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BEFORE: |
CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nisuke Ando (Japan)
VICE-CHAIRMEN: Mr. Vojin Dimitrijevic (Yugoslavia), Mr. Omran El
Shafei (Egypt), Mr. Bertill Wennergren (Sweden)
RAPPORTEUR: Mr. Francisco Jose Aguilar Urbina (Costa Rica)
MEMBERS: Mr. Marco Tulio Bruni Celli (Venezuela), Miss Christine
Chanet (France), Ms. Elizabeth Evatt (Australia), Mr. Janos Fodor
(Hungary), Mr. Laurel B. Francis (Jamaica), Mr. Kurt Herndl
(Austria), Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom), Mr. Rajsoomer
Lallah (Mauritius), Mr. Andreas V. Mavrommatis (Cyprus), Mr. Birame
Ndiaye (Senegal), Mr. Fausto Pocar (Italy), Mr. Julio Prado Vallejo
(Ecuador), Mr. Waleed Sadi (Jordan)
At the forty-ninth session (1273rd meeting), held on 25 October
1993, the Chairperson informed the Committee of the death of one of
its members, Mr. Janos Fodor (Hungary).
All the members attended the forty-ninth session. |
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PermaLink: |
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1993.10.29_RM_v_Trinidad_and_Tobago.htm |
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Citation: |
R. M. v. Trin. & Tobago, Comm. 384/1989, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, Vol. II,
at 246 (HRC 1993) |
Publications: |
Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40,
Part II, Annex X, sect. A, at 246 (Sep.21, 1994) |
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1. The author of the
communication is R.M., a Trinidadian citizen currently awaiting execution at
the State Prison in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. He claims to be a
victim of violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by Trinidad and Tobago.
The facts as submitted by the author:
2.1 The author was arrested in early September 1978 on suspicion of having
killed, during the night of 6 to 7 September 1978, one H.H. On 11 September
1978, the Chaguanas Magistrates Court committed him and his co-defendant
FN1, to stand trial for murder. On 6 November 1980, the author and his
co-defendant were convicted of murder in the High Court in Port-of-Spain and
sentenced to death. On 6 November 1983, the Court of Appeal of Trinidad
quashed the convictions and ordered a re-trial. At its conclusion, on 29
June 1984, the High Court once again convicted both defendants of murder.
Their further appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 July 1985, as
was their petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council (22 May 1986).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1]
On 8 April 1993, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views on the
co-defendant's communication, finding violations of articles 7 and 10,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant (see CCPR/C/47/D/362/1989).
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2.2 In July 1986, a constitutional motion to the High Court of Trinidad and
Tobago was filed on the author's behalf. This motion remains pending, but it
would appear that its determination has been adjourned sine die.
2.3 The author's conviction, as that of his co-defendant, was based
essentially upon the evidence of the principal prosecution witness, L.S. She
testified that in the morning of 6 September 1978, she had gone to the Couva
Magistrates' Court to attend a hearing. As the hearing of the case was
adjourned, she left the court with the author's co-defendant and another man
and visited some places of entertainment, where they took some drinks. Later
in the afternoon, they separated from the third man and drove to the
author's house - the author then joined them. In the evening, they drove to
a snack bar in San Juan, where the author and his co-defendant bought
further drinks. Thereafter, all three drove to the house of H.H.
2.4 L.S. further testified that both men invited H.H. to join them in having
some fun with her; she claimed that, although she became aware of the men's
intentions, she was too scared to react. They then drove to a sugar cane
field, where they tried to abuse of her. L.S. maintained that the author's
co-defendant hit the deceased in the neck or over the head with a cutlass.
While the author was holding the deceased to prevent him from escaping, she
heard the author's co-defendant fire three shots. No bullets or empty shells
were recovered subsequently on the scene of the crime, when the police
searched the field where H.H. had been killed.
2.5 L.S. further testified that afterwards, all three drove to the beach,
where the author's co-defendant threw the murder weapon into the sea and hid
a pair of trousers belonging to the deceased in nearby bushes. A search of
the beach produced the trousers but not the cutlass. L.S. added that both
accused threatened her with death if she were to report the incident to the
police. Under cross-examination, she admitted that she only reported to the
police after having been told by her father that the police was looking for
her.
2.6 The author denies any involvement in the crime. He contends that he knew
neither L.S. nor the author's co-defendant prior to his arrest, and asserts
that he was at home during the night of the crime. He further contends that
the evidence of two witnesses given during the trial would support his claim
that he was in a restaurant when the murder was committed. During the trial,
the arresting officer testified that the author had made an oral statement
to him upon his arrest, which could be understood as implicating the author
in the death of H.H.; [FN2] the author points out that when asked in court
about a cautioned statement taken from the author at the police station, the
officer was unable to produce the station diary in which such a statement
should have been recorded.
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To the arresting officer, the author allegedly remarked that the deceased
"cross my path, he got what was coming to him".
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The complaint:
3.1 The author contends that L.S. was an accomplice or abettor, and that the
judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the trustworthiness and
corroboration of her evidence. In this context, it is submitted that The
author further contends that he had insufficient time to prepare his
defence. Thus, he claims that prior to the first trial, he did not have the
opportunity to discuss the case with his attorney, which his family had
retained for him; during the trial, this lawyer's associate did not visit
the author to discuss defence statements, although the author insists that
he had been promised a visit. Similarly, prior to the re-trial, the attorney
assigned to defend him only consulted with him for a limited amount of time
on the day of the opening of the re-trial; he adds that this attorney never
visited him in prison prior to the re-trial.
The State party's information and observations:
4. The State party does not raise any objections to the admissibility of the
communication. It concedes that the author has exhausted all criminal
appeals. As to the author's constitutional motion filed in July 1986, it
points out that since this motion merely seeks a declaration that should an
order for the author's execution be made, he must be given five day's
notice, and as this question has already been solved in the affirmative in
another case, "... this action is unnecessary". The State party adds that
this motion is the only matter which remains pending in court, and that
assurances have been given not to execute the author pending its
determination. Finally, the State party notes that the author currently
benefits from legal representation.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee:
5.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
5.2 As to the author's claim of unfair trial, because of the court's
evaluation of the evidence, in particular the testimony of the main
prosecution witness and the alleged inadequacy of the judge's instructions
to the jury, the Committee reaffirms that it is generally for the appellate
courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a
particular case. It is not in principle for the Committee to review specific
instructions to thejury by the judge, unless it can be ascertained that the
instructions were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or
that the trial judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality.
After careful consideration of the material before it, the Committee cannot
conclude that the conduct of the trial or the judge's instructions suffered
from such defects. Accordingly, this part of the communication is
inadmissible as incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, under
article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
5.3 As to the author's claim that he had insufficient time to prepare the
defence for his first trial and re-trial, the Committee's concern is only
with the re-trial, as the conviction in the first trial had been quashed.
Concerning the re-trial, the author has failed to substantiate his claim
that the time available for consultation with his attorney prior to it
prevented counsel or himself from adequately conducting the defence.
Furthermore, the material before the Committee does not reveal that an
adjournment of the re-trial was requested because of insufficient time for
the preparation of the defence. In the circumstances, the Committee
concludes that the author has no claim under the Covenant, within the
meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) that the communication is inadmissible under articles 2 and 3 of the
Optional Protocol;
(b) that this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the
author of the communication.
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