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SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. The Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, (the
Secretariat) received a Communication on 17 November 2006 from the Southern
Africa Human Rights NGO Network-Tanzania and its member organizations (the
Complainants).[FN38]
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[FN38] The members of the Organisations of SANGONET are; the Legal and Human
Rights Centre, the Women's Legal Aid Centre, DOLASED, Women in Law and
Development in Africa, the Centre for Human Rights Promotion, the National
Organization for Legal Assistance, the Youth Partnership Countrywide and the
Children Education Society
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2. The Communication is submitted against the United Republic of Tanzania (hereafter
referred to as the Respondent State), State Party[FN39] to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter). The
Communication is submitted under Article 55 of the African Charter.
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[FN39] Ratified on 18 February 1984
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3. The Complainants submit that on 22 June 1994, the High Court of Tanzania
rendered a decision in the case of R v. Mbushuu alias Dominic Mnyaroje and
Kalai Sangula, (the Mbushuu' case) where it found that the death penalty in
Tanzania is unconstitutional on the grounds that the way the sentence is
executed (by hanging) violates the right to dignity of a person as protected
under Article 13(6)(d) of the Constitution of the United Republic of
Tanzania and constitutes an inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment outlawed by Article 13(6)(e) of the same.
4. As a result of the above reasoning, Hon. Justice Mwalusa sentenced the
accused persons (Mbushuu alias Dominic Mnyaroje and Kalai Sangula) to life
imprisonment instead of the compulsory capital punishment for the crime of
murder.
5. The Complainants further submit that the Tanzanian Government[FN40]
appealed the decision of the High Court before the Court of Appeal. They
state that on 30 January 1995, the Hon. Justices of the Court of Appeal:
Makame, Ramadhan and Lubuva overturned the High Court decision rendered by
Justice Mwalusa and found that the death penalty is constitutional because
it is saved by claw back clauses provided in the Tanzanian Constitution.
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[FN40] The Appellant in the Mbushuu' case before the matter was brought to
the African Commission
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6. The Court of Appeal held that the death penalty is permissible under
international human rights instruments, has effective deterrence effect, is
accepted by the public, is economically cheaper to execute than to serve a
life imprisonment and is compatible with the Constitutions and practices of
other States Parties to the African Charter. The Court further held that in
the event of a conflict between domestic law and international law, the
domestic law prevails.
7. The Complainants refuted each of the grounds of the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeal on 30 January 1995.
ARTICLE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
8. The Complainants allege that the decision of the Tanzanian Court of
Appeal is a violation of Article 4 of the African Charter.
PRAYERS
9. The Complainants request the African Commission to declare that the Court
of Appeal's decision violates Article 4 of the African Charter and that the
circumstances of death penalty executions in Tanzania by hanging violates
other relevant articles and other international norms against torture
recognized by the African Commission.
PROCEDURE
10. The Complaint, dated 17 November 2006, was received at the Secretariat
on 25 November 2006.
11. During the 40th Ordinary Session of the African Commission held in
Banjul, The Gambia, from 15 to 29 November 2006, the African Commission
considered the Communication and decided to be seized of it.
12. By Note Verbale ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/333/2006/RWE dated 21 December 2006,
the Secretariat informed the Respondent State of this decision and requested
it to provide, within three months from the date of notification, its
submissions on the Admissibility of the Communication.
13. By letter ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/333/2006/RWE dated 21 December 2006, the
Secretariat also informed the Complainants of this decision and requested it
to forward its submissions on the Admissibility of the Communication within
three months.
14. On 8 May 2007, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale CHD 87/738/01/04
forwarding submissions on Admissibility from the Respondent State.
15. By Note Verbale ACHPR/LPROT /COMM/333/2006/SN dated 18 July 2007, the
Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the Respondent State's submissions on
Admissibility and informed the latter of its decision during the 41st
Ordinary Session to defer its decision on Admissibility of the case in order
to study the Respondent State's submissions on Admissibility.
16. By letter ACHPR/LPROT /COMM/333/2006/SN dated 16 July 2007, the
Secretariat transmitted the Respondent State's submissions on Admissibility
to the Complainants and informed the latter of the African Commission's
decision during the 41st Ordinary Session to defer its decision on
Admissibility in order to study the Respondent State's submissions.
17. By letter ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/333/06/TZ, dated 11 December 2008, both
parties were informed by the Secretariat that the African Commission
deferred its decision on Admissibility to its 45th Ordinary Session in order
to allow both parties submit additional arguments on Admissibility.
18. During the 45th Ordinary Session of the African Commission, the
Communication was deferred to the 46th Ordinary Session.
19. On 5 March 2009, the Respondent State submitted additional arguments on
Admissibility.
20. By Note Verbale ACHPR/COMM/333/06/TZ/0.2/148.09, dated 18 March 2009,
the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the Respondent State's additional
submissions.
21. By letter ACHPR/COMM/333/06/TZ/0.1/147.09, dated 18 March 2009, the
Secretariat forwarded the Respondent State's additional submissions on
Admissibility to the Complainants, and requested the latter to submit their
additional submissions on Admissibility.
22. By letter ACHPR/COMM/333/06/TZ/0.2/864.09 dated 5 November 2009, the
Secretariat sent a reminder to the Complainant requesting for its additional
submissions on Admissibility, including clarifications on specific issues
such as the delay in bringing the matter to the African Commission.
23. By letter ACHPR/COMM/333/06/TZ/0.3/938.09 dated 3 December 2010, the
Secretariat informed the Complainants of the African Commission's decision
to defer the decision on the Admissibility of the Communication during its
46th Ordinary Session to the 47th Ordinary Session, pending additional
information that was requested.
THE LAW
ADMISSIBILITY
SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
COMPLAINANT'S SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
24. The Complainants submit that they have fulfilled all the requirements
under Article 56 of the Charter, including the fact that all domestic legal
remedies have been exhausted. They indicate that the Tanzanian Court of
Appeal is the highest and final court in the country.
25. The Complainants further submit that the case has neither been heard nor
decided by any other international or regional body, and call on the African
Commission to act on the Complaint with urgency because death penalty
convicts or persons awaiting trial on crimes punishable by compulsory death
penalty in the country may be subjected to suffer death by hanging.
RESPONDENT STATE'S SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
26. The Respondent State indicates in its submissions that the list
containing the names of the other members who are joint authors of the
Communication was not communicated to them.
27. The Respondent State affirms that the Court of Appeal is the highest
court of the land, adding that this Court did find that the death penalty is
provided for by Article 30(2) (c) of the Constitution and that it is not a
claw back clause.
28. The State further asserts that the 14th Constitutional Amendment (the
Amendment) expunged some of the so called ‘claw back' clauses, and that this
Amendment did not oust the legislative powers of the National assembly to
enact laws. It also states that the Amendment did not oust the powers of the
Court to interpret the Constitution and other enactments of the National
Assembly by virtue of the rules of interpretation. According to the
Respondent State therefore, the Amendment did not in any way render the
judgment of the of the Court of Appeal outdated, adding that Article 30
gives room for the Court to interpret laws of the land as it did.
29. The Respondent State submits that the death penalty is still a lawful
punishment in Tanzania, and that the decision of the Court of Appeal will
continue to be respected because it is the highest Court in the land. It
adds that, even though the State Party is bound by international instruments
it has ratified, domestic laws will still prevail to serve specific
situations.
COMPLAINANTS' ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
30. In their additional submissions on Admissibility, the Complainants
reiterate the fact that they have fulfilled all the requirements under
Article 56 of the African Charter.
31. The Complainants submit that Article 56(1) has been fulfilled because a
signed copy of the list of the authors was attached to the Complaint brought
before the African Commission.
32. They further submit that the requirement under Article 56(2) has also
been met because the Court of Appeals' decision of 30 January 1995
constitutes a violation of Article 4 of the African Charter.
33. With respect to Article 56(3), the Complainants submit that it has been
met because the Communication is not written in an insulting language.
34. They state that the Communication is in line with Article 56(4) because
it is not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media, but
rather on Court judgments and on the past and present jurisprudence on the
death penalty.
35. The Complainants state further that the requirement under Article 56(5)
has been complied with, because they have exhausted all local remedies. They
elaborate on this by explaining that they took the matter to the Appeal
Court of Tanzania, which is the highest Court in the land, before bringing
it to the African Commission.
36. The Complainants further state that they have fulfilled Article 56(6) of
the African Charter because the Communication was brought to the African
Commission within a reasonable period of time, after the Court of Appeal's
decision on the case.
37. Finally, the Complainants aver that the Communication is in line with
Article 56(7) because it has not been submitted to any other international
body for settlement.
RESPONDENT STATE'S ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
38. The Respondent State made additional submissions on Admissibility
addressing the requirements in Article 56(2), 56(5) and 56(6) of the African
Charter.
39. The Respondent State refutes the Complainants' submission that they have
fulfilled Article 56(2) of the African Charter. According to the Respondent
State, the Complainants have not demonstrated the extent to which the
Communication is in conformity with the provisions of the African Charter.
40. They state that, apart from citing Article 4 which deals with the right
to life, they have not indicated any other provisions in relation to torture
which is the basis of their Communication. In the absence of specific
provisions related to torture, the Respondent State submits that the
Communication is "wild, vague, and hence incompatible with the provisions of
the Charter and it violates Article 56(2)".
41. With regard to Article 56(5), the Respondent State disputes the fact
that local remedies have been exhausted. It submits that the accused persons
in the Mbushuu' case were charged and convicted of murder, and sentenced to
life imprisonment instead of death in the High Court, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 196 and 198 of the Penal Code Cap 16 of the laws of
Tanzania.
42. The Respondent State submits further that the Appellant in the Mbushuu'
case, that is, the State, appealed to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania,
through Criminal Appeal no 142 of 1994, and the Court of Appeal ruled on a
death sentence, instead of life imprisonment, arguing that death sentence is
constitutional.
43. Furthermore, the Respondent State submits that the Complainants did not
exhaust local remedies available under Article 30(4) of the Constitution of
Tanzania and Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act.[FN41]
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[FN41] Article 30(4) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania
provides that:" Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the
High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter
brought before it pursuant to this Article; and the state authority may
enact legislation for the purposes of
(a) regulating procedure for instituting proceedings pursuant to this
Article;
(b) specifying the powers of the High Court in relation to the hearing of
proceedings instituted pursuant to this Article;
(c) ensuring the effective exercise of the powers of the High Court, the
preservation and enforcement of the rights, freedoms and duties in
accordance with this Constitution.
While Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act,41 provides for the right
to apply to the High Court for redress. It stipulates that: "If any person
alleges that any of the provisions of sections 12 to 29 of the Constitution
has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, he may,
without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that
is lawfully available, apply to the High Court for redress."
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44. In contending the Complainants' fulfillment of Article 56(6), the
Respondent State submits that this Communication is based on the Mbushuu'
case decided fifteen years ago, adding that the Complainants have not made
any efforts to exhaust local remedies since then.
45. In its final observations, the Respondent State requests that the
Communication be found inadmissible by the African Commission based on the
aforementioned grounds.
ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
46. This Communication is submitted pursuant to Article 55 of the African
Charter which allows the African Commission to receive and consider
Communications, other than from States Parties. Article 56 of the African
Charter provides that the Admissibility of Communications submitted pursuant
to Article 55 is subject to seven conditions which must all be met.
47. In the Communication before the African Commission, the Complainants
aver that they have complied with all the requirements under Article 56.
However, the State disagrees, arguing that, the Complainants have not
complied with Article 56(2), 56(5) and 56(6).
48. The African Commission will now proceed to determine whether these sub
Articles under Article 56 raised by the Respondent State have indeed not
been complied with. Nevertheless, the Commission would also analyze
compliance with the, other sub- Articles of Article 56 that are not in
contention.
49. In terms of Article 56(1) of the Charter, "Communications should
indicate their authors, even if the latter requests anonymity." In the
Communication before the African Commission, the Respondent State submits
that it was disadvantaged by not seeing the list of the other members who
are the joint authors of the Communication. It is important to note that the
Complainants did attach a list of the joint authors of the Communication in
Annexure I of the Complaint to the attention of the African Commission,
which was forwarded to the Respondent State. The Communication in the
opinion of the African Commission thus clearly shows the name of the authors.
In this regard, the requirement of Article 56(1) has been fulfilled.
50. Article 56(2) requires that, "The Communication be compatible with
either the African Charter or the Constitutive Act of the OAU (now the
Constitutive Act of the AU)." This sub-Article is subject to scrutiny
because the Respondent State raised an objection to it. The State argues
that the Complainants have only cited Article 4 of the African Charter which
deals with the right to life, and that they have not indicated any other
provisions in relation to torture which is the basis of their Communication.
It goes further to describe the Communication as "wild, vague and hence not
compatible with the provisions of the Charter…"
51. This Commission notes that, one of its primary considerations under
Article 56(2) is whether there has been prima facie violation of human
rights guaranteed by the African Charter. Furthermore, as was its position
in Mouvement des Refugee Mauritaniens au Senegal v Senegal,[FN42] the
Commission is only concerned with whether there is preliminary proof that a
violation occurred. Therefore, in principle, it is not mandatory for the
Complainant to mention specific provisions of the African Charter that have
been violated.
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[FN42] Communication 162/97
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52. In the Communication before the African Commission, the Complainants
have alleged violation of Article 4 of the African Charter, meaning they
have alleged the violation of a right by the Respondent State. The
determination whether other rights have been violated or the extent to which
they have been violated is not relevant because such an analyses is required
only at the Merits stage. Based on this, the African Commission finds that
Article 56(2) has been fulfilled.
53. Article 56(3) requires that, "Communications are not written in
disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and
its institutions or to the African Union." According to this Commission,
looking at the alleged facts of this Communication, there is no evidence of
insulting or disparaging language. Thus, Article 56(3) is complied with.
54. Article 56(4) requires that, "The Communication should not be based
exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media." This Communication
has not portrayed any indication of information coming from the media before
this Commission. The Complainants' submissions have been supported by Court
judgments, national laws and reports on which the Complainants relied. In
this regard, the African Commission holds that Article 56(4) has been duly
complied with.
55. Article 56(5) requires that, "Communications be sent to the Commission
only after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this
procedure is unduly prolonged." It has become an established principle in
international law that a State should be given the opportunity to redress an
alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic legal system before
it is dealt with at the international level.[FN43] This requirement
safeguards the role of domestic courts to decide the matter before it is
brought to any international adjudication body.
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[FN43] A.A. Cacado Trinidade, "The application of the Rule of Exhaustion of
local remedies in international law 1' (1983)
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56. The Respondent State in this Communication is of the view that the
Complainants have not complied with this requirement. It argues that the
accused persons in the Mbushuu' case were charged and convicted of murder,
and sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death pursuant to the
provisions of Section 196 and 198 of the Penal Code Cap 16 of the laws of
Tanzania.
57. It further argues that the Complainants did not exhaust local remedies
available under Article 30(4) of the Constitution of Tanzania and Section 4
of the Basic Rights and Duties Act.
58. According to this Commission, the argument by the Respondent State that
the Complainants have not exhausted local remedies because the "accused
persons in the Mbushuu' case were charged and convicted of murder, and
sentenced to life imprisonment in the High Court, instead of death pursuant
to the provisions of Section 196 and 198 of the Penal Code Cap 16 of the
laws of Tanzania," cannot be sustained because the premise of exhausting
local remedies according to the practice and purpose of Article 56(5) only
requires that judicial domestic avenues should be exploited before a
Communication is brought to the Commission. In the present Communication,
there is evidence that the matter was considered and decided upon by the
Highest Court in the Respondent State prior to its submission to this
Commission.
59. This Commission also notes that, the ruling on life imprisonment in the
Mbushuu' Case was made in the High Court on the ground that the death
penalty in Tanzania is unconstitutional. The Appellant not being satisfied
with the decision of the High Court, appealed to the Court of Appeal which
found that the death penalty is constitutional because it is saved by claw
back clauses provided in the Tanzanian Constitution. In this regard
therefore, the Complainants in the present Communication brought the matter
before the Commission after the Court of Appeal had pronounced on the death
penalty.
60. Concerning the argument that the Complainants have not exhausted local
remedies because they did not avail themselves to the remedies provided by
Article 30(4) of the Constitution of Tanzania, as well as the Basic Rights
and Duties Act, it is imperative for the African Commission to verify the
content of these Laws to determine whether remedies provided therein are
sufficient and effective remedies.
61. Article 30(4) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania[FN44]
provides that:
"Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall
have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter brought before
it pursuant to this Article; and the state authority may enact legislation
for the purposes of -
(d) regulating procedure for instituting proceedings pursuant to this
Article;
(e) specifying the powers of the High Court in relation to the hearing of
proceedings instituted pursuant to this Article;
(f) ensuring the effective exercise of the powers of the High Court, the
preservation and enforcement of the rights, freedoms and duties in
accordance with this Constitution
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[FN44] The Constitution of Tanzania is available at http://www.lrct.or.tz/documents/REPUBLIC.pdf
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62. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act,[FN45]
provides for the right to apply to the High Court for redress. It stipulates
that: "If any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 12 to 29
of the Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in
relation to him, he may, without prejudice to any other action with respect
to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the High Court for
redress."
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[FN45] The Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act (Cap 3 R.E. 2002),
available at http://www.lrct.or.tz/documents/DUTIES.pdf
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63. Looking at the content of both Article 30(4) of the Tanzanian
Constitution and Section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act, they are all
geared towards the option of bringing matters to the High Court for redress.
This option was exploited because the matter was considered by the High
Court before later referred to the Court of Appeal.
64. Furthermore, the ‘remedies' referred to in Article 56(5) include all
judicial remedies that are easily accessible for justice. The Commission in
Interights and others v Mauritania,[FN46] declared:
‘The fact remains that the generally accepted meaning of local remedies,
which must be exhausted prior to any Communication/Complaint procedure
before the African Commission, are ordinary remedies of common law that
exist in jurisdictions and normally accessible to people seeking justice."[FN47]
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[FN46] Communication 242/2001
[FN47] n above, para 27
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65. In this regard, what is important to the African Commission in
determining whether local remedies were exhausted is whether judicial
remedies indeed exists, and if so, whether they were explored by the
Complainants. On this ground, the Respondent State's reliance on the
provisions of Article 30(4) of the Constitution of Tanzania and Section 4 of
the Act is not enough to conclude that the Complainants did not exhaust
local remedies.
66. Based on the above reasoning, this Commission holds that local remedies
have been exhausted by the Complainants in compliance with Article 56(5) of
the African Charter.
67. Article 56(6) of the Charter states that, "Communications received by
the Commission will be considered if they are submitted within a reasonable
period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the
Commission is seized with the matter." The Respondent State asserts that the
Complainants have not complied with this requirement because ‘this matter
was decided fifteen years ago…".
68. The African Charter does not specifically state what it means by
‘reasonable time', as opposed to Article 46(1(b) of the American Convention
on Human Rights (the American Convention), which provides for a six months
period.[FN48] In the absence of this specification, the Commission has
always ruled based on the contexts and characteristics of each case.
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[FN48] See also Article 26 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
European Convention)
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69. In Michael Majuru v Zimbabwe,[FN49] for instance, the Communication was
submitted to the African Commission twenty-months (22) after the Complainant
allegedly fled the Respondent State without approaching the Courts therein.
As reasons for delay, he argued without substantiating that he had been
undergoing psychotherapy while in South Africa. He further indicated that he
did not have the financial means to bring the case before the Commission,
and that he was afraid for the safety of members of his family.
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[FN49] Communication 308/2005
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70. In the above Communication, the African Commission held that the
Communication was not submitted within a reasonable time period envisaged in
Article 56(6) because, "The arguments advanced by the Complainant as
impediments for his late submission of the Complaint do not appear
convincing." It added that, "Even if the Commission accepts that he fled the
country and needed time to settle, or that he was concerned for the safety
of his relatives, twenty two (22) months after fleeing the country is
clearly beyond a reasonable man's understanding of reasonable period of time."[FN50]
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[FN50] n above, para 110
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71. Similarly, in Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v Republic of Sudan,[FN51]
the African Commission held that a period of twenty nine (29) months (2
years and 5 months) between the time when the High Court dismissed the
matter and when the Communication was submitted to the African Commission is
unreasonable, particularly because the Complainants did not give any
compelling reason to explain the delay. It stated that, "Where there is a
good and compelling reason why a Complainant does not submit his Complaint
to the Commission for consideration, the Commission has a responsibility,
for the sake of fairness and justice, to give such a Complainant an
opportunity to be heard. In the present case, there is no sufficient reason
given as to why the Communication could not be submitted within a reasonable
period."[FN52]
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[FN51]Communication 310/2005
[FN52] n above 78 and 79
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72. However, in Mr. Obert Chinhamo v Zimbabwe,[FN53] the Communication was
submitted to the African Commission ten months after the Complainant
allegedly fled from his country. Due to the circumstances in this case, the
Commission decided that the Communication complied with Article 56(6),
stating that; "The Complainant is not residing in the Respondent State and
needed time to settle in the new destination, before bringing his Complaint
to the Commission. Even if the Commission were to adopt the practice of
other regional bodies to consider six months as the reasonable period to
submit complaints, given the circumstance in which the Complainant finds
himself, that is, in another country, it would be prudent, for the sake of
fairness and justice, to consider a ten months period as reasonable."[FN54]
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[FN53] Communication 307/2005
[FN54] 54 n above , paras 88 and 89
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73. As portrayed in the facts of the Communication before this Commission,
the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on 30 January 1995, and
the Communication was brought to the Commission on 17 November 2006. Even
though the State indicates that the Complainants took fifteen years before
bringing the matter to the African Commission, according to the latter's
calculation, it took the Complainants exactly eleven years. The question of
whether eleven years falls within the meaning of reasonable time would have
to be assessed by this Commission.
74. The Commission underscores the fact that, in the submissions of the
Complainants, there is no substantiation as to why it took them so long to
bring the matter to the Commission after exhausting local remedies. It is
the opinion of this Commission that, delays such as this could be prompted
by different circumstances, including attempts to request for Presidential
clemency and awaiting response or judicial reviews.
75. This Commission notes that it requested the Complainants to provide
additional information to explain the delay, and no response was provided.
76. In the absence of any explanation whatsoever from the Complainants
regarding the long period of time that it took before the matter was brought
to the African Commission, the latter observes that, given the nature of the
present Communication, there has been an unreasonable delay. In view of this,
it holds that the Communication was not submitted within a reasonable period
of time and therefore does not comply with Article 56(6) of the African
Charter.
77. Article 56(7) states that, "The Commission does not deal with cases
which have been settled by those States involved in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the OAU
or the provisions of the present Charter." There is no evidence in this
Communication that would prompt the Commission to believe that the matter
has been settled by any international body. Moreover, this sub-Article has
not raised any contention on the part of the Respondent State. Accordingly,
the African Commission holds that the requirement under Article 56(7) has
been duly fulfilled.
DECISION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
78. In view of the foregoing, the African Commission decides:
a. That this Communication does not comply with Article 56(6) of the African
Charter, and therefore declares it inadmissible;
b. To transmit its decision to the parties in accordance with Rule 119(1) of
its Rules of Procedure;
c. To Publish this decision in its 28th Activity Report.
Done at the 47th Ordinary Session, held from 12 to 26 May 2010, in Banjul,
The Gambia |
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