| |
[p. 5]
The Court,
composed as above,
gives the following Advisory Opinion:
On November 22nd, 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
the following Resolution:
"The General Assembly,
Keeping in mind the discussion concerning the admission of new Members in
the Ad Hoc Political Committee at its fourth regular session,
Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
the following question:
'Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant
to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for
admission by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite
majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so
to recommend ?' "
By a letter of November 25th, 1949, filed in the Registry on November 28th,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Registrar a
copy of the Resolution of the General Assembly.
On December 2nd, 1949, the Registrar gave notice of the Request for an
Opinion to all States entitled to appear before the Court, in accordance
with paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the Statute. Furthermore, the Registrar
informed the Governments of Members of the United Nations by means of a
special and direct com¬munication, as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 66,
that the Court was prepared to receive from them written statements on the
question before January 24th, 1950, the date fixed by an Order of the Court
made on December 2nd, 1949.
By the date thus fixed, written statements were received from the following
States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United States of America. A written statement from the Secretary-General of
the United Nations was also received within the time-limit. Furthermore, the
Registrar received written statements from the Governments of the Republic
of Argentina on January 26th, 1950, and of Venezuela on February 2nd, 1950,
i.e., after the expiration of the time-limit fixed by the Order of December
2nd, 1949. They were accepted by a decision of the President, as the Court
was not sitting, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of
Article 37 of the Rules of Court. The written statements [p 6] were
communicated to all Members of the United Nations, who were informed that
the President had fixed February 16th, 1950, as the opening date of the oral
proceedings.
In accordance with Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, the
Secretary-General sent to the Registry the documents which are enumerated in
the list annexed to the present Opinion FN1. These documents reached the
Registry on January 23rd, 1950. The Assistant Secretary-General in charge of
the Legal Department also announced by a letter of January 23rd, 1950, that
he did not intend to take part in the oral proceedings, unless the Court so
desired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FN1
See p.35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of
Argentina, by letters of January 14th and February 3rd, 1950, respectively,
announced their intention to make oral statements before the Court. On
February 14th, 1950, the Argentine delegation in Geneva informed the
Registrar that the Government of the Republic of Argentina abandoned its
intention to take part in the oral proceedings.
In the course of a public sitting held on February 16th, 1950, the Court
heard an oral statement presented on behalf of the Government of the French
Republic by M. Georges Scene, Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Law of
the University of Paris, member of the United Nations International Law
Commission.
***
The Request for an Opinion calls upon the Court to interpret Article 4,
paragraph 2, of the Charter. Before examining the merits of the question
submitted to it, the Court must first consider the objections that have been
made to its doing so, either on the ground that it is not competent to
interpret the provisions of the Charter, or on the ground of the alleged
political character of the question.
So far as concerns its competence, the Court will simply recall that, in a
previous Opinion which dealt with the interpretation of Article 4, paragraph
1, it declared that, according to Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65
of the Statute, it may give an Opinion on any legal question and that there
is no provision which prohibits it from exercising, in regard to Article 4
of the Charter, a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function falling
within the normal exercise of its judicial powers (I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948,
p. 61).
With regard to the second objection, the Court notes that the General
Assembly has requested it to give the legal interpretation of paragraph 2 of
Article 4. As the Court stated in the same Opinion, it "cannot attribute a
political character to a request [p 7] which, framed in abstract terms,
invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of
a treaty provision".
Consequently, the Court, in accordance with its previous declara¬tions,
considers that it is competent on the basis of Articles 96 of the Charter
and 65 of its Statute and that there is no reason why it should not answer
the question submitted to it.
This question has been framed by the General Assembly in the following
terms:
"Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant
to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for
admission by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite
majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so
to recommend?"
The Request for an Opinion envisages solely the case in which the Security
Council, having voted upon a recommendation, has concluded from its vote
that the recommendation was not adopted because it failed to obtain the
requisite majority or because of the negative vote of a permanent Member.
Thus the Request refers to the case in which the General Assembly is
confronted with the absence of a recommendation from the Security Council.
It is not the object of the Request to determine how the Security Council
should apply the rules governing its voting procedure in regard to
admissions or, in particular, that the Court should examine whether the
negative vote of a permanent Member is effective to defeat a recommendation
which has obtained seven or more votes. The question, as it is formulated,
assumes in such a case the non-existence of a recommendation.
The Court is, therefore, called upon to determine solely whether the General
Assembly can make a decision to admit a State when the Security Council has
transmitted no recommendation to it.
Article 4, paragraph 2, is as follows:
"The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council."
The Court has no doubt as to the meaning of this text. It requires two
things to effect admission: a "recommendation" of the Security Council and a
"decision" of the General Assem¬bly. It is in the nature of things that the
recommendation should come before the decision. The word "recommendation",
and the word "upon" preceding it, imply the idea that the recom¬mendation is
the foundation of the decision to admit, and that the latter rests upon the
recommendation. Both these acts are indispens¬able to form the judgment of
the Organization to which the previous [p 8]
paragraph of Article 4 refers. The text under consideration means that the
General Assembly can only decide to admit upon the recommendation of the
Security Council; it determines the res-pective roles of the two organs
whose combined action is required before admission can be effected: in other
words, the recommen¬dation of the Security Council is the condition
precedent to the decision of the Assembly by which the admission is
effected.
In one of the written statements placed before the Court, an attempt was
made to attribute to paragraph 2 of Article 4 a different meaning. The Court
considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is
called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and
ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.
If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary mean¬ing are
ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the
Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what
the parties really did mean when they used these words. As the Permanent
Court said in the case concerning the Polish Postal
Service in Danzig (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 11, p.39):
"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted
in the sense which they would normally have in their context, unless such
interpretation would lead to something unreas¬onable or absurd."
When the Court can give effect to a provision of a treaty by giving to the
words used in it their natural and ordinary meaning, it may not interpret
the words by seeking to give them some other meaning. In the present case
the Court finds no difficulty in ascer¬taining the natural and ordinary
meaning of the words in question and no difficulty in giving effect to them.
Some of the written state¬ments submitted to the Court have invited it to
investigate the travaux préparatoires of the Charter. Having regard,
however, to the considerations above stated, the Court is of the opinion
that it is not permissible, in this case, to resort to travaux
préparatoires.
The conclusions to which the Court is led by the text of Article 4,
paragraph 2, are fully confirmed by the structure of the Charter, and
particularly by the relations established by it between the General Assembly
and the Security Council.
The General Assembly and the Security Council are both principal organs of
the United Nations. The Charter does not place the Security Council in a
subordinate position. Article 24 confers upon it "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international [p 9] peace and security", and the Charter
grants it for this purpose certain powers of decision. Under Articles 4, 5,
and 6, the Security Council co-operates with the General Assembly in matters
of admission to membership, of suspension from the exercise of the rights
and privileges of membership, and of expulsion from the Organization. It has
power, without the concurrence of the General Assembly, to reinstate the
Member which was the object of the suspension, in its rights and privileges.
The organs to which Article 4 entrusts the judgment of the Organization in
matters of admission have consistently inter¬preted the text in the sense
that the General Assembly can decide to admit only on the basis of a
recommendation of the Security Council. In particular, the Rules of
Procedure of the General Assembly provide for consideration of the merits of
an appli¬cation and of the decision to be made upon it only "if the Security
Council recommends the applicant State for membership" (Article 125). The
Rules merely state that if the Security Council has not recommended the
admission, the General Assembly may send back the application to the
Security Council for further consideration (Article 126). This last step has
been taken several times: it was taken in Resolution 296 (IV), the very one
that embodies this Request for an Opinion.
To hold that the General Assembly has power to admit a State to membership
in the absence of a recommendation of the Security Council would be to
deprive the Security Council of an important power which has been entrusted
to it by the Charter. It would almost nullify the role of the Security
Council in the exercise of one of the essential functions of the
Organization. It would mean that the Security Council would have merely to
study the case, present a report, give advice, and express an opinion. This
is not what Article 4, paragraph 2, says.
The Court cannot accept the suggestion made in one of the written statements
submitted to the Court, that the General Assembly, in order to try to meet
the requirement of Article 4, paragraph 2, could treat the absence of a
recommendation as equivalent to what is described in that statement as an
"unfavour¬able recommendation", upon which the General Assembly could base a
decision to admit a State to membership.
Reference has also been made to a document of the San Francisco Conference,
in order to put the possible case of an unfavourable recommendation being
voted by the Security Council: 'such a recommendation has never been made in
practice. In the opinion of the Court, Article 4, paragraph 2, envisages a
favourable recommendation of the Security Council and that only. An
unfavourable recommendation would not correspond to the provisions of
Article 4, paragraph 2.
While keeping within the limits of a Request which deals with the scope of
the powers of the General Assembly, it is enough for [p 10] the Court to say
that nowhere has the General Assembly received the power to change, to the
point of reversing, the meaning of a vote of the Security Council.
In consequence, it is impossible to admit that the General Assembly has the
power to attribute to a vote of the Security Council the character of a
recommendation when the Council itself considers that no such recommendation
has been made.
For these reasons,
The Court,
by twelve votes to two,
is of opinion that the admission of a State to membership in the United
Nations, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Charter, cannot be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has
made no recommendation for admission, by reason of the candidate failing to
obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member
upon a resolution so to recommend.
Done in French and English, the French text being authori¬tative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this third day of March, one thousand nine hundred
and fifty, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
Court and the other trans¬mitted to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
(Signed) Basdevant,
President.
(Signed) E. Hambro.
Registrar.
[p 11]
Judges Alvarez and Azevedo, declaring that they are unable to concur in the
Opinion of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them
by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Opinion statements of their
dissenting opinion.
(Initialled) J. B.
(Initialled) E. H.
[p 12]
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALVAREZ
[Translation]
I
On November 22nd, 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations addressed
to the International Court of Justice a highly important Request for an
Advisory Opinion to which a satisfactory answer must be given: what is
really involved is the question of the so-called "right of veto". The
discussions which have arisen in the United Nations concerning the repeated
exercise of this right are well known.
II
We have before us a case which involves the interpretation of the Charter of
the United Nations ; it refers therefore to a new question of international
law.
This case must not be decided in accordance with the precepts of traditional
or classic international law, which were established on an individualistic
basis and have hitherto prevailed, but rather in accordance with the new
international law, which is now emerging.
There is no doubt that the Court must apply the existing law to the case
which has been referred to it.
What is this law to-day? Since the recent social upheaval which opened the
greatest period in the history of humanity, profound changes have suddenly
appeared in almost all spheres of activity, particularly in the
international field. The psychology of peoples has undergone a great change;
a new universal international conscience is emerging, which calls for
reforms in the life of peoples. This circumstance, in conjunction with the
crisis which classic international law has been traversing for some time
past, has opened the way to a new international law.
The Charter of the United Nations has created several organs, notably the
General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. The former has
adopted a number of resolutions on ques¬tions, of great importance. Under
Resolution 171 of the Third General Assembly of the United Nations, the
Court was entrusted with a mission, which was not conferred—at any rate not
in express terms—on the Permanent Court of International Justice, namely the
development and consequently the creation of law.
The Preamble of the United Nations Charter indicates the new lines along
which international life has to develop; and world public opinion has
directly or indirectly given its approval to certain principles framed by
the statesmen of the Big Powers with a view to ensuring development on those
lines.[p 13]
In this way a new international law has rapidly begun to come into
existence. It has its roots in the regime of interdependence which has been
emerging since the middle of the XIXth century.
Formerly the rules of law were elaborated slowly, in accordance with
well-established conventions or customs, or these rules were evolved, again
as a slow process, by jurists. To-day, because of the social upheaval which
we have just traversed, because of the remarkable dynamism in the life of
peoples, because of the new international organization and the institutions
and organs which this organization has created, and finally because of the
aspirations of peoples and the exigencies of modern life, the elaboration of
such new rules is rapid and sometimes even sudden; this elaboration is
effected by means which are different from those of former times, and in
this process the factors which have just been mentioned exert their
influence.
The common view that international law must be created solely by States is,
therefore, not valid to-day—nor indeed has it ever been.
In truth, alongside of conventional law there is customary law, and above
all the doctrines of jurists, who not only have the opportunity of
establishing custom, but have formulated rules which have been respected by
States.
In future, it is to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the
International Court of Justice and to the jurists that we shall look, more
than to anyone, for the creation of the new interna¬tional law.
Consequently, whether in regard to old questions which assume new aspects,
or in regard to entirely new questions, the Court has to give decisions, not
in accordance with traditional inter-national law—that would be an
anomaly—but in accordance with the international law which is now emerging
and which the Court itself is able to create.
It might be said that this law is merely lex ferenda and not an existing law
at the present time ; but both these types of law coincide. In many cases,
so far as the Court is concerned, the tasks of determining, establishing and
applying the law go hand in hand.
What are the main characteristics of the new international law, and what
should be the aims of the organs entrusted with its creation?
I shall confine myself for the moment to emphasizing the point that the new
international law has not only a legal, but also a political, social,
economic and even a psychological aspect.
Its point of departure is that, to-day, States are increasingly
interdependent: and that consequently they do not form a simple community,
as formerly, but rather a veritable inter¬national and organized society.
This society in nowise abolishes the independence and the sovereignty of the
States, nor their legal equality (Article 2 paragraph 1, of the Charter);
but it limits [p 14] this sovereignty, and the rights which flow therefrom,
in view of the general interests of this society.
In accordance with the Preamble to the Charter, the new organ¬ization—and
consequently, the new law which flows therefrom— must have the following
ends in view: to maintain peace, to con¬sider the general interest, to
safeguard fundamental human rights, to promote co-operation between States,
to bring their interests into harmony, to promote economic, social,
intellectual and human-itarian progress. The old individualistic law had
none of these purposes; it took account only of the interests of the
individual considered in isolation.
I will not dwell upon all the other characteristics of international law,
but will confine myself to considering briefly the points which are related
directly to the Request for an Advisory Opinion, namely:
A.—Limitation of the rights of States;
B.—The exercise of these rights;
C.—The abuse of right, which is intimately connected with the two foregoing
points;
D.—The interpretation of treaties, in particular those which have created an
international organization.
III
A.—Limitation of the rights of States. According to classic inter¬national
law, the sovereignty of States, and the rights which flowed therefrom, were
absolute. Consequently, any State could exercise its rights without limit,
or rather, the sole limits were the rights of other States (coalition of
rights), and only rarely the general interest. In addition, each State was
perfectly free to exercise its rights, and even to abuse them, without
having to justify its conduct to anybody.
To-day the situation has changed; the notion of absolute sover¬eignty has
had its day. The general interest, the interests of inter¬national society,
must constitute the limits of the rights of States and make it possible to
determine whether there has been an abuse of these rights.
It would be meaningless to speak of solidarity, interdependence,
co-operation, the general interest, human happiness, etc., if States could
continue to exercise all their rights freely and without restriction. If
these concepts are to have any meaning, these rights must be subject to the
limitations which I have just outlined.
This limitation was recommended by the last General Assembly of the United
Nations in respect of a particular matter': in one of its resolutions, the
Ad Hoc Political Committee of the Assembly recommended that all nations
should, in the use of their rights of sovereignty, join in mutual agreement
to limit the individual exercise of those rights in respect of the control
of atomic energy, [p 15] to the extent required for the promotion of world
security and peace.
IV
B.—Exercise of the rights of States. The question whether, in given
circumstances, a State is or is not bound to exercise its rights, and in
what way it must exercise them, depends upon the policy of that State, and
policy is influenced by public opinion. But in no case may the exercise of
these rights degenerate into a misuse of right.
A State may remain within the limits of its right—for instance, a right of
passage—and yet may abuse this right if it takes advan¬tage of the passage
to obtain information on the natural resources, strategic bases,
fortifications, etc., of the State through which the passage takes place.
C.—Abuse of right. This concept is relatively recent in private law, but it
is already generally accepted. Even before the first World War, some
publicists had asked that it should be extended to inter¬national law.
Because of the new conditions that have arisen in the life of peoples, it is
necessary to-day to find a place for this concept, and the International
Court of Justice must take its share in this evolution.
What are the organs that will define the limits of the rights of States and
determine whether there has been abuse or not? In the past, no such organ
had existed, because the question did not arise. To-day, there are three
very important organs, each of which has power to act in its particular
sphere—the Security Council, the General Assembly of the United Nations and
the International Court of Justice. There are also the other organs of the
United Nations: the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council,
etc., in their respective spheres of jurisdiction.
V
D.—Interpretation of treaties, in particular those creating an international
organization. First of all, it must be made perfectly clear that the Court
has competence to interpret the Charter of the United Nations like any other
instrument, without any limitations whatever.
It has been contended that the Court was not competent to inter¬pret this
treaty. That is not correct. Moreover, the Court has already taken an
opportunity of asserting its competence in this respect (I.C.J. Reports
1947-1948, p. 61).
Legal texts can be interpreted by anyone; but when such an interpretation is
made by an authorized organ, such as the General Assembly of the United
Nations or the International Court of Justice, it presents a great practical
value and creates precedents.[p 16]
Because of the progressive tendencies of international life, it is necessary
to-day to interpret treaties, as well as laws, in a different manner than
was customary when international life showed few changes. This
interpretation must be made in such a way as to ensure that institutions and
rules of law shall continue to be in harmony with the new conditions in the
life of the peoples.
There are two considerations which support this assertion. First, we observe
that national courts, in their interpretation of private law, seek to adapt
it to the exigencies of contemporary life, with the result that they have
modified the law, sometimes swiftly and profoundly, even in countries where
law is codified to such an extent that it is necessary to-day to take into
con¬sideration not only legal texts, but also case-law. It is the same, a
fortiori, in the interpretation of international matter, because
international life is much more dynamic than national life.
Again, because of this very dynamism, the political aspect of questions is
tending to have precedence over the juridical aspect. We have a very
important concrete illustration of this tendency. According to traditional
international law, the state of war still exists between the Allies and
Germany, since no peace treaty has yet been signed with the latter State.
But this situation is considered unacceptable, and efforts are being made to
bring it to an end.
It is therefore necessary to establish a theory, a technique of
interpretation. This process will reveal great differences between the old
system and the new one which will have to be applied henceforward.
The old system possessed the following characteristics:
A.—No distinction was made between treaties: the same rules of
interpretation were applied in all cases.
B.—Those who interpreted the treaties were slaves, so to speak, of the
wording. When the wording was clear, it had to be applied literally, without
taking into account the possible consequences.
C.—When a text was not clear, recourse was had to the travaux preparatoires.
D.—The interpretation of a given text, notably of a treaty, was, so to
speak, immutable. No change could be made, even if the matter considered had
undergone modifications.
The new system of interpretation must present other charac¬teristics:
(A) Distinctions must be made between different kinds of treaties. A
bilateral treaty concerning an ordinary question, such as extradi-[p
17]¬tion, cannot be interpreted in the same way as a political treaty. Three
categories of treaties must be specially recognized: peace treaties, in
particular those affecting world peace; treaties creating principles of
international law; and treaties creating an inter-national organization,
notably the world organization. All these possess both a political and a
psychological character.
Peace treaties are dictated by material force; and those creating principles
of international law, or international organizations, are created by the
majority of the participating States, for the new signatories can only
accept what has already been done. Conse¬quently, these three categories of
treaties are not to be interpreted literally, but primarily having regard to
their purposes.
(B) The text must not be slavishly followed. If necessary, it must be
vivified so as to harmonize it with the new conditions of inter¬national
life.
When the wording of a text seems clear, that is not sufficient reason for
following it literally, without taking into account the consequences of its
application. Multilateral treaties are not drafted with the help of a
dictionary, and their wording is often the result of a compromise which
influences the terms used in the text.
In the case of the Polish Postal Service in Danzig, the Permanent Court of
International Justice (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 11, p. 39) decided that the
words of a treaty must be interpreted according to their normal meaning,
unless the interpretation would thus lead to unreasonable or absurd
consequences.
It is necessary to add that to-day the same method must be observed when the
provisions of a clause appear to run counter to the purposes of the
institution concerned or to the new conditions of international life.
There is a decisive argument applicable to this question. It has long been
held that treaties contained, implicitly, the clause rebus sic stantibus,
according to which, when the fundamental conditions in which a treaty was
made have become modified, the treaty ceases to have effect. The correctness
of this clause is so manifest that it has recently been carried over from
international to priv¬ate law.
For the same reason, it must be recognized that even the clear provisions of
a treaty must not be given effect, or must receive appropriate
interpretation, when, as a result of modifications in international life,
their application would lead to manifest injustice or to results contrary to
the aims of the institution. For, otherwise, marked discrepancies would
result between the written text and the reality; and that would be
inadmissible.[p 18]
But there is more: it is possible, by way of interpretation, to attribute to
an institution rights which it does not possess according to the provisions
by which it was created, provided that these rights are in harmony with the
nature and objects of the said institution. Thus, for instance, in its
Advisory Opinion of April nth, 1949, on the Reparation for Injuries suffered
by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice declared that,
having in view the nature and objects of that institution, it was entitled
to claim damages suffered not only by itself but by its agents in the
performance of their duties. This Court has therefore attributed to the
United Nations a right which was not expressly conferred on that
Organization by the Charter and which, accord¬ing to traditional
international law, appertains solely to States. The Court, in so doing,
created a right and, as I have already shown, it was entitled to do so.
A fortiori, the Court has the power to limit rights, or to give them an
effect other than that prescribed by the literal text where the
circumstances mentioned above make it necessary to do so.
(C) It will be necessary in future—unless in exceptional cases— when
interpreting treaties, even those which are obscure, and especially those
relating to international organizations, to exclude the consideration of the
travaux préparatoires, which was formerly usual. The value of these
documents has indeed progressively diminished, for different reasons: (a)
they contain opinions of all kinds; moreover, States, and even committees,
have at times put forward some idea and have later abandoned it in favour of
ano¬ther; (b) when States decide to sign a treaty, their decision is not
influenced by the travaux préparatoires, with which, in many cases, they are
unacquainted; (c) the increasing dynamism of interna¬tional life makes it
essential that the texts should continue to be in harmony with the new
conditions of social life.
It is therefore necessary, when interpreting treaties—in particu¬lar, the
Charter of the United Nations—to look ahead, that is to have regard to the
new conditions, and not to look back, or have recourse to travaux
préparatoires. A treaty or a text that has once been established acquires a
life of its own. Consequently, in inter¬preting it we must have regard to
the exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of those
who framed it.
(D) The interpretation of treaties must not remain immutable; it will have
to be modified if important changes take place in the matter to which it
relates.
It results from the foregoing considerations, that it is possible, by way of
interpretation, to effect more or less important changes in treaties,
including the Charter of the United Nations. That causes surprise to those
who believe that this document is unchange¬able, but such modifications are
the natural consequence of the [p 19] dynamism of international life. We
have to choose between the maintenance of texts as immutable, even if they
lead to unreason¬able consequences, and the modification of these texts, if
that becomes necessary. There cannot be any doubt as to the choice.
If the International Court of Justice were able by its judgments and
advisory opinions to establish a doctrine of the limitation of the rights of
States and a doctrine of the misuse of rights, and in addition a new
doctrine concerning the interpretation of treaties, it would be rendering
important services to international law and to the cause of peace.
VI
In view of the foregoing considerations, I am unable to adhere to the
Court's Opinion, seeing that it makes no distinction between the reasons for
which the Security Council may fail to recommend the admission of a State as
a Member of the United Nations, and because it holds that it must consider
only whether the Security Council has or has not made a recommendation.
Moreover, the Court believes that the General Assembly has not to take any
particular steps as regards the Council if the latter has not made a
recommendation. Thus the Assembly would have only a somewhat passive role.
I hold that the role of the General Assembly in the admission of new Members
is an active role, for it is the Assembly which effects the admission.
According to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Charter, the Assem¬bly effects
the admission of States which fulfil the conditions laid down in that
article, but it is necessary that the Security Council should have
recommended the State requesting admission.
Two situations may arise:
A.—The State seeking admission has failed to obtain the requisite number of
votes in the Security Council. In that case, its admission cannot be
recommended to the General Assembly. The resulting situation resembles that
which occurs in regard to the election of Members of the International Court
of Justice: in order that a judge may be elected, he must have obtained the
requisite majority both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly;
if he does not secure the required majority in the Council, he cannot be
elected.
B.—The State seeking admission has obtained the requisite num¬ber of votes
in the Council, but one of the permanent Members has opposed the
recommendation, in other words, has made use of the veto. This is the case
which we must specially consider. I think that the General Assembly may
appraise the veto.
The right of veto has been provided by paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the
Charter of the United Nations. But, if we examine the pro¬visions of
Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII to which it refers, we see [p 20] that when
this right was created the only objects in view were matters concerning the
maintenance of peace and international security. Article 24 states that the
Members of the United Nations Organization confer on the Security Council a
primary responsi¬bility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. The article thus establishes something closely resembling the
former "European Directorate" created after the Napoleonic wars, but with a
universal scope. The creation of such a body is certainly fitting and
justifiable, having regard to the primary role played by the Great Powers in
case of conflict. It is entirely natural that the Security Council should be
unable to adopt decisions in matters so grave as those of peace and security
against the opposition of a Great Power, for the latter would then be
obliged to take part, contrary to its will, in the proposed measures, and
that would be a very dangerous situation.
But the exercise of this right of veto must be kept within proper limits.
The literal text of Article 27, which established this right, is clear, if
taken in isolation; but it is no longer clear if we have regard to the
nature and objects of the United Nations Organization.
To decide that the right of veto may be freely exercised in even- case in
which the Security Council may take action would mean deciding that the will
of a single Great Power could frustrate the will of all the other Members of
that Council and of the General Assembly, even in matters other than the
maintenance of peace and security; and that would reduce the U.N.O. to
impotence.
Even if it is admitted that the right of veto may be exercised freely by the
permanent Members of the Security Council in regard to the recommendation of
new Members, the General Assembly may still determine whether or not this
right has been abused and, if the answer is in the affirmative, it can
proceed with the admission without any recommendation by the Council.
It has been argued that the Security Council is alone competent to appraise
the use made by one of its permanent Members of the right of veto, and that
this is shown by the practice which has become established. I cannot agree
with that opinion either: the General Assembly is entitled not only to ask
the Council for what reason it has failed to recommend a State seeking
admission, but also to determine whether or not this right of veto has been
abused.
According to Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly may
make recommendations to the Security Council; a fortiori it may make
observations to that Council whenever it sees fit. It is not necessary that
the Assembly should have been endowed with such a right in express terms,
for it is a necessary consequence of its powers.[p 21]
The above solution is consistent both with the spirit of the Charter of the
United Nations and with the requirements of common sense.
It is consistent with the spirit of the Charter by the terms of which the
U.N.O. has a universal role, with the consequence that all members of the
international community which fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 4
should be admitted to the United Nations; these States have a right to be
admitted.
The solution is also consistent with the requirements of common sense
because, if it were admitted that the right of veto could be freely
exercised, the result might be—as has just been pointed out—that a State
whose request for admission had been approved by all the Members of the
Security Council except one and by all the Members of the General Assembly
would nevertheless be unable to obtain admission to the United Nations
because of the opposition of a single country; a single vote would thus be
able to frustrate the votes of all the other Members of the United Nations;
and that would be an absurdity.
(Signed) Alvarez.
[p 22]
Dissenting opinion of M.Azevedo
[Translation]
I regret that I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority of the
Court for the following reasons:
I.—First of all, I cannot agree to the omission of what I consider to be the
most important part of the question submitted to the Court.
The Request does not ask the Court to say in a general way whether a State
could be admitted when the Council had made no recommendation. It refers
precisely to the case when absence of recommendation is due to specified
reasons, consideration of which would give rise to two entirely different
questions, one dealing with the dual meaning, positive or negative, of the
word "recommenda¬tion", and the other dealing with the problem of the veto.
Even though the Request for an Opinion has approached the question from an
indirect angle, none the less it clearly contem¬plates the case in which an
applicant State, which has obtained seven positive votes, has been opposed
by a permanent Member of the Council.
Even viewed from a practical angle, it must be admitted that the questions
are interdependent by application of a familiar logical method. If the
principal hypothesis is considered, and if, for exam-ple, it is decided that
the candidate can be admitted in spite of an unfavourable answer from the
Security Council, tollitur qucestio, if not, the secondary hypothesis is not
prejudged.
For that reason, it cannot be said that words or even entire sentences have
been omitted because they were redundant and did not change the scope of the
question, where they appeared only for purposes of clarification.
2.—In disregarding the reasons for the absence of recommend¬ation, one is
confronted by facts, the importance of which cannot be minimized.
Indeed, it is easy to see that the original proposal of the Argentine
Republic made no reference to a case in which a permanent Member had cast a
negative vote; the point was raised only after an inter-vention by the
Belgian delegate. Finally, the Dutch delegate pro¬posed the insertion of the
following phrase as a preamble, the scope of which cannot be neglected: [p
23]
"The General Assembly,
Keeping in mind the discussion concerning the admission of new Members in
the Ad Hoc Political Committee at its fourth regular session,
Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
the following question:"
A study of the discussions shows that many States in the Com¬mission and in
the General Assembly referred to the veto, approving or criticizing it.
Moreover, direct or indirect allusions to the same question were made in the
statements submitted to the Court.
3.—On the first question I agree entirely with the majority of the Court ;
because it is not possible to draw from the successive intervention of two
organs in any matter the conclusion that the first step, which is merely
introductory or preliminary, can be over¬looked.
I consider also that it is not sufficient to rely upon an historical element
to reverse a clear conclusion deriving from the circum¬stances. It is true
that one of the delegates called the attention of his colleagues to the
contents of a letter from the Secretary of the Advisory Committee of
Jurists, and that a decision was taken, without opposition from the
President, to insert the new inter¬pretation in the Report of Committee
II/I.
But all this would not justify the conclusion that all delegations gave this
modification all the attention it deserved, when it is well known that
(according to those who are in favour of using them) the value of travaux
préparatoires is based, for purposes of inter¬pretation, on the voluntas
legislatoris, to which no great importance is attached to-day.
4.—It is now possible to pass to the second question, which is much more
complex.
First of all, the commentator is struck by the very unusual stress put by
the Charter on the aims and principles of the Organization; by a unanimous
vote, the signatories also stressed that the obliga-tions assumed by the
Members must be carried out in good faith.
That is why the interpretation of the San Francisco instruments will always
have to present a teleological character if they are to meet the
requirements of world peace, co-operation between men, individual freedom
and social progress. The Charter is a means and not an end. To comply with
its aims one must seek the methods of interpretation most likely to serve
the natural evolution of the needs of mankind.
Even more than in the applications of municipal law, the meaning and the
scope of international texts must continually be perfected, even if the
terms remain unchanged. This proposition is acceptable [p 24] to any
dogmatic system of law, and even to those who hold that law should be
autonomous and free from the interference of forces, tendencies or
influences alien to its proper sphere.
Literal interpretation will not prevail, even through the sinister adage
fiat justitia pereat mundus. The aims of the United Nations must be served
so that mankind may flourish.
5.—Even long practice, usually a good guide in interpretation, cannot
frustrate a pressing teleological requirement. In the present case, this
practice could not be more than four years old and would not have a peaceful
and undisputed character because of the oppo¬sition raised from the start by
such States as Argentina and Cuba, and even Australia, in a very special
sense.
Precedents, whether isolated or repeated, prior or subsequent to the Request
for Opinion, cannot prevent an organ, even the one which created them, from
determining the extent to which they can be legally relied upon. In view of
the failure of such means of con¬ciliation, as referring applications back
for reconsideration, it is understandable that an attempt should be made to
find more energetic methods, but it is necessary to consider first if these
methods are legitimate.
It is always possible to retrace one's steps. For instance, the efforts of
the Argentine Republic failed one after the other, until the time when,
under the pressure of the needs which the U.N. are called upon to satisfy,
it was possible to gather forty-two votes, even though this majority was
formed only to clarify the doubts expressed by a Member of the Organization,
and even though it does not imply acceptance of the arguments presented by
this Member. However, this is no reason for not answering the question.
It is also superfluous to quote the texts of the Rules of Procedure, as
these cannot be contrary to the law, of which they are only a complement.
These texts merely confirm a practice, the strength of which has just been
shown.
6.—In the course of interpretation, one often tends to remain within the
limits of a preliminary question. This is obvious in the present case, in
connexion with the capacity of the organ taking the decision to examine the
validity of the intervention of another organ, in the first phase of the
procedure. In this connexion, one may seek to establish as a natural rule
the complete separation of activities, so as to limit the task of the second
organ to the con¬sideration of the purely formal aspect of the
"recommendation". [p 25]
For instance, in the present case, the question would depend upon whether
the word "recommendation" is used or not.
I cannot accept such a strict view, even if it is out of place to refer by
analogy to the practice of countries which, in their muni¬cipal law, apply
the judicial control of the constitutionality of laws, even to such defects
in the procedure of law-making, as an error in the right of initiative of a
particular Chamber, the absence of constitutional quorum, etc.
Only excessive respect for form will give it priority over sub¬stance.
7.—It is necessary to begin by rejecting the complete separation of the vote
and the recommendation; this is more a quarrel of words than a difference in
substance.
There are not two deliberations, or even different aims. If there were, this
would lead to an absurdity, namely, the recognition that, in spite of a
unanimous vote or of a qualified majority under Article 27, paragraph 3, the
Security Council could refuse to make an explicit recommendation, on the
pretext of a mere interpreta¬tion of its votes.
The recommendation is based on the vote and cannot deviate from it.
Therefore, it is necessary to follow closely the true ele¬ments of the
problem and not the phraseology of the document of transmission, or even the
name or title it has received, provided it contains all the elements
essential to the decision which the competent organ is about to take.
8.—As a preliminary, it must be observed that the General Assembly,
notwithstanding express (Art. 12) or implied exceptions (Arts. 5, 32 and 83,
and 35, para. 2, of the Statute of the Court), has retained a right to watch
over all matters concerning the United Nations, a right which was laid down
in Article 10 of the Charter, the general scope of which is confirmed in
Article 11, paragraph 4.
The right to discuss questions concerning the powers and func¬tions of any
one of the other organs justifies, in principle, the Assembly in considering
the validity of an act of the Security Council from which it receives
ordinary and special reports (Art. 24, para. 3). This intervention is even
more natural in connexion with a preliminary act, following which the
Assembly plays the principal and final part and therefore is in a position
to examine the entire previous procedure.
The fact that in such cases the recommendations of the Security Council are
a necessary requirement is not incompatible with their procedural character.
It often happens that neglect of certain acts of procedure having a specific
purpose make the final decision of any Court null and void. [p 26]
9.—It is evident that the Charter has granted a sort of dual personality to
the Security Council. On one side, it is entrusted with a series of
functions which it performs in complete autonomy and without interference,
and it may even take the place of the Assembly, as in the case of strategic
areas. On the other hand, it is placed on the same level as the other
deliberative organs of the United Nations.
In addition to the serious measures which the Council may take independently
of the control of any other organ, it acts, outside its own sphere, as the
preparatory agent in cases where decision rests with the Assembly. For
example, the Security Council makes "recommendations" to the Assembly, in
cases where the latter has to decide (Art. 4), suspend (Art. 5), expel (Art.
6), determine (Art. 93), appoint (Art. 97) or adopt (Art. 69 of the Statute
of the Court).
In this second field, at least, it would not be possible to consider as
applicable without qualifications the rule whereby each organ is competent
to interpret the use of its own powers as it prefers. Moreover, this rule,
which could never justify arbitrary action, flows a contrario sensu from the
same feeble source already men¬tioned, namely, the rejection of an amendment
during the drafting of the Charter. The same travaux préparatoires would
show that in this case also possible conflicts between the interpretation of
the same text by two organs had been contemplated. Should these conflicts
remain unsolved, chaos would result in this Organization, which is so
complex that it has no water-tight compartments, save in exceptional and
"transitory" cases.
Thus, even in the absence of an express text, and without even needing to
refer to the implied powers of the Assembly, it is possible to argue that
the latter has a certain autonomy in making a preli¬minary examination of
the scope of the deliberations of the Council concerning admission to
membership.
10.—Before considering the substance of the voting problem, it is necessary
to make another preliminary remark.
The Charter is based on the principle of sovereign equality (Arts. 2, para.
1, and 78), the strength of which was beyond dispute when the fifty States
signed the San Francisco document. Most of them were free from commitments
and in particular from those assumed by the Powers which had carried the
heaviest load in the fight against fascism. In any case, other nations which
had also taken effective part in the war, and even those which had preferred
to abstain de jure or de facto, could conclude agreements freely, having due
regard, moreover, to the enormous contribution made by the sponsoring Powers
in favour of the restoration of peace. [p 27]
Article 24, which is the keystone of the Charter, embodies the alienation of
their natural freedom accepted by the nations convened at San
Francisco—alienation which would have a final or perpetual character if no
provision had been made reserving the right to withdraw. The signatories of
the Pact have granted exceptional faculties to the Security Council, which,
on the other hand, has assumed duties, for the performance of which it has
required that proper, specific and clearly defined powers be granted to it.
This is the basis of a system which attempted to balance two forces which
enter into play: sovereign equality and concern for security by means of
world peace. The normal operation of the Organization rests upon the even
balance of these forces.
The concession accepted by the majority of States has led to a series of
consequences which are laid down, for example, in Articles 25, paragraphs 2
and 5, 43, paragraph 1, 48 and 49. But it also resulted in a series of
duties for the Members of the Security Council, especially those enjoying
the privilege of a permanent seat.
11.—In any case, this exceptional situation, which is the parti¬cular
attribute of the Security Council, is linked to the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of peace, embodied in Chapters VI to VIII of the
Charter. To include an exceptional case, which fell outside this field (Art.
83), it was necessary to extend to Chapter XII the reference in Article 24,
paragraph 2.
The idea of security cannot assert itself with the same strength wherever
reference is made to the action of the Council; a grada¬tion at least would
be justified in view of a text which is so import¬ant and under which such
specific powers are granted (Art. 24, para. 2; see also Art. 15, para. 1, in
fine).
It is necessary to refer to the odiosa restringenda as a tribute to this
equality. Privileges cannot be interpreted in an extensive way. It will
therefore be necessary to consider each case with the greatest care, in
order to determine whether the limits indicated above are exceeded, which
limits characterize the autonomous aspect of the Council's activity. Article
25 is nothing more than a corollary to the mandate conferred, and it cannot
therefore have a broader scope than the text which precedes it. It would
also be useless to recall the discussions and hesitations to which the
application of this text has given rise, without forgetting even the
unfailing appeal to travaux preparatoires.
But, even though such an article cannot solve the problem finally, it will
always be useful to consider the extension of the concept of "decision"
which appears in it. Does it extend to "recommendations"?
12.—One cannot expect the Charter to be a model of precision and technique,
made as it was by the hasty adjustment of separate parts prepared in
different workshops. [p 28]
Of course, any "recommendation" resulting from an act of will may range from
a mere opinion of no consequence to a determination, based on the inherent
moral strength of the organ which has given it, and on indirect sanctions.
It is therefore impossible to confuse the two species, but if, setting aside
all logical rigour, "decisions" were raised to the rank of a genus, the
specific characteristic of "recommendations" would be that they do not carry
the same degree of compulsion as laid down in various provisions of the
Charter. The two words have even been used one beside the other, in order to
indicate a difference in the strength of the action of the Security Council
(Arts. 37, para. 2, 39 and 94).
It is useless to run the whole gamut of "recommendations" of the Security
Council to discover whether or not there are exceptions falling under
Article 25. In any case, it must almost be recognized a fortiori that this
article cannot apply to "recom¬mendations" made by one organ to another,
since the Members of the Organization are not directly called upon therein
to take a certain action.
This refers merely to recommendations taken in
"the normal meaning of the word recommendation, a meaning which this word
has retained in diplomatic language, as is borne out by the practice of the
Pan-American Conference, of the League of Nations, of the International
Labour Organization".
This is what seven judges of this Court said on the occasion of the decision
on the preliminary objection in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports
1947-1948, p. 32).
13.—The really important thing is to verify whether the expression
"decision" has the same meaning in Articles 25 and 27, for it could well be
argued that, while denying that "recom¬mendations" have compulsory
character, it was necessary to apply the rule of the unanimous vote for the
adoption of these" recom¬mendations". In that case, "decisions" under the
meaning of Article 25 would not be "decisions" under Article 27, where the
same word would have a broader meaning. But to reach this conclusion it
would be necessary to depart from the literal interpretation of texts.
Moreover, the Security Council has given a first example of departure from
the letter of the texts by considering all along that abstention during the
vote was compatible with the fact that Article 27, paragraph 3, required the
vote of all permanent Members—even when the latter were carrying out duties
and acting on behalf of third parties (Art. 24, para. 1). It was considered
that this faculty was established for the sole benefit of the voter, [p 29]
and, therefore, that the latter could decide not to use it, in application
of the ancient adage invito benefitium non datur.
After all these difficulties, it would never have been possible to include
"recommendations" in the concept of "decisions", except in cases dealt with
in the chapters mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, especially when the
recommendation was addressed precisely to the organ which had to take the
only "decision" in the matter.
14.—But if one considers that "recommendations" outside the specific sphere
of the Council do not come under Article 27, what voting system should he
applied to them?
The classic rule of international law requiring a unanimous vote has already
been impaired, in the regional American agree¬ments (see Treaties of Rio de
Janeiro and Bogota, 1947/1948) ; and the Charter, too, has rejected it even
in the most important cases (Articles 108 and 109, para. 1).
The majority of seven votes could be considered by the com¬mentator as the
one which best corresponds to the system of the Charter, for the simple
majority constitutes an exception in the sole case of the election of judges
(Statute, Article 10). This solution can be reconciled with the provisions
of Article 18 requiring a qualified majority for the vote in the Assembly.
This majority, moreover, has no analogy with the case of the veto, which is
characterized as an individual privilege. In addition, Article 18 reveals a
certain hesitancy in the choice of matters requiring a 2/3
majority—budgetary matters have been included, whereas the appointment of
the Secretary-General has been left out.
In order to reach such a conclusion, it is of course necessary to extend the
sphere of analogy. But in my opinion it would be much bolder to generalize
an exceptional rule, which, as we shall see later, was' adopted with great
difficulty.
15.—If one should refuse, however, to accept any other general voting rule
outside Article 27, and if one were compelled to bring the case of admission
within the rigid framework of this text, the solution would not be different
unless, this time, one confined oneself to the literal meaning of the words.
Volume 11 of the works of the San Francisco Conference gives clear
indications concerning the Yalta formula, the adoption of which assumed
almost dramatic character. Frequent and energetic appeals by the sponsoring
Powers were necessary and more than once reference was made to the memory of
President Roosevelt. Professions of moderation, wisdom, discretion in the
use of the veto (without abuse) were made in Committee III/I.
A substantial majority which opposed this privilege finally consented to
cast a favourable vote or to abstain, not without [p 30] stating the extreme
reasons which brought about this capitulation, namely, that a high price had
to be paid for the creation of the United Nations. Some of the States even
explained that they consented in the hope that the voting procedure would be
made more flexible when consideration of the texts dealing with the
procedure of revision of the Charter was taken up. Subsequently, this hope
was also frustrated.
In accepting this abdication, the signatories of the Charter did not fail to
say that they trusted that the Great Powers would make reasonable use of the
exceptional powers which they consented to grant them.
16.—The commentator cannot overlook such elements in stu¬dying the
consequences to be drawn from the aims and principles which are constantly
referred to.
Nor is that all. At a certain time the delegations opposed to the formula
stated their objections and requested the sponsoring Powers to answer a
questionnaire. It must be noted in passing that the questions put, as well
as the amendments proposed by several countries (including France, before
she accepted the Yalta formula), confined themselves to giving the same
meaning to the word "deci¬sion" in the present texts of Articles 25 and 27
or, more clearly, to exclude from the privileged vote the "recommendations"
made under Chapter VI. In respect of powers conferred upon the Council
outside its own sphere of activity, there is no indication of any intention
of applying the Yalta formula to them.
The answer to the questionnaire assumed a solemn character; besides
constituting a fresh declaration of impartial intentions, this document is
the basis of any study of the problem.
It matters little that it was not formally voted on or that it did not have
the value of a pact. It cannot be denied that this reply was the instrument
which permitted the formation of the reluctant majority necessary for the
adoption of the Yalta formula. Several delegations made reservations as to
the terms of the document which did not give them full satisfaction,
particularly the answer to the only question retained. But it is
indisputable that the sign¬atories of the document bound themselves by
determining the true sense of the said formula. Moreover, they are
constantly invoking it and stressing its binding force.
It must be noted that this is not an ordinary element of the travaux
préparatoires, which can often lend themselves to contra¬dictory use, like a
double-edged weapon.
Four Members of this Court have already said
"Without wishing to embark upon a general examination and assessment of the
value of resorting to travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of
treaties, it must be admitted that if ever there is a case in which this
practice is justified, it is when those [p 31] who negotiated the treaty
have embodied in an interpretative resolution or some similar provision
their precise intentions regarding the meaning attached by them to a
particular article of the treaty." (I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 87.)
There is much more in the present case : a preliminary agreement was made to
break the deadlock involving a matter which is at the very heart of the
Charter. This was pointed out in Committee III/I. This exchange of view did
not result in the expression of an indivi¬dual thought, but in the
determination of the value of words, thus making possible a common
denominator or a single language.
17.—The parties were thus prepared to determine the concept of "procedure"
to which it was probably possible to give by agreement a particular sense,
which departed more or less from the usual and traditional meaning in order
to characterize an entirely new bal¬loting process.
With this determination in mind, the so-called method of "resi¬dues" was
applied, and those cases were described in which complete agreement of the
Five Powers was required; by a process of elimin¬ation there remained cases
of "procedure" chosen by an opposite process to the one which the reading of
the texts which were pro¬posed and finally adopted would lead one to suppose
(Art. 27, paras. 2 and 3).
Such is the method adopted in the letter of June 7th, 1945 (U.N.C.I.O., Vol
II, p. 754, English text Vol II, p. 711), the signa¬tories of which stated
that the Security Council,
"in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international
peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions".
They then proceeded to explain the nature of the measures to be taken in
settling disputes, removing threats to the peace, etc., by adding:
"it will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such
measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of
decisions will be governed by a procedural vote, that is, the vote of any
seven Members. The first group of decision would be governed by a qualified
vote...."
They were saying, not that questions of procedure would be submitted to a
certain quorum, but that a procedural vote would be applied to questions
other than those which entailed specific measures—which is an entirely
different thing, although the letter of the texts is deliberately departed
from.
18.—In this famous Declaration of San Francisco, the Great Powers then
showed the necessity of submitting to the same qualified vote the measures
laid down in Chapter VI: [p 32]
"This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an
investigation or determines that the time has come to call upon States to
settle their differences or makes recommendations to the parties."
The truth of this argument cannot be denied in spite of the strong
opposition which it met. Indeed, the action of the Security Council makes
itself felt only in stages, although it requires an uninterrupted and
uniform direction. It would not be desirable to start in a certain direction
and change this direction half-way. This would create conflicts instead of
solving them. Therefore, the same voting system must be applied from the
first measures taken by the Council, even if these are merely preventive.
That is why it was necessary to adopt in Article 27, paragraph 3, the
formula "decisions .... on all other matters", decisions which always fall
within the limits indicated above. The document doubtless mentions in detail
hypothetical cases of procedure by referring to the present text of Articles
28 to 32 and even to Article 35. But this is only by way of an example.
Except for this continuity, there would be no sufficient reason for
strengthening the value of the word "decision" wherever it is used. A
conflict would thus be created with the system of the Charter by extending
the formula beyond the limits of former Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals.
In the admission of new Members, the influence of security is remote and, on
the other hand, the other aims and principles of the United Nations would
undoubtedly play a role of the greatest importance. It may be recalled,
incidentally, that various States on several occasions suggested the
acceptance of all applications without discrimination in exchange for the
withdrawal of objec¬tions which had previously been raised.
In this connexion, the assimilation of the case of admission to those of
suspension and expulsion is not conclusive, particularly with regard to the
faculty which the Security Council admittedly has to restore to its rights
and privileges a State which has been suspended by the General Assembly,
because this case deals only with specific action previously taken by the
Council. On the other hand, Article 5, while reserving this action to the
field of world security, seeks to protect Members against an abuse of
authority; this protection is obviously granted in the case of restoration
of rights and privileges—sublata causa tollitur effectus. In a very similar
case, outside the field of peace, such as delay in payments, suspension of
the right to vote does not depend upon the action of the Security Council.
19.—Finally, it must not be forgotten that after the laborious vote in the
Committee the latter, on the initiative of the Steering [p 33] Committee,
concerned itself with the nomination of the Secretary-General. It was
pointed out at the time that the question should be considered prejudged in
view of the distinction which had been previously made between substance and
procedure, but it was doubtless too late to change what had already been
established and to go beyond the limits indicated hereabove.
To accept and generalize such a solution, it would be necessary to attribute
exceptional importance to one element of the travaux préparatoires which
emerged in conditions which were similar, or perhaps even worse, than those
surrounding the passage which was originally relied upon by the Argentine
delegation.
Indeed, in both cases, what was involved was a modification introduced at
the last moment and referred to only in a report by a Committee, although
this report is regarded as an integral part of the Commission's report and
was adopted at the last moment and immediately by the plenary meeting
without special comment, as happened for example in the matter concerning
the withdrawal of Members of the United Nations. It might be said that in
the case referred to by the Argentine Republic the Co-ordination Committee
and Advisory Committee of Jurists could introduce only changes in the form;
but actually Committee II/I, in view of a suggestion which might have come
from any source whatever, actually deliberated within the framework of its
own competence before its work was finished. About the same thing happened
in Committee III/I, which, moreover, simply declared null and void a
decision which had already been taken by a substantial majority in an organ
of the same rank, Committee II/I (U.N.C.I.O., Vol. II, p. 575).
20.—This is not the place to appreciate the value of declarations and
resolutions which have not received sufficient publicity, of which the
General Assembly has not been specially informed and to which the
ratification by the signatory States did not extend.
It might be sufficient to point out that the case under Article 97 was
especially provided for in the decision of June 13th, 1945 (U.N.C.I.O., loc.
cit.). It would be risky however to generalize this decision.
The critérium which was solemnly adopted to characterize the word
"procedural" was to continue to be applied to other cases, especially when
it was better adapted to them. This applies pre¬cisely to cases of admission
where the complex character of the procedure was stressed by the amendments
to the Rules of Procedure of the Council and the Assembly dealing with the
possibility of send¬ing applications back for reconsideration and with the
obligation for the Council to report in case of the absence of
recommendation.
These modifications stressed a subordination which does not appear at all in
cases where the activity of the Council is exercised in an exclusive and
principal capacity. [p 34]
21.—From all the foregoing and in particular from the special agreement
which preceded the acceptance by States of a partial restriction of their
sovereignty in accordance with Article 24 and related texts, it would seem
to emerge that the word "decision", as it has been used in Article 27,
cannot be extended to a "recom¬mendation" of the Security Council addressed
to another organ to which has been left the "decision" in a certain case,
even if the recommendation is necessary. Even if we preferred that Article
27 should exceed the specific powers of the Security Council, and go so far
as to include the case of the admission of new Members, we should be
justified in considering such a question as depending upon "procedure" after
the technique contained in the solemn explanation which the sponsoring
Powers had supplied beforehand had been laid down.
Therefore, if, in the report from the Security Council, the General Assembly
observes that the applicant State has obtained the votes of any seven
Members of the Council, it may freely decide to accept or reject the
applicant. On the other hand, if the application has not obtained seven
favourable votes, the Assembly would be under obligation to take note of the
absence of a recommendation preventing any final discussion.
(Signed) Philadelpho Azevedo.
[p 35]
Annex
List of documents submitted to the Court by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in application of article 65 of the statute
I FN1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FN1
These documents had already been transmitted to the Court in accordance with
the Resolution of the General Assembly of November 17th, 1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/96/ Rev. 3.
January 27th, 1948).
2. Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (A/520. Decem¬ber 12th, 1947).
3. Rules governing the admission of new Members (Report of the Committee of
the General Assembly) (A/384, p. 4, Septem¬ber 12th, 1947).
4. Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Com¬mission of the
United Nations (PC/EX/113/Rev. 1. Novem¬ber 12th, 1945).
5. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (PC/20.
December 23rd, 1945).
6. Records of the Security Council Committee of Experts Meet¬ings concerning
the Rules on the admission of new Members:
1946. S/Procedure 91
„ 91, Corr.I
„ 92.
„ 93.
„ 93, Corr.I
„ 94.
„ 99.
„ 99, Corr. I
1947 S/C.I/SR.96.
„ 96, Corr.I.
„ 101.
„ 102.
„ 103.
„ 104.
[p 36]
7. Records of the meetings of the Joint Committees appointed by the General
Assembly and the Security Council on Rules governing the admission of new
Members:
A/AC.II/SR.I.
„ SR.I, Corr.I
„ SR.2.
„ SR.2, Rev.I.
„ SR.3.
„ SR.3, Rev.I.
„ SR.4.
„ SR.5.
„ SR.6.
„ SR.7.
„ SR.8.
„ SR.8, Corr.
„ SR.9.
„ SR.10.
„ SR.11.
8. Report of the Security Council Committee on the admission of new Members,
1946 (Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series,
Supplement No. 4, p. 53).
9. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly on the admission
of new Members, 1946 (A/108, October 15th, 1946).
10. Records of the Security Council Meetings concerning the admission of new
Members, 1946.
Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series:
No. 1.
„ 2.
„ 3
¬ „ 4
„ 5
„ 18.
„ 23.
„ 24.
„ 25.
Security Council Journal, First Year, No. 35.
II. Records of the First Committee Meetings of the Second Part of the First
Session of the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members,
1946: [p 37]
Journal 22, Suppl. No. I—A/C.I/22.
„ 24, „ „ I—A/C.I/3I.
„ 25, „ „ I—A/C.1/37.
„ 26, „ „ 3—A/C.3/43.
„ 27, „ „ I—A/C.I/39.
„ 28, „ „ I—A/C.I/41.
„ 29, „ „ A—A/P.V.47.
„ 31, „ „ I—A/C.I/45.
„ 32, „ „ —A/C.I/47.
„ 37, „ „ A—A/P.V.48.
„ 38, „ „ A—A/P.V.49.
12. Records of the Plenary Meetings of the Second Part of the First Session
of the General Assembly concerning the admis¬sion of new Members, 1946.
(Journal No. 66, Supplement A—A/P.V. 67.)
13. Report of the Security Council Committee on the admission of new
Members, 1947. Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special
Supplement No. 3, Lake Success, New York, 1947.
14. Reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly on the admission
of new Members, 1947 (A/406. October 9th, 1947.—A/515. November 22nd, 1947).
15. Records of the Security Council Meetings concerning the admis¬sion of
new Members, 1947.
Security Council Official Records, Second Year, No. 38:
S/P.V.136. S/P.V.186.
S/P.V.137. S/P.V.190.
S/P.V.151. S/P.V.197.
S/P.V.152. S/P.V.204.
S/P.V.154. S/P.V.205.
S/P.V.161. S/P.V.206.
S/P.V.168. S/P.V.221.
S/P.V.178. S/P.V.222.
16. Records of the First Committee Meetings of the Second Regular Session of
the General Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1947:
A/C.I/SR. 59.
„ 59, Corr. I.
„ 59, Corr. 2.
„ 97.
„ 98.
„ 99.
„ 100.
„ 101.
[p 38]
A/C.I/SR. 102.
„ 102, Corr. I.
„ 102, Corr. 2.
„ 103.
¬17. Records of the meetings of the Second Regular Session of the General
Assembly concerning the admission of new Members, 1947:
A/P.V. 83. A/P.V. 89.
„ 84. „ 90.
„ 85. „ 92.
„ 86. „ 96.
„ 87. „ 117.
„ 88. „ 118.
II
I. Records of General Assembly, second special session
Inclusion of item in agenda.
Records of proceedings.
Records of the General Committee, 42nd meeting.
Records of the General Assembly, 131st plenary meeting.
Inclusion of item in agenda.
Documents.
Application of the Union of Burma for membership in the United Nations—
Letter dated 10 April, 1948, from the President of the Security Council to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations
A/533
Supplementary list of items for the agenda of the second special session:
item proposed by China—Note by the Secretary-General
A/535
[p 39]
Supplementary list of items for the agenda of the second special session :
item proposed by India—Note by the Secretary-General
A/536
Agenda for the second special session:
Report of the General Committee
A/537
Resolution.
Resolutions adopted without reference to a committee—188 (S-2).
Admission of the Union of Burma to membership in the United Nations.
II. Records of General Assembly, first part of third session
Inclusion of items in agenda.
Records of proceedings.
Records of the General Committee, 43rd, 49th and 50th meetings.
Records of the General Assembly, 142nd and 158th plenary meet¬ings.
Inclusion of items in agenda.
Documents.
Provisional agenda for the third session of the General Assembly
A/585
Letter dated 21 July from the Argentine representative to the
Secretary-Gen¬eral requesting the inclusion of items in the provisional
agenda of the third session of the General Assembly
A/586
Adoption of the agenda for the third session and allocation of agenda items
to committees—Report of the General Committee
A/653
Establishment of an Ad hoc Political Committee—Report of the General
Committee
A/715
Provisional agenda for the third regular session of the General Assembly—
Note by the Secretary-General
A/BUR/97
[p 40]
Allocation of items on the agenda of the third session—Letter dated 15
Novem¬ber, 1948, from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman
of the Ad hoc Political Committee
A/AC.24/I
Note by the Secretary-General
A/597
Reconsideration of the applications of Albanie, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mongolian People's Republic, Portugal, Roma¬nia and
Transjordan—Special report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
A/617
Special report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
A/618
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Records of proceedings.
6th meeting.
7th meeting.
8th meeting.
9th meeting.
10th meeting,
11th meeting.
12th meeting.
13th meeting.
14th meeting.
15th meeting.
16th meeting.
22nd meeting.
23rd meeting.
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Documents.
Australia: draft resolution A/AC.24/6
(= A/761, resolution A under paragraph 19)
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24./7
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24/8
[p 41]
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24/9
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24/10
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24/11
Belgium: draft resolution
A/AC.24/12
United States of America: draft reso¬lution
A/AC.23/13
Australia: draft resolution
A/AC.24/14
Argentina: draft resolution
A/AC.24/15
Sweden: draft resolution
A/AC.24/17
Bolivia: amendments to the draft reso¬lution proposed by Sweden
(A/AC.24/17)
A/AC.24/18
India: amendment to the draft resolu¬tion proposed by Sweden (A/AC.24/17)
A/AC.24/19
Burma: amendment to the draft reso¬lution proposed by Belgium
(A/AC.24/12)
A/AC.24/23
Burma: amendment to the Australian draft resolution concerning Ceylon
(A/AC.24/14)
A/AC.24/32
Draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee appointed at the 22nd
meeting of the Ad hoc Political Com¬mittee
A/AC.24/35
Report of the Ad hoc Political Com¬mittee
A/761
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Records of proceedings.
175th meeting.
176th meeting.
177th meeting.
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Documents.
Australia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Phil¬ippines: amendments to draft
reso¬lution J proposed by the Ad hoc Polit¬ical Committee (A/761)
A/771
[p 42]
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Resolution.
Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Ad hoc Political Com¬mittee—197
(III). Admission of new Members.
III. Records of General Assembly, second part of third session
Inclusion of items in agenda.
Records of -proceedings.
Records of the General Committee, 60th, 61st, 62nd and 63rd meetings.
Records of the General Assembly, 191st, 192nd, 204th and 205th plenary
meetings.
Inclusion of items in agenda.
Documents.
Agenda of the third regular session of the General Assembly—Report of the
General Committee
A/829
Report of the General Committee con¬cerning the completion of the work of
the General Assembly
A/845
Completion of the work of the General Assembly, including the date for final
adjournment—Note by the President
A/BUR/116
Allocation of items on the agenda of the second part of the third session:
Let¬ter dated 13 April, 1949, from the President of the General Assembly to
the Chairman of the First Committee
A/C.I/437
Allocation of items on the agenda of the second part of the third session:
Let¬ter dated 2 May, 1949, from the Pre¬sident of the General Assembly to
the Chairman of the First Committee
À/Ñ.1/444 and Corr. I
Allocation of items on the agenda of the second part of the third session:
Let¬ter dated 2 May, 1949, from the Pre¬sident of the General Assembly to
the [p 43] Chairman of the Ad hoc Political Committee
A/AC.24/59 and Corr. I
Letter dated 7 March, 1949, from the President of the Security Council to
the President of the General Assembly concerning the application of Israel
for membership in the United Nations
A/818
Letter dated 17 March, 1949, from the President of the Security Council to
the President of the General Assembly concerning the application of Ceylon
for admission to membership in the United Nations
A/823
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Records of meetings.
42nd meeting.
43rd meeting.
44th meeting.
45th meeting.
46th meeting.
47th meeting.
50th meeting.
51st meeting.
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Documents.
El Salvador: draft resolution A/AC.24/60
El Salvador: revised draft resolution
A/AC.24/60/Rev. I
Argentina: draft resolution
A/AC.24/61
Lebanon: draft resolution
A/AC.24/62
Lebanon: revised draft resolution
A/AC.24/62/Rev. I
Lebanon: revised draft resolution
A/AC.24/62/Rev. 2
Greece: amendment to the Argentine
draft resolution (A/AC.24/61)
A/AC.24/63
Iraq: draft resolution
A/AC.24/64
[p 44]
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations—
Australia : amendment to El Salvador draft resolution (A/AC.24/60)
A/AC.24/65
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations—
Denmark : amendment to El Salvador draft resolution (A/AC.24/60)
A/AC.24/66
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations—
Saudi Arabia: amendment to the Greek amendment (A/AC.24/63) to the Argentine
draft resolution (A/AC.24/61)
A/AC.24/67
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations—
Saudi Arabia: revised amendment to the Greek amendment (A/AC.24/63) to the
Argentine draft resolution (A/AC.24/61)
A/AC.24/67/Rev. I
Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, United States of America and
Uruguay: draft resolution
A/AC.24/68
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations —
Chile: amendment to the joint draft resolution of Australia, Canada,
Gua¬temala, Haiti, Panama, United States of America and Uruguay (A/AC.24/68)
A/AC.24/69
Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations—
Peru: amendment to the Chilean amendment (A/AC.24/69) to the joint draft
resolution of Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, United States of
America and Uruguay (A/AC.24/68)
A/AC.24/72
Report of the Ad hoc Political Com¬mittee
A/855
[p 45]
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Records of proceedings.
207th meeting.
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Resolution.
273 (III). Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations.
IV. Records of General Assembly, fourth session
Inclusion of item in agenda.
Records of proceedings.
Records of the General Committee, 65th meeting.
Records of the General Assembly, 224th plenary meeting.
Inclusion of item in agenda.
Documents.
Adoption of the agenda of the fourth regular session and allocation of items
to Committees—Records of the Gene¬ral Committee
A/989
Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items to Committees—Memoran¬dum by
the Secretary-General
A/BUR/118
Admission of new Members—Application of the Republic of Korea for
mem¬bership in the United Nations—Special report of the Security Council
A/968
Application of Nepal for membership in the United Nations—Special report of
the Security Council
A/974
Reconsideration of the applications of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mongolian People's Republic, Portu¬gal,
Romania and Transjordan for [p 46] membership in the United Nations— Special
report of the Security Council
A/982
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Records of proceedings.
25th meeting.
26th meeting.
27th meeting.
28th meeting.
29th meeting.
Ad hoc Political Committee.
Documents.
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Austria for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.31/L.9
(= A 1066, resolution A)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Ceylon for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.31/L.10
(= A/1066, resolution B)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Finland for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.3I/L.II
(= A/1066, resolution C)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Ireland for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.3I/L.I2
(= A/1066, resolution D)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Italy for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.3I/L.I3
( = A/1066, resolution E)
[p 47]
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Jordan for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations A/AC.31/L.14
(= A/1066, resolution F)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of the Republic of
Korea for admission to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.31/L.15
(= A/1066, resolution G)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Portugal for
admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
A/AC.31/L.16
(= A/1066, resolution H)
Australia: draft resolution concerning the application of Nepal for
admission to membership in the United Nations A/AC.31/L.17
(= A/1066, resolution I)
Argentina: draft resolution
A/AC.31/L.18
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution
A/AC.31/L.19
Note by the Rapporteur (revised draft resolution by Argentina)
A/AC.31/L.20
Iraq: draft resolution
A/AC.31/L.21
Netherlands: amendment to the draft resolution proposed by Argentina
(A/AC.31/L.20)
A/AC.31/L.22
United States of America, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: amendment to the draft
resolution proposed by Iraq (A/AC.31/L.21)
A/AC.31/L.23
Admission of new Members—Report of the Ad hoc Political Committee
A/1066
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Records of proceedings.
251st meeting.
252nd meeting.
[p 48]
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Document.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution
A/1079
Plenary meetings of the General Assembly.
Resolution.
296 (IV). Admission of new Members.
V. RECORDS OF SECURITY COUNCIL
Records of proceedings.
261st meeting (excerpt).
279th meeting.
280th meeting.
318th meeting.
351st meeting.
383rd meeting.
384th meeting.
385th meeting.
386th meeting.
409th meeting.
410th meeting.
413th meeting.
414th meeting.
423rd meeting.
427th meeting.
428th meeting.
429th meeting.
430th meeting.
431st meeting.
439th meeting.
440th meeting.
441st meeting.
442nd meeting.
443rd meeting.
444th meeting.
445th meeting.
[p 49]
Documents.
Letter dated 27 February, 1948, from the Ambassador of Burma addressed to
the Secretary-General concerning the application of Burma for mem¬bership in
the United Nations
S/687
Report of the Committee on the admis¬sion of new Members concerning the
membership application of the Union of Burma
S/706
Letter dated 3 April, 1948, from the representatives of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States to the President of the Security Council
con¬cerning the membership applications of Italy and Transjordan
S/709
Letter dated 5 April, 1948, from the deputy representative of the Ukrai¬nian
Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General concerning the membership
applications of Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Mongolian
People's Republic and Romania
S/712
Letter dated 7 April, 1948, from the representatives of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States to the President of the Security Council
con¬cerning membership applications of Austria, Ireland and Portugal
S/715
China: draft resolution submitted at the 279th meeting of the Security
Council, 10 April, 1948, concerning the applic¬ation of the Union of Burma
for ad¬mission to membership in the United Nations (adopted at the same
meeting)
S/717
Cablegram dated 17 May, 1948, from the Foreign Secretary of the Provi¬sional
Government of Israel to the Secretary-General
S/747 and Corr. I
[p 50]
Letter dated 25 May, 1948, from the Prime Minister and Minister for
Ex¬ternal Affairs of Ceylon to the Secre¬tary-General transmitting the
applic¬ation from the Government of Ceylon for admission to the United
Nations under Article 4 of the Charter
S/820
Report of the Committee on the admis¬sion of new Members to the Security
Council concerning the application of Ceylon for membership in the United
Nations
S/859
Letter dated 2 August, 1948, from the Ceylon Government representative to
the President of the Security Council transmitting information concerning
Ceylon
S/951
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution submitted at the 351st
meeting of the Security Council, 18 Au¬gust, 1948, concerning the
application of Ceylon for admission to membership in the United Nations
S/974
Telegram dated September, 1948, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General regarding Bul¬garia's
request for admission to mem¬bership in the United Nations
S/1012
Declaration of acceptance of the obliga¬tions contained in the Charter,
sub¬mitted by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 9
Oc¬tober, 1948, in connexion with its application for membership in the
United Nations
S/1012/Add. I
Letter dated 27 September, 1948, from the Hungarian Minister to the
Secre¬tary-General concerning Hungary's application for membership in the
United Nations
S/1017
[p 51]
Declaration of acceptance of the obligagations contained in the Charter,
sub¬mitted by the Government of Hungary on 8 October, 1948, in connexion
with its application for membership in the United Nations
S/1017/Add. I
Telegram dated 13 October, 1948, from the Government of the People's
Republic of Albania to the Secretary-General concerning Albania's
applic¬ation for membership in the United Nations
S/1033
Cablegram dated 12 October, 1948, from the Government of the Mongolian
People's Republic to the Secretary-General concerning the application of the
Mongolian People's Republic for membership in the United Nations
S/1035
Declaration of acceptance of the obliga¬tions contained in the Charter,
sub¬mitted to the Secretary-General on 25 October, 1948, by the Government
of the Mongolian People's Republic in connexion with its application for
membership in the United Nations
S/1035/Add. 1
Letter dated 12 October, 1948, from the Government of the People's Republic
of Romania to the Secretary-General concerning Romania's application for
membership in the United Nations
S/1051
Declaration of acceptance of the obliga¬tions contained in the Charter,
sub¬mitted to the Secretary-General on 9 November, 1948, by the People's
Republic of Romania in connexion with its application for membership in the
United Nations
S/1051/Add. 1
Letter dated 29 November, 1948, from the Israeli Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the Secretary-General concerning [p 52] Israel's application for
membership in the United Nations and declaration accepting the obligations
contained in the Charter
S/1093
Declaration of acceptance of the obliga¬tions contained in the Charter,
sub¬mitted on 2 December, 1948, by the Government of the People's Republic
of Albania in connexion with its application for membership in the United
Nations
S/1105
Letter dated 7 December, 1948, from the Chairman of the Committee on the
admission of new Members to the President of the Security Council concerning
Israel's application for membership in the United Nations
S/1110 and Corr. 1
Letter dated 9 December, 1948, from the President of the General Assembly to
the President of the Security Council concerning the application of Ceylon
for membership in the United Nations
S/1113
United Kingdom: draft resolution sub¬mitted at the 384th meeting of the
Security Council, 15 December, 1948, concerning the application of Israel
for admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1121
Syria: draft resolution submitted at the 385th meeting of the Security
Council, 17 December, 1948, concerning the application of Israel for
admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1125
France: draft resolution submitted at the 385th meeting of the Security
Council, 17 December, 1948, conceding the application of Israel for
admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1127
Letter dated 11 December, 1948, from the Secretary-General to the President
of the Security Council transmitting the text of the resolutions concerning
the admission of new Members adopted [p 53] by the General Assembly at its
177th meeting, 8 December, 1948
S/1170
Text of resolution 197 (III) A concerning the admission of new Members,
adopted by the General Assembly at its 177th plenary meeting, 8 December,
1948
S/1170/Add. 1
Letter dated 19 January, 1949, from the Acting Foreign Minister of the
Republic of Korea to the Secretary-General concerning the application of the
Republic of Korea for admission to membership in the United Nations, and a
declaration accepting obliga¬tions under the Charter
S/1238
Telegram dated 9 February, 1949, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Secretary-General concerning
the application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for admis¬sion
to membership in the United Nations and note by the Secretary-General
S/1247
Letter dated 11 February, 1949, from the representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to the Pre¬sident of the Security Council
con¬cerning the application of the Demo¬cratic People's Republic of Korea
for admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1256
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution submitted at the 410th
meeting of the Security CouncL, 16 Fe¬bruary, 1949, concerning the
applic¬ation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for admission to
membership in the United Nations
S/1259
Letter dated 13 February, 1949, addres¬sed to the Secretary-General from the
Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of [p
54] Nepal concerning Nepal's application for admission to membership in the
United Nations
S/1266
Declaration submitted on 10 March, 1949, by the Government of Nepal relating
to the acceptance of the obli¬gations contained in the Charter in connexion
with its application for membership in the United Nations
S/1266/Add. 1
Letter dated 24 February, 1949, from the representative of Israel to the
Secretary-General concerning the application of Israel for membership in the
United Nations.
S/1267
United States of America: draft reso¬lution submitted at the 414th meeting
of the Security Council, 4 March, 1949, concerning the application of Israel
for admission to membership in the United Nations (adopted at the same
meeting)
S/1276
Report to the Security Council by the Committee on the admission of new
Members concerning the application of the Republic of Korea for mem¬bership
in the United Nations
S/1281
China: draft resolution submitted at the 423rd meeting of the Security
Council, 8 April, 1949, concerning the applic¬ation of the Republic of Korea
for admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1305
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Portugal to membership
in the United Nations
S/1331
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Jordan to membership in
the United Nations
S/1332
[p 55]
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the. Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Italy to membership in
the United Nations
S/1333
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Finland to membership in
the United Nations.
S/1334
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Ireland to membership in
the United Nations
S/1335
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Austria to membership in
the United Nations
S/1336
Argentina: draft resolution submitted at the 427th meeting of the Security
Council, 16 June, 1949, concerning the admission of Ceylon to membership in
the United Nations
S/1337
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution submitted at the 428th
meeting of the Security Council, 21 June, 1949, concerning the appli¬cations
of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Transjordan (Jordan), Austria and Ceylon
for admission to mem-bership in the United Nations
S/1340
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution submitted at the 440th
meeting of the Security Council, 9 September, 1949, concerning the
applications of Albania, the Mongolian [p 56] People's Republic, Transjordan
(Jor¬dan), Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria,
Finland, Ceylon and Nepal for admis¬sion to membership in the United Nations
S/1340/Rev. 1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution submitted at the 442nd
meeting of the Security Council, 13 September, 1949, concerning the
applications of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Transjordan (Jordan), Austria,
Ceylon and Nepal for admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1340/Rev. 2
Letter dated 16 August, 1949, from the Chairman of the Committee on the
admission of new Members to the President of the Security Council
S/1378
Report to the Security Council by the Committee on the admission of new
Members concerning the application of Nepal for membership in the United
Nations
S/1382
China: draft resolution submitted at the 439th meeting of the Security
Council, 7 September, 1949, concerning the application of Nepal for
admission to membership in the United Nations
S/1385
Committee on the admission of new Members.
Records of proceedings.
24th meeting.
25th meeting.
26th meeting.
27th meeting.
28th meeting.
29th meeting. [p 57]
30th meeting.
31st meeting.
32nd meeting.
33rd meeting.
34th meeting.
Committee on the admission of new Members.
Document.
Letter dated 22 July, 1949, from the Director-General, Foreign Affairs,
Kathmandu, Nepal, to the Chairman of the Committee on the admission of new
Members
S/C.2/16 |
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