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The Human Rights Committee,
acting through its Working Group pursuant to rule 87, paragraph 2, of the
Committee's rules of procedure, adopts the following decision on
admissibility.
DECISION ON ADMISSIBILITY
1. The author of the communication is M. W., a Trinidadian citizen and
former mason, born in 1964, who at the time of the submission of the
communication was awaiting execution at the State Prison in Port-of-Spain.
He claims to be a victim of violations by Trinidad and Tobago of articles 7,
10, paragraph 1, 14, paragraphs 3 (c) and 5, of the Covenant. He is
represented by Stephen Chamberlain of the London law firm of Nabarro
Nathanson. On 24 June 1996, the author's death sentence was commuted to 75
years' imprisonment with hard labour.
THE FACTS AS SUBMITTED
2.1 Mr. M. W. was convicted of murder in the High Court of Port-of-Spain on
28 February 1989 and sentenced to death. The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and
Tobago dismissed his appeal on 20 January 1994. A subsequent petition for
special leave to appeal was dismissed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council on 11 December 1995.
2.2 On 8 March 1996, a warrant was read to Mr. M. W. for his execution to
take place on 13 March 1996. A constitutional motion was filed on his behalf
after the issuance of the warrant, with a view to obtaining a stay of
execution. A stay was granted, pending the result of the hearing of the
constitutional motion. On 11 March 1996, the author's representative
submitted the case under the Optional Protocol; a request for interim
protection under rule 86 of the Committee's rules of procedure was issued on
14 March 1996.
THE COMPLAINT
3.1 Counsel contends that Mr. M. W. is a victim of a violation of articles 7
and 10, paragraph 1, since Mr. M. W. was detained on death row for a period
of seven years and four months between his conviction and the commutation of
his death sentence in June 1996. In his initial submission, counsel argues
that the delay in carrying out the execution would make it unconstitutional.
Reference is made in this respect to the jurisprudence of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan and in Guerra v. Baptiste,
and of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. [FN1]
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Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney-General of Jamaica et al., Privy Council Appeal
No. 10 of 1993, judgement of 2 November 1993; Guerra v. Baptiste and others
[1995] All ER 583; Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, judgement S.C. 73/93 of 24
June 1993 in Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. The
Attorney-General of Zimbabwe.
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3.2 Counsel contends that the anguish suffered by Mr. M. W. over a period
exceeding seven years, during which he constantly faced the prospect of his
own execution, combined with appalling conditions under which he was
detained in the death row section of the State Prison, amount to cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of articles 7 and 10 (1)
of the Covenant.
3.3 Counsel alleges a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c), juncto
paragraph 5, because of the Court of Appeal's failure to hear Mr. M. W.'s
appeal within a reasonable time: it is submitted that a delay of almost five
years for adjudicating an appeal against conviction and sentence in a
capital case is wholly unacceptable. Reference is made to General Comment 13
[21] of the Human Rights Committee.
STATE PARTY'S OBSERVATIONS
4. By submission received on 9 July 1996, the State party argues that
because the author's pending constitutional motion, the complaint should be
held inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. On 4
October 1996, the State party confirms the commutation of the author's death
sentence to 75 years' imprisonment with hard labour.
Admissibility considerations
5.1 As required, the Committee has considered whether the conditions for
admissibility under the Optional Protocol have been met in the present case.
It observes that the constitutional motion filed on Mr. M. W.'s behalf has
become moot with the commutation of his death sentence by the President of
Trinidad and Tobago. Accordingly, there are no further available and
effective remedies which the author would be required to exhaust.
5.2 The Committee notes that the author has sufficiently substantiated, for
purposes of admissibility, his claims under articles 7 and 10 (1), in so far
as they relate to the conditions of his detention on death row and since the
commutation of his death sentence, and under article 14, paragraph 3 (c),
juncto paragraph 5, on account of the delay in adjudication of his appeal.
These claims should be considered on their merits.
6. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) that the communication is admissible in so far as it appears to raise
issues under articles 7, 10 (1) and 14, paragraph 3 (c), juncto paragraph 5,
of the Covenant;
(b) that, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional
Protocol, the State party shall be requested to submit to the Committee,
within six months of the date of transmittal to it of this decision, written
explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the measures, if any,
that may have taken by it. The State party is requested in particular to
forward to the Committee a copy of the trial transcript and of the judgement
of the Court of Appeal in the author's case;
(c) that any explanations or statements received from the State party shall
be communicated by the Secretary-General under rule 93, paragraph 3, of the
rules of procedure to the author, with the request that any comments which
he may wish to make should reach the Human Rights Committee, in care of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office at
Geneva, within six weeks of the date of the transmittal;
(d) that this decision shall be communicated to the author of the
communication, his counsel and the State party. |
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