

16 JUILLET 2013

ORDONNANCE

**CERTAINES ACTIVITÉS MENÉES PAR LE NICARAGUA
DANS LA RÉGION FRONTALIÈRE**

(COSTA RICA c. NICARAGUA)

**CONSTRUCTION D'UNE ROUTE AU COSTA RICA
LE LONG DU FLEUVE SAN JUAN**

(NICARAGUA c. COSTA RICA)

**DEMANDES TENDANT À LA MODIFICATION DE L'ORDONNANCE
EN INDICATION DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES
DU 8 MARS 2011**

**CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY NICARAGUA
IN THE BORDER AREA**

(COSTA RICA v. NICARAGUA)

**CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD IN COSTA RICA
ALONG THE SAN JUAN RIVER**

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**REQUESTS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE ORDER
OF 8 MARCH 2011 INDICATING
PROVISIONAL MEASURES**

16 JULY 2013

ORDER

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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IN THE BORDER AREA**

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ALONG THE SAN JUAN RIVER**

(NICARAGUA v. COSTA RICA)

**REQUESTS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE ORDER OF 8 MARCH 2011
INDICATING PROVISIONAL MEASURES**

ORDER

Present: President TOMKA; Vice-President SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR; Judges OWADA, ABRAHAM, KEITH, BENNOUNA, SKOTNIKOV, CANÇADO TRINDADE, YUSUF, GREENWOOD, XUE, DONOGHUE, GAJA, SEBUTINDE, BHANDARI; Judges ad hoc GUILLAUME, DUGARD; Registrar COUVREUR.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 76 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

Whereas:

1. By an Application filed in the Registry of the Court on 18 November 2010, the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica (hereinafter “Costa Rica”) instituted proceedings against the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua (hereinafter “Nicaragua”) for “the incursion into, occupation of and use by Nicaragua’s army of Costa Rican territory”, as well as for “serious damage inflicted to its protected rainforests and wetlands”, “damage intended [by Nicaragua] to the Colorado River” and “the dredging and canalization activities being carried out by Nicaragua on the San Juan River” (case concerning *Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, hereinafter “the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* case”).

2. On 18 November 2010, having filed its Application, Costa Rica also submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures, under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73 to 75 of the Rules of Court.

3. By an Order of 8 March 2011 made in that case (hereinafter “the Order of 8 March 2011”), the Court indicated the following provisional measures to both Parties:

“(1) Each Party shall refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, any personnel, whether civilian, police or security;

(2) Notwithstanding point (1) above, Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect;

(3) Each Party shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve;

(4) Each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures.” (*Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011*, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp. 27-28, para. 86.)

4. By an Order of 5 April 2011, the Court fixed 5 December 2011 and 6 August 2012 as the respective time-limits for the filing in the case of a Memorial by Costa Rica and a Counter-Memorial by Nicaragua. The Memorial and the Counter-Memorial were filed within the time-limits thus prescribed.

5. By an Application filed with the Registry of the Court on 22 December 2011, Nicaragua instituted proceedings against Costa Rica for “violations of Nicaraguan sovereignty and major environmental damages on its territory”, resulting from the extensive road construction works being carried out by Costa Rica in most of the border area between the two countries along the San Juan River, the opening-up of the Costa Rican bank of the said river to agriculture and the “uncontrolled industrial development taking place in the river basin” (case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica)*, hereinafter “the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case”).

6. By an Order of 23 January 2012, the Court fixed 19 December 2012 and 19 December 2013 as the respective time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by Nicaragua and a Counter-Memorial by Costa Rica in this latter case. The Memorial was filed within the time-limit thus prescribed.

7. At the time of the filing of the said Memorial, Nicaragua requested the Court, *inter alia*, to “examine *proprio motu* whether the circumstances of the case require[d] the indication of provisional measures”. By letters dated 11 March 2013, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court was of the view that the circumstances of the case, as they presented themselves to it at that time, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 75 of the Rules of Court to indicate provisional measures *proprio motu*.

8. By two separate Orders dated 17 April 2013, the Court joined the proceedings in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* and *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* cases.

9. On 23 May 2013, Costa Rica filed with the Registry a request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011 (see paragraph 3 above). That request makes reference to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 76 of the Rules of Court.

The Registrar immediately communicated a copy of the said request to the Government of Nicaragua.

10. By letters dated 24 May 2013, the Registrar informed the Parties that the time-limit for the filing of any written observations that Nicaragua might wish to present on Costa Rica’s request had been fixed as 14 June 2013.

11. In its written observations, filed within the time-limit thus prescribed, Nicaragua asked the Court to reject Costa Rica’s request, while in its turn requesting the Court to modify or adapt the Order of 8 March 2011 on the basis of Article 76 of the Rules of Court.

A copy of Nicaragua's written observations and request was immediately transmitted to Costa Rica, which was informed that the time-limit for the filing of any written observations that it might wish to present on the said request had been fixed as 20 June 2013.

Costa Rica filed such written observations within the time-limit thus prescribed.

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12. At the end of its request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011, Costa Rica seeks the following measures:

“Pursuant to Article 76 of the Rules of Court, Costa Rica respectfully requests the Court as a matter of urgency to modify its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011 so as to prevent the presence of any person in the Area [indicated by the Court in the said Order] other than persons whose presence is authorized by paragraph 86 (2) of the Order, thereby preventing irreparable harm to individuals and further irreparable harm to the Area, pending its determination of this case on the merits. In particular, Costa Rica respectfully requests the Court as a matter of urgency to modify its Order by including in it the following provisional measures:

- (1) the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Nicaraguan persons from the Area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011;
- (2) that both Parties take all necessary measures to prevent any person (other than persons whose presence is authorized by paragraph 86 (2) of the Order) coming from their respective territory from accessing the area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011; and
- (3) that each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures within two weeks of the issue of the modified Order.

Costa Rica reserves the right to amend this Request and the measures sought.”

13. At the end of its written observations on Costa Rica's request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011, Nicaragua “asks the Court to declare that the [said] request . . . does not fulfil the requirements for the Modification [Costa Rica] has requested”.

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14. At the end of its written observations and request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011 (see paragraph 11 above), Nicaragua contends that, although Costa Rica's request is unsustainable, there has been a change in the factual and legal situations, namely the construction of the road and the joinder of the cases. As a result, on the basis of Article 76 of the Rules of Court, Nicaragua requests that the Court modify its Order in the following ways:

“— The second measure ordered by the Court should be modified to read as follows:

Notwithstanding point (1) above, both Parties may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; both Parties shall consult in regard to these actions and use their best endeavours to find common solutions with the other Party in this respect;

— The third measure ordered by the Court should be modified to read as follows, to make clear that the Order is applicable to the case as now joined.

Each Party shall refrain from any action, which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court in either of the joined cases or make it more difficult to resolve, and will take those actions necessary for avoiding such aggravation or extension of the dispute before the Court.”

15. At the end of its written observations on Nicaragua's request, Costa Rica “requests the Court to reject the two requests by Nicaragua for the modification of the Court's Order of 8 March 2011”.

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16. In order to rule on the respective requests of Costa Rica and Nicaragua for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011, the Court must determine whether the conditions set forth in Article 76, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court have been fulfilled. That paragraph reads as follows:

“At the request of a party the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.”

17. The Court must therefore first ascertain whether, taking account of the facts now brought to its attention by each of the Parties, there is reason to conclude that the situation which warranted the indication of certain provisional measures in March 2011 has changed since that time. If that is so, then it will have to consider whether such a change justifies a modification by the Court, as sought by the Parties or otherwise, of the measures previously indicated.

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18. The Court will therefore begin by determining whether there has been a change in the situation which warranted the measures indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011.

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19. Costa Rica contends that its request for the modification of that Order is prompted, in the first place, by Nicaragua's sending to the disputed area, as defined by the Court in the said Order, and maintaining thereon large numbers of persons, and, secondly, by the activities undertaken by those persons affecting that territory and its ecology. In particular, it objects to the "continuous presence of these individuals . . . sponsored by Nicaragua", claiming that Nicaragua is operating an educational programme by which young Nicaraguan nationals are sent to the disputed area. Costa Rica alleges that these individuals have the support of the Nicaraguan Government and challenges Nicaragua's contention that they are members of a private movement who are present in the said area for the purpose of carrying out activities to protect the environment. In Costa Rica's view, these actions, which have been taking place since the Court decided to indicate provisional measures, create a new situation necessitating the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011, in the form of further provisional measures, in particular so as to prevent the presence of any individual in the disputed territory other than those authorized to enter it under the terms of paragraph 86, point 2, of the said decision.

20. In its written observations, Nicaragua asserts that there has been no change in the situation that could be invoked by Costa Rica so as to obtain the modification of the Order of the Court in the way that it requests. It takes the view that paragraph 78 of that decision "demonstrates that the Court considered the issue of private individuals entering and undertaking activities in the disputed area" and decided to require the Parties to monitor the area and co-operate to prevent

“criminal” activity. It also states that the young people referred to by Costa Rica are only carrying out environmental sustainability programmes and that their activities are thus in no way harmful to the environment. Nicaragua therefore believes that Costa Rica’s complaints do not derive from any change in the situation which formed the basis of the Order of 8 March 2011. Consequently, it asks the Court to declare that Costa Rica’s request for modification of the Order does not fulfil the necessary requirements.

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21. In its request for the modification or adaptation of the Order of 8 March 2011, Nicaragua asserts that the only pertinent changes that have taken place since that decision, within the meaning of Article 76 of the Rules of Court, are Costa Rica’s construction of a 160-km long road along the right bank of the San Juan River and the joinder of the proceedings in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* and *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* cases. It considers that the works along the San Juan River are having a harmful effect on the fragile fluvial ecosystem, including the disputed area near the mouth of the river. It further maintains that, following the joinder of the proceedings, certain measures indicated in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* case should be extended to the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case. Nicaragua concludes that these are the changes which justify modifying the Order of the Court in the way that it is seeking.

22. In its written observations, Costa Rica responds that no part of the road in question is in the disputed area and that the joinder of the proceedings in the two above-mentioned cases “does not mean that there is now one proceeding which should be the subject of joint orders”. Moreover, it recalls that Nicaragua requested the Court to indicate provisional measures *proprio motu* in the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case, but that the Court was of the view that the circumstances of the case, as they presented themselves to it at that time, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 75 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, Costa Rica asks the Court to reject Nicaragua’s request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011.

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23. The Court will first examine the request of Costa Rica. It observes that its Order of 8 March 2011 deals with the sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, “of any *personnel* [of the Parties], whether civilian, police or security” (*Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, p. 25, para. 77, and p. 27, point 1, of the operative clause (emphasis added)). At no time during the proceedings on the Request for the indication of

provisional measures submitted by Costa Rica did it complain of the presence, in the said territory, of individuals or groups of individuals, much less that of “large numbers” of private persons. Nor did the Court specifically address in its decision the question of private persons entering the disputed territory. It confined itself to referring, in paragraph 78 of that decision, to the question of criminal activity in the disputed territory, because, during the oral proceedings, Nicaragua had drawn attention to the fact that it had until then been carrying out patrols in that territory, and argued that to prevent it from continuing with such action “would amount to creating a zone of impunity for drug dealers and other criminals”.

24. As indicated above (see paragraph 19), in its request for modification of that Order, Costa Rica now complains of the “continuous presence” in the disputed territory, since the rendering of the Order of 8 March 2011, of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals. Nicaragua, although maintaining that those concerned “[are] neither part of the Government of Nicaragua nor acting under the Government’s direction or control”, acknowledges the presence in the said territory of members of the *Guardabarranco Environmental Movement*, an entity which it describes as a private movement whose main objective is to implement environmental conservation programmes and projects.

25. In light of the evidence communicated to it, the Court therefore regards it as having been established that, since the rendering of its Order of 8 March 2011, organized groups of persons, whose presence was not contemplated when it made its decision to indicate provisional measures, are regularly staying in the disputed territory. It considers that this fact does indeed constitute, in the present case, a change in the situation within the meaning of Article 76 of the Rules of Court, upon which Costa Rica may be entitled to rely in support of its request for the modification of the said Order.

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26. The Court will now examine the request of Nicaragua. As regards its first argument, concerning the construction of a road (see paragraph 21 above), the Court recalls that, in the Application instituting proceedings which it filed in the Registry on 21 December 2011, Nicaragua indicated that “[t]he most immediate threat to the [San Juan] river and its environment is posed by Costa Rica’s construction of a road running parallel and in extremely close proximity to the southern bank of the river, and extending for a distance of at least 120 kilometres”. When it filed its Memorial in the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case, on 19 December 2012, Nicaragua also asked the Court to “examine *proprio motu* whether the circumstances of the case require[d] the indication of provisional measures”, basing its argument once again on the construction of the road. However, the Court was of the view that this was not the case (see paragraph 7 above).

27. The Court consequently finds that Nicaragua's request for the Order of 8 March 2011 to be modified or adapted does not have any bearing on the situation addressed in that Order. It cannot, as such, be based on any "change in the situation" that gave rise to the indication of provisional measures in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* case.

28. With regard to Nicaragua's second argument, the Court considers that the joinder of proceedings in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* and *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* cases has also not brought about such a change. That joinder is a procedural step which does not have the effect of rendering applicable *ipso facto*, to the facts underlying the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case, the measures prescribed with respect to a specific and separate situation in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* case. Moreover, even if the situation invoked in the *Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* case were to justify the indication of provisional measures, the appropriate method of securing that is not the modification of the Order made in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* case.

29. The Court therefore considers that Nicaragua may not rely upon a change in the situation within the meaning of Article 76 of the Rules of Court in order to found its request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011.

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30. The Court must now examine whether the change in the situation upon which Costa Rica may rely is such as to justify the modification of that Order. That would only be the case if the new situation were, in its turn, to require the indication of provisional measures, i.e., if the general conditions laid down in Article 41 of the Statute of the Court were also to be met in this instance. The Court recalls in this respect that it may only indicate provisional measures if irreparable prejudice may be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings (see, for example, *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993*, *I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 19, para. 34). However, this power will be exercised only if there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights in dispute before the Court has given its final decision (see, for example, *Questions relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009*, *I.C.J. Reports 2009*, pp. 152-153, para. 62).

31. In considering the request for modification of the Order of 8 March 2011, the Court will take account both of the circumstances that existed when it issued that Order and of the changes which have taken place in the situation that was considered at that time.

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32. Costa Rica argues that its request for the modification of the Order of 8 March 2011 is aimed at preventing irreparable prejudice from being caused to “its right to sovereignty, to territorial integrity, and to non-interference with its lands and its environmentally-protected areas”. It states that such prejudice could result from the presence in the disputed territory of any person other than those authorized to enter it under the terms of paragraph 86, point 2, of the Order. Costa Rica claims that the Nicaraguan nationals present in the area have carried out works in an attempt to keep the artificial *caño* open, planted trees in an uncontrolled manner, raised cattle, and erected wire fences to the north of, and running alongside, the *caño*. Costa Rica also complains that these Nicaraguan nationals harass and verbally abuse the Costa Rican personnel charged with the protection of the environment, and states that “of particular concern to [it] is the real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death”.

33. Costa Rica further considers that its request “is of real urgency”. It points out in this respect that the presence of large numbers of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed territory, in breach of its sovereign rights and of the Order of 8 March 2011, and the fact that those concerned “are carrying out activities in the Area that cause harm to the territory of Costa Rica”, pose a serious threat to its internationally protected wetlands and forests. It concludes that, without a modification of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011, there is a real risk that action prejudicial to its rights will occur before the Court has had the opportunity to render its final decision on the questions for determination set out in the Application.

34. In its written observations, Nicaragua recalls that Costa Rica has made three visits to the disputed territory. It maintains that Costa Rica has not demonstrated, after these three visits, that there is any “serious threat” to the disputed territory, nor any “incidents liable to cause irreparable harm in [the] form of bodily injury or death”. Nicaragua further notes that, at the date of its written observations, “neither [the] Ramsar [Secretariat] nor Costa Rica has issued any report regarding the threat of irreparable prejudice” to the disputed area. Nicaragua concludes that Costa Rica has neither demonstrated that any risk of irreparable prejudice exists, nor shown the slightest evidence of “urgency”.

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35. In the light of the evidence before it, the Court considers that, as matters stand, it has not been demonstrated sufficiently that there is a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Costa Rica. The facts put forward by Costa Rica, whether the presence of Nicaraguan nationals or the activities which they are carrying out in the disputed territory, do not appear, in the present circumstances as they are known to the Court, to be such as to cause irreparable harm to “right[s] to sovereignty, to territorial integrity, and to non-interference with [Costa Rica’s] lands”. Nor does the evidence included in the case file establish the existence of a proven risk of irreparable damage to the environment.

Moreover, even assuming that a real risk of irreparable prejudice had been demonstrated, the Court does not see, in the facts as they have been reported to it, the evidence of urgency that would justify the indication of further provisional measures. As it has recalled above (see paragraph 30), the alleged risk must not only be “real”, but also “imminent”. However, most of the evidence put forward by Costa Rica relates to events which occurred some time ago. Thus, Costa Rica’s complaint that Nicaraguan nationals obstructed a visit by Costa Rican environmental personnel to the disputed area concerns a visit which took place in April 2011. By contrast, reports of the most recent visits, on 30 January 2012 and 7 March 2013, contain no suggestion of any disruption. Concerning the 30 January 2012 visit, Costa Rica limits itself to stating that its personnel encountered some 25 Nicaraguans in the disputed territory. With regard to the 7 March 2013 visit, it merely mentions the presence of “a group of approximately 15 Nicaraguan nationals in the area”.

36. Consequently, the Court considers that, despite the change that has occurred in the situation, the conditions have not been fulfilled for it to modify the measures that it indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011.

37. Nevertheless, the presence of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area carries the risk of incidents which might aggravate the present dispute. That situation is exacerbated by the limited size of the area and the numbers of Nicaraguan nationals who are regularly present there. The Court wishes to express its concerns in this regard.

38. The Court thus considers it necessary to reaffirm the measures that it indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011, in particular the requirement that the Parties “shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve” (*Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, p. 27, para. 86, point 3, of the operative clause). It notes that the actions thus referred to may consist of either acts or omissions. It reminds the Parties once again that these measures have binding effect (*LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America)*, *Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001*, p. 506, para. 109) and therefore create international legal obligations which each Party is required to comply with (see, for example, *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, *Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005*, p. 258, para. 263, and *Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, pp. 26-27, para. 84).

39. The Court finally underlines that the present Order is without prejudice as to any finding on the merits concerning the Parties’ compliance with its Order of 8 March 2011.

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40. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

(1) By fifteen votes to two,

Finds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power to modify the measures indicated in the Order of 8 March 2011;

IN FAVOUR: *President* Tomka; *Vice-President* Sepúlveda-Amor; *Judges* Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; *Judge ad hoc* Guillaume;

AGAINST: *Judge* Cançado Trindade; *Judge ad hoc* Dugard;

(2) Unanimously,

Reaffirms the provisional measures indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011, in particular the requirement that the Parties “shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve”.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of July, two thousand and thirteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua, respectively.

(Signed) Peter TOMKA,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.

Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court;
Judge *ad hoc* DUGARD appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) P. T.

(Initialled) Ph. C.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

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I. PROLEGOMENA

1. I regret not to be able to concur with the decision taken by the majority of the Court (first resolutive point) not to indicate *new* provisional measures in the *cas d'espèce*. My perception is that the Court majority's reasoning and decision, *data venia*, suffer from an ineluctable incongruence: having admitted that there is a change in the situation (paras. 25, 31 and 36), it extracts no consequence therefrom, as in its view "the conditions have not been fulfilled" for it to modify the measures it indicated in its previous Order of 08.03.2011 (para. 36). In limiting itself to simply reaffirming its previous provisional measures, yet it expresses its concerns at the new situation created in the disputed area (para. 37), with the presence therein no longer of *personnel* (whether civilian, police or security), but rather of "organized groups" of individuals.

2. My position is, *a contrario sensu*, that the changing circumstances surrounding the present cases (joined), opposing Costa Rica to Nicaragua and *vice-versa*, concerning, respectively, *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, require from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the light of the relevant provisions of its *interna corporis*¹, the exercise of its powers to indicate *new* provisional measures in order to face the *new* situation, which is one of urgency and of probability of irreparable harm, in the form of bodily injury or death of the persons staying in the disputed area.

3. Given the high importance that I attach to the issues raised in the present Order, I feel obliged to present and leave on the records, in the present Dissenting Opinion, the foundations of my position on the matter. I thus take the care to examine herein its aspects, as to the facts and as to the law. I shall start by reviewing the concomitant new requests of additional provisional measures of protection on the part of Costa Rica as well as Nicaragua, and the position taken by them, in their respective requests, as to the purported expansion of provisional measures of protection. After reviewing the technical missions *in loco* pursuant to the 1971 Ramsar Convention, I shall consider the requisites of urgency, and risk or probability of harm (in the form of bodily injury or death, of the persons staying in the disputed area), before proceeding to a general assessment of the requests of Costa Rica and of Nicaragua.

4. I shall then turn my attention to the aspects of the matter as to the law, as I perceive them, namely: a) the effects of provisional measures of protection beyond the strict territorialist outlook; b) the beneficiaries of provisional measures of protection, beyond the traditional inter-State dimension; and c) the effects of provisional measures of protection beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. The way will then be paved for my considerations on the proper exercise of the international judicial function (in the present domain of provisional measures) in the form of a rebuttal of so-called "judicial self-restraint", or *l'art de ne rien faire*. Last but not least, I shall present my concluding reflections towards an *autonomous legal regime* of provisional measures of protection.

II. PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION: THE CONCOMITANT NEW REQUESTS BY COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA

5. May it be recalled, to start with, that, on 18.11.2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was seised of a Request by Costa Rica for the indication of provisional measures in the case, opposing it to Nicaragua, concerning *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*. After the holding of public hearings, the ICJ issued its Order on provisional measures of protection, of 08.03.2011, whereby it determined that

"1. Each Party shall refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, any personnel, whether civilian, police or security; (...)

¹Article 76(1) of the Rules of Court, in addition to Article 41 of its Statute.

2. Notwithstanding point (1) above, Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect; (...)
3. Each Party shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve; (...)
4. Each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures².

Shortly afterwards, on 21.12.2011, Nicaragua filed a case against Costa Rica with the ICJ, concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*. Subsequently, by its Order of 17.04.2013, the ICJ decided to join the proceedings in the two cases.

6. One month later, on 23.05.2013, Costa Rica filed a Request³ for the modification of the aforementioned Order of provisional measures of 08.03.2011. Nicaragua was invited to present written observations concerning Costa Rica's Request⁴. On the stipulated date (14.06.2013), Nicaragua submitted its *Written Observations* on Costa Rica's Request, and presented its own *Request* for the modification of the same Order of 08.03.2011⁵. Costa Rica, for its part, submitted (on 20.06.2013) its own *Written Observations* on Nicaragua's Request, within the stipulated time-limit by the Court⁶.

7. The Court thus had before it two Requests (Costa Rica's and Nicaragua's) and the pieces it needed to proceed to its deliberation on the matter. It should not pass unnoticed that, since the Court issued its Order of provisional measures of 08.03.2011, there have been 16 communications submitted by the parties to the Court in relation to compliance with the Order⁷. This discloses the importance ascribed by both contending parties, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, to the provisional measures of protection in the two respective cases, the proceedings of which having been joined by the ICJ⁸.

III. TECHNICAL MISSIONS *IN LOCO* PURSUANT TO THE RAMSAR CONVENTION

8. The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (known as the Ramsar Convention, adopted in Ramsar, Iran, in 1971, and entered into force on 21.12.1975)⁹ states in its preamble that "the conservation of wetlands and their flora and fauna can be ensured by combining far-sighted national policies with co-ordinated international action".

²ICJ, case concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area* (Costa Rica versus Nicaragua), Provisional Measures — Order of 08.03.2011, *ICJ Reports* (2011) p. 6.

³Costa Rica's *Request* of 23.05.2013 for modification of the Court's Order of 08.03.2011.

⁴On 24.05.2013.

⁵Nicaragua's *Written Observations* on Costa Rica's Request and Nicaragua's *Request* of 14.06.2013 for modification of the Order of 08.03.2011.

⁶Costa Rica's *Written Observations* of 20.06.2013 on Nicaragua's Request.

⁷Parties' communications to the Court along 2011 and 2012, and in 2013.

⁸Pursuant to the Court's two Orders of 17.04.2013.

⁹Cf. *United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS)*, vol. 996, n. I-14583, p. 245. The text of the Ramsar Convention was amended by the Protocol of 03.12.1982 and the Amendments of 28.05.1987.

Both Costa Rica and Nicaragua are Parties to it¹⁰. In its Order of 08.03.2011¹¹, the Court pointed out that, pursuant to Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention, Costa Rica has designated the “*Humedal Caribe Noreste*” wetland “for inclusion in [the] List of Wetlands of International Importance (...) maintained by the [continuing] bureau” established by the Convention, while Nicaragua has proceeded likewise in respect of the “*Refugio de Vida Silvestre Río San Juan*” wetland, of which Harbor Head Lagoon is part (para. 79).

9. Furthermore, the Court, having acknowledged that the disputed area is situated in the “*Humedal Caribe Noreste*” wetland, in respect of which Costa Rica bears obligations under the Ramsar Convention, further considered that,

“pending delivery of the Judgment on the merits, Costa Rica must be in a position to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of that wetland where that territory is situated; (...) for that purpose Costa Rica must be able to dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the said territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to ensure that no such prejudice be caused; and (...) Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect” (para. 80).

10. In this line of reasoning, the Court ordered, in the resolutive point (2) of the *dispositif* of its aforementioned Order, that:

“Notwithstanding point (1) above, Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect”.

Thus, it stems from the Court’s Order of 08.03.2011, that, pursuant to the Ramsar Convention (cf. Article 3(2)¹²), Costa Rica has a duty thereunder to monitor the disputed area which forms part of a protected wetland registered by Costa Rica under the Ramsar Convention.

11. According to those communications submitted to the ICJ, there have been three technical visits, conducted by Costa Rica in the disputed area¹³, in accordance with the Order (resolutive point (2), *supra*). The *first visit in loco* took place in April 2011¹⁴, in order to determine the situation of the wetland and to take “those actions deemed necessary with the aim of avoiding an irreparable damage to the wetlands indicated by the Court in its providence”¹⁵. It is reported that

¹⁰Costa Rica is a Party to it since 27.04.1992, and Nicaragua since 30.11.1997. The Convention counts today (early July 2013), on 168 States Parties.

¹¹Cf. Order of 08.03.2011, *I.C.J. Reports* (2011) p. 6.

¹²Article 3(2) of the Ramsar Convention stipulates that: “Each Contracting Party shall arrange to be informed at the earliest possible time if the ecological character of any wetland in its territory and included in the List has changed, is changing or is likely to change as the result of technological developments, pollution or other human interference. Information on such changes shall be passed without delay to the organization or government responsible for the continuing bureau duties specified in Article 8”.

¹³Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 07.04.2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 11.04.2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13.04.2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 30.01.2012; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 01.03.2013.

¹⁴Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 07.04.2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 11.04.2011, and Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13.04.2011.

¹⁵Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 07.04.2011.

the mission acknowledged “the valuable technical work accomplished at the site during the day of 5 April, which allowed them to gather the technical elements necessary in order to determine the actual condition of the wetland”. It is also stated that “because of the lack of security measures to guarantee the personal safety of the experts as a result of actions outside the control of the Government of Costa Rica, the decision was taken not to return to the ground area and only use the over flight option to compliment the information”¹⁶.

12. This joint Ramsar-Costa Rica first visit included members of the Technical Advisory Mission of the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention and Costa Rican civilian technicians in charge of the protection of the environment¹⁷. Costa Rica further alleges that, during this visit, Costa Rican personnel and members of the Ramsar Mission were “aggressively harassed by Nicaraguan protestors and journalists”. The mission acknowledged “the valuable technical work” accomplished on 05.04.2011, which enabled them to gather the technical elements necessary “in order to determine the actual condition of the wetland”. Yet, “because of the lack of security measures to guarantee the personal safety of the experts as a result of actions outside the control of the Government of Costa Rica”, — Costa Rica adds, — “the decision was taken not to return to the ground area (...)”¹⁸.

13. The *second visit in loco* took place in January 2012. Costa Rica informed the Court that its purpose was to “continue the assessment of the conditions of that wetland in order to avoid irreparable damage”¹⁹. Costa Rica claims that the visit formed “part of the action plan proposed to the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention, and agreed to by the Secretariat”²⁰.

14. The *third visit* occurred in March 2013, Costa Rica having informed the Court that its civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment were to conduct a visit on site. It further communicated to the Court two correspondences, whereby Costa Rica informed the Ramsar Convention Secretariat and Nicaragua of this site visit²¹. And it also reported that this third technical site visit was “carried out in accordance with the Working Plan” contained in the report presented by Costa Rica to the Ramsar Secretariat on 28.10.2011, which was approved by the Ramsar Secretariat in a note dated 07.11.2011. The stated purpose of the visit was to “avoid irreparable prejudice to that part of the northeast Caribbean Wetland”²².

IV. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE PURPORTED EXPANSION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE REQUEST OF COSTA RICA

15. In its *Request* of 23.05.2013 to “modify” the Order of provisional measures of 08.03.2011, Costa Rica calls for three new measures to be added to it, namely, to order:

- “1. The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Nicaraguan persons from the Area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011;
2. That both Parties take all necessary measures to prevent any person (other than the persons whose presence is authorized by paragraph 86(2) of the Order) coming

¹⁶Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13.04.2011; there was the correspondence “Minutes, Coordination Meeting, Advisory Technical Mission of the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention and Representatives of the Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Telecommunications”.

¹⁷Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 07.04.2011.

¹⁸Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13.04.2011.

¹⁹Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 30.01.2012.

²⁰Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 30.01.2012.

²¹Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 01.03.2013.

²²Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 01.03.2013.

from their respective territory from accessing the area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011; and

3. That each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures within two weeks of the issue of the modified Order”²³.

16. It is, in fact, in my perception, a request for an *expansion* of provisional measures of protection. Costa Rica contends that its *Request* is prompted by “Nicaragua’s sending to the area indicated by the Court in its Order [...] and maintaining thereon large numbers of persons, and by the activities undertaken by these persons affecting that territory and its ecology” (para. 2). It adds that there is a change in the situation (para. 4), in the light of Article 76(2) of the Rules of Court²⁴. Costa Rica further claims that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area causes a risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (paras. 18-19). Costa Rica at last contends that there is urgency, since in its view there is a real risk that, without such modification of the Court’s Order, action prejudicial to Costa Rica’s rights will occur before the Court renders its decision on the merits (paras. 18-20).

17. Costa Rica purports to explain further its requested new provisional measures. It alleges that Nicaragua sponsors the continuous presence, in the disputed area, of a large number of Nicaraguan nationals, by its operation of an “academic” program whereby they are sent thereto to carry out activities. In the annexes to its *Request*, Costa Rica refers to press reports on the matter, and adds that it has kept the Court informed about these activities, has formally protested to Nicaragua against them, and has exhausted all efforts to resolve the dispute by diplomatic means, which have failed. Costa Rica claims that the activities at issue have consisted in: a) deliberately interfering with a site visit; b) carrying out works in an attempt to keep the artificial *caño* open; c) engaging in uncontrolled planting of trees in the area; d) raising of cattle in the area; and e) erecting fences in the Area to the North of, and alongside, the *caño* (paras. 4-9)²⁵. This presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area, and their described activities thereon, are, in Costa Rica’s view, in breach of the Court’s Order, and create a new situation, requiring the “modification” of the Court’s Order (paras. 10-14), — in the sense of the expansion of the provisional measures of protection.

18. In its *Written Observations*, Nicaragua, in turn, retorts that Costa Rica’s *Request*, in its view, is “groundless”, as there has been no change in the situation that would call for a “modification” of the Court’s Order in the way described by Costa Rica, and it has not breached the provisional measures indicated by the Court (paras. 1-3). Nicaragua adds that the presence of private individuals is not a new issue under the Court’s Order (para. 13). And as to the presence of members of the *Guardabarranco* Environment Movement referred to by Costa Rica, Nicaragua claims that Costa Rica did not ask, in its request for the indication of provisional measures, for the

²³ Costa Rica’s *Request* of 23.05.2013 for modification of the Court’s Order of 08.03.2011.

²⁴Article 76 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

“1. At the request of a party the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.

2. Any application by a party proposing such a revocation or modification shall specify the change in the situation considered to be relevant.

3. Before taking any decision under paragraph 1 of this Article the Court shall afford the parties an opportunity of presenting their observations on the subject”.

²⁵Costa Rica further recalls that Nicaragua maintains the position that the Court’s Order does not prevent private citizens from accessing the area and carrying activities thereon; in its *Counter-Memorial*, Nicaragua recognizes the presence of its nationals in the area. Costa Rica controverts Nicaragua’s views (paras. 10-14).

withdrawal of private individuals, and adds that the members of the *Guardabarranco* Environment Movement are “private individuals”, as conceded by Costa Rica; it alleges that they are neither part of the Nicaraguan Government, nor are they acting under Nicaragua’s control (paras. 6-14).

19. In its *Written Observations* on Nicaragua’s Request, Costa Rica reiterates its perceived change in the situation, pointing out that Nicaragua does not deny, in its own *Written Observations*, that it is sponsoring, sending and maintaining large number of persons in the area (para. 7). In Costa Rica’s view, the unlawful presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the area is not in dispute. Costa Rica then claims that this is a new situation that did not exist at the time of the oral hearings on provisional measures, as then only *military* personnel was in the area; the Court did not implicitly recognize in its Order of 08.03.2011 that private individuals could enter, remain on, and carry out unsupervised, unpoliced activities in the Area. Costa Rica maintains that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the area is unlawful, and increases the risk of incidents likely to cause irreparable harm²⁶.

V. URGENCY, AND RISK OF HARM IN THE FORM OF BODILY INJURY OR DEATH

20. In its Order of provisional measures of protection of 08.03.2011, the ICJ, recalling the competing claims over the disputed area and Nicaragua’s intention to carry out thereon, “if only occasionally”, certain activities, noted, in paragraph 75, the ensuing risk of irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death. The Court stated that such situation created

“an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica’s claimed title to sovereignty over the said territory and to the rights deriving therefrom; (...) this situation moreover gives rise to a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” (para. 75).

Under these circumstances, the Court decided that provisional measures should be indicated²⁷.

21. The ICJ thus took into account the risk of incidents likely to cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death, and then ordered the requested measures. From the arguments more recently submitted to the Court, it seems that similar concerns about a risk of incidents that could cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death call for additional provisional measures to be adopted by the Court. To this effect, Costa Rica claims that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed territory poses of risk of such irreparable harm²⁸. In its *Request*, Costa Rica sustains that there is “a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” (para. 18); in particular, it links the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area to the risk of irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death, and it adds that there is “real urgency”. There is, furthermore, in its view, “a serious threat to its internationally-protected wetlands and forests” (para. 18).

22. In its *Written Observations*, Costa Rica also argues that there is urgency. Costa Rica links the urgency of the situation to the “real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” in the disputed area (para. 29), and stresses this risk (paras. 25 and 28). Costa Rica asserts that, pursuant to the Court’s Order, it has prevented its police force and residents from entering the area, while Nicaragua has refused to ensure that people from its territory do not enter the area, and continues to maintain therein a constant presence of “substantial numbers of Nicaraguan persons”. Costa Rica then submits that

²⁶*Ibid.*, paras. 25-29.

²⁷Order, para. 75.

²⁸Costa Rica’s *Request*, paras. 18-20; it further alleges that there have lately been incidents in the area, where Nicaraguan nationals have subjected Costa Rican environmental personnel to harassment and verbal abuse, posing a risk of incidents that might cause bodily injury or death.

“[t]here is a real risk that, without a modification of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011, action prejudicial to the rights of Costa Rica will occur before the Court has the opportunity to render its final decision on the questions for determination set out in the Application” (para. 19).

23. For its part, in its *Written Observations* Nicaragua retorts that, after three technical visits to the site, Costa Rica has in its view failed to demonstrate the existence of any “serious threat” to the disputed territory, or any “incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in form of bodily injury or death” (para. 37). It adds that Costa Rica first made such assertions in its *Memorial*, but they had been rebutted by Nicaragua in its *Counter-Memorial*. Thus, Nicaragua denies any urgency in the situation, and adds that Costa Rica’s new allegations could be more properly addressed in the merits phase. Nicaragua claims that, since the Order, it has acted with due diligence to ensure that the area remains free of Nicaraguan *personnel*; as to the presence in the area of members of the *Guardabarranco* Environment Movement referred to by Costa Rica, Nicaragua argues that Costa Rica had not asked, in its earlier *Request* for the indication of provisional measures, for the withdrawal of “private individuals” (paras. 6-14).

VI. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE PURPORTED EXPANSION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE REQUEST OF NICARAGUA

24. On 14.06.2013, Nicaragua submitted its *Written Observations* on Costa Rica’s Request, and made its own *Request* for modification of the Court’s Order²⁹ on the basis of an alleged new factual situation, that is, the construction of a 160 km-long road along the San Juan River and the joinder of the proceedings. Nicaragua argues, in its *Written Observations and Request*, that, despite its call on Costa Rica for halting the construction without an appropriate transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, Costa Rica announced that the work is about to be restarted. Nicaragua argues that the construction of the road has resulted in increased sedimentation and pollution of the River, adverse impact on water quality, aquatic life, navigation and other general uses of the River by the population (paras. 43-46).

25. Nicaragua further argues that the Court’s Order of 08.03.2011 should be adjusted to take into account the “harmful environmental effect of the works in and along the San Juan River on the fragile fluvial ecosystem (including protected nature preserves in and along the river)”, which cover the area in dispute located at the mouth of the River. Nicaragua also refers to the UNITAR/UNOSAT report observing that the area in dispute is being affected by the accumulation of fluvial sediments including those of bank erosion, attributable in part by sediments transmitted to the River by the road construction activities. Nicaragua maintains that the Order should be adjusted to take this into account. Both Parties should be precluded from undertaking any activities unilaterally that increases the “accumulation of fluvial sediments” in the Area (paras. 47-52).

26. As to the joinder of proceedings (cf. *supra*), Nicaragua claims that the Order should be made applicable to the two joined cases, in relation to all activities by either Party that might harm the environment in the area, in order not to aggravate the dispute. Nicaragua recalls a list of urgent measures to prevent further damages to the River which it described in its *Memorial* in the case

²⁹Nicaragua requests that the provisional measure ordered by the Court in resolatory point (2) be modified to read:

“Notwithstanding point (1) above, both Parties may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; both Parties shall consult in regard to these actions and use their best endeavours to find common solutions with the other Party in this respect”.

The third measure ordered by the Court should be modified to read as follows:

“Each Party shall refrain from any action, which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court in either of the joined cases or make it more difficult to resolve, and will take those actions necessary for avoiding such aggravation or extension of the dispute before the Court”.

concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*: reducing the rate and frequency of road fill failure slumps and landslides; eliminating or significantly reducing the risk of future erosion and sediment delivery at all stream crossings along *route 1856*; immediately reducing road surface erosion and sediment delivery; controlling surface erosion and resultant sediment delivery from bare soil areas (paras. 47-52).

27. For its part, in its *Written Observations* on Nicaragua's Request, Costa Rica argues that the request at issue must be rejected on a number of reasons (para. 6). First, the Court had explicitly held that "Costa Rica's claim to title over Isla Portillos was 'plausible'", whereas it had made "no such finding with respect to Nicaragua" (paras. 7-10). Secondly, the Court had explicitly held that Costa Rica "must be able to dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment" to the area, whereas it made no such indication for Nicaragua (paras. 11-13). Thirdly, only Costa Rica, and not Nicaragua, has an obligation to monitor the area forming part of a protected wetland registered by Costa Rica under the Ramsar Convention (paras. 14-18). Fourthly, Costa Rica adds that the basis for the Court's Order was that neither Party should send persons to the area or maintain them there (paras. 19-21).

28. Fifthly, Costa Rica further claims that the sponsoring of activities calculated to change the *status quo* of the area is completely inconsistent with the provisional measures actually indicated by the Court and with the whole object and purpose of provisional measures in general (paras. 22-24). Sixthly, Nicaragua's proposed modification implies the possibility of concomitant exercise of public environmental activities by two different States in the same area, increasing the risk of serious incidents (paras. 25-29). Seventhly, Costa Rica argues that Nicaragua's proposed deletion of the Ramsar Secretariat from the provisional measure (second resolutive point of the Order) is an attempt to vitiate the role of that supervisory organ in supporting Costa Rica in the environmental recovery process of the disputed area in line with the Ramsar Convention, to which Nicaragua is also a Party (paras. 30-31). Finally, Costa Rica claims that the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, as well as the joinder of proceedings of this case with those of the case concerning *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, in its view are not valid reasons to modify the previous provisional measure and to authorize the presence of Nicaraguan personnel charged with the protection of the environment in the area (paras. 32-33)³⁰.

VII. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUESTS OF COSTA RICA AND OF NICARAGUA

1. Costa Rica's Request

29. In support of its Request, Costa Rica recalls that, at the time of the public hearings preceding the previous Order of the ICJ on provisional measures, it claimed that Nicaraguan *personnel* should leave the disputed area, as it then appeared that only military personnel was present therein. At that time, it did not seem that there was a concern with the presence of "private individuals". Indeed, it appears that there is a change in the situation. In its *Written Observations*, Nicaragua does not seem to object to this assertion by Costa Rica, as it claims that Costa Rica did not request at that time, provisional measures in respect of the withdrawal of "private individuals" from the area (cf. para. 11).

³⁰Costa Rica further argues that the proper avenue for Nicaragua to proceed with its request for the indication of provisional measures in the case it lodged with the Court is by way of a new application for the indication of provisional measures, and not by asking for a modification of the Court's Order of 08.03.2011 (paras. 34-39). Costa Rica adds that the mitigation works for the protection of the environment that it is undertaking on the Road (entirely on Costa Rican territory) are an issue for the merits phase of the proceedings in the case lodged by Nicaragua, not to be dealt with by way of a request for modification of the Court's Order of 08.03.2011 (paras. 40-41).

30. The situation, as it appears today, from the evidence and the arguments submitted to the Court, is that “private individuals”, holding Nicaraguan flags, are present in the disputed area. Again, in its *Written Observations*, Nicaragua does not seem to contest this fact (cf. paras. 11-14)³¹. It thus appears that there is indeed a change in the situation. The change seems to lie in the fact that, at the time of the issuance of the Court’s Order of 08.03.2011, there seemed to be no Nicaraguan private citizens in the disputed area, but only the presence of Nicaraguan military *personnel*. The fact that the Court mentioned in the operative paragraphs of the Order the withdrawal of Nicaraguan *personnel*, reflects the situation as it stood at the time of the adoption of its Order of 08.03.2011.

31. It does not necessarily mean that the Court, by using the word “personnel”, was thereby allowing the presence of any and all Nicaraguan persons other than civilian, security or police personnel. Accordingly, the presence of private individuals in the disputed area does not seem to be in line with the objective of safeguarding “Costa Rica’s claimed title to sovereignty over the said territory and to the rights deriving therefrom” or avoiding “incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death”, in the line of its reasoning in paragraph 75 of the Order of 08.03.2011.

32. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, the presence of private individuals in the disputed area amounts to a change in the original situation, as presented to the Court in the public hearings on provisional measures which preceded its Order of 08.03.2011. The presence of “private individuals” does not seem to be in line with the reasoning of the Court, nor with the objectives of the provisional measures it indicated, in its Order of 08.03.2011.

33. It seems not disputed that there are currently Nicaraguan nationals present in the disputed area, conforming a new situation posing a risk of incidents in the disputed area. With the change in the situation now created (on the basis of the documents and arguments presented to the Court), there appears to be a risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (in the terms of paragraph 75 of its Order of 08.03.2011) that would warrant a “modification” — or, more precisely, an expansion — of the Order, so as to avoid that risk. It further appears that there is urgency, in view of a further risk of damage to the disputed area.

2. Nicaragua’s Request

34. The questions that Nicaragua raises in its Request for “modification” or expansion of the Court’s previous Order of 08.03.2011, are centred on important points. In fact, the relevance of the construction of the road to the examination of the *whole* dispute between the Parties has been recognized by the Court in the previous Order on the Joinder of Proceedings, of 17.04.2013, wherein the Court stated that:

“A decision to join the proceedings will allow the Court to address simultaneously the totality of the various interrelated and contested issues raised by the Parties, including any questions of fact or law that are common to the disputes presented. In the view of the Court, hearing and deciding the two cases together will have significant advantages. The Court does not expect any undue delay in rendering its Judgment in the two cases” (para. 17).

35. Be that as it may, the construction of the road, albeit an important question, does not appear to be a matter to be treated in an Order for the “modification” or expansion of a previous Order of provisional measures (of 08.03.2011). The Court does not seem to be satisfied that the construction of the road, as allegedly an entirely new issue, is endowed with urgency, so as to be

³¹And cf. also Costa Rica’s *Written Observations* on Nicaragua’s Request, para. 26.

treated in the form of a new provisional measure. May it be recalled that Nicaragua brought this issue before the Court on 21.12.2011, when it lodged the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River* with the Court.

36. Moreover, the joinder of the proceedings of the cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area* and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, does not appear by itself to support a “modification” of the Order of 08.03.2011. This Order was based on the situation as then argued by the Parties, concerning the disputed area. It rested upon an assessment by the ICJ that the situation, as presented to it, gave rise to “a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death”; on this basis, the Court decided to indicate the provisional measures of protection appropriate to that situation.

37. Thus, the joinder of proceedings in the two aforementioned cases does not amount to a change of the situation, as presented to the Court at the time of the hearings that led to the adoption of its Order of 08.03.2011; nor does it seem to amount to a new fact that would warrant a “modification” of that Order. Keeping in mind the foregoing, and acknowledging that the questions raised by Nicaragua concerning the construction of the road along the San Juan River are relevant, the best course to take is to deal with them in the merits phase of the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*.

VIII. EFFECTS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION BEYOND THE STRICT TERRITORIALIST OUTLOOK

38. The factual context before the Court takes us beyond the traditional outlook of State territorial sovereignty. The concerns expressed before the Court encompass living conditions of people in their natural habitat, and the required environmental protection. International case-law on the matter (of distinct international tribunals) has so far sought to clarify the *juridical nature* of provisional measures, stressing its essentially preventive character. In effect, the likelihood or probability of *irreparable damage*, and the *urgency* of a situation, become evident when, e.g., a growing number of people are about to be injured or murdered, as in cases concerning armed conflicts (cf. *infra*). Whenever ordered provisional measures protect rights of individuals, they appear endowed with a character, more than precautionary, truly *tutelary*³², besides preserving the parties’ (States’) rights at stake³³.

39. The circumstances of certain cases before the Court have led this latter, in its decisions on provisional measures, to shift its attention on to the *protection of people* in territory (e.g., the case of the *Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso versus Mali*, 1986; the case of the *Land and Maritime Boundary, Cameroon versus Nigeria*, 1996; the case of *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, D.R. Congo versus Uganda*, 2000; the case concerning the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Georgia versus Russia*, 2008 — cf. *infra*). In those decisions, among others, the ICJ became attentive *also* to the fate of *persons*.

³²Cf. R.St.J. MacDonald, “Interim Measures in International Law, with Special Reference to the European System for the Protection of Human Rights”, 52 *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht* (1993) pp. 703-740; A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Les mesures provisoires de protection dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l’Homme”, in *Mesures conservatoires et droits fondamentaux* (eds. G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.-F. Flauss), Bruxelles, Bruylant/Nemesis, 2005, pp. 145-163, and in 4 *Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos* (2003) pp. 13-25; A. Saccucci, *Le Misure Provvisorie nella Protezione Internazionale dei Diritti Umani*, Torino, Giappichelli Ed., 2006, pp. 103-241 and 447-507.

³³Cf. E. Hambro, “The Binding Character of the Provisional Measures of Protection Indicated by the International Court of Justice”, in *Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation — Festschrift für Hans Wehberg* (eds. W. Schätzel and H.-J. Schlochauer), Frankfurt a/M, 1956, pp. 152-171.

40. The ICJ thus looked (moved) beyond the strict territorialist outlook. The fact is that, in successive cases lodged with the Court, the beneficiaries of provisional measures of protection are identified well beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. The present cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, provide yet new illustrations to this effect, in so far as the persons currently found in the disputed area are concerned.

41. It should not pass unnoticed that provisional measures of protection have lately invited the Court to move its reasoning beyond the strict territorialist approach, as I observed in my Separate Opinion in the recent Order of the Court of provisional measures of protection (of 18.07.2011) in the case of the *Temple of Preah Vihear* (Cambodia versus Thailand). After dwelling upon the relationship between time and law, I moved to considerations pertaining to space and law, relating (territorial) space to the human element of statehood: the population. (paras. 43-44 and 62-63). International law in a way endeavours to be *anticipatory* in the regulation of social facts, so as to avoid disorder and chaos, as well as irreparable harm; we are here before the *raison d'être* of provisional measures of protection, *i.e.*, to prevent and avoid irreparable harm in situations of gravity and urgency. Endowed with a notorious preventive character, they are anticipatory in nature, looking forward in time; they thus disclose the preventive dimension of the safeguard of rights (para. 64).

42. In my Separate Opinion, I sustained that there was epistemologically no impossibility or inadequacy for provisional measures, of the kind of the ones indicated in that Order, to extend protection — as they should — also to human life, as well as to cultural and spiritual world heritage. In fact, the reassuring effects of the provisional measures indicated in that recent Order of the ICJ were precisely that they extended protection not only to the territorial zone at issue, but also, by asserting the prohibition of the use or threat of force — pursuant to a fundamental principle of international law, — to the life and personal integrity of human beings who live or happen to be in that zone or near it, as well as to the Temple of Preah Vihear itself, situated in the aforementioned zone, and all that the Temple represents (para. 66).

43. I then added, in my Separate Opinion in the case of the *Temple of Preah Vihear* (provisional measures), that the Court should be prepared, in our days, to give proper weight to the *human factor* (para. 97), thus *bringing people and territory together*; and I pondered that:

“Not everything can be subsumed under territorial sovereignty. The fundamental human right to life is not at all subsumed under State sovereignty. The human right not to be forcefully displaced or evacuated from one’s home is not to be equated with territorial sovereignty. The Court needs to adjust its conceptual framework and its language to the new needs of protection, when it decides to indicate or order the Provisional Measures requested from it.

If we add, to the aforementioned, the protection of cultural and spiritual world heritage (cf. *supra*), for the purposes of Provisional Measures, the resulting picture will appear even more complex, and the strict territorialist approach even more unsatisfactory. The *human factor* is the most prominent one here. It shows how multifaceted, in these circumstances, the protection provided by Provisional Measures can be. It goes well beyond State territorial sovereignty, *bringing territory, people and human values together*” (paras. 99-100).

IX. THE BENEFICIARIES OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION, BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL INTER-STATE DIMENSION

44. In the international litigation before the ICJ, only States, as contending parties, can request provisional measures. Yet, in recent years, such requests have invoked rights which go beyond the strictly inter-State dimension³⁴. In successive cases, the ultimate beneficiaries were meant to be the individuals concerned, — and to that end the requesting States advanced their arguments to obtain the Court’s Orders of provisional measures of protection, in distinct contexts. Thus, in its Order of 15.12.1979, in the *Hostages* case (United States *versus* Iran), the Court took into account the State’s arguments to protect the life, freedom and personal security of its nationals (diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran — para. 37), and indicated provisional measures of protection of those rights (resolatory point I(A)), after referring to the “*obligations impératives*” under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (para. 41), and pondering that

“la persistance de la situation qui fait l’objet de la requête expose les êtres humains concernés à des privations, à un sort pénible et angoissant et même à des dangers pour leur vie et leur santé et par conséquent à une possibilité sérieuse de préjudice irréparable” (para. 42).

45. Half a decade later, in its Order of 10.05.1984, in the *Nicaragua versus United States* case, the ICJ indicated provisional measures (resolatory point B(2)) after taking note of the requesting State’s argument calling for protection of the rights to life, to freedom and to personal security of Nicaraguan citizens (para. 32). Shortly afterwards, in its celebrated Order of 10.01.1986 in the *Frontier Dispute* case (Burkina Faso *versus* Mali), duly complied with by the contending parties, the Court’s Chamber took note of the concern expressed by the parties with the personal integrity and safety of those persons who were in the zone under dispute (paras. 6 and 21). One decade later, in its Order of 15.03.1996 in the case of the *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria* (Cameroon *versus* Nigeria), the Court took note of the requesting State’s warning that continuing armed clashes in the region were notably causing “irremediable loss of life as well as human suffering and substantial material damage” (para. 19).

46. In deciding to order provisional measures, the ICJ pondered that the rights at stake were not only claimed State rights, but *also* rights of the *persons* concerned (paras. 38-39 and 42). In fact, in the circumstances of that case, the victimization of human beings resulting from armed conflicts of greater intensity, I would say that the purpose of the provisional measures was to extend protection *mainly to persons*. Another Order illustrative of the overcoming of the strictly inter-State dimension in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved by means of provisional measures pertains to the case of *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo*, opposing this latter to Uganda. In its Order of 01.07.2000 in this case, the ICJ took into account the requesting State’s denunciation of alleged “human rights violations” — invoking international instruments for their protection (paras. 4-5 and 18-19), — and of its plea for protection for its inhabitants (para. 31) as well as for its own “rights to respect for the rules of international humanitarian law and for the instruments relating to the protection of human rights” (para. 40).

47. The Court, recognizing the pressing need to indicate provisional measures of protection (paras. 43-44), found that it was “not disputed that grave and repeated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including massacres and other atrocities”, had been committed

³⁴In the triad *Breard/LaGrand/Avena* cases, for example, provisional measures were requested to prevent an irreparable damage to the right to life of the convicted persons (stay of execution), in the circumstances of their cases (cf. provisional measures in the Court’s Orders of 09.04.1998, 03.03.1999, and 05.02.2003, respectively).

on the territory of the D.R. Congo (para. 42). The Court, accordingly, ordered both parties *inter alia* to “take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law” (resolatory point 3).

48. In its Order of 08.04.1993 in the case concerning the *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (Bosnia and Herzegovina versus Yugoslavia), the Court, after finding “a grave risk” to human life, indicated provisional measures³⁵. In the subsequent Order of 13.09.1993 in the same case, the Court again expressed its concern for the protection of human rights and the rights of peoples (para. 38). In its subsequent Order of 15.10.2008 in the case concerning the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (Georgia versus Russia), the ICJ once again disclosed its concern for the preservation of human life and personal integrity (paras. 122 and 142-143).

49. From the survey above it can be seen that, along the last three decades, the ICJ has gradually overcome the strictly inter-State outlook in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved by means of its Orders of provisional measures of protection. Nostalgics of the past, clung to their own dogmatism, can hardly deny that, nowadays, States litigating before this Court, despite its inter-State contentious procedure, have conceded that they have no longer the monopoly of the rights to be preserved, and, much to their credit, they recognize so, in pleading before this Court on behalf also of individuals, their nationals and others, or even in a larger framework, its inhabitants.

50. Facts tend to come before the norms, requiring of these latter the aptitude to cover new situations they are meant to regulate, with due attention to superior values³⁶. Before this Court, States keep on holding the monopoly of *jus standi*, as well as *locus standi in judicio*, in so far as requests for provisional measures are concerned, but this has not proved incompatible with the preservation of the rights of the human person, together with those of States. The ultimate beneficiaries of the rights to be thereby preserved have been, not seldom and ultimately, human beings, alongside the States wherein they live. Provisional measures indicated in successive Orders of the ICJ have transcended the artificial inter-State dimension of the past, and have come to preserve also rights whose ultimate subjects (*titulaires*) are human beings.

X. EFFECTS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL INTER-STATE DIMENSION

51. In the case concerning *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or to Extradite* (Order of 28.05.2009), the ICJ decided not to indicate provisional measures. On the occasion, I warned, in my extensive Dissenting Opinion, that the basic right at issue pertained to the *realization of justice*, which assumed a central place in the case, one of a paramount importance, deserving of particular attention. The strictly inter-State dimension seemed to have been overcome in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved, in particular as the *search for justice* (the right to the realization of justice) was (and remains to date) at stake. In that case, opposing Belgium to Senegal, the crucial factor was, — as I stressed in my Dissenting Opinion, — the endurance by the victims of an ungrateful two-decade search for justice, in vain until now, for the reported atrocities of the Habré regime in Chad (para. 56).

³⁵The Court, furthermore, recalled General Assembly resolution 96(I) of 11.12.1946 (referred to in its own Advisory Opinion of 1951 on *Reservations on the Convention against Genocide*), to the effect that the crime of genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity (...) and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations” (*cit. in para. 49*).

³⁶Cf., *inter alia*, G. Morin, *La révolte du Droit contre le Code — La révision nécessaire des concepts juridiques*, Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey, 1945, pp. 2, 6-7 and 109-115.

52. I further pointed out in that Dissenting Opinion (para. 97) that, the fact that the binding character of provisional measures of protection is nowadays beyond question (moving from the pre-history into the history of the matter in the ICJ case-law), on the basis of the *res interpretata* of the ICJ itself, does not mean that we have reached a culminating point in the evolution of the ICJ case-law on this matter. Quite on the contrary, I can hardly escape the impression that we are still living the infancy of this jurisprudential development. The review of the matter (*supra*) in the present Separate Opinion indicates that, although some advances have been achieved, there remains a long way to go.

53. The determination of urgency and the probability of irreparable damage are exercises which the ICJ is nowadays used to; yet, although the identification of the legal nature and the material content of the right(s) to be preserved seem not to raise great difficulties, the same cannot be said of the consideration of the *legal effects* and *consequences* of the right at issue, in particular when provisional measures are not indicated or ordered by the Court. We here move to the *effects* of provisional measures of protection, beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. In this respect, there seems to remain still a long way to go.

54. In the *cas d'espèce* before the Court, opposing two Latin American countries, the new provisional measures of protection envisaged in Costa Rica's *Request* seek the protection of individuals against "harm in the form of bodily injury or death" (*supra*), by making sure that they do not remain in the disputed area; the new provisional measures are requested not only in respect of agents of the public power (*personnel*), but also in respect of individuals (*simples particuliers*), well beyond the traditional inter-State dimension.

55. In this connection, the expressions used, by both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in their arguments presented to the Court, should not pass unnoticed. In its *Written Observations*³⁷, Nicaragua refers to "private individuals" (paras. 11 and 13-14), "private persons" (para. 12), "Nicaraguan nationals" (paras. 16 and 30), and "a group of young people" (para. 29). Costa Rica, for its part, in its *Request*³⁸ refers to "Nicaraguan nationals" (paras. 7-8, 10-11 and 17-18), "Nicaraguans" (paras. 13-14), "Nicaraguan persons" (paras. 19-21), "individuals" (para. 9), and "citizens" (para. 10); and, in its *Written Observations*³⁹, Costa Rica refers to "Nicaraguan nationals" (paras. 17-18, 25-27 and 29), "Nicaraguans" (para. 28), Nicaraguan "volunteers" (para. 21), "private individuals" (para. 27), and "persons" (paras. 7 and 28). Both Nicaragua and Costa Rica clearly have in mind human beings, of flesh and bones and soul.

56. States are bound to protect all persons under their respective jurisdictions. Provisional measures, with their preventive nature, appear as truly *tutelary*, rather than only precautionary, purporting to protect individuals also against harassment and threats, thus avoiding "harm in the form of bodily injury or death". After all, the beneficiaries of the compliance with, and due performance of, obligations under ordered provisional measures of protection, are not only States, but also human beings. A strictly inter-State outlook does not reflect this important point. The strictly inter-State dimension has long been surpassed, and seems insufficient, if not inadequate, to address obligations under provisional measures of protection.

XI. THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL FUNCTION: A REBUTTAL OF SO-CALLED "JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT", OR *L'ART DE NE RIEN FAIRE*

57. The present Order of the Court, on requests for provisional measures in the cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area* (Costa Rica versus Nicaragua), and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River* (Nicaragua

³⁷Nicaragua's *Written Observations* of 14.06.2013.

³⁸Costa Rica's *Request* of 23.05.2013.

³⁹Costa Rica's *Written Observations* of 20.06.2013 on Nicaragua's Request.

versus Costa Rica), suffers from a stark incongruence. The Court reviews the arguments of the Parties, and concludes, in respect of Costa Rica's request, that a change in the situation has occurred, as "*organized groups of persons*", — whose presence was not contemplated when it issued its previous decision to indicate provisional measures, — are now "regularly staying in the disputed territory" (para. 25). Though the Court admits a change in the situation, it extracts no consequence therefrom.

58. The Court limits itself to say that, "despite the change that has occurred in the situation", in its view "the conditions have not been fulfilled for it to modify the measures" that it indicated in its previous Order of 08.03.2011 (para. 36). This conclusion simply begs the question. The Court's majority expressly admits that "the presence of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area" is an aggravating circumstance (para. 37). Yet it does nothing. It further admits that this new situation "is exacerbated" (!) by "the limited size of the area and the numbers of Nicaraguan nationals who are regularly present there" (para. 37). Yet it does nothing. Moreover, it admits that incidents may at any time occur. What kind of incidents? Those entailing "bodily injury or death" of the individuals staying there, — as warned by the Court itself, already in its previous Order of 08.03.2011 (cf. para. 20, *supra*), — in addition to environmental damage. Yet it does nothing.

59. Contrariwise, it is crystal clear to me that the new situation created in the disputed area in the *cas d'espèce*, endowed with the prerequisites of urgency and probability of irreparable harm, undoubtedly calls for *new provisional measures, in order to prevent or avoid irreparable harm to the persons concerned and to the environment*. These new provisional measures, which the Court's majority failed to adopt, would make it clear that each Party should refrain from sending to, or maintaining in, the disputed area, including the *caño*, not only any *personnel* (whether civilian, police or security), but also any "organized groups" of individuals, or any "private individuals".

60. As a matter of fact, this is not the first time that the Court discloses its unjustified "judicial self-restraint" (so praised in traditionally conservative, if not reactionary, segments of the legal profession) in respect of provisional measures of protection, even when faced with the presence of the prerequisites of *urgency* and the *probability of irreparable harm*. Four years ago, it did so in its Order of 28.05.2009 in the case concerning the *Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite* (Belgium *versus* Senegal), wherein it refrained from ordering or indicating the requested provisional measures of protection.

61. On the occasion, I appended an extensive Dissenting Opinion (paras. 1-105) to that Order, seeking to preserve the integrity of the *corpus juris* of the 1984 U.N. Convention against Torture. Shortly after the Court's Order of 28.05.2009 wherein it found that the circumstances of the case were, in its view, not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures, there followed a succession of uncertainties (*infra*), amidst the emptiness of the Court's self-imposed "restraint", and its apparent insensitiveness towards the underlying human values.

62. On that occasion, contrary to the Court's majority, I sought to demonstrate that there was manifest urgency in the situation affecting surviving victims of torture, or their close relatives, in respect of their right to the realization of justice under the U.N. Convention against Torture. As I have recently recapitulated⁴⁰, the Court preferred to rely comfortably on an unilateral act of promise (conceptualized in the traditional framework of inter-State relations) made by the respondent State in the course of the legal proceedings before itself. That pledge, in my view, did

⁴⁰Cf. ICJ, case concerning the *Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite* (merits, Belgium *versus* Senegal), Judgment of 20.07.2012, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 82-103.

not remove the prerequisites of urgency and probability of irreparable harm for the indication of provisional measures⁴¹, nor did it efface the longstanding sufferings of the Habré regime, in their saga of more than two decades in search of the realization of justice.

63. Yet the Court took a passive posture, reduced to that of a spectator of subsequent events. In effect, following the Court's Order of 28.05.2009, no initiative was taken in the respondent State towards the trial of Mr. Hissène Habré in Senegal; the return to Mr. H. Habré to Chad was announced, as well as his imminent expulsion from Senegal, which was then cancelled in the last minute under public pressure⁴². The Court was lucky that Mr. H. Habré did not escape from his house *surveillance* in Dakar, and that he was not expelled from Senegal. Instead of assuming its own control over the situation, the self-restrained Court preferred to count on the imponderable, on *la fortuna*. The Court cannot keep on counting on the imponderable, as *la fortuna* may at any time turn against it. As Sophocles, in his perennial wisdom, warned, through the voices of the chorus of one of his tragedies: count no man happy till he passed the final threshold of his life secure from pain⁴³ (bodily or spiritual harm).

64. In the present Order that the Court has just adopted today, 16 July 2013, it has exercised self-restraint once again: this time, after finding that there has been a change in the situation, it has added that the circumstances presented to it, nevertheless, are not such as to require modification of its previous Order of 08.03.2011, which is simply reaffirmed. Moreover, it “does not see (...) the evidence of urgency” (para. 35). The Court's reasoning rests on a *petitio principii*, adducing no persuasive argument to support its decision not to order new provisional measures in face of the new situation. The Court limits itself to reasserting the previous provisional measures, addressed to a new and distinct situation, which the Court admits has now changed.

65. The Court has preferred to indulge into an unfortunate formalism, limiting itself to add that, despite the change in the situation, “the conditions have not been fulfilled for it to modify the measures that it indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011” (paras. 25, 31, 35-36). This is a *petitio principii*, whereby the Court unduly establishes a further test for the indication of provisional measures, rendering it more difficult — or simply avoiding — to order these latter, at variance with its *interna corporis*. The Court does not elaborate on its *dictum*, nor does it provide any demonstration whatsoever to corroborate its assertion. Its ineluctable incongruence lies in the fact that, once it finds that there is a change in the situation, it fails to modify — or rather expand — its previous Order, so as to face the new situation, endowed with the requisite elements of risk (in the form of bodily harm or death, and harm to the environment) and urgency.

66. The ICJ has not adopted new provisional measures in the present Order simply because it did not want to adopt them, for reasons which escape my comprehension. The Court, from now on, will once again only hope for the best, but not without expressing its “concerns” with regard to the new situation (para. 37), given the ostensible risk and the probability of harm posed by it. Instead of remaining preoccupied, the ICJ should have ordered the new provisional measures required by the new situation created in the disputed area. Once again, the Court will nourish the hope that fate is on its side, oblivious of the extreme care with which someone so familiar with human suffering and tragedy like Cicero approached fate, in one of his fragmented reflections⁴⁴. Even so, despite all his awareness, Cicero did not cross over the final threshold of his life secure from pain: at the end of his path, he suffered bodily injuries and violent death...

⁴¹Cf. *ibid.*, para. 79.

⁴²Cf. *ibid.*, paras. 73-75.

⁴³Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* (circa 429 b.C.), verse 1684.

⁴⁴M.T. Cicero, *On Fate [De Fato]* (circa 44 b.C.), fragments 41-43.

67. The ICJ, on 08.03.2011, ordered provisional measures not simply because the persons present in the disputed area were *personnel* (whether civilian, police or security), but also because their presence therein presented a risk to the fragile ecosystem of the disputed area, and a risk of irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (para. 75). The new situation, i.e., the presence of “organized groups” of *private individuals* in the disputed area, discloses in my view new circumstances, which clearly call for the indication of additional provisional measures. The change in the situation, endowed with urgency and the probability of irreparable harm, thus provides a basis for the modification of the Court’s previous Order, in the light of the provisions of Article 41 of the Statute and Article 76(1) of the Rules of Court.

68. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning is far from coherent when, at the end of the present Order, it recognizes that the presence of “organized groups” of individuals in the disputed area is liable to create “the risk of incidents which might aggravate the present dispute”, taking into account in particular “the limited size of the area” at issue and the “numbers of Nicaraguan nationals” staying there (para. 37). If the Court expressly recognizes such risk, and further expresses its “concerns” with this new situation (para. 37), it is then clear that the provisional measures already ordered should be modified, or expanded, so as to face this new situation. That the Court has not done so, in face of the likelihood of bodily harm or death of the individuals staying in the disputed area, is a cause of concern to me, as the rights at issue — and the corresponding obligations — are beyond the strictly inter-State dimension, and the Court seems not to have valued this as it should.

XII. EPILOGUE: TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS LEGAL REGIME OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION

69. I have already made the point that the strictly inter-State dimension has long been surpassed, and appears inappropriate to address obligations under provisional measures of protection; I have done so in other cases taken before the ICJ, as well as in another international jurisdiction⁴⁵, and I have deemed it fit to dwell further upon it in the present Dissenting Opinion (*supra*). The handling of cases from a strict and exclusively inter-State perspective or dimension, irrespective of their circumstances, no longer reflects the complexity of the contemporary international legal order. In my understanding, the institute of provisional measures of protection stands in need of a conceptual refinement, in all its aspects. This leads me into the last point of the present Dissenting Opinion, namely, the needed construction of an *autonomous legal regime* of provisional measures of protection, as I perceive it.

70. Compliance with provisional measures of protection runs parallel to the course of proceedings leading to the Court’s subsequent decision on the merits of the cases at issue. Should the Court find, e.g., a breach of international law in its decision on the merits of a given case, and, parallel to that, it further finds non-compliance with its provisional measures, this latter is an *additional* breach of an international obligation. In its work in the present context, the Court still has before itself the task of elaborating on the *legal consequences* of non-compliance with provisional measures, endowed, in my perception, with an autonomy of their own.

71. Provisional measures of protection indicated or ordered by the ICJ (or other international tribunals) generate *per se* obligations for the States concerned, which are distinct from the obligations which emanate from the Court’s (subsequent) Judgments on the merits (and on reparations) of the respective cases. In this sense, in my conception, provisional measures have an

⁴⁵Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, *Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos — Esencia y Trascendencia (Votos en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1991-2006)*, Mexico, Edit. Porrúa/Universidad Iberoamericana, 2007, pp. 925, 935, 947, 952, 958, 974, 977, 981, 985, 991, 1010 and 1014; A.A. Cançado Trindade, *Los Tribunales Internacionales Contemporáneos y la Humanización del Derecho Internacional*, Buenos Aires/Argentina, Edit. Ad-Hoc, 2013, pp. 22-28, 77-90, 106-113 and 175-179; A.A. Cançado Trindade, “La Humanización del Derecho Internacional y los Límites de la Razón de Estado”, 40 *Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais* — Belo Horizonte/Brazil (2001) pp. 11-23.

autonomous legal regime of their own, disclosing the high relevance of their *preventive* dimension. Parallel to the Court's (subsequent) decisions on the merits, the international responsibility of a State may be engaged for non-compliance with, or breach of, a provisional measure of protection ordered by the Court (or other international tribunals).

72. My thesis, in sum, is that provisional measures, endowed with a conventional basis, — such as those of the ICJ (under Article 41 of the Statute), — are also endowed with autonomy, have a legal regime of their own, and non-compliance with them generates the responsibility of the State, entails legal consequences, without prejudice of the examination and resolution of the concrete cases as to the merits. This discloses their important preventive dimension, in their wide scope. The proper treatment of this subject-matter is the task before this Court, now and in the years to come.

73. The *juridical nature* of provisional measures, with their preventive dimension, has lately been clarified by a growing case-law on the matter, — as those measures came to be increasingly indicated or ordered, in recent years, by contemporary international⁴⁶, as well as national⁴⁷, tribunals⁴⁸. Soon the recourse to provisional measures of protection, also at international level, had the effect of expanding the domain of international jurisdiction, with the consequent reduction of the so-called “reserved domain” of the State⁴⁹. This grows in importance in respect of regimes of *protection*, such as those of the human person⁵⁰ as well as of the environment. The clarification of the juridical nature of provisional measures is, however, still the initial stage of the evolution of the matter, — to be followed, in our days, in my understanding, by the elaboration on the *legal consequences* of non-compliance with those measures, and the conceptual development of what I deem it fit to call their *autonomous legal regime*.

74. What leads me to leave on the records, in the present Dissenting Opinion, my position on the matter, — which I have been sustaining for years⁵¹, — is not a lack of confidence in the contending parties complying with them: I dare to nourish the hope that they will, and the 16 communications (already referred to) that they have submitted to the ICJ, seeking to comply with its Order of 08.03.2011, disclose their awareness and good will. The two contending parties come both from a part of the world, Latin America, with a longstanding and strong tradition in international legal doctrine. What leads me to leave on the records my dissenting position, is the Court's self-restraint, and the incongruence of its reasoning (cf. *supra*), in a matter of such

⁴⁶Cf. R. Bernhardt (ed.), *Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts*, Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 1-152.

⁴⁷Cf. E. García de Enterría, *La Batalla por las Medidas Cautelares*, 2nd. [enlarged] ed., Madrid, Civitas, 1995, pp. 25-385.

⁴⁸Cf. also L. Collins, “Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation”, 234 *Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye* (1992) pp. 23, 214 and 234.

⁴⁹P. Guggenheim, *Les mesures provisoires de procédure internationale et leur influence sur le développement du droit des gens*, Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey, 1931, pp. 15, 174, 186, 188 and 14-15, and cf. pp. 6-7 and 61-62.

⁵⁰Cf., e.g., E.R. Rieter, *Preventing Irreparable Harm — Provisional Measures in International Human Rights Adjudication*, Maastricht, Intersentia, 2010, pp. 3-1109; C. Burbano Herrera, *Provisional Measures in the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights*, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, pp. 1-221; among others. On the needed new mentality, and its benefits, in the present domain of protection, cf., in general, [Various Authors,] *Le particularisme interaméricain des droits de l'homme* (eds. L. Hennebel and H. Tigroudja), Paris, Pédone, 2009, pp. 3-413.

⁵¹Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, *El Ejercicio de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos*, 2nd. ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2013, ch. XXI: “The Preventive Dimension: The Binding Character and the Expansion of Provisional Measures of Protection”, pp. 177-186.

importance for the progressive development international law. I have cared to take the time and work to leave on the records the present Dissenting Opinion, so as to render a service to our mission of imparting justice.

75. In effect, the notion of victim (or of *potential* victim⁵²), of injured party, can thus emerge also in the context proper to provisional measures of protection, parallel to the merits (and reparations) of the *cas d'espèce*. Provisional measures of protection generate obligations (of prevention) for the States concerned, which are distinct from the obligations which emanate from the Judgments of the Court as to the merits (and reparations) of the respective cases. This ensues from their autonomous legal regime, as I conceive it. There is, in my perception, pressing need nowadays to refine and to develop conceptually this autonomous legal regime, focused, in particular, on the contemporary expansion of provisional measures, the means to secure due and prompt compliance with them, and the legal consequences of non-compliance, — to the benefit of those protected thereunder.

76. In this matter, the worst possible posture would be that of passiveness, if not indifference, that of judicial inactivism. As I warned in an earlier Dissenting Opinion (cf. *supra*) and reiterate now in the present one, the matter before the Court calls for a more pro-active posture on its part⁵³, so as not only to settle the controversies filed with it, but also to tell what the Law is (*juris dictio*), and thus to contribute effectively to the avoidance or prevention of irreparable harm in situations of urgency, to the ultimate benefit of *all* subjects of international law, — States as well as groups of individuals, and *simples particuliers*. After all, the human person (living in harmony in her natural habitat) occupies a central place in the new *jus gentium* of our times.

(Signed) Antônio Augusto CANÇADO TRINDADE.

⁵²On the notion of *potential* victims in the framework of the evolution of the notion of victim or the condition of the complainant in the domain of the international protection of human rights, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Co-Existence and Co-Ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights (At Global and Regional Levels)”, 202 *Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye* (1987), ch. XI, pp. 243-299, esp. pp. 271-292.

⁵³ In likewise advocating such pro-active posture of the Court in respect of provisional measures of protection, in my earlier Dissenting Opinion in the Court's Order of 28.05.2009 in the case of *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite* (Belgium *versus* Senegal), I deemed it fit to recall that the Court is not restricted by the arguments of the parties, as confirmed by Article 75(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court. Article 75(1) sets forth that “the Court may at any time decide to examine *proprio motu* whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties”. And Article 75(2) determines that “when a request for provisional measures has been made, the Court may indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the request”. Article 75(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court, — I proceeded in my Dissenting Opinion, — thus expressly entitles it to indicate, *motu proprio*, provisional measures that it regards as necessary, even if they are wholly or in part distinct from those that are requested. A decision of the ICJ indicating provisional measures in the present case, — as I sustained, — “would have set up a remarkable precedent in the long search for justice in the theory and practice of international law”, as this was “the first case lodged with the ICJ on the basis of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture”, the first human rights treaty incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction as an international obligation of all States Parties (para. 80). And I further recalled (para. 81) that the ICJ has made use of its prerogatives under Article 75 of its Rules on some previous occasions, as illustrated by its Orders of Provisional Measures, invoking Article 75(2), in the cases concerning the *Application of the Convention against Genocide* (Bosnia-Herzegovina *versus* Yugoslavia, 08.04.1993, para. 46), the *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria* (Cameroon *versus* Nigeria, 15.03.1996, para. 48), the *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo* (Congo *versus* Uganda, 01.07. 2000, para. 43), and, more lately, the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (Georgia *versus* Russian Federation, 15.10.2008, para. 145).

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE *AD HOC* DUGARD

Order of 2011 prohibits members of Guardabarranco Environment Movement (hereinafter GEM) from visiting disputed territory as they qualify as civilian personnel — Presence of GEM in disputed territory is contrary to object and purpose of Order of 2011 — Access of GEM to disputed territory poses risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica.

1. In 2011 after Nicaragua's armed forces had entered and occupied the Isla Portillos (henceforth disputed territory), the Court found that Costa Rica's claim to sovereignty over the territory was plausible but ordered that both Nicaragua and Costa Rica should refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory "any personnel, whether civilian, police or security" (*Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, p. 27, para. 86 (1)). The Court's intention was to clear the disputed territory of any persons that might exacerbate the dispute and interfere with the ultimate finding of the Court on the merits. This explains why the personnel of both Parties were ordered to keep out of the disputed territory, despite the fact that Costa Rica's claim to sovereignty had been adjudged "plausible" (*ibid.*, p. 20, para. 59). This also explains why only Costa Rica's civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment were permitted to enter the disputed territory, and then only under very strict conditions (*ibid.*, p. 27, para. 86 (2)). Someone had to ensure that the environment was protected pending the settlement of the dispute and the Court had no alternative but to allocate this task to Costa Rica because it alone had been adjudged to have a plausible title to the territory; and it alone was accountable for the environmental protection of the disputed territory under the Ramsar Convention. The Court's third provisional measure calling on Parties to "refrain from *any* action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court" (*ibid.*, p. 27, para. 86 (3); emphasis added), should be construed as emphasizing that the disputed territory was to be cleared of all persons except those specifically authorized to be there. While the present Order expresses "concerns" that "the presence of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area carries the risk of incidents which might aggravate the present dispute" (see paragraph 37 of the Order), it fails to modify its Order of 8 March 2011 to make it clear that the presence of such organized groups in the disputed territory is incompatible with this Order. The failure to clarify this matter may result in further incursions by organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals into the disputed territory with consequent irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica. For this reason, I dissent from the Order of the Court.

2. In its present Application Costa Rica asks the Court to modify its Order on provisional measures of 2011 to make it clear that *all* persons, other than environmental officials of Costa Rica specially authorized by the Order of 2011 to enter the disputed territory, are to be prevented by both Parties from accessing the disputed territory, in order to prevent irreparable harm being caused to both persons and the environment, pending the Court's determination on the merits. It may be that such an order is unnecessary, at least as far as it concerns the activities of environmental youth groups supported by either government, on the ground that such groups are already prohibited from accessing the territory in terms of the 2011 Order. However, in order to clarify this issue, Costa Rica seeks a modification of the 2011 Order.

3. Before examining Costa Rica's Application under Article 76 of the Rules of the Court to modify the Order of 2011, it is necessary to consider the question whether the prohibition imposed on both Parties by the first provisional measure ordered in 2011 requiring them to "refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, any *personnel*, whether civilian, police or security" applies to the Guardabarranco Environment Movement (hereinafter GEM). Strictly, this is a matter for determination on the merits of the case. However, as Costa Rica's Application for modification of the Order is essentially a request for clarification and interpretation of the scope of the Order of 2011 it is necessary to examine this issue at this stage. Furthermore, as Costa Rica's application aims to ensure that irreparable prejudice is not caused to

Costa Rica's plausible right to the disputed territory by the incursion of members of GEM pending a decision on the merits, it is impossible to avoid consideration of this matter as it is essential to a decision on the modification of the existing provisional measures.

4. The answer to the question whether the members of GEM are covered by the Order of 2011 depends on the meaning to be attached to the term "personnel". In the present Order, the Court does not examine the meaning of the term "personnel" but seems to assume that the term "personnel" applies to government employees, because in 2011 Costa Rica complained only about the presence of the army, and possibly police (see paragraph 80 of the Order of 2011), and made no mention of the presence of private persons in the disputed territory (see paragraph 23 of the Order). The term "personnel" should, however, be given a broader meaning to include the members of the GEM for the following reasons.

5. First, the term "personnel" may be interpreted as applying to persons forming part of an organization employed in some service. The Free Online Dictionary defines personnel as "the body of persons employed by or active in an organization, business or service". The concise Oxford Dictionary defines personnel as a "body of persons engaged in some public service". GEM is clearly an organization employed in the service of protecting the environment of what it perceives to be Nicaraguan territory. Its members could therefore be described as constituting "any civilian personnel" falling within the prohibition contained in the first provisional measure in the Order of 2011.

6. It may be argued that the fact the Order requires each Party to refrain from sending "any personnel, whether civilian, *police or security*" into the disputed territory indicates that the civilian personnel should at least be employed in the service of Nicaragua — although there is no suggestion that this employment should take the form of work for remuneration. However, on the facts before the Court, it is clear that GEM and its members are engaged in a public service on behalf of Nicaragua.

7. The precise nature of GEM is not clear. It appears to have a dual purpose: the protection of the environment and the defence of the homeland of Nicaragua. According to an article by Tim Rogers in the *Nicaragua Dispatch* of 26 September 2012, the authenticity of which has not been challenged by Nicaragua, Oscar Garcia, a forestry engineer with the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, described GEM as being "about creating ecological awareness, building nationalism and defence of the homeland". It is common cause that there is a close connection between GEM and the Sandinista Youth, the youth movement of the governing party of Nicaragua. Furthermore, Nicaragua has not denied that members of GEM have placed Nicaraguan flags in the disputed territory and that they fly Nicaraguan flags on their missions into the disputed territory. It may be true, as asserted by Nicaragua that GEM does not act under the direction or control of Nicaragua. Moreover it is unnecessary to decide at this stage whether the acts of GEM may be attributed to Nicaragua, as this is an issue for determination on the merits. This does not, however, detract from the fact that GEM is a nationalistic youth movement, linked with the Sandinista Youth, which is concerned both with protecting the environment of the disputed territory and with asserting that it is Nicaraguan territory. The line between toleration of the presence of GEM in the disputed territory on the part of Nicaragua and sponsorship of their presence is very thin. That Nicaragua's support for GEM goes beyond mere toleration is clear from the letter of Samuel Santos Lopez of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry in which he "sees with great pleasure" the work of youth groups in the disputed territory. The Court's description of GEM in its Order as "organized groups of persons" (see paragraph 25 of the Order) and "organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals" (see paragraph 37 of the Order) fails to capture the true nature of GEM as a nationalistic youth movement, with ties to the governing Sandinista Party of Nicaragua. Although GEM may not be an organized group of paid Nicaraguan officials, it surely qualifies as a body of persons employed by or active in an organization engaged in furthering the objects and interests of the Nicaraguan Government. In short, it constitutes "civilian personnel" within the meaning of the first provisional measure in the Court's Order of 2011.

8. Although the activities of GEM appear to fall within the terms of the Order of 2011, Nicaragua denies that this is the case. Costa Rica has accordingly sought to have this Order modified in order to make it clear that these activities are covered. In doing so, it argues that if the activities of GEM do not fall within the letter of the Order of 2011, they are contrary to the object and purpose of the Order.

9. The object and purpose of the Order of 2011 was to keep all unauthorized persons, whether nationals of Nicaragua or Costa Rica, out of the disputed territory pending the determination of the merits of the case. The first provisional measure referred to “any personnel” of the Parties, perhaps suggesting government officials only (although this interpretation is challenged above, paras. 4-7), because in 2010/2011 only Nicaraguan Government officials and military had entered the territory and the entry of private persons into the territory was not considered by either Costa Rica or the Court (see paragraphs 23 and 25 of the Order). But the intention of the Order to keep all unauthorized persons out of the disputed territory was made clear by the second provisional measure which provided that only Costa Rican civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment of the disputed territory— might enter the territory— subject to strict conditions. There was no suggestion that such “civilian personnel” were to be in the paid employment of the Costa Rican Government: presumably environmentalists attached to environmental NGO’s might be selected for this purpose. But it is clear that Costa Rica was barred from dispatching student activist environmentalists into the disputed territory in large numbers. By necessary implication Costa Rica’s equivalent of GEM was prohibited from accessing the disputed territory to carry out activities to protect the environment of the territory, despite the fact that Costa Rica’s title to the territory had been adjudged “plausible”. It is therefore simply not possible to interpret provisional measures 1 to 3 of the Order of 2011 as allowing private persons belonging to an organization of either Costa Rica or Nicaragua to access the disputed territory, whether such persons were motivated by a concern for the environment or not. *A fortiori* it prohibited nationalistic youth movements committed to protecting the environment and the national interest of either Party from accessing the territory.

10. It is necessary next to consider whether Costa Rica’s request for modifications of the Order of 2011 complies with the requirements for an order for provisional measures.

11. The Court has found that the presence of organized groups of persons in the disputed territory which was not contemplated in 2011, constitutes “a change in the situation within the meaning of Article 76 of the Rules of the Court, upon which Costa Rica may be entitled to rely in support of its request for the modification of the said Order” (see paragraph 25 of the Order). The Court has found it unnecessary to reconsider the requirements that the rights asserted by Costa Rica should at least be plausible and that there should be a link between the rights which form the subject of the proceedings before the Court and the provisional measures being sought (*Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, paras. 58-62).

12. The Court has found that Costa Rica has failed to show that the presence of GEM in the disputed territory constitutes a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica’s rights to territorial sovereignty over the disputed territory or to the preservation of the environment of the territory (see paragraph 35 of the Order). I disagree with the Court’s finding.

13. My disagreement with the Court relates to its assessment of the nature of GEM and the risk it poses to Costa Rica’s rights in the disputed territory. As I have shown above (para. 7), GEM is not a body of young environmentalists *sans frontières*, concerned solely with the preservation of the environment. Instead it is a nationalistic youth movement, linked to the Sandinista youth movement, committed to both the protection of the environment and the defence of the homeland of Nicaragua. With the support and encouragement of the Government of Nicaragua, it sees the Nicaraguan homeland as including the disputed territory. It is not a small group of studious environmentalists who make serious visits to the disputed territory to study the environment in a

scientific manner. It is not clear how many have visited the disputed territory over the past years, but over 6,000 have carried out activities in the region of the San Juan River. Nicaragua does not deny the figure of 6,000 but explains that this number of GEM members have visited the San Juan River region, comprising both Nicaraguan territory and the disputed territory. Members of GEM do not travel in small groups. Instead they travel in large groups, waving the Nicaraguan flag, as befits a nationalistic movement. Fortunately, Costa Rica has neither encouraged nor allowed its youth to behave in a similar fashion. Had Costa Rica which, unlike Nicaragua, has demonstrated a plausible right to territorial title of the disputed territory, done so there would in all probability have been clashes between rival environmentalist groups in the disputed territory.

14. In my opinion, the presence of GEM in the disputed territory is a recipe for disaster. History is replete with instances of violence committed by youth movements committed to a national cause. These historical precedents cannot be ignored. There is a real risk of personal injury and damage to the environment. This arises from the likelihood of future harm based on the reasonable prospect that the present situation, if allowed to continue, will escalate. Moreover the matter is urgent. Unable to send its army or officials into the disputed territory by reason of the Order of 8 March 2011, the Government of Nicaragua has resorted to the stratagem of employing a surrogate force comprising young nationalistic environmentalists to carry out this task. The Court's expression of "concerns" (see paragraph 37 of the Order), falling short of serious concerns, is a gentle rebuke of this stratagem that fails to grasp the gravity of the situation.

15. In these circumstances I believe that the Court should have acceded to Costa Rica's request for modification of the Order of 2011 to make it clear that the presence of GEM or similar bodies, belonging to either Nicaragua or Costa Rica, is contrary to the Order of 8 March 2011. Such a modification would send out a message to both Parties that they are required to police access to the disputed territory and to prevent groups of private persons, whether they be environmentalists or not, from entering the disputed territory. This would be in line with a broad interpretation of the first provisional measure in the Order of 8 March 2011 and the object and purpose of the Order of 8 March 2011. Moreover it would accord with the third provisional measure calling on both Parties to "refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve".

(Signed) John DUGARD.

DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

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I. PROLEGOMENA

1. I regret not to be able to concur with the decision taken by the majority of the Court (first resolatory point) not to indicate *new* provisional measures in the *cas d'espèce*. My perception is that the Court majority's reasoning and decision, *data venia*, suffer from an ineluctable incongruence: having admitted that there is a change in the situation (paras. 25, 31 and 36), it extracts no consequence therefrom, as in its view "the conditions have not been fulfilled" for it to modify the measures it indicated in its previous Order of 8 March 2011 (para. 36). In limiting itself to simply reaffirming its previous provisional measures, it expresses its concerns at the new situation created in the disputed area (para. 37), with the presence therein no longer of personnel (whether civilian, police or security), but rather of "organized groups" of individuals.

2. My position is, *a contrario sensu*, that the changing circumstances surrounding the present cases (joined), opposing Costa Rica to Nicaragua and vice versa, concerning, respectively, *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, require from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the light of the relevant provisions of its *interna corporis*¹, the exercise of its powers to indicate *new* provisional measures in order to face the *new* situation, which is one of urgency and of probability of irreparable harm, in the form of bodily injury or death of the persons staying in the disputed area.

3. Given the high importance that I attach to the issues raised in the present Order, I feel obliged to present and leave on the records, in the present dissenting opinion, the foundations of my position on the matter. I thus take the care to examine herein its aspects, as to the facts and as to the law. I shall start by reviewing the concomitant new requests of additional provisional measures of protection on the part of Costa Rica as well as Nicaragua, and the position taken by them, in their respective requests, as to the purported expansion of provisional measures of protection. After reviewing the technical missions *in loco* pursuant to the 1971 Ramsar Convention, I shall consider the requisites of urgency, and risk or probability of harm (in the form of bodily injury or death, of the persons staying in the disputed area), before proceeding to a general assessment of the requests of Costa Rica and of Nicaragua.

4. I shall then turn my attention to the aspects of the matter as to the law, as I perceive them, namely: (a) the effects of provisional measures of protection beyond the strict territorialist outlook; (b) the beneficiaries of provisional measures of protection, beyond the traditional inter-State dimension; and (c) the effects of provisional measures of protection

¹ Article 76 (1) of the Rules of Court, in addition to Article 41 of its Statute.

beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. The way will then be paved for my considerations on the proper exercise of the international judicial function (in the present domain of provisional measures) in the form of a rebuttal of so-called “judicial self-restraint”, or *l’art de ne rien faire*. Last but not least, I shall present my concluding reflections towards an *autonomous legal regime* of provisional measures of protection.

II. PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION: THE CONCOMITANT NEW REQUESTS BY COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA

5. May it be recalled, to start with, that, on 18 November 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was seised of a request by Costa Rica for the indication of provisional measures in the case, opposing it to Nicaragua, concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*. After the holding of public hearings, the ICJ issued its Order on provisional measures of protection, of 8 March 2011, whereby it determined that

“(1) Each Party shall refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, any personnel, whether civilian, police or security;

(2) Notwithstanding point (1) above, Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect;

(3) Each Party shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve;

(4) Each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures.”²

Shortly afterwards, on 21 December 2011, Nicaragua filed a case against Costa Rica with the ICJ, concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*. Subsequently, by its Order of 17 April 2013, the ICJ decided to join the proceedings in the two cases.

6. One month later, on 23 May 2013, Costa Rica filed a request³ for the modification of the aforementioned Order of provisional measures of 8 March 2011. Nicaragua was invited to present written observations

² *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011*, *I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, pp. 27-28.

³ Request by Costa Rica for the Modification of the Court’s Order Indicating Provisional Measures, doc. of 23 May 2013 [hereinafter “request by Costa Rica”].

concerning Costa Rica's request⁴. On the stipulated date (14 June 2013), Nicaragua submitted its written observations on Costa Rica's request, and presented its own request for the modification of the same Order of 8 March 2011⁵. Costa Rica, for its part, submitted (on 20 June 2013) its own written observations on Nicaragua's request, within the stipulated time-limit by the Court⁶.

7. The Court thus had before it two requests (Costa Rica's and Nicaragua's) and the pieces it needed to proceed to its deliberation on the matter. It should not pass unnoticed that, since the Court issued its Order of provisional measures of 8 March 2011, there have been 16 communications submitted by the Parties to the Court in relation to compliance with the Order⁷. This discloses the importance ascribed by both contending Parties, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, to the provisional measures of protection in the two respective cases, the proceedings of which having been joined by the ICJ⁸.

III. TECHNICAL MISSIONS *IN LOCO* PURSUANT TO THE RAMSAR CONVENTION

8. The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (known as the Ramsar Convention, adopted in Ramsar, Iran, in 1971, and entered into force on 21 December 1975)⁹ states in its preamble that "the conservation of wetlands and their flora and fauna can be ensured by combining far-sighted national policies with co-ordinated international action". Both Costa Rica and Nicaragua are parties to it¹⁰. In its Order of 8 March 2011¹¹, the Court pointed out that, pursuant to Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention, Costa Rica has designated the "Humedal Caribe Noreste" wetland "for inclusion in [the] List of Wetlands of International Importance (. . .) maintained by the [continuing] bureau" established by the Convention, while Nicaragua has pro-

⁴ On 24 May 2013.

⁵ Written observations of Nicaragua and Request by Nicaragua for the Modification of the Order in Light of the Joinder of the Proceedings in the Two Cases, doc. of 14 June 2013 [hereinafter "written observations of Nicaragua"].

⁶ Written observations of Costa Rica on Nicaragua's Request for the Modification of the Court's Order Indicating Provisional Measures in the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case, doc. of 20 June 2013 [hereinafter "written observations of Costa Rica"].

⁷ Parties' communications to the Court in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

⁸ Pursuant to the Court's two Orders of 17 April 2013.

⁹ Cf. *United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS)*, Vol. 996, No. I-14583, p. 245. The text of the Ramsar Convention was amended by the Protocol of 3 December 1982 and the amendments of 28 May 1987.

¹⁰ Costa Rica has been a party to it since 27 April 1992, and Nicaragua since 30 November 1997. The Convention counts today (early July 2013), on 168 States Parties.

¹¹ Cf. *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, p. 6.

ceeded likewise in respect of the “Refugio de Vida Silvestre Río San Juan” wetland, of which Harbor Head Lagoon is part (para. 79).

9. Furthermore, the Court, having acknowledged that the disputed area is situated in the “Humedal Caribe Noreste” wetland, in respect of which Costa Rica bears obligations under the Ramsar Convention, further considered that,

“pending delivery of the Judgment on the merits, Costa Rica must be in a position to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of that wetland where that territory is situated; (. . .) for that purpose Costa Rica must be able to dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the said territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to ensure that no such prejudice be caused; and (. . .) Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect” (para. 80).

10. In this line of reasoning, the Court ordered, in the resolutive point (2) of the *dispositif* of its aforementioned Order, that:

“Notwithstanding point (1) above, Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect.”

Thus, it stems from the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011, that, pursuant to the Ramsar Convention (cf. Article 3 (2)¹²), Costa Rica has a duty thereunder to monitor the disputed area which forms part of a protected wetland registered by Costa Rica under the Ramsar Convention.

¹² Article 3 (2) of the Ramsar Convention stipulates that:

“Each Contracting Party shall arrange to be informed at the earliest possible time if the ecological character of any wetland in its territory and included in the List has changed, is changing or is likely to change as the result of technological developments, pollution or other human interference. Information on such changes shall be passed without delay to the organization or government responsible for the continuing bureau duties specified in Article 8.”

11. According to those communications submitted to the ICJ, there have been three technical visits, conducted by Costa Rica in the disputed area¹³, in accordance with the Order (resolatory point (2), *supra*). The *first visit in loco* took place in April 2011¹⁴, in order to determine the situation of the wetland and to take “those actions deemed necessary with the aim of avoiding an irreparable damage to the wetlands indicated by the Court in its providence”¹⁵. It is reported that the mission acknowledged “the valuable technical work accomplished at the site during the day of 5 April, which allowed them to gather the technical elements necessary in order to determine the actual condition of the wetland”. It is also stated that “because of the lack of security measures to guarantee the personal safety of the experts as a result of actions outside the control of the Government of Costa Rica, the decision was taken not to return to the ground area and only use the over flight option to compliment the information”¹⁶.

12. This joint Ramsar-Costa Rica first visit included members of the Technical Advisory Mission of the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention and Costa Rican civilian technicians in charge of the protection of the environment¹⁷. Costa Rica further alleges that, during this visit, Costa Rican personnel and members of the Ramsar Mission were “aggressively harassed by Nicaraguan protestors and journalists”. The mission acknowledged “the valuable technical work” accomplished on 5 April 2011, which enabled them to gather the technical elements necessary “in order to determine the actual condition of the wetland”. Yet, “because of the lack of security measures to guarantee the personal safety of the experts as a result of actions outside the control of the Government of Costa Rica”, Costa Rica adds, “the decision was taken not to return to the ground area”¹⁸.

13. The *second visit in loco* took place in January 2012. Costa Rica informed the Court that its purpose was to “continue the assessment of the conditions of that wetland in order to avoid irreparable damage”¹⁹. Costa Rica claims that the visit formed “part of the action plan proposed to the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention, and agreed to by the Secretariat”²⁰.

¹³ Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 7 April 2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 11 April 2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13 April 2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 30 January 2012; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 1 March 2013.

¹⁴ Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 7 April 2011; Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 11 April 2011, and Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13 April 2011.

¹⁵ Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 7 April 2011.

¹⁶ Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13 April 2011; there was the correspondence “Minutes, Co-ordination Meeting, Advisory Technical Mission of the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention and Representatives of the Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Telecommunications”.

¹⁷ Nicaragua’s communication to the Court of 7 April 2011.

¹⁸ Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 13 April 2011.

¹⁹ Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 30 January 2012.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

14. The *third visit* occurred in March 2013, Costa Rica having informed the Court that its civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment were to conduct a visit on site. It further communicated to the Court two correspondences, whereby Costa Rica informed the Ramsar Convention Secretariat and Nicaragua of this site visit²¹. And it also reported that this third technical site visit was “carried out in accordance with the Working Plan” contained in the report presented by Costa Rica to the Ramsar Secretariat on 28 October 2011, which was approved by the Ramsar Secretariat in a note dated 7 November 2011. The stated purpose of the visit was to “avoid irreparable prejudice to that part of the northeast Caribbean Wetland”²².

IV. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE PURPORTED EXPANSION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE REQUEST OF COSTA RICA

15. In its request of 23 May 2013 to “modify” the Order of provisional measures of 8 March 2011, Costa Rica calls for three new measures to be added to it, namely, to order:

- “(1) the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Nicaraguan persons from the Area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011 ;
- (2) that both Parties take all necessary measures to prevent any person (other than the persons whose presence is authorized by paragraph 86 (2) of the Order) coming from their respective territory from accessing the area indicated by the Court in its Order on provisional measures of 8 March 2011 ; and
- (3) That each Party shall inform the Court as to its compliance with the above provisional measures within two weeks of the issue of the modified Order.”²³

16. It is, in fact, in my perception, a request for an *expansion* of provisional measures of protection. Costa Rica contends that its request is prompted by “Nicaragua’s sending to the area indicated by the Court in its Order [. . .] and maintaining thereon large numbers of persons, and by the activities undertaken by these persons affecting that territory and its ecology” (para. 2). It adds that there is a change in the situation (para. 4), in the light of Article 76 (2) of the Rules of

²¹ Costa Rica’s communication to the Court of 1 March 2013.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Request by Costa Rica.

Court²⁴. Costa Rica further claims that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area causes a risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (paras. 18-19). Costa Rica at last contends that there is urgency, since in its view there is a real risk that, without such modification of the Court's Order, action prejudicial to Costa Rica's rights will occur before the Court renders its decision on the merits (paras. 18-20).

17. Costa Rica purports to explain further its requested new provisional measures. It alleges that Nicaragua sponsors the continuous presence, in the disputed area, of a large number of Nicaraguan nationals, by its operation of an "academic" programme whereby they are sent thereto to carry out activities. In the annexes to its request, Costa Rica refers to press reports on the matter, and adds that it has kept the Court informed about these activities, has formally protested to Nicaragua against them, and has exhausted all efforts to resolve the dispute by diplomatic means, which have failed. Costa Rica claims that the activities at issue have consisted in: (a) deliberately interfering with a site visit; (b) carrying out works in an attempt to keep the artificial *caño* open; (c) engaging in uncontrolled planting of trees in the area; (d) raising of cattle in the area; and (e) erecting fences in the area to the north of, and alongside, the *caño* (paras. 4-9)²⁵. This presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area, and their described activities thereon, are, in Costa Rica's view, in breach of the Court's Order, and create a new situation, requiring the "modification" of the Court's Order (paras. 10-14) — in the sense of the expansion of the provisional measures of protection.

18. In its written observations, Nicaragua, in turn, retorts that Costa Rica's request, in its view, is "groundless", as there has been no change in the situation that would call for a "modification" of the Court's Order in the way described by Costa Rica, and it has not breached the provisional measures indicated by the Court (paras. 1-3). Nicaragua adds that the presence of private individuals is not a new issue under the

²⁴ Article 76 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

- "1. At the request of a party the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.
2. Any application by a party proposing such a revocation or modification shall specify the change in the situation considered to be relevant.
3. Before taking any decision under paragraph 1 of this Article the Court shall afford the parties an opportunity of presenting their observations on the subject."

²⁵ Costa Rica further recalls that Nicaragua maintains the position that the Court's Order does not prevent private citizens from accessing the area and carrying activities thereon; in its Counter-Memorial, Nicaragua recognizes the presence of its nationals in the area. Costa Rica controverts Nicaragua's views (Request by Costa Rica, paras. 10-14).

Court's Order (para. 13). And as to the presence of members of the Guardabarranco Environment Movement referred to by Costa Rica, Nicaragua claims that Costa Rica did not ask, in its request for the indication of provisional measures, for the withdrawal of private individuals, and adds that the members of the Guardabarranco Environment Movement are "private individuals", as conceded by Costa Rica; it alleges that they are neither part of the Nicaraguan Government, nor are they acting under Nicaragua's control (paras. 6-14).

19. In its written observations on Nicaragua's request, Costa Rica reiterates its perceived change in the situation, pointing out that Nicaragua does not deny, in its own written observations, that it is sponsoring, sending and maintaining large number of persons in the area (para. 7). In Costa Rica's view, the unlawful presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the area is not in dispute. Costa Rica then claims that this is a new situation that did not exist at the time of the oral hearings on provisional measures, as then only *military* personnel were in the area; the Court did not implicitly recognize in its Order of 8 March 2011 that private individuals could enter, remain on, and carry out unsupervised, unpoliced activities in the area. Costa Rica maintains that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the area is unlawful, and increases the risk of incidents likely to cause irremediable harm²⁶.

V. URGENCY AND RISK OF HARM IN THE FORM OF BODILY INJURY OR DEATH

20. In its Order of provisional measures of protection of 8 March 2011 the ICJ, recalling the competing claims over the disputed area and Nicaragua's intention to carry out thereon, "if only occasionally", certain activities, noted, in paragraph 75, the ensuing risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death. The Court stated that such situation created

"an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica's claimed title to sovereignty over the said territory and to the rights deriving therefrom; (. . .) this situation moreover gives rise to a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death" (para. 75).

Under these circumstances, the Court decided that provisional measures should be indicated²⁷.

²⁶ Written observations of Costa Rica, paras. 25-29.

²⁷ *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp. 24-25, para. 76.

21. The ICJ thus took into account the risk of incidents likely to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death, and then ordered the requested measures. From the arguments more recently submitted to the Court, it seems that similar concerns about a risk of incidents that could cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death call for additional provisional measures to be adopted by the Court. To this effect, Costa Rica claims that the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed territory poses the risk of such irremediable harm²⁸. In its request, Costa Rica sustains that there is “a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” (para. 18); in particular, it links the presence of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area to the risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death, and it adds that there is “real urgency”. There is, furthermore, in its view, “a serious threat to its internationally-protected wetlands and forests” (*ibid.*).

22. In its written observations, Costa Rica also argues that there is urgency. Costa Rica links the urgency of the situation to the “real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” in the disputed area (para. 29), and stresses this risk (paras. 25 and 28). Costa Rica asserts that, pursuant to the Court’s Order, it has prevented its police force and residents from entering the area, while Nicaragua has refused to ensure that people from its territory do not enter the area, and continues to maintain therein a constant presence of “substantial numbers of Nicaraguan persons”. Costa Rica then submits that “[t]here is a real risk that, without a modification of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011, action prejudicial to the rights of Costa Rica will occur before the Court has the opportunity to render its final decision on the questions for determination set out in the Application” (para. 19).

23. For its part, in its written observations Nicaragua retorts that, after three technical visits to the site, Costa Rica has in its view failed to demonstrate the existence of any “serious threat” to the disputed territory, or any “incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death” (para. 37). It adds that Costa Rica first made such assertions in its Memorial, but they had been rebutted by Nicaragua in its Counter-Memorial. Thus, Nicaragua denies any urgency in the situation, and adds that Costa Rica’s new allegations could be more properly addressed in the merits phase. Nicaragua claims that, since the Order, it has acted with due diligence to ensure that the area remains free of Nicaraguan personnel; as to the presence in the area of members of the Guardabarranco Environment Movement referred to by Costa Rica,

²⁸ Request by Costa Rica, paras. 18-20; it further alleges that there have lately been incidents in the area, where Nicaraguan nationals have subjected Costa Rican environmental personnel to harassment and verbal abuse, posing a risk of incidents that might cause bodily injury or death.

Nicaragua argues that Costa Rica had not asked, in its earlier request for the indication of provisional measures, for the withdrawal of “private individuals” (paras. 6-14).

VI. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE PURPORTED EXPANSION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE REQUEST OF NICARAGUA

24. On 14 June 2013, Nicaragua submitted its written observations on Costa Rica’s request, and made its own request for modification of the Court’s Order²⁹ on the basis of an alleged new factual situation, that is, the construction of a 160-km-long road along the San Juan River and the joinder of the proceedings. Nicaragua argues, in its written observations and request, that, despite its call on Costa Rica for halting the construction without an appropriate transboundary environmental impact assessment, Costa Rica announced that the work is about to be restarted. Nicaragua argues that the construction of the road has resulted in increased sedimentation and pollution of the river, adverse impact on water quality, aquatic life, navigation and other general uses of the river by the population (paras. 43-46).

25. Nicaragua further argues that the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011 should be adjusted to take into account the “harmful environmental effect of the works in and along the San Juan River on the fragile fluvial ecosystem (including protected nature preserves in and along the river)”, which cover the area in dispute located at the mouth of the river. Nicaragua also refers to the UNITAR/UNOSAT report observing that the area in dispute is being affected by the accumulation of fluvial sediments including those of bank erosion, attributable in part by sediments transmitted to the river by the road construction activities. Nicaragua maintains that the Order should be adjusted to take this into account. Both Parties should

²⁹ Nicaragua requests that the provisional measure ordered by the Court in resolutory point (2) be modified to read:

“Notwithstanding point (1) above, both Parties may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment to the disputed territory, including the *caño*, but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is situated; both Parties shall consult in regard to these actions and use their best endeavours to find common solutions with the other Party in this respect.”

The third measure ordered by the Court should be modified to read as follows:

“Each Party shall refrain from any action, which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court in either of the joined cases or make it more difficult to resolve, and will take those actions necessary for avoiding such aggravation or extension of the dispute before the Court.”

be precluded from undertaking any activities that unilaterally increase the “accumulation of fluvial sediments” in the area (paras. 47-52).

26. As to the joinder of proceedings (cf. *supra*), Nicaragua claims that the Order should be made applicable to the two joined cases, in relation to all activities by either Party that might harm the environment in the area, in order not to aggravate the dispute. Nicaragua recalls a list of urgent measures to prevent further damages to the river which it described in its Memorial in the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*: reducing the rate and frequency of road fill failure, slumps and landslides; eliminating or significantly reducing the risk of future erosion and sediment delivery at all stream crossings along route 1856; immediately reducing road surface erosion and sediment delivery; controlling surface erosion and resultant sediment delivery from bare soil areas (paras. 47-52).

27. For its part, in its written observations on Nicaragua’s request, Costa Rica argues that the request at issue must be rejected on a number of reasons (para. 6). First, the Court had explicitly held that “Costa Rica’s claim to title over Isla Portillos was ‘plausible’”, whereas it had made “no such finding with respect to Nicaragua” (paras. 7-10). Secondly, the Court had explicitly held that Costa Rica “must be able to dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment” to the area, whereas it made no such indication for Nicaragua (paras. 11-13). Thirdly, only Costa Rica, and not Nicaragua, has an obligation to monitor the area forming part of a protected wetland registered by Costa Rica under the Ramsar Convention (paras. 14-18). Fourthly, Costa Rica adds that the basis for the Court’s Order was that neither Party should send persons to the area or maintain them there (paras. 19-21).

28. Fifthly, Costa Rica further claims that the sponsoring of activities calculated to change the *status quo* of the area is completely inconsistent with the provisional measures actually indicated by the Court and with the whole object and purpose of provisional measures in general (paras. 22-24). Sixthly, Nicaragua’s proposed modification implies the possibility of concomitant exercise of public environmental activities by two different States in the same area, increasing the risk of serious incidents (paras. 25-29). Seventhly, Costa Rica argues that Nicaragua’s proposed deletion of the Ramsar Secretariat from the provisional measure (second resolutive point of the Order) is an attempt to vitiate the role of that supervisory organ in supporting Costa Rica in the environmental recovery process of the disputed area in line with the Ramsar Convention, to which Nicaragua is also a party (paras. 30-31). Finally, Costa Rica

claims that the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, as well as the joinder of proceedings of this case with those of the case concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, in its view are not valid reasons to modify the previous provisional measure and to authorize the presence of Nicaraguan personnel charged with the protection of the environment in the area (paras. 32-33)³⁰.

VII. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUESTS OF COSTA RICA AND OF NICARAGUA

1. *Costa Rica's Request*

29. In support of its request, Costa Rica recalls that, at the time of the public hearings preceding the previous Order of the ICJ on provisional measures, it claimed that Nicaraguan personnel should leave the disputed area, as it then appeared that only military personnel was present therein. At that time, it did not seem that there was a concern with the presence of “private individuals”. Indeed, it appears that there is a change in the situation. In its written observations, Nicaragua does not seem to object to this assertion by Costa Rica, as it claims that Costa Rica did not request at that time, provisional measures in respect of the withdrawal of “private individuals” from the area (cf. para. 11).

30. The situation, as it appears today, from the evidence and the arguments submitted to the Court, is that “private individuals”, holding Nicaraguan flags, are present in the disputed area. Again, in its written observations, Nicaragua does not seem to contest this fact (cf. paras. 11-14)³¹. It thus appears that there is indeed a change in the situation. The change seems to lie in the fact that, at the time of the issuance of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011, there seemed to be no Nicaraguan private citizens in the disputed area, but only the presence of Nicaraguan military personnel. The fact that the Court mentioned in the operative paragraphs of the Order the withdrawal of Nicaraguan personnel, reflects the situation as it stood at the time of the adoption of its Order of 8 March 2011.

³⁰ Costa Rica further argues that the proper avenue for Nicaragua to proceed with its request for the indication of provisional measures in the case it lodged with the Court is by way of a new Application for the indication of provisional measures, and not by asking for a modification of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011 (paras. 34-39). Costa Rica adds that the mitigation works for the protection of the environment that it is undertaking on the road (entirely on Costa Rican territory) are an issue for the merits phase of the proceedings in the case lodged by Nicaragua, not to be dealt with by way of a request for modification of the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011 (paras. 40-41).

³¹ And cf. also written observations of Costa Rica, para. 26.

31. It does not necessarily mean that the Court, by using the word “personnel”, was thereby allowing the presence of any and all Nicaraguan persons other than civilian, security or police personnel. Accordingly, the presence of private individuals in the disputed area does not seem to be in line with the objective of safeguarding “Costa Rica’s claimed title to sovereignty over the said territory and to the rights deriving therefrom” or avoiding “incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death”, in the line of its reasoning in paragraph 75 of the Order of 8 March 2011.

32. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, the presence of private individuals in the disputed area amounts to a change in the original situation, as presented to the Court in the public hearings on provisional measures which preceded its Order of 8 March 2011. The presence of “private individuals” does not seem to be in line with the reasoning of the Court, nor with the objectives of the provisional measures it indicated, in its Order of 8 March 2011.

33. It seems uncontested that there are currently Nicaraguan nationals present in the disputed area, conforming a new situation posing a risk of incidents in the disputed area. With the change in the situation now created (on the basis of the documents and arguments presented to the Court), there appears to be a risk of irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (in the terms of paragraph 75 of its Order of 8 March 2011) that would warrant a “modification” — or, more precisely, an expansion — of the Order, so as to avoid that risk. It further appears that there is urgency, in view of a further risk of damage to the disputed area.

2. *Nicaragua’s Request*

34. The questions that Nicaragua raises in its request for “modification” or expansion of the Court’s previous Order of 8 March 2011, are centred on important points. In fact, the relevance of the construction of the road to the examination of the *whole* dispute between the Parties has been recognized by the Court in the previous Order on the joinder of proceedings, of 17 April 2013, wherein the Court stated that :

“A decision to join the proceedings will allow the Court to address simultaneously the totality of the various interrelated and contested issues raised by the Parties, including any questions of fact or law that are common to the disputes presented. In the view of the Court, hearing and deciding the two cases together will have significant advantages. The Court does not expect any undue delay in rendering its Judgment in the two cases.” (Para. 17.)

35. Be that as it may, the construction of the road, albeit an important question, does not appear to be a matter to be treated in an Order for the “modification” or expansion of a previous Order of provisional measures (of 8 March 2011). The Court does not seem to be satisfied that the construction of the road, as allegedly an entirely new issue, is endowed with urgency, so as to be treated in the form of a new provisional measure. May it be recalled that Nicaragua brought this issue before the Court on 21 December 2011, when it lodged the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River* with the Court.

36. Moreover, the joinder of the proceedings of the cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area* and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, does not appear by itself to support a “modification” of the Order of 8 March 2011. This Order was based on the situation as then argued by the Parties, concerning the disputed area. It rested upon an assessment by the ICJ that the situation, as presented to it, gave rise to “a real and present risk of incidents liable to cause irremediable harm in the form of bodily injury or death”; on this basis, the Court decided to indicate the provisional measures of protection appropriate to that situation.

37. Thus, the joinder of proceedings in the two aforementioned cases does not amount to a change of the situation, as presented to the Court at the time of the hearings that led to the adoption of its Order of 8 March 2011; nor does it seem to amount to a new fact that would warrant a “modification” of that Order. Keeping in mind the foregoing, and acknowledging that the questions raised by Nicaragua concerning the construction of the road along the San Juan River are relevant, the best course to take is to deal with them in the merits phase of the case concerning the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*.

VIII. EFFECTS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION BEYOND THE STRICT TERRITORIALIST OUTLOOK

38. The factual context before the Court takes us beyond the traditional outlook of State territorial sovereignty. The concerns expressed before the Court encompass living conditions of people in their natural habitat, and the required environmental protection. International case law on the matter (of distinct international tribunals) has so far sought to clarify the *juridical nature* of provisional measures, stressing its essentially preventive character. In effect, the likelihood or probability of *irreparable damage*, and the *urgency* of a situation, become evident when, e.g., a growing number of people are about to be injured or murdered, as in cases concerning armed conflicts (cf. *infra*). Whenever ordered provisional

measures protect rights of individuals, they appear endowed with a character, more than precautionary, truly *tutelary*³², besides preserving the parties' (States') rights at stake³³.

39. The circumstances of certain cases before the Court have led this latter, in its decisions on provisional measures, to shift its attention on to the *protection of people* in territory (e.g., the case of the *Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)*, 1986; the case of the *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria)*, 1996; the case of *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, 2000; the case concerning the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, 2008 — cf. *infra*). In those decisions, among others, the ICJ became attentive *also* to the fate of *persons*.

40. The ICJ thus looked (moved) beyond the strict territorialist outlook. The fact is that, in successive cases lodged with the Court, the beneficiaries of provisional measures of protection are identified well beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. The present cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area*, and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River*, provide yet new illustrations to this effect, in so far as the persons currently found in the disputed area are concerned.

41. It should not pass unnoticed that provisional measures of protection have lately invited the Court to move its reasoning beyond the strict territorialist approach, as I observed in my separate opinion in the recent Order of the Court of provisional measures of protection in the case of the *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 537)* [hereinafter *Request for Interpretation*] after

³² Cf. R. St. J. MacDonald, "Interim Measures in International Law, with Special Reference to the European System for the Protection of Human Rights", 52 *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht* (1993), pp. 703-740; A. A. Cançado Trindade, "Les mesures provisoires de protection dans la jurisprudence de la Cour inter-américaine des droits de l'homme", in *Mesures conservatoires et droits fondamentaux* (eds. G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.-F. Flauss), Brussels, Bruylant/Nemesis, 2005, pp. 145-163, and in 4 *Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos* (2003), pp. 13-25; A. Saccucci, *Le Misure Provvisorie nella Protezione Internazionale dei Diritti Umani*, Torino, Giappichelli Ed., 2006, pp. 103-241 and 447-507.

³³ Cf. E. Hambro, "The Binding Character of the Provisional Measures of Protection Indicated by the International Court of Justice", in *Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation — Festschrift für Hans Wehberg* (eds. W. Schätzel and H.-J. Schlochauer), Frankfurt a/M, 1956, pp. 152-171.

dwelling upon the relationship between time and law, I moved to considerations pertaining to space and law, relating (territorial) space to the human element of statehood: the population (paras. 43-44 and 62-63). International law in a way endeavours to be *anticipatory* in the regulation of social facts, so as to avoid disorder and chaos, as well as irreparable harm; we are here before the *raison d'être* of provisional measures of protection, i.e., to prevent and avoid irreparable harm in situations of gravity and urgency. Endowed with a notorious preventive character, they are anticipatory in nature, looking forward in time; they thus disclose the preventive dimension of the safeguard of rights (para. 64).

42. In my separate opinion, I sustained that there was epistemologically no impossibility or inadequacy for provisional measures, of the kind of the ones indicated in that Order, to extend protection — as they should — also to human life, as well as to cultural and spiritual world heritage. In fact, the reassuring effects of the provisional measures indicated in that recent Order of the ICJ were precisely that they extended protection not only to the territorial zone at issue, but also, by asserting the prohibition of the use or threat of force — pursuant to a fundamental principle of international law — to the life and personal integrity of human beings who live or happen to be in that zone or near it, as well as to the Temple of Preah Vihear itself, situated in the aforementioned zone, and all that the Temple represents (para. 66).

43. I then added, in my separate opinion in the case of the *Request for Interpretation* (provisional measures), that the Court should be prepared, in our days, to give proper weight to the *human factor* (para. 97), thus *bringing people and territory together*; and I pondered that:

“Not everything can be subsumed under territorial sovereignty. The fundamental human right to life is not at all subsumed under State sovereignty. The human right not to be forcefully displaced or evacuated from one’s home is not to be equated with territorial sovereignty. The Court needs to adjust its conceptual framework and its language to the new needs of protection, when it decides to indicate or order the provisional measures requested from it.

If we add, to the aforementioned, the protection of cultural and spiritual world heritage (cf. *supra*), for the purposes of provisional measures, the resulting picture will appear even more complex, and the strict territorialist approach even more unsatisfactory. The *human factor* is the most prominent one here. It shows how multifaceted, in these circumstances, the protection provided by provisional measures can be. It goes well beyond State territorial sovereignty, *bringing territory, people and human values together*.” (*I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II)*, pp. 599-600, paras. 99-100.)

IX. THE BENEFICIARIES OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION,
BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL INTER-STATE DIMENSION

44. In the international litigation before the ICJ, only States, as contending parties, can request provisional measures. Yet, in recent years, such requests have invoked rights which go beyond the strictly inter-State dimension³⁴. In successive cases, the ultimate beneficiaries were meant to be the individuals concerned, and to that end the requesting States advanced their arguments to obtain the Court's Orders of provisional measures of protection, in distinct contexts. Thus, in its Order of 15 December 1979, in the *Hostages* case (*United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran)*, *Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979*, p. 7) the Court took into account the State's arguments to protect the life, freedom and personal security of its nationals (para. 37), and indicated provisional measures of protection of those rights (resolatory point I (A)), after referring to the "imperatives obligations" under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (para. 41), and pondering that

"continuance of the situation the subject of the present request exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm" (para. 42).

45. Half a decade later, in its Order of 10 May 1984, in *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)* (*I.C.J. Reports 1984*, p. 169), the ICJ indicated provisional measures (resolatory point B (2)) after taking note of the requesting State's argument calling for protection of the rights to life, to freedom and to personal security of Nicaraguan citizens (para. 32). Shortly afterwards, in its celebrated Order of 10 January 1986 in the *Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)* (*I.C.J. Reports 1986*, p. 3), duly complied with by the contending Parties, the Court's Chamber took note of the concern expressed by the Parties with the personal integrity and safety of those persons who were in the zone under dispute (paras. 6 and 21). One decade later, in its Order of 15 March 1996 in the case of the *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria)* (*I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I)*, p. 58), the Court took note of the requesting State's warning that continuing armed clashes in the region

³⁴ In the triad *Breard/LaGrand/Avena* cases, for example, provisional measures were requested to prevent an irreparable damage to the right to life of the convicted persons (stay of execution), in the circumstances of their cases (cf. provisional measures in the Court's Orders of 9 April 1998, 3 March 1999, and 5 February 2003, respectively).

were notably causing “irremediable loss of life as well as human suffering and substantial material damage” (para. 19).

46. In deciding to order provisional measures, the ICJ pondered that the rights at stake were not only claimed State rights, but *also* rights of the *persons* concerned (paras. 38-39 and 42). In fact, in the circumstances of that case, the victimization of human beings resulting from armed conflicts of greater intensity, I would say that the purpose of the provisional measures was to extend protection *mainly to persons*. Another Order illustrative of the overcoming of the strictly inter-State dimension in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved by means of provisional measures pertains to the case of *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)* (*I.C.J. Reports 2000*, p. 111). In its Order of 1 July 2000 in this case, the ICJ took into account the requesting State’s denunciation of alleged “human rights violations” — invoking international instruments for their protection (paras. 4-5 and 18-19), — and of its plea for protection for its inhabitants (para. 31) as well as for its own “rights to respect for the rules of international humanitarian law and for the instruments relating to the protection of human rights” (para. 40).

47. The Court, recognizing the pressing need to indicate provisional measures of protection (paras. 43-44), found that it was “not disputed that grave and repeated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including massacres and other atrocities”, had been committed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (para. 42). The Court, accordingly, ordered both Parties *inter alia* to “take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law” (resolatory point 3).

48. In its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning the *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))* (*I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 3) the Court, after finding “a grave risk” to human life, indicated provisional measures³⁵. In the subsequent Order of 13 September 1993 in the same case (*ibid.*, p. 325), the Court again expressed its concern for the protection of human rights and the rights of peoples (para. 38). In its subsequent Order of 15 October 2008 in the case

³⁵ The Court, furthermore, recalled General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 (referred to in its own Advisory Opinion of 1951 on *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*), to the effect that the crime of genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity (. . .) and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations” (*I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 23, para. 49).

concerning the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (*Georgia v. Russian Federation*) (*I.C.J. Reports 2008*, p. 412), the ICJ once again disclosed its concern for the preservation of human life and personal integrity (paras. 122 and 142-143).

49. From the survey above it can be seen that, along the last three decades, the ICJ has gradually overcome the strictly inter-State outlook in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved by means of its Orders of provisional measures of protection. Nostalgics of the past, clinging to their own dogmatism, can hardly deny that, nowadays, States litigating before this Court, despite its inter-State contentious procedure, have conceded that they no longer have the monopoly of the rights to be preserved, and, much to their credit, they recognize so, in pleading before this Court on behalf also of individuals, their nationals, or even in a larger framework, their inhabitants.

50. Facts tend to come before the norms, requiring of these latter the aptitude to cover new situations they are meant to regulate, with due attention to superior values³⁶. Before this Court, States keep on holding the monopoly of *jus standi*, as well as *locus standi in judicio*, in so far as requests for provisional measures are concerned, but this has not proved incompatible with the preservation of the rights of the human person, together with those of States. The ultimate beneficiaries of the rights to be thereby preserved have been, not seldom and ultimately, human beings, alongside the States wherein they live. Provisional measures indicated in successive Orders of the ICJ have transcended the artificial inter-State dimension of the past, and have come to preserve also rights whose ultimate subjects (*titulaires*) are human beings.

X. EFFECTS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL INTER-STATE DIMENSION

51. In the case concerning *Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or to Extradite* (*Belgium v. Senegal*) (*Order of 28 May 2009*, *I.C.J. Reports 2009*, p. 139), the ICJ decided not to indicate provisional measures. On the occasion, I warned, in my extensive dissenting opinion, that the basic right at issue pertained to the *realization of justice*, which assumed a central place in the case, one of a paramount importance, deserving of particular attention. The strictly inter-State dimension

³⁶ Cf., *inter alia*, G. Morin, *La révolte du droit contre le code — La révision nécessaire des concepts juridiques*, Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey, 1945, pp. 2, 6-7 and 109-115.

seemed to have been overcome in the acknowledgement of the rights to be preserved, in particular as the *search for justice* (the right to the realization of justice) was (and remains to date) at stake. In that case, opposing Belgium to Senegal, the crucial factor was — as I stressed in my dissenting opinion — the endurance by the victims of an ungrateful two-decade search for justice, in vain until now, for the reported atrocities of the Habré regime in Chad (para. 56).

52. I further pointed out in that dissenting opinion (para. 97) that, the fact that the binding character of provisional measures of protection is nowadays beyond question (moving from the pre-history into the history of the matter in the ICJ case law), on the basis of the *res interpretata* of the ICJ itself, does not mean that we have reached a culminating point in the evolution of the ICJ case law on this matter. Quite on the contrary, I can hardly escape the impression that we are still living the infancy of this jurisprudential development. The review of the matter (*supra*) in the present separate opinion indicates that, although some advances have been achieved, there remains a long way to go.

53. The determination of urgency and the probability of irreparable damage are exercises which the ICJ is nowadays used to; yet, although the identification of the legal nature and the material content of the right(s) to be preserved seem not to raise great difficulties, the same cannot be said of the consideration of the *legal effects* and *consequences* of the right at issue, in particular when provisional measures are not indicated or ordered by the Court. We here move to the *effects* of provisional measures of protection, beyond the traditional inter-State dimension. In this respect, there seems to remain still a long way to go.

54. In the *cas d'espèce* before the Court, opposing two Latin American countries, the new provisional measures of protection envisaged in Costa Rica's request seek the protection of individuals against "harm in the form of bodily injury or death" (*supra*), by making sure that they do not remain in the disputed area; the new provisional measures are requested not only in respect of agents of the public power (personnel), but also in respect of individuals (*simples particuliers*), well beyond the traditional inter-State dimension.

55. In this connection, the expressions used, by both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in their arguments presented to the Court, should not pass unnoticed. In its written observations³⁷, Nicaragua refers to "private individuals" (paras. 11 and 13-14), "private persons" (para. 12), "Nicaraguan nationals" (paras. 16 and 30), and "a group of young people" (para. 29). Costa Rica, for its part, in its request³⁸ refers to "Nicaraguan nationals" (paras. 7-8, 10-11 and 17-18), "Nicaraguans" (paras. 13-14), "Nicaraguan persons" (paras. 19-21), "individuals" (para. 9), and "citi-

³⁷ Written observations of Nicaragua.

³⁸ Request by Costa Rica.

zens” (para. 10); and, in its written observations³⁹, Costa Rica refers to “Nicaraguan nationals” (paras. 17-18, 25-27 and 29), “Nicaraguans” (para. 28), Nicaraguan “volunteers” (para. 21), “private individuals” (para. 27), and “persons” (paras. 7 and 28). Both Nicaragua and Costa Rica clearly have in mind human beings, of flesh and bones and soul.

56. States are bound to protect all persons under their respective jurisdictions. Provisional measures, with their preventive nature, appear as truly *tutelary*, rather than only precautionary, purporting to protect individuals also against harassment and threats, thus avoiding “harm in the form of bodily injury or death”. After all, the beneficiaries of the compliance with, and due performance of, obligations under ordered provisional measures of protection, are not only States, but also human beings. A strictly inter-State outlook does not reflect this important point. The strictly inter-State dimension has long been surpassed, and seems insufficient, if not inadequate, to address obligations under provisional measures of protection.

XI. THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL FUNCTION:
A REBUTTAL OF SO-CALLED “JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT”,
OR *L’ART DE NE RIEN FAIRE*

57. The present Order of the Court, on requests for provisional measures in the cases concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, and the *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica)*, suffers from a stark incongruence. The Court reviews the arguments of the Parties, and concludes, in respect of Costa Rica’s request, that a change in the situation has occurred, as “*organized groups of persons*” — whose presence was not contemplated when it issued its previous decision to indicate provisional measures — are now “regularly staying in the disputed territory” (para. 25). Though the Court admits a change in the situation, it extracts no consequence therefrom.

58. The Court limits itself to say that, “despite the change that has occurred in the situation”, in its view “the conditions have not been fulfilled for it to modify the measures” that it indicated in its previous Order of 8 March 2011 (para. 36). This conclusion simply begs the question. The Court’s majority expressly admits that “the presence of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area” is an aggravating circumstance (para. 37). Yet it does nothing. It further admits that this

³⁹ Written observations of Costa Rica.

new situation “is exacerbated” (!) by “the limited size of the area and the numbers of Nicaraguan nationals who are regularly present there” (para. 37). Yet it does nothing. Moreover, it admits that incidents may at any time occur. What kind of incidents? Those entailing “bodily injury or death” of the individuals staying there — as warned by the Court itself, already in its previous Order of 8 March 2011 (cf. para. 20, *supra*) — in addition to environmental damage. Yet it does nothing.

59. Contrariwise, it is crystal clear to me that the new situation created in the disputed area in the *cas d'espèce*, endowed with the prerequisites of urgency and probability of irreparable harm, undoubtedly calls for *new provisional measures, in order to prevent or avoid irreparable harm to the persons concerned and to the environment*. These new provisional measures, which the Court’s majority failed to adopt, would make it clear that each Party should refrain from sending to, or maintaining in, the disputed area, including the *caño*, not only any personnel (whether civilian, police or security), but also any “organized groups” of individuals, or any “private individuals”.

60. As a matter of fact, this is not the first time that the Court discloses its unjustified “judicial self-restraint” (so praised in traditionally conservative, if not reactionary, segments of the legal profession) in respect of provisional measures of protection, even when faced with the presence of the prerequisites of *urgency* and the *probability of irreparable harm*. Four years ago, it did so in its Order of 28 May 2009 in the case concerning the *Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)* (*I.C.J. Reports 2009*, p. 139), wherein it refrained from ordering or indicating the requested provisional measures of protection.

61. On the occasion, I appended an extensive dissenting opinion (paras. 1-105) to that Order, seeking to preserve the integrity of the *corpus juris* of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture. Shortly after the Court’s Order of 28 May 2009 wherein it found that the circumstances of the case were, in its view, not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures, there followed a succession of uncertainties (*infra*), amidst the emptiness of the Court’s self-imposed “restraint”, and its apparent insensitiveness towards the underlying human values.

62. On that occasion, contrary to the Court’s majority, I sought to demonstrate that there was manifest urgency in the situation affecting surviving victims of torture, or their close relatives, in respect of their right to the realization of justice under the UN Convention against Torture. As I have recently recapitulated⁴⁰, the Court preferred to rely com-

⁴⁰ *Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)*, Judgment, *I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II)*, separate opinion of Judge Cañado Trindade, pp. 518-527, paras. 82-103.

fortably on a unilateral act of promise (conceptualized in the traditional framework of inter-State relations) made by the respondent State in the course of the legal proceedings before itself. That pledge, in my view, did not remove the prerequisites of urgency and probability of irreparable harm for the indication of provisional measures⁴¹, nor did it efface the longstanding sufferings of the Habré regime, in their saga of more than two decades in search of the realization of justice.

63. Yet the Court took a passive posture, reduced to that of a spectator of subsequent events. In effect, following the Court's Order of 28 May 2009, no initiative was taken in the respondent State towards the trial of Mr. Hissène Habré in Senegal; the return to Mr. H. Habré to Chad was announced, as well as his imminent expulsion from Senegal, which was then cancelled in the last minute under public pressure⁴². The Court was lucky that Mr. H. Habré did not escape from his house surveillance in Dakar, and that he was not expelled from Senegal. Instead of assuming its own control over the situation, the self-restrained Court preferred to count on the imponderable, on *la fortuna*. The Court cannot keep on counting on the imponderable, as *la fortuna* may at any time turn against it. As Sophocles, in his perennial wisdom, warned, through the voices of the chorus of one of his tragedies: count no man happy till he passed the final threshold of his life secure from pain⁴³ (bodily or spiritual harm).

64. In the present Order that the Court has just adopted today, 16 July 2013, it has exercised self-restraint once again: this time, after finding that there has been a change in the situation, it has added that the circumstances presented to it, nevertheless, are not such as to require modification of its previous Order of 8 March 2011, which is simply reaffirmed. Moreover, it “does not see (. . .) the evidence of urgency” (para. 35). The Court's reasoning rests on a *petitio principii*, adducing no persuasive argument to support its decision not to order new provisional measures in face of the new situation. The Court limits itself to reasserting the previous provisional measures, addressed to a new and distinct situation, which the Court admits has now changed.

65. The Court has preferred to indulge in an unfortunate formalism, limiting itself to add that, despite the change in the situation, “the conditions have not been fulfilled for it to modify the measures that it indicated in its Order of 8 March 2011” (paras. 25, 31, 35-36). This is a *petitio principii*, whereby the Court unduly establishes a further test for the indication of provisional measures, rendering it more difficult — or simply avoiding — to order these latter, at variance with its *interna corporis*. The

⁴¹ Cf. *I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II)*, p. 517, para. 79.

⁴² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 515-516, paras. 73-75.

⁴³ Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* (circa 429 BC), verse 1684.

Court does not elaborate on its dictum, nor does it provide any demonstration whatsoever to corroborate its assertion. Its ineluctable incongruence lies in the fact that, once it finds that there is a change in the situation, it fails to modify — or rather expand — its previous Order, so as to face the new situation, endowed with the requisite elements of risk (in the form of bodily harm or death, and harm to the environment) and urgency.

66. The ICJ has not adopted new provisional measures in the present Order simply because it did not want to adopt them, for reasons which escape my comprehension. The Court, from now on, will once again only hope for the best, but not without expressing its “concerns” with regard to the new situation (para. 37), given the ostensible risk and the probability of harm posed by it. Instead of remaining preoccupied, the ICJ should have ordered the new provisional measures required by the new situation created in the disputed area. Once again, the Court will nourish the hope that fate is on its side, oblivious of the extreme care with which someone so familiar with human suffering and tragedy like Cicero approached fate, in one of his fragmented reflections⁴⁴. Even so, despite all his awareness, Cicero did not cross over the final threshold of his life secure from pain: at the end of his path, he suffered bodily injuries and a violent death . . .

67. The ICJ, on 8 March 2011, ordered provisional measures not simply because the persons present in the disputed area were personnel (whether civilian, police or security), but also because their presence therein presented a risk to the fragile ecosystem of the disputed area, and a risk of irreparable harm in the form of bodily injury or death (para. 75). The new situation, i.e., the presence of “organized groups” of *private individuals* in the disputed area, discloses in my view new circumstances, which clearly call for the indication of additional provisional measures. The change in the situation, endowed with urgency and the probability of irreparable harm, thus provides a basis for the modification of the Court’s previous Order, in the light of the provisions of Article 41 of the Statute and Article 76 (1) of the Rules of Court.

68. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning is far from coherent when, at the end of the present Order, it recognizes that the presence of “organized groups” of individuals in the disputed area is liable to create “the risk of incidents which might aggravate the present dispute”, taking into account in particular “the limited size of the area” at issue and the “numbers of Nicaraguan nationals” staying there (para. 37). If the Court expressly recognizes such risk, and further expresses its “concerns” with this new situation (*ibid.*), it is then clear that the provisional measures already ordered

⁴⁴ M. T. Cicero, *On Fate (De Fato)* (circa 44 BC), fragments 41-43.

should be modified, or expanded, so as to face this new situation. That the Court has not done so, in face of the likelihood of bodily harm or death of the individuals staying in the disputed area, is a cause of concern to me, as the rights at issue — and the corresponding obligations — are beyond the strictly inter-State dimension, and the Court seems not to have valued this as it should.

XII. EPILOGUE: TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS LEGAL REGIME OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION

69. I have already made the point that the strictly inter-State dimension has long been surpassed, and appears inappropriate to address obligations under provisional measures of protection; I have done so in other cases taken before the ICJ, as well as in another international jurisdiction⁴⁵, and I have deemed it fit to dwell further upon it in the present dissenting opinion (*supra*). The handling of cases from a strict and exclusively inter-State perspective or dimension, irrespective of their circumstances, no longer reflects the complexity of the contemporary international legal order. In my understanding, the institute of provisional measures of protection stands in need of a conceptual refinement, in all its aspects. This leads me into the last point of the present dissenting opinion, namely, the needed construction of an *autonomous legal regime* of provisional measures of protection, as I perceive it.

70. Compliance with provisional measures of protection runs parallel to the course of proceedings leading to the Court's subsequent decision on the merits of the cases at issue. Should the Court find, e.g., a breach of international law in its decision on the merits of a given case, and, parallel to that, it further finds non-compliance with its provisional measures, this latter is an *additional* breach of an international obligation. In its work in the present context, the Court still has before itself the task of elaborating on the *legal consequences* of non-compliance with provisional measures, endowed, in my perception, with an autonomy of their own.

71. Provisional measures of protection indicated or ordered by the ICJ (or other international tribunals) generate *per se* obligations for the States

⁴⁵ Cf. A. A. Cañado Trindade, *Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos — Esencia y Trascendencia (Votos en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1991-2006)*, Mexico, Edit. Porrúa/Universidad Iberoamericana, 2007, pp. 925, 935, 947, 952, 958, 974, 977, 981, 985, 991, 1010 and 1014; A. A. Cañado Trindade, *Los Tribunales Internacionales Contemporáneos y la Humanización del Derecho Internacional*, Buenos Aires, Edit. Ad-Hoc, 2013, pp. 22-28, 77-90, 106-113 and 175-179; A. A. Cañado Trindade, "La Humanización del Derecho Internacional y los Límites de la Razón de Estado", 40 *Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais* — Belo Horizonte/Brazil (2001), pp. 11-23.

concerned, which are distinct from the obligations which emanate from the Court's (subsequent) judgments on the merits (and on reparations) of the respective cases. In this sense, in my conception, provisional measures have an autonomous legal regime of their own, disclosing the high relevance of their *preventive* dimension. Parallel to the Court's (subsequent) decisions on the merits, the international responsibility of a State may be engaged for non-compliance with, or breach of, a provisional measure of protection ordered by the Court (or other international tribunals).

72. My thesis, in sum, is that provisional measures, endowed with a conventional basis — such as those of the ICJ (under Article 41 of the Statute) — are also endowed with autonomy, have a legal regime of their own, and non-compliance with them generates the responsibility of the State, entails legal consequences, without prejudice of the examination and resolution of the concrete cases as to the merits. This discloses their important preventive dimension, in their wide scope. The proper treatment of this subject-matter is the task before this Court, now and in the years to come.

73. The *juridical nature* of provisional measures, with their preventive dimension, has lately been clarified by a growing case law on the matter, as those measures came to be increasingly indicated or ordered, in recent years, by contemporary international⁴⁶, as well as national⁴⁷, tribunals⁴⁸. Soon the recourse to provisional measures of protection, also at international level, had the effect of expanding the domain of international jurisdiction, with the consequent reduction of the so-called “reserved domain” of the State⁴⁹. This grows in importance in respect of regimes of *protection*, such as those of the human person⁵⁰ as well as of the environment. The clarification of the juridical nature of provisional measures is, how-

⁴⁶ Cf. R. Bernhardt (ed.), *Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts*, Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 1-152.

⁴⁷ Cf. E. García de Enterría, *La Batalla por las Medidas Cautelares*, 2nd [enlarged] ed., Madrid, Civitas, 1995, pp. 25-385.

⁴⁸ Cf. also L. Collins, “Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation”, 234 *Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye* (1992), pp. 23, 214 and 234.

⁴⁹ P. Guggenheim, *Les mesures provisoires de procédure internationale et leur influence sur le développement du droit des gens*, Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey, 1931, pp. 14-15, 174, 186, 188 and cf. pp. 6-7 and 61-62.

⁵⁰ Cf., e.g., E. R. Rieter, *Preventing Irreparable Harm — Provisional Measures in International Human Rights Adjudication*, Maastricht, Intersentia, 2010, pp. 3-1109; C. Burbano Herrera, *Provisional Measures in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights*, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, pp. 1-221; among others. On the needed new mentality, and its benefits, in the present domain of protection, cf., in general [Various Authors], *Le particularisme interaméricain des droits de l'homme* (eds. L. Hennebel and H. Tigroudja), Paris, Pedone, 2009, pp. 3-413.

ever, still the initial stage of the evolution of the matter, — to be followed, in our days, in my understanding, by the elaboration on the *legal consequences* of non-compliance with those measures, and the conceptual development of what I deem it fit to call their *autonomous legal regime*.

74. What leads me to leave on the records, in the present dissenting opinion, my position on the matter — which I have been sustaining for years⁵¹ — is not a lack of confidence in the contending Parties complying with them: I dare to nourish the hope that they will, and the 16 communications (already referred to) that they have submitted to the ICJ, seeking to comply with its Order of 8 March 2011, disclose their awareness and goodwill. The two contending Parties come both from a part of the world, Latin America, with a longstanding and strong tradition in international legal doctrine. What leads me to leave on the records my dissenting position, is the Court's self-restraint, and the incongruence of its reasoning (cf. *supra*), in a matter of such importance for the progressive development of international law. I have cared to take the time and work to leave on the records the present dissenting opinion, so as to render a service to our mission of imparting justice.

75. In effect, the notion of victim (or of *potential* victim⁵²), or injured party, can thus emerge also in the context proper to provisional measures of protection, parallel to the merits (and reparations) of the *cas d'espèce*. Provisional measures of protection generate obligations (of prevention) for the States concerned, which are distinct from the obligations which emanate from the judgments of the Court as to the merits (and reparations) of the respective cases. This ensues from their autonomous legal regime, as I conceive it. There is, in my perception, pressing need nowadays to refine and to develop conceptually this autonomous legal regime, focused, in particular, on the contemporary expansion of provisional measures, the means to secure due and prompt compliance with them, and the legal consequences of non-compliance — to the benefit of those protected thereunder.

76. In this matter, the worst possible posture would be that of passiveness, if not indifference, that of judicial inactivism. As I warned in an

⁵¹ Cf. A. A. Cañado Trindade, *El Ejercicio de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos*, 2nd ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2013 Chap. XXI: "The Preventive Dimension: The Binding Character and the Expansion of Provisional Measures of Protection", pp. 177-186.

⁵² On the notion of *potential* victims in the framework of the evolution of the notion of victim or the condition of the complainant in the domain of the international protection of human rights, cf. A. A. Cañado Trindade, "Co-Existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights (At Global and Regional Levels)", 202 *Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye* (1987), Chap. XI, pp. 243-299, esp. pp. 271-292.

earlier dissenting opinion (cf. *supra*) and reiterate now in the present one, the matter before the Court calls for a more pro-active posture on its part⁵³, so as not only to settle the controversies filed with it, but also to tell what the law is (*juris dictio*), and thus to contribute effectively to the avoidance or prevention of irreparable harm in situations of urgency, to the ultimate benefit of *all* subjects of international law — States as well as groups of individuals, and *simples particuliers*. After all, the human person (living in harmony in her natural habitat) occupies a central place in the new *jus gentium* of our times.

(Signed) Antônio Augusto CAÑADO TRINDADE.

⁵³ In likewise advocating such pro-active posture of the Court in respect of provisional measures of protection, in my earlier dissenting opinion in the Court's Order of 28 May 2009 in the case of *Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)*, I deemed it fit to recall that the Court is not restricted by the arguments of the parties, as confirmed by Article 75 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Court. Article 75 (1) sets forth that “[t]he Court may at any time decide to examine *proprio motu* whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties.” And Article 75 (2) determines that “[w]hen a request for provisional measures has been made, the Court may indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the request.” Article 75 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Court — I proceeded in my dissenting opinion — thus expressly entitles it to indicate, *motu proprio*, provisional measures that it regards as necessary, even if they are wholly or in part distinct from those that are requested. A decision of the ICJ indicating provisional measures in the present case — as I sustained — “would have set up a remarkable precedent in the long search for justice in the theory and practice of international law”, as this was “the first case lodged with the ICJ on the basis of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture”, the first human rights treaty incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction as an international obligation of all States parties (para. 80). And I further recalled (para. 81) that the ICJ has made use of its prerogatives under Article 75 of its Rules on some previous occasions, as illustrated by its Orders of provisional measures, invoking Article 75 (2), in the cases concerning the *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 22, para. 46)*, the *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria) (Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 24, para. 48)*, the *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 128, para. 43)*, and, more lately, the *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 397, para. 145)*.

DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGE *AD HOC* DUGARD

Order of 2011 prohibits members of Guardabarranco Environment Movement (hereinafter GEM) from visiting disputed territory as they qualify as civilian personnel — Presence of GEM in disputed territory is contrary to object and purpose of Order of 2011 — Access of GEM to disputed territory poses risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica.

1. In 2011 after Nicaragua's armed forces had entered and occupied the Isla Portillos (henceforth disputed territory), the Court found that Costa Rica's claim to sovereignty over the territory was plausible but ordered that both Nicaragua and Costa Rica should refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory "any personnel, whether civilian, police or security" (*Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, p. 27, para. 86 (1)). The Court's intention was to clear the disputed territory of any persons that might exacerbate the dispute and interfere with the ultimate finding of the Court on the merits. This explains why the personnel of both Parties were ordered to keep out of the disputed territory, despite the fact that Costa Rica's claim to sovereignty had been adjudged "plausible" (*ibid.*, p. 20, para. 59). This also explains why only Costa Rica's civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment were permitted to enter the disputed territory, and then only under very strict conditions (*ibid.*, p. 27, para. 86 (2)). Someone had to ensure that the environment was protected pending the settlement of the dispute and the Court had no alternative but to allocate this task to Costa Rica because it alone had been adjudged to have a plausible title to the territory; and it alone was accountable for the environmental protection of the disputed territory under the Ramsar Convention. The Court's third provisional measure calling on Parties to "refrain from *any* action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court" (*ibid.*, p. 27, para. 86 (3); emphasis added), should be construed as emphasizing that the disputed territory was to be cleared of all persons except those specifically authorized to be there. While the present Order expresses "concerns" that "the presence of organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals in the disputed area carries the risk of incidents which might aggravate the present dispute" (see paragraph 37 of the Order), it fails to modify its Order of 8 March 2011 to make it clear that the presence of such organized groups in the disputed territory is incompatible with this Order. The failure to clarify this matter may result in further incursions by organized groups of

Nicaraguan nationals into the disputed territory with consequent irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica. For this reason, I dissent from the Order of the Court.

2. In its present Application Costa Rica asks the Court to modify its Order on provisional measures of 2011 to make it clear that *all* persons, other than environmental officials of Costa Rica specially authorized by the Order of 2011 to enter the disputed territory, are to be prevented by both Parties from accessing the disputed territory, in order to prevent irreparable harm being caused to both persons and the environment, pending the Court's determination on the merits. It may be that such an Order is unnecessary, at least as far as it concerns the activities of environmental youth groups supported by either Government, on the ground that such groups are already prohibited from accessing the territory in terms of the 2011 Order. However, in order to clarify this issue, Costa Rica seeks a modification of the 2011 Order.

3. Before examining Costa Rica's Application under Article 76 of the Rules of the Court to modify the Order of 2011, it is necessary to consider the question whether the prohibition imposed on both Parties by the first provisional measure ordered in 2011 requiring them to "refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the *caño*, any personnel, whether civilian, police or security" applies to the Guardabarranco Environment Movement (hereinafter GEM). Strictly, this is a matter for determination on the merits of the case. However, as Costa Rica's Application for modification of the Order is essentially a request for clarification and interpretation of the scope of the Order of 2011 it is necessary to examine this issue at this stage. Furthermore, as Costa Rica's Application aims to ensure that irreparable prejudice is not caused to Costa Rica's plausible right to the disputed territory by the incursion of members of GEM pending a decision on the merits, it is impossible to avoid consideration of this matter as it is essential to a decision on the modification of the existing provisional measures.

4. The answer to the question whether the members of GEM are covered by the Order of 2011 depends on the meaning to be attached to the term "personnel". In the present Order, the Court does not examine the meaning of the term "personnel" but seems to assume that the term "personnel" applies to government employees, because in 2011 Costa Rica complained only about the presence of the army, and possibly police (see paragraph 80 of the Order of 2011), and made no mention of the presence of private persons in the disputed territory (see paragraph 23 of the Order). The term "personnel" should, however, be given a broader meaning to include the members of the GEM for the following reasons.

5. First, the term "personnel" may be interpreted as applying to persons forming part of an organization employed in some service. *The Free*

Dictionary [Online] defines personnel as “the body of persons employed by or active in an organization, business or service”. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines personnel as a “body of persons engaged in some public service”. GEM is clearly an organization employed in the service of protecting the environment of what it perceives to be Nicaraguan territory. Its members could therefore be described as constituting “any civilian personnel” falling within the prohibition contained in the first provisional measure in the Order of 2011.

6. It may be argued that the fact the Order requires each Party to refrain from sending “any personnel, whether civilian, *police or security*” into the disputed territory indicates that the civilian personnel should at least be employed in the service of Nicaragua — although there is no suggestion that this employment should take the form of work for remuneration. However, on the facts before the Court, it is clear that GEM and its members are engaged in a public service on behalf of Nicaragua.

7. The precise nature of GEM is not clear. It appears to have a dual purpose: the protection of the environment and the defence of the homeland of Nicaragua. According to an article by Tim Rogers in the *Nicaragua Dispatch* of 26 September 2012, the authenticity of which has not been challenged by Nicaragua, Oscar Garcia, a forestry engineer with the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, described GEM as being “about creating ecological awareness, building nationalism and defence of the homeland”. It is common cause that there is a close connection between GEM and the Sandinista Youth, the youth movement of the governing party of Nicaragua. Furthermore, Nicaragua has not denied that members of GEM have placed Nicaraguan flags in the disputed territory and that they fly Nicaraguan flags on their missions into the disputed territory. It may be true, as asserted by Nicaragua that GEM does not act under the direction or control of Nicaragua. Moreover it is unnecessary to decide at this stage whether the acts of GEM may be attributed to Nicaragua, as this is an issue for determination on the merits. This does not, however, detract from the fact that GEM is a nationalistic youth movement, linked with the Sandinista Youth, which is concerned both with protecting the environment of the disputed territory and with asserting that it is Nicaraguan territory. The line between toleration of the presence of GEM in the disputed territory on the part of Nicaragua and sponsorship of their presence is very thin. That Nicaragua’s support for GEM goes beyond mere toleration is clear from the letter of Samuel Santos López of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry in which he “sees with great pleasure” the work of youth groups in the disputed territory. The Court’s description of GEM in its Order as “organized groups of persons” (see paragraph 25 of the Order) and “organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals” (see paragraph 37 of the Order) fails to capture the true nature of GEM as a nationalistic youth movement, with ties to the governing Sandinista Party of Nicaragua. Although GEM may not be

an organized group of paid Nicaraguan officials, it surely qualifies as a body of persons employed by or active in an organization engaged in furthering the objects and interests of the Nicaraguan Government. In short, it constitutes “civilian personnel” within the meaning of the first provisional measure in the Court’s Order of 2011.

8. Although the activities of GEM appear to fall within the terms of the Order of 2011, Nicaragua denies that this is the case. Costa Rica has accordingly sought to have this Order modified in order to make it clear that these activities are covered. In doing so, it argues that if the activities of GEM do not fall within the letter of the Order of 2011, they are contrary to the object and purpose of the Order.

9. The object and purpose of the Order of 2011 was to keep all unauthorized persons, whether nationals of Nicaragua or Costa Rica, out of the disputed territory pending the determination of the merits of the case. The first provisional measure referred to “any personnel” of the Parties, perhaps suggesting government officials only (although this interpretation is challenged above, paras. 4-7), because in 2010-2011 only Nicaraguan Government officials and military had entered the territory and the entry of private persons into the territory was not considered by either Costa Rica or the Court (see paragraphs 23 and 25 of the Order). But the intention of the Order to keep all unauthorized persons out of the disputed territory was made clear by the second provisional measure which provided that only Costa Rican civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment of the disputed territory — might enter the territory — subject to strict conditions. There was no suggestion that such “civilian personnel” were to be in the paid employment of the Costa Rican Government: presumably environmentalists attached to environmental NGO’s might be selected for this purpose. But it is clear that Costa Rica was barred from dispatching student activist environmentalists into the disputed territory in large numbers. By necessary implication Costa Rica’s equivalent of GEM was prohibited from accessing the disputed territory to carry out activities to protect the environment of the territory, despite the fact that Costa Rica’s title to the territory had been adjudged “plausible”. It is therefore simply not possible to interpret provisional measures 1 to 3 of the Order of 2011 as allowing private persons belonging to an organization of either Costa Rica or Nicaragua to access the disputed territory, whether such persons were motivated by a concern for the environment or not. *A fortiori* it prohibited nationalistic youth movements committed to protecting the environment and the national interest of either Party from accessing the territory.

10. It is necessary next to consider whether Costa Rica's request for modifications of the Order of 2011 complies with the requirements for an order for provisional measures.

11. The Court has found that the presence of organized groups of persons in the disputed territory which was not contemplated in 2011, constitutes "a change in the situation within the meaning of Article 76 of the Rules of the Court, upon which Costa Rica may be entitled to rely in support of its request for the modification of the said Order" (see paragraph 25 of the Order). The Court has found it unnecessary to reconsider the requirements that the rights asserted by Costa Rica should at least be plausible and that there should be a link between the rights which form the subject of the proceedings before the Court and the provisional measures being sought (*Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I)*, pp. 19-21, paras. 58-62).

12. The Court has found that Costa Rica has failed to show that the presence of GEM in the disputed territory constitutes a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica's rights to territorial sovereignty over the disputed territory or to the preservation of the environment of the territory (see paragraph 35 of the Order). I disagree with the Court's finding.

13. My disagreement with the Court relates to its assessment of the nature of GEM and the risk it poses to Costa Rica's rights in the disputed territory. As I have shown above (para. 7), GEM is not a body of young environmentalists *sans frontières*, concerned solely with the preservation of the environment. Instead it is a nationalistic youth movement, linked to the Sandinista Youth Movement, committed to both the protection of the environment and the defence of the homeland of Nicaragua. With the support and encouragement of the Government of Nicaragua, it sees the Nicaraguan homeland as including the disputed territory. It is not a small group of studious environmentalists who make serious visits to the disputed territory to study the environment in a scientific manner. It is not clear how many have visited the disputed territory over the past years, but over 6,000 have carried out activities in the region of the San Juan River. Nicaragua does not deny the figure of 6,000 but explains that this number of GEM members have visited the San Juan River region, comprising both Nicaraguan territory and the disputed territory. Members of GEM do not travel in small groups. Instead they travel in large groups, waving the Nicaraguan flag, as befits a nationalistic movement. Fortunately, Costa Rica has neither encouraged nor allowed its youth to behave in a similar fashion. Had Costa Rica which, unlike Nicaragua, has demonstrated a plausible right to territorial title of the disputed territory, done so there would in all probability have been clashes between rival environmentalist groups in the disputed territory.

14. In my opinion, the presence of GEM in the disputed territory is a recipe for disaster. History is replete with instances of violence committed by youth movements committed to a national cause. These historical precedents cannot be ignored. There is a real risk of personal injury and damage to the environment. This arises from the likelihood of future harm based on the reasonable prospect that the present situation, if allowed to continue, will escalate. Moreover the matter is urgent. Unable to send its army or officials into the disputed territory by reason of the Order of 8 March 2011, the Government of Nicaragua has resorted to the stratagem of employing a surrogate force comprising young nationalistic environmentalists to carry out this task. The Court's expression of "concerns" (see paragraph 37 of the Order), falling short of serious concerns, is a gentle rebuke of this stratagem that fails to grasp the gravity of the situation.

15. In these circumstances I believe that the Court should have acceded to Costa Rica's request for modification of the Order of 2011 to make it clear that the presence of GEM or similar bodies, belonging to either Nicaragua or Costa Rica, is contrary to the Order of 8 March 2011. Such a modification would send out a message to both Parties that they are required to police access to the disputed territory and to prevent groups of private persons, whether they be environmentalists or not, from entering the disputed territory. This would be in line with a broad interpretation of the first provisional measure in the Order of 8 March 2011 and the object and purpose of the Order of 8 March 2011. Moreover it would accord with the third provisional measure calling on both Parties to "refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve".

(Signed) John DUGARD.