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[p.1029]
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 48 and 62 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 81, 83, 84 and 85 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application filed by the Republic of Cameroon in the
Registry of the Court on 29 March 1994 instituting proceedings against the
Federal Republic of Nigeria in respect of a dispute described as "relat[ing]
essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula", in
which the Court was also requested "to determine the [p 1030] course of the
maritime boundary between the two States beyond the line fixed in 1975",
Having regard to the Additional Application submitted by Cameroon on 6 June
1994,
Having regard to the Order of 16 June 1994, whereby the Court indicated that
it had no objection to the Additional Application being treated as an
amendment to the initial Application and fixed the time-limits for the
filing of the Memorial of Cameroon and the Counter-Memorial of Nigeria,
respectively,
Having regard to the Memorial filed by Cameroon and the preliminary
objections submitted by Nigeria within the time-limits thus fixed,
Having regard to the Judgment of 11 June 1998, whereby the Court ruled on
the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria,
Having regard to the Order of 30 June 1998, whereby the Court fixed a new
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, and to the
Order of 3 March 1999, whereby it extended that time-limit,
Having regard to the Counter-Memorial filed by Nigeria within the time-limit
thus extended,
Having regard to the Order of 30 June 1999, whereby the Court decided inter
alia that Cameroon should submit a Reply and Nigeria should submit a
Rejoinder, and fixed 4 April 2000 and 4 January 2001 respectively as the
time-limits for the filing of those pleadings,
Makes the following Order:
1. Whereas, by a letter dated 27 June 1999, received in the Registry on 30
June 1999, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea submitted
to the Court an "Application ... to intervene in the case concerning the
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria) pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the Court and Article 81
of the Rules of the Court"; and whereas that same letter appointed H.E. Mr.
Ricardo Mangue Obama N'Fube, Minister of State, Secretary-General of the
Presidency of the Government, as Agent;
2. Whereas, in the introduction to its Application, Equatorial Guinea refers
to the eighth preliminary objection raised by Nigeria in the case concerning
the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria) and quotes as follows paragraph 116 of
the Judgment handed down by the Court on 11 June 1998 on the objections of
Nigeria (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 324)
"The Court notes that the geographical location of the territories of the
other States bordering the Gulf of Guinea, and in particular Equatorial
Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, demonstrates that it is evident that the
prolongation of the maritime boundary between the Parties . . . will
eventually run into maritime zones where the rights and interests of
Cameroon and Nigeria will overlap those of [p 1031] third States. It thus
appears that rights and interests of third States will become involved if
the Court accedes to Cameroon's request. . . The Court cannot therefore, in
the present case, give a decision on the eighth preliminary objection as a
preliminary matter. In order to determine where a prolonged maritime
boundary . . . would run, where and to what extent it would meet possible
claims of other States, and how its judgment would affect the rights and
interests of these States, the Court would of necessity have to deal with
the merits of Cameroon's request. At the same time, the Court cannot rule
out the possibility that the impact of the judgment required by Cameroon on
the rights and interests of third States could be such that the Court would
be prevented from rendering it in the absence of these States, and that
consequently Nigeria's eighth preliminary objection would have to be upheld
at least in part. Whether such third States would choose to exercise their
rights to intervene in these proceedings pursuant to the Statute remains to
he seen" (emphasis added);
and whereas Equatorial Guinea adds:
"It is in this context that Equatorial Guinea comes before the Court.
Equatorial Guinea wishes to be very clear that it has no intention of
intervening in those aspects of the proceedings that relate to the land
boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, including determination of
sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. It is only the maritime boundary
aspects of the case before the Court with which Equatorial Guinea is
concerned; and, as is explained more fully below, it is the purpose of
Equatorial Guinea's intervention to inform the Court of Equatorial Guinea's
legal rights and interests so that these may remain unaffected as the Court
proceeds to address the question of the maritime boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria, the parties to the case before it. Equatorial Guinea does not
seek to become a party to the case";
3. Whereas, in its Application, Equatorial Guinea, referring to Article 81,
paragraph 2 (a), of the Rules of Court sets out inter alia in these terms
"the interest of a legal nature which [it] considers may be affected by the
decision in that case":
"in accordance with its national law, Equatorial Guinea claims the sovereign
rights and jurisdiction which pertain to it under international law up to
the median line between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria on the one hand, and
between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon on the other hand. It is these legal
rights and interests which Equatorial Guinea seeks to protect. . .
Equatorial Guinea .. . wishes to emphasize that it does not seek the Court's
determination of its boundaries with Cameroon or Nigeria. Equatorial Guinea
does wish to protect its legal rights and interests, however, and that
requires [p 1032] that any Cameroon-Nigeria maritime boundary that may be
determined by the Court should not cross over the median line with
Equatorial Guinea. If the Court were to determine a Cameroon-Nigeria
maritime boundary that extended into Equatorial Guinea waters, as defined by
the median line, Equatorial Guinea's rights and interests would be
prejudiced ... It is the purpose of Equatorial Guinea to present and to
demonstrate its legal rights and interests to the Court and, as appropriate,
to state its views as to how the maritime boundary claims of Cameroon or
Nigeria may or may not affect the legal rights and interests of Equatorial
Guinea";
4. Whereas, in its Application, Equatorial Guinea, referring to Article 81,
paragraph 2 (b), of the Rules of Court, sets out "the precise object of the
intervention" as follows:
"First, generally, to protect the legal rights of the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea in the Gulf of Guinea by al1 legal means available, and in this
regard, therefore, to make use of the procedure established by Article 62 of
the Statute of the Court.
Second, to inform the Court of the nature of the legal rights and interests
of Equatorial Guinea that could be affected by the Court's decision in the
light of the maritime boundary claims advanced by the Parties to the case
before the Court";
5. Whereas, in its Application, Equatorial Guinea, referring to Article 81,
paragraph 2 (c), of the Rules of Court, expresses the following opinion
concerning the "basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist as between
[it] and the parties to the case":
"The Republic of Equatorial Guinea does not seek to be a party to the case
before the Court. There is no basis for jurisdiction under the Statute and
Rules of the Court which arises out of the pre-existing understandings
between Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Cameroon. Equatorial Guinea has not
made a declaration under Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court nor is
there an agreement in force among the three States which confers
jurisdiction on the Court in this regard. It would be open, of course, to
the three countries affirmatively to request the Court not only to determine
the Cameroon-Nigeria maritime boundary but also to determine Equatorial
Guinea's maritime boundaries with these two States. However, Equatorial
Guinea has made no such request and wishes to continue to seek to determine
its maritime boundaries with its neighbours through negotiations.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Accordingly, Equatorial Guinea's request to intervene is based solely upon
Article 62 of the Statute of the Court"; [p 1033]
6. Whereas, in ending its Application, Equatorial Guinea formulates the
following conclusion:
"On the basis of the foregoing observations, Equatorial Guinea respectfully
requests permission to intervene in the present proceedings between Cameroon
and Nigeria for the object and purpose specified herein, and to participate
in those proceedings in accordance with Article 85 of the Rules of the
Court";
7.Whereas, in accordance with Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, the Deputy-Registrar, by letters dated 30 June 1999, transmitted
certified copies of the Application for permission to intervene to the
Government of Cameroon and the Government of Nigeria, which were informed
that the Court had fixed 16 August 1999 as the time-limit for the submission
of their written observations on that Application; and whereas, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of that same provision, the Deputy-Registrar, on
30 June 1999, also transmitted a copy of the Application to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations;
8. Whereas Cameroon and Nigeria each submitted written observations within
the time-limit thus fixed; and whereas the Registry transmitted to each
Party a copy of the other's observations, as well as copies of the
observations of both Parties to Equatorial Guinea;
9. Whereas, in its written observations, Cameroon informs the Court that it
"has no objection in principle to [the intervention of Equatorial Guinea],
limited to the maritime boundary, which could allow the Court to be bitter
informed on the general background to the case and to determine more
completely the dispute submitted to it"; whereas it adds, referring to the
Judgment handed down by the Court on 11 June 1998 (Preliminary Objections),
that "the Court envisaged the possibility that third States might intervene,
amongst which was clearly the Republic of Equatorial Guinea"; and whereas it
considers that "the intervention of Equatorial Guinea should allow the Court
to decide on a delimitation of the boundary which will be stable and final
in relation to the States involved"; and whereas, in those same written
observations, Cameroon moreover
"entirely reserves its position in relation to the validity and possible
consequences of the unilateral delimitation undertaken by Equatorial Guinea,
whose claims, based solely on the principle of equidistance, do not take
into account the special geographical features of the area in dispute";
10. Whereas, in its written observations, Nigeria notes that "Equatorial
Guinea does not seek to intervene as a party in the proceedings"; and
whereas it adds the following:
"Whether or not Equatorial Guinea's Application is accepted, it will in
Nigeria's view make no difference to the legal position of [p 1034] Nigeria
to the present proceedings, or to the jurisdiction of the Court. On that
basis, Nigeria leaves it to the Court to judge whether and to what extent it
is appropriate or useful to grant Equatorial Guinea's Application";
11. Whereas communications were subsequently addressed to the Registry by
the Parties and by Equatorial Guinea, and whereas the Registry transmitted
copies of each of those communications to the other two States; whereas
Equatorial Guinea, by a letter dated 3 September 1999, noted that neither
Cameroon nor Nigeria "ha[d] objected in principle to the intervention of
Equatorial Guinea"; whereas Nigeria, by a letter dated 13 September 1999,
referred to certain passages in the written observations of Cameroon and
maintained that Cameroon "misrepresent[ed] the position" of Equatorial
Guinea, in that "[a]s Nigeria understands the position, Equatorial Guinea
did not seek to intervene as a party, but as a third party"; whereas
Cameroon, by a letter dated 11 October 1999, indicated that "it [did] not
dispute the right of Equatorial Guinea to intervene as a non-party
intervener" and expressed the view that "it [was] not for Nigeria to take
the place of Equatorial Guinea in deciding on the latter's entitlement to
intervene", it being for the Court itself to determine the legal effects of
such an intervention; and whereas Equatorial Guinea, in a further
communication, dated 11 October 1999, observed that "there [could] be no
question of the Court's eventual Judgment determining the maritime
boundaries of Equatorial Guinea, whether with Cameroon or Nigeria" and that
it "[sought] the status of a non-party intervener";
12. Whereas neither of the Parties objects to the Application by Equatorial
Guinea for permission to intervene being granted;
13. Whereas, in the opinion of the Court, Equatorial Guinea has sufficiently
established that it has an interest of a legal nature which could be
affected by any judgment which the Court might hand down for the purpose of
determining the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria;
14. Whereas, moreover, as a Chamber of the Court has already had occasion to
observe,
"[s]o far as the object of [a State's] intervention is 'to inform the Court
of the nature of the legal rights [of that State] which are in issue in the
dispute', it cannot be said that this object is not a proper one: it seems
indeed to accord with the function of intervention" (Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application by Nicaragua
for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of 13 September 1990, 1.C.J. Reports
1990, p. 130, para. 90);
15. Whereas in addition, as the same Chamber pointed out,
"[i]t . . . follows . . . from the juridical nature and from the purposes of
intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction [p 1035]
between the would-be intervener and the parties is not a requirement for the
success of the application. On the contrary, the procedure of intervention
is to ensure that a State with possibly affected interests may be permitted
to intervene even though there is no jurisdictional link and it therefore
cannot become a party" (1.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 135, para. 100);
16. Whereas, in view of the position of the Parties and the conclusions
which the Court itself has reached, the Court considers that there is
nothing to prevent the Application by Equatorial Guinea for permission to
intervene from being granted;
17. Whereas copies of the pleadings and documents annexed, as filed in the
case at present, have already been communicated to Equatorial Guinea
pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court; and whereas a
copy of the Reply of Cameroon and of the Rejoinder of Nigeria, which the
Court has directed them to submit pursuant to its Order of 30 June 1999,
will also be so communicated; whereas, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 85 of the Rules of Court, it is necessary to fix time-limits for the
filing, respectively, of a "written statement" by Equatorial Guinea and of
"written observations" by Cameroon and by Nigeria on that statement; and
whereas those time-limits must "so far as possible, coincide with those
already fixed for the pleadings in the case", in the present instance by the
above-mentioned Order of 30 June 1999;
18. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
Unanimously,
1. Decides that the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is permitted to intervene
in the case, pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute, to the extent, in the
manner and for the purposes set out in its Application for permission to
intervene;
2. Fixes the following time-limits for the filing of the written statement
and the written observations referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court:
4 April 2001 for the written statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea;
4 July 2001 for the written observations of the Republic of Cameroon and of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and
3. Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-first day of October, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-nine, in four copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the [p 1036] Government
of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Government of the Republic of
Cameroon and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
respectively.
(Signed) Stephen M. Schwebel,
President.
(Signed) Eduardo Valencia-Ospina,
Registrar. |
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