This is a second appeal. The appellant, an employee, filed a plaint on
the 2nd November, 1965, in the district court of Dar es Salaam against the
respondent, his employer, claiming various sums on the ground that the
employer was in breach of the contract of service in refusing to allow the
employee to work. A preliminary point was taken on behalf of the employer
that the normal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the claim by reason of
section 28 of the Security of Employment Act, 1964, (Cap.574) (herein after
referred to as the Act).
 The resident magistrate held that he had jurisdiction to hear the matter
and after hearing the evidence gave judgment for the employee for the full
amount of his claims. The employer appealed to the High Court on a number of
grounds, but before the appeal was heard on its merits the preliminary point
was again agitated. The High Court held that the district court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the plaint. From this decision the employee
appealed, with leave, to this Court.
 The facts, so far as they are relevant to the issue on this appeal, are
that on the 25th July, 1964, a report was made against the employee and on
the 27th July, whether rightly or wrongly is irrelevant to this appeal, the
employee was suspended by the employer pending investigations by the police.
 After investigation no action was taken by the police. On the 4th
August, 1964, the employer sent for the employee and paid the employee his
salary up to the 25th July. The employee thereafter sought to obtain other
employment but failed to do so. On the 16th December, 1964, an advocate, on
behalf of the employee, wrote claiming the various sums later claimed in the
plaint and on the claim being rejected a plaint was filed on the 2nd
November, 1965.'The Act was enacted in 1964 but the relevant part was not
brought into operation until the 1st May, 1965.The defence, in addition to
denying liability, raised the preliminary point to which I have referred.
That point failed before the resident magistrate but succeeded before the
High Court. Should this appeal be successful and it be held that/the normal
courts had jurisdiction to entertain the plaint, the matter will have to be
remitted to the High Court for the appeal to be heard on its merits.
 The Act, as can be gathered from its title and as is confirmed by its
preamble and its provisions, was enacted for the betterment of the
conditions of employees. By section 19 no employer shall summarily dismiss
any employee save for breaches of the Disciplinary Code, which is setout in
a Schedule to the Act and which permits of summary dismissal in certain
specified oases. Sections 21 and 22 provide for the action to be taken by an
employer where, inter alia, he proposes summarily to dismiss an employee,
and section 23 provides that an employee summarily dismissed may refer the
matter to a Board. Section 28 then reads as follows:
¬"Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts;
(1) No suit or other civil proceeding (other than proceeding to enforce a
decision of the Minister or the Board on a reference under this Part) shall
be entertained in any civil court with regard to the summary dismissal or
proposed summary dismissal, or a deduction by way of a disciplinary penalty
from the wages, of an employee.
(2) In this section, 'civil proceeding' includes a cross suit or
counterclaim, any set off and any civil proceeding under Part XI of the
 The employer urges that section 28 has taken away the jurisdiction of
the courts to entertain claims based on summary dismissal unless the plaint
was filed before the 1st May, 1965.The employee urges that section 28 only
applies where the summary dismissal takes place on or after 1st May, 1965,
and that in any event it does not apply as he was suspended and not
summarily dismissed. The employee goes to the extent of saying that the
employer never terminated the contract of service, but that the termination
took place by the act of the employee in writing the letter of the 16th
December, 1964, and that until then the contract of service was suspended
and he was entitled to payment of his dues under that contract. If this is
so, then the employee, possibly in a true Yuletide spirit, made a present to
his employer by releasing him from any liability for payment of salary over
the Christmas season.
 I am satisfied, however, that the employee, though originally suspended,
was summarily dismissed on the 4th August, 1964, when he was called by his
employer and paid his salary up to the 25th July. That the employee
understood he was so dismissed is shown by his evidence that he then sought
other employment .It was submitted that where one party to a contract by his
action repudiates the contract, the contract is not rescinded until the
other party accepts the repudiation.
 This may be so, but in the case of a contract of service an employee who
has been summarily dismissed cannot keep the contract of service alive until
he chooses, if he ever does so, to accept the termination of the contract.
There will be either an actual or implied rescission, which will have effect
from such date as is appropriate on the particular facts. In this case the
contract was rescinded on 4th August, 1964, when the employee accepted the
money paid to him and thereafter sought alternative employment.
 Turning now to the main issue on the appeal, that is whether the courts
had jurisdiction to entertain the employee's claim, there is no provision in
the Act which sets out whether the provisions of section 28 apply only in
respect of a summary dismissal which takes place after the commencement of
the Act. Section 48 provides that, subject to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the courts set out in section 28, certain provisions of the
Employment Ordinance are to have effect, but this example of legislation by
reference, as is usually the case, certainly does not help to clarify the
position. It is urged by the employee that section 28 only applies to a
summary dismissal which takes place after the 1st May, 1965, the date of the
commencement of the Act.
 It is urged on the other hand by the employer that the section applies
retrospectively to every summary dismissal, no matter when it takes place,
in respect of which proceedings are filed in the courts on or after the 1st
May, 1965.In the Municipality of Mombasa v. Nyali Limited,_ E.A. 371,
at p.374 I said this:-
“Whether or not legislation operates retrospectively depends on the
intention of the enacting body as manifested by the legislation. In seeking
to ascertain the intention behind the legislation the courts are guided by
certain rules of construction. One of these rules is that if the legislation
affects substantive rights it will not be construed to have retrospective
operation unless a Clear intention to that effect is manifested where as if
it affects procedure only, Prima-facie it operates retrospectively unless
there is good reason to the contrary. But in the last resort it is the
intention behind the legislation which has to be ascertained and a rule of
Construction is only one of the factors to which regard must be had in order
to ascertain that intention."
 In my view section 28 is clearly a procedural section as it deals with
the means of enforcing a right and not with the right itself. On the other
hand, it is a section which clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the normal
courts of justice and it is a rule of construction that the courts will not
construe a legislative provision in such a manner as to exclude the
jurisdiction of the courts, save in so far as it is manifest that it is the
intention of the legislature so to provide. This section excludes the
jurisdiction of the courts "with regard to the summary dismissal or proposed
summary dismissal" of an employee. Section 19 of the Act prohibits summary
dismissal save for reaches of the Disciplinary Code in circumstances in
which summary dismissal is a penalty permitted by that Code.
 It would seem, therefore, that the word "summary dismissal" are to be
construed with reference to the Disciplinary Cod end as that Code only had
effect from the 1st May, 1965, the words "summary dismissal" in section 28
should apply only to summary dismissal taking place after the 1st May,
1965.Thisconstruction is, in my view, confirmed by the requirement that an
employer, before he summarily dismisses an employee, must take the action
set out in sections 21 and 22, which action
 Of course he could not take until the Act came into operation.
 Further, under section 23 an employee who is summarily dismissed may
refer the matter to the Board within seven days of his summary dismissal;
and it is obvious he could not do so before the Act came into operation save
in the special case where the summary dismissal took place not more than
seven days before that date. To construe section 28 as having retrospective
operation would be to deprive an employee wrongly dismissed before the
commencement of the Act, but who had not commenced the proceedings before
that date, of all remedy save in the very special case where summary
dis¬missal took place within seven days before the commencement of the Act.
To construe a provision in an Act which is designed to better the position
of an employee in a manner which could impose on him great injustice would,
in my view, be to construe that provision in a way completely contrary to,
the intention of the legislature.
 For these reasons, even though section 28 is a procedural section, in
my view it should not be construed to have retrospective operation and
should be construed so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts only in
the case where the summary dismissal takes place on or after the 1st May,
1965.Accordingly I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and
decree of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court with a
direction to hear the appeal on its merits. I would order that the costs of
the appeal to the High Court, both in respect of the hearing up to date and
the future hearing on the remission, be in the discretion of the judge
hearing the appeal.
 As regards the costs of the appeal before us, I would order the
respondent to pay those costs. As the other members of the Court agree it is
DE LESTANG V-P.
 I agree and have nothing to add.
 I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by
My Lord the President.
 I agree with it entirely and cannot usefully add anything.