| |
[p.135]
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,
Having regard to Article 66 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application by New Zealand filed in the Registry of the
Court on 9 May 1973, instituting proceedings against France in respect of a
dispute as to the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific
region, and asking the Court to adjudge and declare that [p5] the conduct by
the French Government of nuclear tests in the South Pacific region that give
rise to radio-active fall-out constitutes a violation of New Zealand's
rights under international law, and that these rights will be violated by
any further such tests,
Makes the following Order:
1. Having regard to the request dated 14 May 1973 and filed in the Registry
the same day, whereby the Government of New Zealand, relying on Article 33
of the General Act of 1928 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes and on Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute and Article 66 of the
Rules of Court, asks the Court to indicate, pending the final decision in
the case brought before it by the Application of the same date, the
following interim measures of protection:
"The measure which New Zealand requests ... is that France refrain from
conducting any further nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active fall-out
while the Court is seized of the case."
Whereas the French Government was notified by telegram the same day of the
filing of the Application instituting proceedings and a copy thereof was at
the same time transmitted to it by express mail;
2. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article
37, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application were
transmitted to Members of the United Nations through the Secretary-General
and to other States entitled to appear before the Court;
3. Whereas the submissions set out in the request for the indication of
interim measures of protection were on the day of the request communicated
to the French Government, by telegram of 14 May 1973, and a copy of the
request was at the same time transmitted to it by express mail;
4. Whereas pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the
Government of New Zealand chose the Right Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick,
Chief Justice of Australia, to sit as judge ad hoc in the case;
5. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France were informed by
communications of 15 May 1973 that the Court would in due course hold public
hearings to afford them the opportunity of presenting their observations on
the request by New Zealand for the indication of interim measures of
protection, and by further communications of 22 May 1973 the Parties were
informed that such hearings would open on 24 May 1973;
6. Whereas by a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of France to
the Netherlands, handed by him to the Registrar the same day, the French
Government stated that it considered that the Court was manifestly not
competent in the case and that it could not accept the Court's jurisdiction,
and that accordingly the French Government did not [p6] intend to appoint an
agent, and requested the Court to remove the case from its list;
8. Whereas at the opening of the public hearings, which were held on 24 and
25 May 1973, there were present in court the Agent, Co-Agent, counsel and
other advisers of the Government of New Zealand;
9. Having heard the observations on the request for interim measures on
behalf of the Government of New Zealand, and the replies on behalf of that
Government to questions put by a Member of the Court, submitted by
Professor R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, Dr. A. M. Finlay, Q.C., and Mr. R. C.
Savage, Q.C.;
10. Having taken note of the final submission of the Government of New
Zealand made at the hearing of 25 May 1973, and filed in the Registry the
same day, which reads as follows:
"... New Zealand's final submission is: that the Court, acting under Article
33 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
or, alternatively, under Article 41 of its Statute, should lay down or
indicate that France, while the Court is seized of the case, refrain from
conducting any further nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active
fall-out".
11. Having taken note of the written reply given by the Agent of the
Government of New Zealand on 1 June to a question put to him by a Member of
the Court;
12. Noting that the French Government was not represented at the hearings;
and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States concerned can not by
itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures;
13. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France have been afforded an
opportunity of presenting their observations on the request for the
indication of provisional measures;
14. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the
merits of the case, and yet ought not to indicate such measures unless the
provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis
on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;
15. Whereas in its Application and oral observations the Government of New
Zealand claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the following
provisons:
(a) Articles 36, paragraph 1, and 37 of the Statute of the Court and Article
17 of the above-mentioned General Act of 1928; and in the alternative,
(b) Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute of the Court;
16. Whereas, according to the letter of 16 May 1973 handed to the Registrar
by the French Ambassador to the Netherlands, the French [p7] Government
considers, inter alia, that the General Act of 1928 was an integral part of
the League of Nations system and, since the demise of the League of Nations,
has lost its effectivity and fallen into desuetude; that this view of the
matter is confirmed by the conduct of States in regard to the General Act of
1928 since the collapse of the League of Nations; that, in consequence, the
General Act cannot serve as a basis for the competence of the Court to
deliberate on the Application of New Zealand with respect to French nuclear
tests; that in any event the General Act of 1928 is not now applicable in
the relations between France and New Zealand and cannot prevail over the
will clearly and more recently expressed in the declaration of 20 May 1966
made by the French Government under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court; that paragraph 3 of that declaration excepts from the French
Government's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction "disputes concerning
activities connected with national defence"; and that the present dispute
concerning French nuclear tests in the Pacific incontestably falls within
the exception contained in that paragraph;
17. Whereas in its oral observations the Government of New Zealand
maintains, inter alia, that the validity, interpretation and effect in the
present situation of the reservation attached to the French declaration of
20 May 1966 are issues which can be the subject of debate, and that it
cannot be baldly asserted that there is a manifest absence of jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute; that the General Act was,
within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute, a treaty or convention in
force on 24 October 1945 when New Zealand and France became parties to the
Statute, and that Article 37 of the Statute accordingly conferred on the
Court the jurisdiction provided for in Article 17 of the General Act; that
such evidence as there is of State practice in more recent years is wholly
consistent with the Act's continuity; that since 1946 France has more than
once acknowledged that the General Act remains in force; that so far as the
General Act is concerned, not only is there no manifest lack of jurisdiction
to deal with this matter, but the Court's jurisdiction on the merits on that
basis is reasonably probable, and there exist weighty arguments in favour of
it;
18. Whereas the material submitted to the Court leads it to the conclusion,
at the present stage of the proceedings, that the provisions invoked by the
Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be founded; and whereas the Court will accordingly
proceed to examine the Applicant's request for the indication of interim
measures of protection;
19. Whereas the request of the Government of New Zealand for the indication
of provisional measures is based on Article 33 of the General Act of 1928,
as well as on Article 41 of the Statute of the Court; and whereas the
Government of New Zealand in its final submission asks the [p8] Court to
indicate such measures under Article 33 of the General Act or,
alternatively, under Article 41 of the Statute;
20. Whereas the Court considers that it should not exercise its power to
indicate provisional measures under Article 33 of the General Act of 1928
until it has reached a final conclusion that the General Act is still in
force; whereas the Court is not in a position to reach a final conclusion on
this point at the present stage of the proceedings, and will therefore
examine the request for the indication of interim measures only in the
context of Article 41 of the Statute;
21. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate interim measures under
Article 41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve the respective
rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes
that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the
subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court's judgments
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the matters
in issue before the Court;
22. Whereas it follows that the Court in the present case cannot exercise
its power to indicate interim measures of protection unless the rights
claimed in the Application, prima facie, appear to fall within the purview
of the Court's jurisdiction;
23. Whereas it is claimed by the Government of New Zealand in its
Application that rules and principles of international law are now violated
by nuclear testing undertaken by the French Government in the South Pacific
region, and that, inter alia,
(a) it violates the rights of all members of the international community
including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that give rise to radioactive
fall-out be conducted;
(b) it violates the rights of all members of the international community,
including New Zealand, to the preservation from unjustified artificial
radio-active contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial
environment and, in particular, of the environment of the region in which
the tests are conducted and in which New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue and
the Tokelau Islands are situated;
(c) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material enter
the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands,
including their air space and territorial waters, as a result of nuclear
testing;
(d) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material,
having entered the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niueor the
Tokelau Islands, including their air space and territorial waters, as a
result of nuclear testing, cause harm, including apprehension, anxiety and
concern, to the people and Government of New Zealand and of the Cook
Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;
(e) it violates the right of New Zealand to freedom of the high seas,
including freedom of navigation and overflight and the freedom to [p9]
explore and exploit the resources of the sea and the seabed, without
interference or detriment resulting from nuclear testing;
and whereas New Zealand invokes its moral and legal responsibilities in
relation to the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;
24. Whereas it cannot be assumed a priori that such claims fall completely
outside the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, or that the Government of
New Zealand may not be able to establish a legal interest in respect of
these claims entitling the Court to admit the Application;
25. Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may indicate
interim measures of protection only when it considers that circumstances so
require in order to preserve the rights of either party;
26. Whereas the Government of New Zealand alleges, inter alia, that during
the period from 1966 to 1972 the French Government has carried out a series
of atmospheric nuclear tests centred on Mururoa in the South Pacific; that
the French Government has refused to give an assurance that its programme of
atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific is at an end, and that on 2
May 1973 the French Government announced that it did not envisage
cancelling or modifying the programme originally planned; that from official
pronouncements it is clear that some further tests are envisaged with the
likelihood of deploying a thermonuclear warhead by 1976; that the French
Government has also reserved its options on the development of yet another
generation of nuclear weapons after 1976 which would require further tests;
that in previous years the nuclear testing series conducted by France have
begun on dates between 15 May and 7 July; that on the basis of the
pronouncements referred to above and the past practice of the French
Government, there are strong grounds for believing that the French
Government will carry out further testing of nuclear devices and weapons in
the atmosphere at Mururoa Atoll before the Court is able to reach a decision
on the Application of New Zealand;
27. Whereas these allegations give substance to the New Zealand Government's
contention that there is an immediate possibility of a further atmospheric
nuclear test being carried out by France in the Pacific;
28. Whereas the Government of New Zealand also alleges that each of the
series of French nuclear tests has added to the radio-active fall-out in New
Zealand territory; that the basic principles applied in this field by
international authorities are that any exposure to radiation may have
irreparable, and harmful, somatic and genetic effects and that any
additional exposure to artificial radiation can be justified only by the
benefit which results; that, as the New Zealand Government has repeatedly
pointed out in its correspondence with the French Government, the
radio-active fall-out which reaches New Zealand as a result of French
nuclear tests is inherently harmful, and that there is no compensating
benefit to justify New Zealand's exposure to such harm; that the uncer-
[p10] tain physical and genetic effects to which contamination exposes the
people of New Zealand causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and concern;
and that there could be no possibility that the rights eroded by the holding
of further tests could be fully restored in the event of a judgment in New
Zealand's favour in these proceedings;
29. Whereas the French Government, in a diplomatic Note addressed to the
Government of New Zealand and dated 10 June 1966, the text of which was
annexed to the Application in this case, emphasized that every precaution
would be taken with a view to ensuring the safety and the harmlessness of
the French nuclear tests, and observed that the French Government, in taking
all appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the populations close to
the test zone, had sought a fortiori to guarantee the safety of populations
considerably further distant, such as New Zealand or the territories for
which it is responsible; and whereas in a letter dated 19 February 1973 to
the Prime Minister of New Zealand from the French Ambassador to New Zealand,
the text of which was also annexed to the Application in this case, the
French Government called attention to Reports of the New Zealand National
Radiation Laboratory, and of the Australian National Radiation Advisory
Committee, which reached the conclusion that the fall-out from the French
tests had never involved any danger to the health of the populations of
those two countries, and observed that the concern which had been expressed
as to the long-term effects of testing could not be based on anything other
than conjecture;
30. Whereas for the purpose of the present proceedings it suffices to
observe that the information submitted to the Court, including Reports of
the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
between 1958 and 1972, does not exclude the possibility that damage to New
Zealand might be shown to be caused by the deposit on New Zealand territory
of radio-active fall-out resulting from such tests and to be irreparable;
31. Whereas in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court is
satisfied that it should indicate interim measures of protection in order to
preserve the right claimed by New Zealand in the present litigation in
respect of the deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of New
Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
32. Whereas the circumstances of the case do not appear to require the
indication of interim measures of protection in respect of other rights
claimed by New Zealand in the Application;
33. Whereas the foregoing considerations do not permit the Court to accede
at the present stage of the proceedings to the request made by the [p11]
French Government in its letter dated 16 May 1973 that the case be removed
from the list;
34. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the
right of the French Government to submit arguments in respect of those
questions;
35. Having regard to the position taken by the French Government in its
letter dated 16 May 1973 that the Court was manifestly not competent in the
case and to the fact that it was not represented at the hearings held on 24
and 25 May on the question of the indication of interim measures of
protection;
36. Whereas, in these circumstances, it is necessary to resolve as soon as
possible the questions of the Court's jurisdiction and of the admissibility
of the Application;
Accordingly,
THE COURT
Indicates, by 8 votes to 6, pending its final decision in the proceedings
instituted on 9 May 1973 by New Zealand against France, the following
provisional measures:
The Governments of New Zealand and France should each of them ensure that no
action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute
submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect
of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court may render in the case;
and, in particular, the French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing
the deposit of radioactive fall-out on the territory of New Zealand, the
Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
Decides that the written proceedings shall first be addressed to the
questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and of
the admissibility of the Application;
Fixes as follows the time-limits for the written proceedings:
21 September 1973 for the Memorial of the Government of New Zealand;
21 December 1973 for the Counter-Memorial of the French Government;
And reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-second day of June one [p12] thousand
nine hundred and seventy-three, in four copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted respectively to the
French Government, to the Government of New Zealand, and to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security
Council.
(Signed) F. Ammoun,
Vice-President.
(Signed) S. Aquarone,
Registrar.
Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga makes the following declaration:
I have voted in favour of the Order for the reasons stated therein, but wish
to add some brief comments on the relationship between the question of the
Court's jurisdiction and the indication of interim measures.
I do not believe the Court should indicate interim measures without paying
due regard to the basic question of its jurisdiction to entertain the merits
of the Application. A request should not be granted if it is clear, even on
a prima facie appreciation, that there is no possible basis on which the
Court could be competent as to the merits. The question of jurisdiction is
therefore one, and perhaps the most important, among all relevant
circumstances to be taken into account by a Member of the Court when voting
in favour of or against a request for interim measures.
On the other hand, in view of the urgent character of the decision on
provisional measures, it is obvious that the Court cannot make its answer
dependent on a previous collective determination by means of a judgment of
the question of its jurisdiction on the merits.
This situation places upon each Member of the Court the duty to make, at
this stage, an appreciation of whether—in the light of the grounds invoked
and of the other materials before him—the Court will possess jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the dispute. From a subjective point of view, such
an appreciation or estimation cannot be fairly described as a mere
preliminary or even cursory examination of the jurisdictional issue: on the
contrary, one must be satisfied that this basic question of the Court's
jurisdiction has received the fullest possible attention which one is able
to give to it within the limits of time and of materials available for the
purpose.
When, as in this case, the Court decides in favour of interim measures, and
does not, as requested by the French Government, remove the case from the
list, the parties will have the opportunity at a later stage to plead more
fully on the jurisdictional question. It follows that that[13*]question
cannot be prejudged now; it is not possible to exclude a priori, that the
further pleadings and other relevant information may change views or
convictions presently held.
***
The question described in the Order as that of the existence of "a legal
interest in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the
Application" (para. 24) is characterized in the operative part as one
relating to the admissibility of the Application. The issue has been raised
of whether New Zealand has a right of its own—as distinct from a general
community interest—or has suffered, or is threatened by, real damage. As far
as the power of the Court to adjudicate on the merits is concerned, the
issue is whether the dispute before the Court is one "with regard to which
the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights" as required by
the jurisdictional clause invoked by New Zealand. The question thus appears
to be a limited one linked to jurisdiction rather than to admissibility. The
distinction between those two categories of questions is indicated by Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice in I.C.J. Reports 1963, pages 102-103, as follows:
"... the real distinction and test would seem to be whether or not the
objection is based on, or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or clauses
under which the jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to exist. If so, the
objection is basically one of jurisdiction."
Article 17 of the General Act provides that the disputes therein referred to
shall include in particular those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Among the classes of legal
disputes there enumerated is that concerning "the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation" (emphasis added). At the preliminary stage it would seem
therefore sufficient to determine whether the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights. It would not appear necessary to enter at that
stage into questions which really pertain to the merits and constitute the
heart of the eventual substantive decision such as for instance the
establishment of the rights of the parties or the extent of the damage
resulting from radio-active fall-out.
Judge Sir Humphrey Waldock makes the following declaration:
I concur in the Order. I wish only to add that, in my view, the principles
set out in Article 67, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court should guide the
Court in giving its decision on the next phase of the proceedings which is
provided for by the present Order. [p14]
Judge Nagendra Singh makes the following declaration:
While fully supporting the reasoning leading to the verdict of the Court,
and therefore voting with the majority for the grant of interim measures of
protection in this case, I wish to lend emphasis, by this declaration, to
the requirement that the Court must be satisfied of its own competence, even
though prima facie, before taking action under Article 41 of the Statute and
Rule 61 (New Rule 66) of the Rules of Court.
It is true that neither of the aforesaid provisions spell out the test of
competence of the Court or of the admissibility of the Application and the
request, which nevertheless have to be gone into by each Member of the Court
in order to see that a possible valid base for the Court's competence exists
and that the Application is, prima facie, entertainable. I am, therefore, in
entire agreement with the Court in laying down a positive test regarding its
own competence, prima facie established, which was enunciated in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction [FN1] case and having been reiterated in this case may
be said to lay down not only the latest but also the settled jurisprudence
of the Court on the subject.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), I.C.J. Reports
1972, Order of 17 August 1972, paras. 15 to 17, pp. 15 to
16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is indeed a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial function that a
court can be moved only if it has competence. If therefore in the exercise
of its inherent powers (as enshrined in Art. 41 of its Statute) the Court
grants interim relief, its sole justification to do so is that if it did
not, the rights of the parties would get so prejudiced that the judgment of
the Court when it came could be rendered meaningless. Thus the possibility
of the Court being ultimately able to give a judgment on merits should
always be present when interim measures are contemplated. If, however, the
Court were to shed its legal base of competence when acting under Article 41
of its Statute, it would immediately expose itself to the danger of being
accused of discouraging governments from:
"... undertaking, or continuing to undertake, the obligations of
judicial settlement as the result of any justifiable apprehension that by
accepting them they may become exposed to the embarrassment, vexation and
loss, possibly following upon interim measures, in cases in which there is
no reasonable possibility, prima facie ascertained by the Court, of
jurisdiction on the merits. Accordingly, the Court cannot, in relation to a
request for indication of interim measures, disregard altogether the
question of its competence on the merits. The correct principle which
emerges from these apparently conflicting considerations and which has been
uniformly adopted in international arbitral and judicial practice is as
follows: The Court may properly act under the terms of Article 41 provided
that there is in existence an instrument such as a Declaration of Acceptance
of the Optional Clause, emanating from the Parties to the dispute, [p15]
prima facie confers jurisdiction upon the Court and which incorporates no
reservations obviously excluding its jurisdiction." (Separate opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in Interhandel case, I.C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 118.)
It needs to be mentioned, therefore, that even at this preliminary stage of
prima facie testing the Court has to examine the reservations and
declarations made to the treaty which is cited by a party to furnish the
base for the jurisdiction of the Court and to consider also the validity of
the treaty if the same is challenged in relation to the parties to the
dispute. As a result of this prima facie examination the Court could either
find:
(a) that there is no possible base for the Court's jurisdiction in which
event no matter what emphasis is placed on Article 41 of its Statute, the
Court cannot proceed to grant interim relief; or
(b) that a possible base exists, but needs further investigation to come to
any definite conclusion in which event the Court is inevitably left no
option but to proceed to the substance of the jurisdiction of the case to
complete its process of adjudication which, in turn, is time consuming and
therefore comes into conflict with the urgency of the matter coupled with
the prospect of irreparable damage to the rights of the parties. It is this
situation which furnishes the "raison d'etre" of interim relief.
If, therefore, the Court, in this case, has granted interim measures of
protection it is without prejudice to the substance whether jurisdictional
or otherwise which cannot be prejudged at this stage and will have to be
gone into further in the next phase.
Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield Barwick makes the following declaration:
I have voted for the indication of interim measures and the Order of the
Court as to the further procedure in the case because the very thorough
discussions in which the Court has engaged over the past weeks and my own
researches have convinced me that the General Act of 1928 and the French
Government's declaration to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with
reservations each provide, prima facie, a basis on which the Court might
have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claims made by New Zealand in
its Application of 9 May 1973. Further, the exchange of diplomatic notes
between the Governments of New Zealand and France in 1973 afford, in my
opinion, at least prima facie evidence of the existence of a dispute between
those Governments as to matters of international law affecting their
respective rights.
Lastly, the material before the Court, particularly that appearing in the
UNSCEAR reports, provides reasonable grounds for concluding that further
deposit in the New Zealand territorial environment and that of [p16] the
Cook Islands of radio-active particles of matter is likely to do harm for
which no adequate compensatory measures could be provided.
These conclusions are sufficient to warrant the indication of interim
measures.
I agree with the form of the provisional measures indicated, understanding
that the action proscribed is action on the part of governments and that the
measures are indicated in respect only of the New Zealand Government's claim
to the inviolability of its territory, and of that of the Cook Islands.
Judges Forster, Gros, Petren and Ignacio-Pinto append dissenting opinions to
the Order of the Court.
(Initialled) F.A.
(Initialled) S.A. [p17]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE FORSTER
[Translation]
The Order made today in the case between New Zealand and France is related
to the one made also today in the case of Australia v. France.
The two Orders are as alike as twins. They indicate the same measures of
protection; the only difference lies in the mention of different territories
in the case of each Applicant.
There exists, moreover, such a close connection between the questions of law
raised respectively by the Australian and the New Zealand claims that a
joinder of the two cases would have been perfectly justified from the very
first day of the proceedings.
For the same reasons as are set forth in my preceding dissenting opinion
(Australia v. France), I must decline to side with the majority in the
present case (New Zealand v. France).
I remain convinced that in these exceptional cases the International Court
of Justice should have forsaken the beaten paths traditionally followed in
proceedings on interim measures. The Court should above all have satisfied
itself that it really had jurisdiction, and not have contented itself with a
mere probability.
It is not a question of approving or condemning the French nuclear tests in
the Pacific; the real problem is to find out whether we have jurisdiction to
say or do anything whatever in this case.
It was that problem of jurisdiction which it was necessary for us to solve
as a matter of absolute priority, before pronouncing upon the interim
measures.
Since that was not done, I express, here too, my dissenting opinion.
(Signed) I. Forster. [p18]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GROS
[Translation]
In my view, the documents by which New Zealand and Australia instituted
proceedings in the Nuclear Tests cases are drawn up in similar terms, the
same considerations of fact and law are relied on therein, and the
submissions are directed to an identical object. In his opening address on
24 May 1973, counsel for New Zealand stated that:
"New Zealand's case arises out of the same set of circumstances as that of
Australia, and has comparable objectives."
The claims by these two Governments should have been joined, from the outset
of the proceedings, their object being the same. It is artificial to keep up
the appearance of there being two cases, and while a joinder might raise
drafting problems for subsequent decisions of the Court, this could not
constitute a serious obstacle to a joinder. In the South West Africa cases,
the Court joined the two claims at the time when the two Applicants
nominated the same judge ad hoc, which is what New Zealand and Australia
have also done in the present cases. Since the Court has decided not to
effect a joinder of the two claims from the outset of the cases, and to
reserve its decision on the question, I have nothing further to say at
present on the problem of joinder. But since the request made by New Zealand
for interim measures of protection has been made the subject of a separate
Order, I should state the reasons which have led me to dissent from that
Order. In the circumstances referred to above, these reasons are the same as
those set out in my dissenting opinion appended to the Order of the same
date concerning the request made by Australia.
***
The declaration of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction made by the French
Government on 20 May 1966 excludes from that jurisdiction: "... disputes
concerning activities connected with national defence." In a communication
made to the Court on 16 May 1973 by the French Government that reservation
was formally invoked. The bounds placed by that Government on its acceptance
have been deemed by the Order not to create an impediment to the exercise of
the Court's power to grant provisional measures in application of Article 41
of the Statute, since the Court considered that the title invoked by the
Applicant to found the jurisdiction of the Court, namely the General Act of
1928, seemed [p19] sufficient, prima facie, both to justify its competence
provisionally and to rule out the application of the 1966 reservation in the
interim measures phase, without prejudging its later decison on these
questions. I have therefore nothing to say on the substance of the problems
of jurisdiction and admissibility, since every question, without exception,
concerning the Court's power to take jurisdiction in the case as presented
in the Application of New Zealand has been deferred to the next phase of
the proceedings, instituted in the operative part of the Order.
But the decision of the Court indicating provisional measures constitutes
an application which 1 cannot approve of two Articles of the Statute of the
Court, Articles 53 and 41, and it is therefore proper that I should give the
reasons for my dissent, successively on these two points which relate to the
one phase of provisional measures.
When the Court was seised on 9 May 1973 of the Application instituting
proceedings and indicating the French Republic as respondent, and then on 14
May 1973 of a request for the indication of interim measures of protection,
the fact was signified forthwith to the Government of the French Republic,
which replied on 16 May 1973 by a document formally contesting the
jurisdiction of the Court and submitting that the case should be removed
from the list. This was a document of 20 pages which constitutes a reply to
the communications of the Court. The Court, before the first hearing,
examined as in every case the question of the communication to the public of
the documents in the proceedings, in accordance with Article 48 of the Rules
of Court; in a letter to the Court dated 23 May 1973 the Agent of the
Applicant made express reservations to the communication of the French
document of 16 May 1973. On 24 May 1973, at the first hearing, counsel for
the Government of New Zealand stated:
"I recall and adopt the proposition put forward by Australian counsel that
this document was not submitted in accordance with the Rules of the Court."
The proposition thus adopted was as follows:
"Neither the Court nor Australia should have to deal with contentions
advanced by a party if not made in Court but irregularly or outside the
Court. We submit that strict adherence should be had to the requirements
that parties must put their case regularly before the Court and that, if
they fail to appear, then the Court should not take notice of any statement
they may make outside the framework of the Court's established process. This
rule has been a fundamental one throughout the ages for maintaining the
integrity of the judicial process at every level. We trust that the Court
will make clear that it will not take such statements into
account."[p20]
And still, on the date of the present Order, the French document has not
been communicated to the public, whereas the New Zealand Application and the
records of the oral arguments of New Zealand were made public as from 24 May
1973.
The foundation for such an attitude can only be found in a certain
interpretation of Article 53 of the Statute or of the procedure of the Court
in preliminary matters.
Article 53 of the Statute of the Court deals with the situation of States
which contest the jurisdiction of the Court by failing to appear or to
present submissions. Such deliberate non-participation is an act recognized
in the procedure of the Court, being dealt with by an article which is
contained in Chapter III of the Statute, entitled "Procedure", and nowhere
in the intentions of the authors of the Statute would one be able to find
any will to penalize the State which does not appear. The contrary
proposition has been pleaded without the support of any authority and should
be dismissed. Certainly, the absence of a State ought not to prejudice the
action instituted by another State, and may not be allowed to interrupt the
course of justice. But non-appearance is regulated by Article 53, which lays
down what its consequences must be and, when non-appearance is noted, that
Article must be applied. But that is what the Court did not do; the Order
notes failure to appear, in paragraph 12, but takes into account the
submissions of the document addressed to the Court by the French Government
for the purpose of requesting that the case be removed from the list. Now,
if there exist submissions of the Government cited as respondent in the
case, there is no default for want of submissions. By pronouncing neither in
one sense nor in the other, and by deferring to a later date its decision on
the submissions of the French Government, the Court is giving an
interpretation of Article 53 which I find erroneous.
That is not a minor problem and I regret that the Court should have deferred
it to a later phase. By indicating at the opening of the first hearing that
the French Government's request for the removal of the case from the list,
which had "been duly noted", would be dealt with "in due course", the
President was only settling an immediate problem, but the Order has
postponed the moment of decision still further. And that postponement
implies that the Court considers it possible to treat the French Government
both as a party to the main proceedings (of. paras. 33 and 34 of the Order
and the fixing of a time-limit for a French Counter-Memorial) and as being
in default in the present phase, because its failure to appear is noted in
paragraphs 12 and 35. But if the French Government has failed to appear and
formally indicated its intention to remain outside the main proceedings, in
a way which leaves no room for doubt, it was necessary to apply Article 53,
which lays down the effects of default, and to apply it immediately.
It does not seem to me to be in accordance with the rules of procedure to
suspend the application of Article 53 provisionally in the present case on
the ground that this is an interim measures phase. Thus right from the [p21]
outset an error in interpretation has been made with regard to Article 53. I
need not recall the consistent jurisprudence of the Court as to the
interpretation of its Statute: "The Court itself, and not the parties, must
be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity" (Northern Cameroons,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 29). It was therefore for the Court to
decide, on the basis of its own reasons, whether its Statute and Rules lay
down formalities which are indispensable, so that submissions made in any
other way are to be treated as inadmissible, and whether, on that
hypothesis, Article 53 should be applied to a twofold default, absence from
the proceedings and failure to make submissions. Nothing of the kind was
done, and the status of the French document remains uncertain. Objection to
it, on the level of its very existence, has been taken by the Applicant, the
decision on the submissions made in it has been postponed; it is impossible
to deduce from the Order whether this document is or is not a pleading in
the case which should have been taken into account on a footing of equality
with the observations of the Applicant. For if the Statute and Rules of
Court do not forbid the making of "submissions" in the way which was
selected in this case, the French document should have been admitted as the
observations of the respondent; and on the opposite assumption, it should
have been rejected, and Article 53 applied as it was in the Judgment of 2
February 1973 (Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland),
Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1973, para. 12).
The Court's postponement of the application of the effects of Article 53
until the later stages of the case is thus an implicit decision to refuse to
apply Article 53 to an interim measures phase. This is a position which
merits examination. Shortly expressed, the argument is that default does not
necessarily have the same consequences in all phases of a case, and that
while Article 53 does, in paragraph 2, lay down certain effects, those
effects may be set aside when dealing with a request for interim measures of
protection, despite the manifest intention of the State which is absent from
the proceedings.
It could also be maintained that while Article 53 provides the party
interested in note being taken of default with the right to have that done,
it does not do more, and the Court cannot take note of it proprio motu. It
will be sufficient to observe in this respect that even if this were so,
which in my view it is not, the Applicant has in the present case implicitly
invoked Article 53 in the circumstances mentioned above, by making reference
to the applicable provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court. But the
French Government has indicated in a letter of 21 May 1973 that it is "not a
party to this case"; it would appear difficult not to see in its statements
of 16 and 21 May a formal intention to fail to appear. The Court surely
could not overlook both the position taken up by the Applicant and that of
the absent State, when they were at one in seeking that it take note of a
failure to appear.
It should be added that it would be a sort of abuse of procedure to seek to
make use of a failure to appear as a breach of the rules of procedure [p22]
incurring the loss of the right to be heard by the Court, and thus create a
penalty which the Statute itself formally forbids in Article 53, the main
effect of which is that, when a failure to appear has been noted, the Court
"must... satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance
with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and
law". It is not usual to advance at one and the same time an argument and
its opposite; faced with a failure to appear, the Court, by postponing any
decision on the effects of the failure to appear, has allowed some
infringement of the equality which States must enjoy before a court.
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited on the one hand to the States which
have accepted it, and on the other to commitments freely entered into. As a
court of specific jurisdiction, the Court must above all take care not to
exceed the competence it derives from its Statute and from the voluntary
acceptance of its jurisdiction by States, each of which freely determines
the scope of the jurisdiction it confers upon the Court.
A State either is or is not subject to a tribunal. If it is not, it cannot
be treated as a "party" to a dispute, which would be non-justiciable. The
position which the Court has taken is that a State which regards itself as
not concerned in a case, which fails to appear, and affirms its refusal to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court, cannot obtain from the Court anything
more than a postponement of the consideration of its rights. This is not
what Article 53 says. Failure to appear is a means of denying jurisdiction
which is recognized in the procedure of the Court, and to oblige a State to
defend its position otherwise than by failure to appear would be to create
an obligation not provided for in the Statute. It has been argued that the
only way of challenging the jurisdiction of the Court is to employ a
preliminary objection. The way in which States challenge the Court's
jurisdiction is not imposed upon them by a formalism which is unknown in the
procedure of the Court; when they consider that such jurisdiction does not
exist, they may choose to keep out of what, for them, is an unreal dispute.
Article 53 is the proof of this, and the Court must then satisfy itself of
its own jurisdiction, and of the reality of the dispute brought before it. A
State which fails to appear does of course run a risk, that of not supplying
the Court with all possible material for the consideration of its
application for dismissal of the case. But that is a risk which the State,
and it alone, is free to choose to take, and to compare with the risk which
it would run as the result of a long drawn-out procedure in which it does
not wish to participate, with regard to a matter which it considers to be
wholly outside the Court's jurisdiction. Certain indications given in
connection with the Order of 22 June 1973 show that the possibility of
successive deferments is not ruled out.
The Permanent Court of International Justice gave a warning against the
notion that an Application is sufficient to create a justiciable dispute:
"... the Court's jurisdiction cannot depend solely on the wording of the
Application." (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 15.)
If, as I think, failure to appear as provided for in Article 53 is not in
[p22] itself subject to any sanction, it becomes evident that the reasons
for such failure to appear, when they have been clearly stated, must be
examined fully by the Court, and above all they must be formally accepted or
rejected, and that without delay. The idea that a failure to appear is not
opposable to the Court and to the Applicant because it is a case of a
request for interim measures of protection is therefore, in my view, beside
the point.
In the first place, no-one disputes "the connection which must exist under
Article 61. paragraph 1, [now Art. 66, para. 1] of the Rules between a
request for interim measures of protection and the original Application
filed with the Court" {Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland),
Interim Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, para. 12).
A request for interim measures of protection is thus a particular phase, but
one which is not independent of the original Application; there is no magic
in words, and it is impossible to believe that problems of jurisdiction,
admissibility and reality of the principal Application can be conjured away
simply by stating that these points, which are essential for a court of
specific jurisdiction like this Court, are just being taken for granted
provisionally, prima facie, without their being prejudged. It is in each
individual case by reference to the jurisdictional problems in the widest
sense, to the circumstances, and to the "respective rights of either party"
(Art. 41, emphasis added) that a decision should be taken as to whether it
is possible to indicate interim measures, and the forms of words used must
correspond to reality.
Such was not the analysis of the power instituted in Article 41 of the
Statute which was carried out in the present instance. The Court, by putting
off the decision on the effects of non-appearance, embraced the proposition
that a request for provisional measures is utterly independent in relation
to the case which is the subject of the Application.
It is no use referring to certain domestic systems of law which feature such
independence, because the Court has its own rules of procedure and must
apply them in its jurisdictional system, which, as a corollary of a certain
kind of international society, has been established on the basis of the
voluntary acceptance of jurisdiction. It is a fact of international life
that recourse to adjudication is not compulsory; the Court has to take care
lest, by the indirect method of requests for provisional measures, such
compulsion be introduced vis-a-vis States whose patent and proclaimed
conviction is that they have not accepted any bond with the Court, whether
in a general way or with regard to a specified subject-matter.
If it were a question of a State whose non-appearance was due to the total
absence of the Court's jurisdiction, whether for want of a valid
jurisdictional clause or by reason of the inadmissible character of the
principal claim, the immediate decision of lack of jurisdiction in regard to
the Application instituting proceedings itself would be taken without delay;
the decision of the Court in the present case is that, despite the
affirmation that a certain subject-matter has been formally excluded from
the jurisdiction of the Court, and the fact that the State which made that
[p24] affirmation considers itself to be outside the jurisdiction of the
Court in regard to everything connected with that subject-matter, it is
possible to indicate provisional measures without prejudging the rights of
that State.
In the decision which the Court has to take on any request for provisional
measures, urgency is not a dominant and exclusive consideration; one has to
seek, between the two notions of jurisdiction and urgency, a balance which
varies with the facts of each case. If the jurisdiction is evident and the
urgency also, then there is no difficulty, but that is an exceptional
hypothesis. When the jurisdiction is not evident, whether there is urgency
or not, the Court must take the time needed for such an examination of the
problems arising as will enable it to decide one way or the other, and that
is something which it could have done without undue delay in the present
instance with regard to various objections to its power to judge the case as
described in the principal Application.
There is no presumption of the Court's jurisdiction in favour of the
applicant, nor any presumption of its lack of jurisdiction in favour of the
respondent; there is only the right of each of them to a proper and serious
examination of its position.
A State does not have to wait two years or more for the Court to vindicate
its claim that no justiciable dispute exists, for if that is the case there
is nothing to be argued over; the other State, which has submitted the claim
whose reality is contested, evidently has an equal right to have the Court
acknowledge the existence of the dispute it invokes. But the equality
between these claims is upset if, by the indirect means of the allegedly
urgent necessity for the indication of provisional measures, a presumption
operates in favour of the applicant without the Court's carrying out any
serious appraisal of the objection. On behalf of the Applicant it has been
pleaded that argument on all these problems will be presented later; that in
itself is a negation of the claim of the other State to be immediately
relieved of a dispute which it alleges not to exist. Thus, to maintain
equality between the parties, in a case where objections relating to the
very stuff of the dispute are raised, the priority treatment of these
objections is a necessity. In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges McNair,
Basdevant, Klaestad and Read wrote, with reference to the question of the
obligation to submit to arbitration:
"Since there is nothing in the Declaration of 1926 to indicate an
intention that prima facie considerations should be regarded as sufficient,
it is our opinion, based on the principle referred to above and the way in
which this principle has been invariably applied, that the United Kingdom
can only be held to be under an obligation to accept the arbitral procedure
by application of the Declaration of 1926 if it can be established to the
satisfaction of the Court that the difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim falls within the category of differences in respect of
which the United Kingdom consented to arbitration in the Declaration of
1926." (Ambatielos, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 29.)[p25]
President Winiarski also expressed himself in favour of the priority of
certain questions of admissibility over questions of jurisdiction {Certain
Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter),
J.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 449). Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice likewise, in a separate
opinion, said:
"There are however other objections, not in the nature of objections to
the competence of the Court, which can and strictly should be taken in
advance of any question of competence. Thus a plea that the Application did
not disclose the existence, properly speaking, of any legal dispute between
the parties, must precede competence, for if there is no dispute, there is
nothing in relation to which the Court can consider whether it is competent
or not. It is for this reason that such a plea would be rather one of
admissibility or receivability than of competence."
"In the general international legal field there is nothing corresponding to
the procedures found under most national systems of law, for eliminating at
a relatively early stage, before they reach the court which would otherwise
hear and decide them, claims that are considered to be objectionable or not
entertainable on some a priori ground. The absence of any corresponding
'filter' procedures in the Court's jurisdictional field makes it necessary
to regard a right to take similar action, on similar grounds, as being part
of the inherent powers or jurisdiction of the Court as an international
tribunal." ( Northern Cameroons, I.C.J. Reports 1963, pp. 105 and 106
f.)
It is this nexus of questions of jurisdiction and of admissibility which has
been deferred by the Court to the next phase; it will then be for the Court,
and then alone, to decide the fate of these questions in its judgment.
A certain tendency has arisen to consider that the Orders of 17 August 1972
in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases have, as it were, consolidated the law
concerning provisional measures. But each case must be examined according to
its own merits and, as Article 41 says, according to "the circumstances".
Now the case of Iceland was entirely different in circumstances. The Court
had developed an awareness of the existence of its own jurisdiction, the
urgency was admitted, the reality and the precise definition of the dispute
were not contested; finally, the right of the Applicant States which was
protected by the Orders was recognized as being a right currently exercized,
whereas the claim of Iceland constituted a modification of existing law. It
suffices to enumerate these points to show that the situation is entirely
different today; so far as the last point is concerned, the situation is now
even the reverse, since the Applicants stand upon a claim to the
modification of existing positive law when [p26] they ask the Court to
recognize the existence of a rule forbidding the overstepping of a threshold
of atomic, pollution.
Such was the situation with which the Court found itself confronted when the
application of Article 41 of the Statute in the present case was to be
considered. The objections which were made or could be made to the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the claim have a
character of absolute priority. Article 41 does not give the Court a
discretionary power but a competence bound by the conditions laid down in
that text; it is necessary that "circumstances so require" and that the
measures should be necessary to preserve "the respective rights of either
party", which covers the same examination of fact and of law that Article
53, paragraph 2, imposes on the Court, in addition to the general obligation
upon every judge, including a judge of urgent cases, to satisfy himself that
he has jurisdiction; that is what Article 36, paragraph 6, recalls. Now, the
examination of fact and of law which is the condition of any decision on
provisional measures cannot be systematically put off until later with the
indication that the Court's power under Article 41 of the Statute
"presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which
are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court's
judgment should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the
matters in issue before the Court" (Order, para. 21). That is to solve by a
mere assertion the problem of the existence of the "circumstances" to which
Article 41 refers. Article 41 obliges the Court to see whether the
circumstances require it to use the power of indicating measures and, even
if circumstances so require, it can only exercise that power if its decision
will be able to preserve the respective rights of either party. But if the
State cited as respondent invokes the Court's total absence of power, and if
the subject of the claim is really non-existent, what rights would there be
to preserve?
What has been said above with regard to the character of absolute priority
attaching to certain objections shows that it is impossible to escape from
the necessity of settling such objections before indicating measures of
protection; if there are no rights, there is nothing to protect. If the
claim has no subject, the principal application falls to the ground, and
with it the request for provisional measures. The objection is of so
fundamental a nature in regard to the very bases of the Court's
jurisdiction that it seems to me to be a misuse of language to say that a
jus standi to act in such circumstances could exist prime facie.
When the Court declares on the basis of Article 41 that a decision
indicating provisional measures prejudges neither the jurisdiction nor the
merits, that is not a finding which is likely to reassure States as to the
temporary and circumstantial nature of that decision; it is an assertion
that the examination of the case by the Court in accordance with the
criteria of Article 41 of the Statute enables it, in the circumstances of
this [p27] case, to consider that its decision cannot in fact prejudge
either its jurisdiction or the question of jus standi. It is not just a
kind of ritual formula, but a warranty that the Court is satisfied that
Article 41 has been correctly interpreted and applied to a certain case. But
if in reality an indication of provisional measures prejudges the
jurisdiction or the existence of jus standi, the Court does riot have the
power to grant these measures, because the condition laid down by Article 41
of the Statute will not have been respected. These conditions not having
been fulfilled in the present case, the application of Article 41 in the
Order of 22 June 1973 indicating provisional measures constitutes an action
ultra vires.
In the present case, on a point of great importance, the Court has ignored
one of the conditions for the acceptance of a request for provisional
measures. In the case concerning the Factory at Chorzow, the Permanent Court
of International Justice refused to indicate provisional measures because
the request could be regarded as designed to obtain an interim judgment in
favour of a part of the claim formulated in the Application and that,
consequently, "the request [was] not covered by the terms of the provisions
of the Statute and Rules" (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 12, p. 10). Here we have
a condition of general scope for the interpretation of Article 41 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was
identical to the present Article 41, and the recognition of a procedural
requirement operating in regard to interlocutory jurisdiction. For it would
indeed, by definition, be contrary to the nature of interlocutory
proceedings if they enabled the dispute of which they were only an accessory
element to be disposed of.
Comparison between the principal claim (Application, para. 28, submissions
of the Applicant) and of the request for provisional measures (Request,
paras. 2 f, and 51) shows that the latter was indeed designed to obtain an
interim judgment. The request for provisional measures ought therefore to
have been rejected on that ground also.
(Signed) Andre Gros. [p28]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETREN
[Translation]
Having voted against the adoption of the Order, I append a dissenting
opinion.
Considering the identity of claims and submissions between this case and the
Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), as well as the coincident
circumstances of fact and law, I was of the opinion that the two cases
should have been joined even at the present stage of the proceedings. The
Court having rejected that proposal, it only remains for me to express the
same opinion here as in the other case.
I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority either with regard to
the deferment, to a later stage in the proceedings, of the questions of the
Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, or with
regard to the indication of provisional measures.
In my view, the questions of the Court's jurisdiction and of the
admissibility of the Application, and also the question of the indication
of provisional measures, fall into a common framework as follows:
Before undertaking the examination of the merits of the case, the
International Court of Justice, like any other court, has the duty of making
sure as far as possible that it possesses jurisdiction and that the
application is admissible. The absence of the State against which
application is made does not alter this requirement in any way. On the
contrary, Article 53 of the Statute lays an obligation on the Court to
satisfy itself as to its possession of jurisdiction and the admissibility of
the application on the basis of the elements at its disposal. Among the
latter in the present case are the arguments put forward by France in the
letter handed in by its Ambassador, and by New Zealand in its Application
and in its oral pleadings of 24-25 May 1973. It is, however, the Court's
duty also to consider any other elements that it may find relevant. The fact
that New Zealand has requested provisional measures does not dispense the
Court from the obligation of beginning by an examination of the questions of
its jurisdiction and of the admissibility of the Application; indeed, it
makes that examination, if anything, more urgent.
For it to be possible for the Court to consider that it has jurisdiction on
the merits of the case, it would, as I see it, be necessary for it to
approve at least one of three propositions which would serve to underpin the
Application of the New Zealand Government:
1. The reservation expressed by France when in 1966 it renewed its
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, a reservation referring to
activities [p29] connected with French national defence, is not valid;
2. The nuclear tests referred to in the New Zealand Application are not
connected with French national defence;
3. The General Act of 1928 has remained in force as between States parties
to that Act in 1944, the consequence of which is that reservations made by
such States in accepting after 1945 the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice are without effect in their relations among themselves.
The questions thus raised for the Court do not concern the merits of the
case. They occur in a general framework of international law and, in my
view, the Court would not have needed any further explanations from the New
Zealand Government in order to resolve them, and it could and should have
settled them on the basis of the elements at its disposal.
In this connection, it should be pointed out that the question of
jurisdiction raises the issue of the extent to which the 1928 General Act
can have survived the disappearance of the League of Nations and its organs,
as also of the effect, if any, of such survival on the reservations made by
States parties to that Act when accepting the jurisdiction of the present
Court. Now Article 63 of the Statute required that these States should be
notified without delay that such questions were submitted to the Court in
the present case. If they had been so notified, they would already have had
the opportunity of manifesting their astonishment, their satisfaction or
their indifference in regard to the contention of the New Zealand Government
mentioned under 3 above. But the fact that the required notification has not
yet been made does not justify the Court in today inviting the New Zealand
Government to present, at a later stage in the proceedings, further argument
on the question of jurisdiction.
I am therefore of the opinion that the Court should not have opened a new
phase of the case for that purpose but, on the contrary, should have
requested the New Zealand Government to complete its argument on that issue
in the present stage of the case.
As the Court has now deferred its decision on the question of jurisdiction,
I am unable to indicate here and now my own assessment of the various
factors entering into the consideration of that question.
Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government's request for the indication of
provisional measures obliges me to examine whether the pre-conditions for
the Court's ability to indicate such measures have been fulfilled.
Among those pre-conditions, certain relate to the question of jurisdiction.
In that connection the New Zealand Government has referred inter alia to the
Orders made by the Court on 17 August 1972 in the two Fisheries Jurisdiction
cases. In both of these Orders the Court considered that on a request for
provisional measures it need not, before indicating them, finally satisfy
itself that it had jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but that it ought
not to act under Article 41 of the Statute if the absence of jurisdiction
was manifest. [p30]
The New Zealand Government sought to draw from this considerandum the
conclusion that it is only when the absence of the Court's jurisdiction is
manifest that it ought not to act under Article 41 of the Statute. It is not
possible to accept such an interpretation. The paragraph in question simply
alludes to two extreme situations: one in which the jurisdiction of the
Court is finally established and another in which the absence of
jurisdiction is manifest. It says that the existence of the first situation
is not a necessary pre-condition for the indication of provisional measures
and that, in the second situation, the Court should not indicate such
measures, which is a self-evident observation that does not lend itself to
broader conclusions. The paragraph does not say in accordance with what
criteria, within the area lying between finally established jurisdiction and
manifest absence of jurisdiction, the line must be drawn between the
situations which permit the application of Article 41 and those which do not
permit it. It is only in a later paragraph, which the two Orders also have
in common, that a reply is found to that question. There the Court indicates
that it considers that a provision in a certain instrument emanating from
the Parties appears, prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be founded.
In the present case, it appears from paragraph 14 of the Order that the
Court has been guided by that precedent, for it there expresses the opinion
that it ought not to indicate interim measures unless the provisions invoked
by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be founded. I can agree to this formula,
which in my view signifies that for Article 41 of the Statute to be
applicable it is not sufficient for a mere adumbration of proof, considered
in isolation, to indicate the possibility of the Court's possessing
jurisdiction: that there must also be a probability transpiring from an
examination of the whole of the elements at the Court's disposal.
I have therefore been impelled to carry out such an examination. In the
event, however, I do not find it probable that the three propositions
mentioned above, or any one of them, may afford a basis on which to found
the jurisdiction of the Court. For the reason already mentioned, I find
myself, at the present stage of the proceedings, prevented from setting
forth the considerations which have led me to that conclusion and preclude
me from voting for the indication of provisional measures.
Alongside the question of the Court's jurisdiction, there arises that of the
admissibility of New Zealand's Application. As I understand that term, it
includes the examination of every question that arises in connection with
the ascertainment of whether the Court has been validly seised of the case.
But what is first and foremost necessary from that point of view is to ask
oneself whether atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons are, generally
speaking, already governed by norms of international law, or whether they
do not still belong to a highly political domain where the norms concerning
their international legality or illegality are still at the gestation stage.
[p31]Certainly, the existence of nuclear weapons and the tests serving to
perfect and multiply them, are among the foremost subjects of dread for
mankind today. To exorcise their spectre, is, however, primarily a matter
for statesmen. One must hope that they will one day succeed in establishing
a state of affairs, both political and legal, which will shield the whole of
mankind from the anxiety created by nuclear arms. Meanwhile there is the
question whether the moment has already come when an international tribunal
is the appropriate recipient of an application like that directed in the
present case against but one of the present nuclear Powers.
The Order defers the question of the admissibility of the Application, like
that of the Court's jurisdiction, to a later stage in the proceedings. I am
unable to concur in this decision, because 1 consider that the Court could
and should have settled in its present session the whole of the preliminary
and urgent questions which arise in the case and concerning which it is
incumbent upon the Court to take up a position proprio motu.
To avoid anticipating such vote as I may cast in the new phase of the
proceedings, 1 must, I feel, refrain from saying anything more on the
question of the admissibility of the Application. I do not, moreover, find
it necessary to answer the question whether it appears probable that the
Application is admissible, which constitutes one of the conditions enabling
the Court to cross the threshold of Article 41 of its Statute and indicate
provisional measures. Having already found Article 41 inapplicable in this
instance owing to the improbability that France, despite the reservation it
has attached to its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, could be held
subject thereto in the present case, I have no need to pronounce upon any
other aspects of the question of the applicability of Article 41.
(Signed) S. Petren. [p32]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE IGNACIO-PINTO
[Translation]
I am opposed to the Order made this day by the Court, granting New Zealand
the same interim measures of protection as were granted Australia a few
hours before on this same date, in the latter's case against France.
My opposition to the present Order is based on the same considerations as I
have already expounded at length in my dissenting opinion in the first
Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France). I am therefore voting against it
as 1 voted against the first Order, in the case of Australia v. France.
But before going farther, I venture to observe that the Court ought from the
beginning to have pronounced a joinder of the two cases, as some judges had
moreover requested.
For in fact, in the two requests for interim measures presented by the two
States, Australia and New Zealand, there is more than a mere analogy between
the two claims. They have indeed the same object, namely to secure from the
Court an indication that "the French Government should avoid nuclear tests
causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out" on the territory (emphasis
added):
(1) of Australia;
(2) of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands.
There is therefore identity as to the object of the claim; the litigant
cited as respondent, France, is also identical; finally there is, as nearly
as makes no difference, an identity in the terms employed in the requests.
That being so, I think that there was every reason to order a joinder and to
pronounce upon the two States' requests for the indication of interim
measures in one and the same Order.
For that reason I am also voting against the Order made today by the Court
in respect of the New Zealand request, and for the rest of the arguments I
would adduce in support of my dissenting opinion in the present case, I will
confine myself to referring to those I have already put forward in the case
of Australia v. France.
But I wish to take this opportunity of modifying somewhat, in regard to New
Zealand, what I said about the nuclear tests carried out by the United
Kingdom at Maralinga in Australia in the years 1952-1957.
The same reasoning that I followed in order to deny that Australia was
entitled to put forward its claims is likewise valid where New Zealand is
[p33] concerned. It is also necessary to refer in this connection to the
tests carried out by the United Kingdom at Christmas Island—thermonuclear
explosions, what is more—at a distance of 1,200 miles from the Tokelau
Islands, under New Zealand administration.
If therefore New Zealand considered that the United Kingdom was acting
acceptably in carrying out tests at Christmas Island, it is not entitled to
request that the French Government be prevented from exploding nuclear
devices at a site some 1,400 miles from New Zealand.
And so far as the effects of radio-activity are concerned—a subject on which
there is such eagerness to sensitize public opinion—, it is interesting to
note the following passage, taken from page 18 of New Zealand and Nuclear
Testing in the Pacific by Nigel S. Roberts, Lecturer in Political Science,
University of Canterbury, a work published at Wellington in 1972 by the
Institute of International Affairs, of which Mr. Allan Martyn Finlay,
Attorney-General of New Zealand and counsel for his country in the present
case, is the Vice-President:
"Before French testing began, a special report was presented to the
Prime Minister and then to the House of Representatives in an attempt to
assess the health hazards to New Zealand, as well as to other Pacific areas,
from the proposed French tests of nuclear weapons. The report concluded
that:
'Testing of nuclear weapons up to the present time does not and will not
present a significant health hazard to the people of New Zealand or the
Pacific Territories with which it is associated. The proposed French tests
will add fractionally but not significantly to the long-lived fall-out in
these areas. The general levels of such radio-active contamination in the
Southern hemisphere will remain below those already existing in the Northern
hemisphere. ... For New Zealand the chance of significant levels of
contamina-tion being reached is even more unlikely than for the islands in
the Pacific' " (Emphasis added.)
If that could be the unequivocal opinion of the experts in an undisputed
official report addressed to the New Zealand Prime Minister and House of
Representatives, that confirms my conviction that this second Nuclear Tests
case is also political in character. Hence I remain strongly opposed to the
Order indicating the interim measures requested by New Zealand. In making
it, the Court has exceeded its competence and it should have rejected that
request.
(Signed) L. Ignacio-Pinto. |
|
