|
[p.466]
The Court,
composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment:
1. On 2 March 1999 the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to
as "Germany") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedings against the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as
the "United States") for "violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations [of 24 April 1963]" (hereinafter referred to as the "Vienna
Convention").
In its Application, Germany based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article
36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the
Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which
accompanies the Vienna Convention (hereinafter referred to as the "Optional
Protocol").
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of the United States; and, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, all States entitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. On 2 March 1999, the day on which the Application was filed, the German
Government also filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the
indication of provisional measures based on Article 41 of the Statute and
Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
By a letter dated 2 March 1999, the Vice-President of the Court, acting
President in the case, addressed the Government of the United States in the
following terms:
"Exercising the functions of the presidency in terms of Articles 13 and 32
of the Rules of Court, and acting in conformity with Article 74, paragraph
4, of the said Rules, I hereby draw the attention of [the] Government [of
the United States] to the need to act in such a way as to enable any Order
the Court will make on the request for provisional measures to have its
appropriate effects."
By an Order of 3 March 1999, the Court indicated certain provisional
measures (see paragraph 32 below).
4. In accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar sent
the notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to
all States parties to the Vienna Convention or to that Convention and the
Optional Protocol.
5. By an Order of 5 March 1999, the Court, taking account of the views of
the Parties, fixed 16 September 1999 and 27 March 2000, respectively, as the
time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by Germany and of a
Counter-Memorial by the United States.
The Memorial and Counter-Memorial were duly filed within the time-limits so
prescribed.
6. By letter of 26 October 2000, the Agent of Germany expressed his
Government's desire to produce five new documents in accordance with Article
56 of the Rules.
By letter of 6 November 2000, the Agent of the United States informed the
Court that his Government consented to the production of the first and
second documents, but not to that of the third, fourth and fifth documents.
[p 471]
The Court decided, pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Rules, to
authorize the production of the latter group of documents by Germany, it
being understood that the United States would have the opportunity, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, to comment subsequently thereon
and to submit documents in support of those comments. That decision was duly
communicated to the Parties by letters from the Registrar dated 9 November
2000.
7. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after
ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings
and documents annexed would be made available to the public at the opening
of the oral proceedings.
8. Public hearings were held from 13 to 17 November 2000, at which the Court
heard the oral arguments and replies of:
For Germany :Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg,
Mr. Bruno Simma,
Mr. Daniel Khan,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul,
Mr. Andreas Paulus,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
For the United States: Mr. James H. Thessin,
The Honourable Janet Napolitano,
Mr. Theodor Meron,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. Stefan Trechsel,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson.
9. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to Germany, to which
replies were given in writing, in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4,
of the Rules of Court.
In addition, the United States, acting within the time-limit accorded it for
this purpose, commented on the new documents filed by Germany on 26 October
2000 (see paragraph 6 above) and produced documents in support of those
comments.
*
10. In its Application, Germany formulated the decision requested in the
following terms:
"Accordingly the Federal Republic of Germany asks the Court to adjudge and
declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting and
sentencing Karl and Walter LaGrand, as described in the preceding statement
of facts, violated its international legal obligations to Germany, in its
own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, as
provided by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention,
(2) that Germany is therefore entitled to reparation,
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to
[p 472] apply the doctrine of 'procedural default' or any other doctrine of
national law, so as to preclude the exercise of the rights accorded under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and
(4) that the United States is under an international obligation to carry out
in conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any future
detention of or criminal proceedings against any other German national in
its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or
other power, whether that power holds a superior or subordinate position in
the organization of the United States, and whether that power's functions
are of an international or internal character;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,
(1) the criminal liability imposed on Karl and Walter LaGrand in violation
of international legal obligations is void, and should be recognized as void
by the legal authorities of the United States;
(2) the United States should provide reparation, in the form of compensation
and satisfaction, for the execution of Karl LaGrand on 24 February 1999;
(3) the United States should restore the status quo ante in the case of
Walter LaGrand, that is re-establish the situation that existed before the
detention of, proceedings against, and conviction and sentencing of that
German national in violation of the United States' international legal
obligation took place; and
(4) the United States should provide Germany a guarantee of the
non-repetition of the illegal acts."
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Germany,
in the Memorial:
"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth in the present
Memorial, and without prejudice to such elements of fact and law and to such
evidence as may be submitted at a later time, and likewise without prejudice
to the right to supplement and amend the present Submissions, the Federal
Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without
delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36 subparagraph 1
(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Germany
of the possibility of rendering consular assistance, which ultimately
resulted in the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, violated its
international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its
right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36
paragraph 1 of the said Convention;
(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in par-[p
473]ticular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter
LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international
legal obligation to Germany under Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Vienna
Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended;
(3) that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international
legal obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by
the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might
interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings
are pending;
and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,
(4) that the United States shall provide Germany a guarantee that it will
not repeat its illegal acts and ensure that, in any future cases of
detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, United States
domestic law and practice will not constitute a bar to the effective
exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations."
On behalf of the Government of the United States,
in the Counter-Memorial:
"Accordingly, on the basis of the facts and arguments set forth in this
Counter-Memorial, and without prejudice to the right further to amend and
supplement these submissions in the future, the United States asks the Court
to adjudge and declare that:
(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in that
the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly give to Karl
and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that Article, and that the
United States has apologized to Germany for this breach, and is taking
substantial measures aimed at preventing any recurrence; and
(2) That all other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany
are dismissed."
12. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the
Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Germany,
"The Federal Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without
delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36, subparagraph
1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving
Germany of the possibility of rendering con-[p 474]sular assistance, which
ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, violated
its international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its
right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36,
paragraph 1, of the said Convention;
(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in
particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter
LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international
legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended;
(3) that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international
legal obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by
the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might
interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings
are pending;
and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,
(4) that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it will
not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of detention of
or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United States will
ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In particular in
cases involving the death penalty, this requires the United States to
provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired
by a violation of the rights under Article 36."
On behalf of the Government of the United States,
"The United States of America respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that:
(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
in that the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly give
to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that Article, and
that the United States has apologized to Germany for this breach, and is
taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any recurrence; and
(2) All other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany are
dismissed."
***
13. Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in [p 475] 1962 and
1963 respectively, and were German nationals. In 1967, when they were still
young children, they moved with their mother to take up permanent residence
in the United States. They returned to Germany only once, for a period of
about six months in 1974. Although they lived in the United States for most
of their lives, and became the adoptive children of a United States
national, they remained at all times German nationals, and never acquired
the nationality of the United States. However, the United States has
emphasized that both had the demeanour and speech of Americans rather than
Germans, that neither was known to have spoken German, and that they
appeared in all respects to be native citizens of the United States.
14. On 7 January 1982, Karl LaGrand and Walter LaGrand were arrested in the
United States by law enforcement officers on suspicion of having been
involved earlier the same day in an attempted armed bank robbery in Marana,
Arizona, in the course of which the bank manager was murdered and another
bank employee seriously injured. They were subsequently tried before the
Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, which, on 17 February 1984,
convicted them both of murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the
first degree, attempted armed robbery and two counts of kidnapping. On 14
December 1984, each was sentenced to death for first degree murder and to
concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the other charges.
15. At all material times, Germany as well as the United States were parties
to both the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional
Protocol to that Convention. Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna
Convention provides that:
"if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph."
It is not disputed that at the time the LaGrands were convicted and
sentenced, the competent United States authorities had failed to provide the
LaGrands with the information required by this provision of the Vienna
Convention, and had not informed the relevant German consular post of the
LaGrands' arrest. The United States concedes that the competent authorities
failed to do so, even after becoming aware that the LaGrands were German
nationals and not United States nationals, and admits that [p 476] the
United States has therefore violated its obligations under this provision of
the Vienna Convention.
16. However, there is some dispute between the Parties as to the time at
which the competent authorities in the United States became aware of the
fact that the LaGrands were German nationals. Germany argues that the
authorities of Arizona were aware of this from the very beginning, and in
particular that probation officers knew by April 1982. The United States
argues that at the time of their arrest, neither of the LaGrands identified
himself to the arresting authorities as a German national, and that Walter
LaGrand affirmatively stated that he was a United States citizen. The United
States position is that its "competent authorities" for the purposes of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention were the arresting and
detaining authorities, and that these became aware of the German nationality
of the LaGrands by late 1984, and possibly by mid-1983 or earlier, but in
any event not at the time of their arrest in 1982. Although other
authorities, such as immigration authorities or probation officers, may have
known this even earlier, the United States argues that these were not
"competent authorities" for the purposes of this provision of the Vienna
Convention. The United States has also suggested that at the time of their
arrest, the LaGrands may themselves have been unaware that they were not
nationals of the United States.
17. At their trial, the LaGrands were represented by counsel assigned by the
court, as they were unable to afford legal counsel of their own choice.
Their counsel at trial did not raise the issue of non-compliance with the
Vienna Convention, and did not themselves contact the German consular
authorities.
18. The convictions and sentences pronounced by the Superior Court of Pima
County, Arizona, were subsequently challenged by the LaGrands in three
principal sets of legal proceedings.
19. The first set of proceedings consisted of appeals against the
convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which were
rejected by that court on 30 January 1987. The United States Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its discretion, denied applications by the LaGrands for
further review of these judgments on 5 October 1987.
20. The second set of proceedings involved petitions by the LaGrands for
post-conviction relief, which were denied by an Arizona state court in 1989.
Review of this decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1990,
and by the United States Supreme Court in 1991.
21. At the time of these two sets of proceedings, the LaGrands had still not
been informed by the competent United States authorities of their rights
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, and the German
consular post had [p 477] still not been informed of their arrest. The issue
of the lack of consular notification, which had not been raised at trial,
was also not raised in these two sets of proceedings.
22. The relevant German consular post was only made aware of the case in
June 1992 by the LaGrands themselves, who had learnt of their rights from
other sources, and not from the Arizona authorities. In December 1992, and
on a number of subsequent occasions between then and February 1999, an
official of the Consulate-General of Germany in Los Angeles visited the
LaGrands in prison. Germany claims that it subsequently helped the LaGrands'
attorneys to investigate the LaGrands' childhood in Germany, and to raise
the issue of the omission of consular advice in further proceedings before
the federal courts.
23. The LaGrands commenced a third set of legal proceedings by filing
applications for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona, seeking to have their convictions - or at least
their death sentences -- set aside. In these proceedings they raised a
number of different claims, which were rejected by that court in orders
dated 24 January 1995 and 16 February 1995. One of these claims was that the
United States authorities had failed to notify the German consulate of their
arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention. This claim was rejected on the
basis of the "procedural default" rule. According to the United States, this
rule:
"is a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can obtain relief
in federal court, the claim must be presented to a state court. If a state
defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, the defendant can only do so by showing cause and prejudice.
Cause is an external impediment that prevents a defendant from raising a
claim and prejudice must be obvious on its face. One important purpose of
this rule is to ensure that the state courts have an opportunity to address
issues going to the validity of state convictions before the federal courts
intervene."
The United States District Court held that the LaGrands had not shown an
objective external factor that prevented them from raising the issue of the
lack of consular notification earlier. On 16 January 1998, this judgment was
affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals, [p 478] Ninth
Circuit, which also held that the LaGrands' claim relating to the Vienna
Convention was "procedurally defaulted", as it had not been raised in any of
the earlier proceedings in state courts. On 2 November 1998, the United
States Supreme Court denied further review of this judgment.
24. On 21 December 1998, the LaGrands were formally notified by the United
States authorities of their right to consular access.
25. On 15 January 1999, the Supreme Court of Arizona decided that Karl
LaGrand was to be executed on 24 February 1999, and that Walter LaGrand was
to be executed on 3 March 1999. Germany claims that the German Consulate
learned of these dates on 19 January 1999.
26. In January and early February 1999, various interventions were made by
Germany seeking to prevent the execution of the LaGrands. In particular, the
German Foreign Minister and German Minister of Justice wrote to their
respective United States counterparts on 27 January 1999; the German Foreign
Minister wrote to the Governor of Arizona on the same day; the German
Chancellor wrote to the President of the United States and to the Governor
of Arizona on 2 February 1999; and the President of the Federal Republic of
Germany wrote to the President of the United States on 5 February 1999.
These letters referred to German opposition to capital punishment generally,
but did not raise the issue of the absence of consular notification in the
case of the LaGrands. The latter issue was, however, raised in a further
letter, dated 22 February 1999, two days before the scheduled date of
execution of Karl LaGrand, from the German Foreign Minister to the United
States Secretary of State.
27. On 23 February 1999, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency rejected an
appeal for clemency by Karl LaGrand. Under the law of Arizona, this meant
that the Governor of Arizona was prevented from granting clemency.
28. On the same day, the Arizona Superior Court in Pima County rejected a
further petition by Walter LaGrand, based inter alia on the absence of
consular notification, on the ground that these claims were "procedurally
precluded".
29. On 24 February 1999, certain last-minute federal court proceedings
brought by Karl LaGrand ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. In the course
of these proceedings the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
again held the issue of failure of consular notification to be procedurally
defaulted. Karl LaGrand was executed later that same day.
30. On 2 March 1999, the day before the scheduled date of execution of
Walter LaGrand, at 7.30 p.m. (The Hague time), Germany filed in the Registry
of this Court the Application instituting the present proceedings against
the United States (see paragraph 1 above), accompanied by a request for the
following provisional measures: [p 479]
"The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has
taken in implementation of that Order."
By a letter of the same date, the German Foreign Minister requested the
Secretary of State of the United States "to urge [the] Governor [of Arizona]
for a suspension of Walter LaGrand's execution pending a ruling by the
International Court of Justice".
31. On the same day, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency met to consider
the case of Walter LaGrand. It recommended against a commutation of his
death sentence, but recommended that the Governor of Arizona grant a 60-day
reprieve having regard to the Application filed by Germany in the
International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Governor of Arizona
decided, "in the interest of justice and with the victims in mind", to allow
the execution of Walter LaGrand to go forward as scheduled.
32. In an Order of 3 March 1999, this Court found that the circumstances
required it to indicate, as a matter of the greatest urgency and without any
other proceedings, provisional measures in accordance with Article 41 of its
Statute and with Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules (I.C.J. Reports 1999,
p. 9, para. 26); it indicated provisional measures in the following terms:
"(a) The United States of America should take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it
has taken in implementation of this Order;
(b) The Government of the United States of America should transmit this
Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona."
33. On the same day, proceedings were brought by Germany in the United
States Supreme Court against the United States and the Governor of Arizona,
seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court's Order indicating
provisional measures. In the course of these proceedings, the United States
Solicitor-General as counsel of record took the position, inter alia, that
"an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional
measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief".
On the same date, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the motion by
Germany, on the ground of the tardiness of Germany's application and of
jurisdictional barriers under United States domestic law.
34. On that same day, proceedings were also instituted in the United [p 480]
States Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These proceedings were decided
against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed.
***
35. The Court must as a preliminary matter deal with certain issues, which
were raised by the Parties in these proceedings, concerning the jurisdiction
of the Court in relation to Germany's Application, and the admissibility of
its submissions.
**
36. In relation to the jurisdiction of the Court, the United States, without
having raised preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of Court,
nevertheless presented certain objections thereto.
Germany bases the jurisdiction of the Court on Article I of the Optional
Protocol, which reads as follows:
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application
made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."
Germany contends that the
"proceedings instituted by [it] in the present case raise questions of the
interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and of the legal consequences arising from the non-observance on
the part of the United States of certain of its provisions vis-à-vis Germany
and two of its nationals".
Accordingly, Germany states that all four of its submissions
"are covered by one and the same jurisdictional basis, namely Art. I of the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 24 April 1963".
*
37. The Court will first examine the question of its jurisdiction with
respect to the first submission of Germany. Germany relies on paragraph 1 of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:
"With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State: [p 481]
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to
consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall
also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf
of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes
such action."
38. Germany alleges that the failure of the United States to inform the
LaGrand brothers of their right to contact the German authorities "prevented
Germany from exercising its rights under Art. 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the
Convention" and violated "the various rights conferred upon the sending
State vis-a-vis its nationals in prison, custody or detention as provided
for in Art. 36 (1) (b) of the Convention". Germany further alleges that by
breaching its obligations to inform, the United States also violated
individual rights conferred on the detainees by Article 36, paragraph 1 (a),
second sentence, and by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Germany accordingly
claims that it "was injured in the person of its two nationals", a claim
which Germany raises "as a matter of diplomatic protection on behalf of
Walter and Karl LaGrand".
39. The United States acknowledges that "there was a breach of the U.S.
obligation . . . to inform the LaGrand brothers that they could ask that a
German consular post be notified of their arrest and detention". It does not
deny that this violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), has given rise to a
dispute between the two States and recognizes that the Court has [p 482]
jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to hear this dispute in so far as
it concerns Germany's own rights.
40. Concerning Germany's claims of violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (a)
and (c), the United States however calls these claims "particularly
misplaced" on the grounds that the "underlying conduct complained of is the
same" as the claim of the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). It
contends, moreover, that "to the extent that this claim by Germany is based
on the general law of diplomatic protection, it is not within the Court's
jurisdiction" under the Optional Protocol because it "does not concern the
interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention". The United States
points to the distinction between jurisdiction over treaties and
jurisdiction over customary law and observes that "even if a treaty norm and
a customary norm were to have exactly the same content," each would have its
"separate applicability". It contests the German assertion that diplomatic
protection "enters through the intermediary of the Vienna Convention" and
submits:
"the Vienna Convention deals with consular assistance . . . it does not deal
with diplomatic protection. Legally, a world of difference exists between
the right of the consul to assist an incarcerated national of his country,
and the wholly different question whether the State can espouse the claims
of its national through diplomatic protection. The former is within the
jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional Protocol; the latter is not . .
. Germany based its right of diplomatic protection on customary law . . .
This case comes before this Court not under Article 36, paragraph 2 of its
Statute, but under Article 36, paragraph 1. Is it not obvious . . . that
whatever rights Germany has under customary law, they do not fall within the
jurisdiction of this Court under the Optional Protocol?"
41. Germany responds that the breach of paragraph 1 (a) and (c) of Article
36 must be distinguished from that of paragraph 1 (b), and that as a result,
the Court should not only rule on the latter breach, but also on the
violation of paragraph 1 (a) and (c). Germany further asserts "that
'application of the Convention' in the sense of the Optional Protocol very
well encompasses the consequences of a violation of individual rights under
the Convention, including the espousal of respective claims by the State of
nationality".
42. The Court cannot accept the United States objections. The dispute
between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of
the Vienna Convention have been violated in this case in consequence of the
breach of paragraph 1 (b) does relate to the interpretation and appli-[p
483] cation of the Convention. This is also true of the dispute as to
whether paragraph 1 (b) creates individual rights and whether Germany has
standing to assert those rights on behalf of its nationals. These are
consequently disputes within the meaning of Article I of the Optional
Protocol. Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of the United
States that Germany's claim based on the individual rights of the LaGrand
brothers is beyond the Court's jurisdiction because diplomatic protection is
a concept of customary international law. This fact does not prevent a State
party to a treaty, which creates individual rights, from taking up the case
of one of its nationals and instituting international judicial proceedings
on behalf of that national, on the basis of a general jurisdictional clause
in such a treaty. Therefore the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction
with respect to the whole of Germany's first submission.
*
43. The United States does not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in regard
to Germany's second submission. Nor does it as such address the issue of the
jurisdiction of the Court over the third submission concerning the binding
nature of the Order of the Court of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional
measures. It argues, however, that this submission is inadmissible (see
paragraphs 50 and 53-55 below), and that the Court can fully and adequately
dispose of the merits of this case without having to rule on the submission.
44. Germany asserts that the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 was intended to
"enforce" the rights enjoyed by Germany under the Vienna Convention and
"preserve those rights pending its decision on the merits". Germany claims
that a dispute as to "whether the United States were obliged to comply and
did comply with the Order" necessarily arises out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Germany argues further that questions "relating to the non-compliance
with a decision of the Court under Article 41 para. 1 of the Statute, e.g.
Provisional Measures, are an integral component of the entire original
dispute between the parties". Moreover, Germany contends that its third
submission also implicates "in an auxiliary and subsidiary manner . . . the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court for claims as closely interrelated with
each other as the ones before the Court in the present case".
45. The third submission of Germany concerns issues that arise directly out
of the dispute between the Parties before the Court over which the Court has
already held that it has jurisdiction (see paragraph 42 above), and which
are thus covered by Article I of the Optional Protocol. The Court reaffirms,
in this connection, what it said in its Judgment in the [p 484] Fisheries
Jurisdiction case, where it declared that in order to consider the dispute
in all its aspects, it may also deal with a submission that "is one based on
facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising directly out
of the question which is the subject-matter of that Application. As such it
falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction . . ." (Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72). Where the Court has jurisdiction to
decide a case, it also has jurisdiction to deal with submissions requesting
it to determine that an order indicating measures which seeks to preserve
the rights of the Parties to this dispute has not been complied with.
*
46. The United States objects to the jurisdiction of the Court over the
fourth submission in so far as it concerns a request for assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition. The United States submits that its
"jurisdictional argument [does] not apply to jurisdiction to order cessation
of a breach or to order reparation, but is limited to the question of
assurances and guarantees . . . [which] are conceptually distinct from
reparation". It contends that Germany's fourth submission
"goes beyond any remedy that the Court can or should grant, and should be
rejected. The Court's power to decide cases . . . does not extend to the
power to order a State to provide any 'guarantee' intended to confer
additional legal rights on the Applicant State . . . The United States does
not believe that it can be the role of the Court . . . to impose any
obligations that are additional to or that differ in character from those to
which the United States consented when it ratified the Vienna Convention".
47. Germany counters this argument by asserting that
"a dispute whether or not the violation of a provision of the Vienna
Convention gives rise to a certain remedy is a dispute concerning 'the
application and interpretation' of the aforesaid Convention, and thus falls
within the scope of Art. I of the Optional Protocol".
Germany notes in this regard that the Court, in its Order of 9 April 1998 in
the case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v.
United States of America), held that
"there exists a dispute as to whether the relief sought by Paraguay is a
remedy available under the Vienna Convention, in particular in relation to
Articles 5 and 36 thereof; and . . . this is a dispute arising out of the
application of the Convention within the meaning of Article I of the
Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 24
April 1963" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 256, para. 31). [p 485]
Germany asserts also that its fourth submission arises under principles of
State responsibility, according to which Germany is entitled to a "whole
range of remedies" as a consequence of the particular violations alleged in
this case and that these questions of State responsibility "are clearly
within the ambit of the Optional Protocol".
48. The Court considers that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedies
for the violation of the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute that
arises out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and thus
is within the Court's jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute
on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by
the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of
the obligation (Factory at Chorzow, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 22).
Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present case with respect to
the fourth submission of Germany.
**
49. The United States has argued that the submissions of Germany are
inadmissible on various grounds. The Court will consider these objections in
the order presented by the United States.
*
50. The United States objects first to Germany's second, third and fourth
submissions. According to the United States, these submissions are
inadmissible because Germany seeks to have this Court "play the role of
ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings", a role which it
is not empowered to perform. The United States maintains that many of
Germany's arguments, in particular those regarding the rule of "procedural
default", ask the Court "to address and correct . . . asserted violations of
U.S. law and errors of judgment by U.S. judges" in criminal proceedings in
national courts.
51. Germany denies that it requests the Court to act as an appella e
criminal court, or that Germany's requests are in any way aimed at
interfering with the administration of justice within the United States
judicial system. It maintains that it is merely asking the Court to adjudge
and declare that the conduct of the United States was inconsistent with its
international legal obligations towards Germany under the Vienna Convention,
and to draw from this failure certain legal consequences provided for in the
international law of State responsibility.
52. The Court does not agree with these arguments of the United [p 486]
States concerning the admissibility of the second, third and fourth German
submissions. In the second submission, Germany asks the Court to interpret
the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention; the third
submission seeks a finding that the United States violated an Order issued
by this Court pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute; and in Germany's fourth
submission, the Court is asked to determine the applicable remedies for the
alleged violations of the Convention. Although Germany deals extensively
with the practice of American courts as it bears on the application of the
Convention, all three submissions seek to require the Court to do no more
than apply the relevant rules of international law to the issues in dispute
between the Parties to this case. The exercise of this function, expressly
mandated by Article 38 of its Statute, does not convert this Court into a
court of appeal of national criminal proceedings.
*
53. The United States also argues that Germany's third submission is
inadmissible because of the manner in which these proceedings were brought
before the Court by Germany. It notes that German consular officials became
aware of the LaGrands' cases in 1992, but that the German Government did not
express concern or protest to the United States authorities for some six and
a half years. It maintains that the issue of the absence of consular
notification was not raised by Germany until 22 February 1999, two days
before the date scheduled for Karl LaGrand's execution, in a letter from the
German Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State of the United States (see
paragraph 26 above). Germany then filed the Application instituting these
proceedings, together with a request for provisional measures, after normal
business hours in the Registry in the evening of 2 March 1999, some 27 hours
before the execution of Walter LaGrand (see paragraph 30 above).
54. The United States rejects the contention that Germany found out only
seven days before the filing of its Application that the authorities of
Arizona knew as early as 1982 that the LaGrands were German nationals;
according to the United States, their German nationality was referred to in
pre-sentence reports prepared in 1984, which should have been familiar to
German consular officers much earlier than 1999, given Germany's claims
regarding the vigour and effectiveness of its consular assistance.
55. According to the United States, Germany's late filing compelled the
Court to respond to its request for provisional measures by acting ex parte,
without full information. The United States claims that the procedure
followed was inconsistent with the principles of "equality of the [p 487]
Parties" and of giving each Party a sufficient opportunity to be heard, and
that this would justify the Court in not addressing Germany's third
submission which is predicated wholly upon the Order of 3 March 1999.
56. Germany acknowledges that delay on the part of a claimant State may
render an application inadmissible, but maintains that international law
does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It contends that
it was only seven days before it filed its Application that it became aware
of all the relevant facts underlying its claim, in particular, the fact that
the authorities of Arizona knew of the German nationality of the LaGrands
since 1982. According to Germany, it cannot be accused of negligence in
failing to obtain the 1984 pre-sentence reports earlier. It also maintains
that in the period between 1992, when it learned of the LaGrands' cases, and
the filing of its Application, it engaged in a variety of activities at the
diplomatic and consular level. It adds that it had been confident for much
of this period that the United States would ultimately rectify the
violations of international law involved.
57. The Court recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the manner in
which these proceedings were filed and for their timing. The Court recalls,
however, that notwithstanding its awareness of the consequences of Germany's
filing at such a late date, it nevertheless considered it appropriate to
enter the Order of 3 March 1999, given that an irreparable prejudice
appeared to be imminent. In view of these considerations, the Court
considers that Germany is now entitled to challenge the alleged failure of
the United States to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Germany's third submission is admissible.
*
58. The United States argues further that Germany's first submission, as far
as it concerns its right to exercise diplomatic protection with respect to
its nationals, is inadmissible on the ground that the LaGrands did not
exhaust local remedies. The United States maintains that the alleged breach
concerned the duty to inform the LaGrands of their right to consular access,
and that such a breach could have been remedied at the trial stage, provided
it was raised in a timely fashion. The United States contends that when a
person fails, for example, to sue in a national court before a statute of
limitations has expired, the claim is both procedurally barred in national
courts and inadmissible in international tribunals for failure to exhaust
local remedies. It adds that the failure of counsel for the LaGrands to
raise the breach of the Vienna Convention at the appropriate stage and time
of the proceedings does not excuse the non-exhaustion of local remedies.
According to the United States, this [p 488] failure of counsel is imputable
to their clients because the law treats defendants and their lawyers as a
single entity in terms of their legal positions. Moreover, the State is not
accountable for the errors or mistaken strategy by lawyers.
59. Germany responds that international law requires the exhaustion of only
those remedies which are legally and practically available. Germany claims
that in this case there was no remedy which the LaGrands failed to invoke
that would have been available in the specific context of their case. This
is so because, prior to 1992, the LaGrands could not resort to the available
remedies, since they were unaware of their rights due to failure of the
United States authorities to comply with the requirements of the Vienna
Convention; thereafter, the "procedural default" rule prevented them from
seeking any remedy.
60. The Court notes that it is not disputed that the LaGrands sought to
plead the Vienna Convention in United States courts after they learned in
1992 of their rights under the Convention; it is also not disputed that by
that date the procedural default rule barred the LaGrands from obtaining any
remedy in respect of the violation of those rights. Counsel assigned to the
LaGrands failed to raise this point earlier in a timely fashion. However,
the United States may not now rely before this Court on this fact in order
to preclude the admissibility of Germany's first submission, as it was the
United States itself which had failed to carry our its obligation under the
Convention to inform the LaGrand brothers.
*
61. The United States also contends that Germany's submissions are
inadmissible on the ground that Germany seeks to have a standard applied to
the United States that is different from its own practice. According to the
United States, Germany has not shown that its system of criminal justice
requires the annulment of criminal convictions where there has been a breach
of the duty of consular notification; and that the practice of Germany in
similar cases has been to do no more than offer an apology. The United
States maintains that it would be contrary to basic principles of
administration of justice and equality of the Parties to apply against the
United States alleged rules that Germany appears not to accept for itself.
62. Germany denies that it is asking the United States to adhere to
standards which Germany itself does not abide by; it maintains that its law
and practice is fully in compliance with the standards which it invokes. In
this regard, it explains that the German Code of Criminal [p 489] Procedure
provides a ground of appeal where a legal norm, including a norm of
international law, is not applied or incorrectly applied and where there is
a possibility that the decision was impaired by this fact.
63. The Court need not decide whether this argument of the United States, if
true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany's submissions. Here the
evidence adduced by the United States does not justify the conclusion that
Germany's own practice fails to conform to the standards it demands from the
United States in this litigation. The United States relies on certain German
cases to demonstrate that Germany has itself proffered only an apology for
violating Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and that State practice shows
that this is the appropriate remedy for such a violation. But the cases
concerned entailed relatively light criminal penalties and are not evidence
as to German practice where an arrested person, who has not been informed
without delay of his or her rights, is facing a severe penalty as in the
present case. It is no doubt the case, as the United States points out, that
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention imposes identical obligations on States,
irrespective of the gravity of the offence a person may be charged with and
of the penalties that may be imposed. However, it does not follow therefrom
that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be identical in all
situations. While an apology may be an appropriate remedy in some cases, it
may in others be insufficient. The Court accordingly finds that this claim
of inadmissibility must be rejected.
***
64. Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction, and that the
submissions of Germany are admissible, the Court now turns to the merits of
each of these four submissions.
**
65. Germany's first submission requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without
delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36 subparagraph 1
(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Germany
of the possibility of rendering consular assistance, which ultimately
resulted in the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, violated its
international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its
right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36
paragraph 1 of the said Convention". [p 490]
66. Germany claims that the United States violated its obligation under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) to "inform a national of the sending state
without delay of his or her right to inform the consular post of his home
State of his arrest or detention". Specifically, Germany maintains that the
United States violated its international legal obligation to Germany under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), by failing to inform the German nationals Karl
and Walter LaGrand "without delay" of their rights under that subparagraph.
67. The United States acknowledges, and does not contest Germany's basic
claim, that there was a breach of its obligation under Article 36, paragraph
1 (b), of the Convention "promptly to inform the LaGrand brothers that they
could ask that a German consular post be notified of their arrest and
detention".
68. Germany also claims that the violation by the United States of Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), led to consequential violations of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (a) and (c). It points out that, when the obligation to inform
the arrested person without delay of his or her right to contact the
consulate is disregarded, "the other rights contained in Article 36,
paragraph 1, become in practice irrelevant, indeed meaningless." Germany
maintains that, "by informing the LaGrand brothers of their right to inform
the consulate more than 16 years after their arrest, the United States . . .
clearly failed to meet the standard of Article 36 [1 (c)]". It concludes
that, by not preventing the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, and by
"making irreversible its earlier breaches of Art. 5 and 36 (1) and (2) and
causing irreparable harm, the United States violated its obligations under
international law".
69. The United States argues that the underlying conduct complained of by
Germany is one and the same, namely, the failure to inform the LaGrand
brothers as required by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Therefore, it disputes
any other basis for Germany's claims that other provisions, such as
subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention,
were also violated. The United States asserts that Germany's claims
regarding Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), are "particularly misplaced"
in that the LaGrands were able to and did communicate freely with consular
officials after 1992. There was, in the view of the United States, "no
deprivation of Germany's right to provide consular assistance, under Article
5 or Article 36, to Karl or Walter LaGrand" and "Germany's attempt to
transform a breach of one obligation into an additional breach of a wholly
separate and distinct obligation should be rejected by the Court."
70. In response, Germany asserts that it is "commonplace that one [p 491]
and the same conduct may result in several violations of distinct
obligations". Hence, when a detainee's right to notification without delay
is violated, he or she cannot establish contact with the consulate, receive
visits from consular officers, nor be supported by adequate counsel.
"Therefore, violation of this right is bound to imply violation of the other
rights . . . [and] later observance of the rights of Article 36, paragraph 1
(a) and (c), could not remedy the previous violation of those provisions."
71. Germany further contends that there is a causal relationship between the
breach of Article 36 and the ultimate execution of the LaGrand brothers.
Germany's inability to render prompt assistance was, in its view, a "direct
result of the United States' breach of its Vienna Convention obligations".
It is claimed that, had Germany been properly afforded its rights under the
Vienna Convention, it would have been able to intervene in time and present
a "persuasive mitigation case" which "likely would have saved" the lives of
the brothers. Germany believes that, "had proper notification been given
under the Vienna Convention, competent trial counsel certainly would have
looked to Germany for assistance in developing this line of mitigating
evidence". Moreover, Germany argues that, due to the doctrine of procedural
default and the high post-conviction threshold for proving ineffective
counsel under United States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later
than the trial phase could not "remedy the extreme prejudice created by the
counsel appointed to represent the LaGrands".
72. The United States terms these arguments as "suppositions about what
might have occurred had the LaGrand brothers been properly informed of the
possibility of consular notification". It calls into question Germany's
assumption that German consular officials from Los Angeles would rapidly
have given extensive assistance to the LaGrands' defence counsel before the
1984 sentencing, and contests that such consular assistance would have
affected the outcome of the sentencing proceedings. According to the United
States, these arguments "rest on speculation" and do not withstand analysis.
Finally, the United States finds it extremely doubtful that the early
childhood "mitigating evidence" mentioned by Germany, if introduced at the
trial, would have persuaded the sentencing judge to be lenient, as the
brothers' subsequent 17 years of experiences in the United States would have
been given at least equal weight. The United States points out, moreover,
that such evidence was in fact presented at trial.
73. The Court will first examine the submission Germany advances in its own
right. The Court observes, in this connection, that the United States does
not deny that it violated paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Ger-[p492]many. The
Court also notes that as a result of this breach, Germany did not learn
until 1992 of the detention, trial and sentencing of the La Grand brothers.
The Court concludes therefrom that on the facts of this case, the breach of
the United States had the consequence of depriving Germany of the exercise
of the rights accorded it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 1
(c), and thus violated these provisions of the Convention. Although the
violation of paragraph 1 (b) of Article 36 will not necessarily always
result in the breach of the other provisions of this Article, the Court
finds that the circumstances of this case compel the opposite conclusion,
for the reasons indicated below. In view of this finding, it is not
necessary for the Court to deal with Germany's further claim under Article 5
of the Convention.
74. Article 36, paragraph 1, establishes an interrelated regime designed to
facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection. It
begins with the basic principle governing consular protection: the right of
communication and access (Art. 36, para. 1 (a)). This clause is followed by
the provision which spells out the modalities of consular notification (Art.
36, para. 1 (b)). Finally Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), sets out the measures
consular officers may take in rendering consular assistance to their
nationals in the custody of the receiving State. It follows that when the
sending State is unaware of the detention of its nationals due to the
failure of the receiving State to provide the requisite consular
notification without delay, which was true in the present case during the
period between 1982 and 1992, the sending State has been prevented for all
practical purposes from exercising its rights under Article 36, paragraph 1.
It is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the LaGrands
would have sought consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany would
have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict would have
been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these rights,
and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect prevented by the breach of
the United States from exercising them, had they so chosen.
*
75. Germany further contends that "the breach of Article 36 by the United
States did not only infringe upon the rights of Germany as a State party to
the [Vienna] Convention but also entailed a violation of the individual
rights of the LaGrand brothers". Invoking its right of diplomatic
protection, Germany also seeks relief against the United States on this
ground.
Germany maintains that the right to be informed of the rights under Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, is an individual right of
every national of a State party to the Convention who enters the [p 493]
territory of another State party. It submits that this view is supported by
the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention, since the last sentence of that provision speaks of the
"rights" under this subparagraph of "the person concerned", i.e., of the
foreign national arrested or detained. Germany adds that the provision in
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), according to which it is for the arrested
person to decide whether consular notification is to be provided, has the
effect of conferring an individual right upon the foreign national
concerned. In its view, the context of Article 36 supports this conclusion
since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and receiving States
and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the travaux preparatoires
of the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpretation. In
addition, Germany submits that the "United Nations Declaration on the human
rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they
live," adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/144 on 13 December 1985,
confirms the view that the right of access to the consulate of the home
State, as well as the information on this right, constitute individual
rights of foreign nationals and are to be regarded as human rights of
aliens.
76. The United States questions what this additional claim of diplomatic
protection contributes to the case and argues that there are no parallels
between the present case and cases of diplomatic protection involving the
espousal by a State of economic claims of its nationals. The United States
maintains that the right of a State to provide consular assistance to
nationals detained in another country, and the right of a State to espouse
the claims of its nationals through diplomatic protection, are legally
different concepts.
The United States contends, furthermore, that rights of consular
notification and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States,
and not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by
permitting States to offer them consular assistance. It maintains that the
treatment due to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked to
and derived from the right of the State, acting through its consular
officer, to communicate with its nationals, and does not constitute a
fundamental right or a human right. The United States argues that the fact
that Article 36 by its terms recognizes the rights of individuals does not
determine the nature of those rights or the remedies required under the
Vienna Convention for breaches of that Article. It points out that Article
36 begins with the words "with a view to facilitating the exercise of
consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State," and that
this wording gives no support to the notion that the rights and obligations
enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article are intended to ensure that
nationals of the sending State have any particular rights or [p 494]
treatment in the context of a criminal prosecution. The travaux
preparatoires of the Vienna Convention according to the United States, do
not reflect a consensus that Article 36 was addressing immutable individual
rights, as opposed to individual rights derivative of the rights of States.
77. The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the
obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the
sending State. It provides that, at the request of the detained person, the
receiving State must inform the consular post of the sending State of the
individual's detention "without delay". It provides further that any
communication by the detained person addressed to the consular post of the
sending State must be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving State
"without delay". Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the following
language: "The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis added). Moreover,
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State's right to provide
consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised "if he
expressly opposes such action". The clarity of these provisions, viewed in
their context, admits of no doubt. It follows, as has been held on a number
of occasions, that the Court must apply these as they stand (see Acquisition
of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 7, p.
20; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 8; Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 69-70, para. 48;
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1994, p. 25, para. 51). Based on the text of these provisions, the Court
concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by
virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court
by the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in
the present case.
78. At the hearings, Germany further contended that the right of the
individual to be informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Vienna Convention was not only an individual right, but has today
assumed the character of a human right. In consequence, Germany added, "the
character of the right under Article 36 as a human right renders the
effectiveness of this provision even more imperative". The Court having
found that the United States violated the rights accorded by Article 36,
paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to
consider the additional argument developed by Germany in this regard.
**[p 495]
79. The Court will now consider Germany's second submission, in which it
asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in
particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter
LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international
legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended".
80. Germany argues that, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention
"the United States is under an obligation to ensure that its municipal 'laws
and regulations . . . enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended' [and that it] is
in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of domestic law which make
it impossible to successfully raise a violation of the right to consular
notification in proceedings subsequent to a conviction of a defendant by a
jury".
81. Germany points out that the "procedural default" rule is among the rules
of United States domestic law whose application make it impossible to invoke
a breach of the notification requirement. According to Germany, this rule
"is closely connected with the division of labour between federal and state
jurisdiction in the United States . . . [where] criminal jurisdiction
belongs to the States except in cases provided for in the Constitution".
This rule, Germany explains, requires "exhaustion of remedies at the State
level before a habeas corpus motion can be filed with federal Courts".
Germany emphasizes that it is not the "procedural default" rule as such that
is at issue in the present proceedings, but the manner in which it was
applied in that it "deprived the brothers of the possibility to raise the
violations of their right to consular notification in U.S. criminal
proceedings".
82. Furthermore, having examined the relevant United States jurisprudence,
Germany contends that the procedural default rule had "made it impossible
for the LaGrand brothers to effectively raise the issue of the lack of
consular notification after they had at last learned of their rights and
established contact with the German consulate in Los Angeles in 1992". [p
496]
83. Finally, Germany states that it seeks
"nothing . . . more than compliance, or, at least, a system in place which
does not automatically reproduce violation after violation of the Vienna
Convention, only interrupted by the apologies of the United States
Government."
84. The United States objects to Germany's second submission, since it
considers that "Germany's position goes far beyond the wording of the
Convention, the intentions of the parties when it was negotiated, and the
practice of States, including Germany's practice".
85. In the view of the United States:
"the Vienna Convention does not require States Party to create a national
law remedy permitting individuals to assert claims involving the Convention
in criminal proceedings. If there is no such requirement, it cannot violate
the Convention to require that efforts to assert such claims be presented to
the first court capable of adjudicating them".
According to the United States,
"if there is no obligation under the Convention to create such individual
remedies in criminal proceedings, the rule of procedural default - requiring
that claims seeking such remedies be asserted at an appropriately early
stage - cannot violate the Convention".
86. The United States believes that Article 36, paragraph 2, "has a very
clear meaning" and
"means, as it says, that the rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso that said laws and regulations must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under
the Article are intended".
In the view of the United States,
"in the context of a foreign national in detention, the relevant laws and
regulations contemplated by Article 36 (2) are those that may affect the
exercise of specific rights under Article 36 (1), such as those addressing
the timing of communications, visiting hours, and security in a detention
facility. There is no suggestion in the text of Article 36 (2) that the
rules of criminal law and procedure under which a defendant would be tried
or have his conviction and sentence reviewed by appellate courts are also
within the scope of this provision." [p 497]
87. The United States concludes that Germany's second submission must be
rejected "because it is premised on a misinterpretation of Article 36,
paragraph 2, which reads the context of the provision -- the exercise of a
right under paragraph 1 - out of existence".
88. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
article are intended."
89. The Court cannot accept the argument of the United States which
proceeds, in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36 applies
only to the rights of the sending State and not also to those of the
detained individual. The Court has already determined that Article 36,
paragraph 1, creates individual rights for the detained person in addition
to the rights accorded the sending State, and that consequently the
reference to "rights" in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to
the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained
individual (see paragraph 77 above).
90. Turning now to the "procedural default" rule, the application of which
in the present case Germany alleges violated Article 36, paragraph 2, the
Court emphasizes that a distinction must be drawn between that rule as such
and its specific application in the present case. In itself, the rule does
not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The problem arises when the
procedural default rule does not allow the detained individual to challenge
a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph
1, of the Convention, that the competent national authorities failed to
comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information
"without delay", thus preventing the person from seeking and obtaining
consular assistance from the sending State.
91. In this case, Germany had the right at the request of the LaGrands "to
arrange for [their] legal representation" and was eventually able to provide
some assistance to that effect. By that time, however, because of the
failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), the procedural default rule prevented counsel
for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and sentences
other than on United States constitutional grounds. As a result, although
United States courts could and did examine the professional competence of
counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands by reference to United States
constitutional standards, the procedural default rule prevented them from
attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation
of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Germany, in a
timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for [p 498] them and
otherwise assisting in their defence as provided for by the Convention.
Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the effect of
preventing "full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this article are intended", and thus violated
paragraph 2 of Article 36.
**
92. The Court will now consider Germany's third submission, in which it asks
the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international
legal obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by
the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might
interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings
are pending".
93. In its Memorial, Germany contended that "provisional measures indicated
by the International Court of Justice [were] binding by virtue of the law of
the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court". In support of its
position, Germany developed a number of arguments in which it referred to
the "principle of effectiveness", to the "procedural prerequisites" for the
adoption of provisional measures, to the binding nature of provisional
measures as a "necessary consequence of the bindingness of the final
decision", to "Article 94 (1), of the United Nations Charter", to "Article
41 (1), of the Statute of the Court" and to the "practice of the Court".
Referring to the duty of the "parties to a dispute before the Court . . . to
preserve its subject-matter", Germany added that:
"[a]part from having violated its duties under Art. 94 (1) of the United
Nations Charter and Art. 41 (1) of the Statute, the United States has also
violated the obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere
with the subject-matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are
pending".
At the hearings, Germany further stated the following:
"A judgment by the Court on jurisdiction or merits cannot be treated on
exactly the same footing as a provisional measure . . . Article 59 and
Article 60 [of the Statute] do not apply to provisional measures or, to be
more exact, apply to them only by implication; that is to say, to the extent
that such measures, being both incidental [p 499] and provisional,
contribute to the exercise of a judicial function whose end-result is, by
definition, the delivery of a judicial decision. There is here an inherent
logic in the judicial procedure, and to disregard it would be tantamount, as
far as the Parties are concerned, to deviating from the principle of good
faith and from what the German pleadings call 'the principle of
institutional effectiveness' . . . Provisional measures . . . are indeed
legal decisions, but they are decisions of procedure . . . Since their
decisional nature is, however, implied by the logic of urgency and by the
need to safeguard the effectiveness of the proceedings, they accordingly
create genuine legal obligations on the part of those to whom they are
addressed."
94. Germany claims that the United States committed a threefold violation of
the Court's Order of 3 March 1999:
"(1) Immediately after the International Court of Justice had rendered its
Order on Provisional Measures, Germany appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in
order to reach a stay of the execution of Walter LaGrand, in accordance with
the International Court's Order to the same effect. In the course of these
proceedings -- and in full knowledge of the Order of the International Court
-- the Office of the Solicitor General, a section of the U.S. Department of
Justice -- in a letter to the Supreme Court argued once again that: 'an
order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures
is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief'.
This statement of a high-ranking official of the Federal Government . . .
had a direct influence on the decision of the Supreme Court.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
(2) In the following, the U.S. Supreme Court - an agency of the United
States - refused by a majority vote to order that the execution be stayed.
In doing so, it rejected the German arguments based essentially on the Order
of the International Court of Justice on Provisional Measures . . .
(3) Finally, the Governor of Arizona did not order a stay of the execution
of Walter LaGrand although she was vested with the right to do so by the
laws of the State of Arizona. Moreover, in the present case, the Arizona
Executive Board of Clemency - for the first time in the history of this
institution - had issued a recommendation for a temporary stay, not least in
light of the international legal issues involved in the case . . ."
95. The United States argues that it "did what was called for by the Court's
3 March Order, given the extraordinary and unprecedented [p 500]
circumstances in which it was forced to act". It points out in this
connection that the United States Government "immediately transmitted the
Order to the Governor of Arizona", that "the United States placed the Order
in the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have had legal
authority to stop the execution" and that by a letter from the Legal
Counsellor of the United States Embassy in The Hague dated 8 March 1999, it
informed the International Court of Justice of all the measures which had
been taken in implementation of the Order.
The United States further states that:
"two central factors constrained the United States ability to act. The first
was the extraordinarily short time between issuance of the Court's Order and
the time set for the execution of Walter LaGrand . . .
………………………………………………………………………………………………
The second constraining factor was the character of the United States of
America as a federal republic of divided powers."
96. The United States also alleges that the "terms of the Court's 3 March
Order did not create legal obligations binding on [it]". It argues in this
respect that "the language used by the Court in the key portions of its
Order is not the language used to create binding legal obligations" and that
"the Court does not need here to decide the difficult and controversial
legal question of whether its orders indicating provisional measures would
be capable of creating international legal obligations if worded in
mandatory . . . terms".
It nevertheless maintains that those orders cannot have such effects and, in
support of that view, develops arguments concerning "the language and
history of Article 41 (1) of the Court's Statute
and Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations", the "Court's and State
practice under these provisions", and the "weight of publicists'
commentary".
Concerning Germany's argument based on the "principle of effectiveness", the
United States contends that
"in an arena where the concerns and sensitivities of States, and not
abstract logic, have informed the drafting of the Court's constitutive
documents, it is perfectly understandable that the Court might have the
power to issue binding final judgments, but a more circumscribed authority
with respect to provisional measures".
Referring to Germany's argument that the United States "violated the
obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere with the sub-[p
501]ject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending", the
United States further asserts that:
"The implications of the rule as presented by Germany are potentially quite
dramatic, however. Germany appears to contend that by merely filing a case
with the Court, an Applicant can force a Respondent to refrain from
continuing any action that the Applicant deems to affect the subject of the
dispute. If the law were as Germany contends, the entirety of the Court's
rules and practices relating to provisional measures would be surplussage.
This is not the law, and this is not how States or this Court have acted in
practice."
97. Lastly, the United States states that in any case, "because of the press
of time stemming from Germany's last-minute filing of the case, basic
principles fundamental to the judicial process were not observed in
connection with the Court's 3 March Order" and that
"thus, whatever one might conclude regarding a general rule for provisional
measures, it would be anomalous - to say the least - for the Court to
construe this Order as a source of binding legal obligations".
98. Neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the present
Court to date, has been called upon to determine the legal effects of orders
made under Article 41 of the Statute. As Germany's third submission refers
expressly to an international legal obligation "to comply with the Order on
Provisional Measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999", and as the United
States disputes the existence of such an obligation, the Court is now called
upon to rule expressly on this question.
99. The dispute which exists between the Parties with regard to this point
essentially concerns the interpretation of Article 41, which is worded in
identical terms in the Statute of each Court (apart from the respective
references to the Council of the League of Nations and the Security
Council). This interpretation has been the subject of extensive controversy
in the literature. The Court will therefore now proceed to the
interpretation of Article 41 of the Statute. It will do so in accordance
with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph 1 of Article 31, a
treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the
treaty's object and purpose.
100. The French text of Article 41 reads as follows:
"1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circons-[p
502]tances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires due droit de chacun
doivent etre prises a titre provisoire.
2. En attendant l'arret definitif, l'indication de ces mesures est
immediatement notifiee aux parties et au Conseil de securite." (Emphasis
added.)
In this text, the terms "indiquer" and "l'indication" may be deemed to be
neutral as to the mandatory character of the measure concerned; by contrast
the words "doivent etre prises" have an imperative character.
For its part, the English version of Article 41 reads as follows:
"1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken
to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council." (Emphasis
added.)
According to the United States, the use in the English version of "indicate"
instead of "order", of "ought" instead of "must" or "shall", and of
"suggested" instead of "ordered", is to be understood as implying that
decisions under Article 41 lack mandatory effect. It might however be
argued, having regard to the fact that in 1920 the French text was the
original version, that such terms as "indicate" and "ought" have a meaning
equivalent to "order" and "must" or "shall".
101. Finding itself faced with two texts which are not in total harmony, the
Court will first of all
note that according to Article 92 of the Charter, the Statute "forms an
integral part of the present Charter". Under Article 111 of the Charter, the
French and English texts of the latter are "equally authentic". The same is
equally true of the Statute.
In cases of divergence between the equally authentic versions of the
Statute, neither it nor the Charter indicates how to proceed. In the absence
of agreement between the parties in this respect, it is appropriate to refer
to paragraph 4 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which in the view of the Court again reflects customary
international law. This provision reads "when a comparison of the authentic
texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31
and 32 does not remove the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted".
The Court will therefore now consider the object and purpose of the Statute
together with the context of Article 41.
102. The object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to fulfil
the functions provided for therein, and in particular, the basic function of
judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions in
accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. The context in which Article 41
has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from [p 503] being
hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of
the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved. It follows from
the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the terms of Article
41 when read in their context, that the power to indicate provisional
measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power
in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it,
to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as
determined by the final judgment of the Court. The contention that
provisional measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would
be contrary to the object and purpose of that Article.
103. A related reason which points to the binding character of orders made
under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance, is the
existence of a principle which has already been recognized by the Permanent
Court of International Justice when it spoke of
"the principle universally accepted by international tribunals and likewise
laid down in many conventions . . . to the effect that the parties to a case
must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in
regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in general, not
allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the
dispute" (Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Order of 5 December
1939, P.C.I.J, Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199).
Furthermore measures designed to avoid aggravating or extending disputes
have frequently been indicated by the Court. They were indicated with the
purpose of being implemented (see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 106;
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June
1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 142; Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures,
Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 18, and p. 11,
para. 32, point 1 A; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April
1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23, para. 48, and p. 24, para. 52 B;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 349, para. 57, and p. 350, para. 61 (3); Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15
March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 22-23, para. 41, and p. 24, para.
49 (1)).
104. Given the conclusions reached by the Court above in interpreting the
text of Article 41 of the Statute in the light of its object and purpose, it
does not consider it necessary to resort to the preparatory work in order to
determine the meaning of that Article. The Court would nevertheless point
out that the preparatory work of the Statute [p 504] does not preclude the
conclusion that orders under Article 41 have binding force.
105. The initial preliminary draft of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, as prepared by the Committee of Jurists established
by the Council of the League of Nations, made no mention of provisional
measures. A provision to this effect was inserted only at a later stage in
the draft prepared by the Committee, following a proposal from the Brazilian
jurist Raul Fernandes.
Basing himself on the Bryan Treaty of 13 October 1914 between the United
States and Sweden, Raul Fernandes had submitted the following text:
"Dans le cas ou la cause due differend consiste en actes determines deja
effectues ou sur le point de l'etre, la Cour pourra ordonner, dans le plus
bref delai, a titre provisoire, des mesures conservatoires adequates, en
attendant le jugement definitif." (Comite consultatif de juristes,
Proces-verbaux des seances due comite, 16 juin-24 juillet 1920 (avec
annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 609.)
In its English translation this text read as follows:
"In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts already
committed or about to be committed, the Court may, provisionally and with
the least possible delay, order adequate protective measures to be taken,
pending the final judgment of the Court." (Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proces-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920
(with Annexes), The Hague, 1920, p. 609.)
The Drafting Committee prepared a new version of this text, to which two
main amendments were made: on the one hand, the words "la Cour pourra
ordonner" ("the Court may . . . order") were replaced by "la Cour a le
pouvoir d'indiquer" ("the Court shall have the power to suggest"), while, on
the other, a second paragraph was added providing for notice to be given to
the parties and to the Council of the "measures suggested" by the Court. The
draft Article 2bis as submitted by the Drafting Committee thus read as
follows:
"Dans le cas ou la cause due differend consiste en un acte effectue ou sur
le point de l'etre, la Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les
circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires due droit de chacun
doivent etre prises a titre provisoire.
"En attendant son arret, cette suggestion de la Cour est immediatement
transmise aux parties et au Conseil." (Comitee consultatif de juristes,
Proces-verbaux des seances due comite, 16 juin-24 juillet 1920 (avec
annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 567-568.)
The English version read:
"If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place or which
is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it [p 505]
considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures that
should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith
be given to the parties and the Council." (Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proces-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920
(with Annexes), The Hague, 1920, pp. 567-568.)
The Committee of Jurists eventually adopted a draft Article 39, which
amended the former Article 2bis only in its French version: in the second
paragraph, the words "cette suggestion" were replaced in French by the words
"l'indication".
106. When the draft Article 39 was examined by the Sub-Committee of the
Third Committee of the first Assembly of the League of Nations, a number of
amendments were considered. Raul Fernandes suggested again to use the word
"ordonner" in the French version. The Sub-Committee decided to stay with the
word "indiquer", the Chairman of the Sub-Committee observing that the Court
lacked the means to execute its decisions. The language of the first
paragraph of the English version was then made to conform to the French
text: thus the word "suggest" was replaced by "indicate", and "should" by
"ought to". However, in the second paragraph of the English version, the
phrase "measures suggested" remained unchanged.
The provision thus amended in French and in English by the Sub-Committee was
adopted as Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice. It passed as such into the Statute of the present Court without any
discussion in 1945.
107. The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference given in
the French text to "indiquer" over "ordonner" was motivated by the
consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the execution
of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and the lack of
binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that the Court does
not itself have the means to ensure the execution of orders made pursuant to
Article 41 is not an argument against the binding nature of such orders.
108. The Court finally needs to consider whether Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter precludes attributing binding effect to orders indicating
provisional measures. That Article reads as follows:
"1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision
of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council, which may, if it [p 506] deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."
The question arises as to the meaning to be attributed to the words "the
decision of the International Court of Justice" in paragraph 1 of this
Article. This wording could be understood as referring not merely to the
Court's judgments but to any decision rendered by it, thus including orders
indicating provisional measures. It could also be interpreted to mean only
judgments rendered by the Court as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 94. In
this regard, the fact that in Articles 56 to 60 of the Court's Statute, both
the word "decision" and the word "judgment" are used does little to clarify
the matter.
Under the first interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 94, the text of the
paragraph would confirm the binding nature of provisional measures; whereas
the second interpretation would in no way preclude their being accorded
binding force under Article 41 of the Statute. The Court accordingly
concludes that Article 94 of the Charter does not prevent orders made under
Article 41 from having a binding character.
109. In short, it is clear that none of the sources of interpretation
referred to in the relevant Articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, including the preparatory work, contradict the conclusions drawn
from the terms of Article 41 read in their context and in the light of the
object and purpose of the Statute. Thus, the Court has reached the
conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have binding
effect.
*
110. The Court will now consider the Order of 3 March 1999. This Order was
not a mere exhortation. It had been adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the
Statute. This Order was consequently binding in character and created a
legal obligation for the United States.
*
111. As regards the question whether the United States has complied with the
obligation incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of 3 March 1999, the
Court observes that the Order indicated two provisional measures, the first
of which states that
"the United States of America should take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it
has taken in implementation of this Order".
The second measure required the Government of the United States to [p 507]
"transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona". The
information required on the measures taken in implementation of this Order
was given to the Court by a letter of 8 March 1999 from the Legal Counsellor
of the United States Embassy at The Hague. According to this letter, on 3
March 1999 the State Department had transmitted to the Governor of Arizona a
copy of the Court's Order. "In view of the extremely late hour of the
receipt of the Court's Order", the letter of 8 March went on to say, "no
further steps were feasible".
The United States authorities have thus limited themselves to the mere
transmission of the text of the Order to the Governor of Arizona. This
certainly met the requirement of the second of the two measures indicated.
As to the first measure, the Court notes that it did not create an
obligation of result, but that the United States was asked to "take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings". The Court agrees that due
to the extremely late presentation of the request for provisional measures,
there was certainly very little time for the United States authorities to
act.
112. The Court observes, nevertheless, that the mere transmission of its
Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly without
even so much as a plea for a temporary stay and an explanation that there is
no general agreement on the position of the United States that orders of the
International Court of Justice on provisional measures are non-binding, was
certainly less than could have been done even in the short time available.
The same is true of the United States Solicitor General's categorical
statement in his brief letter to the United States Supreme Court that "an
order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures
is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief" (see
paragraph 33 above). This statement went substantially further than the
amicus brief referred to in a mere footnote in his letter, which was filed
on behalf of the United States in earlier proceedings before the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Angel Francisco Breard (see Breard v.
Greene, United States Supreme Court, 14 April 1998, International Legal
Materials, Vol. 37 (1988), p. 824; Memorial of Germany, Ann. 34). In that
amicus brief, the same Solicitor General had declared less than a year
earlier that "there is substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether
an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is binding . . . The better
reasoned position is that such an order is not binding."
113. It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to whom the [p 508]
Court's Order had been transmitted, decided not to give effect to it, even
though the Arizona Clemency Board had recommended a stay of execution for
Walter LaGrand.
114. Finally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a separate
application by Germany for a stay of execution, "given the tardiness of the
pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate". Yet it would have
been open to the Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to grant a
preliminary stay, which would have given it "time to consider, after
briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international
legal issues involved . . ." (Federal Republic of Germany et al. v. United
States et al., United States Supreme Court, 3 March 1999).
115. The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of the United
States with regard to the Order of the International Court of Justice of 3
March 1999 indicates that the various competent United States authorities
failed to take all the steps they could have taken to give effect to the
Court's Order. The Order did not require the United States to exercise
powers it did not have; but it did impose the obligation to "take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings . . .". The Court finds that
the United States did not discharge this obligation.
Under these circumstances the Court concludes that the United States has not
complied with the Order of 3 March 1999.
116. The Court observes finally that in the third submission Germany
requests the Court to adjudge and declare only that the United States
violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order of 3
March 1999; it contains no other request regarding that violation. Moreover,
the Court points out that the United States was under great time pressure in
this case, due to the circumstances in which Germany had instituted the
proceedings. The Court notes moreover that at the time when the United
States authorities took their decision the question of the binding character
of orders indicating provisional measures had been extensively discussed in
the literature, but had not been settled by its jurisprudence. The Court
would have taken these factors into consideration had Germany's submission
included a claim for indemnification.
**
117. Finally, the Court will consider Germany's fourth submission, in which
it asks the Court to adjudge and declare
"that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it will not
repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of detention of or
criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United States will ensure
in law and practice the effective exercise of [p 509] the rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In particular in
cases involving the death penalty, this requires the United States to
provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired
by a violation of the rights under Article 36."
118. Germany states that:
"concerning the requested assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the
United States, they are appropriate because of the existence of a real risk
of repetition and the seriousness of the injury suffered by Germany.
Further, the choice of means by which full conformity of the future conduct
of the United States with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is to be
ensured, may be left to the United States."
Germany explains that:
"the effective exercise of the right to consular notification embodied in
[Article 36,] paragraph 2, requires that, where it cannot be excluded that
the judgment was impaired by the violation of the right to consular
notification, appellate proceedings allow for a reversal of the judgment and
for either a retrial or a re-sentencing".
Finally, Germany points out that its fourth submission has been so worded
"as to . . . leave the choice of means by which to implement the remedy [it
seeks] to the United States".
119. In reply, the United States argues as follows:
"Germany's fourth submission is clearly of a wholly different nature than
its first three submissions. Each of the first three submissions seeks a
judgment and declaration by the
Court that a violation of a stated international legal obligation has
occurred. Such judgments are at the core of the Court's function, as an
aspect of reparation.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
In contrast, however, to the character of the relief sought in the first
three submissions, the requirement of assurances of non-repetition sought in
the fourth submission has no precedent in the jurisprudence of this Court
and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction and authority in this case. It is
exceptional even as a non-legal undertaking in State practice, and it would
be entirely inappropriate for the Court to require such assurances with
respect to the duty to inform undertaken in the Consular Convention in the
circumstances of this case." [p 510]
It points out that "U.S. authorities are working energetically to strengthen
the regime of consular notification at the state and local level throughout
the United States, in order to reduce the chances of cases such as this
recurring" and adds that:
"the German request for an assurance as to the duty to inform foreign
nationals without delay of their right to consular notification . . . seeks
to have the Court require the United States to assure that it will never
again fail to inform a German foreign national of his or her right to
consular notification",
and that "the Court is aware that the United States is not in a position to
provide such an assurance". The United States further contends that it "has
already provided appropriate assurances to Germany on this point".
Finally, the United States recalls that:
"with respect to the alleged breach of Article 36, paragraph 2, . . .
Germany seeks an assurance that, 'in any future cases of detention of or
criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United States will ensure
in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36'".
According to the United States,
"[such an assurance] is again absolute in character . . . [and] seeks to
create obligations on the United States that exceed those that are contained
in the Vienna Convention. For example, the requirement of consular
notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention applies
when a foreign national is arrested, committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or detained in any other manner. It does not apply, as the
submission would have it, to any future criminal proceedings. That is a new
obligation, and it does not arise out of the Vienna Convention."
The United States further observes that:
"even if this Court were to agree that, as a result of the application of
procedural default with respect to the claims of the LaGrands, the United
States committed a second internationally wrongful act, it should limit that
judgment to the application of that law in the particular case of the
LaGrands. It should resist the invitation to require an absolute assurance
as to the application of US domestic law in all such future cases. The
imposition of such an additional obligation on the United States would . . .
be unprecedented in international jurisprudence and would exceed the Court's
authority and jurisdiction."
120. The Court observes that in its fourth submission Germany seeks [p 511]
several assurances. First it seeks a straightforward assurance that the
United States will not repeat its unlawful acts. This request does not
specify the means by which non-repetition is to be assured.
Additionally, Germany seeks from the United States that
"in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against German
nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice the effective
exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations".
This request goes further, for, by referring to the law of the United
States, it appears to require specific measures as a means of preventing
recurrence.
Germany finally requests that
"in particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal
convictions impaired by a violation of the rights under Article 36".
This request goes even further, since it is directed entirely towards
securing specific measures in cases involving the death penalty.
121. Turning first to the general demand for an assurance of non-repetition,
the Court observes that it has been informed by the United States of the
"substantial measures [which it is taking] aimed at preventing any
recurrence" of the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Throughout these
proceedings, oral as well as written, the United States has insisted that it
"keenly appreciates the importance of the Vienna Convention's consular
notification obligation for foreign citizens in the United States as well as
for United States citizens travelling and living abroad"; that "effective
compliance with the consular notification requirements of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention requires constant effort and attention"; and that
"the Department of State is working intensively to improve understanding of
and compliance with consular notification and access requirements throughout
the United States, so as to guard against future violations of these
requirements".
The United States points out that
"this effort has included the January 1998 publication of a booklet entitled
'Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State and Local
Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding [p 512] Foreign Nationals in
the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them', and
development of a small reference card designed to be carried by individual
arresting officers."
According to the United States, it is estimated that until now over 60,000
copies of the brochure as well as over 400,000 copies of the pocket card
have been distributed to federal, state and local law enforcement and
judicial officials throughout the United States. The United States is also
conducting training programmes reaching out to all levels of government. In
the Department of State a permanent office to focus on United States and
foreign compliance with consular notification and access requirements has
been created.
122. Germany has stated that it "does not consider the so-called
'assurances' offered by the Respondent as adequate". It says
"violations of Article 36 followed by death sentences and executions cannot
be remedied by apologies or the distribution of leaflets. An effective
remedy requires certain changes in US law and practice".
In order to illustrate its point, Germany has presented to the Court a "list
of German nationals detained after January 1, 1998, who claim not to have
been informed of their consular rights". The United States has criticized
this list as misleading and inaccurate.
123. The Court notes that the United States has acknowledged that, in the
case of the LaGrand brothers, it did not comply with its obligations to give
consular notification. The United States has presented an apology to Germany
for this breach. The Court considers however that an apology is not
sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases where foreign
nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights under Article
36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to
prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.
In this respect, the Court has taken note of the fact that the United States
repeated in all phases of these proceedings that it is carrying out a vast
and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance by its competent
authorities at the federal as well as at the state and local levels with its
obligation under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
124. The United States has provided the Court with information, which it
considers important, on its programme. If a State, in proceedings before
this Court, repeatedly refers to substantial activities which it [p 513] is
carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain obligations under a
treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with the efforts
in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot provide an
assurance that there will never again be a failure by the United States to
observe the obligation of notification under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention. But no State could give such a guarantee and Germany does not
seek it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by the United
States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in
performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must be
regarded as meeting Germany's request for a general assurance of
non-repetition.
125. The Court will now examine the other assurances sought by Germany in
its fourth submission. The Court observes in this regard that it can
determine the existence of a violation of an international obligation. If
necessary, it can also hold that a domestic law has been the cause of this
violation. In the present case the Court has made its findings of violations
of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention when it dealt
with the first and the second submission of Germany. But it has not found
that a United States law, whether substantive or procedural in character, is
inherently inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the United States
in the Vienna Convention. In the present case the violation of Article 36,
paragraph 2, was caused by the circumstances in which the procedural default
rule was applied, and not by the rule as such.
In the present proceedings the United States has apologized to Germany for
the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1, and Germany has not requested
material reparation for this injury to itself and to the LaGrand brothers.
It does, however, seek assurances:
"that, in any future cases of detention or of criminal proceedings against
German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice the
effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations",
and that
"in particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal
convictions impaired by the violation of the rights under Article 36".
The Court considers in this respect that if the United States,
notwithstanding its commitment referred to in paragraph 124 above, should
fail in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German
nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals
concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and [p
514] sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and
sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be
carried out in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the United
States.
126. Given the foregoing ruling by the Court regarding the obligation of the
United States under certain circumstances to review and reconsider
convictions and sentences, the Court need not examine Germany's further
argument which seeks to found a like obligation on the contention that the
right of a detained person to be informed without delay pursuant to Article
36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention is not only an individual right
but has today assumed the character of a human right.
127. In reply to the fourth submission of Germany, the Court will therefore
limit itself to taking note of the commitment undertaken by the United
States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in
performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention, as well as the aforementioned duty of the United States
to address violations of that Convention should they still occur in spite of
its efforts to achieve compliance.
***
128. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
(1) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article I of the Optional
Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the
Application filed by the Federal Republic of Germany on 2 March 1999;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(2) (a) By thirteen votes to two,
Finds that the first submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren; [p 515]
(b) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the second submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Oda;
(c) By twelve votes to three,
Finds that the third submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal;
(d) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the fourth submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Oda;
(3) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following
their arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention, and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Germany of the
possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by
the Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of America
breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the
LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Oda;
(4) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the light
of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the convictions and sentences
of the LaGrand brothers after the violations referred to in paragraph (3)
above had been established, the United States of America breached its
obligation to the Federal Republic of Ger-[p 516]many and to the LaGrand
brothers under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Oda;
(5) By thirteen votes to two,
Finds that, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the
International Court of Justice in the case, the United States of America
breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating
provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999;
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren;
(6) Unanimously,
Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of America to
ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its
obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention; and finds
that this commitment must be regarded as meeting the Federal Republic of
Germany's request for a general assurance of non-repetition;
(7) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless
be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been respected, the United States
of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in that Convention.
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST: Judge Oda.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of June, two thousand and
one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives [p 517] of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively.
(Signed) Gilbert Guillaume,
President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
Registrar.
President Guillaume makes the following declaration:
Declaration of President Guillaume
Subparagraph (7) of the operative part of the Court's Judgment envisages a
situation where, despite the commitment by the United States noted by the
Court in subparagraph (6), a severe penalty is imposed upon a German
national without his or her rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations having been respected. The Court
states that, in such a case, "the United States, by means of its own
choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in that
Convention".
This subparagraph represents a response to certain submissions by Germany
and hence rules only on the obligations of the United States in cases of
severe penalties imposed upon German nationals.
Thus, subparagraph (7) does not address the position of nationals of other
countries or that of individuals sentenced to penalties that are not of a
severe nature. However, in order to avoid any ambiguity, it should be made
clear that there can be no question of applying an a contrario
interpretation to this paragraph.
(Signed) Gilbert Guillaume.
Vice-President Shi appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge Oda appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges
Koroma and Parra-Aranguren append separate opinions to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge Buergenthal appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the
Court.
(Initialled) G.G.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
[p 518]
Separate opinion of Vice-President Shi
Operative paragraph 128 (3) of the Judgment - Whether Article 36, paragraph
1 (b), of the Vienna Convention creates individual rights - The Court's
interpretation of the subparagraph - Clarity of text and "rules of
interpretation" - Text of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), in the context and in
light of the object and purpose of the Convention - Travaux préparatoires of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) - The Court's interpretation of Article 36,
paragraph 2 - Explanation of my vote on operative paragraph 128 (7) of the
Judgment.
1. It was with a certain reluctance that I voted in favour of operative
paragraph 128 (3) and (4) of the Court's Judgment. The main reason for this
is my belief that the Court's findings in these two paragraphs were based on
a debatable interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (hereinafter called "the Convention").
2. In operative paragraph 128 (3), the Court finds that
"by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following their
arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention,
and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Germany of the possibility,
in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Convention
to the individuals concerned, the United States of America violated its
obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand brothers
under Article 36, paragraph 1".
I fully agree with the Court that the United States violated its obligations
to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention. However, I have
doubts as to the Court's finding that the United States also violated its
obligations to the LaGrand brothers. The Court's decision is a consequence
of its interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1, in particular subparagraph
(b), of the Convention, regarding the differences between the Applicant and
the Respondent as to whether that subparagraph creates individual rights in
addition to the rights appertaining to the States parties.
Germany claimed that:
"the right to be informed upon arrest of the rights under Art. 36 (1) (b) of
the Vienna Convention does not only reflect a right of the sending State
(and home State of the individuals involved) towards the receiving State but
also is an individual right of every national of a foreign State party to
the Vienna Convention [p 519] entering the territory of another State party"
(Memorial of Germany, Vol. I, p. 116, para. 4.91).
Whereas the United States contended that
"rights of consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention in
any event are rights of States, not individuals. Clearly they can benefit
individuals by permitting - not requiring - States to offer them consular
assistance, but the Convention's role is not to articulate or confer
individual rights" (Counter-Memorial of the United States, p. 81, para. 97).
3. In paragraph 77 of the Judgment, the Court, basing its interpretation of
the subparagraph on the clarity of meaning of the text of the provision read
in context, upheld that claim by Germany. I can readily accept this finding
of the Court only if its interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), is
appropriate in the present case. Undoubtedly, the Court's interpretation is
consistent with the well-known jurisprudence of this Court and of its
predecessor that, if the relevant words in their natural and ordinary
meaning make sense in their context, that is the end of the matter and there
is no need to resort to other methods of interpretation (Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 8). However, in my view,
indiscriminate reliance on such a dictum in any circumstances may not always
be dependable or helpful in determining the true intention of the parties to
a treaty. It can happen that for one reason or another - e.g., hasty or
careless drafting, last-minute compromise in negotiations - the meaning
clearly apparent from the text does not necessarily reflect that which the
parties intended it to bear. Recourse to customary rules of interpretation
as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
may seem superfluous when the normal meaning of the text appears to be
clear, but it does serve as a double check to prevent any possibility of
misinterpretation. In fact, in the case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989 (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal) the Court, while affirming its dictum
in its Advisory Opinion referred to above, stated that the rule of
interpretation according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words
employed is not an absolute one and referred to a pronouncement in the case
concerning South West Africa as follows:
"Where such a method of interpretation results in a meaning incompatible
with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which
the words are contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it."
(Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 336). [p 520]
It may also be relevant to quote the following passage from Oppenheim's
International Law, (9th edition, 1992, Vol. I, p. 1267):
"The purpose of interpreting a treaty is to establish the meaning of the
text which the parties must be taken to have intended it to bear in relation
to the circumstances with reference to which the question of interpretation
has arisen. It is frequently stated that if the meaning of a treaty is
sufficiently clear from its text, there is no occasion to resort to 'rules
of interpretation' in order to elucidate the meaning. Such a proposition is,
however, of limited usefulness. The finding whether a treaty is clear or not
is not the starting point but the result of the process of interpretation.
It is not clarity in the abstract which is to be ascertained, but clarity in
relation to particular circumstances and there are few treaty provisions for
which circumstances cannot be envisaged in which their clarity could be put
in question."
4. In the present case, both the Applicant and the Respondent had no
divergence of views as to the normal meaning of the words of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b). However, the Parties reached differing conclusions on the
interpretation of the subparagraph. In these circumstances I wonder whether
it is proper for the Court, in approaching the issue, to place so much
emphasis on the purported clarity of language of the provision, putting
aside altogether the customary rules of interpretation. In my view it is not
unreasonable for the United States to contend that the rights of nationals
of the sending State under detention or arrest to consular notification and
access under paragraph 1 (b) are not independent of, but rather are derived
from, the right of the State party to protect and assist its nationals under
the Convention, if the subparagraph is read, as the United States reads it,
in context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention.
5. In the first place, the very title of the Convention is none other than
the "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations". And the object and purpose of
the conclusion of an international convention on consular relations as
indicated in the preamble is to "contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations". Nowhere in the Preamble of the Convention is
reference made to the creation of rights of individuals under the
Convention.
6. Secondly, Article 36, which bears the title "Communications and contact
with nationals of the sending State", begins with the words: "With a view to
facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the
sending State". This clause serves as the chapeau governing all the
paragraphs of the Article, including paragraph 1 (b), where "rights" of the
concerned nationals of the sending State are provided. Clearly, the effect
of this clause is to limit the scope of Article 36 to facilitation of the
exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State.
It is unfortunate that paragraph 77 of the Judgment made [p 521] no mention
of the chapeau of the Article, as if it were irrelevant to the context of
paragraph 1 (b).
7. Thirdly, according to Article 5 of the Convention, consular functions
consist inter alia in "protecting in the receiving State the interests of
the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies
corporate, within the limits permitted by international law" (Art. 5 (a))
and "helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate,
of the sending State" (Art. 5 (e)). Article 36, paragraph 1, and
specifically subparagraph (b), has to be read in the context of these
consular functions provided for in Article 5. It is obvious that there
cannot be rights to consular notification and access if consular relations
do not exist between the States concerned, or if rights of the sending State
to protect and assist its nationals do not exist.
8. Finally, it is clear, as the United States has contended, that the
travaux préparatoires of the 1963 Vienna Conference on Consular Relations do
not confirm that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), is intended to create
individual rights (Counter-Memorial of the United States, pp. 82-84, paras.
99-100). Indeed, during the negotiating sessions of Article 36, the
delegation of Venezuela objected to the opening statement of paragraph 1 (a)
of the International Law Commission draft, concerning the right of nationals
of the sending State to communicate with and to have access to the competent
consulate, contending that it was inappropriate in a convention on consular
relations, and that "foreign nationals in the receiving State should be
under the jurisdiction of that State and should not come within the scope of
a convention on consular relations" (United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations, 1963, Vol. I, p. 331, para. 32). In the end, on the motion of
Venezuela, Ecuador, Spain, Chile and Italy, the Second Committee of the
Conference decided to reverse the original order of Article 36, paragraph 1
(a), of the International Law Commission draft, so that the subparagraph
refers first to the right of consular officers to communicate with and to
have access to nationals of the sending State, and secondly to the right of
nationals of the sending State to have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State
(ibid., p. 334, para. 2, and p. 336, para. 22).
9. This reversal of order in Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), confirms the
interpretation of that subparagraph in the context and in the light of the
object and purpose of the Convention. Thus, there are good grounds for the
contention by the United States in its Counter-Memorial that
"That reversal underscores the fundamental point, that the position of the
individual under the Convention derives from the right of the State party to
the Convention, acting through its consular officer, to communicate with its
nationals. The treatment due to individuals [p 522] is inextricably linked
to and derived from the right of the State." (Counter-Memorial of the United
States, p. 84, para. 100.)
10. Furthermore, the original International Law Commission draft Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), makes mandatory the obligation of the receiving State to
inform the competent consulate of the sending State in case of detention of
a national of that State. It reads:
"(b) The competent authorities shall, without undue delay, inform the
competent consulate of the sending State, if within its district, a national
of that State is committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communications addressed to the consulate
by the person in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without undue delay" (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1961, Vol. II, p. 112).
11. During the negotiating sessions of the Vienna Conference, a number of
delegations stressed the importance of the draft subparagraph. Thus, the
delegation of Tunisia stated that it
"regarded paragraph 1 (b) as one of the most important in the draft. It was
related to article 5 (Consular functions), . . . Detention (and he agreed
with the French representative that arrest should also be included) was a
serious infringement of the freedom and dignity of the individual. It was
therefore unthinkable that the consul of the sending State should not be
notified, and the obligation of the receiving State to notify him should be
firmly established, for it was possible that in certain circumstances the
foreign national might be unable to inform the consul and ask him for help
and protection" (United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 1963, Vol.
I, p 339).
The delegation of the United Kingdom also stated that
"The rights of communication and contact with the nationals of sending
States defined in article 36 were especially important for the persons under
detention referred to in sub-paragraph (b). Such persons were obviously in
very special need of consular help and the notification stipulated in
sub-paragraph (b) was in many cases a necessary condition for providing it."
(Ibid.)
12. However, during the negotiating sessions, this draft provision mainly
aroused two different reactions. Quite a number of States, though in
agreement with the formulation of the principle in the draft, were much
concerned about the heavy burden that the mandatory consular notification
would impose on the receiving State, particularly on those States on whose
territories there are a sizeable number of resident aliens [p 523] and
foreign tourists or other short-term visitors. There were also some
delegations, at least partly motivated by the then Cold War mentality, who
would have liked the subparagraph to reflect the free will of the detained
or arrested person to state whether or not he or she wished to be approached
by consular officials of his or her country.
13. In these circumstances, a seventeen-States amendment to paragraph 1 (b)
was put forward before the Conference. The delegation of Tunisia,
representing the sponsors of the amendment, stated that
"As far as sub-paragraph (b) was concerned, the sponsors had introduced the
initial proviso 'unless he expressly opposes it', thereby relieving the
receiving State of the automatic duty to inform the consul of the arrest of
the person concerned. The reason for that proviso was the need to take into
consideration the prisoner's own freedom of choice. It had been argued that
in some cases a prisoner might not wish the consul to know that he had been
in prison. The sponsors had hesitated at first; they had, however,
ultimately agreed to take that point into account, but with appropriate
safeguards. It was for that reason that the proviso was so drafted that the
duty to notify would exist unless the person concerned explicitly stated
that he did not wish the consul to be advised." (United Nations Conference
on Consular Relations, 1963, Vol. I, p. 82, para. 56.)
14. In response to this proposed amendment, the delegation of the United
Arab Republic introduced a twenty-States joint amendment which would replace
in paragraph 1 (b) the words "unless he expressly opposes it" by the words
"if he so requests". Explaining the amendment, the delegation of the United
Arab Republic stated that
"The purpose of the amendment was to lessen the burden on the authorities of
receiving Sates, especially those which had large numbers of resident aliens
or which received many tourists and visitors. The language proposed in the
joint amendment would ensure that the authorities of the receiving State
would not be blamed if, owning to pressure of work or to other
circumstances, there was a failure to report the arrest of a national of the
sending State." (United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 1963, Vol.
1, p. 82, para. 62.)
15. The result of the debate was the adoption of the twenty States'
amendment with the insertion of the words "if he so requests" at the
beginning of the subparagraph. The last sentence of Article 36, paragraph 1
(b), i.e., the provision that the competent authorities of the receiving
State "shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights"
(United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 336-343)
was inserted belatedly as a compromise between the aforesaid two opposing
views. [p 524] Thus, it is not possible to conclude from the negotiating
history that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), was intended by the negotiators to
create individual rights. Moreover, if one keeps in mind that the general
tone and thrust of the debate of the entire Conference concentrated on the
consular functions and their practicability, the better view would be that
no creation of any individual rights independent of rights of States was
envisaged by the Conference.
16. With respect to operative paragraph 128 (4) of the Judgment, the Court's
finding is a consequence of its interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Convention.
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention provides:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
article are intended."
In the Court's view, since Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual
rights for the detained person in addition to the rights accorded the
sending State, the reference in paragraph 2 of the Article to rights
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article "must be read as applying not
only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the
detained individual" (paragraph 89 of the Judgment).
As I have shown above, the view that Article 36, paragraph 1, specifically
subparagraph (b), creates individual rights is at the very least a
questionable one. It follows that the Court's finding in regard to the
reference to "rights" in paragraph 2 is also questionable.
17. Finally, I should like to make it clear that it was not for reasons
relating to the legal consequences of the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1
(b), that I voted in favour of operative paragraph 128 (7) of the Judgment.
This operative paragraph is of particular significance in a case where a
sentence of death is imposed, which is not only a punishment of a severe
nature, but also one of an irreversible nature. Every possible measure
should therefore be taken to prevent injustice or an error in conviction or
sentencing. Out of this consideration, I voted in favour.
(Signed) Shi Jiuyong.
[p 525]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ODA
I. The Accumulation of Errors in the Present Case
1. I would like to begin this dissenting opinion by stating my view of the
case as a whole. This case is unique and most difficult to understand. I see
it as one that has come before the Court as a result of an accumulation of
errors: the first made by Germany, as the Applicant; the second made by the
United States, as Respondent; and the third made by the Court itself.[p 526]
1. The Error Made by Germany in Unilaterally Bringing before this Court
Claims for Alleged Violations by the United States of the Convention on
Consular Relations rather than the "Dispute" within the Meaning of the
Optional Protocol
2. On 2 March 1999 Germany, "pursuant to Article I of the Vienna
Convention's Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes", filed in the Registry of the Court an "Application instituting
proceedings . . . against the United States of America for violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations" (Application of the Federal
Republic of Germany; emphasis added).
It is important to note that Germany never stated in the Application that it
was instituting proceedings in respect of a dispute arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, although the
Application did refer to Article I of the Optional Protocol, which reads:
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application."
(Emphasis added.)
This case stands in clear contrast to the case concerning Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), a case which Germany
brought against Iceland nearly 30 years ago and in which Germany filed an
"Application instituting proceedings . . . in respect of a dispute"
(Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 176; emphasis added). This point is most
important and should not have been overlooked in connection with the issues
concerning the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case.
3. I submit, first of all, that before this case was instituted on 2 March
1999, neither the United States, the Respondent, nor even Germany, the
Applicant, considered there to be a dispute between them which had "aris[en]
out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention". There
had been no negotiation, or even discussion, over any such dispute.
4. The background to this case, involving Walter LaGrand, whose name is used
by the Court as the title of the case, and his brother Karl LaGrand, is set
out in detail in paragraphs 13 to 29 of the Judgment. The facts are: the
LaGrand brothers committed crimes on 7 January 1982 and were arrested on
the same day; they were convicted by the Superior Court of Pima County,
Arizona, on 17 February 1984, and were sentenced to the death penalty on 14
December 1984. These facts have not been disputed. Appeals against the
convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Arizona were rejected on
30 January 1987. Applica-[p 527]tions to the United States Supreme Court
for further review of those judgments were denied on 5 October 1987.
Petitions for post-conviction relief were denied by an Arizona state court
in 1989. Review of that decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Arizona
in 1990 and by the United States Supreme Court in 1991. The subsequent
judicial proceedings, including a request to the Supreme Court of Arizona
for review of sentencing and a request for clemency, were all dismissed. The
Supreme Court of Arizona decided on 15 January 1999 that Karl LaGrand and
Walter LaGrand were to be executed on 24 February 1999 and on 3 March 1999
respectively. On 19 January 1999, the German Consulate learned of the
Arizona Supreme Court decisions setting the dates for the executions of the
LaGrand brothers.
5. At the time of their arrest, neither of the LaGrand brothers was aware
that he had German nationality; nor were the competent United States
authorities aware that the LaGrands were not United States nationals. The
present Judgment states that the "competent authorities" of the United
States became aware of the brothers' German nationality at some point
between mid-1983 and late 1984. While the United States authorities failed
to inform either brother of his true nationality until 1991, the LaGrands
had in fact been made aware of their nationality status before that date.
The case was brought to the attention of the German Consulate in June 1992
"by the LaGrands themselves, who had learnt of their rights [under Article
36, paragraph (1) (b), of the Vienna Convention] from other sources, and not
from the Arizona authorities" (Judgment, para. 22). The German Consulate had
repeated contact with the LaGrand brothers between December 1992 and
February 1999. The Court states that "[o]n 21 December 1998, the LaGrands
were formally notified by the United States authorities of their right to
consular access" (Judgment, para. 24; emphasis added). I fail to see the
significance of this "formal" notification, given that "actual" notification
had already occurred and that "on a number of . . . occasions ... an
official of the Consulate-General of Germany in Los Angeles [had] visited
the LaGrands in prison" (Judgment, para. 22).
6. At no point in the sequence of events related above did Germany ever
raise the question of the LaGrand brothers with the United States. Only in
January/February 1999 did Germany approach the United States at the highest
national levels requesting clemency for the LaGrand brothers (Judgment,
para. 26). On 22 February 1999 — just two days before Karl LaGrand's
execution — the German Foreign Minister drew the attention of the United
States Secretary of State to the lack of consular notification.
It must be noted again that Germany did not institute proceedings in respect
of a dispute with the United States regarding application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Even if Germany thought that the United
States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, it raised
no such claims with the United States and the United [p 528] States was, of
course, not privy to any unexpressed thoughts which Germany might have had
about possible violations of the Convention by the United States. Neither
State was aware before 2 March 1999 of any difference of views between them
concerning the Vienna Convention. There were no negotiations between the two
States on this point.
7.Suddenly, on 2 March 1999, Germany filed an "Application instituting
proceedings . . . for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations" (Application, introductory paragraph) in the Registry of the
Court pursuant to the Statute of the Court, Article 40, paragraph 1,and the
Rules of Court, Article 38, paragraph 1.
It was at that point that the United States could have first discovered that
it was involved in a "dispute" arising out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention. It must have been very odd indeed for the
United States to learn, only after proceedings had been brought against it,
of the alleged existence of a "dispute".
The United States was informed by the Application filed by Germany on 2
March 1999 that Germany was claiming violations by the United States of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. I am surprised that Germany
unilaterally brought this case under such circumstances. More than 17 years
had already passed since the LaGrand brothers committed the crimes in
January 1982 and were arrested on the same day. Nearly 15 years had passed
since the Arizona state court sentenced them to death. During this period,
Germany had done nothing to indicate that it had claims against the United
States for violation of the Vienna Convention and that there was an issue
giving rise to a "dispute" between the two countries.
8.Germany filed its Application instituting proceedings against the United
States for an alleged violation of the Convention, but — again I wish to
emphasize this point — not instituting proceedings in respect of" disputes
arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna]Convention
on Consular Relations", which could have fallen within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to the Optional Protocol. A dispute
arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention either
did not in fact exist between Germany and the United States or, if it did
exist, had not been the subject of any diplomatic negotiations between them.
All that existed at that time was Germany's potential claim, unbeknownst to
the United States, of alleged violations of the Convention by the United
States.
I believe that Germany erred: it presented its Application of 2 March 1999
instituting proceedings for violations of the Vienna Convention as if it
were submitting a "dispute" under the Optional Clause. I maintain that this
is a case of a unilateral application made in reliance upon subsequent
consent to the Court's jurisdiction to be given by the respondent State. A
dispute would then have come into existence once the Court was seised of the
case after the United States consented to the Court's jurisdiction. [p 529]
9. I would hazard a guess that the German Government was prompted to bring
this case before the International Court of Justice by the outcry raised by
some in Germany, by the emotional reaction on the part of some people there
— where the death penalty has been abolished — to a case involving the
existence and application of the death penalty in the United States, a
reaction made even stronger by the realization that the nationality of a
fellow German (Karl LaGrand) had been ignored and that he had been executed
after being afforded the same treatment a United States citizen would have
received and that another German national (Walter LaGrand) whose execution
was imminent had been treated in the same way.
It appears to me that the main aim was to save the life of Walter LaGrand,
which aim was further supported by the Request for the indication of
provisional measures filed together with the Application. It is unlikely
that any human rights group in Germany ever thought that this case involved
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This may be mere supposition,
but is there any other convincing reason to explain why the German
Government referred an alleged violation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations to the Court without ascertaining through consultation
or negotiation with the United States Government whether there existed any
difference of views concerning the Vienna Convention between the two
countries?
I am and have always been fully aware of the humanitarian concerns raised by
the fate of the LaGrand brothers. However, I also drew attention to the
rights of the victims of the LaGrand brothers' crimes and stated in my
declaration appended to the Order of 3 March 1999 that:
"if Mr. Walter LaGrand's rights as they relate to humanitarian issues are to
be respected then, in parallel, the matter of the rights of victims of
violent crime (a point which has often been overlooked) should be taken into
consideration" (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional
Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 18, declaration
of Judge Oda).
10. I very much fear that the Court's acceptance of this Application
presented unilaterally pursuant to the "optional clause" will in future lead
States that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, either
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute or under the Optional Protocol
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes attached to multilateral
treaties, to withdraw their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.
2. The Error Made by the United States in Not Responding in an Appropriate
Manner to Germany's Application
11. The United States, which learned of Germany's views concerning the
dispute allegedly "arising out of the interpretation or application of [p
530] the [Vienna] Convention" only upon the filing of Germany's Application,
should, in my view, have raised preliminary objections to the case. The
United States could have done this immediately after the Application was
filed on 2 March 1999 or shortly afterwards. In fact, the United States did
not do so. Instead, on 5 March 1999, the Court ordered that, since this was
a case begun by means of a unilateral application to the Court, the
applicant State (Germany) and the respondent State (the United States) —
both of which are parties to the Optional Protocol — should submit their
written pleadings within the respective time-limits set by the Court,
namely, 16 September 1999 and 27 March 2000.
The United States could still have presented an objection to the case prior
to 27 March 2000, the time-limit set for the presentation of the
Counter-Memorial. I found it surprising that the United States, as
Respondent, raised no objection during that one-year period. One might
suppose that the United States felt itself to be in a weak position in its
defence against this Application. From the earliest stages, the United
States knew that it had failed to give prompt notice to the German
Consulate of the facts involving the two German nationals. The United
States would also have been aware that by that omission it had at that time
violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to a certain limited
extent. If Germany had raised only the matter of the failure to give timely
consular notification, the United States would have been without any strong
counter-argument.
12. Upon receiving Germany's Memorial on 16 September 1999, the United
States must have realized that Germany was essentially attempting to change
the character of the Application as it then stood. Having incorporated the
issues relating to compliance or non-compliance by the United States with
the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional measures, the
submissions presented by Germany in its Memorial of 16 September 1999
appeared to me to be far different in nature and broader in scope than those
in its Application of 2 March 1999.
Once again, the United States could, pursuant to Article 79 of the Rules of
Court, have raised objections before 27 March 2000 (namely, the time-limit
set by the Court for the submission of its Counter-Memorial), and it should
have done so, especially in the light of this significant change in the
issues. The United States did not do so and instead presented its
Counter-Memorial on that date. It was only in its Counter-Memorial of 27
March 2000 that the United States stated that "all other claims and
submissions of. . . Germany [i.e., those other than the alleged breach of
Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations] [should
be] dismissed" (Counter-Memorial, p. 140, para. 175 (2)). It was there that
the United States challenged the inclusion in the Application of 2 March
1999 of some of Germany's submissions contained in its Memorial of 16
September 1999.
13.The United States may have chosen not to raise an objection at the outset
simply because it did not think that Germany would, in its subse-[p
531]quent Memorial, redefine the dispute referred to in its earlier
Application, but the United States must have realized upon receipt of the
Memorial in September 1999 that Germany had broadened and modified the
definition of the "dispute". The case has been greatly complicated by the
approach thus adopted by the United States.
14. In my view the improper filing of Germany's Application, as explained
above, and the very indifferent reaction of the United States to Germany's
Application form the essence of this case.
3. The Error Made by the International Court of Justice in Indicating
Provisional Measures in its Order of 3 March 1999
15. In response to Germany's request submitted on 2 March 1999together with
its Application of the same date, the Court on 3 March 1999issued an Order
granting provisional measures. In my view, the issuing of that Order was not
entirely proper. In order to maintain the solidarity of the Court and out of
humanitarian concerns, I voted — albeit very reluctantly — in favour of the
Order of 3 March 1999, and it was therefore adopted unanimously.
I now regret that I voted in favour of that Order, since I did so against my
judicial conscience. It should, however, be clear from my declaration
appended to the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 that I was, in substance,
opposed to the issuance of that Order.
At that time, I held the view (which I still hold now) that:
"as a general rule, provisional measures are granted in order to preserve
rights of States exposed to an imminent breach which is irreparable and
these rights of States must be those to be considered at the merits stage of
the case, and must constitute the subject-matter of the application
instituting proceedings or be directly related to it" (LaGrand (Germany v.
United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 19, declaration of Judge Oda)
and that
"the request for provisional measures should not be used by applicants for
the purpose of obtaining interim judgments that would affirm their own
rights and predetermine the main case" (ibid.).
16. Let us reflect on the circumstances surrounding the Order of3 March
1999. Karl LaGrand had already been executed, and the request for
provisional measures was submitted to the Court together with the
Application instituting proceedings at 7.30 p.m. on 2 March1999, when Walter
LaGrand's execution was imminent. Only on the morning of 3 March 1999 was
the request dated 2 March 1999 provided to Members of the Court. Another
case had been scheduled for that day, [p 532] and all Members of the Court
therefore happened to be present at The Hague.
The Court made its Order at 7.15 p.m. on 3 March 1999, that is, on the very
same day on which the consideration of Germany's request had begun — the
sole reason for such haste being that Walter LaGrand's execution was
imminent — without having given the United States a chance to express its
views in writing and without having held a court sitting for oral hearings.
(The times of day are those reported in Judge Buergenthal's dissenting
opinion.) This Court was clearly faced with an extraordinary situation for
which there was no precedent; it was only because of the exceptional
circumstances of the case that the Court was able to make such an
extraordinary Order in the limited time available to it.
17. This was not, however, a situation entailing rights of States exposed to
an imminent, irreparable breach. The rights of States in question must be
those to be considered at the merits stage of the case and must constitute
the subject-matter of the application instituting proceedings or be directly
related to it.
I submit that the provisional measures ordered by the Court on 3 March 1999,
aimed at staying the execution — and therefore preserving the life, at least
temporarily — of Walter LaGrand, were not directly related to the rights of
States under the Vienna Convention and that the Court made a significant
error in issuing an Order indicating provisional measures in this case,
since the issue for which interim relief was sought did not figure among
those for which provisional measures may be properly ordered by this Court.
I am confident in my view that the Court did indeed err in issuing that
Order.
This error was, however, quite understandable, as a human life hung in the
balance and the Court was given very little time to decide upon the request
for an order. As I stated earlier, I believe that Germany is responsible
for the ensuing difficulties in this case, since it chose to file its
Appli-cation at the last minute before Walter LaGrand's execution, and for
placing the Court in a very difficult and delicate position. Now, with the
benefit of a full hearing of both Parties and exposition of all the facts,
it should be clear to the Court (as it was already clear to me on 3 March
1999) that it should not have issued the Order.
II. Errors in the Court's Present Judgment
A. Introduction
18. As explained in Part I above, I believe that the Court is confronted
with a situation which resulted from an accumulation of three separate
errors: the first error was made by Germany in improperly bringing the case
before the Court; the second by the United States in not raising objections
to Germany's Application at the proper time; and the third by the Court in
handing down an order improperly granting provisional measures. The Court
appears to be making an ultimate error on top of those cumulative errors. I
am unable to support the Court's decision as a whole in the present
Judgment.
19. Before explaining how I voted on each of the paragraphs of the operative
part, I would like, in particular, to mention five principal issues involved
in the present case.
First, the United States admitted its failure to give prompt consular
notification and the ensuing violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations in that respect. There was no dispute on this point between
Germany and the United States.
Second, I see no relation between the delay in consular notification on the
part of the United States authorities, on the one hand, and the handing
down of the death sentence by the Arizona state court and the execution of
the LaGrand brothers, on the other.
Third, the question of compliance with the Order for the indication of
provisional measures of 3 March 1999 bears no relation to the present case,
which was submitted by Germany in respect of alleged violations by the
United States of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Fourth, the Court seems to cherish the illusion that a national of the
sending State should, under the Convention, be accorded greater protection
and enjoy more rights than nationals of the receiving State.
Fifth, it seems to me that the Court has confused the right, if any, of the
arrested foreign national accorded under the Vienna Convention with the
rights of foreign nationals to protection under general international law or
other treaties or conventions, and, possibly, even with human rights.
B. Specific Critiques of the Operative Part 1. Subparagraph (I) of the
operative part (Judgment, para. ¡28)
20. In subparagraph (1) of the operative part of the Judgment the Court
states that "it has jurisdiction ... to entertain the Application filed by
[Germany] on 2 March 1999". As stated in Part I, section 1,above, there is
no basis for believing that there existed a dispute between Germany and the
United States arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations in respect of which an Application could
have been filed. I voted in favour of the Court's determination that the
Court has jurisdiction to entertain Germany's Application of 2 March 1999
solely for the reason that the [p 534] United States, the Respondent, raised
no preliminary objection to that Application.
However, I must stress that the Court's jurisdiction is over the
Application of 2 March 1999, as originally filed, not as subsequently
qualified by Germany's submissions extensively altering and supplementing
the Application so as to change the very essence of it. It is to be noted
in this regard that the United States, in its Counter-Memorial and in the
oral arguments heard on 17 November 2000, submitted that Germany's claims
and submissions, other than those concerning the breach by the United States
of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, should be
dismissed.
21. In this respect I must refer also to Germany's third submission,
regarding the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional measures,
which, according to the present Judgment, "concerns issues that arise
directly out of the dispute between the Parties before the Court over which
the Court has already held that it has jurisdiction . . . and which are thus
covered by Article I of the Optional Protocol" (Judgment, para. 45). The
Court goes on to state:
"The Court reaffirms, in this connection, what it said in its Judgment in
the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, where it declared that in order to consider
the dispute in all its aspects, it may also deal with a submission that 'is
one based on facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising
directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that
Application. As such it falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction
...' (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72)." (Ibid.)
From these statements the Court concludes:
"Where the Court has jurisdiction to decide a case, it also has jurisdiction
to deal with submissions requesting it to determine that an order indicating
measures which seeks to preserve the rights of the Parties to this dispute
has not been complied with." (Ibid.)
I would like to point out that in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Germany
referred a difference which had already ripened into a dispute with Iceland
to the Court on the basis of, inter alia, an optional clause in the Exchange
of Notes dated 19 July 1961. This differentiates it from the present case,
which, as I stated in paragraphs 6 to 8 above, cannot be considered to have
been brought under the Optional Protocol. In addition, in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction case provisional measures were indicated to protect the rights
of a State, Germany, from possible infringements which might arise from
Iceland's exercise of its competence pursuant to its previously enacted
national legislation. There is no basis [p 535] for likening the present
case to the Fisheries Jurisdiction case as regards orders indicating
provisional measures.
2. Subparagraph (2) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
22. In connection with subparagraph (2) of the operative part, I believe
that the Court should have decided on the admissibility of Germany's
Application of 2 March 1999, not of Germany's submissions set out
subsequently in the Memorial and repeated in its oral pleadings on 16
November 2000. For this reason, I voted against the whole of subparagraph
(2),notwithstanding the fact that I note that the United States raised no
preliminary objection in connection with the admissibility of the present
case.
3. Subparagraph (3) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
23. Subparagraph (3) appears to me to proceed from the premise that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations placed a legal obligation on the
United States not only to Germany but also to the LaGrand brothers. Let me
follow the reasoning set out in the present Judgment. The Court begins by
stating:
"The Court cannot accept the argument of the United States which proceeds,
in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36 applies only to
the rights of the sending State and not also to those of the detained
individual. The Court has already determined that Article 36, paragraph 1,
creates individual rights for the detained person in addition to the rights
accorded the sending State, and that consequently the reference to 'rights'
in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to the rights of the
sending State, but also to the rights of the detained individual (see
paragraph 77 above)." (Judgment, para. 89; emphasis added.)
What "[t]he Court has already determined" is as follows:
"The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the
obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the
sending State. It provides that . . . the receiving State must inform the
consular post of the sending State ... It provides further that any
communication by the detained person . . . must be forwarded to [the
consular post of the sending State] by authorities of the receiving State .
. . Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the following language: 'The
said authorities shall inform the person concerned ... of his rights . . .'.
Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State's right to
provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised 'if
he expressly opposes such action'. The clarity of these provisions [Article
36, para-[p 536]graph 1 (b), (c)], viewed in their context, admits of no
doubt. It follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that the Court
must apply these as they stand . . . Based on the text of these provisions,
the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights,
which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in
this Court by the national State of the detained person. These rights were
violated in the present case." (Judgment, para. 77; original emphasis by the
Court deleted; emphasis is added.)
I see no convincing argument to support the determination of the Court that
"Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights for the detained person
in addition to the rights accorded the sending State, and . . . consequently
the reference to 'rights' in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only
to the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained
individual" (Judgment, para. 89).
24. I shall take the liberty of expressing my puzzlement at the reason for
and relevance of the Court's reference in the Judgment to Article 36,
paragraph 1 (c), of the Convention in connection with the rights of a
detained person. I believe that this provision was included in the
Convention simply to provide for the situation in which an arrested foreign
national waives consular notification in order to prevent his criminal
conduct or even his presence in a foreign country from becoming known in
his home country; that provision may not have any further significance.
25. Article 36, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations is perceptively interpreted by Vice-President Shi in his separate
opinion and I fully share his views.
4. Subparagraph (4) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
26. In connection with this subparagraph (4), the Court admits that "[i]n
itself, the [procedural default] rule does not violate Article 36 of the
Convention" but concludes that in the present case:
"the procedural default rule does not allow the detained individual [in this
case the LaGrand brothers] to challenge a conviction and sentence by
claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that
the competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to
provide the requisite consular information 'without delay', thus preventing
the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending
State" (Judgment, para. 90).
This conclusion may be connected with the refusal on 23 February 1999 by the
Arizona Superior Court in Pima County to entertain a further petition, as
noted in the Judgment (para. 28). I fail to understand the factual situation
underlying the Court's assertion that "the procedural default rule had the
effect of preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under [Article 36 of the Convention] are
intended', and thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36" (Judgment, para.
91).
26. I am not convinced of the correctness of the Court's holding that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations grants to foreign individuals any
rights beyond those which might necessarily be implied by the obligations
imposed on States under that Convention. In addition, I can-not but think
that the Court holds the view that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations grants more extensive protection and greater or broader individual
rights to foreign nationals (in this case, German nationals in the United
States) than would be enjoyed by nationals in their home countries (in this
case, Americans in the United States).
If the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is to be interpreted as
granting rights to individuals, those rights are strictly limited to those
corresponding to the obligations borne by the States under the Convention
and do not include substantive rights of the individual, such as the rights
to life, property, etc. I find the Judgment devoid of any convincing
explanation of this point.
5. Subparagraph (5) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
28. As stated in paragraph 21 above, compliance or non-compliance with the
Order indicating provisional measures of 3 March 1999 does not fall within
the scope of the present case, brought before the Court by Germany's
Application of 2 March 1999 in respect of violations of the Convention on
Consular Relations. Apart from this point, it appears to me that the Court
has not properly understood the meaning of the indication of provisional
measures. As stated above in paragraphs 15 to 17, the Court was mistaken in
March 1999 in granting provisional measures.
29. The Court appears to be mostly concerned with the question of whether or
not provisional measures indicated by it are binding. In the present
Judgment, the Court dedicates as many as 25 paragraphs (paras. 92-116) to
this issue. After summarizing the views of Germany and the United States
(paras. 92-97), the Court attempts to explain at length in 19 paragraphs
(paras. 98-116) why an order indicating provisional measures has binding
effect or binding force.
30. Commencing with a general discussion of the meaning of Article 41,
concerning provisional measures, of the Court's Statute, the Court states
that [p 538]
"in accordance with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ... a treaty must be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty's object
and purpose" (Judgment, para. 99).
Noting the difference between the authentic French text and the authentic
English text, the Court then "consider[s] the object and purpose of the
Statute together with the context of Article 41" (Judgment, para. 101). The
Court goes on to state that:
"The object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to fulfil the
functions provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic function of
judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions in
accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. The context in which Article 41
has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from being
hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of
the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved." (Judgment,
para. 102.)
The Court further states that:
"It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the
terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to indicate
provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch
as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances
call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the
parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court." (Ibid.)
The Court immediately concludes that "[t]he contention that provisional
measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary
to the object and purpose of that Article" (ibid.; emphasis added). I fail
to find any affirmative reason in the above argument to support the binding
force of an order for the indication of provisional measures.
31. As "[a] related reason which points to the binding character of orders
made under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance"
(Judgment, para. 103), the Judgment refers to the jurisprudence of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1939 case concerning
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Electricity Company of Sofia and
Bulgaria, Interim Measures of Protection, Order of 5 December 1939,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 79, p. 194) and to many other orders of the
present Court in which that case was cited (Judgment, para. 103). In my
view, however, the "principle universally accepted by international
tribunals and likewise laid down in many conventions" mentioned in that
Order was nothing more than a general statement concerning provisional
measures "to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any
measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execu-[p
539]tion of the decision to be given" (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199)
and cannot be interpreted as supporting the contention that an order on
provisional measures has binding force.
32.The Court, though "not consider[ing] it necessary to resort to the
preparatory work", "nevertheless point[s] out that the preparatory work of
the Statute does not preclude the conclusion that orders under Article 41
have binding force" (Judgment, para. 104; emphasis added).
After stating that "the lack of means of execution and the lack of binding
force are two different matters" (Judgment, para. 107) and quoting Article
94 of the United Nations Charter, which states that "[e]ach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party" (Judgment, para. 108),
the Court concludes that "Article 94 of the Charter does not prevent orders
made under Article 41 from having a binding character" (ibid.; emphasis
added). The present Judgment further states that
"none of the sources of interpretation . . . including the preparatory work,
contradict the conclusions drawn from the terms of Article 41 read in their
context [that is, the binding character of orders] and in the light of the
object and purpose of the Statute" (Judgment, para. 109; emphasis added).
33. After this extensive discussion, which seems to me a rather vain and
unproductive undertaking, the Court states that "[t]hus, [it] has reached
the conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have
binding effect" (ibid.). I fail to understand either this roundabout method
of analysis to which the Court dedicates as many as 25 paragraphs or the
process by which that analysis led the Court to that conclusion.
34. In my view, addressing the general question as to whether or not an
order indicating provisional measures "is binding" or "has binding force" is
an empty, unnecessary exercise. I wonder what the Court really wants to say
in holding that an order indicating provisional measures is binding. Is the
Court trying to raise the question of responsibility of the State which
allegedly has not complied with the order? This question has not arisen in
the past jurisprudence of this Court. It suffices that provisional measures
"ought to be taken" or, in the French, "doivent etre prises" (Statute, Art.
41). Whether an order indicating provisional measures has been complied with
or not is decided by the Court in its judgment on the merits.
35. In paragraph 111 of the Judgment, the Court then considers the "the
question whether the United States has complied with the obligation
incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of 3 March 1999". After a [p 540]
circuitous analysis the Court concludes that "under these circum-stances . .
. the United States has not complied with the Order of 3 March 1999"
(Judgment, para. 115), simply because Walter LaGrand was executed.
Even if I were to accept that the issuance of the Order indicating
provisional measures of 3 March 1999 was a valid exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction, I believe that that Order was complied with by the United
States, which took all measures at its disposal in an attempt to respect the
terms. At any rate, the stay of an execution, in this case of Walter
LaGrand, could not be — and, in fact, was not — mandated by the Court in its
Order indicating provisional measures. 1 reiterate: it is extraordinary that
the Court, in its Order of 3 March 1999, determined not the rights and
duties of a State but the rights of an individual. In any case, the question
as to whether or not the Order of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional
measures was complied with should never have been raised.
6. Subparagraph (6) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
36.Given my opinion that there was no other violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations on the part of the United States than its
failure to notify the German consular officials without delay of the
incident involving the LaGrand brothers and the fact that the United States
did indeed take various measures to prevent the reoccurrence of that
violation, 1 do not believe there is any more to be said on this subject in
the Judgment. However, I voted in favour of this subparagraph for thesole
reason that the statement in this subparagraph cannot cause any harm.
7. Subparagraph (7) of the operative part (Judgment, para. 128)
37. I am utterly at a loss as to what the Court intends to say in this
subparagraph. My failure to understand may stem from the fact that I hold a
diametrically different view on "the rights set forth in [the
Vienna]Convention". However, I believe that the sole subject-matter of the
Court's consideration should have been the violations of the Vienna
Convention by a party to it, as explained in paragraphs 23 to 25 above.
(Signed) Shigeru Oda.
[p 540]
Separate opinion of Judge Koroma
Issue of procedural default in relation to breach - Court's findings -
Misgivings - Orders for provisional measures under the Court's Statute
binding - Need for caution not to cast doubt on previous orders issued.
1. Although I support the Court's findings in this case, there are one or
two conclusions about which I have some misgivings, in particular to the
extent that they are also embodied in the operative paragraph of the
Judgment.
2. Germany has asked the Court to adjudge and declare
"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in
particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter
LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international
legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended".
3. In paragraph 125 of the Judgment, the Court states that it
"can determine the existence of a violation of an international obligation.
If necessary, it can also hold that a domestic law has been the cause of
this violation. In the present case the Court has made its findings of
violations of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention when
it dealt with the first and second submission of Germany. But it has not
found that a United States law, whether substantive or procedural in
character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the
United States in the Vienna Convention." (Emphasis added.)
But then, the Court goes on to say that:
"In the present case the violation of Article 36, paragraph 2, was caused by
the circumstances in which the procedural default rule was applied, and not
by the rule as such." (Emphasis added.)
Earlier in the Judgment, the Court had stated as follows:
"Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the [p 542]
effect of preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended'" (para. 91;
emphasis added).
4. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended."
The paragraph thus sets out how the rights referred to in paragraph 1 are to
be exercised and the conditions for their application.
5. Among the rights set out in Article 36, paragraph 1, are the following:
the right to request the competent authorities of the receiving State to
inform the relevant consular post without delay of an arrest or detention;
the right to have any communication addressed by a detained or arrested
person forwarded to the relevant consular post by the receiving State
authorities without delay; and the right of the sending State that its
nationals be informed without delay of their right to consular notification.
In my opinion, these rights are the rights referred to in Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Convention and they are obligations for the receiving
State. For them to be violated therefore, the competent authorities of the
receiving State must have failed to comply with them. Clearly, the breach of
the obligation that occurred in the present case was caused neither by the
procedural default rule nor by its application. It was not because of the
procedural default rule that the LaGrand brothers were not informed in a
timely manner of their rights to consular protection or assistance. In my
view, neither the rule nor its application can be held in this regard to
have violated Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention, as it was not the
rule which prevented full effect being given to the rights under Article 36,
paragraph 1. Indeed, as the Court itself has held, the doctrine of
procedural default is not inherently inconsistent with the obligations
assumed by the United States under the Convention. On the other hand, it is
both inconsistent and unsustainable to hold that the violation of Article
36, paragraph 2, in the present case was caused by its application, and not
by the rule as such. Having thus formulated its conclusion, the Court would
appear to be saying that the rule is simultaneously both consistent and
inconsistent with the United States obligations under the Convention. If, as
the Court would appear to hold, the rule is a proper part of the United
States criminal justice system, the Court cannot at the same time hold that
its application on this occasion is the cause of the violation of the United
States obligations. The point which the Court should have determined, in my
view, was not whether aspects of the criminal process were the cause of the
breach of the obligations, which they were not, but rather whether the
obligations assumed under the Convention were breached as a result of the
non-observance of the rele-[p 543]vant provisions. In other words, the
breach of the relevant obligations would still have occurred to the extent
that the relevant provision of the Convention had not been complied with
irrespective of the criminal process.
6. But lest there be a misunderstanding of my position, I strongly subscribe
to the position that everyone is entitled to benefit from judicial
guarantees, including the right to appeal a conviction and sentence, and
this position is universally shared by States. For me, the main issue which
the Court is required to determine is whether the United States conduct, in
not informing Germany and the LaGrand brothers promptly of their rights
under the Convention, was inconsistent with the United States obligation to
Germany under the Convention, as well as the appropriate remedies for that
breach.
7. I also cannot concur entirely with the reasoning of the Court regarding
its finding on Article 41 of the Statute. The real issue is whether the
Order for Provisional Measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999 was
binding on the United States, and not the interpretation of Article 41 of
the Statute which the Court decided to undertake. I do not think its
jurisprudence on this matter was in doubt. Nor do I subscribe to the theory
of the linguistic ambiguity of the said provision. In my view the meaning of
the provision is clear and objective and there can be no fundamental
misunderstanding as to its purpose and meaning. It is also part of the
Statute of the Court. The object and purpose of an order for provisional
measures is to preserve and protect the rights and interests of the parties
in a dispute before the Court, pending the final decision of the Court. It
is for the Court to grant or reject a request for an order. It follows that,
when an order is granted in accordance with the Statute, it is binding.
Otherwise, there would be no purpose in making an order, or the purpose
would be defeated. This is how I have understood the provision and this
Judgment should be seen in that light and not as casting doubt, albeit
unwittingly, on previous orders for provisional measures issued by this
Court.
8. Finally, with regard to operative paragraph 128 (7) of the Judgment and
as I have stated above, it is my understanding that everyone, irrespective
of nationality, is entitled to the benefit of fundamental judicial
guarantees, including the right of appeal or review against conviction and
sentence, irrespective of nationality. In other words the judicial process
must be fair and regular.
(Signed) Abdul G. Koroma.
[p 544]
Separate opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren
Article I of the Optional Protocol - Existence of a dispute as an
essentially preliminary question - Definition of a dispute - There is no
dispute between the Parties as to the breach by the United States of Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention - No jurisdiction of the Court
on this point - The claim made by Germany in its third submission does not
arise out of the interpretation of the Vienna Convention but of Article 41
of the Court's Statute - No jurisdiction of the Court to decide this matter
under Article I of the Optional Protocol.
1. I have voted against operative paragraph 128 (1), (2) (a), (2) (c) and
(5) of the Judgment for the following reasons:
I
2. The Court bases its jurisdiction on Article I of the Optional Protocol
concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the
"Optional Protoco1").
3. Article I of the Optional Protocol prescribes that
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by a written
application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present
Protocol."
II
4. The existence of a dispute is a condition sine qua non established by
Article I of the Optional Protocol for the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court. It is also required by the Statute of the Court. Article 38,
paragraph 1, of the Statute states that the function of the Court in
contentious cases "is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it". Article 36, paragraph 2, and paragraph 1
of Article 40 also refer to the dispute between the Parties. Accordingly,
the Court has stated that the existence of a dispute is an "essentially
preliminary" question and that it is "the primary condition for the Court to
[p 545] exercise its judicial function" (Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 260, para.
24; pp. 270-271, para. 55).
5. The first submission of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter
referred to as "Germany") requests the Court to adjudge and declare inter
alia
"(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36
subparagraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . . .,
violated its international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right .
. ., under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph 1 of the said Convention."
6. The first sentence of the first submission of the United States of
America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States") requests the Court
to adjudge and declare that
"(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in that
the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly give to Karl
and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that Article . . ."
7. As recognized in many paragraphs of the Judgment, e.g., the first
sentence of paragraph 39, the Parties agree that the United States did not
inform the LaGrand brothers without delay following their arrest of their
rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, thus
violating that provision. Paragraph 39 of the Judgment adds that the United
States did not deny that such violation "has given rise to a dispute between
the two States".
8. However, the Court explained in its Judgment of 11 June 1998 that
"'in the sense accepted in its jurisprudence and that of its predecessor, a
dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or interests between parties . . .' (East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, pp. 99-100, para. 22); and that
'[i]n order to establish the existence of a dispute, "It must be shown that
the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other" (South West
Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328); and
further, "Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for
objective determination" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.
74)' (I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 100)." (Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon [p 546] and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria). Preliminary Objections,
I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 314-315, para. 87).
9. The Court has also stated that
"it is not sufficient for one party to a contentious case to assert that a
dispute exists with the other party. A mere assertion is not sufficient to
prove the existence of a dispute any more than a mere denial of the
existence of the dispute proves its non-existence. Nor is it adequate to
show that the interests of the two parties to such a case are in conflict."
(South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South
Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 328.)
10. On the basis of these criteria, even assuming that the United States had
not denied the existence of a dispute, it has not been shown objectively to
the Court that the Parties maintain positively opposed positions on this
point. On the contrary, as it appears from the submissions quoted above,
they agree on the breach by the United States of its violation of Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, in my opinion, the
Court does not have jurisdiction under Article I of the Optional Protocol to
decide whether the United States breached Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), when
arresting the LaGrand brothers. Nor can the Court exercise its functions
under Article 38, paragraph 1, of its Statute. For this reason I voted
against operative paragraph 128 (1) and (2) (a) of the Judgment.
11. A different problem is the consequences of the violation by the United
States of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. The Parties
disagree upon them. Therefore the Court has jurisdiction to decide that
dispute under Article I of the Optional Protocol.
III
12. Germany's third submission requests the Court to adjudge and declare
"(3) that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international
legal obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by
the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might
interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings
are pending". [p 547]
13. Germany, advancing the arguments summarized in the Judgment (para. 93),
maintains that the measures indicated by the Court pursuant to Article 41 of
its Statute are obligatory. This contention is disputed by the United States
(para. 91 of the Judgment).
14. The majority of the Court states:
"The dispute which exists between the Parties with regard to this point
essentially concerns the interpretation of Article 41, which is worded in
identical terms in the Statute of each Court (apart from the respective
references to the Council of the League of Nations and the Security
Council). These difficulties have been the subject of extensive controversy
in the literature. The Court will therefore now proceed to the
interpretation of Article 41 of the Statute." (Para. 99 of the Judgment.)
15. As the Judgment acknowledges, the dispute between Germany and the United
States on this point arises out of the interpretation of Article 41 of the
Court's Statute. Therefore, it is not a dispute arising out of the
interpretation of the Vienna Convention as required by the Optional
Protocol, which is the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court in the
present case. Consequently, in my opinion, the Court does not have
jurisdiction to decide Germany's third submission. For this reason I have
voted against operative paragraph 128 (1), (2) (c) and (5) of the Judgment.
(Signed) Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren.
[p 548]
Dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal
1. Since I find myself in disagreement with the Court's ruling that
Germany's third submission is admissible, I regret that I must dissent from
that part of the Court's Judgment.
2. In the submission, which I consider to be inadmissible, Germany requests
the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international
obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by the
Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might interfere
with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are
pending".
3. Germany filed its Application in this case, together with its request for
provisional measures, at 7.30 p.m. The Hague time on 2 March 1999, some 27
hours before the scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand. On 3 March 1999, at
9.00 a.m. The Hague time, the Vice-President of the CourtFN1 met with the
representatives of Germany and the United States to discuss the subsequent
course of the proceedings. At this meeting Germany's representative asked
the Court to indicate the requested provisional measures proprio motu
pursuant to Article 75 of the Rules of Court and without holding any hearing
on the subject. Responding to this request, the representative of the United
States explained, inter alia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN1
The President of the Court, Judge S. Schwebel of the United States,
relinquished the presidency in this case pursuant to Article 32, of the
Rules of Court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"that the United States would have strong objections to any procedure such
as that proposed only that very morning by the repre-[p 549]sentative of
Germany which would result in the Court making an Order proprio motu without
having first duly heard the two Parties"2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN2
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order
of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 13, para. 12.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Article 74, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court specifies that "[a]
request for the indication of provisional measures shall have priority over
all other cases", and paragraph 3 of that Article provides in part that
"[t]he Court, or the President if the Court is not sitting, shall fix a date
for a hearing which will afford the parties an opportunity of being
represented at it".
Under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules:
"The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the
circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures
which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties."
5. On 3 March 1999, at 7.15 p.m. The Hague time, the Court issued the Order
for provisional measures requested by Germany. It did so without the prior
hearing provided for in Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules, without an
exchange of pleadings, and having before it only Germany's Application and
request for provisional measures, which set out Germany's allegations in
justification of its request.
6. In issuing the requested Order, the Court explained its decision to
proceed in this ex parte fashion in the following terms:
"Whereas, the sound administration of justice requires that a request for
the indication of provisional measures founded on Article 73FN3 of the Rules
of Court be submitted in good time;
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN3
Article 73 of the Rules of Court, which Germany had also invoked, reads as
follows:
"1. A written request for the indication of provisional measures may be made
by a party at any time during the course of the proceedings in the case in
connection with which the request is made.
2. The request shall specify the reasons therefor, the possible consequences
if it is not granted, and the measures requested. A certified copy shall
forthwith be transmitted by the Registrar to the other party."
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Whereas, Germany emphasizes that it did not become fully aware of the facts
of the case until 24 February 1999 and that since then it has pursued its
action at diplomatic level;
"Whereas, under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the latter
'may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the circumstances of
the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be
taken or complied with by any or all of the parties'; whereas a provision of
this kind has substantially[p 550] featured in the Rules of Court since
1936, and whereas, if the Court has not, to date, made use of the power
conferred upon it by this provision, the latter appears nonetheless to be
clearly established; whereas the Court may make use of this power,
irrespective of whether or not it has been seised by the parties of a
request for the indication of provisional measures; whereas in such a case
it may, in the event of extreme urgency, proceed without holding oral
hearings; and whereas it is for the Court to decide in each case if, in the
light of the particular circumstances of the case, it should make use of the
said power."FN4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN4
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order
of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 14, paras. 19-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. The Court issued its Order only four hours before the scheduled execution
of Walter LaGrand, which was to take place in the State of Arizona. The
United States authorities were thus left with very little time to assess and
act upon the Order with the deliberateness its gravity required under
American law and constitutional practice applicable to federal-state
relations as well as under international law. It is to be observed, however,
that the Court was presented by Germany with claims regarding a set of facts
that called for immediate action to save the life of a human being who had
allegedly been deprived of his rights under international law. In light of
these circumstances, it is difficult to fault the Court for issuing the
Order in the manner it did. But there is no excuse for Germany's conduct in
waiting until the last minute to seek the Order. This is so particularly
since it is now clear that the grounds Germany alleged in justification of
its late filing do not withstand scrutiny. The late filing, as will be shown
below, had serious negative consequences for the position of the United
States in defending its rights before this Court. In my opinion, these
circumstances now require the Court to hold the third submission
inadmissible.
8. Germany sought to excuse its last minute request for provisional measures
on the ground that it did not know until 23 or 24 February 1999 that the
authorities of the State of Arizona had been aware at least as far back as
1982 or 1984 that the LaGrand brothers were German nationals. In issuing its
Order, the Court attached considerable importance to this claim. This is
readily apparent from the specific reference the Court makes to Germany's
claim in setting out the reasons motivating its decision and from the
context within which the reference appears in its Order (see para. 6,
above).
9. Even assuming that Germany's late filing could be justified on the ground
advanced by it - something that is open to some doubt - the record now
before the Court indicates that the information Germany [p 551] claimed it
did not have was in fact available to Germany at least since 1993.
10. Germany learned in 1992 that the LaGrands had been arrested in 1982 and
that they had been tried and convicted in Arizona in 1984. According to
Germany, its involvement in this case begins with a prison visit to the
brothers on 8 December 1992. It explained this involvement to the Court in
the following words:
"In the following [after December 1992], Germany helped the brothers'
attorneys to investigate the brothers' childhood in Germany, both by
financial and logistical support, and to raise this issue and the omission
of consular advice in Court proceedings."FN5 (Emphasis added.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN5
Memorial of Germany, Vol. I, p. 11, para. 2.06.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the court proceedings instituted by the LaGrands' lawyers in
co-ordination with German consular officials was an appeal to the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, filed on 8 March 1993.
"In these proceedings", according to Germany, "the attorneys raised for the
first time the lack of consular advice and the violation of Art. 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."FN6 In support of their claim, the
attorneys provided the United States District Court on the same date with
the presentence reports prepared in 1984 by the probation officials of Pima
County, Arizona, in connection with the sentencing of the LaGrand
brothersFN7. Each of these presentence reports stated very clearly that the
LaGrands were German citizensFN8. The reports had been provided to the
defence attorneys of the LaGrands a decade before and they formally
acknowledged receipt of these reports in open court on 12 December 1984FN9.
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FN6
Ibid., p. 12, para. 2.07.
FN7 See Memorial of Germany, Vol. III, Ann. 46, p. 853, at 1009.
FN8 See Presentence Reports on Karl and Walter LaGrand, dated 2 April 1984,
Memorial of Germany, Vol. II, Ann. 2, pp. 261 and 276.
FN9 See Memorial of Germany, Vol. II, Ann. 8, pp. 461-462.
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11. In other words, the information contained in the presentence reports,
including the fact that the Arizona authorities knew as far back as the
early 1980s that the LaGrands were German nationals, was known to the
attorneys of the LaGrands by 1984, if not earlier. These attorneys filed the
presentence reports with the United States District Court for Arizona in
March 1993 in connection with their habeas corpus motion on behalf of the
LaGrands. As of that date, these reports were available to Germany which, as
we have seen, emphasized to this Court that it "helped the brothers'
attorneys . . . to raise . . . the omission of consular advice" and "the
violation of Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention on Con-[p 552]sular Relations"
in the proceedings they instituted in 1993 (see para. 10 above).
12. The foregoing facts raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of
Germany's contention in this Court that the late filing (on 2 March 1999) of
its request for provisional measures was attributable to the fact that it
discovered only on 23 February 1999 that the Arizona authorities knew as far
back as 1984 that the LaGrands were German nationals. Even assuming that
Germany did not actually know these facts, it certainly had no excuse for
not knowing them, given its insistent claim in this Court of its close
involvement in the LaGrand case after 1992 and its collaboration with the
LaGrands' attorneys after that date, particularly in assisting them in
raising issues relating to the Vienna Convention.
13. In its oral argument, Germany responded in the following terms to the
contention of the United States that the 1984 presentence reports provided
the answer to the question concerning the date when the Arizona authorities
learned that the LaGrands were German citizens:
"the only question that makes sense at all in this context is whether German
officials did or did not have easy access to the Presentence Reports in 1992
or thereafter. Although we do not attribute any conclusive weight to this
issue, we can provide you with a clear answer. We have filed with the Court
a Memorandum regarding the Presentence Reports issue in the LaGrand matter,
drafted by the Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona at the
request of the German Consulate General in Los Angeles. Let me summarize
what this Memorandum says: According to a local rule of the Pima County
Superior Court, the Presentence Reports concerning Karl and Walter LaGrand
were filed under seal and kept confidential even after sentencing. When the
Federal Public Defender tried to locate this report in June of this year
[2000], they could not be found. In the words of the Public Defender:
'The exhibits clerk at the superior court advised that the clerk did not
have pre-sentence reports information on either LaGrand, and they had no
idea where the pre-sentence reports were filed. It appears that the
pre-sentence reports are not even in the superior court file.'
Mr. President, if not even the competent US authority managed to retrieve
the reports, does it make sense to say, as the Counter-Memorial [of the
United States] does, that it is 'hard to understand how these reports were
not already familiar to German consular officers'? Can one really accuse a
foreign consulate of negligence [p 553]when it failed to get hold of
documents which could not even be traced by the competent local
authorities?"FN10
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FN10
CR 2000/26, p. 38.
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14. The answer to the question counsel for Germany asked in the last
sentence of the preceding paragraph is a resounding "yes". As we have seen,
the presentence reports were in the possession of the LaGrands' attorneys
and transmitted by them to the United States District Court in 1993.
Moreover, even assuming that these reports were confidential or under seal
after the conviction in 1984 of the LaGrands, they became a matter of public
record when provided to the United States District Court. Since the reports
were thus available to Germany by 1993, it is quite irrelevant that the
Public Defender, quoted above by Germany, was unable allegedly to find them
in the year 2000.
15. It is noteworthy, too, that between 1992, when Germany learned of the
detention, trial and sentencing of the LaGrands, and the beginning of 1999,
when Germany claimed that it found out for the first time that the Arizona
authorities had known since the early 1980s that the LaGrands were German
citizens, Germany never asked the United States Department of State to
investigate the case of the LaGrands. Moreover, in 1998 the Department of
State expressly invited all embassies in Washington "to bring possible
failures of consular notification to its attention, so that it could
investigate and take any appropriate action"FN11. Such an investigation, had
it been requested by Germany consistent with the practice routinely followed
in these types of cases, would have determined the date as of which the
LaGrands' German nationality was known to the Arizona authorities. This
information was in fact contained in the report prepared by the State
Department following its own investigation of the case in 1999-2000FN12.
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FN11
Counter-Memorial of the United States, p. 51, para. 61.
FN12"Karl and Walter LaGrand. Report of Investigation into Consular
Notification Issues." United States Department of State, 17 February 2000,
Counter-Memorial of the United States, Exhibit 1, pp. 7-8.
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16. Germany's lack of diligence in ascertaining the facts it advanced to
justify its late filing deprived the United States of an opportunity to be
heard on Germany's request for provisional measures. What is more, it left
the Court little choice but to accept on face value Germany's claim of its
lack of knowledge, since the absence of a hearing prevented the United
States from rebutting Germany's contention in this regard. Germany's conduct
raises issues analogous to those the Court addressed in the case concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), [p 554] where Yugoslavia
attempted to invoke a new basis of jurisdiction at a very late stage of the
proceedings. In that case, the Court ruled as follows:
"Whereas the invocation by a party of a new basis of jurisdiction in the
second round of oral argument on a request for the indication of provisional
measures has never before occurred in the Court's practice; whereas such
action at this late stage, when it is not accepted by the other party,
seriously jeopardizes the principle of procedural fairness and the sound
administration of justice; and whereas in consequence the Court cannot, for
purpose of deciding whether it may or may not indicate provisional measures
in the present case, take into consideration the new title of jurisdiction
which Yugoslavia sought to invoke on 12 May 1999."FN13
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FN13
Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, para. 44.
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17. Germany's justification for its late filing, which the information now
before the Court has shown to have been based on spurious claims, had the
effect of obtaining a ruling from the Court that "seriously jeopardize[d]
the principle of procedural fairness and the sound administration of
justice". This result, as we have seen, was brought about because of
Germany's lack of diligence. It alone justifies holding the submission
inadmissible on the grounds invoked by the Court in Yugoslavia v. Belgium,
above.
18. In addressing the issue of the admissibility of Germany's third
submission, the Court makes the following finding (para. 57):
"The Court recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the manner in which
these proceedings were filed and for their timing. The Court recalls,
however, that notwithstanding its awareness of the consequences of Germany's
filing at such a late date, it nevertheless considered it appropriate to
enter the Order of 3 March 1999, given that an irreparable prejudice
appeared to be imminent. In view of these considerations, the Court
considers that Germany is now entitled to challenge the alleged failure of
the United States to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Germany's third submission is admissible."
19. I have no disagreement with the Court's view that given the imminence of
"an irreparable harm" in the instant case it was "appropriate" to enter the
Order of 3 March 1999 on the facts then known to the Court. But it does not
follow therefrom, contrary to what the Court says, that "in view of these
considerations, the Court considers that Germany is [p 555] now entitled to
challenge the alleged failure of the United States to comply with the
Order". The fact that it was appropriate for the Court to issue the Order
does not compel the admissibility of Germany's third submission once it is
apparent that Germany's justification for its late filing is shown not to
withstand scrutiny. It is to be regretted that the Court fails to address
this issue since it bears directly on the admissibility of Germany's third
submission.
20. Germany's negligence had other detrimental consequences for the United
States, as far as concerns the Order of 3 March 1999. In its request for
provisional measures, Germany asked the Court for an Order that tracked
verbatim the language of the Court's Order of 9 April 1998 in the Breard
caseFN14. When the Breard Order was before the United States Supreme Court,
the Solicitor General of the United States explained why the Government
believed that the Order was not binding. He made three points in this
regard. He submitted, first, that "there is substantial disagreement among
jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is
binding. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, Sec. 903, Reporter's Note 6, at 369-370 (1986). The better reasoned
position is that such an order is not binding" FN15. The Solicitor General
then attempted to show, by analysing Article 41 of the Statute of the Court,
why that was the better reasoned view. The Solicitor General's second
argument in support of the non-binding character of the Court's Article 41
orders was that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN14
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998,
p. 258, para. 41 (I).
FN15 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Republic of Paraguay v.
Gilmore, Memorial of Germany, Vol. II, Ann. 34, p. 737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"the ICJ itself has never concluded that provisional measures are binding on
the parties to a dispute. That court has indicated provisional measures in
seven other cases of which we are aware; in most of those cases, the order
indicating provisional measures was not regarded as binding by the
respondent."FN16
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FN16
Ibid., p. 738.
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Finally, the Solicitor General argued that, even assuming that "parties to a
case before the ICJ are required to heed an order of that court indicating
provisional measures", the Order in the Breard case was not worded in
mandatory termsFN17. Consistent with the view of the Solicitor General, the
Supreme Court of the United States denied the stay of execution in [p 556]
the Breard case called for by the Order of the International Court of
Justice in that caseFN18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FN17 Ibid., p. 739.
FN18Breard v. Greene, Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore, 118 S.Ct. 1352
(1998), 37 International Legal Materials (1998), p. 829.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Germany was aware of the position of the United States Government
regarding the non-binding character of orders of this Court indicating
provisional measures in general and with its interpretation of the Order in
the Breard case in particular
. It is difficult to understand, therefore, what Germany sought to achieve
with its 2 March 1999 request for provisional measures. It certainly could
not have been surprised that the United States would adopt the same position
with regard to the requested order as it did in relation to the Breard Order
of 9 April 1998. There was nothing in the order Germany requested on 2 March
1999 that would have provided the authorities of the United States with a
legal basis justifying the Solicitor General to reverse his official
position adopted less than a year earlier. In the absence of such a
justification, it would have been unprecedented for him not to adhere to his
earlier view. Moreover, and that is even more important, the Court itself
had not in the meantime clarified its position on the subject. Consequently,
when Germany asked the Court to proceed proprio motu and without a hearing,
and sought an order identical to that the Court issued in the Breard case,
Germany breached an obligation of elementary fairness it owed the United
States in the circumstances of this case. It is true, of course, that a
party in proceedings before this Court, as before any other court, must bear
the consequences of having assumed, erroneously in retrospect, that a given
order is non-binding and being held responsible for the resulting violation.
But this fact does not relieve Germany of responsibility for having engaged
in a litigation strategy prejudicial to the United States.
23. To summarize, the claim advanced by Germany to justify its late filing
has been shown to be without merit. In fact, it is now clear that Germany
had no good reason for not bringing its request for provisional measures to
the Court at least a year or two earlier, if not much earlier. Its late
filing did nevertheless have the consequence of preventing the [p 557]
United States from being heard in a timely fashion on the German request for
provisional measures. The absence of a hearing also deprived the United
States of the opportunity to address the question of the binding character
of the Court's orders and their effect on the laws of the United States.
What is more, Germany sought an Order from this Court that it had every
reason to anticipate the United States would consider to be non-binding and
hence not requiring enforcement - a litigation strategy that is very
difficult to understand unless that was its very purpose.
24. Accordingly, I consider that the manner in which Germany proceeded in
obtaining the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 amounted to procedural
misconduct prejudicial to the interests of the United States as a party to
the instant proceedings. Such misconduct provides the requisite
justification - it compels it, in my opinion - for declaring Germany's third
submission inadmissible.
(Signed) Thomas Buergenthal. |
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