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BEFORE: |
CHAIRPERSON: Ms.
Christine Chanet (France)
VICE-CHAIRPERSONS:
Mr. Maurice Glele Ahanhanzo (Benin), Ms. Elisabeth Palm (Sweden),
Mr. Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen (Argentina)
RAPPORTEUR: Mr. Ivan
Shearer (Australia)
MEMBERS: Mr.
Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia), Mr. Mr. Nisuke Ando (Japan), Mr.
Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (India), Alfredo Castillero Hoyos
(Panama), Mr. Edwin Johnson Lopez (Ecuador), Mr. Walter Kalin
(Switzerland), Mr. Ahmed Tawfik Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah
(Mauritius), Mr. Michael O’Flaherty (Ireland), Mr. Rafael Rivas
Posada (Colombia), Sir Nigel Rodley (United Kingdom), Ms. Ruth
Wedgwood (United States), Mr. Roman Wieruszewski (Poland) |
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PermaLink: |
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2005.03.17_Marin_Contreras_v_Spain.htm |
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Citation: |
Marin
Contreras v. Spain, Comm. 1099/2002, U.N. Doc. A/60/40, Vol. II, at
352 (HRC 2005) |
Publications: |
Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/60/40, Annex VI, sect. N, at 352 (Oct. 3, 2005) |
Represented By: |
Jose
Luis Mazon Costa |
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1. The author of the
communication is Ms. Catalina Marin Contreras, a Spanish national, who
alleges that she is a victim of a violation by Spain of article 14,
paragraph 1, and article 26 of the Covenant. She is represented by counsel,
Jose Luis Mazon Costa.
THE FACTS AS SUBMITTED BY THE AUTHOR
2.1 On 31 May 1992, the author's husband was involved in a traffic accident
in which he lost his life. He bore principal responsibility for the
accident, since he drove onto the left-hand side of the road and collided
head-on with another vehicle carrying Mr. Sanchez Gea. A witness who
travelled in another vehicle for roughly a kilometre behind the one which
caused the accident stated that the vehicle which caused the accident was
travelling some of the time along the central white line, and at a certain
moment veered completely into the left-hand lane. According to the author,
Mr. Sanchez Gea was also responsible for the collision, since he failed to
notice that over a straight stretch of road, over a distance of roughly a
kilometer, and in conditions of good visibility, a vehicle was approaching
him from the opposite direction which was zigzagging and veering onto the
wrong side of the road.
2.2 The author instituted proceedings against the company which had insured
Mr. Sanchez Gea's vehicle in the court of Caravaca de la Cruz in order to
obtain compensation for the death of her husband. The application was
refused. She then lodged an appeal with the Murcia provincial high court,
which was also denied. The author then applied to the Supreme Court for a
declaration that a judicial error had been committed. This application was
rejected on the grounds that the remedy in question is not applicable when,
as in this case, the parties only disagree on the evaluation of the evidence
by the corresponding courts as part of their judicial functions. Finally,
the author instituted amparo proceedings in the Constitutional Court for the
protection of her constitutional rights on the grounds of judicial error.
This application was also denied.
THE COMPLAINT
3.1 The author maintains that the denial of compensation for the death of
her husband constitutes a breach of her right to equal treatment under
article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant for two reasons. Firstly, because
her case was very similar to others in which, when there was any form of
guilt, however slight, on the part of the other driver involved in the
accident, the person principally responsible for the accident was
acknowledged to have a right to compensation, in pursuance of article 1.2 of
the Motor Vehicles (Use and Circulation) Act. Secondly, the restrictive
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in relation to judicial errors, has had
adverse consequences for her.
3.2 The author also maintains that there was a breach of the right to
adversary proceedings under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, since
in the appeal proceedings the court made use of arguments which had not been
subjected to rebuttal or argument. In addition, in the proceedings before
the Supreme Court, the author had not been able to respond to or comment on
the reports of the judicial bodies involved.
STATE PARTY'S OBSERVATIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND THE MERITS AND AUTHOR'S
COMMENTS
4.1 On 27 September 2002 the State party challenged the admissibility of the
complaint. On 17 January 2003, the State party reiterated its view that the
complaint was inadmissible and that there had been no violation of the
Covenant.
4.2 Concerning the violation of the right to equal treatment under article
14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, the State party points out that the author
makes no claim of a distinction based on arbitrary or unreasonable
treatment, and emphasizes that her account of the events is a subjective
one. Concerning the violation of the right to adversary proceedings, the
State party indicates that the items of information or circumstances
referred to in the ruling handed down by the provincial high court already
appeared in the technical reports included in the case file in the court of
first instance. In addition, this allegation was not made in the domestic
courts, so that it should be considered inadmissible under article 5,
paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol.
4.3 The State party points out that the reason for the complaint is the fact
that the author disagrees with the manner in which the judicial bodies
evaluated the evidence. But the author has not shown that the actions of the
judicial bodies were arbitrary or denied her justice, and the State party
considers that the complaint constitutes a clear abuse of the right to
submit complaints.
5.1 On 15 May 2003 the author reiterated the arguments already set out in
her initial complaint and added that, in addition to the articles of the
Covenant referred to previously, her rights under article 26, taken together
with article 2 of the Covenant, had been violated.
ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether the complaint is admissible under the Optional Protocol to
the Covenant.
6.2 The Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement for the
purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol.
6.3 With regard to the author's claim that the situations reported
constitute a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, and
article 26 taken together with article 2, the Committee considers that the
allegations relate in substance to the assessment of facts and evidence made
by the Spanish courts. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence and
reiterates that it is generally for the courts of States parties to review
or to evaluate facts and evidence, unless it can be ascertained that the
conduct of the trial or the evaluation of facts and evidence was manifestly
arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. The Committee considers that
the author has not sufficiently substantiated her complaint to be able to
state that such arbitrariness or such a denial of justice existed in the
present case, and consequently believes that the complaint must be found
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
7. The Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional
Protocol;
(b) That this decision shall be communicated to the author and to the State
party.
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[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the Spanish text being the original
version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as
part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.] |
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