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The Committee
against Torture, established under Article 17 of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Meeting on 10 November 2008,
Having concluded its consideration of complaint No. 316/2007, submitted to
the Committee against Torture under article 22 of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Having taken into account all information made available to it by the
complainant, his counsel and the State party,
Adopts the following decision under article 22, paragraph 7, of the
Convention against Torture.
1.1 The complaint is submitted by L. J. R., a citizen of the United States
born in 1971. When the complaint was submitted, L. J. R. was in prison in
Australia and an extradition order to the United States of America was
pending against him. He claimed that his extradition to the United States,
would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
1.2 By letter dated 10 January 2008, the State party informed the Committee
that the complainant had been surrendered to the United States on 9 January
2008.
The Facts as Presented by the Complainant
2.1 The complainant was arrested in Orange, New South Wales, Australia, on
19 September 2002 under a provisional arrest warrant. On 12 November 2002,
the Minister for Justice and Customs received an extradition request from
the USA in relation to one count of murder allegedly committed by the
complainant in May 2002, as he was the subject of a felony complaint before
the Superior Court of California, San Bernardino, Barstow District. The
request indicated that, pursuant to Article V of the Treaty on Extradition
between Australia and the USA, the District Attorney would not seek or
impose the death penalty on the complainant. In December 2002, a magistrate
determined that the complainant was eligible for surrender and committed him
to prison pending the completion of the extradition proceedings.
2.2 The complainant unsuccessfully challenged the magistrate's decision or
his eligibility to surrender in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the
Full Court of the Federal Court, and the High Court. At issue, inter alia,
was the application of s. 22(3) of the Extradition Act of 1988, under which
the eligible person can only be surrendered in relation to a qualifying
extradition offence if, inter alia:
(a) the Attorney-General is satisfied that there is no extradition objection
in relation to the offence;
(b) the Attorney-General is satisfied that, on surrender to the extradition
country, the person will not be subjected to torture;
(c) where the offence is punishable by a penalty of death-by virtue of an
undertaking given by the extradition country to Australia, one of the
following is applicable:
(i) the person will not be tried for the offence;
(ii) if the person is tried for the offence, the death penalty will not be
imposed on the person;
(iii) if the death penalty is imposed on the person, it will not be carried
out.
2.3 Before the Federal Court, the complainant, inter alia, claimed that he
would be subjected to torture in California, and that his trial would be
prejudiced because of race and religion, as he was a Hispanic-Muslim. He
alleged that the US law enforcement authorities had intentionally released
prejudicial pre-trial publicity against him. In particular, he referred to
the America's Most Wanted programme, featuring his case, which identified
him as the deceased's killer, and to discussion about his case in on-line
chat rooms created in California, which demonstrated that the local
population was hostile towards him.
2.4 The adverse publicity had been obtained by prison guards in Australia
and released to other inmates. This had led to him being physically and
sexually assaulted by prison guards and other prisoners on numerous
occasions over a 12 month period while detained at Long Bay prison. In
particular, he claims that he was poisoned by unknown persons; burned with
hot water by other prisoners; hit over the head by other prisoners and then
dragged; his cell bed was defecated on by police dogs; he was forced to
strip naked and pose as a statue; threatened by a prison guard to be placed
into an area with violent inmates. After one incident, he was hit and had to
be given stitches to the head, as documented in hospital records. In
December 2003 he was transferred to the Silverwater Remand Centre. In April
2004, after he was called a "piece of shit" by a prison guard, he filed a
formal complaint. As a result, he was beaten by a group of guards. He
reported another incident of beatings by prison guards which occurred in
January 2005.
2.5 According to the complainant, these alleged attacks demonstrated the
likelihood that he would be treated similarly in a US prison, which would
amount to torture under s. 22(3)(b) of the Extradition Act. He also provided
written submissions regarding prison conditions in California, including the
high rate of HIV infection. The risk of him contracting HIV or hepatitis C
was very high, due to the adverse publicity his case had received, rendering
him more vulnerable to physical and sexual assaults. Furthermore, he
provided documents as evidence of racial segregation and discrimination in
the Californian prison system.
2.6 The complainant also claims that he risked being placed in solitary
confinement, sentenced to death, despite the assurances given, and being
subjected to a lengthy period of detention on death row. The District
Attorney in California had specified that based on the facts, he would be
seeking a First Degree Murder verdict from the jury for wilful, deliberate
and premeditated murder, which carries a sentence of twenty-five years to
life in prison.
2.7 The Embassy of the US provided diplomatic assurances on 28 February
2005, stating that, based on the information provided by the Deputy District
Attorney, the US "assures the government of Australia that the death penalty
will not be sought or imposed" against the complainant. A further assurance
was given by the new District Attorney in California later in 2005, which
stated that the District Attorney's Office "will not seek to impose the
death penalty on [L. J. R.] on the instant matter". The complainant claimed
that as it is the jury which makes a decision as to the death penalty, even
without an express endorsement of the prosecutor or judge, the assurances
were irrelevant. A 'special circumstance', namely that the murder was
committed during an offence of kidnapping, means that the penalty in his
case could be death.
2.8 The complainant indicates that he is a Hispanic-Muslim accused of
killing a white woman in Barstow, a predominantly white conservative
community of San Bernardino County, largely made of Anglo-Christians. There
is also a large presence of the military in Barstow, as it is very close to
the Yermo Marine base, where he and the deceased person worked. The
accusations against him, including information on his previous military
convictions, were given extended coverage in local newspapers, radio and
television. Hispanics and Muslims are significantly underrepresented and
systematically excluded from jury service in Barstow. Furthermore, they are
discriminated against in the community and there is a systematic pattern of
incitement for hate crimes against them.
2.9 The complainant claims that, while investigating the murder in question,
the police searched his house. As the search did not yield any result, he
was taken to the Sheriff's station for questioning. He was then handcuffed,
put into an unmarked police car and driven to a remote site where he was
assaulted in order to obtain information about the murder. The extradition
request indicated that there were marks of injuries in his body when he was
arrested by the police and implied that such injuries where the result of
the struggle with the deceased person. However, there was nothing in the
autopsy report allowing the conclusion that such a struggle had taken place.
2.10 In support of his allegations that torture is widespread in the US, the
complainant alleges that between December 1998 and February 2000, when he
was in the Army, he was held in a military prison on counts of disobedience
to the military authorities, and tortured. As a result, several military
guards were reprimanded and one was relieved of duty.
2.11 After the dismissal of the complainant's appeal by the Federal Court,
on 16 June 2004, the Minister for Justice and Customs signed, on 31 August
2006, the surrender warrant. On 21 December 2006, the Federal Court
dismissed the complainant's application for review of the Minister's
decision. The Court deemed, inter alia, that it was not for it to determine
whether the complainant might be tortured or whether the complainant could
mount a successful extradition objection based on his race or religion.
These were matters to be considered by the Minister. In that respect, no
reviewable error by the Minister had been demonstrated.
2.12 In its decision on a further appeal, dated 9 August 2007, the Federal
Court indicated that, under section 22(3)(b) of the Extradition Act, the
Minister for Justice and Customs must be satisfied that, on surrender to the
extradition country, the person will not be subjected to torture. The
Minister concluded that the materials provided by the complainant did not
establish that the conditions in the United States prisons were such that
they should be regarded as cruel or inhumane or to involve degrading
treatment or punishment. In short, they did not establish that the treatment
of prisoners amounted to torture. The Court held that it was not for it to
determine whether L. J. R. might be tortured and that, in any event,
mistreatment or abuse in prison did not amount to torture.
The Complaint
3.1 The complainant claims that his extradition to the United States would
constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention. He claims to have
exhausted all domestic remedies, including a complaint with the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission of Australia (HREOC).
3.2 He also claims that while being held in Australian prisons, he was
subjected to treatment amounting to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment by other inmates or by prison guards. However, he
does not invoke particular articles of the Convention. In the context of his
opposition to the extradition, he addressed these claims to the Federal
Court, New South Wales District. He also addressed them to HREOC.
State Party's Observations on Admissibility and Merits
4.1 On 29 November 2007, the State party provided observations on
admissibility and merits. It submits that the allegations made in relation
to article 3 should be ruled inadmissible as manifestly unfounded in
accordance with rule 107(b) of the Committee's rules of procedure. In the
alternative, the State party submits that the allegations should be
dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that the communication is
incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to article
22(2) of the Convention and rule 107(c) of the rules of procedure. Further,
the State party submits that there is no evidence to support the
complainant's allegations with regard to article 3 and that the allegations
are therefore without merit.
4.2 Regarding the complainant's allegations of torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment in Australian prisons, they should be
declared inadmissible for being manifestly unfounded in accordance with rule
107(b) of the rules of procedure. As there is no evidence to support them,
they are without merit.
4.3 As for the complainant's allegations that he will not receive a fair
trial in the United States because of his race and religion, they fall
outside the Committee's mandate. Accordingly, they should be declared
inadmissible as incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.
4.4 The State party submits that, in addition to proving that an act would
constitute torture under the CAT, in order to show that a State party would
be in breach of its non-refoulement obligations under article 3, an
individual must be found to be personally at risk of such treatment. It is
not sufficient to show that there is a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights occurring in the receiving state.
Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned
would be personally at risk. The onus of proving that there is a
foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture upon
extradition or deportation rests on the applicant. The risk need not be
highly probable, but it must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere
theory and suspicion.
4.5 The State party submits that the complainant has not provided sufficient
evidence in substantiation of his claim that, by extraditing him, Australia
will breach article 3 of the Convention. He simply asserts that there is
racial segregation, violence and a high level of disease in Californian
prisons and that prisoners are subjected to solitary confinement and police
brutality, without providing credible evidence to support these assertions.
The communication does not provide any credible evidence that there is a
"consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights"
in the U.S.
4.6 The complainant's argument appears to be that there is such a degree of
certainty that all inmates will be subjected to alleged ill-treatment that,
undoubtedly, he personally will be subjected to that treatment after
extradition. However, even the unreliable statistics cited in the complaint
do not demonstrate any certainty that a prisoner in the United States will
be subjected to the alleged treatment. There is thus no evidence in the case
demonstrating that the complainant would be subjected to a foreseeable, real
and personal risk of the alleged treatment if extradited.
4.7 The treatment and conditions that the complainant asserts he will face
if extradited to the USA, even if proven, would not amount to torture under
the definition in article 1 of the Convention. Nor does the communication
demonstrate that any pain or suffering would be intentionally inflicted upon
him for one of the reasons set out in article 1 of the Convention, or would
be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official, or person acting in an official capacity. Accordingly,
the State party submits that the complaint is inadmissible as incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention.
4.8 The State party submits that the complaint does not even on a prima
facie base substantiate the allegation that the complainant will be
segregated from persons of other racial backgrounds in a Californian prison,
or that this would constitute torture under the Convention. In the
alternative, it submits that this allegation is inadmissible as incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention. Even if the allegation of racial
segregation were proven, it would not amount to torture under the
Convention. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that by extraditing the
complainant to the United States, where he may be segregated from prisoners
of other racial backgrounds for a period, he would be in danger of torture.
There is no evidence to suggest either that the policy of racial segregation
in Californian prisons was intended to inflict severe pain and suffering for
reasons based on racial discrimination. It therefore does not constitute
torture under the Convention. There is no evidence to suggest that the
intention of the policy of segregation in prisons is anything other than
preventing violence.
4.9 Regarding the allegation that the complainant would be exposed to
violence and sexual assault in prison, there is no evidence that he would be
personally at risk of such violence. Furthermore, such violence would not
amount to torture under article 1, given the lack of any requisite intent.
There is no evidence in the complainant's submissions or otherwise to
suggest that the conditions in Californian prisons amount to
"institutionalised torture by government authorities". There is no evidence
either to indicate that the complainant would be personally or particularly
at risk of being the victim of sexual violence. The State party is not aware
of any evidence that there is a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights occurring in Californian prisons. The Human
Rights Committee, in its concluding observations to the United States'
reports under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1995 and 2006, did not express concern that violence amongst or towards the
prison population in the United States may amount to torture. [FN1]
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[FN1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement
No. 40 (A/50/40), paras. 266-304; ibid., Sixty-first Session, Supplement No.
40 (A/61/40), para.84.
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4.10 The Committee against Torture expressed concern in its concluding
observations of 2000 on the report of the United States about ill-treatment
in prisons. However, the Committee used the term "ill-treatment" and not
"torture", implying that conditions in US prisons over the reporting period
did not amount to "torture". Furthermore, the Committee's concerns regarding
prison conditions related to sexual and other violence, which the Committee
noted was more likely to be committed against "vulnerable groups, in
particular racial minorities, migrants and persons of different sexual
orientation". Persons of Hispanic origin comprise over 50% of the prison
population in California, so there is no reason to suspect that the
complainant is a likely victim of such violence.
4.11 The State party further notes that the physical and sexual abuse of
prisoners is unlawful in all US States and that under section 206 of the
Californian Penal Code, persons who commit torture are liable to prosecution
and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Therefore, there are no grounds
to believe that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to
torture due to exposure to prison violence in the US.
4.12 Regarding the risk of contracting an infectious disease in a
Californian prison, the State party submits that the allegation should be
declared inadmissible as manifestly unfounded. No evidence is provided which
demonstrates that the complainant is personally at risk of contracting such
a disease. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence on which to base a
prima facie case. In the alternative, the State party submits that the
allegation is inadmissible as incompatible with the provisions of the
Convention. Even if the contentions regarding the prevalence of
Tuberculosis, Hepatitis-C and HIV in Californian prisons and likelihood of
the complainant contracting one of those diseases were true, there is no
basis on which to believe that those conditions are imposed on prisoners
with the intention of inflicting pain or suffering, for one of the purposes
set out in article 1, at the instigation of, or with the consent or
acquiescence of, a public official. Thus, the State party would not be in
violation of its obligations under article 3 of the Convention.
4.13 Regarding the merits of this allegation, the complaint does not present
credible evidence regarding the risk of contracting an infectious disease in
a Californian prison. After searching a range of information sources, the
State party was unable to locate reliable statistics on the rates of
Hepatitis-C and Tuberculosis infection in US prisons. As for HIV, the US
Department of Health reported at the end of 2005 that the estimated
prevalence of HIV in incarcerated populations was 2%. Such an infection rate
does not amount to a "substantial risk" of the complainant being infected.
4.14 As for the allegations of solitary confinement, the State party submits
that it should be considered inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The
claim is based on mere speculation as to what might occur if the complainant
were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and cannot be taken to amount
to prima facie evidence that the facts asserted will in fact occur. In the
alternative, it should be declared inadmissible as incompatible with the
provisions of the Convention. Even if the claim was substantiated, solitary
confinement does not in itself constitute torture, or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and must still meet the definition in
article 1 of the Convention. There is no evidence to suggest that "solitary
confinement" is used in Californian prisons in any way other than
incidentally to lawful sanctions. As to the merits of such allegation, the
State party has no reason to believe that solitary confinement is used
generally, or would be used in the complainant's case specifically.
4.15 The complainant alleges that he suffered injuries at the hands of US
law enforcement and that this is evidence that he will be tortured if
extradited. The State party submits that this allegation should be declared
inadmissible as manifestly unfounded. No evidence is provided to corroborate
the complainant's story, which lacks in detail and clarity. The date or time
of the alleged assault remain unclear. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's
Department appears to have documented each interview and encounter that they
had with the complainant on 15 and 16 May 2002. There is no indication that
the events to which the complainant refers occurred.
4.16 In the alternative, the State party submits that there are no
substantial grounds to believe that the complainant would be in danger of
torture if extradited based on his allegation to have been assaulted by US
law enforcement officers. The detailed police reports of U.S. law
enforcement officials' encounters with the complainant on 15 and 16 May 2002
do not substantiate his claims. The reports also indicate that facial
injuries were observed on the complainant the first time law enforcement
contacted him, before the alleged assault took place.
4.17 The complainant claims that he will be subjected to long detention on
death row if extradited, which would amount to torture. This allegation
should be considered inadmissible as manifestly illfounded. The State party
received assurances from the US that the death penalty will not be sought or
imposed in the complainant's case. He does not present evidence to suggest
that these assurances are unreliable and the State party has no reason to
consider that they will not be upheld. The Deputy District Attorney in the
matter advised the State party in an affidavit that there are no aggravating
circumstances to the case and that it does not attract the death penalty. On
28 February 2005, the US provided an undertaking that the death penalty
would not be sought or imposed on the complainant. He did not provide
evidence to discredit these assurances. The US has provided death penalty
undertakings in the same form on previous occasions. The US has sought his
extradition for a single offence of murder. In accordance with the
speciality assurance under article XIV of the Treaty on Extradition between
Australia and the United States of America, the complainant cannot be
charged with further offences once extradited, without Australia's consent.
4.18 The complainant claims that during his time in Long Bay Correctional
Complex between December 2002 and December 2003, he was subjected to
treatment amounting to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. The complainant does not point to an obligation
under the Convention that the State party is alleged to have breached.
However, the State party responds to these allegations in case they are
considered to raise issues under articles 12, 13, 14 and 16.
4.19 The complainant availed himself frequently of a number of complaint
mechanisms in connection with such allegations, including a complaint to the
HREOC. However, his claims are manifestly illfounded. First, he does not
provide evidence to support his allegations, many of which lack detail and
specificity. Second, records do not substantiate such claims. In some
instances, there is no record of a complaint filed, or any medical records,
or witness evidence to support the claim. Where records exist, the incidents
in question do not constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Medical records do not bear out the allegations of
physical abuse. There are only two occasions of attendance for treatment: a
case where he was assaulted by another inmate and taken promptly for
treatment by prison staff, and a case involving use of handcuffs, where
there was no injury and no treatment was required.
4.20 In May 2005, the HREOC reported that the complainant's allegations up
to August 2003 were not substantiated, or did not amount to abuses of his
rights. HREOC also received new complaints for the period between August
2003 and May 2006. However, it declined to proceed with these claims in view
of the fact that the complainant had also lodged proceedings in the NSW
Supreme Court on substantially similar allegations.
4.21 Whilst being held on extradition remand, the complainant had a history
of making unfounded, exaggerated and false complaints relating to his
treatment. For instance, in his complaint to HREOC, he claimed to have been
hit with a taser gun by prison officers at Long Bay in June 2003. This claim
cannot possibly be true given that those officers do not have taser guns. He
reported to the Department of Corrective Services (DCS) that he was
assaulted by a prison officer on 28 December 2002. He referred to this
treatment as "torture" in his complaints to HREOC and in applications to the
Minister. In fact, he alleged that, after a verbal confrontation with a
prison officer, the officer "poked" the complainant in the chest with his
finger. The incident was witnessed by another prison officer and a number of
other inmates. On investigation it was found that the complainant had
repeatedly refused to follow the officer's directions, that no physical
force was used by the officer and that any physical contact was inadvertent.
The complainant did not sustain any injuries from the incident, nor did he
require medical attention. He has been held in protective custody, at his
own request, for much of the time he has been held in NSW prisons. At his
request, he has only been associating with a limited number of approved
prisoners. This makes it unlikely that many of his allegations regarding his
treatment by other prisoners are true. Regarding other allegations, he does
not provide sufficient information for the State party to be able to address
them. There are no dates provided, no information about the circumstances of
each allegation and no indication as to the persons involved in each alleged
incident. Sometimes he relates to actions of other prisoners, and there is
no indication of any involvement of officials which might constitute
official instigation, acquiescence or consent.
4.22 DCS records show that on 22 September 2003, he was involved in a fight
with another inmate during which he was hit over the head with a milk crate.
The incident was immediately reported to police by prison staff. The
complainant completed a report stating that the action or inaction of prison
officers was not a cause of his injury. There is no evidence that prison
officers were involved in, instigated or consented to the assault. He was
taken promptly to the Long Bay Correctional Centre Clinic for treatment and
from there was transferred to hospital, where he received stitches to his
head and was discharged on the same day. He was seen again in the Clinic for
follow up care on three occasions. HREOC considered the incident and
concluded that there was no evidence that prison staff caused or condoned
the incident.
4.23 The complainant attended the Silverwater Correctional Centre Clinic on
5 January 2005 complaining he had been bashed and handcuffed too tightly
during a search for contraband. He was examined by clinical staff who found
only reddened skin on his wrists. No treatment was required. This matter was
raised in his second complaint to HREOC, which has since been discontinued.
Complainant's Comments on the State Party's Observations on the
Admissibility and the Merits
5. On 4 February 2008, the complainant' representative submitted that she
did not wish to add anything to what had already been submitted to the
Committee.
Issues and Proceedings Before the Committee
Consideration of Admissibility
6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the
Committee against Torture must decide whether or not it is admissible under
article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is
required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that
the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another
procedure of international investigation or settlement. It notes that the
State party does not contest the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
6.2 The Committee notes the complainant's allegations that he will not have
a fair trial and that, despite the assurances given, he might be sentenced
to death. These allegations, however, fall outside the scope of the
Convention in the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the Committee
considers that part of the complaint inadmissible as incompatible with the
provisions of the Convention. As for the rest of the allegations, the
Committee notes the State party's objections to the admissibility, namely
that the claims are unfounded or incompatible with the provisions of the
Convention. However, it considers that such claims raise issues that must be
dealt with at the merits stage. Accordingly, it considers such claims
admissible and proceeds to their examination on the merits.
6.3 Regarding the complainant's claim that he was subjected to treatment
amounting to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
while imprisoned in Australia, the Committee notes that the description of
facts provided by the complainant lacks precision and that no detailed
information is provided by him on the legal proceedings initiated regarding
the incidents he refers to and the result of such proceedings. In these
circumstances the Committee considers that, for the purpose of
admissibility, the claim is unfounded, under rule 107 (b) of the Committee's
rules of procedure.
Consideration of the Merits
7.1 The issue before the Committee is whether the extradition of the
complainant to the United States would violate the State party's obligations
under article 3 of the Convention not to extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.
7.2 In assessing the risk of torture, the Committee takes into account all
relevant considerations, including the existence in the relevant State of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
However, the aim of such determination is to establish whether the
individual concerned would be personally at risk in the country to which he
would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as
such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to
that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual
concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a
person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in
his or her specific circumstances.
7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment on article 3, which states
that the Committee is to assess whether there are substantial grounds for
believing that the complainant would be in danger of torture if returned to
the country in question. The risk of torture need not be highly probable,
but it must be personal and present. As to the burden of proof, the
Committee also recalls its general comment on article 3 and its
jurisprudence which establishes that the burden is generally upon the
complainant to present an arguable case. Furthermore, the risk of torture
must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion.
7.4 The complainant claims that he will be at risk of torture if extradited
to the United States in view of, inter alia: a) the prejudicial publicity
against him identifying him as the author of the crime for which extradition
is requested; b) prison conditions in California, including the high
incidence of HIV and other infectious diseases, and the risk of him
contracting such diseases; c) racial segregation and discrimination in the
Californian prison system; d) the discrimination against Hispanics and
Muslims in his community; e) the fact that he was tortured by police to
obtain information about the murder he is accused of, and that torture is
widespread in the United States; f) the possibility for him to be placed in
solitary confinement and, if sentenced to death, to be subjected to a
lengthy period of detention on death row.
7.5 The Committee is aware of reports of brutality and use of excessive
force by US lawenforcement personnel and the numerous allegations of their
ill-treatment of vulnerable groups, including racial minorities. It is also
aware of numerous reports of sexual violence perpetrated by detainees on one
another and that appropriate measures to combat these abuses have not been
implemented. [FN2] However, the complainant's allegations remain of a
general nature. He does not provide specific evidence about the
ill-treatment he alleges to have been subjected to when questioned by the
Californian police. No significant evidence is provided either that the
conditions in the prison or prisons in which he would be held in California
generally amount to torture within the meaning of article 1 of the
Convention, or that the circumstances of his case are such that he would be
subjected to treatment falling under that provision. Furthermore, the State
party considered that the United States was bound by the assurances it
provided to the effect that the author, if found guilty, would not be
sentenced to death penalty.
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[FN2] A/61/40 (see note a above), para 84, (32) and (37).
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8. For the abovementioned reasons, the Committee concludes that the
complainant has failed to substantiate his claim that he would face a
foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture upon his
return to the United States.
9. The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, concludes that the extradition of the complainant
to the United States did not constitute a breach of article 3 of the
Convention.
[Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the
original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as
part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]
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