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SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. This Communication is jointly submitted by Associated Newspapers of
Zimbabwe (PVT) Ltd (ANZ) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (the
Complainants) against the Republic of Zimbabwe (the Respondent State).
2. ANZ is a Company registered under the laws of Zimbabwe whose primary
business is newspapers publishing. Since 1999, they have been publishing the
Daily News, which is the largest-selling newspaper independent of government
control in Zimbabwe.
3. The Complainants state that a new media law - the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) was enacted in 2002 by the Respondent
State. They claim that section 66 of AIPPA read together with section 72
purports to prohibit "mass media services" from operating until they have
registered with the Media and Information Commission (MIC).
4. ANZ filed an application challenging the constitutionality of the
provisions requiring it to register with the MIC. ANZ therefore declined to
register until the question of the constitutionality of the AIPPA provisions
it was challenging had been determined by the Supreme Court
5. In its judgement of 11 September 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that by
not registering with the MIC, the ANZ had openly defied the law and as such
were operating outside the law.
6. The Complainants claim that the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether
or not the aforementioned provisions of the AIPPA were consistent with the
Constitution but instead maintained that every law enacted in Zimbabwe
remains valid and should be complied with until it is either repealed by an
Act of Parliament or declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In its
ruling, the Supreme Court stated that ‘The applicant is operating outside
the law and this Court will only hear the applicant on the merits once the
applicant has submitted itself to the law'.
7. It is further alleged that following the Supreme Court decision, the
Daily News was forcibly closed on 12 September 2003, ANZ assets were seized
and several ANZ officials were arrested, while others were threatened with
arrest and criminal charges.
8. Consequently, ANZ submitted its application for registration with the MIC
on 15 September 2003 and on 18 September 2003, the High Court pending
determination of the matter by MIC granted permission to the ANZ to publish
the Daily News. The High Court also ordered the return of all the equipment
seized and demanded an end to police interference with ANZ business
activities.
9. On 19 September 2003, the MIC refused ANZ's application based on the
Supreme Court finding that ANZ had been unlawfully operating its media
business. ANZ appealed against the MIC's decision to the Administrative
Court and on 24 October 2003, the Administrative Court unanimously set aside
MIC's decision and held that the MIC was biased and improperly constituted.
The Administrative Court also ordered the Board of the MIC to issue ANZ with
a certificate of registration by 30 November 2003 failing which, ANZ would
be deemed registered as from that date.
10. The Complainants state that following publication of the Daily News on
25 October 2003, police immediately moved back into the ANZ offices, stopped
their work and prevented all further publication.
11. The Complainants argue further that since then, the authorities have
prevented the re-opening of the newspaper offices. The computers and other
equipment of the Company remain in the hands of the police and ANZ employees
have been arrested and charged with criminal offences.
12. The Complainants argue that the current closure of the paper is causing
irreparable harm to the freedom of expression and information and many other
associative rights as delineated in the African Charter. They add that the
closure is costing the ANZ 38 million Zimbabwean dollars per day in lost
sales and advertising
COMPLAINT
13. The Complainants allege that Articles 3, 7, 9, 14 and 15 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights have been violated.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
14. The Communication was hand-delivered to the Secretariat of the African
Commission on 12 November 2003.
15. On 4 December 2003, the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the
Communication and informed the Complainants that the matter would be
scheduled for consideration by the African Commission at its 35th Ordinary
Session.
16. At its 35th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 21 May - 4
June 2004, the African Commission decided to be seized of the Communication.
17. By Note Verbale of 15 June 2004 addressed to the Respondent State and by
letter of the same date addressed to the Complainant, the African Commission
invited both parties to submit arguments on the admissibility of the
Communication
18. By Note Verbale dated 16 September 2004 addressed to the Responding
State and by letter of the same date addressed to the Complainant the
Secretariat of the African Commission reminded both parties to submit their
arguments on admissibility.
19. On 20 September 2004 the Secretariat of the African Commission received
a Note Verbale from the Respondent State requesting that it be allowed to
submit its arguments on admissibility by 30 October 2004.
20. By Note Verbale dated 23 September 2004, the Secretariat of the African
Commission accepted the Respondent State's request that it submit its
arguments on admissibility by 30 October 2004.
21. On 4 October 2004, the Secretariat received a supplementary brief and
arguments on admissibility on the Communication from the complainant
22. By letter dated 7 October the Secretariat of the African Commission
acknowledged receipt of the supplementary brief and arguments on
admissibility submitted by the Complainant and by Note Verbale of the same
date the Secretariat sent a copy of the said document to the Respondent
State.
23. On 28 October 2004, the Secretariat of the African Commission received a
Note Verbale from the Respondent State dated 25 October 2004 indicating that
it received the supplementary brief of the complainant only on 20 October
and it may not be able to submit its arguments by 30 October 2004 since the
Supplementary Brief raises issues on the merits.
24. By Note Verbale dated 29 October 2004, the Secretariat wrote to the
Respondent State informing it that as the matter is still at the
admissibility stage, the Respondent State can submit its argument on
admissibility for consideration by the African Commission at the 36th
Ordinary Session.
25. On 29 October 2004, the Secretariat received the submission from the
Respondent State and by Note Verbale of 3 November 2004 acknowledged receipt
thereof.
26. By letter of 3 November 2004, the Secretariat of the African Commission
forwarded the response of the State to the Complainant.
27. On 24 November 2004 the Complainant submitted a rejoinder to the State's
response and this was also hand-delivered to the State delegation attending
the 36th Ordinary Session of the Commission.
28. At its 36th Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal, the African
Commission heard both parties on the question of provisional measures and
decided to grant the Complainants' request for provisional measures which
called on the Respondent State to return the seized equipment of ANZ. The
African Commission deferred its decision on admissibility pending the
State's response to the complainant's rejoinder which was handed to the
State during the session.
29. By Note Verbale of 25 December 2004, the State wrote to the Secretariat
seeking clarification on the deadline it was expected to make its submission.
By Note Verbale of 16 December 2004, the Secretariat informed the State that
the communication will be considered at the 37th Ordinary Session of the
African Commission.
30. By letter of 16 December 2004, the Secretariat informed the complainant
of the African Commission's decision taken at its 36th Ordinary Session in
Dakar, Senegal.
31. By Note Verbale of 16 February 2005, the Secretariat reminded the State
to submit its arguments on admissibility before 16 March 2005.
32. By letter of 14 March 2005, the Officer of the Attorney General of
Zimbabwe requested the African Commission for an extension to allow the
State submit its arguments by 31 March 2005.
33. By letter of 18 March 2005 addressed to the Attorney General, the
Secretariat granted the State an extension of thirty days and requested it
to submit its arguments by 18 April 2005.
34. At its 37th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, the African
Commission deferred consideration on admissibility of the Communication
after receiving a Supreme Court ruling dated 15 March 2005 from the
Respondent State in which the latter claims the complainant's grievances
were addressed in the Court ruling.
35. By Note Verbale of 24 May 2005, the Respondent State was notified of the
Commission's decision and requested to submit its arguments within three
months of the notification. By letter of the same date, the Complainants
were notified of the Commission's decision.
36. On 14 June 2005, the Secretariat of the African Commission received a
letter from the Complainant in which the latter expressed concern at the
Commission's decision to postpone consideration on admissibility of the
Communication. The Complainant also expressed concern at the Commission's
inaction on the State's failure to abide by its request for provisional
measures.
37. On 7 July 2005, the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the Complainants' letter of 14 June 2005 and informed the Complainant why the Communication
was deferred.
38. At its 38th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 21 November
- 5 December 2005, the African Commission considered the Communication and
declared it admissible.
39. By Note Verbale dated 15 December 2005 and by letter of the same date,
the State and the Complainants were notified of the African Commission's
decision and requested to submit their arguments on the merits within three
months of the date of notification.
40. By letter of 21 December 2005, the Complainant acknowledged receipt of
the Secretariat's letter of 15 December and indicated that it will furnish
its arguments on the merits "within the procedurally stipulated period".
41. By Note Verbale of 6 March 2006 and by letter of the same date, the
Secretariat of the African Commission reminded the State as well as the
Complainant to submit their arguments on the merits. Both parties were given
until 31 March to do so.
42. On 3 April 2006, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale from the
Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in Ethiopia forwarding another Note
Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe
requesting the Secretariat to extend the date of submission of its arguments
to 15 April 2006.
43. By Note Verbale date 10 April 2006, the Secretariat of the African
Commission acknowledged receipt of the Embassy's Note Verbale and obliged to
the latter's request.
44. At the 39th Ordinary Session of the Commission, the Respondent State
submitted on the merits and the Commission decided to defer further
consideration of the Communication to its 40th session.
45. By note verbale of 29 May and letter of the same date, the Secretariat
of the Commission notified both parties of the Commission's decision.
46. At its 40th Ordinary Session the Communication was deferred due to lack
of time and the parties were informed accordingly.
47. At its 41st Ordinary Session the Communication was deferred to give the
Secretariat more time to prepare the draft decision. During the same session
the Secretariat received a supplementary submission from the respondent
State.
48. By note verbale of 10 July 2007, and letter of the same date, both
parties were notified of the Commission's decision.
49. At its 42nd Ordinary Session the Communication was deferred to verify
the State's claim that it hadn't submitted on the merits and to allow it
submit its arguments.
50. By note verbale of 19 December 2007, and letter of the same date, both
parties were notified of the Commission's decision. The Respondent State was
informed that it had in fact submitted on the merits and a copy of the
State's submission was sent to both parties for ease of reference.
51. At its 43rd Ordinary Session held in Ezulwini, the Kingdom of Swaziland
the Communication was deferred to allow the Secretariat incorporates the
State's supplementary submission into the draft decision.
52. At its 44th Ordinary Session held in Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria,
the Communication was deferred due to lack of time.
THE LAW ADMISSIBILITY
COMPLAINANTS' SUBMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
53. The Complainants submit that the Republic of Zimbabwe adopted an Act of
Parliament on 13 March 2002, which obliged all media houses, journalists and
all those working in the media profession to be registered or face closure.
The Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe("ANZ") (publishers of the Daily News
and the Daily News on Sunday) challenged the provisions of the Act under
Section 24(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter the "Constitution" )
54. Section 24 (1) of the Constitution provides that in cases involving the
Bill of Rights, one may approach the Supreme Court (hereinafter the "Court") as the court of first instance. The ANZ challenged the Act on the basis of
its likelihood to infringe freedom of expression, free and uninhibited
practice of journalism. According to the Complainants, the Court declined to
pronounce on the constitutionality of the Act and instead made a preliminary
ruling that the ANZ had to and was supposed to comply with the provisions of
the Act before challenging them as the ANZ was approaching the court with "dirty hands".
55. According to the Complainants, the interpretation of the Constitution by
the Court was contrary to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
Charter. They believe that the application of the judicial doctrine of clean
hands by the Court had a detrimental effect on the rights of the petitioners
in the domestic courts. They argue that the reliance by the Court on the
common law equitable doctrine of unclean or dirty hands in a matter not of
an ordinary nature but one that is dealing with fundamental human rights and
freedoms grievously affects the fundamental human right to due protection of
the law and further undermines the predictability in human rights related
issues.
56. The Complainants submit that the Constitution provides that laws which
are inconsistent with the Constitution are void ab initio, and not voidable,
as seemingly was the interpretation of the Court, noting that the
interpretation by the Court of this particular provision of the Constitution
clearly subordinates basic constitutional and human rights issues to general
rules deciphered from ordinary case law mainly in English jurisdiction where
their Lordships were never confronted with a matter involving violation of
fundamental human rights. The unclean hands doctrine, according to the
Complainants, was established to deal with principles of equity and stems
from the law of equity. They argue that it cannot be applied in matters
relating to extent of conformity of Acts of Parliament to the Constitution
in a system of constitutional supremacy, separation of powers and the power
of judicial review without leading to violation and infringement of
fundamental rights and freedoms.
57. The Complainants submit that their contention before the Supreme Court
was that the Act was contrary to the Constitution and other international
instruments which provide for fundamental rights and therefore sought the
protection of the Court and its decision on the constitutionality or
otherwise of the Act. Instead of dealing with the merits of the claim the
Court applied a procedural discretionary rule of practice thereby
undermining the notion of constitutional supremacy and intermittently
denying the Petitioners of an effective remedy.
58. The Court ruled that the ANZ had approached the court with dirty hands
therefore the court could not attend to the merits of the case until the ANZ
had obeyed the law which they deemed not to be law. Further the Court ruled
that the Act was not blatantly unconstitutional.
59. The Complainants argue that as provided by the Constitution, any law
which is contrary to the supreme law shall be impugned. The impugning of the
law or sections of it can only be achieved if the law is put under a
‘constitutional compliance test', which again in terms of the Constitution,
that power lies with the Supreme Court. They claim that by failing to decide
on the constitutionality of AIPPA, the Court abrogated its responsibility
and duties as provided by the Constitution and one can reasonably conclude
that the Court was in contravention of the Constitution, the Charter and
other international instruments signed and ratified by the government of
Zimbabwe which provide for appeal to competent bodies and equal protection
of the law.
60. According to the complainants, without approaching the Court, or as in
this case, the Court deciding to "shut the door in the face of the
applicants", there is no other mechanisms of establishing the nature and
extent of repugnancy of an Act of Parliament to the Constitution. In
constitutional supremacy, they argue, jurisdictions matters relating to the
constitutional conformity of any law deemed to be contrary to the
Constitution there is no need to have that said by the Court since from the
onset there is no law to argue about as provided by Section 3 of the
Constitution.
61. As a result of the reliance on the unclean hands doctrine, the
Complainants believe that the Court refused to hear the arguments of the ANZ
on the merits of the case thereby refusing the petitioner of equal
protection before the law and appeal to competent bodies. They refer to
Section 24 of the Constitution which provides for the ‘Enforcement of
Protective Provisions' and states that "if any person alleges that the
declaration of rights has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in
relation to him…then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to
the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other
person) may subject to the provisions of subsection (3) apply to the Supreme
Court for redress"
62. The above section they claim gives the Court original jurisdiction to
enforce the provisions of the Bill of Rights, adding that the ANZ approached
the Court to enforce the very same tenets establishing the Court, i.e. to
protect fundamental rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, but the Court
abrogated its duty to decide on the constitutional soundness or validity of
the petition.
63. The Complainants submit that the absence of an effective remedy to
violations of rights recognised in the Convention is itself a violation of
the Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is lacking. In that
sense it should be emphasised that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not
sufficient that it be provided for by the Constitution or by law or that it
be formally recognised, but rather it must be truly effective in
establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in
providing redress.
64. According to the Complainants, a remedy which proves illusory because of
the conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particular
circumstances in a given case, cannot be considered effective, in the
opinion of the Inter-American Courts on Human Rights.[FN1]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN1] Advisory Opinion OC 9/87, also Annual Report 39/96 Case 11.673
Santiago Marzioni.
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65. The Complainants further argue that the determination of one's rights by
a competent and impartial tribunal is a procedural guarantee provided for in
the Charter, adding that to determine whether ones' rights have been
violated, the national body has to make an evaluation of the facts of the
case on the merits. According to them, the Supreme Court avoided dealing
with the petitioner's rights and the soundness of the claim, thereby
depriving the petitioners of an effective remedy.
66. The Complainants finally submit that with the decision of the Supreme
Court to decline to entertain the applicants, particularly given that the
decision was taken by the respondent's most senior Court in the land and
that the decision had the unanimous approval of all the justices of the
Court, local remedies have been exhausted.
RESPONDENT STATE'S SUBMISSION ON ADMISSIBILITY
67. The Respondent State submitted its argument on admissibility on 2
November 2004. The State notes that the Complainants' application is based
on section 24 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which allows anyone who feels
that the Declaration of Rights contained in the Constitution is being
violated in relation to him/her should apply to the Supreme Court for relief.
The State notes further that in the Complainants' application, they sought
the nullification of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(AIPPA) on the grounds that the latter is ultra vires section 20 of the
Republican Constitution.
68. The Respondent State submits further that at the time the application
was filed with the Supreme Court, the First Complainant, the Associated
Newspaper of Zimbabwe (ANZ) had not complied with section 66 of the AIPPA
which makes it an offence to provide mass media services without
registration. That the ANZ did not want to register in terms of the
provisions of the AIPPA because it viewed the legislation as
unconstitutional, and argued "it [could not] on conscience obey such a law".
69. The State added that the Supreme Court refrained from deliberating on
the merits of the case, directing the Complainants to "first put its house
in order", either by registering or by refraining from carrying on mass
media services, and thereafter approaching the courts. The State added that
the Complainants did not comply with the Court order but instead went ahead
to continue publishing. According to the Respondent State, this led to the
closure of its two papers and seizure of its property by the Police.
According to the Respondent State, the complainant subsequently made an
application to register in terms of the AIPPA but this application was
unsuccessful.
70. The Respondent State explains the background to the AIPPA and notes that
the Act was enacted by the Parliament of Zimbabwe in 2002 to, among other
things:
a. provide members of the public with the right of access to information
held by public bodies;
b. make public bodies accountable by giving a right to request correction of
misrepresented personal information;
c. prevent the authorised collection, use or disclosure of personal
information by public bodies;
d. protect personal privacy, to provide for the regulation of the mass media
and to establish a Media and Information Commission.
71. It notes further that the regulation of the mass media constitutes part
and not the sole provision of the Act, adding that prior to the enactment of
the Act, there was no regulation of the press in the country and that the
regulation was necessitated by a number of "irresponsible and misleading
publications in the media…" According to the State, to address the security
interests of the nation as well as protect the rights of others, the rights
which "hitherto the press enjoyed without statutory limitation were thus
subjected to control", adding that this was intended to instil discipline
and ensure responsibility within the profession.
72. The State notes further that notwithstanding the prohibition under the
Act, section 93 allows any person who was lawfully operating a mass media
service at the time of the coming into force of the Act to continue
practising for a period of three months from the date of commencement of the
Act. However, at the end of the three months, the necessary regulations were
not in place, the period was extended to the end of December 2002. The State
submits that Complainant's averment that "publication is specifically
allowed by the Law while any application for registration is pending", is
misleading.
73. The State submits that the Communication does not meet the requirements
under Article 56 (3), (5) and (6) of the African Charter and should thus be
declared inadmissible.
74. With regards to Article 56 (3), the State submits that the language used
in the Communication and its attachments is disparaging of the Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe. To support this claim the State refers the African Commission
to paragraphs (r) (page 6), 13, 15, 17, 18, 26, 27, 30 and 31 in the
Complainants' Summary of facts submitted on 10 November 2003. The State
submits further that on 12 September 2003, the Complainants published an
issue of its newspaper in which it stated inter alia that
"…the handing down of the judgment marked a sad day for Zimbabwe's
constitutional history. I suppose we should be immensely thankful that we
are not prisoners on death row because the practical effect of this judgment
is that had we have been challenging the death penalty and not AIPPA , we
would have had to hang first and challenge the penalty from hell."
According to the State, this statement shows the contempt that the
complainant has for the Supreme Court.
75. The State notes further that the implications of the statement and the
paragraphs mentioned above includes the fact that:
i. there is bias in the appointment of judges of the High Court and the
Supreme Court because they are appointed by the President;
ii. that the composition of the Supreme Court that heard the Complainants'
matter was manipulated so that a junior judge, Judge Sandura, was omitted.
The State claims that the use of the word "omitted" clearly connotes a
motive by the Chief Justice to exclude Judge Sandura; and
iii. that the Supreme Court was biased towards the government and therefore
acted not as the judiciary but as a political agent of the Government.
76. The State notes that its submission should not be taken as an attempt to
curtail freedom of expression and criticism of the judiciary but is intended
to protect the dignity of the judiciary, adding that the language used by
the Complainants go beyond mere criticism of the judiciary, that the
language is discourteous, contemptuous and disparaging and is clearly
intended to undermine the judiciary in the performance of its duties and
hence the administration of justice. It notes further that fair criticism of
the conduct of a judge, the institution of the judiciary and its functioning
may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in the public
interest, and good faith and the public interest are ascertained from all
the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for the
comments and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. The State concluded
by stating that the Complainants operated in apparent defiance of the law
and the decision of the Administrative Court and Supreme Court and now
invites the African Commission to sanction its defiance of the law and did
so in a language disparaging and insulting to the judiciary of Zimbabwe. It
notes that the Judiciary in Zimbabwe cannot enter into public or political
controversy as such involvement will bring the judiciary into disrepute and
it is therefore improper for the Complainants to make such disparaging
statements knowing very well that the judiciary cannot respond to the
statements.
77. Regarding Article 56 (5) on the exhaustion of local remedies, the State
notes that the Complainants indeed filed an application in terms of section
24 of the Constitution to challenge the constitutionality of AIPPA and
argues that the judgment on the matter is not yet out not because the
process is unduly prolonged but because of the Complainants' defiance of the
law. The State notes that the Complainants, after refusing to comply with
the AIPPA chose to comply with it later and is still pursuing its challenge
of its constitutionality and if the Complainants are successful, they will
be able to resume operations without going through the registration process.
78. The State notes that as at when the Complainants were submitting the
Communication to the Commission during the 34th Ordinary Session in November
2003, there was an application in the Supreme Court they were pursuing to
challenge the constitutionality of the AIPPA. The State notes further that
the Minister of State for Information and Publicity and Cabinet appealed a
decision that the Complainants should publish by 30 November 2004.
79. The State notes further that the provisional order sought by the
Complainants demonstrates that it has not exhausted local remedies. The
State referred the African Commission to the Complainants' statement in page
6 paragraph (r) that "[a]s a provisional measure necessary to uphold and
protect the rights contained in the Charter and avoid irremediable damage,
complainants ask the Commission to request that ANZ's computers and
equipment be returned and it be allowed to resume publication on the Daily
News immediately, until its question whether the impugned sections of the
Zimbabwe statute are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe has been properly heard and determined by an impartial tribunal"
80. The State also submitted that it is misleading for the Complainants to
argue that the Supreme Court did not consider the question of admissibility
as the Court made an obiter statement on the question of constitutionality.
The Respondent States finally notes that appeal by the Government of the
Republic against the decision of the Administrative Court was heard together
with the Complainants' constitutional application and judgment is awaited
and as such, the African Commission cannot entertain the Communication until
all local remedies have been exhausted.
AFRICAN COMMISSION'S DECISION ON ADMISSIBILITY
81. The current Communication is submitted pursuant to Article 55 of the
African Charter which allows the African Commission to receive and consider
Communications, other than from States Parties. Article 56 of the African
Charter provides that the admissibility of a Communication submitted
pursuant to Article 55 is subject to seven conditions.[FN2] The African
Commission has stressed that the conditions laid down in Article 56 are
conjunctive, meaning that, if any one of them is absent, the Communication
will be declared inadmissible.[FN3]
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[FN2] See Article 56 of the African Charter.
[FN3] See African Commission, Information Sheet No. 3.
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82. The Complainants in the present Communication argue that it has
satisfied the admissibility conditions set out in Article 56 of the Charter
and as such, the Communication should be declared admissible. The Respondent
State on its part submits that the Communication should be declared
inadmissible because, according to the State, the Complainants have not
complied with Article 56 (3), (5) and (6) of the African Charter.
83. Article 56 (3) of the Charter requires that Communications submitted to
the African Commission are not written in disparaging or insulting language
directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the
Organization of African Unity (or African Union).
84. In the present Communication, the Respondent State argues that the
Communication is written in a language insulting to the judiciary of the
State. The State avers that the Complainants published an issue of its
Newspaper (The Daily News) on 12 September 2003 in which it stated inter
alia that "…the handing down of the judgment marked a sad day for Zimbabwe's
constitutional history. I suppose we should be immensely thankful that we
are not prisoners on death row because the practical effect of this judgment
is that had we have been challenging the death penalty and not AIPPA , we
would have had to hang first and challenge the penalty from hell". According
to the State, this statement shows the contempt that the Complainants have
for the Supreme Court.
85. The State claims further that by stating in the Communication that a
Judge of the Supreme Court - Judge Sandura, was omitted from the case
Complainants were insinuating that the composition of the Supreme Court was
manipulated. The State claims that the use of the word "omitted" in the
Communication clearly connotes a motive by the Chief Justice, who selects
judges to sit on a case, to have excluded Judge Sandura and that there is
bias in the appointment of judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court
because they are appointed by the President, and that that the Supreme Court
was biased towards the government and therefore acted not as the judiciary
but as a political agent of the Government.
86. In response to the State's allegation of disparaging language, the
Complainants refuted the allegation and noted that the language was
necessary in that it sought to describe the effect of the judgment on the
Complainants. The Complainants also described a number of situations in
which it claims the Respondent State itself had made "uncharitable remarks
against the same judiciary…" which they consider as insulting and
disparaging and far removed from the "criticism that is contained in the
Complainants' brief" which according to them "are aimed at showing the
absence of a local remedy in the light of the decision by the Supreme Court".
87. The fundamental question that has to be addressed in the present
Communication is how far one can go in criticizing a judge or the judiciary
in the name of free expression, and whether the statement made by the
Complainants constitutes insulting or disparaging language within the
meaning of Article 56 (3) of the African Charter. Indeed, the Communication
invites the Commission to clarify the ostensible relationship between
freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of the judiciary
and the judicial process.
88. The operative words in sub-paragraph 3 in Article 56 are disparaging and
insulting and these words must be directed against the State Party concerned
or its institutions or the African Union. According to the Oxford Advanced
Dictionary, disparaging means to speak slightingly of… or to belittle…. and
insulting means to abuse scornfully or to offend the self respect or modesty
of…
89. The judiciary is a very important institution in every country and
cannot function properly without the support and trust of the public. Judges,
by the very nature of the profession, speak in courts and courts only. They
are not at liberty to debate or even defend their decisions in public. This
manner of conducting the business of the courts is intended to enhance
public confidence. In the final analysis, it is the people who have to
believe in the integrity of their judges. Without such trust, the judiciary
cannot function properly, and where the judiciary cannot function properly
the rule of law must die. Because of the importance of preserving public
trust in the judiciary and because of the reticence required for it to
perform its arbitral role, special safeguards have been in existence for
many centuries to protect the judiciary against vilification. One such
protective device is to deter insulting or disparaging remarks or language
calculated to bring the judicial process into ridicule and disrepute.
90. The freedom to speak one's mind and debate the conduct of public affairs
by the judiciary does not mean that attacks, however scurrilous, can with
impunity be made on the judiciary as an institution or on individual
officers. A clear line cannot be drawn between acceptable criticism of the
judiciary and statements that are downright harmful to the administration of
justice. Statements concerning judicial officers in the performance of their
judicial duties have, or can have, a much wider impact than merely hurting
their feelings or impugning their reputations. Because of the grave
implications of a loss of public confidence in the integrity of the judges,
public comment calculated to bring the judiciary into disrepute and shame
has always been regarded with disfavour.
91. In determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and
whether it has dampened the integrity of the judiciary, the Commission has
to satisfy itself whether the said remark or language is aimed at unlawfully
and intentionally violating the dignity, reputation or integrity of a
judicial officer or body and whether it is used in a manner calculated to
pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast aspersions on
and weaken public confidence on the administration of justice. The language
must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status of the institution and
bring it into disrepute. To this end, Article 56 (3) must be interpreted
bearing in mind Article 9 (2) of the African Charter which provides that
"every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his
opinions within the law". A balance must be struck between the right to
speak freely and the duty to protect state institutions to ensure that while
discouraging abusive language, the African Commission is not at the same
time violating or inhibiting the enjoyment of other rights guaranteed in the
African Charter, such as in this case, the right to freedom of expression.
92. The importance of the right to freedom of expression was aptly stated by
the African Commission in Communications 140/94, 141/94, 145/94 against
Nigeria [FN4] when it held that freedom of expression is a basic human right,
vital to an individual's personal development and political consciousness,
and to his participation in the conduct of public affairs in his country.
Individuals cannot participate fully and fairly in the functioning of
societies if they must live in fear of being persecuted by state authorities
for exercising their right to freedom of expression.
The state must be required to uphold, protect and guarantee this right if it
wants to engage in an honest and sincere commitment to democracy and good
governance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN4] Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media
Rights Agenda/Nigeria, 13th Annual Activity Report of the OAU, 1999–2000.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
93. Over the years, the line to be drawn between genuine criticism of the
judiciary and insulting language has grown thinner. With the advancement of
the politics of human rights, good governance, democracy and free and open
societies, the public has to balance the question of free expression and
protecting the reputation of the judiciary. Lord Atkin expressed the basic
relationship between the two values in Ambard v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago
(1936) 1 All ER 704 at 709 in the following words:
"but whether the authority and position of an individual judge or the due
administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member
of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good faith
in private or public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism
is a public way…Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to
suffer scrutiny and respectful even through outspoken comments of ordinary
men."
94. More recently Corbett CJ in Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v
Esselen's Estate (1994) 2 SA expressed the modern balance as follows:
Judges, because of their position in society and because of the work which
they do, inevitably on occasion attract public criticism and that it is
right and proper that they should be publicly accountable…Criticism of
judgments, particularly by academic commentators, is at times acerbic,
personally oriented and hurtful…To some extent what in former times may have
been regarded as intolerable must today be tolerated…. This, too, will help
maintain a balance between the need for public accountability and the need
to protect the judiciary and to shield it from wanton attack
95. In an open and democratic society individuals must be allowed to express
their views freely and especially with regards to public figures, such views
must not be taken as insulting. The freedom to speak one's mind is now an
inherent quality of a democratic and open society. It is the right of every
member of civil society to be interested in and concerned about public
affairs – including the activities of the courts.
96. In the present communication, the Respondent State has not established
that by stating that one of the judges of the Supreme Court was "omitted"
the Complainants has brought the judiciary into disrepute. The State hasn't
shown the detrimental effect of this statement on the judiciary in
particular and the administration of justice as a whole. In its submission
to the Commission, the Complainants indicated that
"… [t]he judges who issued the judgment sat as the country's constitutional
court, constituted as usual by a bench of five. The country only has six
Supreme Court judges. The most senior judge, Justice Sandura, was omitted
from the Court's line-up, but he cannot now constitute a new bench, either
by sitting alone or by sitting with acting judges of appeal". In the opinion
of the Commission, the Complainants were simply stating a fact - a fact to
demonstrate that in their view, it had approached the highest judicial body
in the country. The use of the word "omitted" can not in the Commission's
view be seen as disparaging or insulting to the judiciary. There is no
evidence to show that it was used in bad faith or calculated to poison the
mind of the public against the judiciary.
97. With regards the Respondent State's claim that the Complainants
published an article with disparaging language in their Newspaper edition of
12 September 2003, the African Commission cannot make a pronouncement on the
same as the purported statement does not form part of the complaint
submitted to the Commission. Article 56 (3) of the Charter requires that
Communications submitted to the African Commission are not written in
disparaging or insulting language…. Communications within the meaning of
Articles 55 and 56 refer to the complaints submitted by petitioners. These
complaints invariably include other documentations submitted by the
petitioner to support their case, such as annexes. Documents supplied by
third parties or the Respondent cannot and should not form part of the
complaint. In the present Communication, neither the complaint itself nor
the annexes thereto made reference to the statement purportedly published by
the Complainant in its Newspaper edition of 12 September 2003. For the above
reasons, the Commission decline to uphold the Respondent State's argument
that the Communication is written in disparaging and insulting language.
98. With regards the exhaustion of local remedies, Complainants submit that
domestic remedies are ineffective, that the Respondent State has been given
the opportunity to remedy the grievance submitted before the Commission but
the State, through its courts, has proved unable to do so. The Respondent
State on its part argues that the matter is still before the Supreme Court,
the highest court in the country, and has been pending before the Court
simply because of the Complainants' "defiance of the law".
99. It is a well established rule of customary international law that before
international proceedings are instituted, the various remedies provided by
the State should have been exhausted. The principle of the exhaustion of
local remedies is contained in Article 56(5) of the African Charter and
provides that Communications relating to human and peoples' rights referred
to in Article 55 received by the African Commission shall be considered if
they "are sent after the exhaustion of local remedies, if any, unless it is
obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged".
100. International mechanisms are not substitutes for domestic
implementation of human rights, but should be seen as tools to assist the
domestic authorities to develop a sufficient protection of human rights in
their territories. If a victim of a human rights violation wants to bring an
individual case before an international body, he or she must first have
tried to obtain a remedy from the national authorities. It must be shown
that the State was given an opportunity to remedy the case itself before
resorting to an international body. This reflects the fact that States are
not considered to have violated their human rights obligations if they
provide genuine and effective remedies for the victims of human rights
violations.
101. The international bodies do recognize however, that in many countries,
remedies may be non-existent or illusory. They have therefore developed
rules about the characteristics which remedies should have, the way in which
the remedies have to be exhausted and special circumstances where it might
not be necessary to exhaust them. The African Commission has held that for
the domestic remedies referred to in Article 56 (5) of the Charter to be
exhausted they must be available, effective and sufficient. If the domestic
remedies do not meet these criteria, a victim may not have to exhaust them
before complaining to an international body. However, the complainant needs
to be able to show that the remedies do not fulfil these criteria in
practice, not merely in the opinion of the victim or that of his or her
legal representative.
102. If a Complainant wishes to argue that a particular remedy does not have
to be exhausted because it is unavailable, ineffective or insufficient, the
procedure is as follows: (a) the Complainant states that the remedy did not
have to be exhausted because it is ineffective (or unavailable or
insufficient) - this does not yet have to be proven; (b) the Respondent
State must then show that the remedy is available, effective and sufficient;
and (c) if the Respondent State is able to establish this, then the
Complainant must either demonstrate that he or she did exhaust the remedy,
or that it could not have been effective in the specific case, even if it
may be effective in general.
103. In the present Communication, the Complainants and the Respondent State
seem to have reached what the Commission would call a "legal impasse". The
Complainants argue that the domestic remedy provided by the Respondent State
is ineffective and cannot remedy their grievance, while the State contends
that the remedy is available and effective but the Complainants' defiance of
the law has prevented them from using it. Usually, when there is a legal
disagreement between two parties, the appropriate national institution to
resolve that disagreement is the domestic courts. In the present
Communication, the Complainants have been to the highest court of the
country and the latter refused to hear and determine Complainants' grievance
on the merits claiming Complainants have approached it with dirty hands.
Complainants argue that on matters of fundamental human rights, as is the
case with the present Communication, the dirty hands doctrine invoked by the
Supreme Court cannot be used as it would be undermining the supremacy of the
Constitution. According to the Complainants therefore, the domestic remedy
available is not effective because it is incapable of redressing the
grievance and that is why the matter has been referred to the Commission.
104. A brief account of the circumstances of the case would be helpful to
determine whether Complainants' argument that there is no effective remedy
or the State's contention that the Complainants haves not exhausted domestic
remedies is correct.
105. On 15 March 2002, the Respondent State enacted a law, the Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act which required media practitioners
to register their businesses before operating in the country. In terms of
Section 93 of the Act, any person who immediately the Act became law was
publishing a Newspaper was deemed to be lawfully registered for a period of
three months, that is, up to 15 June 2002. It was envisaged that those who
were required to register would apply and be registered within the three
months period. However, the Regulations to the Act prescribing the various
forms that had to be used for registration were published only on the date
the three months was due to expire, 15 June 2002. This means that no
application for registration could be made before 15 June 2002. To cater for
this delay, section 8(2) of the Regulations provides that once a person has
submitted an application for registration, then that person is permitted to
carry on mass media activities while the application is being considered.
106. Meantime, the Complainants sought to challenge the constitutionality of
the Act claiming the Act was unconstitutional and thus null and void ab
initio. The Complainants applied to the Supreme Court for an order declaring
certain provisions of the Act a nullity. The application was heard on 3 June
2003. On 11 September 2003, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling that it
was not prepared to hear and determine the merits of the case until the
applicant (the Complainants) had registered, that is, comply with the Act. A
day after the ruling, that is, 12 September 2003, Complainants published an
edition of their Newspaper, the Daily News. That same day, police visited
the premises of the Complainants and evicted all employees there from.
107. After discussions with the police on 13 September 2003, Complainants
were given permission to enter the premises with a few staff to prepare
documents to apply for registration. On 15 September 2003, Complainants
submitted application for registration to the Media and Information
Commission and the application was duly acknowledged on the same day. On 16
September 2003, Respondent's agents - the police, raided the premises of
Complainants seizing equipment – computers, printers and other office
accessories belonging to Complainants. On 17 September Complainants went to
the High Court seeking an order that Respondent vacates the premises and
restore possession and control thereof to them and return all goods and
equipment removed from the premises. On 18 September, the High Court ruled
in favour of the Complainants and ordered the Respondent to return the
property. The Court also noted that in terms of section 8 (2) of the
Regulations, the Respondent has no legal right to prevent the applicant and
its employees from gaining access to the premises of the applicant and
carrying on its business of publishing a Newspaper.
108. On 19 September 2003, the MIC informed the Complainants that its
application for registration could not be granted because Complainants have
been operating illegally even after the Supreme Court Order of 11 September
2003 and that the Complainants had failed to accredit is journalists. On
23rd September 2003, the Complainants lodged an appeal with the
Administrative Court of Zimbabwe against the decision of the MIC claiming
that MIC was improperly constituted, acted ultra vires and that the
Chairperson of the MIC was biased. On 24 October 2003, the Administrative
Court upheld the arguments of the Complainants and ordered the MIC to grant
a certificate of registration to the Complainants by the 30th of November
2003. Before the certificate could be issued and before the 30th of November
2003, Complainants went ahead and published on 25 November 2003, another
edition of its Newspaper – The Daily News. The Respondent State claims it
has appealed the decision of the Administrative Court and it is this appeal
which the State is claiming is still before the courts and thus domestic
remedies have not been exhausted.
109. In view of the above scenario, it is apparent to the African Commission
that there are two matters that the Complainants have taken to the Courts of
the Responding State. The one is a matter to declare the AIPPA
unconstitutional, which the Supreme Court on 11 September 2003 declined to
entertain on condition that Complainants comply with AIPPA – the same Act
they sought to challenge before the Court. The second matter brought before
the Administrative Court is the one to appeal against the decision of the
Media and Information Commission not to grant the complainant registration
to operate media services. The Administrative Court ruled in favour of the
Complainants and the State claims to have appealed the decision.
110. Both matters originate from the Complainants' desire to challenge the
AIPPA. The matter for which the African Commission is called upon to decide
is clear. It is the decision of the Supreme Court not to rule on the
Complainants' challenge of the constitutionality of AIPPA. After the Supreme
Court decision of 11 September 2003, the Complainants argue that there was
no other court available in the country to hear the matter. Since the
Complainants disagreed with the reasoning of the Supreme Court for not
making a determination on the merits of the matter and since the Court sat
as the highest court in the land on the matter, there was no other avenue
for appeal. As far as the Complainants are concerned, the only domestic
remedy available, the Supreme Court, was not able to deal with the
particular case and as such was ineffective. The Complainants therefore
approached the African Commission to seek redress. The Communication to the
African Commission was submitted on 12 November 2003, twelve days before the
decision of the Administrative Court on another matter – that dealing with
the MIC's refusal to grant the Complainants a registration certificate.
111. In the opinion of the African Commission, the two cases, though
stemming from the same matter, cannot be considered as pending before the
courts of the Respondent State. The appeal of the Respondent on the
Administrative Court's decision has no bearing on the case before the
African Commission, because the Respondent State has not established that
the Complainants intend to use the outcome of that case to revert to the
Supreme Court to hear its original application on the constitutionality of
AIPPA. Also, the fact that the Complainants submitted the present
Communication to the Commission while the appeal on the other case was still
pending indicates that the outcome of the appeal had no bearing on the case
submitted to the Commission. There is no information submitted to the
African Commission to the effect that the matter before it is on appeal.
What the Commission knows is that the Supreme Court refused to hear the
matter on the merits and ordered Complainants to go and put its house in
order. Complainants have not indicated that they intend to put their house
in order and revert to the Court.
112. In view of the above, the African Commission is of the view that the
matter for which the State has appealed is not before it and has not been
brought to it by any of the parties. However, on the matter submitted to it
by the Complainants, the latter has demonstrated that it has seized the
highest Court in the country and could not get appropriate remedy.
113. It is immaterial at this stage to discuss why the Supreme Court refused
to hear the Complainants' case. What the Complainants need to do is to
satisfy the African Commission that it approached the Supreme Court with the
current grievance and failed to get remedy. This, in the opinion of the
Commission, has been aptly demonstrated.
114. Regarding the Supreme Court ruling of 14 March 2005, the African
Commission recognises the fact that the parties to the case are the same,
that the subject matter is similar to those brought by the Complainants
before the same Supreme Court in June 2003 and which the latter ruled on 11
September 2003 against the Complainants.
115. The question before the African Commission at this stage is not to
determine whether the Complainant have, subsequent to the submission of the
Communication to the Commission, had their grievances resolved, but rather
whether at the time of submitting the Communication, domestic remedies were
available, effective and sufficient.
116. The African Commission has held that a remedy is considered available
if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment. In communication 147/95
and 149/96, the Commission held that a remedy is considered available only
if the applicant can make use of it in the circumstances of his case. It is
deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found
sufficient if it is capable of redressing the complaint. [FN5]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN5] Sir Dawda Jawara v The Gambia, communication 147/95 and 149/96.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117. The facts as presented before the African Commission indicate that at
the time the Communication was submitted the Complainants had approached the
highest court in the Respondent State – the only domestic remedy available
to address the grievance. The Court declined to make a determination on the
merits of the case brought by the Complainants requiring the Complainants
instead to undertake an action which was the very subject matter of the
application.
118. By refusing to make a determination on the merits of the case and by
"forcing" the Complainants to perform that which it was challenging before
the Court, the Supreme Court effectively demonstrated its inability to
address the question put to it by the Complainants and made domestic
remedies unavailable and ineffective in the instance of the Complainants'
case and left the latter with no other alternative than to resort to the
international forum to seek protection.
119. The availability of a remedy must be sufficiently certain, not only in
theory but also in practice, failing which, it will lack the requisite
accessibility and effectiveness. Therefore, if the applicant cannot turn to
the judiciary of his country because he is required by the same judiciary to
first of all recognise that which he is challenging, local remedies would be
deemed to be unavailable to him. In the present Communication, that seems to
have been the case.
120. The Respondent State, without elaborating, also argues that the
Complainants have not complied with Article 56 (6) of the African Charter.
This sub–article provides that Communications referred to under Article 55
of the Charter shall be considered if they…are submitted within a reasonable
period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the
Commission is seized with the matter…". The Communication was received at
the Secretariat of the African Commission on 12 November 2003, two months
after the Supreme Court refused to hear the matter on the merits. It is the
opinion of the Commission that the Communication was submitted within a
reasonable time.
121. For the above reasons, the African Commission declines to grant the
Respondent State's request for the Communication to be declared inadmissible
and upholds the Complainants' arguments that all the conditions under
Article 56 have been met and thus declares the Communication admissible.
SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS
COMPLAINANTS' SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS
122. The Complainants submit that, the Respondent State's court, by invoking
the dirty hands doctrine and refusing to hear their case, violated their
rights guaranteed in Articles 3, 7, 9, 14 and 15 of the African Charter. The
Complainants are not asking the Commission to pronounce on the compatibility
of the AIPPA to the African Charter.
123. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 3, they submit that the
failure of the Supreme Court to decide whether the AIPPA was
unconstitutional was a violation of their right to equal protection of the
law, adding that this refusal ‘collides not only with the letter and spirit
of the Charter but more so with universal law as expressed in several other
documents such as Article 2 (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as
well as Articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter.
124. According to the Complainants, the relief sought by ANZ was a
determination of the constitutionality or otherwise of an Act of Parliament,
and the Court was supposed to decide on the facts of the alleged violations
and ‘not on the presumption of non-compliance with an Act of Parliament'.
That by deciding on a procedural aspect on a principle of equity which was
not applicable to matters pertaining to human rights, the Court denied the
ANZ the right to equal protection before the law as provided in the Charter.
125. The Complainants argue that the right to equal protection of the law is
guaranteed in the constitution of the Respondent State thus:
‘any one who has reason to belief that his fundamental rights are about to
be violated or are likely to be violated can petition the Court for its
immediate intervention'. The Complainants submit that ‘to then rely on a
doctrine of equity addressing an issue which is believed to stem from the
rights protected by the constitution will not only be depriving the
petitioner of an effective remedy but also denial of the right to protection
of the law'.
126. Regarding allegation of violation of Article 7, Complainants argue that
by refusing to hear the merits of their petition, the supreme court proved
to be ineffective in acting both as the court of first instance in matters
relating to human rights, and in their case, as final tribunal. They argue
that for an appeal to a competent body to be considered to be effective,
there must be an equally effective decision to remedy the violation of the
right of the petitioner. The decision that results from the appeal need not
be favourable to the petitioner but it must be considered effective in so
far as it addresses the petition.
127. The Complainants argue further that the right to appeal to competent
authorities on allegation of human rights violations should not be dealt
with on procedural aspects only, but the competent body, in this case the
Supreme Court, should make a decision based on the merits of the petition.
According to the Complainants, in their case, the Court denied them the
right to be heard and therefore denying them justice.
128. The Complainants indicate that the determination of one's rights by a
competent tribunal is a procedural guarantee provided for in the Charter. To
determine whether one's rights have been violated, the national body has to
make a determination on the merits of the petition. In the present case,
they argue, the Supreme Court refused to determine the merits of the case
thereby depriving them of an effective remedy. The Complainants go further
to state that the application of the clean hands doctrine in matters
relating to constitutional challenges actually results in legal
unpredictability and could ultimately lead to disorder, adding that
non-judicial decision of a bona fide case deprives litigants as well as
future actors of that knowledge of effective remedies, and the fact that an
Act has been passed into law does not preclude one from challenging its
constitutionality and the notion of complying with an illegality first does
not tally with the notion of constitutional supremacy and laws which are not
in conformity with the constitution are void ab initio.
129. The Complainants further submit that by declining to decide on the
constitutionality of the AIPPA, the Court abdicated on its primary duty as
the protector of fundamental human rights and denied the petitioners the
right to be heard and the protection of the law.
130. In conclusion, the Complainants submit that the role of the African
Commission in the matter is not to interpret the law being challenged or
declare that the decision of the domestic court was unconstitutional, but it
is rather to establish whether the decision of the court is in violation of
the Charter. They implore the Commission to find that by applying the
unclean hands doctrine in matters relating to constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe violated the rights guaranteed in the Charter, in
particular, equal protection of the law, fair trial and the right to appeal
to competent bodies.
RESPONDENT STATE'S SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS
131. In its submissions, the Respondent State argues that all the
Complainant's submissions are without merit. The State cited the Supreme
Court decision in Association of Independent Journalists and Others vs.
Minister of State for Information and Publicity and others, where it was
held that any law that seeks to regulate the practice of journalism has to
conform to the stringent requirements for a law abridging the right
conferred by section 20 of the Constitution in order to be valid. The State
emphasised that the Media Commission does not have any discretion and that
anybody who complies with the requirements of section 79 is entitled to
accreditation. According to the State, the implication is that, if the
requirements are too onerous, then the regulations, including section 83
which prohibits practicing as a journalist without accrediation, could be
held to be unconstitutional.
132. The Complainants indicate that, regulations require personal
information which includes marital status, national identity number,
residential address, criminal record and details of accreditation to a
specific media house. They claim that for purposes of licensing, these
requirements cannot be said to be onerous.
133. According to the Respondent State, statitics held by the Media and
Information Commission portrayed that none of these requirements are onerous.
134. The Respondent State argues that the Complainants' claim that it is
dangerous for journalists to disclose their residential address for fear of
arrest after midnight cannot go unchallenged because there is no prove as to
the fact that any journalist has been arrested at midnight after having
filed the application for accreditation.
135. The Respondent quotes Article 9(2) of the African Charter, where the
African Commission in interpreting the phrase ‘within the law' has said that
the authorities should not overide constitutional provisions and fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution and International human rights
standards.[FN6] The Respondent recognises that national law cannot set aside
the right to express and disseminate information which is recognised under
international law.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN6] Communication 101/1993.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
136. Furthermore, the State contends that the Charter recognises the right
of the State to justify resorting to limitation of the right which has to be
justifiable in terms of international practice, and measures taken must be
in line with protected interest, adding that Section 20(1) of the Zimbabwen
Constitution is in line with Article 9(2) of the Charter. The Constitution
provides for derogration of a fundamental right where the derogration is
according to law.
137. The Respondent State submits further that, the legislation applies to
all media houses and practictioners who wish to practice in Zimbabwe without
posing any threat to the right of the public to receive information.
138. In addition to the above, that mere registration of the media does not
inhibit the practice of journalism and that the Complainants' submission
does not portray how exercise of that right is curtailed by the requirement
of registration. The State quotes the wordings of Article 13 of the European
Convention which grants an absolute right as opposed to Article 9(2) of the
African Charter, adding that the interpretation by the American Convention
is different from that in article 10.1 of the European Convention which
empowers legislation in respect for licensing of broadcasting, television
and cinema, and Artilce 9 of the African Charter which allows for the
execise of the right. Therefore, the State asserts, within the African
Charter provisions, there is nothing that stops both technical and
journalistic regulation as long as it is in accordance with the Charter.
139. The Respondent State contends that, the objective of regulating
journalists is not to control them and to prevent or limit critical
journalism, rather it is within the ambit of allowable derogations within
the Charter.
140. According to the Respondent, the provisions being challenged by the
Complainant may cause inconveniences to journalists. However, that they are
not arbitrary and oppressive and do not violate the right of freedom of
expression.
141. The State further submit that, the accreditation of journalists and
licensing of the media is constitutional and compliant to the Charter.
142. The Repondent therefore submit that both sections 79 and 80 of the
AIPPA are not in contravention of Article 9 of the Charter. Furthermore,
that the provisions of Article 27(2), in line with section 20(1) of the
Constitution and section 80 of the AIPPA provide that the rights and
freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights,
collective security, morality and common interest.
143. The Respondent State therefore prays that the Commission finds that the
legislation in question does not violate Article 9 of the Charter as alleged
by the Complainant.
RESPONDENT STATE'S SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS
144. During the 41st Ordinary Session, the Respondent State made a
supplementary submission claiming that it never received the Complainant's
submissions on the merits prior to submitting its original submission on the
merits, adding that the supplementary submissions was meant to address the
issues raised by the Complainants.
145. In its submissions, the Respondent State notes that Complainants argue
that there are civil and criminal sanctions for injuria and defamation which
already regulate the conduct of journalists and hence no need for further
legislation, that registration requirements are unduly intrusive and
burdensome, and that compliance with the requirements does not necessarily
guarantee registration of a journalist as the MIC has the discretion to
decide whether or not to register a journalist. The Respondent State claims
that each of the Complainants' submissions referred to above and elsewhere
are without merit.
146. The African Commission finds that supplementary submission of the
Respondent State does not depart from its earlier submission summarised in
paragraphs 131 – 143 of this decision.
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION'S DECISION ON THE MERITS
147. In the present Communication, the Commission is called upon to make a
determination whether the decision of a domestic court, the highest court of
the land in the Respondent State, not to hear a petition brought by the
Complainants because the latter came before the Court with ‘dirty hands', is
a violation of the Charter. In other words, did the Supreme Court violate
the rights of the Complainants by invoking the equitable doctrine of ‘he who
comes to equity must come with clean hands'? The Commission is not called
upon to determine the constitutionality of the AIPPA which was the subject
at issue before the Supreme Court. The Commission is also not called upon to
determine whether the AIPPA or provisions thereof, violate the African
Charter. It is called upon to determine whether by invoking the dirty hands
doctrine, the Respondent State, through its Court, violated the right to
have the Complainants' cause heard, as guaranteed under Article 7 (1) (a) of
the African Charter.
WHAT IS THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE?
148. According to the Black's Law Dictionary (2000), the clean hands
doctrine is an equitable principle which requires that a party cannot seek
equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has violated
an equitable principle such as good faith. It bars relief to persons who are
guilty of misconduct in the matter for which they seek relief. It is a
positive defense that is available where the complaint by the claimant is
equitable.
149. Normally, equitable relief is generally available when a legal remedy
is insufficient or inadequate to deal with the issue. These rights and
procedures were created to provide fairness, unhampered by the narrow
confines of the old common law or technical requirements of the law. It was
recognised that sometimes the common law did not provide adequate remedies
to solve all problems hence the creation of the courts of equity by the
monarch.
150. However, in modern days, separate courts of equity have largely been
abolished and the same courts that may award a legal remedy have the power
to prescribe an equitable one. With time, certain aspects of equity were
imported into the law and one such import is the doctrine of Clean Hands.
151. It is notable also that it is quite a controversial doctrine
particularly in the sphere of public law where the formulation is that the
responsibility of the state is not engaged when the complainant has acted in
breach of the law of the state. However, as an equitable rule extended to
the domain of law, it is necessary to be cautious when applying it
particularly in cases where fundamental legal/human rights are involved.
152. In the present Communication, the relief sought by the Complainants
before he Supreme Court was a determination by the Court whether an Act of
Parliament, enacted by the Respondent State, violated or was likely to
violate their fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and
other international human rights instruments, including the African Charter.
According to the Supreme Court, the petition could not be entertained
because the Complainants approached the Court with dirty hands. They (the
Complainants) had refused to comply with the very law they approached the
Court to challenge. The Court thus invoked the equitable doctrine of ‘he who
comes to equity must come with clean hands', and refuse to entertain the
Complainants' request for the Court to determine the constitutionality of
the Act they were challenging.
153. The question before the Commission is whether the Supreme Court, by
invoking the clean hands doctrine, and refusing to entertain the merits of
the petition of the Complainants, violated the rights of the Complainants
and in effect, the African Charter.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3
154. The Complainants allege the violation of Article 3 of the African
Charter. This Article provides that:
‘Every individual shall be equal before the law, and every individual shall
be entitled to equal protection of the law ".According to the Complainants,
by applying the unclean hands doctrine and refusing to hear the merits of
their case, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe violated the right to equal
protection of the law guaranteed under Article 3 of the African Charter. The
State did not address itself to this allegation.
155. Article 3 guarantees fair and just treatment of individuals within the
legal system of a given country. The aim of this principle is to ensure
equality of treatment for individuals irrespective of nationality, sex,
racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation.
156. The most fundamental meaning of equality before the law provided for
under Article 3(1) of the Charter is the right by all to have the same
procedures and principles applied under the same conditions.
157. The right to equality before the law means that citizens should expect
to be treated fairly and justly within the legal system and be assured of
equal treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights available
to all other citizens. With respect to Article 3(2) on the right of equal
protection of the law, the African Commission in its decision in Zimbabwe
Lawyers for human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development
/Republic Of Zimbabwe[FN7], relied on the Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka,[FN8] in which Chief Justice Earl Warren of the
United State of America argued that ‘equal protection of the law refers to
the right of all persons to have the same access to the law and courts and
to be treated equally by the law and courts, both in procedures and in the
substance of the law. It is akin to the right to due process of law, but in
particular applies to equal treatment as an element of fundamental fairness.[FN9]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FN7] Communication 293/2004.
[FN8] 347 U.S 483 (1954).
[FN9] www.legal-explanations.com.
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158. In order for a party to establish a successful claim under Article 3 of
the Charter, it should show that, the Respondent State has not given the
Complainant the same treatment it accorded to the others in a similar
situation. Or that, the Respondent State had accorded favourable treatment
to others in the same position as the Complainant.
159. In the present Communication, the Commission notes that the
Complainants have not demonstrated the extent to which the Courts treated
them differently from the Respondent State or from any other party in a
similar situation. This seems to be the first instance where the Supreme
Court is approached to deal with the kind of matter raised by the
Complainants and there is no evidence to indicate that the Complainants were
treated differently. The African Commission can therefore not find the
Respondent State to have violated the Complainants' rights under Article 3
of the African Charter.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7
160. With respect to the alleged violation of Article 7 of the African
Charter, the Complainants submit that the right to have their cause heard,
in particular, the right to an appeal to competent national organs against
acts violating their fundamental rights… guaranteed under Article 7 (1) (a)
of the African Charter have been violated. The Respondent State on its part
argues that their right to be heard has not been violated, noting that
Complainants' have disregarded the law.
161. The Respondent State operates a legal system where the Constitution
reigns supreme. Article 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that
"this Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is
inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of
the inconsistency, be void". This means any law that violates the
Constitution, or any conduct that conflicts with it, can be challenged and
struck down by the courts.
162. The fundamental rights of Zimbabweans are enshrined in Chapter 3 of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe entitled the Declaration of Rights (Bill of Rights).
All legislation passed by Parliament must conform to the Bill of Rights
provisions of the Constitution. If a legislative provision is inconsistent
with the Bill of Rights, the courts, in particular, the Supreme Court, have
been given the power to declare it to be void and of no force and effect.
163. This function to determine constitutionality or compatibility or
otherwise of laws with the Constitution rests with the Supreme Court of the
Respondent State. Thus, when there are doubts about the constitutionality of
a new legislation, persons affected are entitled to obtain a ruling from the
Supreme Court as to whether or not the legislation is constitutional.
164. The Supreme Court has also been given extensive powers to provide
appropriate remedies to persons whose fundamental rights have been violated.
In terms of Section 24 (1) of the Constitution, if any person alleges that
the Declaration of Rights has been, is being or is likely to be contravened
in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is detained, if any
other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person),
then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter
which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may, subject
to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Supreme Court for redress.
165. In view of the importance attached to fundamental rights, Article 24
(4) provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction -
to hear and determine any application made by any person pursuant to
subsection (1) or to determine without a hearing any such application which,
in its opinion, is merely frivolous or vexatious; and… may make such orders,
issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for
the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of the Declaration of
Rights:
166. In terms of the Constitution, there are at least two instances in which
the Supreme Court can decline to entertain an application to determine the
constitutionality of a law. The first is when in its view, the application
is vexatious or frivolous; and the second is when the Supreme Court is
satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are
or have been available to the person concerned under other provisions of the
Constitution or under any other law. In the present Communication, neither
of the two grounds could apply. The Court did not find the application
vexatious or frivolous and there was no other adequate means of redress of
the issue as the Supreme Court in the Respondent State has original and
final jurisdiction with respect to matters dealing with fundamental rights.
167. Article 24 of the Constitution does not provide any time bar or an
indication on when one should approach the Supreme Court to seek redress for
any alleged violation of their rights. The Constitution simply provides that
anyone who believes his rights have been, are being or are likely to be
violated can approach the Court. This means that a law can be challenged at
any time, depending on the circumstances, and on how the alleged victim
perceive the law as interfering with the enjoyment of their rights, that is,
whether the law has already violated the person's rights, whether the law is
violating the person's rights or whether the law is likely to violate the
person's rights.
168. In the case under consideration, the Complainants argue that the law
enacted by Parliament is likely to violate their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of the Respondent State and under international human rights
instruments. For this reason, they approached the Supreme Court to declare
those sections of the law they believed would likely violate their rights,
unconstitutional. In the Supreme Court, the Respondent State raised the
point in limine that the Applicant (Complainants before the Commission),
ought not to be heard on the merits as it had not sought registration. The
Supreme Court upheld the Respondent State's contention, and in its ruling
advised the applicant to seek registration with the Respondent State before
approaching it (the Supreme Court) for the relief on the merits of the
constitutional challenge.
169. Can it be said that the Complainants were refused to be heard by the
Supreme Court? In other words, by not hearing the Complainants' petition on
the merits, could it be argued that their right to have their cause heard
has been violated?
170. To answer this question, the Commission will have to determine the
meaning of having ‘one's cause heard' under Article 7(1)(a) of the Charter.
171. Article 7(1) of the African Charter provides that "every individual
shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right
to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws,
regulations and customs in force".
172. The right to have one's cause heard requires that the matter has been
brought before a tribunal with the competent jurisdiction to hear the case.
A tribunal which is competent in law to hear a case has been given that
power by law: it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person,
and the trial is being conducted within any applicable time limit prescribed
by law.
173. In the present Communication, the Complainants argue that the Supreme
Court failed to hear their ‘cause' on the merits. The Supreme Court instead
pronounced itself on a preliminary objection raised by the Respondent State
that the Complainants were before the Court with dirty hands. In its ruling,
the Supreme Court directed the Complainants to go and do that which they
were challenging (to register in accordance with the Respondent State's Law
they were challenging before the Court), and it is only then that their
‘cause' could be heard on the merits.
174. In the opinion of the Commission, a ‘cause' before a tribunal must be
construed in broader terms to include everything related to the matter,
including preliminary issues raised on the matter. The Court need not
pronounce itself on the merits of the substantive matter. It simply needs to
hear the parties. Thus, by pronouncing on the preliminary issue raised by
the Respondent State on the question brought by the Complainants, the
Supreme Court in effect heard the ‘cause' of the Complainants. Besides, the
Supreme Court did not close its doors on the Complainants, it simply asked
the latter to go and register and come back to it for the matter to be heard
on the merits. It can therefore not be said that the Respondent State has
violated the Complainants' rights under Article 7.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9, 14 AND 15
175. It is alleged that the State moved into action to seize the premises
and close the offices of the Complainants after the Court's decision.
176. Can it be said that the State was enforcing a Court decision or trying
to prevent a breach of the law? The African Commission is of the view that
even if the State was in the process of ensuring respect for the rule of law,
it ought to have responded proportionally. In law, the principle of
proportionality or proportional justice is used to describe the idea that
the punishment of a certain crime should be in proportion to the severity of
the crime itself. The principle of proportionality seeks to determine
whether, by the action of the State, a fair balance has been struck between
the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and the
interests of the society as a whole. In determining whether an action is
proportionate, the Commission will have to answer the following questions:
i. Was there sufficient reasons supporting the action?
ii. Was there a less restrictive alternative?
iii. Was the decision-making process procedurally fair?
iv. Were there any safeguards against abuse?
v. Does the action destroy the very essence of the Charter rights in issue?
177. In its decision, on Communication 242/2001 – Interights, Institute for
Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne des
Droits de l'Homme/Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the African Commission
held in respect of the allegations made against the State that "the
dissolution of UFD/Ere nouvelle political party by the Respondent State was
not proportionate to the nature of the breaches and offences committed by
the political party and is therefore in violation of the provisions of
Article 10(1) of the African Charter".
178. In the present Communication, when put against the above criteria, it
is clear that the action of the State to stop the Complainants from
publishing their newspapers, close their business premises and seize all
their equipment cannot be supported by any genuine reasons. In a civilized
and democratic society, respect for the rule of law is an obligation not
only for the citizens but for the State and its agents as well. If the State
considered the Complainants to be operating illegally, the logical and legal
approach would have been to seek a court order to stop them. The State did
not do that but decided to use force and in the process infringed on the
rights of the Complainants.
179. The action of the Respondent State to stop the Complainants from
publishing their newspapers, close their business premises and seize their
equipment resulted in them and their employees not being able to express
themselves through their regular medium; and to disseminate information. The
confiscation of the Complainants' equipment and depriving them of a source
of income and livelihood is also a violation of their right to property
guaranteed under Article 14. By closing their business premises and
preventing the Complainants' and their employees to work, the Respondent
State also violated Article 15 of the Charter. Thus, whether motivated by
the Supreme Court's decision or through its own initiative, the action of
the Respondent State resulted to an infringement of the rights of the
Complainants. The Commission thus finds the State in violation of Articles 9
(2), 14 and 15 of the African Charter.
180. The African Commission thus finds the Respondent State has not violated
Articles 3 and 7 of the African Charter as alleged by the Complainants.
181. The African Commission however finds the Respondent State in violation
of Articles 9 (2), 14 and 15 of the African Charter.
182. Since a violation of any provision of the Charter necessarily connotes
the State Party's obligation under Article 1, the African Commission also
finds the Respondent State in violation of Article 1 of the African Charter.
The African Commission thus recommends that the Respondent State provides
adequate compensation to the Complainants for the loss they have incurred as
a result of this violation.
Adopted at the 6th Extra Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, 30th March – 3rd April, 2009, Banjul, The Gambia.
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