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1. The author of the
communication is Henricus A.G.M. Brinkhof, a citizen of the Netherlands born
on 1 January 1962, residing at Erichem, the Netherlands. He is a
conscientious objector to both military service and substitute civilian
service and claims to be the victim of a violation by the Government of the
Netherlands of articles 6, 7, 8, 14, 18 and 26 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. He is represented by counsel.
2.1 The author did not report for his military service on a specified day.
He was arrested and brought to the military barracks, where he refused to
obey orders to accept a military uniform and equipment on the ground that he
objected to military service and substitute public service as a consequence
of his pacifist convictions. On 21 May 1987, he was found guilty of
violating articles 23 and 114 of the Military Penal Code (Wetboek van
Militair Strafrecht) and article 27 of the Penal Code (Wetboek van
Strafrecht) by the Arnhem Military Court (Arrondissementskrijgsraad) and
sentenced to six months' imprisonment and dismissal from military service.
2.2 Both the author and the Public Prosecutor appealed to the Supreme
Military Court (Hoog Militair Gerechtshof) which, on 26 August 1987, found
the author guilty of violating articles 23 and 114 of the Military Penal
Code and sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment and dismissal from
military service. On 17 May 1988, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) rejected the
author's appeal.
The complaint:
3.1 The author contends that whereas article 114 of the Military Penal Code,
on which his conviction was based, applies to disobedient soldiers, it does
not apply to conscientious objectors, as they cannot be considered to be
soldiers. He claims, therefore, that his refusal to obey military orders was
not punishable by law.
3.2 The Supreme Military Court rejected the author's argument and, noting
that article 114 of the Military Penal Code did not differentiate between
conscientious objections and other objections to military service,
considered article 114 applicable.
3.3 The author also alleges a violation of article 26 of the Covenant, on
the grounds that while conscientious objectors may be prosecuted under the
Military Penal Code, Jehovah's Witnesses may not.
3.4 The Supreme Military Court dismissed this argument, stating that
Jehovah's Witnesses, unlike conscientious objectors, are not required to do
military service, and thus cannot commit offences under the Military Penal
Code. The Supreme Military Court further considered that it was not
competent to examine the draft policy of the Netherlands Government.
3.5 The author further alleges that the proceedings before the courts
suffered from various procedural defects, notably that the courts did not
correctly apply international law.
3.6 The author's defence was based on the argument that by performing
military service, he would become an accessory to the commission of crimes
against peace and the crime of genocide, as he would be forced to
participate in the preparation for the use of nuclear weapons. In this
context, the author regards the strategies of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) as well as the militaryoperational plans based on them,
which envisage resort to nuclear weapons in armed conflict, as a conspiracy
to commit a crime against peace and/or the crime of genocide.
3.7 According to the author, if the NATO strategy is meant to be a credible
deterrent, it must imply that political and military leaders are prepared to
use nuclear weapons in armed conflict. The author states that the use of
nuclear weapons is unlawful.
3.8 The Supreme Military Court rejected the author's line of defence. It
held that the question of the author's participation in a conspiracy to
commit genocide or a crime against peace did not arise, as the international
rules and principles invoked by the author do, in the view of the Court, not
concern the issue of the deployment of nuclear weapons and likewise the
conspiracy does not occur, since the NATO doctrine does not automatically
imply use without further consultations.
3.9 The author further alleges that the Supreme Military Court was not
impartial within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. He
explains that the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Court were
highranking members of the armed forces who, given their professional
background, could not be expected to hand down an impartial verdict.
Furthermore, the civilian members of the Supreme Military Court had served
in the highest ranks of the armed forces during their professional careers.
3.10 The author also invoked the defence of force majeure, because, as a
conscientious objector to any form of violence he could not act in any other
way than he did. By prosecuting him, the State party has violated his right
to freedom of conscience.
3.11 The Supreme Military Court rejected this defence by referring to the
Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service, under which the author
could have applied for substitute civilian service. According to the author,
however, his conscience prevents him from filing a request under the Act on
Conscientious Objection to Military Service.
3.12 Finally, the author alleges another violation of article 26 of the
Covenant, on the ground that the Military Penal Code, unlike the Penal Code,
makes no provisions for an appeal against the summons. According to the
author, it is inconceivable that civilians who become soldiers should be
discriminated visàvis other civilians.
The State party's observations and author's clarifications:
4.1 The State party notes that a State's right to require its citizens to
perform military service, or substitute service in the case of conscientious
objectors whose grounds for objection are recognized by the State, is, as
such, not contested. Reference is made to article 8, paragraph 3(c)(ii), of
the Covenant.
4.2 The State party states that Jehovah's Witnesses have been exempted from
military service since 1974. Amendments to the Conscription Act, which are
being prepared in order to make provision for the hearing of "total
objectors", continue to provide for the exemption of Jehovah's Witnesses. In
the view of the Government, membership of Jehovah's Witnesses constitutes
strong evidence that the objections to military service are based on genuine
religious convictions. Therefore, they automatically qualify for exemption.
However, this does not exclude the possibility for other individuals to
invoke the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service.
4.3 The Government takes the view that the independence and impartiality of
the Supreme Military Court in the Netherlands is guaranteed by the following
procedures and provisions:
(a) The president and the member jurist of the Supreme Military Court are
judges in the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) in The Hague, and remain
president and member jurist as long as they are members of the Court of
Appeal;
(b) The military members of the Supreme Military Court are appointed by the
Crown. They are discharged after reaching 70 years of age;
(c) The military members of the Supreme Military Court do not hold any
function in the military hierarchy. Their salaries are paid by the Ministry
of Justice;
(d) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court have to take
an oath before they take up their appointment. They swear or vow to act in a
fair and impartial way;
(e) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court do not owe
any obedience nor are they accountable to any one regarding their decisions;
(f) As a rule the sessions of the Supreme Military Court are public.
4.4 The State party points out that national and international judgements
have confirmed the impartiality and independence of the military courts in
the Netherlands. Reference is made to the Engel Case of the European Court
of Human Rights [FN1] and to the judgement of the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands of 17 May 1988.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1]
See European Court of Human Rights, series A, Vol. 22, page 37, para. 89.
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4.5 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State party
claims that the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service (Wet
Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst) is an effective remedy to insuperable
objections to military service. The State party contends that as the author
has not invoked the Act, he has thus failed to exhaust domestic remedies.
4.6 With regard to the alleged violation concerning the absence of a right
to appeal against the initial summons, the Government refers to the decision
on admissibility by the Human Rights Committee in respect of communications
Nos. 267/1987 and 245/1987, which raised the same issue. The Government
therefore submits that this part of the present communication should be
deemed inadmissible.
4.7 The State party contends that the other elements of the applicant's
communication are unsubstantiated. It concludes that the author has no claim
under article 2 of the Optional Protocol and that his communication should
accordingly be declared inadmissible.
5.1 In his reply to the State party's observations the author claims that
the Conscientious Objection Act has a limited scope and that it may be
invoked only by conscripts who meet the requirements of section 2 of the
Act. The author rejects the assertion that section 2 is sufficiently broad
to cover the objections maintained by "total objectors" to conscription and
substitute civilian service. He argues that the question is not whether the
author should have invoked the Conscientious Objection Act, but whether the
State party has the right to force the author to become an accomplice to a
crime against peace by requiring him to do military service.
5.2 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author explains
that he was convicted by the court of first instance and that his appeals to
the Supreme Military Court and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands were
rejected. He argues, therefore, that the requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies has been fully complied with.
5.3 With regard to the State party's proposed amendments to the Conscription
Act, the author claims that they are to be withdrawn.
5.4 The author contends that the State party cannot claim that the European
Court of Human Rights has confirmed the impartiality and independence of the
Netherlands court martial procedure (Military Court).
The Committee's admissibility decision:
6.1 During its 44th session the Committee considered the admissibility of
the communication. It considered that, since the author had been convicted
for his refusal to obey military orders and his appeal against his
conviction had been dismissed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the
communication met the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the
Optional Protocol.
6.2 The Committee considered that the author's contention that the Court had
misinterpreted the law and wrongly convicted him, as well as his claims
under articles 6 and 7 were inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional
Protocol. As regards the author's claim that his rights under article 26 of
the Covenant were violated since the Military Penal Code, unlike the Penal
Code, made no provisions for an appeal against the summons, the Committee
referred to its jurisprudence in cases Nos. 245/1987 and 267/1987 [FN2], and
considered that the scope of article 26 could not be extended to cover
situations such as the one encountered by the author; this part of the
communication was therefore declared inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN2]
R.T.Z. v. the Netherlands , declared inadmissible on 5 November 1987, and
M.J.G. v. the Netherlands , declared inadmissible on 24 March 1988.
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6.3 The Committee decided that the author's allegation regarding the
differentiation in treatment between Jehovah's Witnesses and conscientious
objectors to military and substitute service in general should be examined
on the merits.
6.4 The Committee considered that the author's other claims were not
substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, and therefore inadmissible
under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.5 Accordingly, on 25 March 1992, the Committee declared the communication
admissible in so far as the differentiation in treatment between Jehovah's
Witnesses and conscientious objectors in general might raise issues under
article 26 of the Covenant.
The State party's submission on the merits and author's comments:
7.1 In its submission, dated 20 November 1992, the State party argues that
the distinction between Jehovah's witnesses and other conscientious
objectors to military service is based on objective and reasonable criteria.
7.2 The State party explains that, according to the relevant legal
regulations, postponement of initial training can be granted in specific
cases where special circumstances exist. A Jehovah's Witness who is eligible
for military service is as a rule granted postponement of initial training
if his community provides the assurance that he is a baptised member. The
State party submits that this postponement is withdrawn, if the community
informs the Ministry of Defence that the individual concerned no longer is a
full member of the community. If the grounds for granting postponement
continue to apply, his eligibility for military service will expire when the
individual reaches the age of 35.
7.3 To explain the special treatment for Jehovah's Witnesses, the State
party states that baptised members form a closed group of people who are
obliged, on penalty of expulsion, to observe strict rules of behaviour,
applicable to many aspects of their daily life and subject to strict
informal social control. According to the State party, one of these rules
prohibits the participation in any kind of military or substitute service,
while another obliges members to be permanently available for the purpose of
spreading the faith.7.4 The State party concludes that the different
treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses does not constitute discrimination against
the author, since it is based on reasonable and objective criteria. In this
connection, it refers to the case law of the European Commission on Human
Rights FN3. The State party moreover argues that the author has not
substantiated that he is in a situation comparable to that of Jehovah's
Witnesses.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN3]
European Commission on Human Rights, case No. 10410/83, Norenius v. Sweden ,
decision of 11 October 1984, and case No. 14215/88, Brinkhof v. the
Netherlands , decision of 13 December 1989.
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8. In his comments, dated 25 January 1993, on the State party's submission,
the author argues that, while the State party accepts membership of
Jehovah's Witnesses as sufficient evidence that their objection to military
and substitute service is sincere, it does not recognize the unsurmountable
objections of other persons which are based on equally strong and genuine
convictions. The author argues that the State party, by exempting Jehovah's
Witnesses from military and substitute service, protects them against
punishment by their own organisation, while it sends other total objectors
to prison. He further argues that the preparedness of total objectors to go
to prison constitutes sufficient evidence of the sincerity of their
objections and contends that the differentiation in treatment between
Jehovah's Witnesses and other conscientious objectors amounts to
discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant.
Examination of merits:
9.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in
the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as
provided in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.
9.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the differentiation in
treatment as regards exemption from military service between Jehovah's
Witnesses and other conscientious objectors amounts to prohibited
discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee has noted the
State party's argument that the differentiation is based on reasonable and
objective criteria, since Jehovah's Witnesses form a closely-knit social
group with strict rules of behaviour, membership of which is said to
constitute strong evidence that the objections to military and substitute
service are based on genuine religious convictions. The Committee notes that
there is no legal possibility for other conscientious objectors to be
exempted from the service altogether; they are required to do substitute
service; when they refuse to do this for reasons of conscience, they are
prosecuted and, if convicted, sentenced to imprisonment.
9.3 The Committee considers that the exemption of only one group of
conscientious objectors and the inapplicability of exemption for all others
cannot be considered reasonable. In this context, the Committee refers to
its General Comment on article 18 and emphasizes that, when a right of
conscientious objection to military service is recognized by a State
party,no differentiation shall be made among conscientious objectors on the
basis of the nature of their particular beliefs. However, in the instant
case, the Committee considers that the author has not shown that his
convictions as a pacifist are incompatible with the system of substitute
service in the Netherlands or that the privileged treatment accorded to
Jehovah's Witnesses adversely affected his rights as a conscientious
objector against military service. The Committee therefore finds that Mr.
Brinkhof is not a victim of a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.
9.4 The Committee, however, is of the opinion that the State party should
give equal treatment to all persons holding equally strong objections to
military and substitute service, and it recommends that the State party
review its relevant regulations and practice with a view to removing any
discrimination in this respect. |
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