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1. The author of the
communication is Ramcharan Bickaroo, a Trinidadian citizen who, at the time
of submission of his complaint, was awaiting execution at the State Prison
in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. He claims to be a victim of
violations by Trinidad of articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On 31 December 1993,
his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the President of
Trinidad and Tobago, in accordance with the Guidelines laid down in the
judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of 2 November 1993
in the case of Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica.
THE FACTS AS SUBMITTED BY THE AUTHOR
2.1 The author was arrested in 1975 and charged with murder. No information
is provided about the circumstances or facts of the crime with which he was
charged. He was tried for murder in the Port-of-Spain Assizes Court, found
guilty as charged and sentenced to death on 5 April 1978. His appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago on 21 June 1979.
2.2 On an unspecified date after the dismissal of the appeal, the author was
informed by his counsel that there were nog rounds on which a further appeal
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could be argued with any
prospect of success. On 30 September 1993 FN1, a warrant was issued for the
execution of the author on 5 October 1993. A constitutional motion was filed
on his behalf in the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago, and a stay of
execution was granted during the night of 4 to 5 October 1993.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1]
The date does not appear clearly in the communication; it appears, however,
that the warrant was issued on the same day as another warrant for the
execution of Robinson LaVende (communication No. 554/1993).
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2.3 The author argues that he has exhausted domestic remedies within the
meaning of the Optional Protocol, and that the fact that a constitutional
motion was filed on his behalf in the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago
should not preclude his recourse to the Human Rights Committee. He contends
that because of the very nature of his situation, an individual on death row
whose warrant of execution has been read will necessarily invoke all
available procedures, possibly until the scheduled time of execution.
2.4 Counsel adds that to require that all last minute procedures be
exhausted before allowing a recourse to the Human Rights Committee would
imply that the applicant either wait until a moment dangerously close in
time to his execution, or that he refrain from invoking all potentially
available domestic remedies. It is submitted that neither option is within
the letter or the spirit of the Optional Protocol.
THE COMPLAINT
3.1 The author, who was confined to the death row section of the State
Prison from the time of his conviction in April 1978 to 31 December 1993,
i.e. close to 16 years, alleges a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, on
the ground that the length of time spent on death row amounts to cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. He further argues that the period of time
spent on death row runs counter to his right, under article 10, paragraph 1,
to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of his
person.
3.2 It is argued that the execution of the sentence after so many years on
death row would amount to a violation of the above-mentioned provisions. In
support of his argument, counsel refers to recent jurisprudence, inter alia
a judgment of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe [FN2], the judgment of the
European court of Human Rights in the case of Soering [FN3], and the
arguments of counsel for the applicants in the case of Pratt and Morgan v.
Attorney General of Jamaica.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN2]
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 of June 1993.
[FN3] Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 EHHR 439 (1989).
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ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
4.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of
procedure, whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to
the Covenant.
4.2 The communication was forwarded to the State party under rule 91 of the
Committee's rules of procedure on 5 October 1993, requesting it to provide
information and observations on the admissibility of the author's
complaints. No submission has been received from the State party, in spite
of a reminder addressed to it on 6 December 1994. Under cover of a Note
dated 18 February 1994, the State merely forwarded a list with the names of
individuals whose death sentences had been commuted following the judgment
of the Judicial Committee of the privy Council in the case of Pratt and
Morgan; the author's name was included in this list.
4.3 While welcoming the information contained in the State party's note
verbale of 18 February 1994, the Committee notes that the State party has
failed to provide information and observations in respect of the
admissibility of any of the author's claims under the Covenant that have not
been mooted by the commutation of the sentence. In the circumstances, due
weight must be given to the author's allegations, to the extent that they
have been sufficiently substantiated.
4.4 In respect of the author's claims under articles 7 and 10 (1), the
Committee observes that the State party itself commuted the author's death
sentence so as to comply with the Guidelines laid down by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Pratt and Morgan v.
Attorney-General. The State party has not informed the Committee of any
further effective remedy available to the author in respect of the above
claims; the State party's silence in this respect must be deemed to
constitute an admission that no such remedies exist.
4.5 The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated,
for purposes of admissibility, his claim under the above-mentioned
provisions of the Covenant. It should, accordingly, be considered on its
merits.
5. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) that the communication is admissible in so far as it appears to raise
issues under articles 7 and 10(1) of the Covenant;
(b) that the State party shall be requested, under article 4(2) of the
Optional Protocol, to submit to the Committee, within six months of the date
of transmittal to it of the present decision, written explanations or
statements clarifying the matter and the measures, if any, that may have
been taken by it;
(c) that any explanations or statements received from the State party shall
be communicated by the Secretary-General under rule 93(3) of the Committee's
rules of procedure, to the author and his counsel, with the request that any
comments that they may wish to submit thereon should reach the Human Rights
Committee in care of the Centre for Human Rights, United Nations Office at
Geneva, within six weeks of the date of the transmittal;
(d) that this decision shall be communicated to the State party, the author
and his counsel. |
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