The appellants were tenants of the respondent of certain premises in
Hathi Road, Nairobi. The respondent filed a suit for the recovery of
possession of those premises and the appellants resisted the claim for
 The appellants claimed, inter alia, the protection of the Landlord and
Tenant (Shops, Hotels & Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301 (hereinafter
called the Act), alleging that the premises were a "shop" within the meaning
of the said Act. The High Court held that the premises wore not a "shop"
within the meaning of the Act and decreed possession in favour of the
 The sole point for decision in this appeal is whether the said premises
are a "shop" within the meaning of the Act. During the trial the following
facts emerged. The appellants began a furniture making business in or about
1952. It was carried on in a workshop where furniture was made and sold.
Some years later the appellants leased the suit premises from the respondent
for the manufacture of furniture. The appellants had a shop and show room in
Ngara Road where the furniture manufactured in the suit premises was
retailed and sold.
 Sometimes if a large concern or a Government Department wanted furniture
in bulk the sale would take place at the suit premises, but otherwise the
sale of the furniture was at the shop at Ngara Road. The learned trial judge
found that the suit premises were mainly used for the manufacture of
furniture, not for the sale of it, and were not therefore a shop within the
moaning of the Act. It will be convenient at this stage to set out the
definition of a shop in the Act. A shop is defined in Sec. 2 of the Act as
“'Shop' means premises occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of a
retail or wholesale trade or business or for the purposes of rendering
services for money or money's worth."
 Mr. Khanna for the appellants has submitted that the learned trial judge
erred in holding that the main use of the suit premises was for the
manufacture of furniture, not to sell it. He submitted that the manufacture
of furniture was not an end in itself; the appellants manufactured furniture
in order to sell it. The manufacture, storage and sale of furniture formed
an integral part of the business of the appellants. He submitted that the
learned trial judge had used a wrong yardstick in singling out and isolating
the element of manufacture and contrasting it with sale in coming to the
conclusion that the suit premises were mainly used for the manufacture of
furniture, not to sell it.
 The suit premises were used to manufacture furniture to feed the retail
shop at Ngara Road and would therefore be a part of the shop, and the suit
premises would be "occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of a retail
trade or business". He further submitted that the word "business" has a wide
meaning and would include all activities for the purposes of gaining profit
or reward. He also submitted that the word "for the purposes of a retail
trade or business" cannot be restricted to only sale; the words would
include storage and manufacture as well.
 He argued that manufacturing was only one stage in a trading or business
activity. He further submitted that what the appellants did in the suit
premises could also be construed as activities designed for the "purposes of
rendering services for money or money's worth". He referred to the case
Hirani v. Ramji Mepa & Co. (1971) E.A. 332 where the learned trial judge had
held that storehouses which were situated separately from the shop promises
were occupied for the purposes of a business and wore entitled to protection
under the Act. He argued that by parity of reasoning the suit premises would
also be so protected. In brief he submitted that the suit premises could be
a shop either because (a) sales had taken place there (b) the suit premises
were used to manufacture furniture to food the retail shop at Ngara Road and
thus would form a part of the said retail shop or (c) the suit premises were
used for the purposes of rendering services for money or money's worth.
 In my opinion the definition of a "shop" in the Act has to be construed
from a common sense point of view. The authorities cited by learned counsel
are hardly of any assistance. I think that the learned trial judge was
justified, on the evidence before him, in concluding that the suit premises
were mainly used for the purposes of manufacturing furniture, not to sell
it, and that they were not occupied wholly or mainly for the purpose of a
retail or wholesale trade or business.
 There is something termed a lease for manufacturing purposes (sec. 106
of the Indian Transfer of Property Act which applies to Kenya) and the lease
here clearly was such a lease. The long title to the Act refers only to
shops, hotels and catering establishments, not to factories or premises for
manufacturing goods. The sales from the suit premises did not form any
substantial or material part of the business; they were merely incidental
 I am not prepared to accept the proposition that as the suit premises
were used to manufacture furniture to feed the retail shop at Ngara Road
they would form a part of the said shop. Such a proposition can lead to
absurd results. Indeed Mr. Khanna suggested that a factory, like say the
Bata Shoe Factory at Limuru, would be protected as a shop because its
products are being sold through its retail shops in Nairobi. With respect
that seems to me to be a fanciful argument and I reject it without
hesitation. If the Legislature had wanted to protect factories it could
easily have said so In the Hirani case referred to by Mr. Khanna,
storehouses separated from a shop were considered as part of a shop. Perhaps
storehouses have much more affinity with a shop than a factory or premises
where goods are manufactured and can therefore be distinguished. As Mr.
Couldrey for the respondent has pointed out the decision in that case has
reached judge the high water mark and as the learned trial judge said in
reference to it "a line must be drawn somewhere". It is after all a question
 Assuming without deciding that the Hirani case is correctly decided I
am not prepared to say that storehouses used for storing goods for a shop
would be in the same category as a factory or the suit premises where
furniture is manufactured. I am also of the view that "premises occupied…for
the purposes of rendering services for money or money's worth" would be
applicable to offices like those of advocates I accountants, manufacturers'
representatives, barbers and so forth, and cannot apply to a factory or the
suit premises. In my opinion the learned trial judge was right in holding
that the suit premises were not a shop within the meaning of the Act and
were thus not protected.
 I would dismiss the appeal with costs and order that the appellants
hand back possession of the suit premises to the respondent on or before
31st May, 1972.
SPRY, V. P.
 I agree, and as Lutta, J.A. also agrees, it is so ordered.
 I agree.