



## **DECISION TO STRIKE OUT**

**Case no. CH/02/11080**

**Senaid HADŽIĆ**

**against**

**THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA**

The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, sitting as the Second Panel on 4 April 2003 with the following members present:

Mr. Mato TADIĆ, President  
Mr. Jakob MÖLLER  
Mr. Mehmed DEKOVIĆ  
Mr. Vitomir POPOVIĆ

Mr. Ulrich GARMS, Registrar  
Ms. Olga KAPIĆ, Deputy Registrar  
Ms. Antonia DE MEO, Deputy Registrar

Having considered the aforementioned application introduced pursuant to Article VIII(1) of the Human Rights Agreement (“the Agreement”) set out in Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Adopts the following decision pursuant Article VIII(3)(c) of the Agreement and Rules 49(2) and 52 of the Chamber’s Rules of Procedure:

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The application was introduced on 27 May 2002 and registered on the same day. The applicant is represented by Zijad Mehmedagić, a lawyer in Doboj, the Republika Srpska.
2. The applicant complained of his inability to repossess his pre-war apartment, located at Ulica Kneza Miloša 32/6, in Doboj.
3. On 27 February 2003, the applicant informed the Chamber that he had repossessed his pre-war apartment on 18 September 2001. The applicant further stated that the apartment was completely devastated at that time. The applicant noted that while he withdraws his complaints with respect to his repossession, he would like to maintain his claim for compensation.

## II. OPINION OF THE CHAMBER

4. In accordance with Article VIII(3) of the Agreement, “the Chamber may decide at any point in its proceedings to suspend consideration of, reject or strike out, an application on the ground that ... (c) for any other reason established by the Chamber, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application; provided that such a result is consistent with the objective of respect for human rights.”
5. The Chamber notes that the applicant lodged his application with a view to regaining possession of his apartment, and while the case was still pending before the Chamber, he regained such possession. The Chamber further notes that although the applicant has been reinstated, he understandably asks the Chamber to find a violation of his rights protected by the Agreement due to the time that elapsed between his request for reinstatement into possession of his pre-war apartment and the actual repossession. He also asks the Chamber to order the respondent Party to pay compensation to him in recognition of the damage, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, suffered by him during the course of that time.
6. The Chamber recalls that under Article VIII(2)(e) of the Agreement, “the Chamber shall endeavour to give particular priority to allegations of especially severe or systematic violations and those founded on alleged discrimination on prohibited grounds”. As the Chamber has explained in the case of *Vujičić v. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (case no. CH/99/2198, decision to strike out of 10 October 2002, Decisions July–December 2002), there are presently thousands of undecided applications pending before the Chamber, and this number is growing month by month. Moreover, significant progress in the return and property law implementation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina has occurred (*id.* at paragraphs 15-16).
7. Taking into account that the applicant has been reinstated into possession of his apartment, the Chamber considers that the ongoing alleged human rights violation has been brought to an end and the main issue of the application has been resolved. The Chamber recognises that valid reasons may underlie the applicant’s request to nonetheless maintain his claim for compensation. However, in the light of the considerations discussed above, the Chamber finds that “it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application” within the meaning of Article VIII(3)(c) of the Agreement. The Chamber moreover finds that this result is “consistent with the objective of respect for human rights”, as this “objective” must be understood to embrace not only the individual applicant’s human rights, but also the Chamber’s more general mandate to assist the Parties in securing to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognised human rights (Articles I and II of the Agreement).
8. The Chamber, therefore, decides to strike out the application, pursuant to Article VIII(3)(c) of the Agreement.

**III. CONCLUSION**

9. For these reasons, the Chamber, unanimously,

**STRIKES OUT THE APPLICATION.**

(signed)  
Ulrich GARMS  
Registrar of the Chamber

(signed)  
Mato TADIĆ  
President of the Second Panel