006)("[A]n appellate court's reversal of a conviction for trial error, unless specifically stated, does not oblige the government on remand to present a virtually identical version of the evidence and arguments that led to the initial reversal. In light of this court's statement in *Davis*, and because the type of limitation sought by Patterson is not ordinarily imposed, we conclude that our prior opinion did not intend to impose restrictions on the amount or type of evidence that the state could present during his retrial.").

[37] *Mucić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 17 ("Once the Appeals Chamber exercised its inherent power to remit those limited issues to the Trial Chamber to be determined, the Trial Chamber had no power to go beyond determining the limited issues remitted to it. The Trial Chamber was not conducting a new trial on the issue of sentence, and – just as the situation would have been had the Appeals Chamber determined those limited issues itself – Rule 101(B) did not require the Trial Chamber to have regard to further evidence from the parties when determining those issues. The Trial Chamber's ruling, effectively that further evidence was inadmissible in the circumstances of this case, was correct. The argument that the Trial Chamber was obliged to receive further evidence in accordance with Rule 101(B) is rejected.").

conclusion of the ground of appeal related to the Gikore Trade Center event which suggests that the retrial should be limited to the original evidence.

15. To the contrary, the operative paragraph of the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement reflects that the purpose of the retrial was to allow the trier of fact "the opportunity to fully assess *the entirety of the relevant evidence* and to provide a reasoned opinion."[38] This broad formulation does not limit consideration of evidence to the witnesses heard during the initial proceedings, but rather implies that the Trial Chamber is to take into consideration all of the admissible and relevant evidence proposed by the parties, in order to provide a reasoned opinion on Count 3. It would be unreasonable to hold that, by ordering the exceptional measure of a retrial, the Appeals Chamber wanted to pursue the same goal that it could have reached by simply remitting the question to the Trial Chamber for a further assessment of the available evidence.

16. In addition, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Mr. Muvunyi's argument that allowing the Prosecution to present new evidence at the retrial stage would constitute a violation of the *non bis in idem* principle. The *non bis in idem* principle aims to protect a person who has been finally convicted or acquitted from being tried for the same offence again.[39] The Appeals Chamber quashed Mr. Muvunyi's conviction related to his alleged conduct at the Gikore Trade Center and ordered a retrial on Count 3 of the Indictment for that event, in accordance with the Rules. As such, there is no final judgement with respect to that allegation.

17. Furthermore, Rule 73*bis*(E) of the Rules, which delimits the Prosecution's ability to amend its witness list, is not relevant in the present context. The considerations under that rule apply "after [a] commencement of Trial" and not to the filing of an initial witness list in a retrial. However, the Appeals Chamber draws to the attention of the Prosecution that, in the circumstances of this case, it shall present all the evidence produced in the trial on Count 3, apart from any additional evidence it might want to adduce.

18. Finally, the Appeals Chamber considers that, contrary to Mr. Muvunyi's submissions, allowing the Prosecution to present new evidence in the retrial would not prejudice him. The fact that the Prosecution has changed its trial strategy in the subsequent proceedings is not a factor for consideration in the interpretation of the order for the retrial in the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement. All fair trial principles governing trial also apply to the retrial proceedings. The Prosecution proposes to call only six witnesses, which suggests that the duration of the proceedings will not be significantly

[38] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148 (emphasis added).
[39] *See* International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(7) ("No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.").

longer than if it were limited to those called to testify on this point in the initial trial. Mr. Muvunyi has also been in possession for several years of the statements of the three witnesses who did not appear in his original trial but whom the Prosecution proposes to call during the retrial. He has made no submissions that the addition of these witnesses will require significantly more investigations on his part. Moreover, as a further safeguard, the Appeals Chamber limited any possible sentence to be imposed in the new trial to no more than the 25 years' imprisonment ordered in the initial proceedings.[40] Therefore, Mr. Muvunyi is not prejudiced by the limited expansion of the Prosecution's witness list during the retrial.

19. In light of the above considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Impugned Decision erred in law in interpreting the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement as imposing restrictions on the scope of evidence to be considered at the retrial.[41]

DISPOSITION

20. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber **GRANTS**, Judges Shahabuddeen and Meron dissenting, the Appeal.

Done in English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Done this 24th day of March 2009,
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.

Judge Fausto Pocar
Presiding

[Seal of the Tribunal]

[40] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 170.
[41] This does not mean that the Trial Chamber cannot exercise its discretion under Rule 73*bis*(D) of the Rules to order the Prosecution to reduce the number of its witnesses if it considers that an excessive number of witnesses are being called to prove the same facts.

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES SHAHABUDDEEN AND MERON

A. The Scope of the Trial Chamber's Order that Muvunyi be Retried

1. The core issue facing the Appeals Chamber is the scope of limitation on Muvunyi's retrial. On this question, Presiding Judge Byron of the Trial Chamber found that the Appeals Chamber's order for retrial was limited "to the allegation . . . [that Muvunyi] made a speech at the Gikore trade centre . . . [and to] assessment of the evidence adduced before the first Trial Chamber."[1] There is no disagreement that the retrial was limited "to the allegation under Count 3 of the Indictment that Mr. Muvunyi is responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on a speech he purportedly gave at the Gikore Trade Center."[2] We disagree with the majority's broad interpretation of what evidence may be introduced in the retrial.

2. The majority quotes the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement's statement that the retrial should serve as an "'opportunity to fully assess *the entirety of the relevant evidence* and to provide a reasoned opinion.'"[3] On the basis of this language, it concludes that the *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement's "broad formulation does not limit consideration of evidence to the witnesses heard during the initial proceedings, but rather implies that the Trial Chamber is to take into consideration all of the admissible and relevant evidence proposed by the parties, in order to provide a reasoned opinion on Count 3."[4]

3. The majority's logic hinges on the phrase "the entirety of the relevant evidence." Its focus on one sentence of the Appeals Judgement does not, however, appropriately take into account the context of the decision to order retrial. The Appeals Chamber explained that its quashing of Muvunyi's conviction under Count 3 was based on the Trial Chamber's "aggregate errors in addressing the apparently inconsistent testimony of Witnesses YAI, CCP, and MO78."[5] In particular, these errors included the "utter lack of any discussion [...] in the Trial Judgement" of the "numerous inconsistencies" in the testimonies of Prosecution witnesses YAI and CCP.[6] The Appeals Chamber also noted that the Trial Chamber "failed to provide a reasoned opinion"

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[1] Impugned Decision, p.3.
[2] *See* Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 3.
[3] *Ibid.*, para. 15 (quoting *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148 (emphasis added by the Appeals Chamber)).
[4] *Ibid.*, para. 15.
[5] *Muvunyi* Appeal Judgement, para. 148.
[6] *Ibid.*, para. 144.

explaining its preference for "the testimony of Witnesses YAI and CCP over that of [Defence] Witness MO78."[7]

4. Once the broader discussion of the order that Muvunyi be retried is considered, the parameters of the Appeals Chamber's concerns are patent, and thus the appropriate scope of retrial is also clear. The relevant evidence is the testimonies of Witnesses YAI, CCP and MO78, which the Trial Chamber "failed to provide a reasoned opinion on"[8] when assessing. The purpose of the ordered retrial was to correct this significant flaw in the initial Trial Judgement, allowing the Trial Chamber an additional opportunity to assess the testimony of the original witnesses at trial and provide a reasoned explanation for choosing which account of Muvunyi's speech it believed. In this sense, the Appeals Chamber's order reflected the fact that "it is not, as a general rule, in the best position to assess the reliability and credibility of [. . .] evidence."[9]

5. The majority's singular focus on one fragment of the *Muvunyi* Appeals Judgement disregards the surrounding discussion. While the language quoted by the majority might well stand for a full retrial in isolation, in context it can only be understood as authorizing retrial on the concerns identified by the Appeals Chamber – in this case, the lack of explanation for choosing one set of witness accounts over another.

B. The Impact of the Prosecution's Proposed Trial Strategy

6. We note also that the new, expansive trial strategy proposed by the Prosecution is troubling. The Prosecution proposes to drop one of the two witnesses whose inconsistent testimony was identified by the Appeals Chamber as a major concern, and add the testimony of three additional witnesses.[10] The Prosecution's proposed strategy underscores the problematic nature of retrial, where the Prosecution is effectively given a second chance to make its case. It may also have the effect of obscuring rather than explaining discrepancies in its witnesses' testimony. When retrial is ordered, it is particularly important to safeguard defendants' rights through means such as limitations on which evidence the Prosecution may adduce; we believe the *Muvunyi* Appeals Judgement intended just that.

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[7] *Ibid.*, para. 147.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik* Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, 17 March 2009, para. 798.
[10] *See* Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 4.

Done in English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Done this 24th day of March 2009,
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.

Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen

Judge Thedor Meron

[Seal of the Tribunal]